Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rawl v. United States

Supreme Court brief1986

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Supreme Court, U.S,

85-1742 | FiLeEp

; | MAR 24 1986

4 | JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

In The =... =

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEC STATES

October Term, 1986

Julian W. Rawl, Administrator of the

Estate of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

United States of America.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT

Seo ae ae eae aoe a Oe ee ee

i

Arnold S. Goodstein

Diane Schafer Goodstein

Goodstein & Goodstein, P.A.

133 East First North Street

Summerville, S.C. 29483

(803) 871-1000

G. Daniel Bowling*

333 1/2 King Street

Charleston, S.C. 29401

(803) 722-8728

Counsel for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

a Certiorari should be

granted to review the Fourth

Circuit's practice of circumventing

the protections afforded the

findings of fact of a trial court

under Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, by characterizing

its de novo findings of fact as

corrections of the District Court's

the circuits and within the Fourth

Circuit regarding whether Rule

Sa tess Federal Rules of civil

procedure, forbids appellate review

of trial court findings of

negligence as findings of fact.

PARTIES

The parties to this proceeding

are Julian

“fo and

America.

W. Rawl,

RFetata of Fau

yw &- A HY NS J as A TE

the

United

1

74

a

n" FE Raw!

aa ave sw

we

States

as Administra-

’

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented....... are

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Rule TAVOSVOG s 4020660 6 e4 6 ee ews

Statement of the Case..... Scenes

Reasons for Granting the Writ..

COUCTUSLORs « k 4:40 CAR eR EE

177

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APPENDIX

District Court Findings

of Fact and Conclusions

of Law,October 12, 1984.

Judgment, October 15, 1984.

Opinion of the Court of

Appeals, December 4, 1985.

Order of the Court of

Appeals Denying Re-

hearing and Rehearing

En Banc, January 21, 1986.

VV

Page

ho

38

39

58

- 7 2

a ay ae _

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Anderson v. City of Bessemer 24,26

City, 470 U.S. , 105 S. Ct, 27,28

1504 (1985) 30,31,38,.42,56-60

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.

Yates, 438 F.2d 798

[eee St. 867150.

Bonds v. Mortensen and Lange,

et al, 717 F.2d 123

(4th Cir. 1983). . . ses « §6

Brown v. Howell, 327 SE2d 659

(S.C. mee, 1966) ..4 cc. 28,29

Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855

(2d Cir. SUNG) 6 sé Ke Ka

Darter v. Greenville Community,

Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 76

(4th Cir. 1962) . . . . .29,50,61

Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co. v.

Timpany, 495 F.2d 830

(2d Cir 1974)... ...,.. «47

Famous Knitware Corp. v. Drug

Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 25]

(4th Cir. 1974)... .. . «(55

Fuchstadt v. U.S., 434 F.2d 367

(2d Cir. 1970) ..... . 47,48

Graham v. Whitaker, 321 SE2d 40

282 S.C. 393 (1984) . . , 38,39,61

Hawkins v. Southern Ry. Co.,

45 FRD. 459 (1968) .... . 38

Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d

626 (4th Cir. 1966) . . , , 52-55

V

House v. European Health Spa,

239 $.€.2¢ 653 269 S.C. 644

Page

Sis s ree errno Pe

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.

Ives Laboratories, Inc.

456 U.S. 844 (1 982). «aes

vOnnSOn Vv. U. 3.. 30 F.46

801 (4th Cir. 1964).

Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipmen

CO. ARC. 5 £9e S3-RctG £70, 27

S.C. 171 (1978) a5

Kloster v. Steamship Chatham

C. A., 475 F.2d 43 (4th

Cir. 1973) .

Lane v. United States, 529

F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).

Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S. S.

L2nOs. i8C., 3260 *.28 7%,

cert. den 385 U.S. 835

(1966) —

McAllister v. United States,

348 U.S. 19 (1954) ... 43-

Merriman v. Sea Pines Planta-

58,59

51

t

1

28

ca

29

46

4@,55

tion Company, 294 S.E.2d 423,

278 S.C. 263 (1982).

Nelson v. Jacksonville

Shipyards, Inc., 440 F.2d

668 (5th Cir. 1971).

Nolan v. Sullivan, 372 F.2d

776 (3rd Cir 1967)

Oblensky v. Saldana Schmier,

409 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1971)

Vi

.39,61

45

49

45

Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.

S.S. Marie Leonhardt, 320

F.2d 262 (3rd Cir 1963)

Quinn v. United States, 439

F.2d 335 (8th Cir 1971)

Richards v. United States,

369 U.S. 1 (1962).

Scheel v. Conboy, 551 F.2d

41 (4th Cir. 1977)

Taylor v. Bryant, 265 S.E.2d

514, 274 S.C. 509 (1980).

Taylor v. United States,

360 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.

1966) Ee 5 ~

Thompson v. United States,

268 F.2d 426 (4th Cir.

1959)

Tucker v. Calmar Steamship

Corp., 457 F.2d 440, 444

Seemeeere befe)....

U.S. VS. U.S. Gypsum Co.,

333 U.S. 364 (1948)

United States v. Yellow Cab

Ce., gee U.S. 338 (1949).

Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S.

Corp., 269 F.2d 68, cert.

den. 361 U.S. 934 (1961).

Whelan v. Penn Central Co.,

503 F.2d 886 (2nd Cir.

1974) a,

Williams v. Kinney, 226 S.E.2d

555 267 S.C. 163 (1976)

Vii

iJ

Dis

WwW

PhO

cn

Oo

wn

©O

I>

OY

I>

~~

40,62

Wiseman v. United States, 32/7

P.2¢@ 70] tard Cir. i964) . .. ™

.

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Haz

Research, Inc., Inc. 3 :

ub. S&S. 208 42060) 6 ood hee ee

LO WM

Vv ] ] ]

Statutes and Rules

14 CFR 71.11 (1983) 10

1A crn eq 1A? r7 0059 \ wn

as u aN 7Hhe & VE (i zoo) iv

14 CFR 91.115-.129 (1983) 6

14 CFR Section 91.3(a). 22

14 CFR Section 91-105 (1983). 6

Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of 3,24,26

Ciwt) Precedurée . . . . « 8¥031,33

38,39,41

42,50,53

54,55,57

Other Authorities 99

Websters Third International

Dictionary 2537 14

Air Traffic Control Manual 14,20

Section 7110.65 A Foreward. 21

Air Traffic Control Manual

Section 40;Chap 3, Section

18; Paragraph .521; Chap

2, Section 2, Paragraph 4. 14,20

S24 ot. vonn’'s L. Rev. 68

Paee?) . 33

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OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of

appeals is reported at 778 F. 2d

Petition. The order denying

rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing en banc, which is not

reported, was filed on January 21,

1986, and is set out at p. 58 of

ry

ctr

n

the Appendix. The District Cou

Findings of Fact, Conclusions oc

Law and Order, which are not

reported, are set out at

pp. of the Appendix.

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals was entered on December 4,

5. A timely Petition for Re-

hearing was filed, which was denied

on January 21, 1986. Jurisdiction

of this court 1S invoked under 28

ST)

tered

y

en

review.

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was brought under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2671,

et seq. The claim arose out of an

South Carolina, which took the

lives of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr., and

estate of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr.

Petitioner's complaint alleged

that the defendant's, Fe ey Fe

agents and employees, acting within

the course. and scope of their

employment with the defendant, and

in particular one air traffic

controeilLer, violated certain

Federal Aviation Administration

("FAA") regulations and procedures,

and committed other acts of

negligence which led to the crash.

-~ 7 -

Jury crias on August 2 | and

September l1 and 2, 1983. Oral

arguments were made by the parties

on January 17, 1984. The testimony

was extensive, including that from

air traffic control experts,

pilot expert and submission of

countless pages of transcripts from

radio transmissions culminating in

the crash of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr.

The facts in this matter are

far from simple. On the afternoon

of February 17, 1978, petitioner's

intestate, Mr. Rawl, left the Grand

Strand Airport at Myrtle Beach,

South Carolina at approximately

2¢€3 eo Pee with a planned

destination of Greenville, North

Carolina, a distance in flying time

of approximately one hour. He was

flying an airplane which he owned,

a 1977 Beechcraft Bonanza, bearing

FAA registration number N17523.

Mr. Rawl was certified by the FAA

to fly airplanes under visual

cae eases 86 “"VFR"). Visual

flight rules means a pilot flies by

5

Sight. It is authorized and quite

normal for a "VFR" pilot to fly

either during the daytime or

nighttime, See 14 C.F.R. Section

91-105 (1983). The FAA provides

another certification, instrument

flight ruies or “IFR" which means a

pilot must be able to fly relying

on his or her instruments alone.

See 14 C.F.R Section 91.115-.129

OG. ate Mr. Rawl was not certified

as an IFR pilot.

the day on February 17, Mr. Rawl

contacted Myrtle Beach Flight

Service Station for weather

nformation. His last contact with

be:

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>

light Service was at p.m.

approximately eleven minutes prior

+

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is flight from Myrtle Beach to

Greenville. Those forecasts

indicated VFR flight conditions

y visibility

and a forecast for deterioration of

those conditions towards the middle

of the evening. In fact, the

weather report disseminated by

Tank + e

tAiyiitl 1)

0)

tT — ts a. fas TAA + A

L > V & Ww ang & & GVA ij WJ

accurate as the weather conditions

deteriorated more rapidly than

forecast, so that visibility at the

Grand Strand Airport was less than

two miles at the time Mr. Rawl lef

ct

the airport with fog and haze

present. There was a broken layer

of clouds at 500 feet and the same

at 3000 feet. On his take off, Mr

Rar ‘aw 4 ry - + nO a\a\nrat+ ~ A

Kaw J broke Out Or TNE scattered

Y > + nnrr x, ™ = s1* © i - +

clouds at approximately ¢& feet

re 2

ann rem rKeon +h 3+ ha r | r OY >} ‘

oeeas 4 i L A Abd de %

+ ©¢ é > | +h ¢ Wwe ~*~ * »~ ‘Fr _ +

My > + +

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= s. ¥ - . ~ . ~ . ¥ >

+ 799 + 4 . 4 4

. Y . *

During the period after Mr.

Rawl left Myrtle Beach to the time

he returned to the Myrtle Beach

the Flight Service simply failed to

predict or adequately depict this

rapidly changing weather condition.

An unusually thick fog settled in

the area. The plaintiff himself,

Mr. Rawl's son, upon exiting a

restaurant where he had just eaten

4)

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dinner, became conce

change and proceeded to promptly

call both Radar Approach Control

("RAPCON") and Myrtle Beach

Approach Control! to plead with

them to tell his father of the

IThe approach control tower

and the radar approach control

("RAPCON") were under the control

of and operated by the Air Force at

the time of these events. The FAA

had delegated authority to control

civilian planes flying into the

Grand Strand Airport to the Air

Force.

change in weather conditions and

communicate to Mr. Rawl that he

needed to divert to Wilmington,

North Carolina where the weather

have a car waiting to transport Mr.

and Mrs. Rawl back to Myrtle Beach.

Five such calls were made to RAPCON

and one to Approach Control. While

it is uncertain when the calls were

J

nade, it is known at least two

S

calls were made prior to the crash.

No such warning or message was

delivered to Mr. Rawl.

with the Myrtle Beach Approach

Control at or about 7:19:40 p.m.¢

At Approximately a minute

later at 7:20:52 p.m., Mr. Rawl

informed the RAPCON that he was

flying under visual flight rules or

2All references to time in the

petition are given in Eastern

Standard Time--hours, minutes and,

in instances where available,

seconds.

VFR. In preparation for entering

the control zone?, Mr. Rawl became

classified as special VFR. 4 About

seven minutes tater at :29:23

~ RA w c aba va! ') j >

p.m., Mr. Rawl reported that he was

EVerds DD er AM © .

flying in VFR conditions as he

yr Oe -_ a ho _ | c -awns

approached the Grand Strand

Y\ ae arta

Alrport.

A+ - “Av 4 = e , ? « 2e.é 2h . .

At approximately ¢28:30 p.m.

+ 7 - y -- ramso , y » >s & 7

and again at approximately 42:5

‘ T> - o.9 o™— «£ 7 ] ~ x

p.M., Mr. Raw I Was tola t< stay

- “ } ~ - - 7 - =| -

clear of the control 7: and tc

, ’ ~ Y }

expect a ten minute aelay.

Wh 3 : Ay 2 | mec ,

While Mr. Rawl was in a

3 " ; 7

Y\ vee = r ~ i i -

“A control zone 1S a clirculay

a > a : 7 > = ™ £ ~ _ « = - «

area with a radius of 5 miles and

- 'e ; — ~ — -* , ~) - a

any extensions necessary t include

parts." 14 CFR Section 71.11 (1983).

4The special VFR weather

minimums are found at 14 CFR

Section 91.107 (1983). Visibility

~

must be at least one statute mile

inimums under thi

section are inapplicable between

Sunset and sunrise. In essence,

the special VFR allows a pilot to

fly within controlled airspace as

long as there is at least one mile

of visibility and the pilot stays

W

clear of clouds. Further, a

° II 7 - : ——- 1

Special VFR only applies to flight

Within the control zone.

holding pattern, the RAPCON’ was

attempting to bring Cessna 46309

into the airport. Like Mr. Rawl,

the pilot of Cessna 46309 was

flying with special VFR clearance.

That pilot made several passes over

the Grand Strand Airport but was

unable to see it. At approximately

13:50:18 p.m. the flight data

position at the Grand Strand

Airport tower declared Cessna 46309

to be involved in an emergency

Situation. At approximately

7:50:18 p.m., Cessna 46309 landed,

but ended up off the a

the aqrass. For a period of time

t ’

Cessna was nonexistent. From peals

Oo f laughter he rd fron the

wicrophone at the flight data

position within the control tower,

| . “ . a " | ‘ =~ =o

the comment was made, tell Cessna

RAPCON was aware of the difficulty

the Cessna had in attempting to

land and that the attempt to get it

down safely had been jiabeied an

emergency. There was no evidence

Mr. Rawl reaiized the difficulty of

Cessna 46309.°? Apparently,

believing the landing was

uneventful, Mr. Rawl requested

RAPCON to inform him of the

altitude Cessna had broken through

the cloud cover.

- . > & Gh dn im 2 oO f\

At approximatel 8:00 a

Mr. Rawl was cleared to approach

a+ Cc rannyn — ~~ ~rnec + ™

the Grand Strand control zone from

the northeast. He was told tc

maintain Special VFR conditions at

or below 1500 feet. He was

approximately seven miles from the

airport at this time.

In its Opinion and without

citation in the record, the Court

of Appeals disregards the District

r

Court's finding that Mr. Rawl wa

unaware of the difficuities of

Cessna 46309 and makes it

independent finding that Mr. Raw

was aware of Cessna's problems.

12

At approximately 8:03:16 p.m.,

RAPCON suggested that another small

aircraft, Baron 9669 Yankee divert

to Wilmington, North Carolina where

the weather was better than Myrtle

Beach at three mile visibility with

fog and haze. 9669 Yankee did not

land at Myrtle Beach following this

Suggestion. A similar suggestion

was not made to Mr. Rawl nor did

7 £e >: Lc

> + aa nr + ranAacr ran Salah: > + -~Ha+

bc ae. Sat & raal € eric as Chat

time

A Ce

teats" nowy t+ Mm SATRMmIiINnIAte|a+e ANN 1+H

A = = UU u = a % Ue de Ww a &

MA e.7 1} ~~ ~ = de 7 g f\ A

Mr. Rawl was at approximately >04

t 2

: ATT

a cad ry + Tr ) ~ + =

. . = re 4 i og @ | r eo a S = os

* + - -

nar ~r\r vn *7* TY +-c > mY ~/ i | ~ +>

ca MA appro at se I 2AVUL 1oOurs irk

ae ee . 1] e 1 -

1} a € imal ei

:ue.i Lei Gs ri€ Wand stl B oh 4 4 at

Arn . . +

) ann no naa + A rh | x an

2500 feet and indicated he believed

} t 1ld ~ mnrahlea + 7 +he

Ne WOU ol be u anLe L see Gsse

airport at that altitude. At or

+ ~14 ee ee . MA > t.7 1 een =|

about 8:04:51 p.m., Mr. Rawl asked

this evening

7

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conditions existed between the

clouds, the outside visual

references were obscured or

severely limited by the ciouds, the

Atlantic Ocean to the East, and

unpopulated areas to the West. It

is important that Mr. Rawl

experienced no difficulty flying

under these circumstances and had

done so for approximately thirty

minutes.

During Mr. Rawl's' exchange

with RAPCON, which began at 8:04,

he was told to descend and maintain

1600 feet.

At or about 8:05:17 p.m., Mr.

Rawl was outside the control zone

flying in a generally northeast

direction which would be a heading

was told by RAPCON to turn left to

a heading of 270. This is a left

Following this instruction, at

Or about 8:06:36 p.m., Mr. Rawl was

headi

was

his

he

asked to state

responded that

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bY Oo A\ ~ \ L U + ow < U | ” q > - bts @

YU Ne n\ A » ‘ m4 WY) “ e : 2

Ms = Q) B ( " * 1 4 ~~ n + @ Q4 we we

v @ S nl @ as . one 4 , > ‘ V

- : ; r _

oF SY —_ reo ex ( Q :

t U ( v4 =

s _— : )

ae N C C

XY

1) od u

her and he or she quite simply may

not be able to tell which end 1s

up. For example, he or she may

the sensation of climbing when

the plane is actually descending.

This condition may occur whilc

pilot is in straight flight if

there are uneven light sources, a

we

=

slanting, uneven cloud bank or

sunlight through haze hitting

03)

propeller. It may also be induced

W

by putting the plane through turn

or by head movements by the pilot.

=)

Mr. Rawl developed spatial

Gisorientation

bY

deprived of outside visua

5 4:

references ana was GcGirectea t

execute several sharp turns withir

a very short period of time.

Hennessey had been briefex Or

spatial disorientation during is

trainin and knew that one of the

= ~ 2

T) » | cs Y om = = ~T g > nr + an

inducing spatlai aisorient

+

- 4 . on + ¢ c K

& 4 ~-* rt = A __ > ~ / +*

of the activities he should guard

against was directing the pilot to

make excessive turns, that is one

turn right after another turn after

another.

Section 1592 of the Arr

Traffic Control Manual? entitled

"Radar Assistance Techniques'

reiterates this concern and

provides as follows:

Use the following techniques

to the extent possible when you

provide radar assistance to a pilot

not gualified to operate in IFR

conditions:

a. Avoid radio frequency

changes except when necessary to

provide a clear communications

channel.

Ds Make turns while the

aircraft is in VFR conditions so it

will be in a position to fly a

9The Aig TeGtEiC Centre:

Manual, an GOELTiCiLSs | internal

document of the FAA prescribes air

traffic control procedures) and

phraseology for use by personnel

providing air traffic control

services. "Controllers are

reguired to be familiar with the

provisions of the handbook which

pertain to their operational

responsibility and to exercise

their best judgment if they

encounter situations not covered by

as Air Traffic Control Manual

Section 7110.65A Foreword.

20

straight course while in IFR condi-

tions.

Cc. Have pilot lower gear and

slow aircraft to approach speed

while in VFR conditions.

- Avoid requiring a climb or

t while in a turn if in IFR

descer

conditions.

e. Avoid abrupt maneuvers.

r% Vector aircraft to VFR

to controllers to help them deal

with spatial disorientation.

With the foregoing facts

presented to him the District Court

resolved the questions of negli-

gence and proximate cause in favor

of plaintiff. In the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law filed

October 12, 1984, the trial judge

held that the government was

negligent in directing Mr. Rawl to

make the turns that were ordered

between 8:05:17 p.m. and 8:06:55

p.m. The court further found the

government negligent for

Hennessey's interpretation ee | ae

p-m. as being 30 degrees and not

requesting Mr. Rawl to repeat the

ort until it was clear.

The court found these acts

proximately caused the crash and

subsequent death of Mr. Rawl.

The court further found

petitioner's decedent lacked any

contributory negligence.

The government contended Mr.

Rawl was contributorily negligent

on two basic grounds. The first

being on the basis of an FAA

14 C.F.R. Section 32.2

(a), which states;

"The pilot in command of

an aircraft is directly

responsible for and is

the final authority as to

the operation of that

sirerart.™

This defense is commonly called the

"pilot an command" defense.

Secondly, the government asserted

that Mr. Rawl's acceptance of the

special VFR after sunset consti-

i

oh oo oe m Fee die

tuted negligence on his part. re

court determined, and the

government conceded with reference

to the second defense, that at the

time of the crash, Mr. Rawl was

clearly outside the control zone in

4

tTCD _ &

t

QD

O

.

¢

re

+

=| Ka ~ , ~ eo

The court there held that any acts

sAH43O-} ‘ t.7 , ~ - rc I;

which Mr. Rawl may have done

aarli 73 +) - rAc - we

earlier with regards to accepting a

5, a7 7’ R +mMmnN 1 ro vata

special VFR Simply were not

-A\vIM + cr A p- h

proximate to the crasn.

t

With roaqardac + 7) the mi10t in

ae Se ee reqaras L ic Mii UL mo

~““Ammanse Jefence +ho tat hh ao ATW AINN

Si al a ae Tense ’ oh 6% Low Ms © qaualiil

- 5

ry | + -“LD 735 — . : 1

Trouna cCnueirt < was nO caus

ee eT ’ y mee? % awa eh

connection between Mr. Rawl's crash

A hee Is _ L - - hare sae

ana his reliance on the weatner as

he knaw - ; A . . ods om x

he knew had it had been when he

left Myrtle Beach and as it had

been forecast by the government via

flight service in making his

decision to pursue his course to

+ 1

~leaarl, Eninnr the Ato hich the

v C - - > LOU oi ne avy |a WN1C Nn AL

oO a rnman + conten Jan oe

Y ae oe \ L GW. eSenusSsu O48 ©. ee Se a Cs

nt+yr } + * nNonmliianranre = +ho Wart

\ LCi AWU I PU —3o Oe a= Cc L C wMWali

i.

WwW

<

‘ >

io : >

4+ 4+

- bu

r4 rj

a x

. we

+ ~

See anc Mere ee en ee

"clearly erroneous" standard. In

ion decided December

>

~

tv

a

O

@)}

be:

J

1 r . :

+} V5 ++ri at Court ryt ~+ n+ 4A NO

es = S L Y = = if 45 es. Ge ~/ y S -Aw tilts y

Ww ~A mM + ho $F- n+ wre

r } J itl ae GT LA aw i @ , Wo

-

Cry a 17 ae 4 = + ~~» €

UY UWilu od UA L1iGAt » a oO a

Cc

matTtTargT CC) T 7 ty Raw! JAR c

Aw .. J + » A V¥ A\A¥ ¥ oe

— mw ler ma lanan?t hiit

iIVL On i y ne dis ae Sil. g Ayu L

= 2

— * " ~ 4 , r ,rlinoan?

eWVilildl AVNWULCYSA aw y ssa - =

o : » : _

~ . “gi ho mero 7 ‘rT ,acr48t Ss Y c

i ¢ oS ee 4 a il1U Su Ss > an ws OE Bok x

rohe _r4ang en L nro \ c nAonian r

+ “ > 4 a4 ~Y y i

T ry 27 19R¢

} A ACA SL y “= A sf a A

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari Should Be

Granted to Review the

Fourth Circuit's Practice

of Circumventry the

Protections Afforded “the

Findings of Fact of a

Trial Court Under Rule 52

(a), Federal Rules of

Civil procedure, by

Characterizing its De

Novo Findings of Fact as

h

Corrections of the

District Court's Error (

Law.

The Fourth Circuit Court of

\ppeals decision in this case 1S 4

} <7 7 ' sntonac

now » ey Lili_tciitiio

(t

sv

?

(D

‘3

i)

3

mf

rh

— =

to circumvent Federal Rule oO!

Procedure 52(a) and this court Ss

very recent admonition to the

- °

Foourth Circuit for misapplying

52(a) in Anderson v_ Bessemer Caty

( = 1905 c cm 1504

40 swe eS Be wewss+t eo + =

= . — as * _

fi9S>) -« in the instant case the

dictates that findings of fact of a

lower court may be overturned only

} - ‘ " .

when "clearly erroneous, and then

26

quite amazingly says it need not

? erronnenic"

-—~x~T-e« é "

apply the clear]

standard if it recharacterizes

findings of fact as matters of law.

This portion of the order bears

repeating:

"Of course, we are aware

of the limits placed upon

uS aS an appellate court

reviewing a trial court's

decision. We may not

overturn findings of fact

unless they are "clearly

4

erroneous" Fed. R. CW. P.

52(a). --- The clearly

erroneous rule applies

even when the trial

court's findings are based

upon physical or

documentary evidence, or

inferences from the facts.

Anderson v City of Besse-

mer City, 407 U. S. ’

105 S.CT. 1504 (1985). In

the case sub judice, how-

ever, we find a mistake in

the rule of law, or

perhaps, a mistake in the

application of law to the

facts. Characterized in

either fashion, the

Situation permits us_ to

correct the error in the

District Court.’" Ap

48-49, (Emphasis adde

u's

After espousing the above

proposition the Court of Appeals

goes on to decide

"From the facts, we

27

i$.C. App. 1985);3 Darter Vv

Greenville Community Hotel Corp.,

301 FF. 24. 0 (isd).

Determinations that there is

but one reasonable inference to be

drawn from the facts presented are

to be made by the trial court and

usually when determining whether to

submit an issue of fact to a jury.

The corresponding standard at the

appellate level is the "clearly

erroneous" test. Hence, the Court

of Appeals cannot circumvent the

appropriate standards by denoting

hey have made their findings of

fact as a matter of law.

Although the Fourth Circuit

stated it made its findings as a

matter of law it never addressed

the question regarding

contributory negligence whether

there was but one reasonable

inference to be drawn from the

evidence in the record. The reason

the Court of Appeals failed to so

29

CO

mention is because where there is

more than one permissible view of

the evidence, the fact finder's

choice between them cannot be

clearly erroneous. Inwood

Laboratories, Ine. v Ives

Laboratories, Inc.-, 456 U.S. 844

of Bessemer

City 407 U.S. , 105 S.Ct.

1504 (1985). In making its skewed

view of the facts, the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals has done

precisely what Rule 52(a) guards

against. That is, it has made an

independent, de novo finding of

fact without regard to the lower

court's determination. If this be

the appropriate workings of the

appellate courts then today in

Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia

and the Carolinas, the rule of

federal district judges in cases

involving negligence findings of

fact is merely to compile the

record on which the Fourth Circuit

30

will base its de novo

determination. In any case in

which a district judge decides to

role for the plaintiffs, the

drafting of the findings of fact

‘ale ate ~*lusi ne a } ) -Or1i Kran Ks

eele| ho Ga & % US L,vVvuils Od Liaw Leuuliired W\y

Rule 52(a) 1s generally pointless,

ince such findings will ordinarily

carry no weight and should this

court make demand that findings f

fact be given weight as: it lid in

Anderson . rr then the Fourth

Circuit will simply rename them and

makin . ~ rY Fannin + + + ~+ ve

making its Own findings of fac anda

} — . n= b - } ~ -_e «CO 4 »

Say tney are making tnem as matter

£ 7 "

Law.

ry ~ ? 7 \y T ) } ’ "

rraqgi illy, tne |! rt 'wWaeoGuat

ley } ] } ¢ ‘

ic kK wledaqed that the facts of thi

. , ] 4 1 } ]

Ise welt COMPLEX, ye qisreqaraeada

the deference t be alive! 1 the

: ) ' y

trial Judge's positi 1! seeing

y 4+ } ‘ 7. |

ind hearl J the ( ien rirst-

oxo

As an alternative position the

Fourth Circuit in footnote nine

states that the "clearly erroneous"

standard is inapplicable where the

court 1s reviewing mixed questions

of law and fact. App.p. 49. In

support of this proposition, the

court cites decisions from the

Second, Third, and Tenth circuits.

Noticeably absent are citations

from the Fourth Circuit and a close

examination of those cases reveals

why. The matter is well settled in

the Fourth Circuit. Where there

are mixed questions of law and fact

the Fourth Circuit applies the

"

"clearly erroneous standard of

review. See Tucker V Calmar S.S.

Corp 45/7 F.2d 440 (4th Cie 19728.

See also Kloster Vv Steamship

e)

Chatham 475 F 2a 43 (4th Cir.

1973).

The Fourth Circuit simply

cannot correctly state that it is

making no finding of facts when,in

32

TT

actuality, it finds many of the

facts to be opposite to those

determined by the District Court.

Questions of fact have been defined

as those whose resolution is based

those based in

b]

0)

i @ |

oe

fans

=

Q

m

ct

be

O

3

O

hh

legal standard. See Note, Federal

Rule of Civil rocedure 52(a) and

the Scope of Appellate Fact Review:

Has application of the clearly

erroneous rule been clearly

erroneous.” 52 St. John's L.Rev.

68 (1977). The Fourth Circuit's

decision is replete with such

contra Panaings, however,

Hh

petitioner gives the ollowing as

exemplification.

Mr. Rawl was reasonable to rely

upon the conditions as he knew then

when he departed frcm Myrtle Beach

ana on the weather forecasts which

were reported by the Flight Service

Station (that have been shown to be

incorrect) in deciding to make the

return flight to Myrtle Beach. The

District Court further found that

the deterioration of weather

conditions following Mr. Rawl's

deperture was most unusual. When

t

Mr. Rawl departed he had

experienced no problem with the

cloud cover obscuring his view.

There were certainly other VFR

pilots, namely 6996 Yankee and

46309 Baron, in the vicinity along

with Mr. Rawl. Without any mention

that the finding by the District

Court was clearly erroneous, the

Fourth Circuit, citing nothing in

the record as support, makes the

sweeping determination that

"When he, Rawl, departed

Greenville on the return

flight, he knew or should

have known that

conditions precluded VFR

landing at Grand Strand."

App p. Ol.

34

Te

Likewise and without citing any

support in the record the Fourth

Circuit states

" . it is at least true

that Rawl was flying in

circumstances that 4

reasonable pilot with

similar qualifications,

or perhaps, more accu~

rately with similar lack

of qualifications would

have shunned." App.p. 50

Such a broad indictment of

plaintiff's decedent is tragic,

specially when, if the court of

appeals had reviewed the record it

would have realized that it is

uncontroverted that at the time the

turns commenced, as directed by

Hennessey, Mr. Rawl was flying in

VFR conditions for which he was

undisputably qualified. App-P- 50.

The record further reflects that

instrument qualification is not

necessary for VFR flying. There

were, incidentally, at least two

other VFR pilots attempting to land

at Myrtle Beach at approximately

35

the same time.

The District Court further

determined that Mr. Rawl was

unaware of the difficulty that

Cessna 46309 experienced in trying

to land. The District Court had

presented to it the actual tapes of

the transmissions, printed

transcript from those tapes and two

air traffic control experts to help

it make that determination. Again

the Fourth Circuit without finding

tne District Court clearly

erroneous and without any refer-

ence to the record states, Pg a

was on the same frequency 4S that

of the Cessna..." App-P- 51.

As a further finding of fact,

characterized as a correction of an

error of law the Fourth Circuit

states "Rawl insisted upon landing

at Grand Strand despite the

conditions there..." That the

Fourth Circuit could and would make

a determination of Mr. Rawl's state

36

of mind without any credible evi-

dence and certainly without

disturbing. This finding con-

cerning the state ol mind of Mr.

Rawl prior to the crash come:

completely "out of the blue."

Based upon the foregoi

~

2

cy

3-4

findings of fact or, as the Fourth

Mr Rawl wa: "not only negligent

but contributoril neaqligent." It

ls notable that the I ure

Circuit' statement ear t

imply that contributor negligence

} ‘ e+} Lina y y* ( + } y W Y r

than neq] 1¢ e, however, South

con - 7 . - ‘ ~ ™~ - .

contributory neaqligqence 1s the

Cc _ ~~ - ~Iartmant nein 4 eh

negligenc © OF a op Gg. F Fit Fees wri Cr

_ ~— Wa ac + +a 1 a 11 YR? Ma <s? -

contributes to his injury. Traylor

= —

> . oman am 5 e ~ ma A = 4 4 .

vy Bryant 265 S.&. <a 914, 274 S.C.

- -

S09 (1980)

TanaAiry + ry at + o

sa iH | | | t ,

he

Wil

Court’ finding is "eleariy

erroneous. Again, however, the

et "concluded that Rawl's

negligence was é concurrent

proximate cause of the crash..."

The Court of Appeals further

ignored the substantive law of

as the accident occurred in South

+ “ml ans oa - and 7 T ’

Carolina. Richards V United

States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).

The clear rule in South

Carolina is that the issues of

negligence, contributory negligence

ard proximate cause are questions

of fact for the jury, the trier of

fact. Graham v. Whitaker, 321 S.E.

2d 40, ee 8,€. 393 (1984) ;

Merriman v. Sea Pines’ Plantation

Company., 294 S.E. 2d 423, 278 S.C.

263 (1982). Contributory

negligence only becomes a matter of

law when the evidence admits but

one reasonable inference. House v.

39

European Health Spa, 239 S.E. 2d

653, 269 S.C. 644 (1977); Williams

Y Ranney, 220 S.£. 2€ 555, 267 S.C.

163 (1976).

Where evidence is susceptible

to more than one reasonable

inference on the issue Oo f

contributory negligence, the issue

must be determined by the trier of

facts. Willis v. Floyd _ Brace

Comeenvs 200., 209 5.E. 20 295, 279

S.C. $58 (S.C. App. 1983).

Clearly, more than one

reasonable inference was

permissible from the evidence in

the record. Rather than addressing

1 '

whether the weeerict Eourt’s

findings were reasonable

inferences, the Fourth Circuit

merely ignored the law of South

Carolina and made its own de novo

review of the record and concluded

that Mr. Rawl was contributorily

negligent and that his negligence

was a "concurrent proximate cause

40

of the crash."

much of the District Court’s

discussion of intervening and

Superceding negligence on the part

of the government. This discussion

was based upon an arguendc

assumption that petitioner's

decedent was contributorily

negligent. The court, however,

made its findings of negligence

prior to and independent of this

intellectual inquiry. The court

was careful at the end of this

discussion to reiterate that it was

not finding Mr. Rawl contributorily

©

H

ve

_

D

)

h

positions

in tact,

WwW

h

aa

the only essential fact on

ich these courts concur is that

had Mr. Rawl not been flying the

evening of February 17, 1978, there

would have been n crash. This

Petitioner prays this court protect

for this individual and for ther

appellees, the protections and

Girectives of Rule 52(a) and this

—™ r,~+ I Ior4c}i Yr rh An | ~ Yr 7

Ou ft GoecisiO 1] AnGers .

City of Bessemer City Supra.

Certiorari Shou

Granted TO Reso

Conflict in the Circuits

and Within the “ourth

Circuit Regarding whether

Rule 52(a), Federal Rules

of of GFR! Procedures

Forbids Appellate Review

of Trial Court Finding

of Negligence as Findings

of Fact.

~

V eS fy

rc

js

tr

’

cr

2

fi

"

P

ctr

[

Q)

od

}

17 + ao >

an apvpeiiacve Ourt of a

& 3 £ . ~ 7 N ~~ +

ww. G S ) et oe & | IS 4

.

Ar

a7

Cc

rc

crt

€

Y)

oad

sv

mA CcTMmM

Mural

43

Ww

A\

a/ aw

-

-

J

Fone ond

~~

p44

of

ond

uy

4J

‘ }

s

we

ad

r

> ce

bo

ado

4J

ed a |

> vt

4

ae |

4

=

et

4J

“4

ient

-

WA om™

WwUAtal

>

ce

Y)

5 |

4

T

a

44

i eee a —

erroneous, thereby holding that

findings of neqligence are

reviewable only under the "clearly

erroneous" standard.

A majority ofr the courts oO!

appeal have applied the ruling in

McAllister 1! determining that

findings of negligence and

contributory negligence ire

reviewable under the “clearly

erroneous" standard. Oblensky v.

>

Saldana Sc yhmier, 409 F.2d 52 (lst

~} ° 5 AAT 5 > c

Whantwarac Tnr f tT 7 ¢ h

onipyaras, L Vey se ie | . « &Y 006 ¢t

_—_

QO | 7 aR al

j = - ( " _ ~ c +> . | ry =

oo? & 1971). This standara 1aS alSO

Ka ry ’ ~ 3 +r + }, “2 1 + 4 -~cC}

Dee! abvpilied U Chie Le iatve@d issue

r

+ + ) - , 4 +

rY . ,mD > »=HA1I3C { snr , Yr 7 |

Ol Drox] € cause wun Ve. § 1ltea

Wh

ct

c

$d

+

4)

n

I

>

A

,

L

ae 9

e

P

cf

h2

lr

A>.

J

_

Or

(Tt

c

~~

ry

.

The Second Circuit, however,

has tended to traditionally ignore

McAllister by determining that

findings of negligence are not

Subject to the "clearly erroneous"

standard. The Second Circuit

continued to apply this view after

McAllister without even discussing

the applicability of McAllister.

Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S.

Corp., 269 F.2d 68, cert. den. 361

U.S. 934 (1961); Dale v. Rosenfeld,

229 ¥F.28 855 (20 Cie. 1996). The

Second Circuit held in Mamiye Bros.

¥. Barber §&.S. . Lines, iIne., 360

F.2G 778, Cert. den. 39835. 0.8. 835

(i966), that its view that

negligence findings were freely

reviewable was sound despite

McAllister.

More recent cases decided by

the Second Circuit indicate a

possible shift in its position

regarding the reviewability of

negligence findings. In two cases

decided in 1974, the court

strengthened the deference to be

given to findings of negligence by

a trial court by holding that

although findings of negligence are

46

reviewable as findings of law, they

should not be overturned by the

appellate court unless the lower

court manifests an incorrect

conception of the law. Whelan v.

Penn Central Co.; 503 F.2d 886 (2d

Cir. 1974) and Erie Lackawanna Ry

Co. v. Timpany, 495 F.2d 830 (2d

The Second Circuit has even

gone as far as to uphold findings

of negligence on the ground that it

could not hold the findings were

SLrTOonecous. rucnstadt Ve

Vemes Soe £sea 36/7 (2a Cir. 1970).

Fuchstadt involved an action for

negligence against the United

States for personal injuries

resulting from an automobile

accident. The Second Circuit

stated:

"We are not left here

with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake

has been committed by the

trial judge,... and hence

we are unable to hold

that these findings of

47

ante

fact (emphasis ours) are

clearly erroneous within

the meaning of Rule

D2 UA) aes”

The Third Cizreuae has been

influenced by the Second Circuit

decisions. Prior to 1967, the

decisions of the Third Circuit had

held that findings of negligence,

contributory negligence and

proximate cause could not be set

aside unless clearly erroneous

regardless of what the Court o

~ yy rm?) fr 1 + share Aq

Appeals would have found if charged

with the responsibilit Of tne

finding in the Tiret place.

Wiseman v. United States, 32/7 F.2d

~ 77 7} | a y C

Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. S.S.

2

a Sire eae a des ia ae de =

Marie Leonhardt, 32 F.2d 262 (3rd

Circuit departed from is earlier

decisions to hold that a finding

contributory negligence 1S one o

law and is reviewable on appeal

D

A

+

free from the restrictions of the

clearly erroneous standard. Nolan

v. Sullivan, 372 F.2d 776, 778 (3rd

was brought

ct

+

5

/

‘

=

ry

O

QO

rh

c

—

Qu

an

er)

wlio

ey

resulting from an automobile

accident. The District Court found

that the defendent was guilty of

negligence and that the decedent

was guiity of contributory

negligence. The Third Circuit

reversed on the grounds that the

conclusion that the decedent had

The Fourth Ci eceusit has

vacillated between the view

traditionally espoused by the

Second Circuit that findings’ of

negligence are findings of law and

are freely reviewable, and the view

that the clearly erroneous standard

applies to negligence findin

Q

”

49

fs ee cree ek Ed

ea ee

clearly erroneous standard to

findings of negligence. Darter v.

Greenville Community Hotel Corp.,

Darter involved an action against a

hotel owner for personal injuries

Fourth Circuit held that negligence

The court then cited Rule

52(a). Factual questions settled

by the findings of the District

Court must be accepted by the

appellate court. Thompson _v.

United States, 268 F.2 426 (4th

Cir. i359).

In Johnson v. U.S., 336 F.2d

801 (4th Cir. 1964), the Fourth

Circuit again applied the clearly

erroneous test to the District

Court's finding of no negligence on

the part of the defendant. In

Johnson, an action was7 brought

under the Federal Tort Claims Act

for the wrongful death of a child

run over by a bus. The court

upheld the findings of no

negligence by the District Court on

appeal. The court stated that it

was for the District Judge to make

the Subsidiary and ultimate

findings and that his findings were

binding upon appeal.

The clearly erroneous standard

waS again applied in Taylor ov.

ot

.

W

.

7

WW

‘en

Y

-

>

F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1966),

a case involving negligence and

contributory negligence findings.

21

f

mi.

a4

~

rmment

iil Li |

4

ee

finding of negligence was freely

reviewable. Hicks involved an

action under the Federal Tort

Claims Act alleging negligence of a

doctor in diagnosing and treating a

patient's illness. The District

Court dismissed the case on the

grounds of insufficient evidence to

establish negligence or proximate

cause. The Fourth Circuit

reversed, holding that the doctor

was negligent and that this holding

| was not inconsistent with Rule

| rae) The court stated that Rule

52(a) comes into play where the

trial judge as fact finder has

: reconciled conflicting testimony or

evidence and prevents a disturbance

of those findings unless clearly

erroneous, however, where the trial

court's conclusions are

"based on undisputed

facts, they are not

entitled to the finality

customarily accorded

basic factual findings

under Rule 52(a)..."

53

aie eine

The court in Hicks did not

refer at all to its earlier

decisions, which had _ generally

applied the clearly erroneous

standard to findings of negligence.

The Hicks decision has been

severely criticized in the Fourth

Circuit case Bonds v. Mortensen and

Lange, @€t a1, 717 F.2d 123 (4th

Cir. 1983). In Bonds, a shipowner,

challenged the District Court's

findings of fact regarding the

"responsibility and fault" of the

shipowner for the injuries’ and

death of a longshoreman by

contending that the findings of the

OZ ServrZ.et Court regarding

"responsibility and fault" were

mixed questions of law nd fact

which were not entitled tc the

protection of the clearl erroneous

standard of Rule 52(a), but rather

subject to full review under ic

= re ee + AtieanreccoaA +¢ +

> ass & ee ee ee — sa & 4 » —=

the findings were Subject t a

PO aes

4 ENS Ae EB QI he

review under Hicks The Fourth

Circuit disagreed that the findings

were subject to full review under

Hicks and stated:

"More recent decisions of

our circuit indicate that

the ruling in Hicks on

this point has to a large

degree been abandoned,

see Famous Knitware Corp.

v. Drug Fair, iInc., 493

FeaGQ @£298, @32 Rive (4th

Cir. 1974), and indicate

that a District Court's

findings of negligence

are generally treated as

findings of Fact

reviewable under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 52(a). Scheel v.

Conboy, 551 F.2d 41, 43

(4th Cir. 1977); Lane v.

United States, 529 F.2d

L739, 400 (400 Ciz. 2975) 3

Kloster v. Steamship

Chatham C.A., 475 F.2d

a3, G4 Stn Cit. 197335

T,ecrer Vv Calmar

Steamship Corp., 457 F.2

440, 444 (4th Cir. 1972)”

The other eight of the eieven

circuits follow the majority view

that findings of negligence cannot

be disturbed by an appellate court

uniess clearly erroneous.

The Supreme Court's decision

Supreme Court decision Anderson v.

City of Bessemer City, Supra.

Support this majority view.

In Anderson, the Fourth

Circuit was held by this court to

have misapplied the clearly

erroneous standard in overturning

the District Court's finding of sex

adiscriminaiton. In Anderson a

female teacher with college degrees

in social studies and education

applied for and was rejected for a

job managing a city's recreational

facilities and programs. A male

who had recently graduated with a

degree in physical education was

sition. The

O

chosen for the p

selection was made by a committee.

testimony from Anderson, the male

applicant who was _ hired, and

members of the committee was heard,

the District Court found that

Anderson had been denied the

position because of her sex.

56

The Fourth Circuit reversed

the District Court's decision,

holding that the District Court's

findings were clearly erroneous.

On certiorari, this Court held that

the Fourth Circuit misapprehended

and misapplied the clearly erron-

eous standard and thereby comitted

error, and reversed the decision of

the Fourth Circuit. This Court

stated that a finding of inten-

tional discrimination is a finding

of fact and as such, the standard

governing appellate review is that

set forth in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 52 (a)"

This court then discussed the

Qu

meaning of "clearly erroneous" an

"A finding is clearly

erroneous’ when although

there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing

court on the entire

evidence is left with the

definite and firm

conviction that a mistake

has been committed. U.S.

v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333

U.S. 364, 395, 92 L Ed

a7

re

746, 68 S$. Ct. 523

(1948). This standard

plainly does not entitle

a reviewing court to

reverse the finding of

the trier of fact simply

because it is convinced

that it would have de-

cided the case

differently. The

reviewing court oversteps

the bounds of its duty

under Rule 52 if it

undertakes to duplicate

the role of the lower

court. “In applying the

clearly erroneous

standard to findings of a

District Court sitting

without a jury, appellate

courts must constantly

have in mind that their

function is not to decide

factual issues de novo.'

zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

395 U.S. 100, 123, 23 L

Ed 2a 129, 89 S. Ct. 1562

(1969). If the District

Court's account of the

evidence is plausible in

light of the record

viewed in its entirety,

the Court of Appeals may

not reverse it even

though convinced that had

it been sitting as the

trier of fact, it would

have weighed the evidence

differently. Where there

are two permissible views

of the evidence, the fact

finder's choice between

them cannot be clearly

erroneous. United States

v. Yellow Cab Co., 338

U.S. 336, 242; 35 G Ga

150, 70 S. Ct. 177

(1949); see also Inwood

58

Laboratories, Inc. Vv.

Ives Laboratories, Inc.,

456 U.S. 844, 72 L Ed 2d

606, 102 Bs Gee 2182

raS82)." An

Supra.

This court further stated that Rule

52 does not exclude any particular

categories of factual findings from

the appellate court's obligation to

accept a District Court's findings

unless clearly erroneous.

2 oe . eae D - er ; — .

Deference is given to the trial

sEtlelet= - +h +o} ri nde 7

udde as the original finder of

+ a a ae ~— _ oe “ a @ _ ~

fact because ofl his superior

7 ~j5> +4

- ~— > .

Le : » ¥ + + 5,ceAR 1a ¢ nec

I U est reas iS ,

. + + 7

review oO I factual

f i 11 S under the

=m - : s - ~

\ i e me 4 y e r Y T e oO of S

stance rad-witi! its

+ Y + 4 } a > £

‘

t=1& t gt ee , t tne

Al ~ 5 .

exrycenpti A A rect .

et haha

Supra.

ee

+ ¥ + ¢ > y

- ~ +> > + — . *

”” »¥ + 8 e a}?

+ - > ~ ~

Thi

£ + - . + _ _

l } I e

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a

record, this Court refused to find

that the District Court’ s

interpretaion of the facts in

Anderson was ALiogicea: or

implausible and declined to find

them clearly erroneous, and

therefore reversed the appellate

Court.

In addition to the existence

of a conflict regarding the

reviewability oF negligence

findings within the circuits and

within the Fourth Circuit itself,

there is a conflict present in the

instant case between the law of

South Carolina and the law applied

by the Fourth Circuit.

A federal District Court and

federal Court of Appeals must apply

the law of the state in which it is

sitting. Richards v. United States,

369 U.S. 1, 10 (1962). Therefore,

in the instant case, the Fourth

Circuit was required to apply South

Carolina law regarding negligence,

60

a \A

icy

ag

7 .

‘Se

s trie

_

1

t

evidence,

issues to

the

+

subm1

to

c

Whitaker,

required

294

CO /

1t10Nn

a

Plant

Under South Carolina law,

contributory negligence only

becomes a matter of law when the

evidence admits but one reasonable

inference. House v. European

Health Spa, 239 S.E. 2d 653, 269

Sst 644 ‘is7y 7) 2 Williams a

Kinney, 226 8.8. #G@ 5353, 467 S.€.,

163 (1976). Where evidence on the

issue of contributory negligence is

susceptible to more than one

reasonable inference, the issue

Fourth Ci Teust ignored the

Tanah , x } 14 \%

applicable law of South Carolina by

/

4

finding contributory negligence on

the part of Mr. Rawl as a finding

of law. There was clearly more

than one reasonable inference to be

drawn from the evidence, therefore

the issues of negligence and

62

contributory negligence were

questions of fact for the trier of

fact, rather than questions of law.

The Fourth Circuit failed to

even address whether the District

Court's decision as to its findings

of no contributory negligence on

the part of Mr. Rawl was a

reasonable inference from the

record. The court merely concluded

from its de novo review of the

record, that Mr. Rawl was

contributorily negligent "as a

matter of law", thereby igncring

the applicable law of South

Carolina.

Certiorari should be granted

1ssue of the reviewability of

findings of negligence as findings

far

O Tract.

Conclusions

For the above reasons, a writ

ade BPEL REGIE ER rpaer

pe

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no. i aa le a le alate a ag nae i ai | cries ideas actos o "

distin:

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:

A DE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) CERTIFICATE OF FILING

COUNTY OF CHARLESTON )

PERSONALLY appeared before ne G. Danie! Bowling, who being duly sworn,

deposes and says that he has knowledge of the mailing of the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari in the case of Julian W. Rawl, as Administrator of the Estate of

Edwin E. Rawl, Jr. vs. United States of America to the correct address for the

Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. for

filing.

That said original and forty (49) copies were placed in a package with prepaid

first class postage by depositing said package and contents in the United States

Mail at Charleston, South Carolina on “March 22, 1986.

That to his knowledge the said original and forty (40) copies were mailed

within the sixty (69) day time period for filing.

CG. Datel Bowling

Counsel of Record

Sworn to before me this 22nd day of March, 1986.

6

“NotaryPubli the Stape of South Carolin

a

“ly Commiss: 7 LIFES

dulv sworn, deposes anc says -opies of the attached

sf the Estate of Edw . Kawi, VS. td

hereinafter named, at the place and address, by placing said Copies a package

with repaid first acs set 7 4 by depositing sa 4 package a 4 tant<

the United States Mail at Charleston, South Carolina purs ant to Rules 28.4 and

28. Sof the Rules of the Supreme Court. Affiant further states thata rties

.

“ea ZL @ Ha é,

Solicitor General!

Department

Washington,

Sworn to before me this 22nd day of March, |98€

4.) %

Lf? Si A“? c

hig © etkberss | ee

“far for > 4 Ce ae . ° ar

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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