Appendix — Independent U. S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Skinner

Supreme Court brief1990

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JOSEPH F. SPANICL 48

IN THE ——.

Supreme Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

INDEPENDENT U.S. TANKER OWNERS COMMITTEE, et al.,

Petitioners.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Responde nts.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

DANIEL P. LEVITT JOSEPH A. KLAUSNER *

REID & PRIEST ALLAN A. TUTTLE

40 West 57th Street MICHAEL D. ESCH

New York, NY 10019 PATTON, Boccs & BLow

(202) 603-2000 2550 M Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 457-6000

Counsel for Petitioner

Independent U.S. Tanker

Owners Committee

Counsel for Petitioner Overseas

Shipholding Group, Inc.

* Counsel of Record

| Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover]

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

rin OY

Vy

ROBERT J. BLACKWELL

ANNE E. MICKEY

Dow, LOHNES & ALBERTSON

1255 23rd Street, N.W.

Suite 500

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 857-2500

Counsel for Petitioners

American Trading Transportation Co., Inc.,

Cove Maritime Companies, Inc.,

Falcon Carriers, Inc.,

Keystone Shipping Co.,

Sun Transport, Inc.

Appendix A:

Appendix B:

Appendix C:

Appendix D:

Appendix E:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion of United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit, entered August 22, 1989 0...

Order of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit, denying petitions for rehearing, en-

tered November 2, 1989 000000.

Order of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Cir-

cuit, denying suggestions for rehearing

en banc, entered November 2, 1989 ........

Opinion of the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, en-

- tered April 29, 1988 ...... AREA Dnt! OO nee

Construction-Differential Subsidy Re-

payment, Final Rule, Maritime Admin-

istration, Department of Transporta-

tion, 52 Fed. Reg. 23522 (June 22,

I acicckinsecesvidiacnctercabdacsaseamo Leas

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 1989 Decided August 22, 1989

No. 88-5313

INDEPENDENT U.S. TANKER OWNERS COMMITTEE, et al.

V.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER, in his capacity as

Secretary of the United States Department

of Transportation, et al.

~ AMERICAN PETROFINA, INCORPORATED,

Appellant

& consolidated case Nos. 88-5314, 88-5317, 88-5318

88-5319, 88-5320 & 88-5324

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civil Action Nos. 87-01685 & 87-02102)

Richard A. Olderman, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, with whom John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney

Genera) at the time the brief was filed, Jay B. Stephens,

U.S. Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, U.S.

a atte

2a

Department of Justice, were on the brief, for federal ap-

pellants. Michael Kimmel, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, also entered an appearance for federal appellants

in Nos. 88-5319 and 88-5320.

A. Stephen Hut, Jr., with whom Patrick J. Carome,

Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Michael Joseph, and Thomas

L. Mills were on the brief, for appellants/intervenors

Atlantic Richfield Co. and SPC Shipping, Inc.

Roy G. Bowman, Richard H. Saltsman, and Daniel

Joseph were on the brief for appellant American Petro-

fina, Inc. R. Bruce McLean also entered an appearance

for appellant American Petrofina, Inc.

William E. McDaniels and Joseph A. Klausner, with

whom Daniel P. Levitt, Allan A. Tuttle, Michael D. Esch,

Robert J. Blackwell, Anne E. Mickey, and Kevin T.

Baine were on the joint brief, for appellees.

Robert H. Loeffler entered an appearance for State of

Alaska, appellant in No. 88-5324 and appellee in No. &88-

5313.

Before BUCKLEY and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

GEORGE H. ReEvERCOMB,* U.S. District Judge for the

District of Columbia.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: Under the Merchant Marine

Act, the Department of Transportation may provide con-

struction subsidies to vessels, but the subsidized vessels,

with certain exceptions, may not operate domestically.

The rule under review reaffirms an earlier one that al-

lowed three tankers to repay their construction subsidies

in return for permission to ship domestically. The chal-

lenged rule was issued and made immediately effective

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a).

3a

less than one month before Congress passed an appropria-

tions rider that barred the use of appropriated funds to

promulgate or implement such subsidy repayment agree-

‘ments.

Appellee tanker owners argue that the rider renders

the rule null and void both because Congress intended the

rider to apply retroactively and because it prevents the

Department’s Maritime Administration from taking the

further actions they claim to be necessary before the rule

is fully implemented. Appellees also claim that the regu-

lation is procedurally defective.

The district court accepted these arguments or varia-

tions of them and vacated the rule. We hold that Con-

gress’ appropriations rider applies prospectively only and

does not reach the challenged rule because it is self-

implementing. We also conclude that the procedural chal-

lenges are without merit. We therefore reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (“Act”), 46 U.S.C.

§§ 1101 et seg. (1982), was enacted, in part, to place

American merchant vessels operating in foreign trade on

a more equal footing with foreign-built and manned ves-

sels. To this end, the Act authorizes the Secretary of

Transportation (“Secretary”) to subsidize construction

costs for ships built in American shipyards on the con-

dition that vessels receiving such subsidies “shall be op-

erated exclusively in foreign trade, or on a round-the-

world voyage.” Jd. §$ 1151 & 1156. Congress, however,

made certain exceptions to this rule. For example, with

the Secretary’s approval, a vessel financed through a

“construction-differential subsidy” (“CDS”) may oper-

ate domestically for a maximum of six months per year

provided that the vessel repays a pro rata share of the

subsidy. Jd. § 1156.

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4a

The agency with immediate administrative responsibil-

ity over the merchant marine is the Maritime Adminis-

tration (‘““MarAd’’). See 49 C.F.R. §1.4(j) (1) (1987).

MarAd was originally located within the Department of

Commerce, but was transferred to the Department of

Transportation (“DOT” or “Department”) in August

1981. See 46 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982). Authority over spe-

cific aspects of the CDS program has been assigned to a

three-member Maritime Subsidy Board located within

MarAd. 49 C.F.R. § 1.4(k).

This case involves the latest in a series of attempts by

successive administrations to permit certain very large

erude oil carriers (“VLCCs”) to repay their subsidies

in return for permission to operate domestically full-

time. These efforts were prompted, first, by a determina-

tion that the vessels could no longer compete in foreign

commerce as a result of the world oversupply of tankers

that had arisen since 1970, and second, by the need, fol-

lowing the completion of the Alaskan pipeline, for an in-

crease in domestic tanker capacity to carry Alaskan oil

to Panama where it is transshipped to Atlantic and Gulf

Coast ports. See 52 Fed. Reg. 23,522.

Thus in the late 1970’s, the Secretary of Commerce en-

tered into subsidy repayment arrangements on a case-by-

case basis. His authority to do so was challenged, and,

in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S.

572, 597 (1980), the Supreme Court held “that the Act

empowers the Secretary to approve full-repayment/

permanent-release transactions.”

On October 15, 1980, the Secretary of Commerce pub-

lished and made immediately effective an interim rule

that limited the full CDS repayment option to tankers

over a certain weight and provided that the Secretary

would only accept repayment in “exceptional circum-

stances” after a determination that the vessels had little

prospect for viable employment in foreign trade over an

5a

extended period. 45 Fed. Reg. 68,393, 68,394 (1980).

On November 13, 1980, MarAd approved repayment for

the VLCC BAY RIDGE. Shortly thereafter, the Inde-

pendent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee (“ITOC”) chal-

lenged the interim rule as well as the approval of the

subsidy repayment by the BAY RIDGE. In Independent

U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908,

918-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“ITOC I’), we upheld the

challenge after finding that the agency had failed to pro-

vide an adequate “general statement of the [rule’s] basis

and purpose” as required by section 553(c) of the Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).

Nevertheless, we allowed the BAY RIDGE to continue

operating in domestic commerce. /d. at 931.

Following TOC I, the Secretary of Transportation,

who had by then acquired jurisdiction over shipping mat-

ters, issued a new regulation providing that for a one-

year period beginning June 6, 1985, any CDS tanker

could enter into a repayment transaction. 50 Fed. Reg.

19,170, 19,178 (1985) (“1985 rule”). During this period,

three additional VLCCs—the ARCO INDEPENDENCE,

ARCO SPIRIT, and BROOKLYN—took advantage of the

rule and repaid in excess of $100 million in subsidies

and interest. See 52 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,524 (1987).

ITOC challenged the 1985 rule and, in Independent

U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847,

854 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“TOC II”), we held that DOT

had once again failed to provide an adequate statement

of basis and purpose. We vacated the rule but withheld

issuance of our mandate until July 16, 1987 “to avoid

further disruptions in the domestic market [by permit-

ting the VLCCs to continue in domestic commerce pro

tem] and to ailow the Secretary to undertake further

proceedings to address the problems of the merchant

marine trade.” Jd. at 855.

After our decisions in JTOC JI, MarAd initiated an in-

formal rulemaking and, on June 22, 1987, published the

———————:———<—

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final rule (“1987 rule’) that is at issue here. The rule

(in which the Secretary concurred) provides in pertinent

part:

The Maritime Administration reaffirms the allowance

of the irreversible total repayment of unamortized

construction-differential subsidy (CDS), with inter-

est and rescission permanently of the domestic trad-

ing restrictions related to the grant of CDS for tank-

ers of any deadweight tonnage for applications ap-

proved between June 6, 1985 and June 5, 1986, in

accordance with the terms and conditions of pava-

graph (b) of this section [specifying methods of

computing interest, etc.]. The approved applications

were for the ARCO INDEPENDENCE, ARCO

SPIRIT and BROOKLYN.

52 Fed. Reg. 23,522, 23,536 (June 22, 1987). The Sec-

retary made the rule effective immediately upon publica-

tion, invoking the ‘good cause” exception to the thirty-

day waiting period between issuance and effectiveness re-

quired by section 553(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)

(1982). Id.

Meanwhile, Congress had begun work on a rider to an

appropriations bill that was designed to bar CDS re-

payment arrangements. On July 11, 1987, the President

signed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987

(“Appropriations Act”) which provides (at section 505)

that none of the appropriated funds “shall be used to

propose, promulgate, or implement any rule or regula-

tion” with respect to the repayment of subsidies in order

to relieve CDS vessels from their commitment to foreign

commerce. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.

100-71, § 505, 101 Stat. 471 (1987) (“section 505’’).

ITOC and certain tanker owners successfully chal-

lenged the 1987 rule in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Columbia. The court ordered the rule vacated

on a finding that Congress had intended to bar the prom-

7a

ulgation of a CDS repayment rule after the date of our

ITOC II decision, January 16, 1987. The court also con-

cluded that it was improper for MarAd to issue the regu-

lation when it knew that Congress was at work on section

505. Finally, the court found the regulation procedurally

defective for two reasons: first, MarAd did not have

good cause to waive the thirty-day waiting period; and

second, the rule was arbitrary and capricious because

the agency had failed to provide an adequate statement

of its basis and purpose. /ndependent U.S. Tanker Own-

ers Committee v. Burnley, Civ. Action Nos. 87-1685 &

87-2102 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1988) (“‘Mem. Op.’’).

Appellees reassert an additional claim not reached by

the district court, namely, that MarAd had no authority

to issue the rule because that responsibility had been

delegated to the Maritime Subsidy Board. As appellees

failed to present this objection during the rulemaking

process, however, they are precluded from doing so at

this time. See National Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas,

849 F.2d 1516, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109

S. Ct. 1528 (1989).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Issues

We begin with a discussion of the procedural issues

because if, as the district court found, the 1987 rule

was invalid ab initio, we wiil not need to consider the

effect of section 505 of the Appropriations Act.

1. Waiver of Thirty-Day Waiting Period

As an alternative ground for striking down the 1987

rule, the district court held that the agency had violated

section 553(d) of the APA by failing to observe the stat-

utorily mandated thirty-day waiting period between the

date of the 1987 rule’s publication and the date of its

effectiveness. Mem. Op. at 22-25. Section 553(d) pro-

vides:

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8a

The required publication or service of a substantive

rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its

effective date, except—

(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes as

exemption or relieves a restriction;

(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or

(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good

cause found and published with the rule.

5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982).

In the notice accompanying the publication of the rule

in the June 22, 1987 Federal Register, the Maritime Ad-

ministrator invoked the “‘good cause” exception provided

by subsection (d)(3) (“good cause exception”) to the

thirty-day waiting period required by section 553/d) by

explaining that “|t|he rule must be made effective prior

to the |/70C II) imposed deadline of July 16, 1987 in

order to avoid disruptions in the domestic trade.” 52 Fed.

teg. at 23,536. The Administrator also stated that be-

cause the three ships affected by the rule had been oper-

ating in the domestic trade for more than a year, the

public did not need time to prepare for their permanent

entry into domestic service. /d. In the proceedings be-

fore the district court, the government also claimed ex-

emption under subsection (di (1) (“(di(1) exception’)

which excepts a substantive rule that “relieves a restric-

tion” because the 1987 rule lifted the ban on the three

vessels’ participation in domestic shipping.

The district court rejected the government’s claim of a

(d) (1) exception becayes it had not been asserted in the

agency’s published notice, characterizing it as a post hoc

rationalization that an agency may not advance for the

first time on appeal. Mem. Op. at 22-23. The court then

dismissed the claim to a good cause exception on the

ground that as the agency could and should have delayed

the rule’s effective date until July 15, one day prior to

the expiration of the /TOC II stay, the agency had failed

—

9a

to demonstrate good cause for the June 22 effective date.

Id. at 23-25.

We need not determine whether the good cause excep-

tion is applicable in this instance because we find that

the agency’s alternative claim under the (d)(1) excep-

tion is valid. Despite the district court’s characterization,

the Secretary’s invocation of the exception is not a post

hoc rationalization. We are dealing here not with the

reasoning by which an agency seeks to justify its actions,

but with a pure question of law: Was the 1987 rule sub-

ject to the thiry-day waiting requirement? The answer is

straightforward. The section 553(d) waiting period does

not apply to “a substantive rule . . . which relieves a

restriction,” 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1); as the MarAd regula-

tion is such a rule, it is not subjeci to the requirement.

As the statute itself relieves MarAd of any obligation

to defer the effectiveness of its rule, it is under no obliga-

tion to make an explicit claim of the right to do so. Cf.

Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney General, 362 F. Supp. 1288,

1292 (D.D.C. 1973) ‘rejecting agency’s proffered reason

for dispensing with the thirty-day waiting period but

holding sua sponte that the challenged rule granted an

exemption within the meaning of subsection (d)(1)). By

way of contrast, the good cause exception must be claimed

because the statute explicitly requires agencies to assert

affirmatively their exemption “for good cause found and

published with the rule.” 5 U.S.C. §553(d)(3) (em-

phasis added’. In sum, the good cause exception must be

invoked and justified; the (d) (1) exception applies auto-

matically.

Appellees contended, at oral argument, that the (d)

(1) exception did not apply in instances, such as the

present one, where a thirty-day waiting period might

benefit third parties. Although they were unable to sup-

ply specific references, appellees claimed that the APA’s

legislative history and the Attorney General’s Manual on

DT

10a

the Administrative Procedure Act supported their posi-

tion. Having consulted both sources, we can find nothing

in the former that touches on this question, while the

latter actually contradicts appellees’ position:

The fact that an interested person may object to

such issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule does

not change the character of the rule as being one

“granting or recognizing exemption or relieving re-

striction”, thereby exempting it from the thiry-day

requirement.

Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Proce-

dure Act 37 (1947).

2. The Agency's Explanation of the Rule

The district court also found the 1987 regulation to be

arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unlawful under

5 U.S.C. § 70612) (A) (1982), because it found MarAd’s

explanation to be inconsistent with the evidence before

the agency and the objectives of the Merchant Marine

Act. Mem. Op. at 13-18. We respectfully disagree.

In [TOC II, we held that the statement of basis and

purpose for the 1985 rule was inadequate because the

Secretary had failed “to provide a sufficiently reasoned

discussion of why [the 1985] rule was adopted and al-

ternatives were rejected in light of the policies of the

Merchant Marine Act.” 809 F.2d at 851. In her ex-

planation of the 1985 rule, the Secretary had relied on

policies, such as economic efficiency, use of underemployed

resources, increased competition, and deregulation, that

are not explicitly listed among the Merchant Marine Act’s

stated goals. At the same time, she failed to explain why

they were “implicit in or compatible with the statutory

objectives.” Jd. at 853.

The preamble of the Act states that its purpose is to

further the development and maintenance of an ade-

quate and well-balanced American merchant marine,

lla

to promote the commerce of the United States, [and]

to aid in the national defense. . . .

Pub. L. No. 74-835, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936). Section 101 of

the Act provides:

It is necessary for the national defense and develop-

ment of its foreign and domestic commerce that the

United States shall have a merchant marine (a) suf-

ficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce

and a substantial portion of the water-borne export

and import foreign commerce of the United States

and to provide shipping service essential for main-

taining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-

borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving

as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or

national emergency, {c) owned and operated under

the United States fiag by citizens of the United

States, insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed

of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types

of vessels, constructed in the United States and

manned with a trained and efficient citizen person-

nel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities for

shipbuilding and ship repair. It is declared to be the

policy of the United States to foster the development

and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant

marine.

46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).

The Administrator asserts that the 1987 rule promotes

two statutory objectives. First, by allowing the VLCC’s

to remain in the domestic fleet, the rule promotes the

goal of ensuring that the “most suitable types of vessels”’

will make up the merchant marine. He defines suitability

to mean “suitability of particular vessels for the U.S.

commerce, and suitability of vessels to serve as naval

auxiliaries.” 52 Fed. Reg. at 23,525. Second, the Ad-

ministrator maintains that the rule ensures that the U.S.

merchant marine will be a ‘“‘well-balanced”’ fleet

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12a

composed of a mix of vessels that are suitable for

serving particular trades. While VLCCs are more

suitable than smaller, handy-sized tankers for the

long-haul, high volume crude oil trades, e.g., Valdez-

Panama, handy-sized tankers . . . are better suited

than VLCCs for U.S. coastwise trades.

Id. at 23,527.

Appellees argue that the VLCCs will not increase the

fleet’s suitability because other tankers are newer, better

designed, safer, faster, and more fuel efficient. These

arguments, however, do not undermine the premise be-

hind the Administrator’s conclusion—namely, that the

VLCCs feature economies of scale that make them partic-

ularly appropriate for the long Alaska-to-Panama trip.

See, e.g., id. at 23,526 (“In port, costs per ton increase

with ship size; at sea, however, costs per ton decline

with ship size.”’)

Appellees also contest the agency’s finding that the

tankers will contribute to a ‘“‘well-balanced” fleet. They

argue that the Alaska-Panama route will soon expire

because of a decrease in the production of Alaskan Oil

and because of the advent of a new pipeline from Cali-

fornia to Texas that will obviate the need for shipments

from Alaska to Texas through Panama. The Administra-

tor acknowledges that demand on the Alaska-Panama

route might decrease in the future (id. at 23,530) but

nevertheless concludes that the rule’s benefits outweigh

its detriments.

In [TOC II, we complained that the agency had given

only cursory treatment to the rule’s effect on domestic

trade. 809 F.2d at 852. This deficiency has been cor-

rected. First, the Administrator explores the problem of

excessive tonnage and concludes that the rule will not

exacerbate it. On the contrary, he finds that the presence

of the three VLCCs in the domestic fleet “has stabilized

the trade by allowing permanent entry of a limited num-

13a

ber of suitable tankers into the {[Alaskan-Panama] trade

instead of the uncertainty of the six-month waivers for

an uncertain number of VLCCs.” 52 Fed. Reg. at 23,530.

Second, the Administrator argues that if the VLCCs left

the domestic trade, the increased use of smaller ships

with higher costs per ton-mile would result in higher

rates for crude oil transportation, with a consequent di-

version to pipelines that would reduce overall tanker em-

ployment. Id.

In ITOC II, we also found that the agency had not

dealt in sufficient detail with the rule’s effect on the goal

of ensuring thai the U.S. merchant marine be capable of

carrying ‘a substantial portion of the water-borne export

and import foreign commerce of the United States.” See

809 F.2d at 852-53. In his discussion of the rule, the

Administrator asserts that in view of the world over-

supply of tankers and the higher operating costs experi-

enced by U.S. flag vessels, the likely result of the removal

of the VLCC’s from domestic trade is that they would be

scrapped rather than used in international shipping. 52

Fed. Reg. at 23,529.

Appellees contend that MarAd should have responded

to this situation by providing the three VLCCs with

“operating-differential subsidies,” see 46 U.S.C. § 1173

(a), rather than transferring them to the domestic fleet.

The agency rejected this alternative because, among other

things, the price “would be exhorbitant . . . approximately

$5 million annually per ship. ... There would be no

incentive for efficient operation, and the Government

would become the guarantor of profitable operation.” 52

Fed. Reg. at 23,523.

One could argue that this cost is the price we should

be ready to pay to achieve the explicit congressional ob-

jective of a U.S. merchant fleet that is capable of meeting

domestic needs as well as carrying “a substantial por-

tion” of U.S. water-borne import and export commerce

“at all times.” 46 U.S.C. $1101. The Secretary, how-

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l4a

ever, has been vested with the authority to determine

when operational subsidies should be provided, not the

courts.

In ITOC II, we found that the agency had not satis-

factorily addressed the 1985 rule’s impact on the Act’s

goal of maintaining a merchant marine capable of serv-

ing as a naval auxiliary, and noted a Navy warning that

the rule might result in the loss of certain “handy-sized”

tankers. 809 F.2d at 853. Appellees argue that the 1987

rule will undermine national defense because the VLCCs

will drive out smaller ships that would prove more use-

ful to the Navy in the event of war. Id. The Navy,

however, has expressed its support for the 1987 rule,

Admin. Rec. at 1289 ‘letter dated June 10, 1987 from

Dep't of the Navy to MarAd), and certified the three

VLCC’s as militarily useful. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23,526. Un-

der these circumstances, we cannot conclude that MarAd

has failed to consider the rule’s impact on national

security.

The Administrator addresses the 1987 rule’s impact on

two of the Act’s other goals. He acknowledges that re-

taining the VLCC’s in the domestic trade will result in

a net loss of up to 300 jobs for U.S. seamen. Id. at

23,531. On the other hand, he rejects appellees’ conten-

tion that the 1987 rule will hurt the U.S. shipbuilding

business by depriving it of the opportunity to build new

ships arguing that retaining the three VLCCs in the

domestic trade is unlikely to have a “significant adverse

effect” on U.S. shipyards. He asserts that it is doubtful

that any company would build new VLCCs because of

their high construction costs and the probable decline in

the volume of oil that will be shipped from Alaska to

Panama in the 1990’s. Nor would shippers build smaller

tankers as substitutes for the VLCCs because they would

be unsuitable for the Alaska-Panama route. The Admin-

istrator maintains that if the rule is set aside, other

CDS-built tankers will likely fill the resulting shortage

15a

by applying for temporary permission to ship domes-

tically, as permitted under the Act. Jd. at 23,527-28.

Finally, in [TOC II, we criticized the Secretary be-

cause her explanation for the rejection of alternatives to

the 1985 rule focused on non-statutory criteria that fa-

vored the rule, while admitting that the rule created

“problems that impinge on the statutory objectives and

that might be avoided under some of the alternative

measures.” 809 F.2d at 854. In his statement in sup-

port of the present rule, the Administrator examines each

of the alternatives in terms of the Act’s objectives and

persuasively argues that because of the suitability of the

VLCCs for the Alaska-Panama route, the rule better

serves the Act’s overall goals. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23,534-35.

We conclude that the Administrator has cured the

shortcomings we identified in JTOC II and provided a

sufficient statement of basis and purpose for the 1987

rule. As he concedes, the rule will result in some reduc-

tion in employment. While this is unfortunate, this court

has previously acknowledged that the Department may

not be able to pursue all of the Act’s goals simul-

taneously:

It may be, of course, that present conditions in the

world shipping market make it impossible for the

Secretary to find a way to meet all of the statutory

objectives. If this is the problem, she should discuss

it frankly and directly when she considers which

measures to adopt in light of the objectives explicitly

set out in the Act.

ITOC II, 809 F.2d at 854 n.4. In the case before us,

the agency has exhibited the required candor. While some

of its judgments are no doubt controversial, Congress has

entrusted them to the agency, and not the courts. We

also find that while others might interpret the evidence

in different ways, the Administrator’s conclusions have

adequate support in the record. We therefore find that

————————

16a

MarAd acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously, but in

full accord with its legal responsibilities and the purposes

of the Act.

3. Preemption of Legislative Action

The district court suggests that the 1987 rule must be

set aside because MarAd had advance notice of congres-

sional opposition to CDS repayments and, therefore,

should have deferred publication until Congress had had

the opportunity to make its will known:

Rather than heed the command of Congress, the

agency chose to outrace Congress by issuing a final

rule before Congress could complete the legislative

process. The agency’s action was nothing more than

an attempt te subvert the will of Congress, and thus,

cannot stand.

Mem. Op. at 5-6.

We offer two comments. First, while the agency was

fully aware that there was strong congressional opposi-

tion to the rule, it was by no means clear that the final

version of the appropriations bill would contain section

505 because the Senate had already been persuaded to

drop the section from its version of the Supplemental

Appropriations Act. Second, however unseemly a race

to preempt congressional action may at times appear, we

know of no principle that holds that the executive branch

must stay its mand whenever it learns that the legisla-

tive branch may change the law. We say this notwith-

standing the district court’s reference to our decision in

National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 733 F.2d

114 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Mem. Op. at 8-11.

Devine is readily distinguishable. That case involved

controversial changes in federal personnel practices that

the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) had first

proposed on March 30, 1983 and then incorporated in

modified form in proposed regulations that it issued on

July 14, 1983. One month later, on August 15, Congress

17a

adopted an appropriations rider similar to section 505

that forbade the commitment or expenditure of any funds

to implement OPM’s March 30 or July 14 proposals be-

fore October 15, 1983. 733 F.2d at 115. Immediately

following the expiration of the rider, OPM published a

somewhat modified form of the same regulations, with an

effective date of November 25, 1983. In the meantime, on

November 12, Congress passed another funding resolu-

tion again barring OPM from committing or expending

any funds to implement or administer the regulations

that would take effect thirteen days later. /d. at 115-16.

We found clear indications in the legislative history

that Congress “wished to prevent the effectuation of

major changes in personnel management policies before

it had an adequate opportunity to consider possible legis-

lative solutions.” Jd. at 120. We also stated, in dicta,

that “even assuming arquendo that the regulations could

be implemented workahly without further participation

by the OPM, it is evident that Congress intended to pre-

vent” the implementation of the proposed regulations.

Id. at 120. Nevertheless, Devine is inapposite because

we found that OPM’s final regulations were incapable of

implementation not because they had been invalidated by

congressional action, but because OPM, which “had to

play a critical and continuing role in their implementa-

tion, administration, and enforcement,” had been denied

the funds required to put them into effect. Id. at 119.

By contrast, MarAd need not take any further action

before the 1987 rule becomes fully operational. See dis-

cussion below at 20.

B. Section 505

Section 505 of the Appropriations Act reads as follows:

None of the funds appropriated or made available

by this or any other Act or otherwise appropriated

or made available to the Secretary of Transporta-

tion or the Maritime Administrator for purposes of

administering the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as

18a

amended (46 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), shall be used by

the United States Department of Transportation or

the United States Maritime Administration to pro-

pose, promulgate, or implement any rule or regula-

tion, or, with regard to vessels which repaid subsidy

pursuant to the rule promulgated by the Secretary

May 3, 1985 and vacated by Order of the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the D.C. Cireuit January 16, 1987,

conduct any adjudicatory or other regulatory pro-

ceeding, execute or perform any contract, or par-

ticipate in any judicial action with respect to the

repayment of construction differential subsidy for the

permanent release of vessels from the restrictions in

section 506 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as

amended: Provided, That such funds may be used

to the extent such expenditure relates to a rule which

conforms to statutory standards hereafter enacted by

Congress.

The district court held that section 505 voided the

1987 rule because

Congress’ choice of language indicates an intent to

bar the agency from promulgating any CDS repay-

ment rule as of the date of the Court of Appeals’ de-

cision, January 16, 1987 until or unless it acted later.

Mem. Op. at 7. As Congress acted almost six months

following our decision in JTOC IJ and nineteen days after

publication of the 1987 rule, the court’s holding requires

that the section be given retrospective effect. We there-

fore, evaluate the court’s interpretation in light of the

principle of statutory construction providing that

a retrospective operation will not be given to a stat-

ute which interferes with antecedent rights... un-

less such be “the inequivocal and inflexible import

of the terms, and the manifest intention of the leg-

islature.”’

United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79

(1982) (citation omitted) (ellipsis in original).

; 19a

We find it difficult to reconcile the district court’s

interpretation with the plain language and stated purpose

of section 505. Although it refers to the JTOC II deci-

sion, section 505 applies to any CDS repayment arrange-

ment, and it operates exclusively as a restriction on the

expenditure of appropriated funds. Such a prohibition is

inherently prospective as the language does not purport

to reach expenditures already made. Moreover, the pro-

vision that no funds “shall be” used for the enumerated

purposes speaks only to future expenditures. See 1A

C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction 693 (4th

ed. 1985) (‘It is obvious that the word ‘shall,’ in itself,

cannot ‘include’ the past.’’).

Appellees offer two alternative reasons why section 505

must be given retrospective effect despite the prospective

thrust of its language. First, they contend that inter-

preting section 505 as allowing the 1987 rule to stand

would render it a nullity because the Department had

indicated before section 505 was enacted that it would

not accept repayment from any CDS vessels other than

the three that were the subject of the 1987 rule. There-

fore, appellees argue, as the section applies exclusively to

the three VLCCs, we must reject a construction that

would give the section prospective effect only because that

would deprive Congress’ action of meaning. We find this

argument unconvincing for several reasons: It presup-

poses that the statutory language is susceptible te an

alternative construction, which we find it not to be; it

ignores the fact (as appellees themselves call to our at-

tention in their appeal to legislative histery) that a

number of members of Congress believed that section

505 would nullify the rule through the prospective denial

of funds for its implementation (see, e.g., 134 Cong.

Ree. $9142 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) ‘remarks of Sen.

Hollings) ; 134 Cong. Rec. H2792 (daily ed. July 8, 1987)

(remarks of Rep. Carr): 134 Cong. Rec. S10866 (daily

ed. July 29, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Mikulski) ); and fi-

nally, section 505 could well have been intended to guard

————————

20a

against the possibility that the Department might change

its mind and enter into repayment arrangements with

additional CDS vessels.

Second, appellees argue that section 505’s legislative

history evidences Congress’ intention that the appropria-

tions measure apply retroactively to bar the 1987 regula-

tion. That argument also founders on the stubborn fact

that the statute, with its use of the verb “shall” and its

focus on expenditures, cannot be read to apply retroac-

tively. There being no ambiguity to be resolved, an ap-

peal to legislative history is inappropriate. See, e.g., Gar-

cia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 n.3 (1984) (“ ‘Re-

sort to legislative history is only justified where the face

of the Act is inescapably ambiguous.’ ’’) (citation omitted) ;

Overseas Education Ass’n v. FLRA, 876 F.2d 960 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) (Buckley, J., concurring). While some pro-

ponents of section 505 may well have intended it to pre-

vent MarAd from adopting the 1987 rule, we are none-

theless bound by its language, which accurately reflects

Congress’ decision to rely on the appropriations process

to achieve its policy objectives. Restrictions on expendi-

tures of appropriated funds are inherently prospective,

and we have no authority to give them retroactive effect.

We now reach appellees’ argument that section 505

effectively nullifies the 1987 rule because it bars the use

of appropriated funds to implement it. According to ap-

pellees, MarAd must take two further actions before the

1987 rule becomes operative: It must amend the vessels’

CDS contracts to delete the restrictions on domestic trad-

ing, and it must respond to the appellees’ petitions for

rehearing. MarAd asserts, however, and we agree, that

because payment from the three VLCCs has already been

received and because the tankers have operated domes-

tically since 1985, the rule affirms the right of the ARCO

INDEPENDENCE, ARCO SPIRIT, and BROOKLYN to

remain in domestic commerce, and their contracts need

not be amended to cenfirm this right.

woe Ni ants” eel ll

2la

Nor are we persuaded by appellees’ remaining argu-

ment, which is based on a regulation that provides that

“!t}he {Maritime} Administration’s decision or order

shall be stayed pending resolution by the Administration

of a petition for reopening... .” 46 C.F.R. § 201.171

(1988). According to them, this regulation prevents the

1987 rule from going into effect until the agency re-

sponds to the petitions for reopening filed by ITOC and

others. Section 201.171, however, only applies in in-

stances where the agency has held a formal hearing.

Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 22 S.S.R. 542, 543 (MSB

1983). As the 1987 rule was promulgated pursuant to

an informal rulemaking, the regulation does not apply.

See 52 Fed. Reg. 12,199 (1987) (initiating notice and

comment rulemaking).

In sum, we find that section 505 neither retrospectively

voids the 1987 rule nor prevents it from becoming fully

operational. As appellees have amply demonstrated, in-

terested members of Congress were fully aware of the

rule’s existence before the conference committee resolved

the differences between the Senate and House versions

of the Supplemental Appropriations Act. Had the con-

ferees wished to vacate the 1987 rule, they could have

done so simply by ordering its revocation. As they did

not, our task is to apply the language they agreed upon

and that Congress enacted into law.

III. CONCLUSION

Section 505 applies prospectively only, and because the

Maritime Administrator is not required to take any fur-

ther action to implement the 1987 rule, it remains in

effect. Nor is the rule procedurally flawed. The Ad-

ministrator was under no obligation to provide a thirty-

day waiting period between issuance and effectiveness,

and we find his statement of its basis and purpose to be

sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment entered

in the district court.

So ordered.

22a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 88-5313

INDEPENDENT U.S. TANKER OWNERS COMMITTEE et a/,

Petitioner

v.

SAMUEL K. SKINNER, in his capacity as Secretary of

the US Department of Transportation, et a/.,

Re por lent

and consolidated cases

Before: Buckley and Williams, Circuit Judges, and

Revercomb ae lL nited States [)j trict J mive

ORDER

Filed Nov. 2. 1989

Upon consideration of the Petitions for Re

appellees Seatrain Tankers, Inc., et al., American Trad-

ing Transportation Company, Inc. et al., and the Inde-

pendent U.S Tanker Owners Committee, it 1:

ORDERED, by the Court, that the petitions are denied

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT

CONSTANCE L. Dv!

Clerk

By - ~ Robe rt A. Bont er

ROBERT A. BONNER

Deputy Clerk

tre I teg Stats 1) ’ =. f< thy 1) trict of ¢ }

bia, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S. 92(a

23a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 88-5313

INDEPENDENT U.S. TANKER OWNERS COMMITTEE et al..

Petitioner

SAMUEL K. SKINNER, in his capacity as Secretary of

the US Department of Transportation, et a/.,

Respondent

and consolidated cases

Before: Wald, Chief Judge: Mikva, Edwards, Ruth B.

Ginsburg, Silberman, Buckley, Williams, D. H.

Ginsburg and Sentelle, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Filed Nov. 2, 1989]

The Suggestions For Rehearing En Banc of appellees

Seatrain Tankers, Inc., et al., American Trading Trans-

portation Company, Inc. et al., and the Independent U.S.

Tanker Owners Committee have been circulated to the

full Court. The taking of a vote was requested. There-

after, a majority of the judges of the court in regular

active service did not vote in favor of any suggestion.

Upon consideration of the foregoing it is

ORDERED, by

are denied.

24a

the Court en banc, that the suggestions

Per Curiam

For THE COURT:

CONSTANCE L. DUPRE

Clerk

Robert A. Bonner

ROBERT A. BONNER

Dep ity Clerk

25a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

C.A. No. 87-1685

INDEPENDENT U.S. TANKERS OWNERS COMMITTEE, et al.,

. Plaintiffs,

JAMES H. BURNLEY, IV, et al.,

Defendants.

C.A. No. 87-2102

OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING GROUP, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

JAMES H. BURNLEY, IV, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION OF CHARLES R. RICHEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

[Filed Apr. 29, 1988]

I. INTRODUCTION

These consolidated actions are before the Court on

cross-motions for summary judgment.' The facts are not

disputed. Plaintiffs challenge a final rule issued by the

Secretary of Transportation through the Maritime Ad-

1 These actions were consolidated by Order of the Court dated

September 10, 1987.

a

26a

ministration (“MARAD”) on June 22, 1987. 52 Fed.

Reg. 23522. This rule would reaffirm prior agency ac-

tion that allowed four Very Large Crude Oil Carriers

““VLCCs”) built with construction differential subsidies

(“CDS”) to re-pay these subsidies, with interest, as a

condition for entering the domestic trade. See 50 Fed.

Reg. 19170. This rule previously had been vacated by

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in

Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809

F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987) on the ground that the Secre-

tary’s statement of basis and purpose failed to give an

adequate account of how the payback rule served the

objectives of the Merchant Marine Act. The Court of

Appeals specifically found fault with the Secretary’s cur-

sory treatment of these objectives and her substitution of

non-statutory ¢riteria for Congress’ stated objectives in

the Act. See id. at 852, 854. Thus, on remand, the Sec-

retary was afforded the opportunity to square the policies

underlying the CDS repayment rule with the objectives

of the Merchant Marine Act. Id. at 854. As a result of

the Court of Appeals’ decision, handed down January 16,

1987, the payback rule would have been vacated six

2 This rule permitted any tanker vessel built with a construction

differential subsidy, and which had been barred from competing in

the domestic trade on account of that subsidy, to enter the domestic

trade upon repayment of the unamortized portion of the subsidy,

plus interest. See Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v.

Dole, 809 F.2d at 850. Tanker vessels over 100,000 DWT (dead-

weight tons) were given a one-year period that began June 6, 1985

in which to apply for repayment Ultimately, three VLCCs took

advantage of the rule. These vessels are the Arco Independence, the

Arco Spirit, and the Brooklyn. The rule at issue in the instant case

also would confirm the CDS repayment, wtih interest, and recission

of the domestic trading restriction of the Bay Ridge. This ship

had entered the domestic trade in 1980 pursuant to a rulemaking,

45 Fed. Reg. 68393 (October 15, 1980). That rulemaking was

vacated in Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis,

690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the rule in question

would allow these four vessels to enter, sail, and compete in U.S.

trade and commerce.

27a

months later uniess the Secretary had taken further ac-

tion in the interim. See id. at 855.

Plaintiffs, owners and operators of U.S.-flag tankers

employed in the domestic trade, have challenged this lat-

est rulemaking on a variety of grounds.’ The plaintiffs

contend that the rule is invalid because it contravenes the

express will of Congress, constitutes arbitrary and ca-

pricious action, lacks an adequate explanation of the ex-

istence of “good cause” to make the rule effective upon

publication, violates the agency’s own procedures, and

fails to comply with the National Environmental Policy

Act. Because Congress clearly intended to block the chal-

lenged rulemaking, the Court will grant summary judg-

ment for the piaintiffs. Furthermore, the Court finds that

the rulemaking is arbitrary and capricious in violation

of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and that the agency lacked

“good cause” to make the rule effective upon publication

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).

Il. THE CHALLENGED CDS REPAYMENT RULE

CANNOT STAND BECAUSE CONGRESS

CLEARLY INTENDED TO PROHIBIT IT WHEN

IT ENACTED SECTION 505 OF THE SUPPLE-

MENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1987

The Court concludes that Congress clearly intended to

bar the challenged rule when it enacted Section 505 of

‘The plaintiff in C.A. No. 87-1685 is Independent U.S. Tanker

Owners Committee. Plaintiff-intervenors in this action are Ameri-

can Trading Transportation Co., Inc., Cove Maritime Companies,

Inc., Crest Tankers, Inc., Faicon Carriers, Inc., Keystone Shipping

Company, Sun Transport, Inc., Trinidad Corp., and Victory Car-

riers, Inc. The plaintiff in C.A. No. 87-2102 is Overseas Shipholding

Group, Inc. Plaintiff-intervenors in this action are Seatrain Tank-

ers, Inc., Richmond Tankers, Inc., and Stuyvesant Tankers Corp.

The defendants in both these actions are the Secretary of Trans-

portation and the Department of Transportation. Defendant-

intervenors in these actions, American Petrofina, Inc., SPC Ship-

ping, Inc., Atlantic Richfield Co.. and the State of Alaska, support

the agency’s rulemaking.

28a

the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987. The Court

of Appeals withheld issuance of its mandate vacating the

subsidy repayment rule for six months in order to give

the agency time to square the rule in terms of compli-

ance with the objectives of the Merchant Marine Act.

Rather than permit the agency the opportunity to recon-

cile the rule with the Act, Congress moved decisively to

end the rulemaking altogether. The agency knew that

Congress opposed CDS repayment and that it was in the

process of legislating that opposition. The agency’s at-

tempt to outrace Congress on this issue cannot be given

effect. In light of Congress’ clear intent, the Court finds

that Section 505 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act

of 1987 applies directly to the challenged rule. There-

fore, the rule must be vacated.

The plaintiffs have argued that, by enacting Section

505 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987,

Congress intended to prohibit the agency from imple-

menting any payback rule that does not conform to the

statutory standards enacted by Congress, and, specifi-

cally, the rule promulgated by the agency and challenged

in the instant action. The defendants and defendant-

intervenors dispute this contention and claim that to ap-

ply Section 505 so as to invalidate the rule is to give the

law retroactive effect or to sanction repeal of the regu-

lation by implication.’ The defendant-intervenors further

argue that Section 505 of the Supplemental Appropria-

tions Act of 1987, on its face, operates prospectively from

4 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (‘Plaintiffs’ Memo-

randum”) at 15-26.

5 See Defendants’ Statement in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Statement”) at 17-25; Memo-

randum of Points and Authorities of Defendant-Intervenors’ Oppo-

sition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant-

Intervenors’ Memorandum”) at 28-30.

ee ON ee

29a

the date of enactment. The Court disagrees with the de-

fendants’ and defendant-intervenors’ position.

A. The Agency Should Have Deferred Publication of the

CDS Repayment Rule Until Congress Completed Con-

sideration of the Funding Measure

As an administrative agency, MARAD is required to

follow a congressional mandate. See Summit Nursing

Home, Inc. v. United States, 572 F.2d 737, 742 (Ct. Cl.

1978). Congress’ position in opposition to CDS repayment

was well known to the agency. In fact, the agency was

aware that Congress was actively considering a CDS re-

payment prohibition so as to prevent any subsidy repay-

ment following the Court of Appeals’ January 16, 1987

decision. Rather than heed the command of Congress,

che agency chose to outrace Congress by issuing a final

rule before Congress could complete the legislative proc-

ess. The agency’s action was nothing more than an at-

tempt to subvert the will of Congress, and thus, cannot

stand.

The challenged rule was issued in final form in the

Federal Register on June 22, 1987. The Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 1987 containing the prohibition

against just such a rulemaking was signed into law by

the President on July 11, 1987. As of the date of publi-

cation of the final rule in the Federal Register, the House

of Representatives had already voted in favor of the pro-

hibition. Furthermore, House and Senate conferees were

already discussing the differences between the two ver-

sions of the funding measure, including the prohibition,

when the rule was published.* The conferees ultimately

reported a bill that contained the original House language

barring any CDS repayment rule. The language of Sec-

tion 505 specifically and expressly addresses any rule-

6 The Sentae version of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of

1987 did not contain any language dealing with a CDS repayment

rule.

30a

making regarding CDS repayment that the agency might

undertake as a result of the Court of Appeals decision in

Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809

F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Section 505 provides:

None of the funds appropriated or made available

by this or any other Act or otherwise appropriated

or made available to the Secretary of Transportation

or the Maritime Administrator for purposes of ad-

ministering the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as

amended (46 U.S.C. 1101 ef seq.), shall be used by

the United States Maritime Administration to pro-

pose, promulgate, or implement any rule or regula-

tion, or, with regard to vessels which repaid subsidy

pursuant to the rule promulgated by the Secretary

May 3, 1985 and vacated by Order of the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit January 16, 1987,

conduct any adjudicatory or other regulatory pro-

ceeding, execute or perform any contract, or partici-

pate in any judicial action with respect ot the repay-

ment of construction differential subsidy for the

permanent release of vessels from the restrictions in

section 506 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as

amended: Provided, That such funds may be used to

the extent such expenditure relates to a rule which

conforms to statutory standards hereafter enacted

by Congress.

Clearly Congress intended to bar the agency from prom-

ulgating this CDS repayment rule here involved until or

unless the Congress later laid down the standard by

which it could be done. Congress’ choice of language in-

dicates an intent to bar the agency from promulgating

any CDS repayment rule of the date of the Court of Ap-

peals’ decision, January 16, 1987 until or unless it acted

later.

Rather than await the legislative outcome when it knew

that Congress was seriously and actively addressing this

issue, MARAD decided it would determine merchant ma-

3la

rine policy rather than follow Congress’ direction. “It

is not for an administrative agency, however, to preempt

Congressional action or to ‘fill in’ where it believes some

federal action is needed.” Office of Consumers’ Counsel!

v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Here

Congress acted decisively and with unmistaken clarity in

declaring that no funds could be used, and the agency

clearly violated this mandate. The agency should have

deferred publication of the rule pending a determination

by Congress as to whether, and to what extent, a pro-

hibition on a CDS repayment rule was necessary and ap-

propriate. Moreover, had it waited, the agency would

have been in a better position to develop a policy con-

sistent with congressional intent. It is the first branch of

government which makes laws, and it is for the second

branch to execute the laws consistent with congressional

authority and mandates. See generally Lyng v. Payne,

106 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1986); Stallings v. Harris, 493

F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. Tenn. 1980) (citing Stark v.

Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944) ).

B. In a Situation Similar to this Case, the Court of Ap-

peals for this Circuit Held that, Where an Agency

Issued Final Regulations Prior to Enactment by

Congress of a Statutory Ban on Such Regulations,

the Regulations Were Null and Void

The Court finds that the present case is strikingly

similar, albeit not identical, to NTEU v. Devine, 733

F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'g, 577 F.Supp. 738

(D.D.C. 1983). In that case, the Court of Appeals struck

down regulations promulgated prior to passage of legis-

lation containing language prohibiting OPM from prom-

ulgating and implementing new federal personnel regula-

tions because it found, inter alia, a clear indication that

Congress intended that those regulations should not be

allowed to take effect The Court finds in this case that

Congress did not want the agency promulgating or im-

plementing the rule challenged here.

32a

In NTEU v. Devine, the Office of Personnel Manage-

ment proposed changes in federal personnel practices by

way of a rulemaking. Congress opposed these changes

and moved to enact legislation prohibiting the promulga-

tion and implementation of any such rules. While Con-

gress was actively considering a legislative proposal to

bar the proposed rules, the agency issued final regula-

tions. The agency argued, among other points, that the

subsequently passed legislation had no effect on the regu-

lations it had issued because it was not required to take

any subsequent steps to implement the regulations. Al-

though it found that the agency had much to do in order

to implement the regulations, and thus ran afoul of the

express prohibition in the statute against agency action,

the Court of Appeals held that nevertheless, the regula-

tions were null and void because they contradicted con-

gressional intent. The Court of Appeals would not per-

mit the agency to beat Congress to the punch by enacting

regulations which Congress opposed before Congress had

an opportunity to enact a prohibition.

The Court finds that the instant situation closely mir-

rors that which existed in NTEU v. Devine. In both

cases, Congress was actively considering a prohibition on

a discrete agency rulemaking that the agency moved to

issue in final form before Congress completed its con-

sideration. However, in NTEU v. Devine, OPM issued

its final regulations only after the House Appropriations

Committee had recommended that the regulations be

barred. In this case, the House of Representatives had

voted in favor of the prohibition on a CDS payback rule,

and House and Senate conferees were in the process of

discussing that prohibition.

The agency attempts to distinguish NTEU v. Devine

on the ground that the decisions of the District Court

and the Court of Appeals turned on a finding that, con-

trary to OPM’s assertions, the regulations were not self-

enforcing or self-administering. See Defendants’ State-

ment at 23-24. In contrast, MARAD argues that it does

33a

not need to “take any steps to implement a rule which

merely affirms what has already occurred.” Jd. at 24.

The agency claims that “the court in Devine never sug-

gested that actions taken pursuant to OPM’s regulations

prior to enactment of the funding bar were invalid.”

Id. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals, in dicta,

found that “even assuming arguendo that the regulations

could be implemented workably without further participa-

tion by the OPM, it is evident that Congress intended to

prevent this.” 733 F.2d at 120.

In this case, the Court finds that Congress clearly in-

tended to bar promulgation of any rule authorizing CDS

repayment as of January 16, 1987 through enactment of

Section 505 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of

1987. At least as early as March 25, 1987, the agency

was on notice that Congress was considering barring a

repayment rule when the House of Appropriations Com-

mittee reported a bill containing the prohibitory lan-

guage. On the day that the House passed the CDS pay-

back prohibition, Representative Jones, Chairman of the

House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, stated

on the floor of the House that the language was aimed at

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by MARAD regard-

ing the rule. See Cong. Record H2202 (April 23, 1987).

Therefore, in light of the clear indication that Congress

intended to bar the subsidy payback rule here challenged

and mindful of the Court of Appeals’ decision in NTEU

v. Devine, this Court finds that Section 505 of the Sup-

plemental Appropriations Act of 1987 prohibits the im-

plementation of the rule published by the Secretary of

Transportation in the Federal Register on June 22, 1987.

C. Section 505 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act

of 1987 Is a Valid Exercise of Legislative Authority

and Does Not Operate Retroactively Or Repeal the

Contested Rulemaking By Implication

Section 505 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of

1987 does not operate retroactively nor does it have the

34a

effect of repealing the challenged rule by implication.

Congress intended that the agency not promulgate or im-

plement any CDS repayment rule following the decision

handed down by the Court of Appeals on January 16,

1987. Furthermore, there can be no argument that this

legislation repeals the rule by implication. Congress ex-

pressly barred any CDS repayment rule, including the

one chalienged nere, when it passed this legislation.

In spite of Congress’ clear intent to bar promulgation

of the rule, the agency and the defendant-intervenors

nevertheless argue that Section 505 cannot be given retro-

active effect nor can it be given effect so as to repeal the

rulemaking by implication. See Defendant’s Statement at

29; Defendant-Intervenors’ Memorandum at 28. They

argue that the words “shall be used” connote a meaning

that the prohibition was to take effect from the date of

enactment. This argument is unavailing. The word

“shall” is language of command in a statute. See Asso-

ciation of American Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310

1312 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted). The inter-

pretation pushed by the agency and the defendant-

intervenors ‘“‘can be defeated by indications of legislative

intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the

structure and purpose of the statute.” United States v.

Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (citation omitted).

The Court concludes that Congress clearly intended this

section to take effect following the Court of Appeals’ de-

cision in Indenendent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v.

Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Although amending

the section to specifically cover the June 22, 1987 rule-

making might have been prudent, it certainly was not

essential in view of the fact that the language of, and

expressed rationale for, the legislation indicated its ap-

plicability to the final rule. See NTEU v. Devine, supra,

733 F.2d at 118.

The Court realizes that TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 153.

190 (1978), relied on by the defendants and the

35a

defendant-intervenors, stands for the proposition that

substantive changes in the law by means of appropria-

tions bills are to be narrowly construed and that repeal

of laws by implication is disfavored. However, this case

does not implicate that doctrine. With this in mind, the

Court finds that Section 505 does not repeal the rule by

implication since this provision expressly prohibits the

CDS repayment rule. See NTEU v. Devine, 577 F.

Supp. 738, 750 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 114 (D.C.

Cir. 1984).

III. THE CDS REPAYMENT RULE IS ARBITRARY

AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT IS NOT CON-

SISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE

MERCHANT MARINE ACT AND, THERE-

FORE, MUST BE VACATED

Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion that the agency

acted contrary to the express terms of Section 505 of the

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, the Court finds

that this rulemaking is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion or not otherwise in accordance with law.”

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Normally, an agency rule would

be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on

factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the

problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs

counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so im-

plausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in

view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle

Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto-

mobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). “To as-

sure that the necessary factual support for the finding

exists, the reviewing court must examine the evidence

in the existing administrative record.” Center for Auto

Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2é¢ 799, 810 (D.C. Cir. 19%1). In

this case, the agency rule is arbitrary and capricious

because it has relied on factors which Congress has not

intended it to consider and because it has offered an ex-

36a

planation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-

dence before it. Accordingly, the rule must be vacated.

The agency must provide an adequate statement of

basis and purpose, of how this rule “directly further{(s]

the general goals of the [Merchant Marine] Act.” Sea-

train Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572,

588 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Independent U.S.

Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Here, the agency has acknowledged

that the evidence on the record leads to the conclusion

that the challenged rule wil! not further most of the

objectives of the Act. However, the agency decided that

the advantages of efficiency and transportation savings

outweigh the net adverse impact on vessels and seaman

in the domestic trade. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 23524. A rule

supported by non-statutory criteria at the expense of the

express objectives of the Act is arbitrary and capricious.

A. The Agency's Explanation in Support of the Rule

Runs Counter to the Evidence in the Record and Is

Therefore Arbitrary and Capricious

The goals of the Merchant Marine Act are to develop

and encourage the maintenance of a U.S. merchant

marine that is:

(a) sufficient to carry its domestic waterborne com-

merce and a substantial portion of the water-borne

export and import foreign commerce of the United

States and to provide shipping service essential for

maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign

water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of

serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of

war or national emergency, (¢)} owned and operated

under the United States flag by citizens of the

United States, insofar as may be practicable, (d)

composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suit-

able types of vessels, constructed in the United States

and manned with a trained and efficient citizen per-

_—_—— ew nine

37a

sonnel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities

for shipbuilding and ship repair.

46 U.S.C. $1101. The Court notes that “efficiency” and

“transportation savings” are not among the enumerated

objectives of the Merchant Marine Act. The Secretary

admits that this rule will not directly further many of

the objectives of the Act. Nevertheless, the Secretary

claims that the rule promotes the Act because the four

VLCCs are suitable for the domestic trade and will pro-

mote and maintain a well-balanced fleet. See 52 Fed.

Reg. at 23525, 23527. The evidence in the record sug-

gests otherwise.

The agency admits that the rule will not directly fur-

ther many of the statute’s objectives. For example,

“MARAD recognizes that the rule will not increase the

participation of U.S.-flag vessels in the foreign trade.”

52 Fed. Reg. at 23525; see also id. at 23528 (“MARAD

acknowledges that [the rule] would not increase or de-

crease the U.S.-flag share of the water-borne export and

import bulk foreign commerce of the United States,”).’

In addition, “MARAD also recognizes that this rule pos-

sibly will result in the lay-up or scrapping of a few

smaller sized crude carriers sooner than would otherwise

occur and that additional seamen possibly will become

unemployed as a result.” Jd. at 23525. Furthermore,

7 The agency secks to justify the rule's impact on the foreign

trade fleet objective of the Merchant Marine Act by relying on a

footnote in the Court of Appeals’ decision in Independent U.S.

Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole in which the Court admonished

the Secretary to discuss present conditions in the world shipping

market “frankly and directly.” See 809 F.2d at 854 n.4. Rather

than do so, the Secretary dismisses this objective by contending

that because the current U.S.-flag foreign trade fleet cannot carry

a substantial portion of U.S. foreign commerce. a lessening in the

size of that fleet will make no difference. Sve 52 Fed. Reg. at 23522.

Merely relying on a finding that surplus tonnage worldwide is at

very high levels does not, per se, moot an objective of the Merchant

Marine Act. Sce id. at 23529.

-

38a

the agency acknowledges that “(while this rulemaking

will not actively promote this goal [of ensuring efficient

facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair], it also will

not have a significant advere (sic) effect on U.S. com-

mercial shipbuilding.” Jd. at 23528. Such a statement

leads this Court to believe that the rule will have at

least some adverse effect on U.S. commercial shipbuild-

ing.

MARAD does not contend that the Alaska North Slope-

Panama (“ANS”) trade lacks sufficient tonnage to trans-

port Alaskan crude oil. Rather, it argues that there is

a need for vessels that can take advantage of greater

economies of scale and thus provide shippers with trans-

portation savings. /d. at 23524. With these “suitable”

vessels in the trade, the agency concludes that the fleet

will be “well-balanced.” The Court concludes that the

agency's proffered justifications for the rule are belied

by the evidence in the record and that, therefore, the

rule is arbitrary and capricious.

By MARAD’s own estimate, Alaskan oil production

will decline in the very near future leading to a con-

comitant decrease in the need for tanker tonnage in the

ANS-Panama trade. The agency has estimated that ANS

tanker loadings are expected to fall as soon as 1989 due

to a decline in production, the opening of the All Ameri-

can Pipeline, and the potential construction of a refinery

at Valdez, the output of which may be transported abroad

by foreign-flag vessels. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 23530 (em-

phasis added). Thus, due to falling demand, these

VLCCs, though so uniquely suited for the ANS-Panama

trade, will be laid up.*

— ——

* MARAD expects these VLC(s to be employed only in the ANS.

Panama trade. Alaska North Slope oil is transported by pipeline

across Alaska to a terminus located at Valdez. The oil is then

loaded onto tankers bound for the U.S. West Coast or Panama.

These vessels would not be used in the West Coast segment of the

ANS trade if demand in the Valdez-Panama trade is insufficient to

39a

In addition, the Court finds it significant that a num-

ber of vessels are idle and laid up. At present, the

Bay Ridge, one of the VLCCs at issue in this rulemaking,

is laid up. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23527. F urthermore, the

VLCCs BT Alaska and BT San Diego have been idled

since August 4, 1987. See id.” In addition, two un-

subsidized VLCCs, the Exxon Valdez and the Exxon

Long Beach, each totaling 209,000 DWT, recently went

into service in the ANS-Panama trade. With three

VLCCs currently laid up, the Court cannot condone a

rulemaking that would add three more VLCCs to the

domestic fleet as a rational decision on the part of the

agency. Thus, the evidence in the record strongly sug-

gests that the challenged rule will not further directly

many of the objectives of the Merchant Marine Act.

Therefore, because the explanation for its decision runs

counter to the evidence before the agency, the rule must

be struck down as arbitrary and capricious. See Motor

Vehicle Manufacturers Association. supra.

B. The Agency Cannot Rely on Non-Statutory Criteria

Such as Efficiency and Transportation Savings to

Support the Rule Because These Are Factors that

Congress Did Not Intend the Agency to Consider

In Promulgating a Rule Pursuant to the Merchant

Marine Act

Having admitted that this rulemaking will not directly

further most of the goals of the Act as required by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp.,

the agency contends that the rule wil] further “day-to-

support all four VLCCs, given port constraints and the higher

costs of lightering or operating the ships light loaded. 52 Fed.

Peg. at 23530.

*Each of these vessels totals 188.100 DWT. Administrative

Record at 1357. Their owner, Shell Refinery and Marketing Com-

pany, claims that these vessels may have to be scrapped due to

the rulemaking. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23527.

40a

day” commercial operations by allowing more suitable

ships in the Alaska-Panama trade,” 52 Fed. Reg. at

23524, and will result in a more well-balanced fleet “com-

posed of a mix of vessels that are suitable for serving

particular trades,” 52 Fed. Reg. at 23527. MARAD con-

tinues to rely heavily on its claim that admission of these

VLCCs into the domestic trade will enhance efficiency

and create transportation savings. This may in fact be

true, but it cannot be a justification for the rule. Re-

ducing transportation costs is not an objective of the

Merchant Marine Act. See Independent U.S. Tanker

Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d at 853. By allow-

ing these vessels to enter the trade, the agency sees a

further benefit in the form of “bumping.” ” Bumping,

according to the agency, will create a pool of small tank-

ers available to meet peak seasonal demand in the up-

coast (U.S. Gulf Coast/East Coast) trade. 52 Fed. Reg.

at 23527. As of May 12, 1987 (the latest date measured

by the agency in this rulemaking), 23 of these smaller,

unsubsidized tankers were inactive.'' The agency has not

adequately explained how bumping directly furthers the

objectives of the Act. In fact, the evidence in the record

strongly suggests that this is not a beneficial effect of the

rule. The agency recognizes that the rule will result

” When these VLCCs are waived into the ANS-Panama trade,

slightly smaller unsubsidized ships are “bumped” from that seg-

ment into the shorter segmert from Valdez to the West Coast.

Vessels engaged in that segment are then bumped into the Panama

Canal-Gulf Coast and Panama Canal-East Coast segments of the

trade forcing smaller unsubsidized ships out of business. Sce

American Trading Transportation Co. v. United States, 791 F.2d

942, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In that case, the Court of Appeals

vacated and remanded the agency’s decision to grant Section 506

waivers because MARAD had failed to give any consideration to

the “bumping” effect. See id. at 948-49.

"Of this total, seven vessels totaling 212,000 DWT were laid

up, 14 vessels totaling 636,600 DWT were temporarily idled, and

two vessels totaling 204,000 DWT were casualties. 52 Fed. Reg.

at 22527.

4la

in layoffs of seamen. 52 Fed, Reg. at 23525, 23531.

Furthermore, the agency foresees that smaller vessels,

which are a critical component of the military’s emer-

gency auxiliary fleet, will be laid up or scrapped. Id. at

23525, 23530. Bumping appears to have the effect of

forcing smaller, unsubsidized vessels out of business to

make room for larger, previously subsidized ones. As

the Court of Appeals stated in American Trading Trans-

port Co. v. United States, 791 F.2d 942, 948 (D.C. Cir.

1986), the Merchant Marine Act “indicates no solicitude

for the interests of large, subsidized vessels that over-

rides consideration of the interests or small, unsubsidized

ships.”

MARAD’s explanation of its rejection of alternatives

to this rule also relies on non-statutory criteria at the

expense of the objectives of the Merchant Marine Act.

The agency has rejected alternatives because they will

not generate transportation savings nor offer possible

environmental protections to the same extent as the rule.

MARAD also justifies the rule on the ground that it will

recoup subsidy payments"? and increase Alaska state

revenues. The agency even rejected one proposed alter--

native which involved admitting less than four VLCCs

because it would not be fair to the excluded vessels. This

focus on non-statutory criteria again renders the rule

defective. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association,

supra; Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v.

Dole, supra, 809 F.2d at 854. MARAD never considered

using Section 506 waivers as an alternative to the rule,”

12 The agency recognizes that the rule may result in U.S. Gov-

ernment defaults. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23534-35. When the cost of

these defaults is combined with the increased outlay by the Navy

to acquire ships that would otherwise be part of the merchant

marine fleet, see supra at 16-17, the agency’s rosy prediction that

the national coffers will be replenished as a result of this rule

is significantly tarnished.

* Under Section 506, a vessel constructed with CDS may, upon

consent by the Secretary of Transportation, operate for up to six

42a

The agency rejected using operating differential sub-

sidies (“ODS”) pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §1173(b) on the

ground that to do so would be too expensive. See Defend-

ants’ Statement at 13-14." The rejection of the ODS

option is never discussed by the agency in terms of how

it helps or hinders the objectives of the Merchant Marine

Act. Once again, the agency, in rejecting alternatives,

has substituted goals other than those specified by Con-

gress.

In consideration of the evidence in the record and the

explanation offered by the agency, the Court concludes

that the challenged rule is arbitrary and capricious pur-

suant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The agency has ignored

the evidence in the record which shows that the rule will

not directly further the objectives of the Merchant

Marine Act. Instead, MARAD has substituted factors

such as efficiency and transportation savings which the

Congress did not intend for it to consider. Therefore,

the rule must be vacated.

1V. THE AGENCY’S PROFFERED EXPLANATION

OF WHY IT WAIVED THE STATUTORILY

PRESCRIBED 30-DAY WAITING PERIOD BE-

TWEEN THE RULE’S PUBLICATION DATE

AND EFFECTIVE DATE FAILS TO CON-

VINCE THE COURT THAT “GOOD CAUSE”

EXISTED

MARAD declared the CDS repayment rule effective

upon publication stating that there was “good cause” to

waive the 30-day waiting period required by 5 U.S.C.

months of the year in the domestic trade upon payment of an

amount that bears the same proportion to the CDS as such tempo-

rary period bears to the entire economic life of the vessel.

14The Secretary of Transportation may, with respect to any

vessel in an essential bulk cargo carrying service... pay... such

sums as he shall determine to be necessary to make the cost of

operating such vessel competitive with the cost of operating similar

vessels under the registry of a foreign country. 46 U.S.C. §1173(b).

AD Cen ee

43a

$ 553(d)(3). In support of the waiver, the agency ar-

gues that it was facing a judicially-imposed court dead-

line and, that, in any case, the public did not need time

to prepare for the rule. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 23536. In

their papers, the agency and the defendant-intervenors

argue that because the rule “grants or recognizes an ex-

emption or relieves a restriction,” it may be made effec-

tive immediately upon publication in the Federal Register

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §553(di(1). See Defendants’

Statement at 30; Defendant-Intervenors’ Memorandum at

55. However, this rationalization was not offered by the

agency when it published the rule.

The Court must reject the agency’s invocation of § 553

(d)(1) at this late date. The agency claimed the “good

cause” exception pursuant to § 553(d)(3) when it pub-

lished the rule. Courts may not accept post hoc rationali-

zations for agency action; if an agency’s action is to be

upheld, it must be so on the basis of the reason articu-

lated by the agency. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). This is a rule “directed

at reviewing courts which forbids judges to uphold agency

action on the basis of rationales offered by anyone other

than the proper decisionmakers.” Local 814, Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 546 F.2d 9839,

992 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The rule applies to rationalizations

offered for the first time in litigation affidavits and ar-

guments of counsel. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Over-

ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); FPC

v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974); NLRB v. Food

Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).

Therefore, the Court cannot accept the agency’s explana-

tion, offered after it gets to Court and which was not

articulated as a basis for the agency’s action at the time

the rule was published, that because the rule relieves a

restriction, the agency may have been entitled to make

the rule effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

44a

In any event, the Court finds that the agency has not

proffered grounds sufficient to establish that ‘good cause”’

existed to waive the 30-day period between the publica-

tion date and the effective date. The exceptions to the

provision of $ 553(d) permitting an agency to avoid its

obligations to publish a rule not less than 30 days before

its effective date “will be narrowly construed and only

reluctantly countenanced.” See American Federation of

Government Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting State of New Jersey, Depart-

ment of Environmental Protection v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038,

1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The “good cause” exception is

not an “escape clause” that may be arbitrarily utilized

at the agency’s whim. See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 752,

79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945), reprinted in Administrative

Procedure Act, Legislative History, 79th Cong. 1944-46

at 200, 201). The exception should be limited to emer-

gency situations. /?. No such emergency existed in this

case to justify making the rule effective immediately

upon publication.

In support of its showing of “good cause,” MARAD

claimed that it was operating under a judicially-imposed

deadline and that the public did not need time to prepare

for the final rule. Neither of these reasons is adequate

to invoke the “good cause’’ exception. While it is true

that the agency was operating under something of a

judicially-imposed deadline (the Court of Appeals’ man-

date vacating the blanket repayment rule was to take

effect July 16, 1987), that fact alone is insufficient.

MARAD’s reliance on American Federation of Govern-

ment Employees v. Block, supra, is misplaced. In that

case, the Department of Agriculture invoked the “good

cause” exception to the requirement that general notice

of a proposed rulemaking be published in the Federa!

Register pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) because it

was under a court order to issue certain regulations

+e tet Coe

45a

forthwith. See id. at 1157.'° No such urgency existed in

this case to justify an immediate effective date. MARAD

knew that Congress was actively considering a proposal

to deal with any CDS repayment rule. The agency could

have and should have allowed Congress a period of time

in which to act. An effective date of July 15, 1987, one

day prior to the effective date of the Court of Appeals’

mandate, was the proper course of action.

Furthermore, the fact that the agency decides that the

public does not need time to prepare for the rule does

not, by itself, support a finding of “good cause.” Both

the statute and the legislative history envision a holding

period to permit, in the words of the statute, “an in-

terested person the right to petition for the issuance,

amendment, or repeal of a rule.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); sce

also Note, The “Good Cause” Exceptions: Danger to No-

tice and Comment Requirements Under the Administra-

tive Procedure Act, 68 Geo.L.J. 765, 771 n.57 (1980)

(quoting S.Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 207

(The 30-day delay in the effective date “will afford per-

sons affected a reasonable time to prepare for the effec-

tive date of a rule or rules or to take any other action

which the issuance of the rules may prompt.”). Although

the general public might not have needed time to prepare

for the final rule, persons affected, such as the plaintiffs,

were entitled to at least some time to react to the agen-

cy’s rulemaking before it became final.

Therefore, the Court finds that MARAD’s explanation

in support of its invocation of the “good cause” exception

is insufficient and unavailing.

15 An agency may waive this requirement if it “for good cause

finds . .. that notice and public procedure theeron are imprac-

ticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(B).

46a

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court must grant plain-

tiffs’ motion for summary judgment and deny defend-

ants’ motion for summary judgment. Not only has the

agency contravened the express intent of Congress as

articulated in Section 505 of the Supplemental Appropri-

ations Act of 1987, but it has also acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in promulgating the CDS repayment rule.

Furthermore, the agency impermissibly made the rule

effective upon publication in the Federal Register. There-

fore, the Court will declare the rule invalid and order

that it be vacated.

An order in accordance with this Opinion will issue

of even date herewith.

s Charles R. Richey

CHARLES R. RICHEY

United States District Judge

Dated: April 29, 1988

47a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

C.A. No. 87-1685

INDEPENDENT U.S. TANKER OWNERS COMMITTEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

JAMES H. BURNLEY, IV, et al.,

Defendants.

C.A. No. 87-2102

OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING GROUP, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

JAMES H. BURNLEY, IV, et al..,

Defendants.

ORDER

In accordance with the Opinion issued on even date

herewith, it is by the Court this 29 day of April, 1988,

ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion f

for summary judg-

ment be, and hereby is, granted; and it is

Lists

FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion f

summary judgment be, and hereby is,

FURTHER ORDERED that the rule

structional differential subsidv repavment issued bv the

‘ o M ~ A ] a eens . — > <b } ] — +h F } = |

Maritime Administration and published in the Federal]

> m. — 99 wf } . |

Register on June 22, 1987, be r s declared

48a

arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and con-

trary to law; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the rule referred to in

the above-ordered paragraph be, and hereby is, vacated;

and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that any vessel operating in

the domestic trade of the United States pursuant to the

rule held invalid in the above-ordered paragraph be re-

moved from that trade as soon as is practical.

s/ Charles R. Richey

CHARLES R. RICHEY

United States District Judge

49a

APPENDIX E

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Maritime Administration

46 CFR Part 276

Docket No. R-110]

Construction-Differential Subsidy Repayment

AGENCY: Maritime Administration, Transportation.

ACTION: Final rule

SUMMARY: This final rule allows four vessels that re-

paid their construction-differential subsidy (CDS) in ex-

change for the right to operate in the domestic trade to

emain in that trade. Three of those vessels have been

operating in the Alaska oil trade after repaying their

CDS under a 1985 Department of Transportation rule.

isi January 16, 1987 vacated that rule,

LN the effective date of its order to July 16,

987. The fourth repaid its CDS pursuant to an admin-

| lecision issued in 1980 under an interim rule

ently vacated by the court. However,

vesse | to remain in the domestic

0 nsideration. This final rule al-

remain in the domestic trade

: s of the Mer-

50a

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 22, 1987.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lynne Adams-

Whitaker, Chief, Division of Regulations, 400 Seventh

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, Tel. (202) 366-5181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION :

Background

The Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 883) generally provides that

all cargo transported in the domestic trade between points

in the United States must be carried on vessels built in

the United States, documented under United States law

and owned by United States citizens. However, U.S. ves-

sels operating in the foreign trade must compete with

foreign-flag vessels that have lower operating and con-

struction costs. In an effort to compensate for higher

U.S. construction costs, Congress passed Title V of the

Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (“the Act’’),

which authorized the payment of construction-differential

subsidy (CDS) for the purpose of building ships in

U.S. shipyards to be operated in foreign commerce. 45

App. U.S.C. 1151 et seg. The Secretary of Transporta-

tion, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD).

may pay as much as half the construction costs of such

vessels. 46 App. U.S.C. 1152. There is no corresponding

subsidy program for vessels constructed by U.S. owners

for use in the domestic trade.

In addition, Title VI of the Act authorized the pay-

ment of an operating-differential subsidy (ODS) for U.S.-

flag vessels manned by U.S. citizens and operated in ac-

cordance with U.S. safety standards. 46 App. U.S.C.

1171. By a policy decision, ODS was not paid to CDS-

built bulk vessels over 100,000 DWT. Because of the

large economies of scale of these vessels, labor costs,

which are the main subsidized item under the ODS pro-

gram, are relatively small in terms of the overall operat-

ing cost.

5la

CDS-built vessels are subject to certain restrictions.

Under section 506 of the Act, vessels constructed with

CDS “shall be operated exclusively in foreign trade or

on a round-the-world voyage... .” 46 App. U.S.C. 1156.

Section 506 of the Act allows CDS vessels to be operated

in the domestic trade in the following limited circum-

stances: (1) On a round voyage from the west coast of

the United States to European ports which includes in-

‘tercoastal U.S. ports; (2) on a round voyage from the

Atlantic coast of the U.S. to the Orient which includes

intercoastal ports of the U.S.; (3) on a foreign voyage

including a stop in Hawaii or an island possession or

territory of the U.S. In addition, CDS vessels may be

operated in the domestic trade with the consent of the

Secretary of Transportation for up to six months in any

year under authority of section 506 with the require-

ment that the vessel owner repay the subsidy on a pro

rata basis. All domestic trading restrictions for each

CDS-built vessel lapse at the end of the vessel’s statu-

tory life. Section 9 of Pub. L. 86-318 (74 Stat. 216) sets

a 20 year economic life for tankers.

The overall objectives of the 1970 amendments to the

Act (Pub. L. 91-469, 84 Stat. 1018) were to provide for

a long-range shipbuilding program of 300 ships in the

next ten years, a general lessening of dependence on ODS

for the liner carriers, and the build up of our bulk carrier

fleet in the U.S. foreign commerce. The envisioned ship-

building program of the 1970 amendments with emphasis

on building bulk carriers, including tankers.’

Prior to the 1970 amendments, the operating subsidy

programs and for the most part the construction subsidy

program of the Merchant Marine Act had been confined

to liner vessels, which operated scheduled services in for-

eign commerce under the regulatory supervision of the

1Conf. Report No. 91-1555, H.R. 15424, Oct. 1, 1970. In fact,

only 34 petroleum tankers were built with CDS authorized by the

1970 amendments.

52a

Federal Maritime Commission. The Congress, in extend-

ing and initially funding the reach of these programs

to the unregulated bulk traders (particularly the dry

bulk trade), specifically recognized the need to make

these vessels “competitive” with foreign flag ships. See

H. Rep. No. 1073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1969) ; Mer-

chant Marine Act, 1936, 603(b), 46 U.S.C. 1173(b).

Unfortunately, the governmental program offered to

U.S.-flag very large crude carriers (“VLCCs,” i.e., tank-

ers over 160,000 DWT) has not enabled them to be com-

petitive in the foreign trade. In 1970, Congress did not

foresee, and perhaps could not have foreseen, the drastic

changes that would occur in the world oil market. The

decline in export of crude oil from the Middle East, in

addition to an oversupply of world tankers built since

1970, has been financially devastating for the world

tanker market. As a consequence, the two ultra large

crude carriers and nine VLCCs constructed with CDS

under the 1970 amendments were left with no significant

competitive opportunities in the foreign commerce.

The domestic market, however, has not fared as poorly.

With the opening in 1977 of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline

System, the demand for U.S.-flag tanker tonnage has in-

creased and that demand has not been completely met by

the existing Jones Act (domestic) fleet. To alleviate the

shortage of suitable Jones Act tanker vessels, MARAD

has allowed CDS-built tankers to enter the trade for up

to six month periods after repaying the subsidy pro rata

under section 506 of the Act and in accordance with 46

CFR Part 250.2 Since 1977, MARAD has approved 43

246 CFR Part 250 establishes procedures by which MARAD may

temporarily waiver (i.e., for no more than six months in any

twelve month period) the domestic trade restrictions on CDS-

built vessels over 200,000 deadweight tons (DWT) in the Alaska-

Panama trade. Applications for such waiver must be accompanied

by information showing that suitable vessels (i.e., those over 100,000

DWT) of a competitor could not be available for the prospective

voyages.

———,

58a

such applications for CDS-built tanker service in the

Alaska oil trade (of those approvals, 37 were for VLCCs).

During 1982 and 1983, approximately six VLCCs per

year entered the domestic trade under six month per-

missions, which was the equivalent of three VLCCs par-

ticipating in the domestic trade on a full-time basis.

Because of the limited duration and availability of

these temporary permissions and the depressed market

conditions confronting tankers in the foreign trade, sev-

eral CDS tanker owners (predominantly those owning

VLCCs) applied for permission to enter the domestic

market on a permanent basis in exchange for the total

repayment of their CDS.

Prior to 1978, requests for permanent repayment were

handled ad hoc. No hearings were held on these requests

and notice of the proposed determinations was not given

to the public. However, after MARAD admitted the

VLCC STUYVESANT (operated by Seatrain Lines) to

the domestic trade, with full CDS repayment, competitors

in that trade brought suit challenging MARADs action.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Secretary’s

broad contracting powers and discretion to administer

the Act encompass the authority to grant permanent en-

try into the domestic trade to vessels upon repayment of

CDS. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444

U.S. 572 (1980).

In 1978, MARAD issued a notice of proposed rulemak-

ing (NPRM) that would have set guidelines for per-

manent CDS repayment. 43 FR 51045 (November 2,

1978).

Charterers and owners of six CDS-built vessels applied

for CDS repayment. On October 15, 1980, MARAD

adopted and made immediately effective an interim rule

to govern applications for CDS repayment. 45 FR 68393.

Under the interim rule, approvals would be granted only

for vessels of at least 100,000 DWT, and only in excep-

54a

tional circumstances, after a determination that no fav-

orable opportunities existed for viable employment of the

vessel in foreign trade during a protracted period.

MARAD was to consider a number of factors in deter-

mining whether exceptional circumstances existed.

On November 13, 1980, through an adjudicative de-

cision, issued under the interim rule, MARAD approved

the CDS repayment application for the BAY RIDGE, an-

other Seatrain VLCC. MARAD deferred action on the

other pending CDS repayment applications. On Novem-

ber 25, 1980, the Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Com-

mittee filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for

review of the interim rule and the BAY RIDGE decision,

alleging substantive and procedural defects in connection

with both actions. The District Court granted summary

judgment for defendants on all counts. An appeal was

taken.

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that MARAD was not

legally obligated to issue regulations limiting its discre-

tion and that the interim rule itself did not constitute an

abuse of MARAD’s statutory discretion. Independent

Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908 (D.C.

Cir. 1982) {hereinafter referred to as ITOC v. Lewis}.

Nevertheless, the Court vacated the interim rule on pro-

cedural grounds. It concluded that the rule lacked a

general statement of basis and purpose, as required by

the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.),

to explain MARAD’s position on the various issues raised

during the rulemaking proceeding. The Court also found

that adjudication allowing the BAY RIDGE repayment

was procedurally and substantively flawed.

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Dis-

trict Court with instructions to vacate the interim rule

and to order new rulemaking procedures, and to vacate

the approval of the BAY RIDGE application, but to allow

the BAY RIDGE to continue in domestic operation pend-

ing reconsideration of the BAY RIDGE adjudication.

no a a

na otal re cad Oe ell ae

55a

The Court left to MARAD’s discretion whether the new

BAY RIDGE decision should await publication of a per-

manent rule regarding CDS repayment. The Court also

left to MARAD’s discretion whether to adopt a perma-

nent rule similar to the interim rule so long as the jus-

tification for the rule adopted was “clearly and thought-

fully presented in a statement published contemporane-

ously with the rule’. JTOC v. Lewis, 690 F.2d at 920.

Following the transfer of MARAD to the Department of

Transportation, the Department published a new NPRM

on January 31, 1983, 48 FR 4408. That NPRM, which

was issued by the Secretary, proposed to permit all CDS-

built U.S. tanker vessels to enter the domestic trade upon

repayment of unamortized CDS plus compound interest.

The notice reviewed the entire history of this issue since

MARAD first accepted total repayment on the VLCC

STUYVESANT and reviewed the comments received on

earlier MARAD rulemakings pertaining to total repay-

ment in return for domestic trading privileges. It in-

vited further comment on these issues and assessed the

economic impact of allowing the owners/operators of these

vessels to determine whether to repay their CDS. The

rulemaking concluded that the Government was not in a

position to assess, on its own, which vessels should, and

which should not, be allowed to meet the needs for addi-

tional capacity in the domestic trade. For example, it

pointed out that only allowing operators in financial jeop-

ardy to repay their CDS was not consistent with the ob-

jectives of the 1936 Act. 48 FR at 4412.

The Department concluded that the marketplace de-

cisions of individual operators would best serve the needs

of the fully deregulated domestic tanker trade, provided

that those operators that repaid were not given an un-

fair competitive advantage vis-a-vis the existing Jones

Act fleet. Id. at 4409-4410.

Accordingly, the Department’s proposed rule required

repayment of an additional amount consisting of com-

56a

pound interest on the unamortized subsidy from the date

of its original receipt. According to the Department’s

analysis, the addition of this amount, which frequently

would exceed the unamortized subsidy itself, would dup-

liecate the financial conditions inherent in a private sector

decision to commit any comparable asset to the domestic

trade, with an allowance only for its age, by allowing the

amortization of the subsidy pursuant to its statutory use-

ful life of 20 years. See 48 FR 4408-4414. Since the

Government does not otherwise .egulate entry of new

capacity in the domestic trade, duplicating the condi-

tions ordinarily governing such entry was deemed the

most appropriate approach by the Department.*

Shortly after the close of the comment period on the

NPRM, the Congress took action to prevent temporarily

the Secretary from promulgating a final rule. The DOT

FY 84 Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 96-78, August 15,

1983) prohibited the enforcement of any rule with re-

spect to the repayment of CDS until 60 days following

the promulgation of any such rule. Thereafter, the Com-

merce Department’s FY 84 Appropriations Act (Pub. L.

98-166, November 28, 1983) imposed an additional re-

striction that prohibited DOT from enforcing any CDS

repayment rule until after June 15, 1984. In August

1984, the FY 85 Appropriations Act for Commerce, Justice

and State, which provides appropriations for MARAD,

imposed yet another restriction. The Act prohibited the

Department from enforcing any CDS repayment rule un-

til May 15, 1985 (Pub. L. 96-411, August 30, 1984).

Thereafter, Congress considered, but did not extend, these

prohibitions.

3 It should be noted that damaged foreign-built vessels may be

acquired and reconstructed for use in the domestic trade under the

Wrecked Vessels Act without prior government approval, provided

a specific amount is expended in the reconstruction (i.e., three times

their salvage value). 46 App. U.S.C. 14.

reer neremameryr sein |

57a

On May 7, 1985, the Department published in the Fed-

eral Register a final rule which allowed any owner of

a tanker built with CDS to repay its subsidy (with in-

terest) and consequently obtain a permanent removal of

domestic trading restrictions. (50 FR 19170). The amount

of repayment included the unamortized CDS on the ves-

sels plus compounded interest on that amount. The in-

terest rate, to be used for computational purposes, was

to be the rate at which the original Title XI obligation

was made or the Title XI long-term bond rate at the

vessel’s delivery. The final rule included a one-year time

limit after the rule’s effective date during which total

CDS repayment had to be made. See 46 CFR 276.3 That

time limit was from June 6, 1985 to June 6, 1986. Dur-

ing that period, three VLCCs repaid their CDS: the

ARCO INDEPENDENCE (262,400 DWT), ARCO SPIRIT

(262,400 DWT), and the BROOKLYN (226,200 DWT).

The total amount of CDS repaid by these ships was

$105.8 million. Those ships are now operating in the

domestic trade.

The final rule was challenged in court. Initially, the

District Court upheld the rule. 620 F. Supp. 1289 (D.D.C.

1985). However, on January 16, 1987, the Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the

Secretary of Transportation violated section 553(c) of

the Administration Procedure Act by adopting a final

rule which did not contain a statement of basis and pur-

pose giving an adequate account of how the rule served

the objectives. of the Act and why alternatives were re-

jected in light of them. Independent U.S. Tanker Own-

ers Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(hereinafter referred to as JOTC v. Dole|. The court

found that the Secretary’s failure to provide an adequate

statement of basis and purpose was arbitrary and ca-

pricious. The court vacated the rule, but withheld is-

suance of its mandate until July 16, 1987 “to avoid

further disruptions in the domestic market and to allow

the Secretary to undertake further proceedings to ad-

dress the problems of the merchant marine trade.” Id

58a

at 855. Under the Court’s decision; as of July 16, 1987,

the present rule will be vacated and conditions will be

returned to the status quo ante, before the CDS repay-

ment rule took effect, subject to any further action that

the agency may have taken in the interim.

In response to the JTOC v. Dole decision, MARAD pub-

lished a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal

Register (52 FR 12199, April 15, 1987) with a closing

date of May 15 for comments. That NPRM proposed to

reaffirm the allowance of the repayment of CDS, with

interest, and rescission of the domestic trading restriction

for tankers that applied to and were approved by MARAD

pursuant to the 1985 rule between June 5, 1985 and June

6, 1986. The approved applications were for the ARCO

INDEPENDENCE, ARCO SPIRIT and BROOKLYN.

Further, the NPRM proposed to reaffirm the allowance

of the repayment of CDS, with interest, and rescission

of the domestic trading restrictions for the BAY RIDGE,

which was approved to repay its CDS in November 1980.

Since the terms of repayment for the BAY RIDGE were

different from the other three VLCCs (i.e., it repaid in

accordance with conditions stated at the time of repay-

ment of principal and interest), the NPRM imposed the

same conditions on the BAY RIDGE that were imposed

in 1980.4

The proposed rule differed from the 1985 CDS repay-

ment rule in that it did not authorize all vessels that were

built with CDS to repay. Rather, it was limited to those

4 By letter dated March 16, 1987, counsel for the BAY RIDGE

requested that a proceeding on the BAY RIDGE should be conducted

independently of proceedings with respect to the three vessels which

repaid CDS pursuant to the 1985 repayment rule. The court in

ITOC vy. Lewis specifically left te MARAD’s discretion whether

or not the BAY RIDGE decisions should await publication of a

permanent rule governing repayment applications. MARAD has

decided that it is appropriate to consider the BAY RIDGE in this

rulemaking, since it would operate in the same domestic trade as

the other three vessels at issue and involves many of the same issues.

59a

vessels that were already operating in the domestic trade

on a full-time basis pursuant to prior approvals that had

been invalidated by the courts. The proposed rule im-

posed the same terms and conditions on the three tankers

that repaid during the one-year window as were required

in the 1985 CDS repayment rule.

The proposed rule also differed from the 1985 rule in

that the proposed rule was issued by order of the Mari-

time Administrator. By delegation, the Maritime Ad-

ministrator is authorized to administer and carry out the

Act, except for specific authorities delegated to the Mari-

time Subsidy Board (e.g., certain contractual functions,

see 49 CFR 1.4(k) (1), 1.67). 49 CFR 1.45(2), 1.66(e).

While the Maritime Subsidy Board is responsible for

awarding and amending CDS contracts, the Maritime

Administrator is responsible for administering CDS con-

tracts. 49 CFR 1.4(j) (2). Inasmuch as only adminis-

tration of the CDS contracts to the ARCO INDEPEND-

ENCE, ARCO SPIRIT, BROOKLYN and BAY RIDGE

are involved, the Maritime Administrator has the au-

thority by delegation from the Secretary to issue this

rule.

This final rule confirms the repayment of CDS, with

interest, and rescission of the domestic trading restric-

tions for the ARCO INDEPENDENCE, ARCO SPIRIT,

BROOKLYN and BAY RIDGE.

Summary of the Rationale for this Rulemaking

This rule provides a means to further the purposes and

policies of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

There is a tremendous overcapacity of VLCCs in the U.S.

foreign trades. On the other hand, prior to the 1985 rule,

there had been a shortage of VLCCs in the U.S. domestic

trades, which has led to frequent approvals of temporary

permissions under section 508 of the Act for the ANS-

Panama trade. This rule allows four VLCCs that have

not been able to find employment in the foreign trade to

— 60a

move permanently from the foreign to the domestic trade,

upon the repayment, with interest, of the unamortized

portion of the subsidy provided by the U.S. Treasury for

their construction. It is recognized that this action may

possibly adversely affect, though not to the degree claimed

by opponents, vessels and seamen now in the domestic

trade. The net »ossible adverse impact is outweighed by

the resulting stronger, more viable merchant marine.

The primary purpose for permitting the four VLCCs

to enter the domestic trade is to allow the employment

of the most suitable vessels for a more well-balanced U.S.

tanker fleet. The 1936 Act requires consideration of the

impact of this action on suitability of vessels both for

day-to-day commercial operations and military mobiliza-

tion needs. In the absence of the rule, a significant por-

tion of the domestic trade—the transport of crude oil

from Valdez, Alaska to Panama—would face a shortage

of vessels that can take advantage of inherent economies

that larger ships (resulting from the length of haul)

enjoy in the market. The rule furthers day-to-day com-

mercial operations by allowing more suitable ships in the

Alaska-Panama trade. As for military mobilization needs,

the Navy has certified the suitability for military pur-

poses of each of the four vessels the rule would allow into

the domestic trade, and the fleet as a whole will be suit-

able for military needs.

Allowing the four VLCCs into the domestic trade also

results in a better balance of large, medium, and handy-

sized tankers in the domestic fleet. Further, it avoids

the possible lay-up or scrapping of these generally more

modern, more efficient vessels. Instead, a few smaller

vessels may possibly be forced into extended lay-up or

scrapped. As a result of the rule significant oil transport

cost savings will be effected, which, based on the Regu-

latory Impact Analysis, could total as much as $386-542

million.

6la

MARAD recognizes that rule will not increase the

participation of U.S.-flag vessels in the foreign trade.

However, because of changes in the pattern of world de-

mand for crude oil, and reductions in demand for VLCCs

for the foreign trade, it is extremely unlikely that these

vessels would be operating in the U.S. foreign trade in

any event. Absent the rule it is likely that these vessels

would be forced into long-term lay-up and concomitant

waste or scrapped.

MARAD also recognizes that this rule possibly will

result in the lay-up or scrapping of a few smaller sized

crude carriers sooner than would otherwise occur and

that additional seamen possibly will become unemployed

as a result. Opponents of this action generally overstate

these effects. MARAD believes that six Jones Act tank-

ers may possibly be laid up or scrapped as a consequence

of this rule versus possible lay-up or scrapping of four

CDS VLCCs if the rule is not adopted. MARAD also

estimates that possibly between 100 and 225 seafarers

fay lose employment as a result of the rule. (Approxi-

mately 300 seafarers could lose employment because of

the possible displacement of six handy-sized tankers, but

this must be adjusted to account for losses due to less

use of the VLCCs. Since factors other than CDS repay-

ment (including the vessels’ size, age, source of power,

crew requirements, pollution equipment and market con-

ditions) will have an impact on the prospects for employ-

ment of Jones Act tankers, it is not clear that they would

be employed in any event. MARAD believes the direct

benefits of the rule to the fleet as a whole outweigh these

possible adverse effects on other Jones Act tankers and

seafarer employment.

Finally, regardless of the outcome of this proceeding,

the four VLCCs would be entitled to enter the dornestic

trade automatically under the Act at the end of their

statutory (20 year) useful life, at which time their CDS

will have been fully amortized. Thus, the BROOKLYN

62a

would be eligible to enter the domestic trade in 1993, the

ARCO INDEPENDENCE and ARCO SPIRIT in 1997

and the BAY RIDGE in 1999. Thus, this rule merely

serves to accelerate their entry into the domestic fleet,

with the recovery of the unamortized subsidy for the

Treasury, p!us compound interest on that amount. Thus,

the vessels are effectively placed on the same footing as

they would be at the end of the statutory amortization

of their CDS.

The owners or charterers of the four VLCCs must have

believed that it was worthwhile to repay CDS in order to

participate in the domestic trade. Obviously, those com-

panies concluded that they would make a reasonable re-

turn on their investment (i.e., CDS repayment) through

their domestic operations, despite the fact that the domes-

tie trade restrictions would be lifted on their tankers in

six to twelve years.

By the close of the comment period, MARAD had re-

ceived over 100 comments in support of or opposition to

the issuance of this rule from members of Congress, a

Federal agency, operators of both CDS-built and Jones

Act vessels, environmental groups, a fishermen’s associa-

tion, a seafarer’s union, individual seafarers, a shipbuild-

ers’ organization, two shipyards, and the State of Alaska.

MARAD also received several comments after the close

of the comment period, which were placed in the docket.

MARAD now turns to addressing the comments that it

has received.

Discussion of the Comments Received

1. Purposes and Policy of the Merchant Marine Act

Several commenters argued that this rule does not fur-

ther the purposes and policies of the Act. Other comment-

ers agreed with MARAD’s assessment that this rule does

further the objectives of the Act.

MARAD believes that the rule will further the goals

of the Act. The preamble to the Merchant Marine Act,

63a

1936, as amended, states that the intent of the Act is

“fto] further the development and maintenance of an

adequate and well-balanced American merchant marine,

to promote the commerce of the United States, to aid in

the national defense. . . .” The specific goals of the Mer-

chant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, as set out in section

101 of the Act, are to foster the development and encour-

age the maintenance of an American merchant marine

that is:

(a) sufficient to carry out its domestic water-

borne commerce and a substantial portion of the

waterborne export and import foreign commerce of

the United States and to provide shipping service

essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic

and foreign waterborne commerce at all times, (b)

capable of serving as a naval auxiliary in time of

war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated

under the United States flag by citizens of the

United States, insofar as may be practicable, (d)

composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suit-

able types of vessels, constructed in the United States

and manned with a trained and efficient citizen per-

sonnel, and ‘e) supplemented by efficient facilities

for shipbuilding and ship repair. 46 App. U.S.C.

1101.

MARAD believes that this final rule, which allows the

four CDS-built very large crude carriers (“the four

VLCCs”) to remain in the domestic trade, will benefit

the domestic water-borne commerce by allowing vessels

that are the most “suitable” for the Alaska-Panama oil

trade to serve that trade, and will result in a more

“well-balanced” American merchant marine. The fact

that the four VLCCs have been consistently employed in

that trade since their repayment of CDS (except for the

recent lay-up of the BAY RIDGE) demonstrates their

suitability for and benefit to that trade, as does the

history of six month permissions issued pursuant to sec-

tion 506 of the Act. Although originally built to operate

64a

in the foreign trade, the four VLCCs are not competitive

in that trade. If not allowed to operate in the domestic

trades, the four VLCCs would likely be laid up and

possibly scrapped.

a. Suitability of the Four VLCCs for the Domestic

Trade

‘i) Some commenters (predominantly owners of tank-

ers in the Jones Act trade that would have to compete

with the four VLCCs either directly or indirectly) con-

tended that the four VLCCs are not suitable for the do-

mestic trade and that allowing these four VLCCs to re-

main in the trade will disrupt the domestic tanker fleet.

Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) and American Pe-

trofina disagreed, arguing that the four VLCCs will ben-

efit the domestic tanker fleet overall.

A key purpose for allowing the four VLCCs to remain

in the domestic trade is to have a sufficient U.S. domestic

fleet “composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most

suitable types of vessels” for that trade. Suitable vessels

for the Alaska-Panama trade are defined by MARAD

regulation as tank vessels of at least 100,000 DWT en-

gaged in the carriage of Alaskan oil. 46 CFR 250.2(h).

Suitability, in the context of the overall goals of the Act,

means suitability of particular vessels for the U.S. com-

merce, and suitability of vessels to serve as naval aux-

iliaries (for discussion of suitability of the four VLCCs

as naval auxiliaries, see section 1.°

5 “Suitability” is discussed in section 101 of the Act (46 U.S.C.

1101(d) in terms of “best-equipped, safest and most suitable types

of vessels... .” It is also referred to in other sections of the Act

in the context of military usefulness, as in section 501 of the Act.

(46 U.S.C. 1131, 1152, see also 46 U.S.C. 861, 1125) and 46 CFR

Part 250. Participation by Vessels Built with Construction-Differ-

ential Subsidy in the Carriage of Oil from Alaska in the Domestic

Trade.

65a

Tanker demand in the ANS trade depends on ANS

oil production and the distribution of the oil. As produc-

tion increases, so does the amount of tonnage needed to

carry the oil. However, the increase in demand for tank-

ers may not be proportional to oil production if there is

also a change in the distribution of the oil.

Several factors contribute to the sutability of the four

VLCCs for the ANS-Panama trade. VLCCs are more

suitable for long-haul, high volume trades than smaller

tankers, due to economies of scale. That is, tanker oper-

ating costs do not rise as fast as cargo volumes. Studies

of optimal ship size have shown that optimal ship size

is determined by minimizing costs per ton at sea and in

port. (In port, costs per ton increase with ship size; at

sea, however, costs per ton decline with ship size). J.O.

Jansson and D. Shneerson, “The Optimal Ship Size,”

Journal of Transport Economic and Policy,” Journal of

Transport Economic and Policy, 217, 223 (Sept. 1982).

VLCCs are more suitable for the Alaska-Panama leg of

the ANS trade because of the length of the voyage (ap-

proximately 4,950 miles). The at-sea time is significantly

longer than any of the other legs of U.S.-flag oil ship-

ments in the U.S. Another factor contributing to the

suitability of the VLCCs for the Panama leg is the deep-

draft at the Puerto Armuelles terminal in Panama, which

can accommodate those larger tankers. Because of these

factors, VLCCs are able to carry oil in that trade more

efficiently than smaller tankers under 100,000 DWT.

Historically, VLCCs have carried the majority of oil

from Alaska to Panama. During 1986, about half the

full-time equivalent tanker employment in the Alaska-

Panama trade was for vessels from 200,000 DWT to

265,000 DWT; most of the other half was for VLCCs

from 170,000 DWT to 190,000 DWT. A small percent-

age was carried by tankers from 110,000 DWT-137,000

DWT, while only 0.6 percent in 1986 was carried by ves-

sels under 100,000 DWT. (Historically, the share car-

66a

ried by tankers under 100,000 DWT has been no more

than six percent.) Even prior to the 1985 CDS repay-

ment by three of the VLCCs, the Valdez-Panama trade

was overwhelmingly dominated by tankers over 100,000

DWT. Many of these were CDS-built VLCCs operating

under six month permissions in the domestic trade.

The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) also indicate

trends in the distribution of oil by trade and by vessel

tonnage pertinent to this issue. It indicates that since

the permanent entrance of the three CDS-built VLCCs

in the domestic trade (i.e., from 1985-1986), the percent-

age of full-time equivalent tanker employment for VLCCs

over 200,000 DWT in the Alaska-Panama trade has risen

considerably, and employment by vessels under that ton-

nage range has decreased correspondingly.® It appears

therefore that the trend of large VLCCs carrying the

majority of Valdez-Panama ANS trade will continue.

(ii) Several commenters argued that the legislative

history of the Act indicates that the term “suitability”

in section 101 refers solely to military suitability, and

that the four VLCCs are not suitable for military use.

MARAD agrees that usefulness of a vessel for national

defense or military purposes is one factor to be consid-

ered in determining whether a vessel is “suitable” under

section 101. In fact, the four VLCCs at issue have been

certified by the Navy as being so useful. Section 501 of

the Act establishes requirements for approval of appli-

cations by proposed ship purchasers for CDS. One of the

requirements for approval in section 501 is that the Sec-

retary of Transportation must determine that the “plans

and specifications call for a new vessel which will... be

suitable for use by the United States for national defense

or military purposes in time of war or national emer-

*It should be noted, however, that in some years, the full-time

equivalent of three VLCC’s operated in the ANS trade under six

month waivers pursuant to 46 CFR Part 250.

67a

gency .. .” section 501(b) requires the Secretary of

Transportation to submit the plans and specification for

the proposed vessel to the Navy Department “for exam-

ination thereof and suggestions for such change therein

. in order that such vessel shall be suitable for eco-

nomical and speedy conversion into a naval or military

auxiliary, or otherwise suitable for the use of the United

States Government in time of war or national emer-

gency.” 46 App. U.S.C. 1151. If the Secretary of the

Navy approves the plan, the approval shall be certified

to the Secretary of Transportation.

In a letter dated June 22, 1971 to the Assistant Secre-

tary for Maritime Affairs, Department of Commerce, the

Navy Department certified the plans and specifications

on the same ship design as the BROOKLYN and BAY

RIDGE. In that letter, the Navy Department certified

“that the proposed ships are suitable for the use of the

United States Government in time of war and national

emergency.” The Navy Department suggested certain

features to enhance the suitability of the tankers, which

subsequently were included in the plans. On July 3,

1973, the Navy Department approved the plans for the

design of the two ARCO VLCCs, and certified that they,

too, were suitable for use by the government in time of

war or national emergency. The Navy again suggested

certain features that were in accordance with Military

Sealift Command standards. That letter also noted that

the design did not meet basic environmental standards

expected to be established for oil transport vessel, and,

thus, the Navy requested that the final contract plans

and specifications be resubmitted to the Navy for review.

Those plans were subsequently resubmitted to Navy, and

received their approval. Thus, the CDS-built VLCCs

were built with the approval of the Navy as suitable for

use by the government pursuant to section 501 of the Act.

Further, the word “suitable” as used in section 101(d)

of the Act, (i.e., “(d) composed of the best equipped,

-

68a

safest and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in

the United States and manned with a trained and effi-

cient citizen personnel, and ...”) is not limited to suit-

able vessels for use in time of war or national emergency

or for economical and speedy conversion into naval or

military auxiliary. The word also addresses the suit-

ability of vessels for commercial trading purposes. Other-

wise section 101(a) of the Act loses its meaning and

section 101(b) becomes redundant.

MARAD has historically employed the term “suitable”

in referring tu vessels that meet the requirements set out

in section 211(c) of the Act. Thus, the formal findings

which are made by the Maritime Administrator in his

determination as to whether vessels meet the require-

ments of section 211(c) employ the word “suitable.” As

used by the Maritime Administrator in this context

“suitable” refers primarily to commercial characteristics

as described in section 211(c) which would enable a ves-

sel to operate efficiently in commercial operations.

Further, the legislative history to the Act indicates

that “suitable vessels” include those that are “modern”

and “mobile,” * “properly equipped,” and “of adequate

speed and efficiency” * with “reduced fuel consumption.” ®

The legislative history further acknowledges that “larger

and faster ships might be more efficient, not only in de

veloping foreign commerce, but also more desirable as

naval auxiliaries.” '°

MARAD acknowledges the importance of the national

defense objective of the Act, which is clearly an essential

7 House Report No. 1277, The Merchant Marine Bill 1935, 74th

Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1935).

8 House Document No. 118, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. 35 (1935).

® See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2582, Merchant Marine Act, 1935,

Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 74th Cong., 1st

Sess. 120 (1935).

10 Senate Report No. 1721, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., April 3, 1936.

69a

feature of the Act.’' Since the four VLCCs have been

certified by the Navy as being useful to the government

in times of war or national emergency, MARAD believes

that they are “suitable” vessels as defined by the Act and

its legislative history.

b. Well-Balanced Fleet

(i) Several commenters also argued that the domestic

fleet will not be well-balanced under this rule, but will

be top-heavy with VLCCs at expense of 12 handy-sized

tankers. Other commenters believed that VLCCs are

necessary to provide a combination of types of ships for

the varied segments of the domestic oil trade.

The preamble to the Act states that the Act is intended

to “further the development and maintenance of an ade-

quate and well-balanced American merchant marine, to

promote the commerce of the United States...” MARAD

believes that this rule furthers those goals and that to be

well-balanced, the U.S. fleet must be composed of a mix

of vessels that are suitable for serving particular trades.

While VLCCs are more suitable than smaller, handy-

sized tankers for the long-haul, high volume crude oil

trades, e.g., Valdez-Panama, handy-sized tankers (i.e.,

approximately 27,500 DWT) are better suited than

VLCCs for U.S. coastwise trades.

During 1986, all Jones Act VLCCs were employed in

the ANS-Panama and ANS-West Coast crude trades.

Such temporary lay ups can be attributed to seasonality

of the coastwise product trades. Thus, the current Jones

Act tanker fleet, including the repayment VLCCs, ap-

pears to have an adequate mix of VLCCs and smaller

tankers to serve the long-haul crude oil trades as well as

the highly seasonal coastwise trades. In fact, allowing

the four VLCCs to remain in the domestic trade makes

the domestic fleet better balanced than it would be with-

out these vessels in the trade. Without the four VLCCs

11 House Report No. 1950, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., 13 (1976).

70a

being employed full-time in the Alaskan oil trade, it is

likely that there would not be sufficient small tanker

capacity available to meet peak seasonal demand in the

upeoast (U.S. Gulf/East Coast) trade.

Further, only six percent of the domestic tanker dead-

weight tonnage (a total of twelve tankers of 649,609

DWT) were in long-term lay-up or temporarily idled as

of February 19, 1987. Of those, three tankers (totaling

146,600 DWT) are over 20 years old. The remaining

nine tankers include the PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND

(123,400 DWT) which was in repair, and smaller tank-

ers that could serve in the Alaska-Panama trades, al-

though at much higher cost per ton delivered than the

VLCCs currently operating in that trade. As of May 12,

1987, there were 23 inactive U.S.-flag domestic tankers.

Of these, seven (312,000 DWT) were laid up, 14

(636,600 DWT) were temporarily idled and two

(204,000 DWT) were casualties. The PRINCE WIL-

LIAM SOUND recently was chartered for six months,

the ASPEN was repaired and is scheduled for loading in

Valdez on June 12, 1987. The Navy has announced it

will purchase the SPIRIT OF LIBERTY for the Reserve

Fleet. The CHESAPEAKE has been approved for for-

eign transfer. The remaining tankers could be sufficient

to offset the loss of the three latest CDS-repayment

VLCCs from the ANS-Panama trade, although at a much

higher cost per delivered ton of crude oil. However, if

the repayment VLCCs were removed from the Valdez-

Panama trade, and replaced by laid-up tonnage, there

would be severe shortages of tanker services (at least

through 1989) to meet seasonal peak demands in domes-

tic petroleum trades.

Comparing the February lay-up list to the May list

shows an addition of 11 ships.’* Some of this increase

12 Tankers of less than 8,000 DWT and chemical tankers were

not included in calculating these figures. The RLA lists the laid up,

idle, and casualty tankers as of May 22, 1987.

7la

can be attributed to the delivery of the 209,000 DWT

EXXON LONG BEACH as there has been little change

in the employment of the four CDS-repayment VLCCs

during this period. Although the BAY RIDGE has re-

cently been laid up, MARAD believes there are still ade-

quate employment opportunities in the Valdez-Panama

trade. (See RIA).

(ii) Shell Refinery and Marketing Company com-

mented that the domestic fleet will not be well-balanced

with the four VLCCs in the trade. The basis for this

contention was Shell’s statement that it was given con-

tractual notice of terminaiton of their subcharters for

the B.T. ALASKA and B.T. SAN DIEGO, two VLCCs

-which will be idled as of August 4, 1987. Shell argued

that its two proven “most suitable” tankers and other

Jones Act vessels will be unemployed and _ possibly

scrapped in order to accommodate and reward those who

unwisely invested in CDS vessels.

While some realingments of the tanker fleet has oc-

curred following CDS repayment, that realignment has

resulted from shippers seeking to charter suitable, cost-

effective tankers (see RIA). That shippers have kept the

four VLCCs and the Shell vessels employed since the four

VLCCs repaid their CDS indicates that they are suitable

for the Alaska-Panama trade. The recent lay-up of the

BAY RIDGE and notice of termination of the Shell ves-

sels’ charters do not necessarily indicate at this point

anything beyond anticipated temporary idle tonnage. It

is reasonable to believe that if in fact these vessels are

among the most suitable tankers, they will be employed

in the future and thus contribute to a well-balanced U.S.

flag fleet.

(iii) Several commenters argued that the rule will

cause the U.S. fleet to be unbalanced on the basis that

the U.S. foreign trade fleet will be less adequate because

the four VLCCs will not operate in that trade.

72a

The U.S.-flag tanker fleet engaged in the foreign trade

will in all likelihood be unaffected by this rulemaking.

The four repayment VLCCs were built for the foreign

trades, but because of changes in the geographic pattern

of U.S. foreign oil trades and continually depressed mar-

ket conditions for VLCCs in foreign trades, U.S.-flag

VLCCs have been unable to compete effectively in these

trades (see RIA and section 1.d.(i) below). If the four

VLCCs were removed from the domestic trade, they

would probably not be employed in the U.S. foreign

trades. They would be laid-up or more likely, eventually

scrapped. The agency has not ignored the objective of

fostering a fleet capable of carrying a substantial portion

of U.S. waterborne export and import foreign commerce,

put the reality is that this rulemaking will not discour-

age or enhance that objective.

ce. Impact on Shipyards and Shipbuilding

(i) Several commenters argued that the rule will have

a negative effect on U.S. shipyards, in opposition to the

goals of the Act. Some commenters stated that CDS re-

payment has already destabilized the domestic tanker

industry and, thus, discouraged shipbuilding. Some com-

menters also believed that the rule will particularly dis-

courage the building of militarily useful handy-size tank-

ers. Other commenters believed that domestic construc-

tion has and will continue to decline, due to factors

other than CDS repayment.

One of the objectives of the Act is to encourage the

development of a merchant marine fleet “supplemented by

efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair.”

While this rulemaking will not actively promote this goal,

it also will not have a significant adverse effect on U.S.

commercial shipbuilding. MARAD acknowledges that fu-

ture shipbuilding prospects with or without this rule do

not appear positive. Even without CDS repayment, as

discussed elsewhere, the growth prospects for the domes-

73a

tic petroleum trades are not sufficient to require the con-

struction of additional tanker capacity.

No orders for the construction of unsubsidized tankers

over 100,000 DWT were placed between April 1976 and

August 1984. On August 27, 1984, EXXON placed an

order for construction of two 209,000 DWT tankers in

the United States for employment in the ANS trade. Two

foreign-flag tankers over 190,000 DWT were rebuilt in

the United States for the ANS crude oil trade in 1981

and 1983 under the Wrecked Vessel Act (46 U.S.C. 14).

Under this Act, foreign-built vessels that are wrecked

off the U.S. coast are eligible to enter the U.S. domestic

trade provided the vessel is purchased by a U.S. citizen

and rebuilt in the United States at a cost that is at least

three times the appraised salvage value. The first vessel,

the OVERSEAS BOSTON (123,700 DWT), was rebuilt

in 1981 and the second vessel, the OGDEN COLUMBIA

(136,000 DWT), was rebuilt in 1983.

Full-time operations of the three additional VLCCs

in the ANS trade following the 1985 rule did not signifi-

cantly affect the total capacity available. VLCC capacity

in the ANS trade following the three most recent pay-

backs is virtually the same as it was prior to the 1985

rule, when six VLCCs operated for several years in the

ANS trade on six-month waivers. In fact, the 1985 entry

stabilized domestic tanker markets because the propor-

tional payback required for waiver did not fully offset

capital cost advantages of CDS tankers, and any suitable

non-CDS tanker could block the granting of a waiver

even if its unemployment was due solely to the insistence

on unreasonable rates.

Removal of the repayment VLCCs from the domestic

trade would not increase construction of militarily use-

ful, handy-sized tanker in U.S. yards for the following

reasons. Because those smaller tankers are not suitable

for ANS-Panama trade, shertages of tanker tonnage in

74a

that trade (following removal of repayment VLCCs)

would probably be met by the granting of six-month

waivers for CDS-built VLCCs, and/or by activating laid

up tankers. However, it is unlikely that new VLCCs

would be built for this trade in any case. In addition to

the high cost of construction and the long lead time be-

fore delivery, the ANS-Panama trade is expected to de-

cline in the 1990s. It is unrealistic to expect any invest-

ment in new tankers for a market in which capital would

have to be amortized over a 5-10 year period. Thus,

allowing the four CDS-Built VLCCs to remain perma-

nently in the domestic Jones Act fleet will have little ef-

fect on the amount of domestic tanker construction.

(ii) The Shipbuilders Council of America asserted that

withdrawal of the rule would have a positive impact

on West Coast ship repair facilities, because smaller

and more numerous tankers presently in lay-up would

replace the VLCCs. These smaller tankers would be re-

paired in domestic yards.

MARAD acknowledges that a few smaller, less efficient

tankers might remain fully employed in the ANS trade

if the four VLCCs were not allowed to remain in the

domestic trade, with some additional repair opportunities

for shipyards. However, many of the laid up tankers

are nearing the end of their statutory useful life and

several are older. Thus, opportunities for ship repair

facilities would decline as these older tankers are

scrapped.

d. Impact on the Foreign Trade Fleet

(i) A number of commenters argued that removing

the four VLCCs from the foreign trade will reduce needed

tonnage in that trade. Other commenters insisted that

the four VLCCs cannot compete in the foreign trade.

One of the goals of the Act is to encourage the devel-

opment and maintenance of a merchant marine sufficient

75a

to carry “a substantial portion of the waterborne export

and import foreign commerce of the United States... .”

46 U.S.C. 1101(a). The Court of Appeals criticized the

previous CDS repayment rule for its “dubious proposition

that the fleet will remain able to carry out ‘a substantial

portion’ of foreign commerce .. . TOC v. Dole, 809 F.2d

at 853 (D.C. Cir. 1987). However, the Court also noted

in a footnote:

It may be, of course, that present conditions in the

world shipping market make it impossible for the Secre-

tary to find a way to meet all of the statutory objectives.

If this a problem, she should discuss it frankly and

directly when she considers which measures to adopt in

light of the objectives explicitly set out in the Act. 7d.

at 854, n.4.

While this rulemaking will provide a domestic tanker

fleet that is: (1) Sufficient to carry the domestic water-

borne commerce of the United States and (2) composed

of the “best equipped, safest, and most suitable types of

vessels,” MARAD acknowledges that it would not increase

or decrease the U.S.-flag share of the water-borne export

and import bulk foreign commerce of the United States.

The U.S.-flag foreign trade tanker fleet currently con-

sists of 26 CDS-built tankers totaling three million dead-

weight tons, including four VLCCs and two ULCCs.

(This excludes the four VLCCs that are the subject of

this rulemaking and three CDS§S-built integrated tub-

barges, but includes two CDS-built ore-bulk-oil carriers

built with CDS.) This tonnage is insufficient to carry a

substantial portion of the U.S. bulk foreign commerce.

The four CDS-built VLCCs and two ULCCs (ultra large

crude carriers) are currently laid up. Only one of the

CDS-built tankers under 100,000 DWT is laid up. Seven

of those tankers are employed in the foreign trade, while

the remaining 12 tankers are under charter to the Military

Sealift Command (6) or are employed in the preference

trades (6) carrying Strategic Petroleum Reserve oil.

76a

While the intent of MARAD’s CDS and ODS programs

was to provide a basis for a U.S.-flag fleet that is suffi-

cient to carry a substantial portion of our bulk import

and export trade, the assumptions of those programs

were not met for VLCC tankers and most of these tank-

ers built under the 1970 program are not competitive in

the international market. Moreover, even with the bene-

fits of CDS, the capital costs of CDS-built VLCCs exceed

those of comparable foreign-built tankers. In addition,

provision for full ODS, as some suggest, would be exor-

bitant, whether it included or excluded capital cost dif-

ferentials. Full subsidy would require approximately $5

million annually per ship. There would be no incentive

for efficient operation and the Government would become

the guarantor of profitable operation. Moreover, the

trade ramifications of such a massive open-ended sub-

sidy could prove totally counterproductive at a time when

the United States is seeking to remove other anticom-

petitive trade measures by our trading partners. The

United States is neither required to make such expendi-

tures nor would it be sound policy.

The United States currently imports approximately

6.0 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined prod-

uct, of which only three percent is carried on U.S.-flag

tankers. Further, a substantial portion of our crude oil

imports—approximately 45 percent—is received from

nearby sources including Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and

the Caribbean region. The CDS-built VLCCs are unsuit-

able for these nearby import trades. Approximately 32

percent of U.S. crude oil imports are received from the

distant Arabian Gulf and North Sea regions for which

VLCCs would be suitable. (However, as noted below,

U.S. ships cannot compete profitably in that trade.) In

contrast, ten years ago U.S. crude oil and refined product

imports averaged 8.8 million barrels per day. Only 14

percent of our crude oil imports were received from

nearby sources while over 40 percent of our oil imports

77a

were received from the Arabian Gulf and North Sea

regions.

During the last year, there has been an increase in

oil exports from the Arabian Gulf region and a corre-

sponding rise in demand for VLCCs in the international

trade. Despite this increase, it is unlikely that the U.S.-

flag share of U.S. oil imports would increase, due to an

oversupply of tonnage in the world tanker fleet and the

higher cost structure for U.S. tankers.

According to the Tanker Review in the May 1987

Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, “tanker owners’ hopes for a

more sustained period of improvement have quickly

evaporated. Once again they are suffering the conse

quences of a sharp but transitory upturn in the demand

for tankers. This had effectively halted the process of

overall fleet contraction during 1986 and actually caused

an increase in the size of the active oil carrying fleet

during the year, so that the subsequent downturn in oil

liftings left the market severely overtonnaged and, by

March 1987, charter rates for most vessel categories had

fallen back to the distressed levels witnessed during the

early 1980s.” The International Association of Independ-

ent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) warned in its 1986 an-

nual report that the severe imbalance in the world’s

tanker market could worsen over the next couple of

years unless the rate of scrapping accelerates. Inter-

tanko, whose members account for about 70 percent of

the world’s independent tanker fleet, notes that last

year’s newbuilding orders at 11.5 million DWT reached

the highest level since 1979 and that by the end of 1988,

the tonnage surplus is projected to rise to about 30 mil-

lion DWT if the rate of demolition does not increase.

The amount of idle capacity in the over 200,000 DWT

size class represents more than 26 percent of the avail-

able tonnage in that class. Therefore, given the relative

higher operating costs for U.S.-flag tankers and the

78a

amount of idle tonnage over 200,000 DWT in the world

fleet, it is very likely that the four VLCCs that are the

subject of this rulemaking would be laid up or scrapped

if they are required to leave the domestic trade.

In fact, of the nine VLCCs and two ULCCs built with

CDS under the 1970 program, none has had any sig-

nificant employment in the foreign commercial trades,

other than occasional shipments of oil to the Strategic

Petroleum Reserve, which are reserved to U.S.-flag car-

riage. The BAY RIDGE, which repaid its CDS in 1980,

has been operating actively in the domestic trade since

that time, as has the STUYVESANT. The other three

VLCCs operated in the domestic trade regularly under

six month waiveis under Part 250 (a total of 17 times

since 1978) and a full-time basis since they repaid CDS.

Thus, the deployment of these four VLCCs to the domes-

tic trade would have no impact on U.S.-flag tanker pres-

ence in foreign trades. If anything, by precluding their

scrapping, the rule enhances the possibility, concededly

remote, that the vessels could be used in the foreign trade

if market conditions change.

The D.C. Circuit criticized the statement in the pre-

amble to the 1985 rule that, while the rule would not en-

hance U.S. participation in the foreign trade, the repay-

ing vessels would be available if opportunities should

arise in that trade. The court was of the view that if

total U.S. tonnage decreased to the level required by the

domestic trade as a result of the rule, there would not

be capacity available to carry a “substantial portion” of

foreign oil. 809 F.2d at 853. However, it is not CDS

repayment that is causing or hastening the “natural

tendency” of the fleet to shrink to the level required to

serve the domestic demand, it is the dearth of profitable

opportunities in the foreign trade due to factors un-

related to CDS repayment.

(ii) Some commenters disagreed with MARAD’s as-

sessment that the four VLCCs could not compete in the

79a

foreign trade. These commenters argued that there were

opportunities for U.S.-flag VLCCs in foreign trade in

1986. The comments of American Trading Transporta-

tion Company, Inc., and others contended that the four

VLCCs could be competitive in the foreign trade by using

the refund of money they used to repay CDS to subsidize

their vessels in the foreign trade until international mar-

ket conditions improved. Further, a commenter stated

that ARCO and American Petrofina could use a portion

of these funds to re-engine their VLCCs from steam to

diesel, which would result in savings in fuel oil consump-

tion and manning costs, thus reducing the operating cost

differential between the ARCO and foreign-flag VLCCs.

The breakeven rate for the ARCO VLCCs in the

Persian Gulf-U.S. Gulf trade, the predominant market

for VLCCs in U.S. foreign trade, is $10.75/long ton or

WS 66 fully loaded, excluding capital costs; or $12.65/

long ton or WS 78, including capital costs.

The highest publicly reported voyage fixture for

200,000-300,000 long ton shipments in the Persian Gulf-

U.S. trade in 1986 was $7.70/long ton or WS 47.5

(Lloyd’s Maritime Data Network), well below the break-

even rate excluding capital cost for the ARCO VLCCs in

that trade. American Petrofina (which charters the

BROOKLYN) in its comments calculated that it would

incur annual operating losses of $6-6.7 million per ship

to engage in the foreign trade, in addition to $6 million

for charter hire which is payable even if the ship is not

employed. Since it would cost approximately $8 million

to lay up one of its ships, American Petrofina stated that

it would not be likely that its ships would enter the

foreign trade. Thus, it appears that the repayment

VLCCs would have generated substantial operating losses

if they had operated in U.S. foreign trades in 1986.

MARAD believes that, even if it refunded the CDS

payback money, it could not force those that repaid to

80a

use the money to re-engine their VLCCs. In repaying

their CDS, the VLCC owners made the business decision

that they could operate their tankers more profitably,

even in light of the cost of repayment, in the domestic

trade than in the foreign trade. Even if the VLCCs were

re-engined, their operating and capital costs would be

higher than that of comparable foreign-built VLCCs.”

The oversupply of VLCCs in the world market has re-

sulted in rates that could not possibly compensate the

four VLCCs for their costs. (American Petrofina pre-

dicted it would incur annual operating losses of $6 to

$6.7 million per ship to engage the foreign trade.) Fur-

ther, as American Petrofina noted, not one of the four

VLCCs has had a single commercial foreign trade voyage

in the last six years.

Hence, MARAD continues to believe that allowing the

four VLCCs to remain in the domestic trade is the best

option for their continued viable operation. To force the

four VLCCs out of that trade would not enhance U.S.

participation in the foreign trade and will not further

any of the other objectives of the Act.

(iii) A number of commenters believed that the rule

will hurt the existing foreign fleet, i.e., those non-pay-

ing CDS VLCCs, by eliminating their main source of em-

ployment in the domestic trade (through six-month

waivers).

Full-time employment of the repayment VLCCs may

have eliminated a source of employment, i.e., six-month

waivers, for non-repaying CDS VLCCs. However, under

Part 250 employment of the non-repaying CDS VLCCs

in the ANS trades may have otherwise been blocked by

an “unemployed” non-CDS tanker. Furthermore, under

13 If the vessels could have been operated profitably in the foreign

trade following re-engining. It is reasonable to presume that their

owners would have taken that step prior to the 1986 rule, rather

than allow the ships to remain idle at least six months each-year.

8la

the 1985 CDS repayment rule, all CDS-built tankers were

afforded the opportunity to permanently enter the do-

mestic trades in exchange for repayment of CDS plus

interest. Those non-repaying tanker owners have no basis

to now complain that they are adversely affected by their

failure to take that opportunity.

Moreover, as of April 10, 1987, three CDS-built VLCCs

originally owned by Seatrain (NEW YORK. MARY-

LAND, MASSACHUSETTS) were turned over by bank-

ruptcy court order to MARAD following MARAD’s hon-

oring of loan guarantees under Title XI of the Act fol-

lowing Seatrain’s defaults. Seatrain no longer has any

interest in operating those VLCCs. The only other CDS-

built VLCC that did not repay is the WILLIAMSBURG

operated by American Petrofina, which is not complaining.

e. Impact on the Domestic Fleet

Some commenters argued that CDS repayment has

caused overtonnaging in the domestic fleet. Other com-

menters supported MARAD’s assessment that the rule

would benefit the domestic fleet overall.

(i) Forecast of Alaskan Tanker Capacity. MARAD

believes that CDS repayment rule has not caused over-

tonnaging in the domestic trade, but has stabilized the

trade by allowing permanent entry of a limited number

of suitable tankers into the ANS trade instead of the un-

certainty of six-month waivers for an uncertain number

of VLCCs. Prior to the three post-1985 paybacks, six

VLCCs for several years operated in the ANS trade on

six-month waivers, representing the equivalent of three

full-time operating VLCCs. Moreover, the BAY RIDGE

has been operating in that trade since 1980.

In fact, despite a sharp decline in the upcoast pe-

troleum products trades from 1984 to 1985, laid up do-

mestic tanker tonnage has declined, in part due to high

levels of tanker scrappings in 1984-86 as a result of the

82a

Port and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA). The PRINCE

WILLIAM SOUND and the ASPEN are laid up as a

result of casualties, not because of lack of employment op-

portunities. Four of the inactive tankers, the NEW YORK

(an integrated tug/barge), JACKSONVILLE (integrated

tug/barge), FREDERICKSBURG and CHARLESTON

are under long term charter to Amerada Hess. The

Navy has announced it will purchase the SPIRIT OF

LIBERTY for the Reserve Fleet. The CHESAPEAKE

has been approved for foreign-flag transfer.

Of the remaining four tankers, all are more than 20

years old. The aggregate capacity of these four tankers

(156,000 DWT) would not be sufficient to cover the loss

of one VLCC in the event of a casualty. (A more com-

plete discussion of the “bumping” process that could im-

pact the domestic fleet is set out in the RIA at p. 31 and

in section 1.F. below.)

Further, as of May 1987, there were 50 U.S.-flag tank-

ers (with domestic trading privileges) over 20 years old.

The aggregate capacity of these ships was 1.8 million

DWT. This capacity is likely to be subject to greater

maintenance requirements, i.e., out of service time, in

the future. Some will likely be scrapped. Thus, the ca-

pacity of the domestic tanker fleet is expected to fall

sharply in the late 1980s.

A further relevant consideration is that the repayment

VLCCs have significantly lower cost per ton-mile than

smaller tankers in the Valdez-Panama trade. If the pay-

ment VLCCs were removed from the Valdez-Panama

trade, the total marine cost of transporting ANS crude

oil would rise by approximately $386-$542 million. With

resulting higher rates, cargo might be diverted from

tankers to pipelines, i.e., All American and Four Cor-

ners pipelines, thus reducing tanker employment in the

Valdez-Panama trade as well as the Panama-Gulf/ East

Coast trades.

83a

ii. Forecast of Alaska Crude Oil Production and Dis-

tribution. The demand for tankers in the ANS trade in

1987 is expected to be 6.1 to 6.2 million DWT of which

2.7 to 2.8 million DWT will be in the Valdez to Panama

trade. Production is expected to decline after 1989, thus

reducing tanker demand in all segments of the ANS

trade (RIA, Appendix VI).

As long as there is sufficient demand in the Alaska-

Panama trade, MARAD expects that the VLCCs will

continue to be employed in that trade. MARAD does not

expect that they will be employed in the West Coast seg-

ment of the ANS trade if demand in the Valdez-Panama

trade is insufficient to support all four VLCCs, given port

constraints and the higher costs of lightering or operat-

ing the ships light loaded. (Although MARAD is aware

that the BAY RIDGE did make one trip to Los Angeles

in May 1987 light loaded at 160,000 tons recently, that

was an unusual circumstance. )

While ANS tanker loadings have increased from 629

thousand barrels per day in 1977 to 1,788 thousand bar-

rels per day in 1986, loadings are expected to fall after

1989, due to a decline in ANS production (RIA Table

II-1).

The opening of the All American Pipeline in 1988 will

likely further dampen the demand for VLCCs in the

Valdez-Panama trades. The pipeline will have a capacity

to move 300,000 barrels per day of either California or

ANS crude oil from Southern California to the Texas

Gulf. To the extent that ANS crude oil is shipped

through the pipeline or more ANS crude oil is shipped

to California to replace California crude, less oil will be

shipped from Valdez to Panama.

Another factor which may reduce the demand for

U.S.-flag tankers in the ANS trades in the early 1990’s

is the potential construction of a 105,000 barrel per day

(rated capacity) refinery at Valdez by Alaskan Refining,

84a

Inc. Products from the refinery may be transported

abroad on foreign-flag tankers, thus reducing Valdez

loadings for U.S.-flag tankers. The only possible fore-

seeable offsetting trend is the development of new oil

fields, such as the Arctic Wildlife Reserve. Such de-

velopment is extremely speculative.

f. Effect on the Naval Auxiliary

Some commenters contended that this rule will cause

a displacement of handy-sized tankers, which are useful

for the naval auxiliary. Others argued that there was

no evidence that any tanker will be displaced by the four

VLCCs.

One of the objectives of the Act is to foster the de-

velopment of a merchant marine fleet “capable of serv-

ing as a naval and military auxiliary in tinie of war

or national emergency ....” 46 U.S.C. 1101(b).

MARAD has considered the effect on the naval aux-

iliary of allowing the four VLCCs to remain in the do-

mestic trade (see Regulatory Impact Analysis). MARAD

believes that up to six handy-sized militarily useful tank-

ers may possibly be displaced as a result of this rule.

Market conditions and statutory requirements have con-

tributed to a reduction in the number of U.S.-flag product

tankers, including a declining upcoast petroleum trade

(the principal market for U.S.-flag product tankers), the

opening of the Trans-Panama Pipeline in 1982, and the

anti-pollution standards of the PTSA.

As a result of these factors, 41 tankers, of the type

considered highly military useful, were scrapped over a

three year period from 1984 through 1986 (see RIA.

Appendix 1). All had exceeded their statutory life of 20

years (see RIA, Appendix 1). The average age of these

tankers was 34 years. Further, the 1978 PTSA set cer-

tain anti-pollution requirements for tankers entering

United States waters. By January 2, 1986, crude oil

85a

tankers between 20,000 and 40,000 DWT were required

to have segregated ballast tanks or a crude oil washing

system, and product tankers between 20,000 and 40,000

DWT were required to have segregated ballest tanks or

dedicated clean ballest tanks. To comply with the PTSA

requirements, tanker owners had the option of retrofit-

ting existing systems, reducing load lines (so as to carry

less than 20,000 DWT), using port reception facilities

under a specific trade exemption, scrapping, or changing

the tanker’s service. Due to the cost of retrofitting and

resulting loss of cargo capacity, and the inherent limita-

tions of reducing load lines or obtaining a specific trade

exemption to use port reception facilities, many tanker

owners scrapped their older, less efficient vessels. The

PTSA served to speed up the natural process of scrapping

that occurs when tankers exceed their useful life.

Of those 41 that were scrapped, 25 were scrapped in

1984, nine in 1985, and seven in 1986. The vast ma-

jority of those lacked some or all of the anti-pollution

features required by the PTSA. Of the seven scrapped

in 1986, four lacked PTSA features. The average age

of those tankers was 35 years.

These figures indicate that the scrapping that has oc-

curred in the past three years is not attributable to CDS

repayment but rather to the age of the vessels, their in-

ability to economically retrofit to satisfy PTSA require-

ments and poor market conditions. Since the effective date

of the PTSA requirements (January 2, 1986), the num-

ber of product tankers scrapped has declined. MARAD

believes that this decline in scrapping will continue, since

the oldest, least efficient tankers have already been

scrapped. In addition, since the enactment of the PTSA,

a number of new product tankers have been built.

Further, any effect that the four VLCCs would have

on the handy-sized tankers would be indirect, unlike the

above factors. VLCCs generally do not compete with

these smaller tankers in the same trades. As discussed

86a

above, VLCCs have historically served the Alaskan-Pan-

ama trade, and smaller tankers serve the Panama Gulf/

East Coast trades. While a mix of vessels served the

West Coast, the four VLCCs have not entered that trade.

The BAY RIDGE made one trip to Los Angeles in May

1987. Thus, any effect the VLCCs may have on the

smaller tankers would be through an indirect displace-

ment. That is, the VLCCs, being more cost-effective, may

“bump” other large tankers that could serve the Alaska-

Panama trade. In turn, these large tankers could op-

erate in the West Coast and Panama Gulf trade, picking

up oil that could have been carried by smaller tankers.

A trend in this direction is indicated by Table III-2 in

the Regulatory Impact Analysis. However, such “bump-

ing” effects are much more remote than the effects of

the PTSA, the Trans-Panama Pipeline, and declining

market conditions, over which MARAD has no control.

Moreover, the current goal of the Navy is to increase

the number of tankers in the Ready Reserve Force from

eight to twenty by the year 1992. This makes it more

likely that if militarily useful tankers became commer-

cially unattractive, the Navy will be able to purchase

these vessels for military support. In a letter dated June

10, 1987, the Department of the Navy stated its support

for the Department of Transportation’s position in its

rulemaking. That letter has been placed in the docket.

g. Impact on Employment of U.S. Seamen

Many seamen and others commented that from 600-

900 jobs will be lost due to CDS repayment. Others ar-

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Appendix — Independent U. S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Skinner · 495 U.S. 904 | Frix