Opposition Brief — Wainwright v. DeAngelo

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ORIGINAL = _

CT 14 1855

CASE NO: 85-1922 Og i

yee sFL. Je

IN THE LER

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,

Secretary, Department of

Corrections,

Petitioner,

vs.

RICHARD RAYMOND DeANGELO

Vy

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

i BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael D. Gelety

1700 E. Las Olas Blvd.

Suite 300

Ft. Lauderdaie, Fla. 33301

(305) 462-4600

Counsel for Respondent

TABLE OF CITATIONS ..ccccccccscsece weer ere ae eer ee Te

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .wsccccsccccvncccsecs a

REASONS FOR DENYING JURISDICTION .....cccccccsvcvceoce

CONCLUSION ..cccccccescccccceseveces coc e reece esseces

PROOF OF SERVICE ..... err ee ee ee eeccccces a

APPENDIX wccsccvpecesvccsccnccsccesscceseseeeceseese

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i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

16

i

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page

Case Authorities:

Edwards v.Arizona

74 Vise €77, 101 S.Ct. 1860,

OS. Tete Ce Ie. COCA) “owen ban dew os kb'e ae ite pes ot

Escobedo v. Illinois

210 Usb, SIO, C8 S.Ct... 1758,

£2 Less 20s O77 CL9GR) ici xt A ee ee oe Se Be LO

Hoffa v. United States

Seo. Uees 293; 87. SvCt. 408,

Ae (roe eee SIO RUS OG) bss vy seatas vos eo ee 4

Maine v. Moulton

474 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 477

Be hie eee SOD PLOOS) cacy cde veces cls oaks I}

Michigan v. Jackson

Sees or be ea ARN) PAM cis pn oi 6. 6 'ash. wk site das 10

Miller v. Fenton

u<UsSs ~~, 400 S.Ct. 445,

ewes aes eo FISBR) as Sok ee oOo ea wee ee |

Miranda v. Arizona

364 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602

A eeu, Sele WES PLUGS sais boas kb ewe as Pe

Stone v. Powell

428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037

a? Dames cee 2007 C2666) ios bie ees ck es 5

United Staes v. Gouveia

S67 Uxes too; 108 S.Ct. 2292 (1984) 2 ouK ce 10

United States v. Henry

a77 Uses. 2es, 100 8,Cr. 2183

Oe Agnes ses cao LLO80) Sava aweds evs See re ll

Other Authorities:

United States Constitution:

20 UL Sule S2eoets) svecss SAT Lea le ie a waa tae te eee

Fifth Amendment ..... ke i eee ee ee eee | eae

tage te

PEC Pe sa cd ce ek bo aK oe oe oe eS x o, 30; "3

3 28

a4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Respondent herein supplements Petitioner's

Statement of the Case with the following pertinent factual

information:

1. Regarding eke Respondent's voluntary hospitali-

zation in the matter, it must be emphasized that the Respon-

dent had been shot in the abdomen numerous times with a .357

caliber handgun, the Respondent was also inforined that his

death was imminent, and he was given the last rites by a

priest while at the hospital;

2. It was while in this weakened end extreme

physical condition (with its accompanying psychological

weakening) that the statements in question were elicited

from the Respondent by the use of Gary Leon, the brother

of one of the persons killed and an acquaintance of the

Respondent. Gary Leon was specifically enlisted by the

Oakland Park Police Department to not only learn infor-

mation, but to ask specific questions and touch upon

specific areas in a series of two conversations with the

Respondent. It was, ih fact, admitted at the trial of

the matter that Leon was acting as an agent of the police

during these interrogation sessions;

3. Even before the first interrogation session

by Leon, the Respondent DEANGELO was already a primary

suspect in the case, and as further conceded by the State.

a police officer would have had to advise Respondent DEANGELO

of his rignts pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d. 694 (1966);

4. Although the tape recording of the first

interrogation by Leon was inaudible, the officers involved

did, in fact, monitor the conversation (while it was being

Simultaneously recorded) and the officers were able to hear

the statements elicited from Respondent DEANGELO and were

privy to the inculpatory nature of those statements. The

monitoring of the first interrogation session led to further

specific questions being given to Gary Leon for a repeat

visit to Respondent DEANGELO.

REASONS FOR DENYING JURISDICTION

The initial and most practical reason for denying

the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is the fact that this

Court, as well as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

and the District Court for the Southern District of Florida,

have all denied Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Mandate

and/or Extension of Time in regard to this matter. See

Appendix, pages 1, 2 and 3.

After rehearing was denied in the instant matter,

an extension of time was initially granted by the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals, and with the expiration of that

extension, the Mandate in the instant case was issued and

the further motions were denied.

More importantly, in the Order Denying Extension

of time in the Southern District of Florida, it will also

be noted that the transcript of the Respondent DENGELO's

trial was ordered to be supplied to the Southern District

f Florida. Appendix, page 4.

Finally, in this regard, it should be noted that

the instant matter is on the docket for the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and

an evidentiary hearing is set for Tuesday, October 28, 1986

in Fort Lauderdale, in compliance with the Eleventh Circuit

Opinion in the matter. Appendix, page 5.

It is the Respondent's position in this initial

regard that all of the Courts in question, including this

Court, have seen fit to deny additional time for the State

Petitioner to seek review, and more importantly, the case

has progressed, in panei with the Eleventh Circuit's

Opinion, to the point of having the record supplied and

the case set for an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary

hearing should proceed, and the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied, consistent with this Court's

denial of an extension of time for such Writ.

Similarly, it is the Respondent's position that

the Writ of Certiorari should be denied as being prematurely

brought before this Court. A perusal of the subject of this

appeal, that being the Review and Recommendation of the

Magistrate (page A-19 of Petitioner's Appendix), reveals

that the Recommendation and later Order by the District

Judge (page A-35 of Petitioner's Appendix) dealt with the

presumption of correctness of 28 U.S.C. §2254 as it

related to the need for an independent evidentiary hearing.

Of course, the upshot of the Review and Recommendation,

leading to the appeal in the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, was that the presumption of correctness did apply

to the instant matter and that, therefore, an independent

evidentiary hearing was not necessary and that the Petition

for Habeas Corpus was therefore denied. (Pages A-32 and

A-33 of Petitioner's Appendix).

Further, the Magistrate in the Review and Recom-

mendation specifically did not address the merits of

Respondent DEANGELO's Motion to Suppress, choosing in fact

to rely upon the presumption of correctness to dispose of

the question of constitutionality and admissibility of the

statements involved. (Page A-32 of Petitioner's Appendix).

In the Opinion in question from the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals, the Court noted that:

Although it is not clear

whether the District Court

accorded the §2254(d)

presumption to the trial

court's decision that

DEANGELO's statements

were volunary under

Hoffa v. United States,

300 U.S. 293, B87 S.Ct. 408;

i? L.E@. 2a. 374 (1966),

it appears that such was

the case. To the extent

that the District Court

deferred to this pre-

sumption, we reverse."

Pg. A-6 of Petitioner's

Appendix.

The Court Opinion then discusses Stone v. Powel]

428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037 49 L.Ed. 2d. 1067 (1976), which

was relied upon by the Magistrate in the Review and Recom-

mendation, specifically dealing with whether or not a claim

is fully and fairly litigated in the state court, and in

light of Miller v. Fenton, _ U.S. , 406 &.Ct. 445,

88 L.Ed. 2nd 405 (1985), the Eleventh Circuit Opinion

Simply acknowledged the need for an evidentiary hearing

regarding the admissiblity of the statements of Respondent

DEANGELO:

Neither the state trial

court nor the District

Court made any findings

as to whether DEANGELO

was in custody within

the meaning of Esco-

bedo when visited

by Gary Leon ....a

remand is necessary to

determine several

crucial facts. Pq.

A-13 of Petitioner's

Appendix.

Further, the Opinion went on to state that:

The testimony of Gary

Leon is not in the

record before us, so

it is impossible to

determine at this

point whether the

investigation had

focused on DEANGELO

at the time of the

first or second

visit or both

on remand, these

matters should be

considered by the

District Court on.

the full record

of DEANGELO's

trial, followed by

written findings of

fact and conclusions

of law. Pgs. A-16

and A-17 of Petit-

ioner's Appendix.

Peal

esl

It is clear from the Opinion of the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals that the District Court's

Opinion and ruling was reversed for the purpose of

affording an evidentiary hearing with a complete finding of

fact and conclusion of law which would make further review

of the constitutional issues possible - as it is currently

impossible under the state of the record at present.

Therefore, the Petitioner's attempt to frame

important constitutional issues in the instant Petition

are premature, as those issues were not addressed by the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the Respondent's

position at this point that a factual determination through

an evidentiary hearing in the District Court would be the

next logical and practical step in the history of the

instant matter, finally setting a factual groundwork upon

which to make findings of law. The supposed constitutional

issues raised by the Petitioner are simply not ripe for

review by this Court until a factual groundwork is laid

and the merits of the Respondent DEANGELO's Motion to

Suppress are addressed and decided based upon such factual

findings. A review of the matter by certiorari at this

point would be based upon speculation as to the outcome

of such factual and legal conclusions. It is interesting

to note that the Petitioner does not question the fact

that the District Court erroneously considered the pre-

Sumption of correctness in §2254(d) (although in fairness

to the Court, was without this Court's holding and clari-

fication in Miller v. Fenton), but the Petitioner

chooses instead to ignore the real basis for the Eleventh

Circuit Opinion and to instead choose to distract this

Court with constitutional issues which have yet to be

decided by either the Dis .rict Court or the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals, those issues being merely pinpointed and

suggested on remand by the Eleventh Circuit Opinion.

id

Therefore, it is the Respondent's position that

the Petition for Certiorari should be denied at this point

és being premature and as having an inadequate basis of

fact upon which to be grounded.

Turning to the merits of the case and that aspect

of the Petition which requests certiorari review based upon

the application of the law to the case at bar, it is the

Respondent's position that, notwithstanding the earlier

objections, certiorari would be inappropriate in this case

as there is no conflict shown between the Opinion in question

and existing case law, nor are there substantial novel ques-

tions which must be answered by this court. Quite the con-

trary, the Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit merely reversed

the summary dismissal of the Habeas Corpus Petition and

remanded the case for further proceedings for necessary

factual determinations regarding the statements admitted

before the jury. In so remanding, the Eleventh Circuit

suggested various points of emphasis to the lower court,

to guide the lower court in its further proceedinas and

to, presumably, eliminate the need for further remand.

It is primarily from these guidelines that the Petitioner

attempts to formulate a conflict as a basis for certiorari

jurisdiction.

It is very clear from a reading of the Eleventh

Circuit's Opinion that “whether DEANGELO was in custody,

as was the case in Escobedo, thereby triggering the need

for Miranda warnings, obviously is a pivotal question.”

(Page A-12, Petitioner's Appendix). See Escobedo v.

Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed. 2d. 977

(1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.

1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d. 694 (1966).

Similarly, the Opinion went on to note that

“neither the State trial court nor the District Court made

any findings as to whether DEANGELO was in custody within

the meaning of Escobedo when visited by Gary Leon”.

(Page 813, Petitioner's Appendix).

Finally the court's Opinion again stated that

"..-- It is impossible to determine at this point whether

the investigation had focused on DEANGELO at the time of

the first or second visit or both ... this information is

pertinent to whether the conversations were custodial in-

terrogations of DEANGELO with a view toward gathering in-

criminating evidence against him...” (Pages A-16, A-17 of

Petitioner's Appendix). DEANGELO's Fifth Amendment right

to remain silent and its parallel right to counsel to

ensure such Fifth Amendment right is and always has been

the issue in the case. In their Petition, the State con-

fuses the right to counsel, which accompanies the Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent, with the attachment of

the mandatory right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

See pages 19 and 20 of the Petition. The right to counsel

guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment is separate and distinct

from the Sixth Amendment guarantee. The Fifth Amendment

protection against compeiled self incrimination provides the

right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed. 2d. 378

(1981), page 482; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, page 470;

Michigan v. Jackson, U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 1404 (1986),

page 1407. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the Assistance

of Counsel also provides the right to counsel at post-

arraignment interrogations. Michigan v. Jackson, supra,

page 1407. In their effort to create a conflict, the State

has unfortunately confused these two distinct rights to the

assistance of counsel, unfortunately intertwining the Sixth

Amendment as was again clarified in United States v. Gouveia,

467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (1984), with the right to

counsel supplement to the Fifth Amendment right as is noted

in Miranda, Edwards, and Escobedo.

There is absolutely no question that the right

to counsel under the Sixth Amendment attaches at the

initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings, more speci-

fically, the filing of a formal indictment or information

or the appearance at an arraignment, Gouveia, supra,

page 187; Jackson, supra, page 1407. It follows that

10

the Respondent's position is not that the interrogation in

question could be carried out only in the presence of an

attorney, as it was a critical stage in a post-arraignment

Situation, see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. _, 106 S.Ct.

477, 8&8 L.Ed. 2d. 481, (1985), but the position of the

Respondent has consistently been that the Respondent was

entitled to a Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate

himself with the accompanying assistance of counsel.

The Petitioner cites the Eleventh Circuit's

Opinion and the Opinions mentioned in the United States

v. Henry, 477 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed. 2d.

115 (1980), and then the Petitioner concludes that Henry

was a case dealing with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,

again misunderstanding the fact that the Eleventh Circuit

Opinion was addressing the Fifth Amendment right and the

possible circumventing of that Fifth Amendment right and

its accompanying right to counsel through the use of a

government agent (in Henry's case a cellmate).

If the investigation in question focused upon

DEANGELO, and went from investigatory to accusatory,

particularly in light of the information learned in the

first interview by Gary Leon, DEANGELO had the right to

remain silent and had the accompanying right to counsel

to help him secure the Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda,

Supra, Edwards, supra, Escobedo, supra.

il

This fact is made all the more clear by the

admission of the State that Miranda rights would have

been necessary had the police officers spoken directly to

DEANGELO. (Page A-11, Appendix of Petitioner). The mere

fact that the police officers chose to attempt to circum-

vent that Fifth Amendment privilege by sending Leon, an

agent, instead of a uniformed officer, does not diminish

DANGELO's Fifth Amendment privileges at the point when

the investigation focused upon him and he was, for all

practical purposes, in custody. The dire physical and

mental condition of the Respondent at the time of the

questioning by Leon cannot be ignored, although this con-

dition was ignored in the Petition for Certiorari. The

physical and mental condition of the Respondent at the

time of the first and second questionings are very impor-

tant facts which must be developed at a hearing, as a person

facing death (and continuously being told of his condition),

lying in a hospital bed with tubes and life supporting

mechanisms is clearly not in the same position as a healthy

person who walks into the police station voluntarily and

gives a statement. Where the police will necessarily feel

that they must either arrest the healthy suspect or risk

his leaving the jurisdiction, no such formal compulsion

faces the officer who has a suspect lying near death ina

12

hospital room. Just as handcuffing a dying man to his

hospital bed will not change his physical condition or

his ability to leave at his whim, the mere fact that he

may not have been placed formally under arrest after his

first or second confession does not change the fact that

the police have their man in their control, secure in the

knowledge that he cannot physically move.

The questions of custody and interrogation have

yet to be adequately determined. However, it is beyond

dispute, after a careful reading of the cases cited by the

Petitioner, that the legal precedent involved is consistent,

the cases and their propositions remain vital, and that there

is no conflict between the cases involved and the application

of those cases in the Eleventh Circuit Opinion. The mere

fact that the Petitioner happens to misread the Eleventh

Circuit's Opinion and then misapplies Sixth Amendment cases

to a Fifth Amendment situation does not in any way create a

conflict and does not somehow provide a jurisdictional

foundation for the granting of certiorari review.

Therefore, it is the position of the Respondent

that, on the merits of the case involved, there is no conflict

which arises from the Eleventh Circuit's Opinion, nor is there

even a misapplication of the pertinent legal theories to the

case at bar, and therefore certiorari review should be denied

in the matter.

13

CONCLUSION

It is the Respondent's position that certiorari

review should be denied in the instant case, as the

Mandate has been issued and stays have been denied by the

United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals and the District Court of Appeals for the

Southern District of Florida, and the case has been

remanded and is actually set upon the District Court's

docket for an evidentiary hearing.

Further, Respondent feels that the Petition

should be denied as the issues are not ripe for a decision

on the merits without first holding an evidentiary hearing

and determining the necessary factual basis upon which to

apply the legal theories.

Finally, the merits of the case do not lend

themselves to certiorari review, as there are no conflicts

which arise from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Opinion as it is applied to the cases cited therein, and,

as a matter of fact, Petitioner misconstrues some of the

cases cited in the Petition, and in so doing, confuses

the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and its accompany-

ing right to counsel as opposed to the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel which attaches after formal charging docu-

ments have been filed.

14

denied.

Therefore,

the Petition for Certiorari should be

25

Respectfully submitted,

; | |

Wail... f |Z,

MICHAEL D. GELETY

Attorney for Respondent

1700 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 300

Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 33301

(305) 462-4600

CASE NO: 85-1922

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,

Secretary, Department of

Corrections,

Petitioner,

VS.

RICHARD RAYMOND DEANGELO,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PROOF OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies of the opposition

of the Respondent to the Writ for Certiorari were furnished

by United States Mail to the Attorney General's Office for

the state of Florida at 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 204, West

Palm Beach, Florida, 33401 on this ioe day of October,

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1986.

MICHAEL D. GELETY

16

REEEKTKKKKKKKKEKKKEKKKEKEEK

‘

APPENDIX

RETAKE KKKKKEKKEEE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

JOSEPH F SPANIOL, JR

LERK OF THE COURT

Penny H. Brill, Esquire

Assistant Attorney General

11l Georgia Avenue, Suite 204

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Re: Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department

of Corrections v. Richard Raymond DeAngelo, A-242

Dear Ms. Brill:

Your application to continue a stay pending appeal in

the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice Powell,

who has endorsed thereon the following:

"Denied

5/7/86

L.F.P., Jr."

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR., Cler

By

ard L. Turner, Jr

cc: Michael D. Gelety, Esa.

1700 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 300

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

i7

FILED

N THE UNITE S COURT 0 <

I FE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPHALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT LEVENTH CIRCUIT

, 85-514 MAY - 1986

SPENCER 0. MERCER

CLERK

RICHARD RAYMOND DeANGELO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

ORDER:

The motion of respondent-appellee made by and through his counsel

for enlargement of time staying the mandate beyond May 5, 1986, is

DENIED. See Fed. R. App. P. 4l,

Lato Aah CIRCUIT TTpet

~~ eee

-_—

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 82-6652-Civ-ROETTGER

RICHARD DE ANGELO, :

Petitioner,

vs. 2

LOUIE WAINWRIGHT, 2

Respondent.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion of

Respondent to stay prscobbinns pending disposition by the

United States Supreme Court of the respondent's Petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

Owing to the respondent's delayed filing of his

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals issued its mandate on May 8, 1986 remanding the

case to this Court. This Court is directed to consider the

full record of the petitioner's trial, followed by written

findings of fact and conclusions of law. DeAngelo v. Wain-

wright, 781 F.2d 1516, 1520 (llth Cir. 1986).

The United States Supreme Court did not dispose of

respondent's petition before the end of its term. To avoid

further delay in these proceedings, it is hereby

ORDERED that the respondent's Motion to Stay is

APP. - Page 3

denied and it is further

ORDERED that the respondent shall provide to this

Court a copy of the transcript of the petitioner's trial on

or before August 27, 1986, so that the Court can comply with

the mandate of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale,

on

AYA aay of July, 1986.

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Copies to:

Michael D. Gelety, Esq.

1700 East Las Olas Boulevard

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

lll Georgia Avenue - Suite 204

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Florida, this

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

LURANA S.

APP. _ Page 4

NOTICE OF _EVIDENTI. —HEARING D. C. Form No. 18 (Rev. Sept. 1953)

United States District Cort

TUR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

RICHARD DE ANGELO,

Petitioner,

v.

LOUIE WAINWRIGHT, ; No. §2-6652-Civ_ROETTGER

Reepondent.

TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been set for hearing at

10:00 a.m. » ON Tuesday, October 28, »19g6 =» AE Courtroom 203B,

299 East Broward Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301.

Date October 6, 1986 | 49 LURANA S. SNOW

U.S. MAGISTRATE N

By wa A... tla 1...

Deputy Clerk,

Tv

Richard DeAngelo, #068779

Avon Park Correctional Institution

P.O, Box 1100

Avon Park, FL 33825

Michael D. Gelety, Esq.

1700 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 300

Fe. Lauderdale, FL 33301

Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Actorney General

lil Georgia Ave. = Room 204

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

ort

Sa

NaS

FP) Mines 2a Tt im PROS TERE

APP. _ Page 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLOR’ A

CASE NO. 82-6652-Civ-ROETTGER

RICHARD DE ANGELO, :

Petitioner, :

vs. :

LOULE WAINWRIGHT, :

Respondent. :

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM

TO: SUPERINTENDENT of Avon Park Correctional Institution

Avon Park, Florida

IT APPEARING that the above named Richard

DeAngelo is confined in Avon Park Correctional Institu-

tion, and a hearing is set in this cause at Fort Lauderdale,

Florida, on October 28, 1986, and that it is necessary for

the above named Richard DeAngelo to be before this Court

for the purpose of giving testimony,

NOW, THEREFORE, this is to command you, the Warden

of Avon Park Correctional Institution, that you have the

body of the said Richard DeAngelo now in custody as

aforesaid, under safe and secure conduct, before this Court

at Fort Lauderdale, Flor‘sa by or before 10:00 a.m., on

October 28, 1986.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this

TEs STATES MAGISTRATE

LURANA S. SNOW

3 day of October, 1986.

APP. - Page

6

Copies to:

Michael D. Gelety, Esq.

1700 East Las Olas Boulevard

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

111 Georgia Avenue - Suite 204

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Warden, Avon Park Correctional

Institution (2 certified copies)

APP.

- Page 7