Amicus Curiae Brief — City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission
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U.S.
FOR ARGUMENT ta
RECOF” DEC 26 2012
ANT
ia OFFICE OF THE CLERK
BRIE ns Nos. 11-1545 & 11-1547
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, et al,
Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF FOR PCIA—THE WIRELESS
INFRASTRUCTURE ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
JONATHAN M. CAMPBELL CATHERINE E. STETSON
D. ZACHARY CHAMP DANIEL L. BRENNER
ALEXANDER BLAKE DOMINIC F. PERELLA
REYNOLDS HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
PCIA—THE WIRELESS 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
INFRASTRUCTURE Washington, D.C. 20004
ASSOCIATION (202) 637-5600
901 N. Washington Street cate.stetson@hoganlovells.com
Suite 600
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 739-0300
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
“Counsel of Record
WiILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WasnincTon, D.C. 20002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG...............0...cceccceeeeceeeeeeeees ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST .....................--.....000-000s 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. ...................-.---ccccceeeeeees 2
fT Te eT EON 3
I. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION’S ORDER IN THIS
CASE HELPED SOLVE A PROBLEM
OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE....................... 3
A. Wireless Siting Delays —_
The Broadband Rollout And us
TED See BD cecececocescsescscceccessesccccsccscese 3
B. Section 332(c)(7)(B)’s Silence On
Timi Issues Was Allowing Sit-
ing Delays To Persist ............................265. 13
C. The Commission’s Action Alleviat-
ed Siting Delays By Implementing
| TERA TAL TARA LL TIT TOA AO 15
Il. THE COMMISSION CLEARLY HAD
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE
RULING UNDER REVIEW.......................ccc0e000s 17
A. The Commission Has Authority To
Interpret The Communications
Act, And Nothing In Section
332(c(7) Withdrew That Au-
TIT iitiitas ch pcciceestdenieniarianiaticeiantat taeda eneiuents 18
B. When Co ss Intends To With-
draw The Commission’s Authority,
It Does So Clearly...................0ecc0eeeceeeeeeene 20
SEIT ceeccussusccsenenesnenssnmnnenenserenmenenessanennesneets 22
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston,
303 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2002) ....................22.0002- 10
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.,
525 U.S. 366 (1999)................-..... 18, 19, 20, 21
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
I a 21
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,
SET en aa 14
Global Crossing Telecommce’ns, Inc.
v. Metrophones Telecommce'ns, Inc.,
ES ee 18
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
ieee 20
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
ee iciiettianictnsenincedcndncentiwsesnaniaccinn 2
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
BBB UF. BID Cio nn cecccccccccceccccccoccccccccccsses 3, 17
United States v. Mead Corp.,
I 19
Statutes:
I a 20
| IER RRS aa neo moar eon 17
I I , nicicicthieieliiicicditiciih ieee cntace 2,17
Oe is 3, 17, 18
OF ee a iccentanitesiccisinsatacndinntinsasiiiiiisnniacitionniae 17
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
47 U.S.C. § 3826cK7) ...........002200-. 13, 15, 17, 18, 19
47 U.B.C. § SBBTAITIA) ....0..00cccnesccccesesscceces 3, 19, 20
GE TEE, © Be ierkctcttccciccciccnsiccsssins passim
47 U.S.C. § SOB TIDG) ..........20000000sccccccesesesecs: 13
a, Be ciitaitteciintsinsicitiis 13
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)Giv) ...............seeeeeeeees 13, 16
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) .......0.0 2... eee 13, 14, 16
I aii iccciaaleialdinacihiconianieitl 5
il el 5
3 ETS aeons 3
ee I icctersiiniscereirnncsensistisecseoannitenainia 5
Pub. L. No. 112-96, § GOO03(a) ................ecceceeeeeeee 21
as Ta BR, SI, recites 21
Legislative History:
H.R. Rep. No. 104-204 (1995) ..................00cceeeeeee 14
Administrative & Executive Materials:
Amendment of the Commission’s Rules
to Establish Part 27, the Wireless
Communications Service, 12 FCC
a cccmninlion 13
Acceleration of Broadband Deployment:
Expanding the Reach and Reducing
the Cost of Broadband Deployment,
Notice of Inquiry, 26 FCC Red 5384
Se asctscstteiastiesnsesiepesinsennsnetcainnniininduistipneensceienendonn 9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Comments of PCIA—The Wireless Infra-
structure Association & The DAS Fo-
rum, WC Docket No. 11-59 (FCC July
a Se ahiseeiciblceesibinsiiiietielcasietaneibiisiliniteiaeeiios
FCC, Connecting America — The Nation-
al Broadband Plan (2010)......................--
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability to All Americans, Seventh
Broadband Progress Report & Order
on Recon., 26 FCC Red 8008 (2011)........
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability to All Americans, Eighth
Broadband Progress Report & Order
on Recon., 27 FCC Red 10342 (2012).......
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, WT
Docket No. 08-165 (FCC July 11,
Saranac cedars dale pieiaiiinieaibenionten
Prepared Remarks of Chairman Julius
Genachowski, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Broadband Accel-
eration Conference, Washington, D.C.
RS ERAS A ce SSN cole eo
Prepared Remarks of Chairman Julius
Genachowski, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, “The Global Inter-
net at a Crossroads,” at the Council
on Foreign Relations, Washington,
D.C., 2012 WL 5879188 (Nov. 20,
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
The White House, Presidential Memo-
randum: Unleashing the Wireless
Broadband Revolution (June 28,
Other Authorities:
S. Andes & D. Castro, Opportunities &
Innovations in the Mobile Broadband
Economy (Sept. 14, 2010) ..............2..-...2200++-
S. Blumberg et al., Wireless Substitu-
tion: State-level Estimates From the
National Health Interview Survey,
2010—2011, Nat’) Health Statistics
Reports No. 61 (Oct. 12, 2012) ....................
Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global
Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update,
2011-2016 (Feb. 14, 2012)............2.::cceeeeeee
CNN, Survey: U.S. Mobile Web Access
Growing Fast (July 8, 2010)....................0...
CTIA, Wireless Quick Facts (2012)..................
C. Dingwall, Rural Broadband: Miles to
Go Before We Sleep, WirelessWeek,
GR Tey Ce recscnvescvencanssnessensemrmemeneneneesenseren
C. Moy, Cell tower rejected at Trixi’s
Antler Saloon; no service for Ovando,
The Missoulian, Mar. 13, 2010....................
B. Sandrick, Parma officials uncertain
about future of cell phone antennae
placement, Parma Sun Post, Apr. 7,
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
R. Shapiro & K. Hassett, The Employ-
ment Effects of Advances in Internet
& Wireless Technology: Evaluating
the Transitions from 2G to 3G & from
3G to 4G (Jan. 2012)
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
Nos. 11-1545 & 11-1547
CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF FOR PCIA—-THE WIRELESS
INFRASTRUCTURE ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF INTEREST"
PCIA—The Wireless Infrastructure Association
respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae.
PCIA is the trade association representing the
wireless telecommunications infrastructure industry.
PCIA’s members include the nation’s leading wire-
less carriers and infrastructure providers. Those
members develop, own, manage, and operate more
1 No party or counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or
in part. No party, counsel for a party, or person other than
amicus curiae, its members, or counsel made any monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
than 125,000 telecommunications towers and anten-
na structures used as sites for wireless service.
Through advocacy and educational initiatives, PCIA
seeks to facilitate the widespread deployment of
communications networks across the country. It
thus seeks to advance the Federal Communications
Commission’s key mission under the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996: “encouragling] the deployment
on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced tele-
communications capability to all Americans” by
“removling] barriers to infrastructure investment.”
47 U.S.C. § 157 nt.
PCIA and its members have an abiding interest in
this case because the Commission’s order below was
a major step forward for wireless broadband. It
helped remove a roadblock—siting delay—that is
preventing broadband service and reliable wireless
voice service from reaching all Americans. The
Commission’s order was a paradigmatic, and proper,
use of its delegated authority.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court does not “leave [its] common sense at
the doorstep when [it] interpret[s] a statute.” Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
That is why it is important to recognize that the
Commission’s order in this case solved a communica-
tions-infrastructure problem of national importance,
in exactly the fashion Congress would have expected.
The Commission found that access to wireless
broadband Internet and phone service is crucial for
all Americans. It found that local siting-approval
delays were blocking wireless providers from expand-
ing their infrastructure, thus keeping reliable wire-
less service out of reach for many. And it found that
while Congress had tried to solve that problem by
enacting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), the statute’s silence
on timing issues was rendering it ineffective; wire-
less providers could not tell when localities had
“failled] to act” under Section 332(c)(7)(B), and thus
could not make use of the statutory provisions allow-
ing providers to turn to courts and the Commission
for relief. The Commission accordingly “useld] its
discretion to determine how best to implement
[Congress’s] policy|.]” United States v. Haggar
Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999).
That sort of implementation is just what Congress
authorized when it instructed the Commission to
“prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest” to carry out the
Act’s provisions, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), and to “take
immediate action to accelerate deployment of [broad-
band] capability by removing barriers to infrastruc-
ture investment,” id. § 1302(b). The Commission
plainly had delegated authority to do what it did.
And nothing in Section 332(c)(7)(A) stripped that
authority away. The Court can, and should, affirm
the decision below on the ground that the Commis-
sion’s authority to act was clear and unambiguous.
ARGUMENT
I. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISS-
ION’S ORDER IN THIS CASE HELPED SOLVE A
PROBLEM OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.
A. Wireless Siting Delays Hamper The Broadband
Rollout And Thus The U.S. Economy.
1. “Broadband,” or high-speed, Internet service is
not a luxury. It is vital for “economic * * * competi-
tiveness and a better way of life.” FCC, Connecting
America — The National Broadband Plan xi (2010)
(“Broadband Plan”).2 Broadband Internet service
“can expand access to jobs and training [and] support
entrepreneurship and small business growth.” Id. at
xiv. It “help[s] businesses improve internal produc-
tivity and reach customers.” Jd. at 16. It opens
doors “to jobs in information and communications
technology,” which “is growing 50% faster than * * *
other sectors.” Jd. at 3. It spurs educational im-
provements by giving educators and students—
especially those with fewer financial resources—
access to a vastly expanded array of learning tools.
Id. at 223-227. And the buildout of the broadband
network itself is a major job creator. One study
demonstrated that “the investments and innovation
entailed in the transition from 2G to 3G wireless
technologies and Internet infrastructure spurred the
creation of some 1,585,000 new jobs from April 2007
to June 2011.” R. Shapiro & K. Hassett, The Em-
ployment Effects of Advances in Internet & Wireless
Technology: Evaluating the Transitions from 2G to
3G & from 3G to 4G at 1 (Jan. 2012).3
The bottom line: Broadband deployment “is critical
for economic development, growth, jobs, education,
telemedicine and other data-centric services, and for
the United States to remain competitive with other
countries.” C. Dingwall, Rural Broadband: Miles to
Go Before We Sleep, WirelessWeek, July 16, 2010.4
Congress has recognized as much. It found in 2008
that broadband “has resulted in enhanced economic
2 Available at http¥//download.broadband gov/plan/national-
broadband-plan. pdf
8 Available at http//www.sonecon.com/doca/studies/Wireless_
Technology_and_Jobe-Shapiro_Hassett-January_2012.pdf
4 Available at http://www.wirelessaweek.com/News/Feeds/2010/
07/wireless-rural-broadband-miles-to-go-before-we-sleep
development and public safety for communities
across the Nation, improved health care and educa-
tional opportunities, and a better quality of life for
all Americans.” 47 U.S.C. § 1301(1). It further found
that “[clontinued progress in the deployment and
adoption of broadband technology is vital to ensuring
that our Nation remains competitive and continues
to create business and job growth.” Jd. § 1301(2).
And it has placed responsibility squarely on the
Commission to spur that progress. The Commission
is directed by statute to “ensure that all people of the
United States have access to broadband capability.”
Id. § 13050k)(2). Moreover, Congress has mandated
that if the Commission finds that broadband is not
being deployed to all Americans in a timely fashion,
it “shall take immediate action to accelerate deploy-
ment of such capability by removing barriers to
infrastructure investment and by promoting compe-
tition in the telecommunications market.” Id.
§ 1302(b) (emphases added).
The nation has made great strides in recent years
in making broadband available to all citizens. Yet
millions of Americans still lack access to this tech-
nology. In 2011 the Commission found that as many
as 26 million Americans live in areas unserved by
broadband. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans, Seventh Broadband Progress Report &
Order on Recon., 26 FCC Red 8008, 4 1 (2011).
Those millions of people lack reasonable access to
everything from banking services to educational
opportunities to the capacity to apply for jobs. IJn-
quiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans,
Eighth Broadband Progress Report & Order on
Recon., 27 FCC Red 10342, ¥ 120 & n.280 (2012)
(“Eighth Broadband Report’).
2. Wireless networks have a central role to play in
solving this problem. The Commission in 2010
announced, as one of its primary goals, that “the
United States should lead the world in mobile inno-
vation, with the fastest and most extensive wireless
networks of any nation.” Broadband Plan at xiv.
The agency made that a centerpiece of its push
toward universal broadband because “{mlJobile
broadband”—that is, high-speed Internet provided to
smartphones and other devices without the need for
wireline connections—‘is growing at unprecedented
rates. From smartphones to app stores to e-book
readers to remote patient monitoring * * * , mobile
services and technologies are driving innovation and
playing an increasingly important role in our lives
and our economy.” Id. at 9. As President Obama
recently observed:
Few technological developments hold as much
potential to enhance America’s economic compet-
itiveness, create jobs, and improve the quality of
our lives as wireless high-speed access to the In-
ternet. Innovative new mobile technologies hold
the promise for a virtuous cycle—=millions of con-
sumers gain faster access to more services at less
cost, spurring innovation, and then a new round
of consumers benefit from new services.
The White House, Presidential Memorandum:
Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Revolution, at 1
(June 28, 2010).5 The technology is particularly
5 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-preas-office/
presidentialmemorandum-unleashing- wireless-broadband-
revolution
important as a tool to close the “digital divide”—the
gap in Internet access and adoption rates between
higher-income and lower-income Americans. Studies
show that “use of wireless Internet has grown fastest
amongst lower income households,” in part because
of the lower cost of mobile devices compared to PCs
and laptops. S. Andes & D. Castro, Opportunities &
Innovations in the Mobile Broadband Economy
(Sept. 14, 2010).6 Wireless broadband thus is “reduc-
ing the digital divide and expanding access to tech-
nology to all segments of the population.” Id.
Of course, the importance of wireless devices goes
well beyond Internet access. As of December 2011,
there were 331.6 million wireless subscriber connec-
tions in the United States—an increase of nearly 100
million during the previous five years alone. CTIA,
Wireless Quick Facts (2012).7 The majority of those
users rely on mobile phones. CNN, Survey: U.S.
Mobile Web Access Growing Fast (July 8, 2010).®
Indeed, “[a]s of the second half of 2011, one in three
U.S. households (34%) had only wireless telephones.”
S. Blumberg et al., Wireless Substitution: State-level
Estimates From the National Health Interview
Survey, 2010—2011, Nat’ Health Statistics Reports
No. 61 (Oct. 12, 2012). That makes reliable wireless
service especially important. “[CJarriers need to be
able to provide a strong, high-quality signal in resi-
6 Available at http://www. itif.org/publications/opportunities-
and-innovations-mobile-broadband-economy
7 Available at http://www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.
cfm/AID/10323
8 Available at http-//articles.cnn.com/2010-07-08/tech/mobile.
internet.access.pew_1_cell-phone-users-feature-phones-mobile-
internet?_s=PM:TECH
® Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr06 1.pdf
dential areas so that wireless users can be protected
in case of an emergency.” Jd. Without a strong
signal, users may not be able to dial 911. And with-
out a strong signal, “E911” service—an innovation
that allows first responders to identify a caller's
precise location when he or she dials 911—cannot
operate. For these reasons a comprehensive wireless
network is more than an economic boon; it is “a
crucial public safety necessity.” Id.
3. As with any communications technology, the
wireless network requires infrastructure. Wireless
providers use radio transmitters and other electronic
equipment to convey signals from phone to phone
and from wireless devices to the Internet. To allow
for clear signals over a broad coverage area, that
equipment often must be placed high in the air.
Sometimes that means attaching the equipment to a
support structure for cellular facilities. See Com-
ments of PCIA—-The Wireless Infrastructure Associ-
ation & The DAS Forum, WC Docket No. 11-59 at 11
(FCC July 18, 2011) “PCIA Broadband Comments’).
Other times it means “collocating” equipment, i.e.,
placing it on an existing structure. Id. Providers
sometimes collocate by adding equipment to an
existing communications support structure that
already hosts several other providers’ equipment. Id.
Other times, providers obtain permission to place
equipment on another type of tall structure, such as
a roof or water tank.
Wireless industry participants continuously explore
these options (and more) in localities across the
country because the need for infrastructure is vast
and growing. “Both new construction of wireless
antenna structures and the availability of existing
structures for purposes of collocating additional
antennas have been, and will continue to be, integral
to wireless buildout.” Acceleration of Broadband
Deployment: Expanding the Reach and Reducing the
Cost of Broadband Deployment, Notice of Inquiry, 26
FCC Red 5384 (2011). Indeed, an estimated 40,000
towers are needed to expand mobile broadband to
virtually all Americans. See Prepared Remarks of
Chairman Julius Genachowski, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Broadband Acceleration Confer-
ence, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 9, 2011).!° And that is
only one facet of a much broader industry investment
in new infrastructure. “Industry analysts anticipate
the U.S. wireless industry as a whole will invest * * *
$23 billion to $53 billion in 4G network deployment
between 2012 and 2016.” Eighth Broadband Report
q 33.
These sorts of infrastructure investments are, of
course, necessary for wireless service to reach new
markets. But they are no less critical in areas that
already have service. That is so for two reasons.
First, overall wireless traffic has exploded in recent
years—global mobile data traffic grew 133 percent in
2011 alone—and the growth rate shows no signs of
slowing. See Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global
Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2011—2016 at i
(Feb. 14, 2012).11 The only way for providers to keep
up with that growth, and continue offering reliable
service and high speeds, is to deploy additional
infrastructure in high-use areas. Second, the indus-
try constantly must upgrade and replace infrastruc-
ture as wireless technology advances. To offer just
10 Available at http-//www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_
Business/20 1 1/db0209/DOC-304571A1.pdf
11 Available at http-//www.cisco.com/en/US/solutiona/collateral/
ns34 1/ns525/ns637/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-620862.pdf
10
one example: Wireless carriers have been upgrading
their networks to use “LTE,” the shorthand name for
a wireless communication standard that offers
substantially increased capacity and speed. See
Prepared Remarks of Chairman Julius Genachowski,
Federal Communications Commission, “The Global
Internet at a Crossroads,” at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Washington, D.C., 2012 WL 5879188, at
*2 (Nov. 20, 2012) (LTE “will allow us to enjoy
broadband speeds on the go comparable to what
we’re used to from our Wi-Fi connections at home”).
But LTE uses a different radio interface and differ-
ent core network components than previous technol-
ogies. The LTE rollout thus requires infrastructure
upgrades. Residents in a given community cannot
take advantage of this exciting new technology
unless and until the wireless industry can put the
necessary hardware in place.
4. In short, consumers want expanded wireless
access, public safety agencies need it, and providers
stand ready to offer it. But there is a logjam in this
otherwise robust market: localities’ sometimes
lengthy delays in granting siting approvals.
Wireless providers seeking to upgrade existing
facilities, build new tower-mounted facilities, or
collocate their facilities on existing structures typi-
cally must obtain zoning approvals, use permits, or
other siting authorizations from the relevant locality.
See, e.g., PCIA Broadband Comments 18-19; ATC
Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 93
(Ist Cir. 2002). Some localities process those re-
quests efficiently. Others, however, do not. As a
result, “personal wireless service providers have
often faced lengthy and unreasonable delays in the
consideration of their facility siting applications”—
11
delays that the Commission found were “impeding
the deployment of advanced and emergency ser-
vices.” Pet. App. 97a.
These delays are sometimes egregious. Evidence
before the Commission indicated that at the time the
proceeding began, there were “more than 3,300
pending personal wireless service facility siting
applications before local jurisdictions. Of those,
approximately 760 [were] pending final action for
more than one year. More than 180 such applica-
tions [were] awaiting final action for more than 3
years.” Pet. App. 98a (emphasis in original).
That is an extraordinary delay for any approval.
But the evidence also demonstrated that “almost 350
of the 760 applications that were pending for more
than one year were requests to collocate on existing
towers, and 135 of those collocation applications
were pending for more than three years.” Pet. App.
98a. That is particularly unreasonable because
“collocation involves simply sharing an existing
facility rather than building a new one. * * * There is
no legitimate local interest in taking a year—much
less three—to decide a collocation application.” CTIA
Br. in Opposition 6 n.5. Indeed, the evidence before
the agency indicated that efficient localities process
collocation applications in as little as a week. Peti-
tion for Declaratory Ruling 16, WT Docket No. 08-
165 (FCC July 11, 2008). That means some wireless
providers wait more than 150 times longer than
others for approval simply to modify an existing
facility, or to place additional radio equipment at a
location where other facilities are already installed.
The Commission received evidence that delays
were widespread. One provider reported that “the
12
typical processing times for personal wireless service
facility siting applications range from 28 to 36
months in several California communities.” Pet.
App. 98a. Another reported that “in Southern Cali-
fornia, 25 applications took more than two years to
be approved, with 52 taking more than a year, and
93 taking more than 6 months.” Jd. 99a. A third
showed that it was experiencing “delays of 10 to 25
months for its proposals to place facilities in public
rights-of-way’—even when all it wanted to do was
replace old equipment. Id.
For localities with existing wireless coverage, siting
delays can mean inability to take advantage of new
high-speed technologies like LTE. Delays can also
mean persistent gaps in coverage and dropped
calls—including emergency calls. But for localities
without existing coverage, those same delays keep
residents in the dark altogether. In Montana, for
example, a cell tower company sought approval to
build a tower along a highway so a provider could
offer service to the town of Ovando. C. Moy, Cell
tower rejected at Trixi’s Antler Saloon; no service for
Ovando, The Missoulian, Mar. 13, 2010.2 £4But
“[dlebate over the proposed tower * * * rfaln nonstop
. for over two years.” Id. With no end in sight, a
company representative suggested he was giving up:
“It’s been going on for so long now that there’s not
the feeling of urgency that there was two years agol.]
*** People have started * * * pursuing other oppor-
tunities.” Id. Meanwhile, the town remained with-
out any wireless broadband—or even cell phone—
coverage. One resident said she had “no doubt that
\2 Available at http-//missoulian.com/newsa/local/article_
8 lebbGce-2e6d- 1 1df-8093-00 1cc4c002e0. html
13
cell phone service in the Ovando area is inevitable.”
Id. The question was when.
Nor are these sorts of problems new. The Commis-
sion observed in rules issued to implement the
Telecommunications Act that “zoning approval for
new wireless facilities is * * * a major delay factor in
deploying wireless systems.” Amendment of the
Commission’s Rules to Establish Part 27, the Wire-
less Communications Service, 12 FCC Red 10,785,
10,833 4 90 (1997). That observation is now nearly
16 years old. And yet the Commission’s findings in
this proceeding make clear that not much had
changed.
B. Section 332(c)(7)(B)’s Silence On Timing Issues
Was Allowing Siting Delays To Persist.
Localities do not have free rein to sit on wireless
siting applications indefinitely or to arbitrarily deny
permit requests. Section 332(c)(7) forbids any state
or local government from “prohibitling] or ***
effectlively] * * * prohibiting the provision of person-
al wireless services.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)GXD-
(ID. It requires localities to respond to wireless
siting requests “within a reasonable period of time
*** taking into account the nature and scope of
such request.” Jd. § 332(c)(7)(B)Gi). It limits their
discretion to deny requests, providing that a locality
may not issue a denial “on the basis of the environ-
mental effects of radio frequency emissions” so long
as the provider is complying with Commission regu-
lations on that subject. Jd. § 332(c)(7)(B)Giv). And it
gives these new safeguards teeth by making them
enforceable in federal court: “Any person adversely
affected by any final action or failure to act by a
State or local government or any instrumentality
14
thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph
may, within 30 days after such action or failure to
act, commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction.” Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
Congress added these provisions to the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 to spur competition and
kick-start the nation’s wireless buildout. See City of
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115
(2005). Section 332(c)(7)’s legislative history demon-
strates that Congress was concerned about the
“inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork” of
state and local zoning requirements, believing that
this patchwork threatened “the deployment” of
wireless communications. H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, pt.
1 at 94 (1995). Congress thus created a statutory
framework that would “speed deployment and the
availability of competitive wireless telecommunica-
tions services which ultimately wlould] provide
consumers with lower costs as well as with a greater
range and options for such services.” Jd. As this
Court has observed, Section 332(c)(7)(B)’s primary
purpose was to “reducle] *** the impediments
imposed by local governments upon the installation
of facilities for wireless communications, such as
antenna towers.” City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 544
U.S. at 128.
The safeguards, however, proved insufficient to
ward off delay. The petition that launched the
proceeding now on review identified one reason why:
The statute lacked specifics regarding what consti-
tuted a “reasonable time” for action on an applica-
tion, 47 U.S.C. § 332(cX7)(B)Gi), and what constitut-
ed a locality’s “failure to act,” id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
See Pet. App. 93a. Absent details on what those
terms mean, localities could spend months or even
15
years shuttling a siting application through various
application and hearing processes, and providers
would be hard-pressed to obtain relief. They had no
way to know when a “reasonable time” had elapsed
and when the locality had failed to act. And con-
versely, “an aggrieved party wishing to challenge a
State or local government’s failure to act could miss
the 30-day statute of limitations through no fault of
its own.” Pet. App. 93a. Indeed, even where a locali-
ty was holding up a siting application for obviously
unlawful (and preempted) reasons such as debunked
emissions concerns—a not uncommon occurrence !3*—
wireless providers could have trouble remedying the
delay. After all, Section 332(c)(7) provided no guid-
ance on when the locality’s intransigence ripened
into a “failure to act.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
And without action or a failure to act, the statute’s
remedies were not triggered.
C. The Commission’s Action Alleviated Siting De-
lays By Implementing The Act.
1. Alerted to the adverse effects this statutory
silence was producing, the Commission took action.
It requested public comments in 2008 and received
hundreds of them, with “lilndustry commenters
generally supportling] the Petition in all respects.”
Pet. App. 79a. It found that “[wlireless services are
central to the economic, civic, and social lives of over
270 million Americans” and that “[wlithout access to
mobile wireless networks *** consumers cannot
13 See, e.g., B. Sandrick, Parma officials uncertain about future
of cell phone antennae placement, Parma Sun Post, Apr. 7,
2010 (Ohio locality “tabled” a provider's plan to collocate radio
antennae on a roof, expressing concern about ‘radiation coming
from the antennae”). Available at http-//blog.cleveland.com/
parmasunpost/2010/04/parma_officials_uncertain_abou. html
16
receive voice and broadband services from provid-
ers.” Jd. 7la. It found “that the record shows that
unreasonable delays” in local processing of siting
requests “are occurring in a significant number of
cases.” Jd. 98a. And it found that “[dJelays in the
processing of personal wireless service facility siting
applications are particularly problematic as consum-
ers await the deployment of advanced wireless
communications services, including broadband
services, in all geographic areas in a timely fashion.”
Id. 102a.
In a carefully constrained decision, the Commission
determined to “lend clarity” to the statutory terms by
“interpreting the limits Congress already imposed on
State and local governments.” Id. llla, 90a. The
Commission decided that delays longer than 90 days
to process collocation requests and i50 days to
process other siting requests were presumptively
“unreasonable” under Section 332(c)(7)(B)Gi, and
that when a locality did not act within those times
frames it had “failed to act” under Section
332(7)(B)(v). Id. 115a. Those determinations gave
the wireless industry clarity, for the first time, about
what Section 332(c)(7)(B) means. The Commission
recognized as much. It observed that “because an
‘action or failure to act’ is the statutory trigger for
seeking judicial relief, our clarification of these terms
will give personal wireless service providers certain-
ty as to when they may seek redress for inaction on
an application.” Jd. 106a. And yet by establishing
presumptive as opposed to hard-and-fast deadlines,
the Commission left the courts wide latitude in
determining whether delays beyond the presumptive
deadlines are reasonable under the facts of a specific
case.
17
2. The Commission’s action helped solve a problem
of national significance. And it did so by doing
precisely what agencies are supposed to do: It
“usel[d] its discretion to determine how best to im-
plement [Congress’s] policy in those cases not cov-
ered by the statute’s specific terms.” Haggar Appar-
el, 526 U.S. at 393. That is what Congress had in
mind when it broadly authorized the Commission to
“execute and enforce the provisions” of the Commu-
nications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151, to “prescribe such
rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the provisions of thle}
Act,” id. § 201(b); accord §§ 1546), 303(r), and to
“encouragle] the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capa-
bility to all Americans” by “removling] barriers to
infrastructure investment,” id. § 157 nt. The Com-
mission acted consistently with the goals Congress
set for it in 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt. when it invoked its
general authority under other provisions to interpret
and give effect to Section 332(c)(7)(B).
Il. THE COMMISSION CLEARLY HAD AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE THE RULING UNDER REVIEW.
For the reasons above, the Commission acted well
within its delegated authority in issuing its ruling in
this case. The only question is whether something in
Section 332(c)(7) stripped away that delegated au-
thority. The answer is no. There was no jurisdic-
tional ambiguity for the Commission to resolve. The
Court can and should affirm the decision below
without resolving the Chevron question at the heart
of Petitioners’ argument.
18
A. The Commission Has Authority To Interpret
The Communications Act, And Nothing In Sec-
tion 332(c)(7) Withdrew That Authority.
1. Congress delegated to the Commission the au-
thority to “execute and enforce” the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151, and to “prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public inter
est to carry out the provisions” of the Act, id.
§ 201(b). In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525
U.S. 366 (1999), this Court addressed the reach of
Section 201(b). It explained that that provision gives
the Commission jurisdiction over all matters that are
within the “substantive reach” of the Communica-
tions Act. Jd. at 380. Thus any “expansion of the
substantive scope of the [Communications] Act”
necessarily means a “pari passu expansion of Com-
mission jurisdiction”; whatever Congress adds to the
Communications Act, the Commission may imple-
ment. Jd. That includes the provisions of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, the Court explained,
because “Congress expressly directed that the 1996
Act * * * be inserted into the Communications Act of
1934.” Id. at 377.
Section 332(c)(7) was enacted as part of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. That means Section
332(c)(7) is now part and parcel of the Communica-
tions Act. And that in turn means, under Jowa
Utilities Board, that Section 332(c)(7) is within the
Commission’s jurisdiction. As with all Communica-
tions Act provisions within the Commission’s juris-
diction, “ ‘Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when it * * * fills a
space in the enacted law.’” Global Crossing Tele-
comme’ns, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommce’ns, Inc.,
550 U.S. 45, 57 (2007) (quoting United States
19
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)). That is
just what the Commission did. The agency’s inter-
pretative exercise was within its authority unless
something else in the Act withdrew that authority
from it.
2. Petitioners say that that “something else” is
Section 332(c)(7)(A). They overread the provision.
Subsection 332(c)(7)(A) is part of the same para-
graph as the provisions discussed above—those
mandating that localities process siting applications
in a reasonable time. It states that “[elxcept as
provided in this paragraph, nothing in this [Act]
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local
government * * * over decisions regarding the place-
ment, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A).
There is nothing ambiguous about that language.
The “except as provided in this paragraph” clause
means by necessary implication that the provisions
of Section 332(c)(7), including the “reasonable time”
limitation, can limit localities’ siting authority, and it
says nothing to limit the Commission’s administra-
tive authority. Absent more, the Commission would
be able to interpret and enforce Section 332(c)(7).
Petitioners’ argument therefore must rest on the
“nothing in this Act” clause. But that clause speaks
only to the rest of the Act outside of Section 332(c)(7).
It says nothing at all about, and imposes no limits
on, what the Commission may do under the auspices
of Section 332(c)(7) itself.
The Commission’s usual authority to interpret the
Communications Act thus stands unimpeded; it may
implement Section 332(c)(7)(B)’s new restrictions on
local siting authority. The import of Section
20
332(c)(7)(A), as the court below correctly recognized,
is merely that the Commission would not have been
able to “imposle] restrictions or limitations that
cannot be tied to the language of [Section]
332(c)(7)(B).” Pet. App. 41a (emphasis added). The
Commission made no attempt to do so. Section
332(c)(7)(A) is not triggered.
B. When Congress Intends To Withdraw The
Commission’s Authority, It Does So Clearly.
The Commission’s authority to issue its ruling in
this proceeding is clear on the face of Section
332(c)(7). But if further confirmation were needed, a
comparison to Section 2(b) of the Communications
Act provides it. That provision states that, with
certain exceptions, “nothing in this [Act] shall be
construed to apply or to give the Commission juris-
diction with respect to” certain matters that are
reserved to the states. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (emphasis
added). The italicized language restricts both the
reach of the Act and the Commission’s jurisdiction.
In other words, it does exactly what Petitioners want
Section 332(c)(7)(A) to do. And yet the difference in
the statutory language is striking: Section 2(b)
limits the Commission’s jurisdiction expressly, while
Section 332(c)(7) says nothing about the Commission
at all.
“The contrast between these two paragraphs makes
clear that Congress knows how to impose express
limits” on the Commission’s authority to implement
the Communications Act when it wants to do so.
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
2149, 2156 (2010). Congress’s failure to impose those
same limits in Section 332(c)(7)(A) is fatal to Peti-
tioners’ case. After all, “when Congress includes
21
particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,
452 (2002) Ginternal quotation marks omitted). The
Court should reject Petitioners’ effort to import
jurisdiction-stripping language into a provision that
clearly lacks it.!4
14 Other congressional enactments similarly suggest that
Congress did not intend to divest the Commission of authority
to interpret Section 332(c)(7)(B). For example, Congress
recently provided that localities must approve requests for
collocation and infrastructure replacement “that do[] not
substantially change the physical dimensions” of the struc-
ture—and Congress gave the Commission authority to enforce
that provision. Pub. L. No. 112-96, §§ 6003(a), 6409. As the
government points out in its merits brief (at 43 n.13), it is
difficult to imagine why Congress would have wanted the
Commission to have this authority and yet to be completely
excluded from authority over the closely related requirements
of Section 332(c)(7)(B).
22
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision below
should be affirmed.
JONATHAN M. CAMPBELL
D. ZACHARY CHAMP
ALEXANDER BLAKE
REYNOLDS
PCLA—THE WIRELESS
INFRASTRUCTURE
ASSOCIATION
901 N. Washington Street
Suite 600
Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 739-0300
December 26, 2012
Respectfully submitted,
CATHERINE E. STETSON’
DANIEL L. BRENNER
DOMINIC F. PERELLA
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
cate.stetson@hoganlovells.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
“Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.