Opposition Brief — Hartman v. United States

a Ty ee | ee Pa eRe eae Supreme Court, U.S.

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No. 90-1058 pe 1s :

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Gu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

MICHAEL A. HARTMAN AND BENJAMIN H. Woops,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Assistant Attorney General

JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the “pattern of racketeering activity”

element of the RICO statute is unconstitutionally

vague.

2. Whether the evidence established the requisite

nexus between the charged enterprise and _ petition-

ers’ predicate acts of racketeering.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

' Page

Opinion below ......................... es ts SPOT AGERE Nae LER pene 1

pda sacesahvon somes once nenduceeoonsaces 1

Nes canesacenpariemnindansecioscns 1

sed np cemetenantnntinenadiiniamsnsnaies 5

EES ETS SE a 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Colautti v. Franklin, 489 U.S. 379 (1979) ......00...... 8

Connally v. ~2neral Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385

Neen esetensnocinsnns 6

Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46

ee SERS i 7

Giacco Vv. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) _......... 8

Grayned V. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)... 6

H.J. Inc. Vv. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109

Nee es ousibhnmnsuupncencecesd 4,5, 6,8

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,

sue., Gee Us. 489 (1968) .................................... 7

Kolender y. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) 7,8

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156

as cnevavewesoumwes 8

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) ....................... 7

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) ............ tbl dan 8

United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.

1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) _.......... 5

United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 180 (1990) 2.000... 5

United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985) ........... 10

United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976)... 5

United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.

Neer ccuchbinesonanehoinsees 11

United States vy. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985) ............ 9,11

(111)

IV

Cases—Continued : Page

United States v. Coiro, No. 90-1192 (2d Cir

RARER EER SS Ree eRe oN 5

United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. i?

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986) —.....000000000000000... 9

United States v. Glecier, No. 88-3417 (7th Cir.

Ps EERE bl ian” ian ae ee CO 5

United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 218 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984) 0.00000... 10, 11

United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982) .......... 5

United States v. Masters, No. 89-2851 (7th Cir.

Be RR EOF ~ Ce eo ae ee —

United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981) ......................... 5

United States v. Pieper, 854 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.

Reale: TS RRA ie a et gaa oe ORE 10

United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975) .......... 7

Cor

United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.

1990), petition for cert. pending, No. 90-6524... 6-7

United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984) 0.000000... 5

United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981) ..... besdatals 10

United States v. Simmons, No. 88-1504 (2d Cir.

Ie SIND as rile dh. Srosapiceticasdacammnnanaenenceceuithaises

United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C.

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979)...... 5

United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986) 0000000200200... 5

United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th

RES ea eS Se a

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stitution, statutes and rule:

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§u the Suprenve Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-1058

MICHAEL A. HARTMAN AND BENJAMIN H. Woops,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-

22a) is reported at 915 F.2d 854.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on October 1, 1990. The petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari was filed on January 2, 1991. The jurisdic-

tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,

petitioners were convicted on one count of participat-

(1)

2

ing in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern

of racketeering activity, in violation of the RICO

statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). In addition, Woods was

convicted on two counts of conspiracy to defraud the

United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371; six

counts of extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18

U.S.C. 1951; five counts of income tax evasion, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201; and two counts of mak-

ing false statements on an income tax return, in vio-

lation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). Hartman also was con-

victed on one conspiracy count and one count of mak-

ing a false statement on an income tax return.

Woods was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment,

to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Hartman was sentenced to 25 months’ imprisonment,

to be followed by three years of supervised release,

and a $40,000 fine. The court of appeals affirmed.

Pet. App. la-22a.

1. The evidence at trial is described in detail in

the court of appeals’ opinion. Pet. App. 3a-15a.

From 1983 to 1985, petitioner Woods was a member

of the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, City Council, and

chairman of its Finance Committee. He was elected

to serve as Council President in 1985 and as Presi-

dent Pro-Tem in 1987. He also served as a member

of the Board of Directors of the Pittsburgh Housing

Authority. Jd. at 4a.

In the early 1980s, Joseph Wozniak, who sold

weatherproofing products to the Housing Authority,

agreed to “kick back” to Woods approximately 10°.

of the gross revenues Wozniak realized from the sale

of his products to contractors for Housing Authority

projects. Wozniak understood that if he did not

make the kickback payments, the Housing Authority

would stop using his products. In addition, Woods

and Wozniak agreed that, in return for the kick-

3

backs, Woods would use his influence in “opening up

doors” for Wozniak at other municipal agencies.

Eventually, Woods’ share was increased to 25% of

Wozniak’s gross sales. Pet. App. 3a-4a. In all, Woz-

niak paid at least $35,000 to Woods as part of their

arrangement, mostly by way of checks made payable

to third parties in order to disguise the nature of the

payments. Jd. at 4a-8a.

During the period he was dealing with Wozniak,

Woods entered into a similar relationship with peti-

tioner Hartman, the president of Ablebuilt Co., which

was in the business of constructing and renovating

housing in Pittsburgh, including projects for the

Housing Authority and the Urban Redevelopment

Authority. From March 1984 to March 1986, Woods

received payments of at least $22,000 from Hart-

man. In return for those payments, Woods exercised

his influence in securing early progress payments on

Ablebuilt’s work for the Housing Authority, in help-

ing Ablebuilt in its contract negotiations with the

Redevelopment Authority, and in licensing Hart-

man’s brother as a city electrician. The payments

were made from the proceeds of checks issued to one

of Ablebuilt’s subcontractors, Louis Billota, who

acted as an intermediary between Hartman and

Woods. Pet. App. 8a-15a.

2. On appeal, petitioners contended that the “pat-

tern of racketeering activity” element of RICO is

unconstitutionally vague.’ The court of appeals re-

1The principal substantive provision of RICO, 18 U.S.C.

1962(c), prohibits a person employed by or associated with a

RICO enterprise from conducting or participating in the

enterprise’s affairs “through a pattern of racketeering activ-

ity.” The statute provides that such a pattern “requires at

least two acts of racketeering activity” committed within ten

years of each other. 18 U.S.C. 1951(5).

4

jected that contention. It began by noting that out-

side of the First Amendment context, a party may

challenge a statute for vagueness only on the basis

that the statute is vague as applied to the party’s

conduct in a particular case. In light of petitioners’

failure to claim that their RICO prosecution impli-

cated any constitutionally protected conduct, the

court viewed petitioners’ challenge as confined to a

claim that the statute was vague as applied to them.

Pet. App. 17a. :

Examining petitioners’ conduct, the court con-

cluded that RICO’s “pattern of racketeering activ-

ity” element was not vague as applied to this case.

The court noted that under this Court’s decision in

H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S.

Ct. 2893 (1989), the predicate acts of racketeering

must be related to one another and amount to or pose

a threat of continuing criminal conduct in order to

constitute a “pattern.” Pet. App. 17a-18a. Applying

H.J. Inc., the court found that the relatedness plus

continuity test was “readily satisfie[d]” here. Jd. at

19a. The court explained that each petitioner’s acts

of racketeering extended over a substantial period of

time and involved the same methods, purposes, re-

sults, and participants. /d. at 19a-20a. The court

concluded that, whatever might be true in other cases,

the application of RICO to this “ongoing, hardcore

political corruption case” should “not have come as a

surprise to [petitioners].” Jd. at 21a.

Petitioners also contended that the evidence failed

to establish the requisite nexus between themselves,

the RICO enterprise (the City Council), and the

predicate acts of racketeering activity. Without dis-

cussion, the court of appeals rejected that contention

(among others) as “clearly without merit.” Pet.

App. 22a.

5

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioners renew their contention (Pet. 6-14)

that the pattern of racketeering element of a RICO

offense is unconstitutionally vague. They rely on the

concurring opinion in A.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2906-

2909, in which Justice Scalia, joined by three other

Justices, expressed doubts about whether the RICO

‘“nattern’” requirement could withstand a constitu-

tional vagueness challenge. The court of appeals cor-

rectly rejected petitioners’ challenge to RICO, and its

holding is consistent with the holding of every other

court of appeals that has considered that contention

in the wake of H./J. Inc. See United States vy. Mas-

ters, No. 89-2851 (7th Cir. Feb. 6, 1991), slip op.

6-7; United States v. Glecier, No. 88-3417 (7th Cir.

Jan. 8, 1991), slip op. 2 n.1; United States v. Coiro,

No. 90-1192 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 1991), slip op. 7621-

7622: United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169,

1178-1180 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 150

(1990) .?

2 Before H.J. Inc. as well, the courts of appeals had uni-

formly held that the RICO statute is not unconstitutionally

vague. See, e.g., United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 41-42

(6th Cir.) (reference to state law in predicate acts did not

render statute vague), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986) ;

United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 923 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Martino, 648

F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949

(1982); United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 412 (6th

Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981);

United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979)

(enterprise element), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) ;

United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir.

1978) (RICO conspiracy), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) ;

United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).

6

Petitioners do not argue that the “pattern of

racketeering activity” element of RICO was vague as

applied to them. To sustain such a vagueness attack,

petitioners would have to establish that RICO fails

to give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable

notice that his conduct is prohibited. See Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ; Con-

nally vy. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391

(1926). This Court explained in H.J. Inc. that proof

of a RICO pattern requires a showing that the predi-

cate criminal acts bear a relationship to each other,

in that the crimes are similar in purpose, result,

participants, victims, methods of commission, or in

other ways, and that there is continuity in the course

of criminal conduct or a threat of continuity. 109 S.

Ct. at 2901. Whatever ambiguity there may be at

the margins, petitioners’ participation in this case of

“ongoing, hardcore political corruption,” Pet. App.

21a, unmistakably satisfied the pattern requirement.

Petitioner Woods “repeatedly solicited and accepted

bribes in connection with public matters” over a

period of four years; throughout that period, the

bribery scheme exhibited similar “methods, purposes,

results, and participants.” Jd. at 19a. Petitioner

Hartman’s conduct likewise reflected a clear pattern

of continuing activity; he “bribed Woods on many

occasions over an extended period” to obtain Woods’

influence in public construction projects in which

Hartman was interested. Jd. at 20a. On these facts,

the court of appeals correctly concluded that “[t]he

application of RICO to the activities of these de-

fendants should not have come as a surprise to

them.” Jd. at 2la. See also United States vy. Pungi-

7

tore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1105 (3d Cir. 1990), petition

for cert. pending, No. 90-6524.*

Instead of contending that RICO is vague as ap-

plied to their own conduct, petitioners urge this

Court to undertake a facial review of the constitu-

tionality of RICO’s pattern element. When constitu-

tionally protected conduct is not implicated, however,

this Court has consistently refused to consider vague-

ness challenges to statutes on the basis of facts not

before the Court. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,

Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) (a

facial challenge to a criminal statute based on vague-

ness will be permitted only if the statute reaches “a

substantial amount of constitutionally protected con-

duct’”’); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358-359

n.8 (1983). Rather, the defendant must establish

that the statute is vague as applied to the particular

conduct with which he is charged. Hoffman Estates,

455 U.S. at 494-495 & n.7; United States v. Powell,

423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.

733, 756 (1974) (“One to whose conduct a statute

clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for

vagueness.”’). In each of the cases cited by petition-

ers in which the Court has held a criminal statute

facially void because of vagueness (Pet. 11-12), the

3In view of the fact that petitioners’ RICO violations re-

quired the commission of at least two predicate acts of

extortion and bribery—crimes that petitioners do not sug-

gest are unduly vague—it is difficult to imagine how peti-

tioners could have lacked fair notice that their conduct was

prohibited. Cf. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S.

46, 57 n.7 (1989) (“[I]t would seem that the RICO statute

[as applied to predicate acts of obscenity] is inherently less

vague than any state obscenity law: a prosecution under the

RICO law will be possible only where all the elements of an

obscenity offense are present, and then some.’’).

8

statute implicated constitutional rights. See Kolen-

der v. Lawson, supra (First Amendment rights) ;

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (right to

abortion); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574

(1974) (First Amendment rights); Papachristow vy.

City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (First

Amendment rights) .*

There is no contention in this case that RICO im-

plicates constitutionally protected conduct; indeed,

petitioners disclaim that suggestion and purport. to

make “a pure due process attack” based on their

view that RICO is not sufficiently clear. Pet. 11. But

petitioners offer no reason for the Court to depart

from its practice of evaluating vagueness challenges

in a factually concrete setting, rather than abstractly

canvassing all conceivable applications of a statute.

It would be particularly inappropriate to do so for

RICO, in light of this Court’s expressed preference

for fleshing out the pattern requirement “in the con-

text of concrete factual situations presented for de-

cision.” A.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.

Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion (Pet. 12), a

facial challenge is not necessary to fulfill the goal

of giving sufficient guidance to law enforcement offi-

cials in order to prevent arbitrary enforcement of

RICO. Cf. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-358. As the

4In Giacco Vv. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), the Court

invalidated on due process grounds a statute that permitted

a jury to impose costs on an acquitted defendant without any

governing standards at all. Although the statute in Giacco

did not regulate constitutionally protected primary conduct,

Giacco is distinguishable from this case because the statute

examined in that case was vague in all of its applications, in-

cluding as applied to the particular defendant challenging it.

Petitioners make no contention that RICO is vague as applied

to them.

9

uniform rejection of vagueness challenges by the

courts of appeals demonstrates, RICO does give ade-

quate guidance to prosecuwrs; petitioners’ case is no

exception to that rule. If the danger of arbitrary

enforcement of RICO exists, that contention can be

addressed when it is raised by the facts of a par-

ticular defendant’s case.

2. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 14-17) that re-

view is warranted to clarify the standards governing

whether a defendant has conducted the affairs of a

RICO enterprise “through” a pattern of racketeering

activity. They argue that on the facts of this case

there was an insufficient “nexus” between the Pitts-

burgh City Council (the enterprise) and their predi-

cate acts of racketeering to satisfy this requirement

of RICO.’

The courts of appeals have employed different lin-

guistic formulations to describe the appropriate test

for determining whether a sufficient nexus exists be-

tween the charged enterprise and the predicate acts

of racketeering. Some courts have applied a formu-

lation originating in United States v. Cauble, 706

F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 994 (1985), that requires a showing, where the

enterprise itself is not devoted to unlawful activity,

that ‘‘(1) the defendant has in fact committed the

racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant’s po-

sition in the enterprise facilitated his commission of

the racketeering acts, and (3) the predicate acts had

some effect on the lawful enterprise.” See United

States vy Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir.)

5 The statute requires proof that the defendant conducted

or participated in the enterprise’s affairs “through” the pat-

tern of racketeering; this requirement is often called a

“nexus” requirement. 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).

10

(same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986); United

States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 138 (7th Cir.)

(same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985); United

States v. Pieper, 854 F.2d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir.

1988) (same).

Since United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54

(1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), the Second

Circuit has used a different formulation of the test.

It has treated the nexus requirement as requiring the

government to show either that (1) the defendant

was “enabled to commit the predicate offenses” solely

because of his position in, involvement with, or con-

trol over, the enterprise’s affairs, or (2) “the predi-

cate offenses are related to the activities of the enter-

prise.” See United States v. Simmons, No. 88-1504

(2d Cir. Jan. 11, 1991), slip op. 1267-1268 (collect-

ing cases) ; see also United States v. Yarbrough, 852

F.2d 1522, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Scotto).

The Third Circuit, in prior cases, has cited the Scotto

formulation with approval. United States v. Jannotti,

729 F.2d 213, 226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

880 (1984).

As a practical matter, it is far from clear that the

two approaches lead to different results in particular

cases; we are not aware of any such conflicts. Even

as a theoretical matter, the two stated tests are not

incompatible, because the formulations in Cauhle and

Scotto do not appear to express different substantive

requirements. To begin with, it is difficult to con-

ceive of instances in which a defendant’s predicate

acts were “related’”’ to the enterprise’s activities or

enabled by the defendant’s position in it, as Scotto

requires, yet were not facilitated by the defendant’s

association with the enterprise and did not have an

effect on the enterprise, as required by Cauble. More-

over, the principal purpose of the test announced in

11

Cauble is to ensure that a defendant is not held to

have conducted the affairs of a legitimate business

“through” racketeering activity simply because the

“defendant works for a legitimate enterprise and

commits racketeering acts while on the business

premises.” 706 F.2d at 1332. The Third Circuit has

expressly acknowledged the validity of that concern,

United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d at 226, and has

accommodated it within the framework of the Scotto

approach.”

In any event, the evidence in this case satisfied the

nexus test regardless of the formulation applied.’

The evidence clearly demonstrated that Woods’ posi-

tion on the Pittsburgh City Council facilitated his

bribery scheme and that it affected the Council’s

functions. Woods’ very ability to obtain business for

Wozniak and Hartman from various public and

quasi-public agencies derived from his membership

on the City Council, which had the responsibility of

authorizing expenditures for city projects and over-

®The absence of any substantive ditterenlh between the

standards is illustrated by United States Vv. Carter, 721 F.2d

1514, 1527 & n.16 (11th Cir. 1984), where the court expressly

declined to determine whether the Caudle formulation or

some other test was appropriate, but held that Cauble would

be satisfied, and the requisite nexus established, when a de-

fendant routinely employed a legitimate enterprise’s resources

“to make possible the racketeering activity.”

* The sufficiency of the evidence is the only issue that peti-

tioners preserved for review. Hartman requested a jury in-

struction on the nexus issue, which the district court agreed

to give “in other words.” X Gov’t C.A. App. 2767. The court

then gave an instruction, id. at 2941, to which petitioners

made no objection before the jury began its deliberations as

required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. Nor did petitioners chal-

lenge the jury instruction in the court of appeals, where they

argued only that the evidence was insufficient to establish a

nexus. Pet. App. 21a.

12

seeing city agencies generally.* Petitioners argue

(Pet. 16) that it was Woods’ position on the Board

of Directors of the Housing Authority that was of

value to Hartman, not his seat on the City Council.

But petitioners overlook that one seat on the Board

of Directors of the Housing Authority is required

under local law to be held by a councilman, and

Woods held his board seat while a member of the

Council. II Gov’t C.A. App. 423, 448. The Council

therefore played an integral role in the Housing Au-

thority’s management, and Woods’ crimes under-

mined the Council’s ability to carry out that role.

Petitioners also overlook that Woods corruptly assist-

ed Hartman in connection with contracts with the

Urban Redevelopment Authority, which depended on

the Council for funding and approval of its property

transactions. Pet. App. 10a. When a city councilman

solicits bribes for influencing the award of city con-

tracts by city agencies, he necessarily impairs the

Council’s fulfillment of its responsibility to protect

the city against corruption in the conduct of city

government. In sum, because petitioners’ conduct

satisfied the nexus requirement under the tests ap-

plied in all circuits, this Court’s review is not war-

ranted.

\

8 For example, the director of the Three Rivers Stadium

Authority testified that he agreed to meet with Wozniak at

Woods’ request because Woods had been supportive of the

Stadium Authority on the City Council. IV Gov’t C.A. App.

880. And the Executive Director of the Allegheny County

Sanitation Authority, who arranged at Woods’ request to pur-

chase Wozniak’s product, noted that, as city councilman from

the Northside, Woods had more impact on the operation of

the Sanitation Authority than the average councilman. Id.

at 932.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Assistant Attorney General

JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ

Attorney

MARCH 1991

wv U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1991 28206! 20409