Opposition Brief — Illinois v. Struebin

Polk Supreme Court, UAL

Cees EFILED

No. 88-88 AUG 11! 1986

—SOREPHFréPANIOL, IR,

| CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1988

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Petitioner,

vs.

RONALD STRuEBIN, Ancillary Administrator

of the Estate of Joel F. Struebin, Deceased;

KATHLEEN S. Potter, Ancillary Administrator

of the Estate of James K. Potter; and

DAVENPORT BANK AND TRUST,

Ancillary Administrator of Both Estates,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA

ROBERT V. P. WATERMAN

RAND S. Wonio

600 Davenport Bank Building

Davenport, IA 52801

Attorneys for Respondents

Of Counsel:

LANE & WATERMAN

600 Davenport Bank Building

Davenport, IA 52801

319-324-3246

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 13305 Manchester Road 63131 314-231-4477

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ie ee ee eee Sa an teaiele AeAe e ee

ne Sake a dk

Argument:

F

II.

Ill.

IV.

The Iowa Supreme Court Did Not Misinter-

pret or Misapply Nevada v. Hall............

The Decision of the Iowa Supreme Court

Does Not Substantially Interfere with Illinois’

Ability to Perform Its Sovereign Governmen-

tal Functions ...... 2 ee Nal it Ey end ener

Permitting Garnishment Here Does Not Pose

a Substantial Threat to Cooperative Fed-

Ca a Ce Eek ee es cuaenenanawen'é

This Court Should Not Reconsider Its Deci-

ee Pe Ws NE bn vk c tc'eecedeuseaas

a rae eat at i oad er Se ae

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir.

1984); cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909,

et. rar. oppecen thy 9

Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 718,

19S.Ct. 797, 800, 43 L.Ed. 1144, 1147 (1899) ..... 6

Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va., 490 F.Supp. 307

Ce Bae Bee sb sos kota ccn cee eee 9

Erlich-Boeber & Co., Inc. v. Univ. of Houston, 427

N.Y.S.2d 599, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 404 N.E.2d 726

(IQUE kite cbvi-dan Oésdes ake nee y

Guarini v. New York, 215 N.J. Super. 426, 521, A.2d

1362 (Ch.Div.), aff'd, 215 N.J. Super. 292, 521

A.2d 1294 (App.Div.1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.

FREESE 6nnv no nnds sated eee 8

Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 99 Nev. 93, 658

P.2d 422, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 806, 104 S.Ct.

SSG, FO bce CFO CIEEE 5 5s cdc cab ba cuee ewes 9

Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d

ty REPRE Tere Or rye Omg eats 2,4,5,7,8,9,10

Peterson v. Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo.Ct.App.1981)... 9

Skipper v. Prince George’s County, 637 F.Supp. 638

A eee GS 0d da co ee wee Ok aa oe 9

State of Illinois v. Struebin, et al, 459 U.S. 1087, 103

GR. FAR, PO Le CRED ok ok cance c anna 2

Struebin v. State, 322 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1982) ......... 2,6,9

iil

Struebin v. State of Ill., 383 N.W.2d 516, 519 (lowa

Struebin v. State, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570, 74

ee is na ah bipas'e ¥06.5.b 6 eee 0%

Taylor v. Taylor, 44 Ill.2d 139, 254 N.E.2d 445 (1969) ..

Wendt v. County of Osceola, lowa, 289 N.W.2d 67

See ce sks batadewhe bees

Other Authorities:

Iowa Code Section 642.10 (1985) ....................

Constitutional Provisions:

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

Article III, or the Full Faith and Credit Clause ....

2,3

- a oe eee ed en ey

No. 88-88

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Petitioner,

Vs.

RONALD STRUEBIN, Ancillary Administrator

of the Estate of Joel F. Struebin, Deceased;

KATHLEEN S. Potter, Ancillary Administrator

of the Estate of James K. Potter; and

DAVENPORT BANK AND TRUST,

Ancillary Administrator of Both Estates,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ronald Struebin and Kathleen Potter are the administrators

of the estates of Joel Struebin and James Potter who died on

December 8, 1978 when their vehicle skidded on the icy surface

of the Interstate 80 bridge over the Mississippi River. The vehi-

cle went over the bridge railing and plunged into the river below.

Illinois was responsible for maintaining the bridge by virtue of

an interstate compact with Illinois.

On December 5, 1980, plaintiffs Struebin and Potter sued the

State of Illinois in an amended petition in the lowa courts. The

State of Illinois appeared specially, claiming that it had

sovereign immunity from this suit in the lowa courts. The state

trial court overruled the special appearance and Illinois appeal-

ed to the lowa Supreme Court. The lowa Supreme Court re-

jected Illinois’ assertion that it was immune from suit in lowa,

relying upon this court’s decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.

410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). Siruebin v. State,

322 N.W.2d 84 (lowa 1982).

The State of Illinois filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

which was denied by this court. The State of Illinois v.

Struebin, et al., 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 933

(1982).

The case was returned to the state trial court for a three and

one-half week jury trial. The jury returned verdicts against the

State of Illinois and judgments were entered thereon in the total

amount of approximately $118,000.00.

When Illinois did not pay the judgments, plaintiffs sought to

enforce their judgments by the issuance of a writ of general ex-

ecution with a direction to serve notice of garnishment upon

Caterpiller Tractor Company. Plaintiffs sought to garnish Il-

linois withholding taxes deducted from compensation paid at

this lowa plant to employees who were Illinois residents. Illinois

again appeared specially, claiming sovereign immunity from ex-

ecution and garnishment of its property located in lowa. The

trial court sustained this special appearance and dismissed the

garnishment proceedings. Plaintiffs then appealed to the lowa

Supreme Court. During oral argument before the lowa

Supreme Court, the Illinois Assistant Attorney General pointed

out that Illinois was not unwilling to pay the judgments, and he

stated that the vehicle and mechanism provided for such pay-

ment under Illinois law was through the Illinois Court of

Claims. Struebin v. State of Ill., 383 N.W.2d 516, 519 (lowa

1986). The lowa Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the

garnishment proceedings, but on wholly different grounds than

those utilized by the trial court. The lowa Supreme Court con-

cluded, as follows:

“We therefore hold, as a matter of comity and

cooperative federalism, we will not open our courts to con-

sider plaintiffs’ proceedings to collect the judgments by

garnishment in lowa until such time as they can allege and

prove they were unable to secure payment of these

judgments in the Illinois courts. This holding, of course, is

without prejudice to plaintiffs’ future return io the lowa

court system to secure payment of their judgments upon

the pleading and proof above specified.’’ Jd. at 520.

Plaintiffs filed Complaints with the Illinois Court of Claims

on April 18, 1986. On July 18, 1986, the Illinois Attorney

General filed Motions to Dismiss these complaints, alleging that

Plaintiffs had failed to timely file notice within prescribed

periods after the date of death of the decedents. Plaintiffs made

several requests to the Illinois Court of Claims for rulings on the

motions, but received no reply. On December 12, 1986, Plain-

tiffs filed a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment in the lowa

courts. The Illinois Court of Claims subsequently granted the

state’s motion and dismissed the claims. The trial court granted

this Petition and ordered that Plaintiffs could secure payment

of their judgment in any manner that they could if the State of

Illinois were a private, non-governmental litigant.

Illinois again appealed to the lowa Supreme court, again con-

tending that it had sovereign immunity from statutory collection

procedures. The lowa Supreme Court rejected Illinois’ claim of

sovereign immunity and concluded that Plaintiffs were free to

garnish funds owed to the State of Illinois that are located

within the State of lowa. Struebin v. State of Illinois, 421

N.W.2d 874 (lowa 1988).

ARGUMENT

I.

THE IOWA SUPREME COURT DID NOT MISINTERPRET

OR MISAPPLY NEVADA V. HALL.

It is Illinois which has both misinterpreted and misapplied the

decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59

L.Ed.2d 416 (1979), not the lowa Supreme Court. In Hall,

supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the State of

Nevada was not immune from suit in California for injuries

caused by a state employee’s negligence within the State of

California. 440 U.S. at 426, 99 S.Ct. at 1191, 59 L.Ed.2d at

428. The Court held that there was nothing in the federal con-

stitution requiring California to grant Nevada immunity from

negligence claims.

The court discussed the history of the so-called sovereign im-

munity doctrine and concluded that ‘‘it affords no support for a

claim of immunity in another sovereign’s courts.”’ 440 U.S. at

416, 99 S.Ct. at 1186, 59 L.Ed.2d at 422.

The Court also rejected Nevada’s argument that the United

States Constitution provided for such immunity in either Article

Ill, the Eleventh Amendment, or the Full Faith and Credit

Clause. 440 U.S. at 421-24, 99 S.Ct. at 1188-90, 59 L.Ed.2d at

425-27. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the con-

stitution implicitly established a union in which states must

respect each other’s sovereignty by extending such immunity.

440 U.S. at 424-25, 99 S.Ct. at 1190, 59 L.Ed.2d at 427-28.

The Court did not make any distinction between jurisdiction

for purposes of obtaining a judgment and jurisdiction for pur-

poses of enforcing that judgment. Both the majority and the

dissenters in Hail, supra, foresaw an attempt to avoid the en-

forcement of a judgment rendered against a sister state. In foot-

note 12, the majority said:

~_

**12. Were it an independent sovereign, Nevada might

choose to withdraw its money from California banks, or to

readjust its own rules as to California’s amenability to suit

in the Nevada courts. And it might refuse to allow this

judgment to be enforced in its courts. But it could not, ab-

sent California’s consent and absent whatever protection is

conferred by the United States Constitution, invoke any

higher authority to enforce rules of interstate comity and

to stop California from asserting jurisdiction. For to do so

would be wholly at odds with the sovereignty of Califor-

nia.’’ 440 U.S. at 417, 99 S.Ct. at 1187, 59 L.Ed.2d at 423.

The Hall, supra, dissenters felt that the broad holding of the

majority would place severe strains on our system of

cooperative federalism. They said:

“States probably will decide to modify their tax-

collection and revenue systems in order to avoid the collec-

tion of judgments. In this very case, for example, Nevada

evidently maintains cash balances in California banks to

facilitate the collection of sales taxes from California cor-

porations doing business in Nevada. Under the court’s

decision, Nevada will have strong incentive to withdraw

those balances and place them in Nevada banks so as to in-

sulate itself from California judgments.’’ 440 U.S. at 429,

99 S.Ct. at 1192-93, 59 L.Ed.2d at 430-31 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting). See also 440 U.S. at 443, 99 S.Ct. at

1199-1200, 59 L.Ed.2d at 439 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)

(decision will induce states to isolate assets from foreign

judgments).

The argument by Illinois that the garnishee, Caterpiller Trac-

tor Company, could be liable in two different states for the

same obligation, is also incorrect. lowa Code §642.10 (1985),

expressly provides that such a corporation is exonerated from its

liablility to Illinois to the extent it must pay under the garnish-

ment. Should Illinois seek to recover this money from the cor-

poration after the corporation pays under this garnishment, II-

linois courts would be obligated to give full faith and credit to

the lowa garnishment discharge. In Chicago, R.J. & Pac. Ry. v.

Strum, 174 U.S. 710, 718, 19 S.Ct. 797, 800, 43 L.Ed. 1144,

1147 (1899), the Court held that a garnishee’s discharge under

lowa law required a Kansas court to give that discharge the

same effect it would have had in Iowa. The Supreme Court of

Illinois has also recognized this principle. Taylor v. Taylor, 44

Ill.2d 139, 142-43, 254 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1969). Double liability

to Caterpiller Tractor Company is not a risk under these cases.

Illinois claims in this Petition that the relevant policies of

Iowa and Illinois are the same. This is totally incorrect. The

Supreme Court of Iowa refused to grant Illinois immunity from

garnishment because to do so would be to have Iowa abandon

its interest in full compensation for accident victims in the State

of Iowa. Furthermore, to grant immunity from garnishment

would be an abandonment of Iowa’s interest in enforcing

judgments rendered in its courts. The interests of Illinois are to

extend its statutory limitation on recovery and to refuse to en-

force the judgment rendered in the Iowa courts as being untime-

ly under its court of claims act.

The refusal by Iowa to abandon its interests in full compensa-

tion for accident victims was the linchpin of its decision in the

first appeal of this case. Struebin v. State, 322 N.W.2d 84, 87

‘Iowa 1982). The United States Supreme Court denied Cer-

tiorari of that decision. Struebin v. State, 459 U.S. 1087, 103

S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982).

In the most recent opinion by the lowa Supreme Court, that

court decided that Illinois might be free to apply its own statute

of limitations in its court of claims, but that lowa should not as

a matter of comity apply it in Iowa courts, especially where

there was is no dispute that the action to enforce was timely in

Iowa. Thus, the state policies at issue are not the same, as is

contended by Illinois.

aaa die

THE DECISION OF THE IOWA SUPREME COURT DOES

NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERE WITH ILLINOIS’

ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS SOVEREIGN GOVERN-

MENTAL FUNCTIONS.

Illinois also claims that to permit Appellees to garnish its state

tax withholding will interfere with the ability of Illinois to exer-

cise a “‘purely governmental function - removing snow from

public roadways.”’

This is exactly the same argument made by Illinois when it

originally appeared specially in this case in 1980. (See Petition

for Writ of Certiorari - Appendix B-4 through 6) This court has

already denied Certiorari on that basis.

There is very little distinction between the factual basis of

liability in Hall, supra, and in this case. The question in Hall

was whether a Nevada state employee drove his car in California

in a negligent manner. The question in Struebin is whether an

Illinois state employee maintained the interstate bridge in a

negligent manner. It is spurious to argue that driving a snow

plow is any more a “‘sovereign obligation’’ than driving a state

car on state business. No ‘‘different state policies’? as con-

templated by Footnote 24 of the Hail decision are involved. 440

U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1190, 59 L.Ed.2d at 427.

PERMITTING GARNISHMENT HERE DOES NOT POSE

A SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO COOPERATIVE

FEDERALISM.

Illinois claims that its sovereign power to levy and distribute

taxes will be interfered with by this garnishment. This is also in-

correct. The power to tax has already been exercised by Illinois

and the funds garnished were already designated as tax revenue

owed to Illinois. lowa is not challenging the governmental

authority of Illinois. Iowa is not saying that Illinois can not

_

deny plaintiffs relief in its own court of claims. What the lowa

Supreme Court is doing is permitting its own courts to enforce a

judgment entered in Iowa. The only potential threat to

cooperative federalism is the claim by Illinois that lowa may not

enforce its own judgments.

The Iowa Supreme Court gave an example of where such a

substantial threat to cooperative federalism would exist. The

court cited Guarini v. New York, 215 N.J. Super. 426, 521 A.2d

1362 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 215 N.J. Super. 293, 521 A.2d 1294

(App. Div. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 71 (1987). In that case,

citizens of New Jersey were challenging the authority of New

York to exercise authority over two islands on the New Jersey

side of the Hudson River. New York had been granted that

authority through an interstate compact with New Jersey. The

court saw the action as a challenge to the governmental authori-

ty of New York and held that permitting the action would, in-

deed, violate principles of cooperative federalism.

It is difficult to imagine how enforcement of a $118,000.00

judgment can pose a substantial threat to cooperative

federalism or to the ability of Illinois to function as a sovereign

entity.

Illinois is attempting to paint this case as some kind of colli-

sion between the States of Iowa and Illinois. This is a

mischaracterization. The Iowa courts are merely permitting

private litigants, who obtained jurisdiction over Illinois, to en-

force a money judgment that was obtained pursuant to that

jurisdiction.

IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECONSIDER ITS

DECISION IN NEVADA V. HALL.

Illinois contends that this case is an example of the ‘‘severe

strains’’ on the federal system that were mentioned in a dissent

in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 427, 99 S.Ct. at 1191. Illinois ap-

pears to lament that such strains include the fact that its At-

torney General has been required to defend this action in the

lowa courts for eight years. (Petition for Writ p. 15) It is dif-

ficult to comprehend how Illinois can make such an argument.

It is the plaintiffs who have been subjected to endless litigation

by the intransigence of Illinois. The plaintiffs in this case sued

Illinois in 1980 in reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in

Nevada v. Hall, supra. Since that time, these litigants have been

subjected to three appeals in the Iowa Supreme Court, a three

and one-half week jury trial which established Illinois’ liability,

a claim that was rejected in the Illinois Court of Claims even

though the Illinois Assistant Attorney General told the Iowa

Supreme Court that they would not resist payment in that court,

and now two attempts to appeal this case before the United

States Supreme Court.

The decision in Nevada v. Hall, supra, has been followed in a

multitude of jurisdictions. Wendt v. County of Osceola, Iowa,

289 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 1979); Daughtry v. Arlington County,

Va., 490 F.Supp. 307 (D.C.D.C. 1980); Ehrlich-Boeber & Co..,

Inc. v. Univ. of Houston, 427 N.Y.S.2d 599, 49 N.Y.2d 574,

404 N.E.2d 726 (1980); Peterson v. Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo.

Ct. App. 1981); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 99 Nev.

93, 658 P.2d 422, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 806, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78

L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352

(D.C.Cir. 1984); cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83

L.Ed.2d 923 (1985); Skipper v. Prince George’s County, 637

F.Supp. 638 (D.C.D.C. 1986).

Certiorari has been denied in three of these cases. Struebin v.

State, 322 N.W.2d 84 (lowa 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087,

103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982); Mianecki v. Second

Judicial Dist. Ct., supra, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 806, 104 S.Ct.

195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Biscoe v. Arlington County, supra,

469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985). The mere

fact that a state is now resisting the payment of a judgment ob-

tained pursuant to Nevada v. Hall is insufficient reason for the

grant of the Writ of Certiorari.

iat ME ss

CONCLUSION

There are no special or important reasons for the Court to ex-

ercise its discretion and grant review on Writ of Certiorari. This

is not a state court decision on an important question of federal

law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. All

pertinent questions in this case were decided by Nevada v. Hall.

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

ROBERT V.P. WATERMAN

RAND S. WONIO

600 Davenport Bank Building

Davenport, IA 52801

Attorneys for Respondent

OF Counsel:

LANE & WATERMAN

600 Davenport Bank Building

Davenport, IA 52801

(319) 324-3246

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Robert V.P. Waterman, do affirm and declare that I am

counsel for Ronald Struebin and Kathleen Potter, ad-

ministrators of the estates of Joel Struebin and James Potter,

and Davenport Bank and Trust, Ancillary Administrators for

Both Estates. and that three (3) copies of the foregoing Brief in

Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari were served on

all of the parties to this appeal by mailing three (3) copies

thereof to the respective parties or counsel for said parties, as

follows:

Robert E. Wagner

Special Assistant Attorney General

1300 South Eighth Street, Suite 1

P.O. Box 1858

Springfield, IL 62705

Mailing was made by depositing copies in a United States Postal

Service mail box, with first class postage pre-paid in envelopes

addressed to the above addressees. This Proof of Service is

made in accordance with the requirements of Rule 28.3 and

28.5, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Robert V.P. Waterman

Attorney for Ronald Struebin and

Kathleen Potter and Davenport

Bank and Trust