Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moore v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
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87 = | G wf 7 \) Supreme Court, US.
FILE @
JUN 3 1988
eT
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
Pte:
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
DONALD H. MOORE,
Petitioner,
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Donaup L. RetHart
LAUCKS & MONROE
29 North Duke Street
York, Pennsylvania 17401
Tel: (717) 848-4900
Attorneys for Petitioner
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. WHETHER THE AFFIRMATIONS OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF A FINDING BY A
SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DENYING
BACK PAY AND OTHER BENEFITS, DESPITE
A FINDING THAT THE URINE TEST RELIED
UPON WAS NOT COMPETENT EVIDENCE BE-
CAUSE CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION
FAILED TO PRESENT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE
AS TO THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE URINE
SAMPLE RENDERING THE FINDING WHOLLY
BASELESS AND WITHOUT REASON, ARE IN
ERROR.
WHETHER ANY INDIVIDUAL’S FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY NECESSI-
TATES THE USE OF CAREFULLY SAFEGUARD-
ED DRUG TESTING PROCEDURES AS FOUND
IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.
PARTIES BELOW
Petitioner/Appellant/Petitioner Below
Donald H. Moore
Respondents/Appellees/Respondents Below
Consolidated Rail Corporation
- Ry
ree om
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ciaoamuaietae i
THE PARTIES BELOW ... cdateaocamiekasinas ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iil
TABLE OF CITATIONS ... Vv
OPINIONS BELOW 2
JURISDICTION ... . wikttiniemiticaienaibanaaase 2
STATUTE INVOLVED 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .. secnamlaeiias 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION
A.
B.
THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY
TO THE STATUTE, 42 U.S.C. SECTION 153
(FIRST), IN THAT THE FINDING OF
THE SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUST-
MENT TO DENY BACK PAY AND OTH-
ER BENEFITS, RELYING ON A URINE
TEST FOUND NOT TO BE COMPETENT
EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF A LACK OF
ADEQUATE EVIDENCE AS TO THE
CHAIN OF COMMAND, IS WHOLLY
BASELESS AND WITHOUT REASON,
MAKING FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
PROPER AND JUST ....
LOW SPECIAL BOARDS OF ADJUST-
MENT TO RULE ON MATTERS WITH
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS A BA-
SIS FOR THE DECISION AND TO AL-
LOW THAT DECISION TO STAND AB-
SOLUTE WITH NO REVIEW AVAIL-
ABLE TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED
CONCLUSION
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases PAGE
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Burling-
ton Railroad Company, 838 I°.2d 1087 (9th Cir.
1988 ) . Sra ANS ON Rare Ae «nen cs Pees RRO wilt Tae
Grimes v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 583 F.
Supp. 642 (S.D. Indiana, 1984) .___. 11
Gunther v. San Diego and Arizona Eastern Rail-
way Co., 382 U.S. 257 (1965) ats 11
Rinker v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 350
. emp, BET CURE BA, BG niceties 11
Zeviar v. Local 2747 Airline, etc., Employees, 733
ee RE Re | ren 10
EDERAL STATUTES
- Bik The 7" g : ee SE ee ee 2
eee ee OS OS: | eS
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987
DONALD H. MOORE,
Petitioner,
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION,
Respondent.
O some
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Donald H. Moore seeks a Writ of Certiorari to re-
view the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Cireuit in Case No. 87-5739, Moore v. Con-
solidated Rail Corporation, unreported (3rd Cir. 1988).
)
OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Cireuit is unreported, it is reproduced in
Petitioner’s Appendix (‘*P. App.’’) at 1A through 6A.
The original Memorandum and Order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania dismissing Petition for review of an award made
by Special Board of Adjustment is unreported; it is
reproduced in P. App. at 9A through 14A. The decision
of the Special Board of Adjustment finding the urine
test results unreliable and reinstating Petitioner without
back pay is reproduced at P. App. 15A through 20A.
JURISDICTION
On March 11, 1988, the Third Cireuit Court entered
judgment affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the
Petition for review of the award of the Special Board of
Adjustment. Based on the Third Cireuit’s entry of judg-
ment, this Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to
298 U.S.C. Section 1254(1) (1982).
STATUTE INVOLVED
42 U.S.C. Section 153 (First).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Donald H. Moore has been, with the exception of one
interruption due to the improper firing, an employee of
Consolidated Rail Corporation from 1971 until the present.
Consolidated Rail Corporation is a Railway Carrier as
defined by the Railway Labor Aet.
In his years of service for Consolidated Rail Corpora-
tion, Donald H. Moore had a good reeord. Prior to July
of 1985, there was not a scintilla of evidence Donald H.
Moore ever engaged in the consumption of illegal drugs.
In July of 1985, an anonymous phone caller claimed that
Donald H. Moore was a drug user. Consolidated Rail
Corporation forced Donald H. Moore to submit to a urine
test on July 25, 1985, based solely upon this anonymous
phone call,
Consolidated Rail Corporation promptly lost the
sample and then discovered the sample. Despite the fact
that the sample was lost, Consolidated Rail Corporation
attempted to have the sample analyzed. The sample was
found to be of insufficient confirming value.
Consolidated Rail Corporation then forced Donald H.
Moore to submit to a second test on August 2, 1985. Don-
ald H. Moore was then fired. Donald H. Moore appealed
this decision and hearing was held on September 6, 1985
and September 19, 1985. These hearings were before a
Hearing Officer as required by the Railway Labor Act.
After the hearings, the Hearing Officer upheld the de-
cision to terminate Donald H. Moore. Donald H. Moore
filed a timely Appeal and a review of this decision was
conducted by the Special Board of Adjustment. Donald
H. Moore demanded, on Appeal, removal of the discipline
and payment for all time lost, including reasonable com-
pensation for mental and physical distress, traveler’s bene
fits, dental plan, Title VII allowance, vacation rights and
retirement benefits.
On December 22, 1986, the Special Board of Adjust-
ment overturned the decision of the Hearing Officer and
held that Donald H. Moore was to be reinstated. A copy
of the findings of the Special Board of Adjustment ts set
forth at P. App. 15a through 20a.
The Special Board of Adjustment held that Donald
H. Moore had a ‘‘good prior record’’ (P. App. 15a) in his
15 years as a locomotive engineer and that there was not
competent indication that Donald H. Moore had engaged
in the conduct of which he was accused prior to the ine
dent which led to his wrongful dismissal.
The Special Board of Adjustment further held that
competent evidence was not presented supporting Donald
H. Moore’s dismissal and that, therefore, Donald H. Moore
should be reinstated.
The Special Board of Adjustment found:
‘« | this Board would not have reinstated claimant
_ if the record had established a reasonable doubt
that claimant could be relied upon as an engineer.”’
(P. App. 19a).
The decision of the Board mentions two drug tests
which were used to determine whether Donald H. Moore
used marijuana. The first test was of July 25, 1985, which
was lost and then found to be of insufficient confirming
value. A second sample was taken on August 2, 1985. This
sample and subsequent analysis of the sample was held to
be irrelevant by the Board.
The Board noted that the rights of individual em
ployees must be protected when it comes to handling of
urine samples. The Board found that there was ‘‘. . . no
clear evidence as to the chain of possession’’, (P. App.
18a). As a result, the Board ordered that Donald H.
Moore be reinstated as an employee.
Article G-C-9 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provides that where discipline is expunged, the employee
is to be paid for lost wages (P. App. 2la through 23a).
Despite the aforementioned holdings of the Board as to
the urine samples and the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, the Board ordered that Donald H. Moore was to be
reinstated without back pay. No explanation was pro
vided for the Board’s decision to deny back pay.
On June 30, 1987, this action was commenced by Don-
ald H. Moore’s Petition for Review and Enforcement un-
der Section 3 (First) of the Railway Labor Act. Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation was the named Respondent.
Donald H. Moore was discharged by Consolidated
Rail Corporation on September 24, 1985, for the alleged
use of marijuana. Pursuant to the Railway Labor <Aet,
Donald H. Moore challenged this decision at a hearing
before a Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer decided
in favor of Consolidated Rail Corporation and Donald H.
Moore appealed to the Special Board of Adjustment. The
6
Special Board of Adjustment rendered a decision rein-
stating Donald H. Moore, but denying back pay as well
as other benefits. (P. App. 15a through 20a). Donald H.
Moore appealed this decision to the United States District
Court by filing the aforementioned Petition.
On August 17, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. On September 25,
1987, the Honorable William Caldwell of the Middle Dis-
trict Court of Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum and
Order granting Consolidated Rail Corporation’s Motion
to Dismiss the Petition.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The decision of the Third Circuit is in direct conflict
with the provisions of the controlling statute, 42 U.S.C.
Section 153(q) (First). The Petition of review of the
findings of the Special Board of Adjustment was proper
in that the findings of the Board were wholly baseless
and without reason. In addition it is completely against
the ideals of the Constitution of the United States to allow
a judicial entry to exist and concurrently exercise legisla-
tive and executive powers as this Special Board has done,
particularly in an area of such sensitivity as drug test-
ing, requiring special attention and review procedures to
ensure the protection of employees’ rights.
A. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO
THE STATUTE, 42 U.S.C. SECTION 153 (FIRST), IN
THAT THE FINDING OF THE SPECIAL BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT TO DENY BACK PAY AND OTHER
BENEFITS, RELYING ON A URINE TEST FOUND
NOT TO BE COMPETENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF A
LACK OF ADEQUATE EVIDENCE AS TO THE CHAIN
OF COMMAND, IS WHOLLY BASELESS AND WITH-
OUT REASON, MAKING FEDERAL JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW PROPER AND JUST.
Since Subsection (q) of U.S.C. Section 153 (First)
provides that the Board’s decision forms the basis for
Appellate review, the language of the decision is obviously
critical. The Board noted that Donald H. Moore had a
‘‘reasonably good record’’ (P. App. 15a), and that there
was apparently no suspicions that Donald H. Moore used
drugs until a single, anonymous phone caller made this
serious accusation. (P. App. 16a).
As a result of this anonymous phone eall, Consolidated
Rail Corporation forced Donald H. Moore to submit to a
urine test on July 25, 1985. This test, however, was lost
and subsequently reappeared and was determined to be
insufficient confirming value. (P. App. 16a). Consoli-
dated Rail Corporation proceeded to require Donald H.
Moore to submit to a second urine test which he complied
with on August 2, 1985. (P. App. 16a). The second test
was found to be positive. (P. App. 17a). Upon review,
the Board stated that ‘‘no clear evidence as to the chain
of possession during transit’’ was presented as to this
second test. (P. App. 18a).
The Board correctly noted that:
‘«. . . the gravity of the drug problem does not re-
lieve any employer trom making certain that the engi-
8
neer is accorded all the procedural protection that
elementary principles of due process, fair play and
common sense require. Mere suspicion, conjecture
and hearsay may never be substituted for competent
proof.’’ (P. App. 17a).
The Board scrutinized the evidence and properly held
that the positive reading from the August 2, 1985 test
would not support the firing because of the lack of evi-
dence as to chain of custody.
Chain of possession or custody is not a trivial matter
which the courts may wink at or choose to overlook when
convenient. The Board was absolutely correct in over-
turning the firing on this critical ground. The award of
the Board, however, provides that reinstatement is to occur
without back pay. (P. App. 19a). There is no explanation
as to the reasoning for the denial of back pay.
The Middle District Court attempted to provide this
missing explanation. The Court noted on Page 4 of its
Memorandum that:
‘*A fair reading of the decision indicates that, while
it is believed that the deficiency in the record did not
justify discharge, the record was insufficient to jus-
tify a suspension without pay for having used mari-
juana.’’ (P. App. 12a).
The citation from Page 4, however, is not a fair read-
ing of the Board’s decision. The Board’s decision was
that the second test was rendered unreliable by the failure
to provide adequate testimony as to the critical issue of
chain of custody. The result of this decision was quite
simply: no evidence to prove the use of marijuana.
The Middle District’s Memorandum, therefore, is
illogical on this critical ground. If the one piece of evi-
dence is entirely tainted on the issue of dismissal, must it
not likewise be entirely tainted on the interrelated issue to
back pay? Consolidated Rail Corporation has argued that
the Board must have used this tainted evidence in order
to reduce the discipline. This argument, which was adopt-
ed by the Middle District Court, has no basis in law or in
the Board’s Order.
In a very recent Ninth Circuit decision, Brotherhood
of Locomotwe Engineers v. Burlington Northern Rail-
road Company, 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988), it was held
that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy is paralleled
by a right of employees to an expectation of privacy be-
tween the employee and employer. An employee has the
right to certain expectations concerning an employer’s in-
vasion of this privacy.
Just as justice requires that the Fourth Amendment
has parallels in non-governmental employer/employee re-
lationships, so, too, does it require that there is a uni-
formity in the application of the rules of evidence between
administrative proceedings and state and federal adjudi-
eatory proceedings. A person’s rights which require pro-
tection in the court system need no less protection in the
setting of an administrative hearing when the decision
rendered can have just as far reaching and damaging
effects as in the formal court environment as seen here.
Consolidated Rail Corporation did not raise any ob-
jections to the Board’s clear finding that there was in-
sufficient proof as to chain of custody. This finding was
binding on the Middle District Court. The Middle Dis-
trict ignored the importance of the Board’s evidentiary
finding. The purpose of proof of chain of custody is to
es ts
10
show that the sample was not altered or that the sample
was from Donald Moore. If Consolidated Rail Corpora-
tion could not prove that the sample was not altered or
that the sample was from Donald Moore, the results of the
analysis of the sample are irrelevant. The Middle Dis-
trict Court erred by even mentioning the results of the
test, as a basis for a decision.
Paragraph 15 of the Petition alleges that denial of
back pay is contrary to the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment and that the Special Board of Adjustment exceeded
its authority and was without jurisdiction under the Rail-
way Labor Act to deny back pay. Article G-C-9(h) of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement specifically provided
that where discipline is expunged, the engineer shall be
paid for such wage losses incurred. (P. App. 21a through
23a).
In a case discussing denial of back pay under the
Railway Labor Act, it has been held that it is proper to
determine whether the Collective Bargaining Agreement
gave the Special Board of Adjustment the authority to
make its award as it did. Zeviar v. Local 2747 Airline, etc.,
Employees, 733 F.2d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1984). In the
matter confronting this Court, the Collective Bargaining
Agreement has spoken as to this issue. The Board may
not simply ignore the language in Article G-C-9(h).
It has been held that where the award drew its es-
sence from the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court
may not review the merits of the award. Id. Conversely,
it must be true that where the award issued ignores the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, this Court should and
must review the decision.
11
As stated previously, Subsection (q) of Section 153
(First) permits review of Special Board of Adjustment
decisions which fail to confine to matters within the scope
of its jurisdiction. Donald H. Moore has met this burden.
Denial of back pay is clearly outside the Board’s juris-
diction that the Board ignored the Collective Bargaining
Agreement in reaching its decision.
Furthermore, awards of the Special Board of Adjust-
ment are subject to review if they are wholly baseless and
completely without reason. In this case, it is alleged that
Donald H. Moore was exonerated of the charges. He was
punished nevertheless. This is clearly improper. If the
Board of Adjustments is to punish Donald H. Moore as it
did, some reasonable basis must exist and must be stated
in the Order.
This separate ground for review was established by
the United States Supreme Court in Gunther v. San Dicyo
and Arizona Eastern Ratlway Co., 382 U.S. 257, 86 S. Ct.
368, 15 L.Ed.2d 308 (1965). See also Rinker v. Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co., 350 F. Supp. 217, 219 (E.D. Pa.
1972). It has also been held that the Board’s decision is
outside its jurisdiction if the decision is without founda-
tion and reason in fact or is wholly baseless and without
reason. Grimes v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 583
F. Supp. 642, 641 (S.D. Indiana 1984).
B. IT IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY TO ALLOW
SPECIAL BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT TO RULE ON
MATTERS AND NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS A
BASIS FOR THE DECISION AND TO ALLOW THAT
DECISION TO STAND ABSOLUTE WITH NO REVIEW
AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED.
The Special Board of Adjustment was created to solve
minor disputes arising out of interpretation or applica-
tion of an existing agreement. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers v. Burlington Northern Railroad Com-
pany, 838 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988). When such a board
needs to make decisions on matters as sensitive and im-
portant as the propriety and competency of particular
drug testing strict compliance with the rules of evidence
is proper and just. Issues such as drug testing involve
parallel rights of the fundamental constitutional right to
privacy and as such demands a particularly specifie de-
gree of uniformity between administrative hearings and
the court system. To allow an administrative board to
make decisions wholly baseless and without reason and
without review available is to return to a McCarthy style
of adjudicatory proceedings which is without a doubt
against the public policy of this Court and this Nation.
o
CONCLUSION
In this case, there is nothing in the decisions which
could possibly justify Donald H. Moore’s severe punish-
ment. Consolidated Rail Corporation has stated that Page
3 of the Board’s decision indicated a finding that Donald
H. Moore tested positive for marijuana. This is a mis-
statement in the Board’s decision. The Board’s decision
was that the procedure used for the keeping of the positive
specimen was so inadequate that it could not support the
decision to fire Donald H. Moore. If specimen procedures
were so inadequate that Donald H. Moore could not be
fired based upon a positive reading, how can the same
specimen be used to punish Donald H. Moore? This rea-
13
soning is clearly illogical and not based upon fact or
reason.
For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
LAUCKS & MONROE
Donavp L. RErHART
Sup. Ct. L.D. No. 07421
29 North Duke Street
York, Pennsylvania 17401
Tel: (717) 848-4900
Attorneys for Petitioner
5.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Third Cireuit Court of Appeals Decision 1A
Judgment of Third Cireuit lied dati ehialaites it 6A
Memorandum & Order of Judge Caldwell . 8A
findings of Special Board of Adjustment 0.894 ISA
Article G-C-9 of Colleetive Bargaining Agreement I17A
1A
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 87-5739
MOORE, DONALD H.,
Appellant
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Civil Action No. 87-0917
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
Submitted Pursuant to Third Cireuit rule 12(6)
March 8, 1988
BEFORE: WEIS, GREENBERG, and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges
(Filed Mar. 11, 1988)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge
Petitioner, Donald H. Moore, appeals from an order
entered in the district court on September 25, 1987 dis-
missing his petition to review an award made by a Spe-
cial Board of Adjustment following a hearing under the
Railway Labor Act reinstating him without back pay fol-
lowing his discharge by respondent, Consolidated Rail
9 |
~-*
Corporation, for the alleged use of marijuana on Conrail’s
property. The facts significant to us for this appeal are
not in dispute.
In July 1985 Conrail received an anonymous call stat-
ing that Moore was using drugs. Consequently, Conrail
required that Moore submit to a urine analysis on July
25, 1985. Unfortunately, however, the sample from that
test was lost and then when recovered was found to be
inconclusive. On August 2, 1985 he was again tested. The
Board deseribed the procedure for this second test as
follows:
The test took place at Carrier’s Regional Medical
Office at Philadeiphia and Carrier’s Dr. Brindisi,
Registered Nurse Farrell and Health Service Man-
ager McGee were present at the time. The container
holding the specimen was handed by claimant to Dr.
Brindisi immediately after it was given and the Doe-
tor in turn gave it to Ms. Farrell who placed the con-
tainer with the specimen in another container prop-
erly labeled and secured by a cap. She then placed it
in a labeled bag with a note for Metpath Laboratories
requesting analysis and report. That procedure took
place at about noon and about two hours later the bag
was picked up by a Metpath messenger.
This report of the test was understood by the Board to be
positive for marijuana. Though Moore does not concede
the accuracy of the report he does not suggest that the
Board’s understanding of what the report meant is in-
correct.
As a result of the report Conrail, after a hearing, dis-
charged Moore who then administratively appealed as au
thorized by 45 U.S.C. § 1538. The appeal was heard by a
three member Board with a neutral chairman and a car-
rier and an employee member. See United Steelworkers
of America v. Union Railroad Co... 648 F.2d 905 9138 (3d
Cir, 1981). In its decision the Board noted that Moore
had a reasonably good record with discipline having been
imposed on him twice in 15 years. The Board recognized
that the use of a narcotic by an engineer is a serious mat
ter but cautioned that an employee should be disciplined
only on the basis of appropriate evidence, It indicated
that Conrail had made a determined effort to observe most
of the requirements to make an appropriate case but that
‘*!t}he reeord is not as clear as it should be, however,
since there is no clear evidence as to chain of POSSession
during transit from Carrier to the Laboratories and of
the Laboratories’ procedures,’
The Board said that upon “weighing all aspects
of the case, the hazards involved, the respective interests
of the parties and the shortcomings in the record, it is
our conclusion that claimant should be reinstated with
seniority unimpaired but without back pay. It pointed
out that it would not have reinstated Moore despite errors
made by Conrail if the record had established a reason
able doubt that he could be relied on as an engineer, It
said that before he could return to active duty he must
pass a physical examination including a drug screening.
Moore filed a petition for review of the award in the
district court seeking a remand of the matter to the Board
so that he could be awarded baek pay. Conrail subse
quently moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed, R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In a memorandum opinion on September 25
‘
1987 Judge Caldwell gwranted this motion. He indicated
4A
that Moore argued that he was entitled to relief because
the collective bargaining agreement governing his employ-
ment provided that when discipline is expunged an eng'-
neer who has a wage loss shall be paid for the loss. Here,
according to Moore, the discipline had been expunged and
thus he was entitled to back pay. The judge rejected this
contention as he found that:
The Board did not expunge the discipline or find the
petitioner not guilty of having used marijuana. <A
fair reading of its decision indicates that, while it be-
lieved that the deficiencies in the reeord did not jus-
tify discharge, the record was sufficient to justify
a suspension without pay for having used marijuana.
In this light, the Board, as the respondent asserts,
merely reduced the discipline, and the failure to award
back pay consequently did not ignore the agreement.
We cannot disturb a decision which draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement.
Moore further argued that once the Board coneluded
that there were procedural irregularities concerning the
sample, it necessarily had to conelude that there was no
basis for finding that he had been using marijuana and
thus he should have been awarded back pay. The judge
rejected this argument as lie found no statutory basis for
setting aside the Board’s order, citing Union Pacific RR.
Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 99 S.Ct. 399 (1978). He fur.
ther indicated that the Board’s decision was not irrational
and without foundation. On September 25, 1987 the judge
entered the order granting Conrail’s motion from which
Moore appeals.
On this appeal Moore asserts that Judge Caldwell’s
ruling was flawed as a ‘‘piece of evidence,’’ the test re-
port, if ‘‘entirely tainted’? for one purpose, dismissal, was
also tainted for purposes of denial of back pay. He also
OA
argued, as he did in the district court, that the collective
bargaining agreement required the back pay award.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by
Judge Caldwell and note that cases decided after he ruled
support his result. See United Paperworkers Interna-
tional Union, AF L-C10O v. Misco, Ine., 108 8.Ct. 364 (1987) ;
United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, No. 87-3501, 3d Cir., decided February 5, 1988.
We do, however, add the following comment. While there
is logic in Moore’s argument that evidence is either tainted
or not, there was some proof of a chain of custody. We
read the record to mean that while this chain was not per-
fect the Board was to some degree accepting the test re-
sults. This understanding is buttressed by the fact that
the Board required Moore to go through a drug screening
before returning to work. If the Board did not think there
was a drug problem here it is difficult to comprehend why
it would have ordered the screening. ‘Thus, though Con-
rail accepts the award of the Board, the inconsistency, if
any, in its award may have been in ordering Moore’s
reinstatement rather than denying him back pay.
Conrail in its brief asks for damages under Fed. R.
App. P. 88. While we reject Moore’s appeal, as we have
indicated there is a certain logic in his position. In the
circumstances we cannot find Rule 388 applicable here.
The order of September 25, 1987 will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK:
Kindly file the foregoing opinion.
s/ Morton J. Greenberg
Cireuit Judge
6A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 87-5739
MOORE, DONALD H.,
Appellant
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Civil Action No. 87-0917
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
BEFORE: WEIS, GREENBERG, and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be considered on the record
from the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, and was submitted under Third
Circuit Rule 12(6) on March 8, 1988.
On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this court that the order of the District Court
entered on September 25, 1987, be and the same is hereby
affirmed.
7A
Costs shall be taxed against appellant.
ATTEST:
/s/ Sally Mrvos
Clerk
March 11, 1988
Certified as a true copy and issued in lieu
of a formal mandate on April 4, 1988
Test: /s/ M. Elizabeth Ferguson
Chief Deputy Clerk, United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit
8A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONALD H. MOORE,
Petitioner
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 87-0917
Vs.
CONSOLIDATED RAIL
CORPORATION,
Rsspondent
Nee Ne ee as es es we
MEMORANDUM
(Filed Sep. 25, 1987)
Introduction
This case comes before the court on respondent, Con-
solidated Rail Corporation’s (Conrail), motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). We grant respondent’s
motion.
Background
Petitioner, Donald H. Moore, has filed a petition for
review and enforcement, pursuant to Section 3 (First) of
the Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. §153 (First). He
seeks to modify a decision of the Special Board of Adjust-
ment (Board) which, while reinstating him to his railroad
engineer’s job with Conrail, did so without back pay, the
relief he seeks in the instant petition. Petitioner was an
engineer with Conrail from 1971 until his discharge on
September 24, 1985. In August of 1985, respondent had
suspected that Moore was using drugs while at work. Ae-
cordingly, Conrail tested petitioner s urine on two sepa-
rate occasions. Moore’s second test was positive for the
a |
Bess
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presence of marijuana metabolites. Respondent held a
hearing on September 24, 1985 at which time Moore was
dismissed, based on the results of this test, for using mari-
juana while on company property under pay and subject
to duty.
Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the Board pur-
suant to the Act. The Board reinstated petitioner effec-
tive January 30, 1987, but it did not award him back pay.
In doing so, the Board concluded that the record of the
Conrail hearing resulting in petitioner’s discharge did
not adequately show the chain of possession of the urine
sample from Conrail to the testing laboratory or the lab-
oratory’s procedures in testing the sample. It noted its
concern for procedural rights when the charged miscon-
duct could result in a loss of livelihood, but also empha-
sized Conrail’s ‘‘determined efforts’’ to meet those re-
quirements. Thus, the Board noted that a physician and
nurse testified to the circumstances surrounding the tak-
ing of the sample and its identification and the existence
of the laboratory report, showing the presence of mari-
juana metabolites. The Board then stated: ‘‘Upon weigh-
ing all aspects of the case, the hazards involved, the re-
spective interests of the parties and the shortcomings in
the record, it is our conclusion that claimant should be
reinstated with seniority unimpaired but without back
pay. 9?
Discussion
The jurisdiction of federal courts to review decisions
of the Special Board of Adjustment is statutorily limited.
The court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a Board
decision only ‘‘. . . for failure of the [Board] to comply
iain aaa
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™~
with the requirements of this chapter, for failure of the
order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the
scope of the [Board’s] jurisdiction, or for fraud or cor-
ruption by a member of the [Board] making the order.’’
45 U.S.C. § 153 (first) (q) (brackets added). This is a
very narrow standard of review. See United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Union Railroad Co., 648 F.2d 905 (3d
Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has alleged neither violations of
chapter 153 nor that the Board acted fraudulently or cor-
ruptly. We may therefore only set aside its decision if it
exceeded its jurisdiction when it failed to award back pay
in alleged violation of the Agreement.!
Petitioner’s first argument is based on the following
language found at Article G-C-9(h) of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. (Complaint, Exhibit B):
When discipline assessed as a result of a tormal in-
vestigation is subsequently expunged, an engineer who
has incurred wage loss shall be paid for such wage
loss incurred. When discipline assessed is subse-
quently reduced, an engineer who has incurred wage
loss shall be paid for such wage loss during any period
not part of his final discipline assessment.”?
Petitioner contends that the Board expunged the dis-
cipline by concluding that there were procedural irregular-
ities in the handling of his urine sample and consequently
reinstating him. Hence, the clear language of the agree-
ment required an award of back pay as well. We disagree.
1. We reject petitioner's claim that we may reverse the Board
if its decision was wholly baseless and without reason. In any
event, even if we agreed with petitioner, the Board’s decision,
as shown below, would not have fallen short of that standard.
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The Board did not expunge the discipline or find the
petitioner not guilty of having used marijuana. A fair
reading of its decision indicates that, while it believed that
the deficiencies in the record did not justify discharge, the
record was sufficient to justify a suspension without pay
for having used marijuana. In this light, the Board, as the
respondent asserts, merely reduced the discipline, and the
failure to award back pay consequently did not ignore the
agreement. We cannot disturb a decision which draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. See
Zeviar v. Local No. 2747, 733 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1984).
Petitioner’s next argument is that once the Board
concluded that there were procedural irregularities con-
cerning the sample, it necessarily had to conclude that
there was no basis for finding that petitioner had been
using marijuana. Without that finding, it was completely
irrational to deny back pay. We have already rejected
petitioner’s argument that we may use an absence of ra-
tionality standard in reviewing the Board’s decision. The
Supreme Court has ‘‘time and again emphasized’’ that we
are limited to the grounds for review provided by the Act.
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93, 99
S.Ct. 399, 402, 58 L.Ed.2d 354, 359 (1978) (per curiam). In
any event, in accordance with our discussion above, we do
not find the Board’s decision irrational or without founda-
tion.
We will issue an appropriate order.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
Date: September 25, 1987
ee
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONALD H. MOORE, )
)
Petitioner )
)
vs. ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 87-0917
CONSOLIDATED RAIL )
CORPORATION, )
)
Respondent )
ORDER
(Filed September 25, 1987)
AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 1987, it is
ordered that:
1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition
is granted.
2. The petition is hereby dismissed.
3. The Clerk of Court shall close this file.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldweil
United States District Judge
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Award No. 848
Case No. 848
Special Board of Adjustment No. 894
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
and
Consolidated Rail Corporation
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Appeal by Engineer D. H. Moore from dismissal on Sep-
tember 24, 1985. Claim for removal of discipline and pay-
ment for all time lost, ineluding reasonable compensation
for mental and physical duress, travelers benefits, dental
plan, Title VII allowance, vacation rights and retirement
benefits.
FINDINGS:
Claimant was dismissed, after a hearing had been held on
due notice, for using marijuana while on Company prop-
erty, under pay and subject to duty on August 2, 1985.
Claimant had a reasonably good record. In the course of
15 years service as a locomotive engineer he had been dis-
ciplined twice, a reprimand in 1981 and a five-day suspen-
sion in early 1984 for train operating errors. So far as the
record shows, there is no competent indication that he had
engaged in a Rule G violation prior to August 1985. The
fact that he had a good prior record would not protect him
from dismissal if he were found guilty of using drugs.
Regional Road Foreman Black’s suspicions were roused
in July, 1985 when he received an anonymous telephone
eall that claimant was using drugs. On the strength of that
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call, claimant was given a urine test on July 25, 1985 at
one of Carrier's medical facilities, but that test was then
temporarily lost and then found insufficient to be of con-
firming value.
Accordingly, claimant was again tested, this time on Aug-
ust 2, 1985, when he was not operating a train but was on
the engineer's extra list. The test took place at Carrier’s
Regional Medical Office at Philadelphia and Carrier’s
Dr. Brindisi, Registered Nurse Farrell and Health Service
Manager McGee were present at the time. The container
holding the specimen was handed by claimant to Dr. Brin-
disi immediately after it was given and the Doctor in turn
gave it to Ms. Farrell who placed the container with the
specimen in another container properly labeled and se-
cured by a cap. She then placed it in a labeled bag with a
note for Metpath Laboratories requesting analysis and
report. That procedure took place at about noon and about
two hours later the bag was picked up by a Metpath mes-
senger.
Metpath’s report of August 4, 1985 advised Carrier that
the specimen was positive,
‘THC, urine, GT 50 micrograms per liter."
It is quite apparent that the use of a narcotic by a locomo-
tive engineer is a matter of serious concern to his em-
ployer and indeed to the public. That it provides a valid
basis for dismissal is equally clear. Nevertheless, the
gravity of the drug problem does not relieve an employer
from making certain that the engineer is accorded all the
procedural protection that elementary principles of due
process, fair play and common sense requires. Mere su-
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spicion, conjecture and hearsay may never be substituted
for competent proof.
In any such case, qualified witnesses shou!d be made avail-
able to furnish information, on direct and cross examina-
tions, as to the nature and effect of the chemical substance
involved, the manner in which the test was given; the pro-
cedures or protecting the specimen during time delays,
transit and storage, and the details regarding analysis at
the Laboratory.
In brief, it must be shown that the rights of the individual
have been protected. And that obligation becomes all the
more sensitive and important when the misconduct im-
puted to him is particularly serious and reprehensible and
gives rise to loss of livelihood.
In the present case, Carrier made a determined effort to
observe most of these requirements. It did not rely on the
anonymous call to Black. The findings as to the taking of
the test were based on testimony by a physician, a regis-
tered nurse, and the health facility manager; the findings
regarding the analysis rest on Metpath Laboratories’ re-
port.
The record is not as clear as it should be, however, since
there is no clear evidence as to chain of possession during
transit from Carrier to the Laboratories and of the Lab-
oratories’ procedures.
Upon weighing all aspects of the case, the hazards in-
volved, the respective interests of the parties and the
shortcomings in the record, it is our conclusion that claim-
ant should be reinstated with seniority unimpaired but
without back pay. In reaching this decision, we have not
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been impressed by Petitioner’s hearing procedure objec
tions; they do not constitute reversible error. Nor have
we given undue weight to the fact that claimant’s tests
were prompted by an anonymous telephone call, although
no complaint had been received from any supervisor or
employee regarding claimant’s vigilance, judgment and
conduct.
In any event, this Board would not have reinstated claim-
ant, despite errors on Carrier’s part, if the record had
established a reasonable doubt that claimant could be re-
lied on as an engineer. Before returning to active duty,
claimant must pass a return to duty physical examination,
including a drug screen as well as any necessary rules ex
amination.
AWARD:
Claimant reinstated without back pay. To be effective
within 30 days.
Adopted at Philadelphia, PA, December 22, 1986.
s/ Harold M. Weston
Harold M. Weston, Chairman
Illegible
Carrier Member
/s/ R. W. Godwin
Employee Member
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ARTICLE G-C-9—Time Allowance—Attending Inves-
tigations
(a) If an engineer is not disciplined after being re-
quired to attend a formal investigation and loses time on
his regular assignment or turn in a pool or extra list, he
shall be paid for the time lost due to his attendance at the
investigation.
(b) If an engineer is not disciplined after being re
quired to attend a formal investigation at his base termi-
nal and loses no time on his regular assignment or turn in
a pool or extra list, he shall be paid for attending the in-
vestigation as follows:
(A) If his attendance is immediately before or after
his tour of duty, the time spent at the investiga-
tion shall be paid for continuous with his tour of
duty.
(B) If his attendance is not immediately before or
after his tour of duty or is on his assigned day
off, actual time spent at the investigation shall be
paid for at the straight time rate of pay of the
last service performed with a minimum of one
day’s pay.
(c) (1) When an engineer is not disciplined after
being required to attend a formal investigation at other
than his home terminal, for attending the investigation he
shall be paid on a continuous time basis at the basic daily
rate of pay applicable to the last service performed com-
puted from the time he starts from his home terminal and
ending at the time he returns thereto with a minimum of
one day’s pay, except as provided in paragraph (c) (2).
Continuous time spent traveling from and to the home
terminal shall be computed on the basis of 1.5 minutes for
each mile traveled via the best route and added to the
time spent at the investigation.
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2) If an investigation is recessed on the first
day and continued on the succeeding day or days and the
engineer is held over, the continuous time payment shall
+
cease at the time the investigation is recessed on the first
day. If such investigation is reconvened the next day and
again recessed, the engineer held over shall be paid actual
time for attending the investigation with a minimum of
one day’s pay. When the investigation is reconvened, com-
pleted, and the engineer is authorized to return to his
home terminal, he shall be paid on a continuous time basis
computed from the time the investigation was reconvened
on that day until he returns to his home terminal with a
minimum of one day's pay.
(3) When the time lost to attend a formal in-
vestigation is greater than the total payment provided for
in this paragraph (c), the engineer shall be paid. for the
time lost.
(d) (1) When an engineer is authorized to use
other than rail transportation, he shall be reimbursed for
out of pocket cost of authorized transportation: when
authorized to use his own automobile he shall be reimbursed
for the mileage travelled at the applicable car mileage rate
paid by the Corporation.
(2) When an engineer is held over at other
than his home terminal to attend a reconvened formal in
vestigation he shall be permitted to use lodging facilities
provided by the Corporation at that location. If no such
lodging facility is available otler suitable lodging shall be
provided.
(e) When an engineer is required to attend a formal
investigation while he is already under pay, no additional
payment is due.
rrr eel
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(f) The foregoing paragraphs (a), (b), (¢c), (d), and
(e) shall also apply to an engineer who is directed by the
Corporation to attend a formal investigation as a witness.
(g) Kxeept when held out of service because of in-
volvement in a serious act or occurrance, an engineer in
pool or extra service required to attend a formal investi-
ga‘ion shall if unable to accept call for his assignment due
to attendance at an investigation be marked up as follows:
(1) An engineer in a pool where a pool engi-
neer is replaced by an extra engineer when he marks off
shall be marked up at the bottom of the pool when the
extra engineer taking his place returns.
(2) An engineer in a pool where a pool engi
neer is not replaced by an extra engineer when he marks
off or an engineer on an extra list shall be marked up at
the bottom of the pool or extra list in the same manner as
if ie were called for the assignment.
(h) When discipline assessed as a result of a formal
investigation is subsequently expunged, an engineer who
has incurred wage loss shall be paid for such wage loss in-
curred. When discipline assessed is subsequently reduced,
an engineer who has incurred wage loss shall be paid for
such wage loss during any period not part of his final dis-
cipline assessment. An engineer paid pursuant to this
paragraph shall not be entitled to payment under para-
graph (a).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.