Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rawl v. United States
Supreme Court brief1986
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Supreme Court, U.S,
85-1742 | FiLeEp
; | MAR 24 1986
4 | JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
In The =... =
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEC STATES
October Term, 1986
Julian W. Rawl, Administrator of the
Estate of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
United States of America.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
Seo ae ae eae aoe a Oe ee ee
i
Arnold S. Goodstein
Diane Schafer Goodstein
Goodstein & Goodstein, P.A.
133 East First North Street
Summerville, S.C. 29483
(803) 871-1000
G. Daniel Bowling*
333 1/2 King Street
Charleston, S.C. 29401
(803) 722-8728
Counsel for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
a Certiorari should be
granted to review the Fourth
Circuit's practice of circumventing
the protections afforded the
findings of fact of a trial court
under Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, by characterizing
its de novo findings of fact as
corrections of the District Court's
the circuits and within the Fourth
Circuit regarding whether Rule
Sa tess Federal Rules of civil
procedure, forbids appellate review
of trial court findings of
negligence as findings of fact.
PARTIES
The parties to this proceeding
are Julian
“fo and
America.
W. Rawl,
RFetata of Fau
yw &- A HY NS J as A TE
the
United
1
74
a
n" FE Raw!
aa ave sw
we
States
as Administra-
’
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented....... are
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he
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Rule TAVOSVOG s 4020660 6 e4 6 ee ews
Statement of the Case..... Scenes
Reasons for Granting the Writ..
COUCTUSLORs « k 4:40 CAR eR EE
177
"ne
~ —t
=
| outta ae ae — “cold
APPENDIX
District Court Findings
of Fact and Conclusions
of Law,October 12, 1984.
Judgment, October 15, 1984.
Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, December 4, 1985.
Order of the Court of
Appeals Denying Re-
hearing and Rehearing
En Banc, January 21, 1986.
VV
Page
ho
38
39
58
- 7 2
a ay ae _
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Anderson v. City of Bessemer 24,26
City, 470 U.S. , 105 S. Ct, 27,28
1504 (1985) 30,31,38,.42,56-60
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Yates, 438 F.2d 798
[eee St. 867150.
Bonds v. Mortensen and Lange,
et al, 717 F.2d 123
(4th Cir. 1983). . . ses « §6
Brown v. Howell, 327 SE2d 659
(S.C. mee, 1966) ..4 cc. 28,29
Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855
(2d Cir. SUNG) 6 sé Ke Ka
Darter v. Greenville Community,
Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 76
(4th Cir. 1962) . . . . .29,50,61
Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co. v.
Timpany, 495 F.2d 830
(2d Cir 1974)... ...,.. «47
Famous Knitware Corp. v. Drug
Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 25]
(4th Cir. 1974)... .. . «(55
Fuchstadt v. U.S., 434 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1970) ..... . 47,48
Graham v. Whitaker, 321 SE2d 40
282 S.C. 393 (1984) . . , 38,39,61
Hawkins v. Southern Ry. Co.,
45 FRD. 459 (1968) .... . 38
Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d
626 (4th Cir. 1966) . . , , 52-55
V
House v. European Health Spa,
239 $.€.2¢ 653 269 S.C. 644
Page
Sis s ree errno Pe
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc.
456 U.S. 844 (1 982). «aes
vOnnSOn Vv. U. 3.. 30 F.46
801 (4th Cir. 1964).
Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipmen
CO. ARC. 5 £9e S3-RctG £70, 27
S.C. 171 (1978) a5
Kloster v. Steamship Chatham
C. A., 475 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1973) .
Lane v. United States, 529
F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).
Mamiye Bros. v. Barber S. S.
L2nOs. i8C., 3260 *.28 7%,
cert. den 385 U.S. 835
(1966) —
McAllister v. United States,
348 U.S. 19 (1954) ... 43-
Merriman v. Sea Pines Planta-
58,59
51
t
1
28
ca
29
46
4@,55
tion Company, 294 S.E.2d 423,
278 S.C. 263 (1982).
Nelson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 440 F.2d
668 (5th Cir. 1971).
Nolan v. Sullivan, 372 F.2d
776 (3rd Cir 1967)
Oblensky v. Saldana Schmier,
409 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1971)
Vi
.39,61
45
49
45
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
S.S. Marie Leonhardt, 320
F.2d 262 (3rd Cir 1963)
Quinn v. United States, 439
F.2d 335 (8th Cir 1971)
Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1 (1962).
Scheel v. Conboy, 551 F.2d
41 (4th Cir. 1977)
Taylor v. Bryant, 265 S.E.2d
514, 274 S.C. 509 (1980).
Taylor v. United States,
360 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.
1966) Ee 5 ~
Thompson v. United States,
268 F.2d 426 (4th Cir.
1959)
Tucker v. Calmar Steamship
Corp., 457 F.2d 440, 444
Seemeeere befe)....
U.S. VS. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364 (1948)
United States v. Yellow Cab
Ce., gee U.S. 338 (1949).
Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S.
Corp., 269 F.2d 68, cert.
den. 361 U.S. 934 (1961).
Whelan v. Penn Central Co.,
503 F.2d 886 (2nd Cir.
1974) a,
Williams v. Kinney, 226 S.E.2d
555 267 S.C. 163 (1976)
Vii
iJ
Dis
WwW
PhO
cn
Oo
wn
©O
I>
OY
I>
~~
40,62
Wiseman v. United States, 32/7
P.2¢@ 70] tard Cir. i964) . .. ™
.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Haz
Research, Inc., Inc. 3 :
ub. S&S. 208 42060) 6 ood hee ee
LO WM
Vv ] ] ]
Statutes and Rules
14 CFR 71.11 (1983) 10
1A crn eq 1A? r7 0059 \ wn
as u aN 7Hhe & VE (i zoo) iv
14 CFR 91.115-.129 (1983) 6
14 CFR Section 91.3(a). 22
14 CFR Section 91-105 (1983). 6
Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of 3,24,26
Ciwt) Precedurée . . . . « 8¥031,33
38,39,41
42,50,53
54,55,57
Other Authorities 99
Websters Third International
Dictionary 2537 14
Air Traffic Control Manual 14,20
Section 7110.65 A Foreward. 21
Air Traffic Control Manual
Section 40;Chap 3, Section
18; Paragraph .521; Chap
2, Section 2, Paragraph 4. 14,20
S24 ot. vonn’'s L. Rev. 68
Paee?) . 33
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OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the court of
appeals is reported at 778 F. 2d
Petition. The order denying
rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc, which is not
reported, was filed on January 21,
1986, and is set out at p. 58 of
ry
ctr
n
the Appendix. The District Cou
Findings of Fact, Conclusions oc
Law and Order, which are not
reported, are set out at
pp. of the Appendix.
The judgment of the Court of
Appeals was entered on December 4,
5. A timely Petition for Re-
hearing was filed, which was denied
on January 21, 1986. Jurisdiction
of this court 1S invoked under 28
ST)
tered
y
en
review.
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was brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2671,
et seq. The claim arose out of an
South Carolina, which took the
lives of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr., and
estate of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr.
Petitioner's complaint alleged
that the defendant's, Fe ey Fe
agents and employees, acting within
the course. and scope of their
employment with the defendant, and
in particular one air traffic
controeilLer, violated certain
Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") regulations and procedures,
and committed other acts of
negligence which led to the crash.
-~ 7 -
Jury crias on August 2 | and
September l1 and 2, 1983. Oral
arguments were made by the parties
on January 17, 1984. The testimony
was extensive, including that from
air traffic control experts,
pilot expert and submission of
countless pages of transcripts from
radio transmissions culminating in
the crash of Edwin E. Rawl, Jr.
The facts in this matter are
far from simple. On the afternoon
of February 17, 1978, petitioner's
intestate, Mr. Rawl, left the Grand
Strand Airport at Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina at approximately
2¢€3 eo Pee with a planned
destination of Greenville, North
Carolina, a distance in flying time
of approximately one hour. He was
flying an airplane which he owned,
a 1977 Beechcraft Bonanza, bearing
FAA registration number N17523.
Mr. Rawl was certified by the FAA
to fly airplanes under visual
cae eases 86 “"VFR"). Visual
flight rules means a pilot flies by
5
Sight. It is authorized and quite
normal for a "VFR" pilot to fly
either during the daytime or
nighttime, See 14 C.F.R. Section
91-105 (1983). The FAA provides
another certification, instrument
flight ruies or “IFR" which means a
pilot must be able to fly relying
on his or her instruments alone.
See 14 C.F.R Section 91.115-.129
OG. ate Mr. Rawl was not certified
as an IFR pilot.
the day on February 17, Mr. Rawl
contacted Myrtle Beach Flight
Service Station for weather
nformation. His last contact with
be:
rr]
Ul
LJ
>
light Service was at p.m.
approximately eleven minutes prior
+
a
—
-
U
is flight from Myrtle Beach to
Greenville. Those forecasts
indicated VFR flight conditions
y visibility
and a forecast for deterioration of
those conditions towards the middle
of the evening. In fact, the
weather report disseminated by
Tank + e
tAiyiitl 1)
0)
tT — ts a. fas TAA + A
L > V & Ww ang & & GVA ij WJ
accurate as the weather conditions
deteriorated more rapidly than
forecast, so that visibility at the
Grand Strand Airport was less than
two miles at the time Mr. Rawl lef
ct
the airport with fog and haze
present. There was a broken layer
of clouds at 500 feet and the same
at 3000 feet. On his take off, Mr
Rar ‘aw 4 ry - + nO a\a\nrat+ ~ A
Kaw J broke Out Or TNE scattered
Y > + nnrr x, ™ = s1* © i - +
clouds at approximately ¢& feet
re 2
ann rem rKeon +h 3+ ha r | r OY >} ‘
oeeas 4 i L A Abd de %
+ ©¢ é > | +h ¢ Wwe ~*~ * »~ ‘Fr _ +
My > + +
i ° ae ee
y ) ~- + > y ~ +
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¥ > + +> > i” os
T . + + + +
pt y 4 i Ww 4
4 ea +
+ fy
Mv ~+ 7 Cc R Kr My T yY om
I ° I e
+ > + My + y
= s. ¥ - . ~ . ~ . ¥ >
+ 799 + 4 . 4 4
. Y . *
During the period after Mr.
Rawl left Myrtle Beach to the time
he returned to the Myrtle Beach
the Flight Service simply failed to
predict or adequately depict this
rapidly changing weather condition.
An unusually thick fog settled in
the area. The plaintiff himself,
Mr. Rawl's son, upon exiting a
restaurant where he had just eaten
4)
ry
_
40
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se
2 i
O
or
ct
as
nt
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dinner, became conce
change and proceeded to promptly
call both Radar Approach Control
("RAPCON") and Myrtle Beach
Approach Control! to plead with
them to tell his father of the
IThe approach control tower
and the radar approach control
("RAPCON") were under the control
of and operated by the Air Force at
the time of these events. The FAA
had delegated authority to control
civilian planes flying into the
Grand Strand Airport to the Air
Force.
change in weather conditions and
communicate to Mr. Rawl that he
needed to divert to Wilmington,
North Carolina where the weather
have a car waiting to transport Mr.
and Mrs. Rawl back to Myrtle Beach.
Five such calls were made to RAPCON
and one to Approach Control. While
it is uncertain when the calls were
J
nade, it is known at least two
S
calls were made prior to the crash.
No such warning or message was
delivered to Mr. Rawl.
with the Myrtle Beach Approach
Control at or about 7:19:40 p.m.¢
At Approximately a minute
later at 7:20:52 p.m., Mr. Rawl
informed the RAPCON that he was
flying under visual flight rules or
2All references to time in the
petition are given in Eastern
Standard Time--hours, minutes and,
in instances where available,
seconds.
VFR. In preparation for entering
the control zone?, Mr. Rawl became
classified as special VFR. 4 About
seven minutes tater at :29:23
~ RA w c aba va! ') j >
p.m., Mr. Rawl reported that he was
EVerds DD er AM © .
flying in VFR conditions as he
yr Oe -_ a ho _ | c -awns
approached the Grand Strand
Y\ ae arta
Alrport.
A+ - “Av 4 = e , ? « 2e.é 2h . .
At approximately ¢28:30 p.m.
+ 7 - y -- ramso , y » >s & 7
and again at approximately 42:5
‘ T> - o.9 o™— «£ 7 ] ~ x
p.M., Mr. Raw I Was tola t< stay
- “ } ~ - - 7 - =| -
clear of the control 7: and tc
, ’ ~ Y }
expect a ten minute aelay.
Wh 3 : Ay 2 | mec ,
While Mr. Rawl was in a
3 " ; 7
Y\ vee = r ~ i i -
“A control zone 1S a clirculay
a > a : 7 > = ™ £ ~ _ « = - «
area with a radius of 5 miles and
- 'e ; — ~ — -* , ~) - a
any extensions necessary t include
parts." 14 CFR Section 71.11 (1983).
4The special VFR weather
minimums are found at 14 CFR
Section 91.107 (1983). Visibility
~
must be at least one statute mile
inimums under thi
section are inapplicable between
Sunset and sunrise. In essence,
the special VFR allows a pilot to
fly within controlled airspace as
long as there is at least one mile
of visibility and the pilot stays
W
clear of clouds. Further, a
° II 7 - : ——- 1
Special VFR only applies to flight
Within the control zone.
holding pattern, the RAPCON’ was
attempting to bring Cessna 46309
into the airport. Like Mr. Rawl,
the pilot of Cessna 46309 was
flying with special VFR clearance.
That pilot made several passes over
the Grand Strand Airport but was
unable to see it. At approximately
13:50:18 p.m. the flight data
position at the Grand Strand
Airport tower declared Cessna 46309
to be involved in an emergency
Situation. At approximately
7:50:18 p.m., Cessna 46309 landed,
but ended up off the a
the aqrass. For a period of time
t ’
Cessna was nonexistent. From peals
Oo f laughter he rd fron the
wicrophone at the flight data
position within the control tower,
| . “ . a " | ‘ =~ =o
the comment was made, tell Cessna
RAPCON was aware of the difficulty
the Cessna had in attempting to
land and that the attempt to get it
down safely had been jiabeied an
emergency. There was no evidence
Mr. Rawl reaiized the difficulty of
Cessna 46309.°? Apparently,
believing the landing was
uneventful, Mr. Rawl requested
RAPCON to inform him of the
altitude Cessna had broken through
the cloud cover.
- . > & Gh dn im 2 oO f\
At approximatel 8:00 a
Mr. Rawl was cleared to approach
a+ Cc rannyn — ~~ ~rnec + ™
the Grand Strand control zone from
the northeast. He was told tc
maintain Special VFR conditions at
or below 1500 feet. He was
approximately seven miles from the
airport at this time.
In its Opinion and without
citation in the record, the Court
of Appeals disregards the District
r
Court's finding that Mr. Rawl wa
unaware of the difficuities of
Cessna 46309 and makes it
independent finding that Mr. Raw
was aware of Cessna's problems.
12
At approximately 8:03:16 p.m.,
RAPCON suggested that another small
aircraft, Baron 9669 Yankee divert
to Wilmington, North Carolina where
the weather was better than Myrtle
Beach at three mile visibility with
fog and haze. 9669 Yankee did not
land at Myrtle Beach following this
Suggestion. A similar suggestion
was not made to Mr. Rawl nor did
7 £e >: Lc
> + aa nr + ranAacr ran Salah: > + -~Ha+
bc ae. Sat & raal € eric as Chat
time
A Ce
teats" nowy t+ Mm SATRMmIiINnIAte|a+e ANN 1+H
A = = UU u = a % Ue de Ww a &
MA e.7 1} ~~ ~ = de 7 g f\ A
Mr. Rawl was at approximately >04
t 2
: ATT
a cad ry + Tr ) ~ + =
. . = re 4 i og @ | r eo a S = os
* + - -
nar ~r\r vn *7* TY +-c > mY ~/ i | ~ +>
ca MA appro at se I 2AVUL 1oOurs irk
ae ee . 1] e 1 -
1} a € imal ei
:ue.i Lei Gs ri€ Wand stl B oh 4 4 at
Arn . . +
) ann no naa + A rh | x an
2500 feet and indicated he believed
} t 1ld ~ mnrahlea + 7 +he
Ne WOU ol be u anLe L see Gsse
airport at that altitude. At or
+ ~14 ee ee . MA > t.7 1 een =|
about 8:04:51 p.m., Mr. Rawl asked
this evening
7
CA
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Man
asCA 44
Chap
>
n1sg,
ctio
Se
14
!
conditions existed between the
clouds, the outside visual
references were obscured or
severely limited by the ciouds, the
Atlantic Ocean to the East, and
unpopulated areas to the West. It
is important that Mr. Rawl
experienced no difficulty flying
under these circumstances and had
done so for approximately thirty
minutes.
During Mr. Rawl's' exchange
with RAPCON, which began at 8:04,
he was told to descend and maintain
1600 feet.
At or about 8:05:17 p.m., Mr.
Rawl was outside the control zone
flying in a generally northeast
direction which would be a heading
was told by RAPCON to turn left to
a heading of 270. This is a left
Following this instruction, at
Or about 8:06:36 p.m., Mr. Rawl was
headi
was
his
he
asked to state
responded that
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t U ( v4 =
s _— : )
ae N C C
XY
1) od u
her and he or she quite simply may
not be able to tell which end 1s
up. For example, he or she may
the sensation of climbing when
the plane is actually descending.
This condition may occur whilc
pilot is in straight flight if
there are uneven light sources, a
we
=
slanting, uneven cloud bank or
sunlight through haze hitting
03)
propeller. It may also be induced
W
by putting the plane through turn
or by head movements by the pilot.
=)
Mr. Rawl developed spatial
Gisorientation
bY
deprived of outside visua
5 4:
references ana was GcGirectea t
execute several sharp turns withir
a very short period of time.
Hennessey had been briefex Or
spatial disorientation during is
trainin and knew that one of the
= ~ 2
T) » | cs Y om = = ~T g > nr + an
inducing spatlai aisorient
+
- 4 . on + ¢ c K
& 4 ~-* rt = A __ > ~ / +*
of the activities he should guard
against was directing the pilot to
make excessive turns, that is one
turn right after another turn after
another.
Section 1592 of the Arr
Traffic Control Manual? entitled
"Radar Assistance Techniques'
reiterates this concern and
provides as follows:
Use the following techniques
to the extent possible when you
provide radar assistance to a pilot
not gualified to operate in IFR
conditions:
a. Avoid radio frequency
changes except when necessary to
provide a clear communications
channel.
Ds Make turns while the
aircraft is in VFR conditions so it
will be in a position to fly a
9The Aig TeGtEiC Centre:
Manual, an GOELTiCiLSs | internal
document of the FAA prescribes air
traffic control procedures) and
phraseology for use by personnel
providing air traffic control
services. "Controllers are
reguired to be familiar with the
provisions of the handbook which
pertain to their operational
responsibility and to exercise
their best judgment if they
encounter situations not covered by
as Air Traffic Control Manual
Section 7110.65A Foreword.
20
straight course while in IFR condi-
tions.
Cc. Have pilot lower gear and
slow aircraft to approach speed
while in VFR conditions.
- Avoid requiring a climb or
t while in a turn if in IFR
descer
conditions.
e. Avoid abrupt maneuvers.
r% Vector aircraft to VFR
to controllers to help them deal
with spatial disorientation.
With the foregoing facts
presented to him the District Court
resolved the questions of negli-
gence and proximate cause in favor
of plaintiff. In the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law filed
October 12, 1984, the trial judge
held that the government was
negligent in directing Mr. Rawl to
make the turns that were ordered
between 8:05:17 p.m. and 8:06:55
p.m. The court further found the
government negligent for
Hennessey's interpretation ee | ae
p-m. as being 30 degrees and not
requesting Mr. Rawl to repeat the
ort until it was clear.
The court found these acts
proximately caused the crash and
subsequent death of Mr. Rawl.
The court further found
petitioner's decedent lacked any
contributory negligence.
The government contended Mr.
Rawl was contributorily negligent
on two basic grounds. The first
being on the basis of an FAA
14 C.F.R. Section 32.2
(a), which states;
"The pilot in command of
an aircraft is directly
responsible for and is
the final authority as to
the operation of that
sirerart.™
This defense is commonly called the
"pilot an command" defense.
Secondly, the government asserted
that Mr. Rawl's acceptance of the
special VFR after sunset consti-
i
oh oo oe m Fee die
tuted negligence on his part. re
court determined, and the
government conceded with reference
to the second defense, that at the
time of the crash, Mr. Rawl was
clearly outside the control zone in
4
tTCD _ &
t
QD
O
.
¢
re
+
=| Ka ~ , ~ eo
The court there held that any acts
sAH43O-} ‘ t.7 , ~ - rc I;
which Mr. Rawl may have done
aarli 73 +) - rAc - we
earlier with regards to accepting a
5, a7 7’ R +mMmnN 1 ro vata
special VFR Simply were not
-A\vIM + cr A p- h
proximate to the crasn.
t
With roaqardac + 7) the mi10t in
ae Se ee reqaras L ic Mii UL mo
~““Ammanse Jefence +ho tat hh ao ATW AINN
Si al a ae Tense ’ oh 6% Low Ms © qaualiil
- 5
ry | + -“LD 735 — . : 1
Trouna cCnueirt < was nO caus
ee eT ’ y mee? % awa eh
connection between Mr. Rawl's crash
A hee Is _ L - - hare sae
ana his reliance on the weatner as
he knaw - ; A . . ods om x
he knew had it had been when he
left Myrtle Beach and as it had
been forecast by the government via
flight service in making his
decision to pursue his course to
+ 1
~leaarl, Eninnr the Ato hich the
v C - - > LOU oi ne avy |a WN1C Nn AL
oO a rnman + conten Jan oe
Y ae oe \ L GW. eSenusSsu O48 ©. ee Se a Cs
nt+yr } + * nNonmliianranre = +ho Wart
\ LCi AWU I PU —3o Oe a= Cc L C wMWali
i.
WwW
<
‘ >
io : >
4+ 4+
- bu
r4 rj
a x
. we
+ ~
See anc Mere ee en ee
"clearly erroneous" standard. In
ion decided December
>
~
tv
a
O
@)}
be:
J
1 r . :
+} V5 ++ri at Court ryt ~+ n+ 4A NO
es = S L Y = = if 45 es. Ge ~/ y S -Aw tilts y
Ww ~A mM + ho $F- n+ wre
r } J itl ae GT LA aw i @ , Wo
-
Cry a 17 ae 4 = + ~~» €
UY UWilu od UA L1iGAt » a oO a
Cc
matTtTargT CC) T 7 ty Raw! JAR c
Aw .. J + » A V¥ A\A¥ ¥ oe
— mw ler ma lanan?t hiit
iIVL On i y ne dis ae Sil. g Ayu L
= 2
— * " ~ 4 , r ,rlinoan?
eWVilildl AVNWULCYSA aw y ssa - =
o : » : _
~ . “gi ho mero 7 ‘rT ,acr48t Ss Y c
i ¢ oS ee 4 a il1U Su Ss > an ws OE Bok x
rohe _r4ang en L nro \ c nAonian r
+ “ > 4 a4 ~Y y i
T ry 27 19R¢
} A ACA SL y “= A sf a A
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Certiorari Should Be
Granted to Review the
Fourth Circuit's Practice
of Circumventry the
Protections Afforded “the
Findings of Fact of a
Trial Court Under Rule 52
(a), Federal Rules of
Civil procedure, by
Characterizing its De
Novo Findings of Fact as
h
Corrections of the
District Court's Error (
Law.
The Fourth Circuit Court of
\ppeals decision in this case 1S 4
} <7 7 ' sntonac
now » ey Lili_tciitiio
(t
sv
?
(D
‘3
i)
3
mf
rh
— =
to circumvent Federal Rule oO!
Procedure 52(a) and this court Ss
very recent admonition to the
- °
Foourth Circuit for misapplying
52(a) in Anderson v_ Bessemer Caty
( = 1905 c cm 1504
40 swe eS Be wewss+t eo + =
= . — as * _
fi9S>) -« in the instant case the
dictates that findings of fact of a
lower court may be overturned only
} - ‘ " .
when "clearly erroneous, and then
26
quite amazingly says it need not
? erronnenic"
-—~x~T-e« é "
apply the clear]
standard if it recharacterizes
findings of fact as matters of law.
This portion of the order bears
repeating:
"Of course, we are aware
of the limits placed upon
uS aS an appellate court
reviewing a trial court's
decision. We may not
overturn findings of fact
unless they are "clearly
4
erroneous" Fed. R. CW. P.
52(a). --- The clearly
erroneous rule applies
even when the trial
court's findings are based
upon physical or
documentary evidence, or
inferences from the facts.
Anderson v City of Besse-
mer City, 407 U. S. ’
105 S.CT. 1504 (1985). In
the case sub judice, how-
ever, we find a mistake in
the rule of law, or
perhaps, a mistake in the
application of law to the
facts. Characterized in
either fashion, the
Situation permits us_ to
correct the error in the
District Court.’" Ap
48-49, (Emphasis adde
u's
After espousing the above
proposition the Court of Appeals
goes on to decide
"From the facts, we
27
i$.C. App. 1985);3 Darter Vv
Greenville Community Hotel Corp.,
301 FF. 24. 0 (isd).
Determinations that there is
but one reasonable inference to be
drawn from the facts presented are
to be made by the trial court and
usually when determining whether to
submit an issue of fact to a jury.
The corresponding standard at the
appellate level is the "clearly
erroneous" test. Hence, the Court
of Appeals cannot circumvent the
appropriate standards by denoting
hey have made their findings of
fact as a matter of law.
Although the Fourth Circuit
stated it made its findings as a
matter of law it never addressed
the question regarding
contributory negligence whether
there was but one reasonable
inference to be drawn from the
evidence in the record. The reason
the Court of Appeals failed to so
29
CO
mention is because where there is
more than one permissible view of
the evidence, the fact finder's
choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous. Inwood
Laboratories, Ine. v Ives
Laboratories, Inc.-, 456 U.S. 844
of Bessemer
City 407 U.S. , 105 S.Ct.
1504 (1985). In making its skewed
view of the facts, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has done
precisely what Rule 52(a) guards
against. That is, it has made an
independent, de novo finding of
fact without regard to the lower
court's determination. If this be
the appropriate workings of the
appellate courts then today in
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia
and the Carolinas, the rule of
federal district judges in cases
involving negligence findings of
fact is merely to compile the
record on which the Fourth Circuit
30
will base its de novo
determination. In any case in
which a district judge decides to
role for the plaintiffs, the
drafting of the findings of fact
‘ale ate ~*lusi ne a } ) -Or1i Kran Ks
eele| ho Ga & % US L,vVvuils Od Liaw Leuuliired W\y
Rule 52(a) 1s generally pointless,
ince such findings will ordinarily
carry no weight and should this
court make demand that findings f
fact be given weight as: it lid in
Anderson . rr then the Fourth
Circuit will simply rename them and
makin . ~ rY Fannin + + + ~+ ve
making its Own findings of fac anda
} — . n= b - } ~ -_e «CO 4 »
Say tney are making tnem as matter
£ 7 "
Law.
ry ~ ? 7 \y T ) } ’ "
rraqgi illy, tne |! rt 'wWaeoGuat
ley } ] } ¢ ‘
ic kK wledaqed that the facts of thi
. , ] 4 1 } ]
Ise welt COMPLEX, ye qisreqaraeada
the deference t be alive! 1 the
: ) ' y
trial Judge's positi 1! seeing
y 4+ } ‘ 7. |
ind hearl J the ( ien rirst-
oxo
As an alternative position the
Fourth Circuit in footnote nine
states that the "clearly erroneous"
standard is inapplicable where the
court 1s reviewing mixed questions
of law and fact. App.p. 49. In
support of this proposition, the
court cites decisions from the
Second, Third, and Tenth circuits.
Noticeably absent are citations
from the Fourth Circuit and a close
examination of those cases reveals
why. The matter is well settled in
the Fourth Circuit. Where there
are mixed questions of law and fact
the Fourth Circuit applies the
"
"clearly erroneous standard of
review. See Tucker V Calmar S.S.
Corp 45/7 F.2d 440 (4th Cie 19728.
See also Kloster Vv Steamship
e)
Chatham 475 F 2a 43 (4th Cir.
1973).
The Fourth Circuit simply
cannot correctly state that it is
making no finding of facts when,in
32
TT
actuality, it finds many of the
facts to be opposite to those
determined by the District Court.
Questions of fact have been defined
as those whose resolution is based
those based in
b]
0)
i @ |
oe
fans
=
Q
m
ct
be
O
3
O
hh
legal standard. See Note, Federal
Rule of Civil rocedure 52(a) and
the Scope of Appellate Fact Review:
Has application of the clearly
erroneous rule been clearly
erroneous.” 52 St. John's L.Rev.
68 (1977). The Fourth Circuit's
decision is replete with such
contra Panaings, however,
Hh
petitioner gives the ollowing as
exemplification.
Mr. Rawl was reasonable to rely
upon the conditions as he knew then
when he departed frcm Myrtle Beach
ana on the weather forecasts which
were reported by the Flight Service
Station (that have been shown to be
incorrect) in deciding to make the
return flight to Myrtle Beach. The
District Court further found that
the deterioration of weather
conditions following Mr. Rawl's
deperture was most unusual. When
t
Mr. Rawl departed he had
experienced no problem with the
cloud cover obscuring his view.
There were certainly other VFR
pilots, namely 6996 Yankee and
46309 Baron, in the vicinity along
with Mr. Rawl. Without any mention
that the finding by the District
Court was clearly erroneous, the
Fourth Circuit, citing nothing in
the record as support, makes the
sweeping determination that
"When he, Rawl, departed
Greenville on the return
flight, he knew or should
have known that
conditions precluded VFR
landing at Grand Strand."
App p. Ol.
34
Te
Likewise and without citing any
support in the record the Fourth
Circuit states
" . it is at least true
that Rawl was flying in
circumstances that 4
reasonable pilot with
similar qualifications,
or perhaps, more accu~
rately with similar lack
of qualifications would
have shunned." App.p. 50
Such a broad indictment of
plaintiff's decedent is tragic,
specially when, if the court of
appeals had reviewed the record it
would have realized that it is
uncontroverted that at the time the
turns commenced, as directed by
Hennessey, Mr. Rawl was flying in
VFR conditions for which he was
undisputably qualified. App-P- 50.
The record further reflects that
instrument qualification is not
necessary for VFR flying. There
were, incidentally, at least two
other VFR pilots attempting to land
at Myrtle Beach at approximately
35
the same time.
The District Court further
determined that Mr. Rawl was
unaware of the difficulty that
Cessna 46309 experienced in trying
to land. The District Court had
presented to it the actual tapes of
the transmissions, printed
transcript from those tapes and two
air traffic control experts to help
it make that determination. Again
the Fourth Circuit without finding
tne District Court clearly
erroneous and without any refer-
ence to the record states, Pg a
was on the same frequency 4S that
of the Cessna..." App-P- 51.
As a further finding of fact,
characterized as a correction of an
error of law the Fourth Circuit
states "Rawl insisted upon landing
at Grand Strand despite the
conditions there..." That the
Fourth Circuit could and would make
a determination of Mr. Rawl's state
36
of mind without any credible evi-
dence and certainly without
disturbing. This finding con-
cerning the state ol mind of Mr.
Rawl prior to the crash come:
completely "out of the blue."
Based upon the foregoi
~
2
cy
3-4
findings of fact or, as the Fourth
Mr Rawl wa: "not only negligent
but contributoril neaqligent." It
ls notable that the I ure
Circuit' statement ear t
imply that contributor negligence
} ‘ e+} Lina y y* ( + } y W Y r
than neq] 1¢ e, however, South
con - 7 . - ‘ ~ ™~ - .
contributory neaqligqence 1s the
Cc _ ~~ - ~Iartmant nein 4 eh
negligenc © OF a op Gg. F Fit Fees wri Cr
_ ~— Wa ac + +a 1 a 11 YR? Ma <s? -
contributes to his injury. Traylor
= —
> . oman am 5 e ~ ma A = 4 4 .
vy Bryant 265 S.&. <a 914, 274 S.C.
- -
S09 (1980)
TanaAiry + ry at + o
sa iH | | | t ,
he
Wil
Court’ finding is "eleariy
erroneous. Again, however, the
et "concluded that Rawl's
negligence was é concurrent
proximate cause of the crash..."
The Court of Appeals further
ignored the substantive law of
as the accident occurred in South
+ “ml ans oa - and 7 T ’
Carolina. Richards V United
States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
The clear rule in South
Carolina is that the issues of
negligence, contributory negligence
ard proximate cause are questions
of fact for the jury, the trier of
fact. Graham v. Whitaker, 321 S.E.
2d 40, ee 8,€. 393 (1984) ;
Merriman v. Sea Pines’ Plantation
Company., 294 S.E. 2d 423, 278 S.C.
263 (1982). Contributory
negligence only becomes a matter of
law when the evidence admits but
one reasonable inference. House v.
39
European Health Spa, 239 S.E. 2d
653, 269 S.C. 644 (1977); Williams
Y Ranney, 220 S.£. 2€ 555, 267 S.C.
163 (1976).
Where evidence is susceptible
to more than one reasonable
inference on the issue Oo f
contributory negligence, the issue
must be determined by the trier of
facts. Willis v. Floyd _ Brace
Comeenvs 200., 209 5.E. 20 295, 279
S.C. $58 (S.C. App. 1983).
Clearly, more than one
reasonable inference was
permissible from the evidence in
the record. Rather than addressing
1 '
whether the weeerict Eourt’s
findings were reasonable
inferences, the Fourth Circuit
merely ignored the law of South
Carolina and made its own de novo
review of the record and concluded
that Mr. Rawl was contributorily
negligent and that his negligence
was a "concurrent proximate cause
40
of the crash."
much of the District Court’s
discussion of intervening and
Superceding negligence on the part
of the government. This discussion
was based upon an arguendc
assumption that petitioner's
decedent was contributorily
negligent. The court, however,
made its findings of negligence
prior to and independent of this
intellectual inquiry. The court
was careful at the end of this
discussion to reiterate that it was
not finding Mr. Rawl contributorily
©
H
ve
_
D
)
h
positions
in tact,
WwW
h
aa
the only essential fact on
ich these courts concur is that
had Mr. Rawl not been flying the
evening of February 17, 1978, there
would have been n crash. This
Petitioner prays this court protect
for this individual and for ther
appellees, the protections and
Girectives of Rule 52(a) and this
—™ r,~+ I Ior4c}i Yr rh An | ~ Yr 7
Ou ft GoecisiO 1] AnGers .
City of Bessemer City Supra.
Certiorari Shou
Granted TO Reso
Conflict in the Circuits
and Within the “ourth
Circuit Regarding whether
Rule 52(a), Federal Rules
of of GFR! Procedures
Forbids Appellate Review
of Trial Court Finding
of Negligence as Findings
of Fact.
~
V eS fy
rc
js
tr
’
cr
2
fi
"
P
ctr
[
Q)
od
}
17 + ao >
an apvpeiiacve Ourt of a
& 3 £ . ~ 7 N ~~ +
ww. G S ) et oe & | IS 4
.
Ar
a7
Cc
rc
crt
€
Y)
oad
sv
mA CcTMmM
Mural
43
Ww
A\
a/ aw
-
-
J
Fone ond
~~
p44
of
ond
uy
4J
‘ }
s
we
ad
r
> ce
bo
ado
4J
ed a |
> vt
4
ae |
4
=
et
4J
“4
ient
-
WA om™
WwUAtal
>
ce
Y)
5 |
4
T
a
44
i eee a —
erroneous, thereby holding that
findings of neqligence are
reviewable only under the "clearly
erroneous" standard.
A majority ofr the courts oO!
appeal have applied the ruling in
McAllister 1! determining that
findings of negligence and
contributory negligence ire
reviewable under the “clearly
erroneous" standard. Oblensky v.
>
Saldana Sc yhmier, 409 F.2d 52 (lst
~} ° 5 AAT 5 > c
Whantwarac Tnr f tT 7 ¢ h
onipyaras, L Vey se ie | . « &Y 006 ¢t
_—_
QO | 7 aR al
j = - ( " _ ~ c +> . | ry =
oo? & 1971). This standara 1aS alSO
Ka ry ’ ~ 3 +r + }, “2 1 + 4 -~cC}
Dee! abvpilied U Chie Le iatve@d issue
r
+ + ) - , 4 +
rY . ,mD > »=HA1I3C { snr , Yr 7 |
Ol Drox] € cause wun Ve. § 1ltea
Wh
ct
c
$d
+
4)
n
I
>
A
,
L
ae 9
e
P
cf
h2
lr
A>.
J
_
Or
(Tt
c
~~
ry
.
The Second Circuit, however,
has tended to traditionally ignore
McAllister by determining that
findings of negligence are not
Subject to the "clearly erroneous"
standard. The Second Circuit
continued to apply this view after
McAllister without even discussing
the applicability of McAllister.
Verbeeck v. Black Diamond S.S.
Corp., 269 F.2d 68, cert. den. 361
U.S. 934 (1961); Dale v. Rosenfeld,
229 ¥F.28 855 (20 Cie. 1996). The
Second Circuit held in Mamiye Bros.
¥. Barber §&.S. . Lines, iIne., 360
F.2G 778, Cert. den. 39835. 0.8. 835
(i966), that its view that
negligence findings were freely
reviewable was sound despite
McAllister.
More recent cases decided by
the Second Circuit indicate a
possible shift in its position
regarding the reviewability of
negligence findings. In two cases
decided in 1974, the court
strengthened the deference to be
given to findings of negligence by
a trial court by holding that
although findings of negligence are
46
reviewable as findings of law, they
should not be overturned by the
appellate court unless the lower
court manifests an incorrect
conception of the law. Whelan v.
Penn Central Co.; 503 F.2d 886 (2d
Cir. 1974) and Erie Lackawanna Ry
Co. v. Timpany, 495 F.2d 830 (2d
The Second Circuit has even
gone as far as to uphold findings
of negligence on the ground that it
could not hold the findings were
SLrTOonecous. rucnstadt Ve
Vemes Soe £sea 36/7 (2a Cir. 1970).
Fuchstadt involved an action for
negligence against the United
States for personal injuries
resulting from an automobile
accident. The Second Circuit
stated:
"We are not left here
with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake
has been committed by the
trial judge,... and hence
we are unable to hold
that these findings of
47
ante
fact (emphasis ours) are
clearly erroneous within
the meaning of Rule
D2 UA) aes”
The Third Cizreuae has been
influenced by the Second Circuit
decisions. Prior to 1967, the
decisions of the Third Circuit had
held that findings of negligence,
contributory negligence and
proximate cause could not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous
regardless of what the Court o
~ yy rm?) fr 1 + share Aq
Appeals would have found if charged
with the responsibilit Of tne
finding in the Tiret place.
Wiseman v. United States, 32/7 F.2d
~ 77 7} | a y C
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. S.S.
2
a Sire eae a des ia ae de =
Marie Leonhardt, 32 F.2d 262 (3rd
Circuit departed from is earlier
decisions to hold that a finding
contributory negligence 1S one o
law and is reviewable on appeal
D
A
+
free from the restrictions of the
clearly erroneous standard. Nolan
v. Sullivan, 372 F.2d 776, 778 (3rd
was brought
ct
+
5
/
‘
=
ry
O
QO
rh
c
—
Qu
an
er)
wlio
ey
resulting from an automobile
accident. The District Court found
that the defendent was guilty of
negligence and that the decedent
was guiity of contributory
negligence. The Third Circuit
reversed on the grounds that the
conclusion that the decedent had
The Fourth Ci eceusit has
vacillated between the view
traditionally espoused by the
Second Circuit that findings’ of
negligence are findings of law and
are freely reviewable, and the view
that the clearly erroneous standard
applies to negligence findin
Q
”
49
fs ee cree ek Ed
ea ee
clearly erroneous standard to
findings of negligence. Darter v.
Greenville Community Hotel Corp.,
Darter involved an action against a
hotel owner for personal injuries
Fourth Circuit held that negligence
The court then cited Rule
52(a). Factual questions settled
by the findings of the District
Court must be accepted by the
appellate court. Thompson _v.
United States, 268 F.2 426 (4th
Cir. i359).
In Johnson v. U.S., 336 F.2d
801 (4th Cir. 1964), the Fourth
Circuit again applied the clearly
erroneous test to the District
Court's finding of no negligence on
the part of the defendant. In
Johnson, an action was7 brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for the wrongful death of a child
run over by a bus. The court
upheld the findings of no
negligence by the District Court on
appeal. The court stated that it
was for the District Judge to make
the Subsidiary and ultimate
findings and that his findings were
binding upon appeal.
The clearly erroneous standard
waS again applied in Taylor ov.
ot
.
W
.
7
WW
‘en
Y
-
>
F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1966),
a case involving negligence and
contributory negligence findings.
21
f
mi.
a4
~
rmment
iil Li |
4
ee
finding of negligence was freely
reviewable. Hicks involved an
action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act alleging negligence of a
doctor in diagnosing and treating a
patient's illness. The District
Court dismissed the case on the
grounds of insufficient evidence to
establish negligence or proximate
cause. The Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that the doctor
was negligent and that this holding
| was not inconsistent with Rule
| rae) The court stated that Rule
52(a) comes into play where the
trial judge as fact finder has
: reconciled conflicting testimony or
evidence and prevents a disturbance
of those findings unless clearly
erroneous, however, where the trial
court's conclusions are
"based on undisputed
facts, they are not
entitled to the finality
customarily accorded
basic factual findings
under Rule 52(a)..."
53
aie eine
The court in Hicks did not
refer at all to its earlier
decisions, which had _ generally
applied the clearly erroneous
standard to findings of negligence.
The Hicks decision has been
severely criticized in the Fourth
Circuit case Bonds v. Mortensen and
Lange, @€t a1, 717 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1983). In Bonds, a shipowner,
challenged the District Court's
findings of fact regarding the
"responsibility and fault" of the
shipowner for the injuries’ and
death of a longshoreman by
contending that the findings of the
OZ ServrZ.et Court regarding
"responsibility and fault" were
mixed questions of law nd fact
which were not entitled tc the
protection of the clearl erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a), but rather
subject to full review under ic
= re ee + AtieanreccoaA +¢ +
> ass & ee ee ee — sa & 4 » —=
the findings were Subject t a
PO aes
4 ENS Ae EB QI he
review under Hicks The Fourth
Circuit disagreed that the findings
were subject to full review under
Hicks and stated:
"More recent decisions of
our circuit indicate that
the ruling in Hicks on
this point has to a large
degree been abandoned,
see Famous Knitware Corp.
v. Drug Fair, iInc., 493
FeaGQ @£298, @32 Rive (4th
Cir. 1974), and indicate
that a District Court's
findings of negligence
are generally treated as
findings of Fact
reviewable under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a). Scheel v.
Conboy, 551 F.2d 41, 43
(4th Cir. 1977); Lane v.
United States, 529 F.2d
L739, 400 (400 Ciz. 2975) 3
Kloster v. Steamship
Chatham C.A., 475 F.2d
a3, G4 Stn Cit. 197335
T,ecrer Vv Calmar
Steamship Corp., 457 F.2
440, 444 (4th Cir. 1972)”
The other eight of the eieven
circuits follow the majority view
that findings of negligence cannot
be disturbed by an appellate court
uniess clearly erroneous.
The Supreme Court's decision
Supreme Court decision Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, Supra.
Support this majority view.
In Anderson, the Fourth
Circuit was held by this court to
have misapplied the clearly
erroneous standard in overturning
the District Court's finding of sex
adiscriminaiton. In Anderson a
female teacher with college degrees
in social studies and education
applied for and was rejected for a
job managing a city's recreational
facilities and programs. A male
who had recently graduated with a
degree in physical education was
sition. The
O
chosen for the p
selection was made by a committee.
testimony from Anderson, the male
applicant who was _ hired, and
members of the committee was heard,
the District Court found that
Anderson had been denied the
position because of her sex.
56
The Fourth Circuit reversed
the District Court's decision,
holding that the District Court's
findings were clearly erroneous.
On certiorari, this Court held that
the Fourth Circuit misapprehended
and misapplied the clearly erron-
eous standard and thereby comitted
error, and reversed the decision of
the Fourth Circuit. This Court
stated that a finding of inten-
tional discrimination is a finding
of fact and as such, the standard
governing appellate review is that
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52 (a)"
This court then discussed the
Qu
meaning of "clearly erroneous" an
"A finding is clearly
erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing
court on the entire
evidence is left with the
definite and firm
conviction that a mistake
has been committed. U.S.
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395, 92 L Ed
a7
re
746, 68 S$. Ct. 523
(1948). This standard
plainly does not entitle
a reviewing court to
reverse the finding of
the trier of fact simply
because it is convinced
that it would have de-
cided the case
differently. The
reviewing court oversteps
the bounds of its duty
under Rule 52 if it
undertakes to duplicate
the role of the lower
court. “In applying the
clearly erroneous
standard to findings of a
District Court sitting
without a jury, appellate
courts must constantly
have in mind that their
function is not to decide
factual issues de novo.'
zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 123, 23 L
Ed 2a 129, 89 S. Ct. 1562
(1969). If the District
Court's account of the
evidence is plausible in
light of the record
viewed in its entirety,
the Court of Appeals may
not reverse it even
though convinced that had
it been sitting as the
trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence
differently. Where there
are two permissible views
of the evidence, the fact
finder's choice between
them cannot be clearly
erroneous. United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 338
U.S. 336, 242; 35 G Ga
150, 70 S. Ct. 177
(1949); see also Inwood
58
Laboratories, Inc. Vv.
Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 72 L Ed 2d
606, 102 Bs Gee 2182
raS82)." An
Supra.
This court further stated that Rule
52 does not exclude any particular
categories of factual findings from
the appellate court's obligation to
accept a District Court's findings
unless clearly erroneous.
2 oe . eae D - er ; — .
Deference is given to the trial
sEtlelet= - +h +o} ri nde 7
udde as the original finder of
+ a a ae ~— _ oe “ a @ _ ~
fact because ofl his superior
7 ~j5> +4
- ~— > .
Le : » ¥ + + 5,ceAR 1a ¢ nec
I U est reas iS ,
. + + 7
review oO I factual
f i 11 S under the
=m - : s - ~
\ i e me 4 y e r Y T e oO of S
stance rad-witi! its
+ Y + 4 } a > £
‘
t=1& t gt ee , t tne
Al ~ 5 .
exrycenpti A A rect .
et haha
Supra.
ee
+ ¥ + ¢ > y
- ~ +> > + — . *
”” »¥ + 8 e a}?
+ - > ~ ~
Thi
£ + - . + _ _
l } I e
‘ P
a
record, this Court refused to find
that the District Court’ s
interpretaion of the facts in
Anderson was ALiogicea: or
implausible and declined to find
them clearly erroneous, and
therefore reversed the appellate
Court.
In addition to the existence
of a conflict regarding the
reviewability oF negligence
findings within the circuits and
within the Fourth Circuit itself,
there is a conflict present in the
instant case between the law of
South Carolina and the law applied
by the Fourth Circuit.
A federal District Court and
federal Court of Appeals must apply
the law of the state in which it is
sitting. Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 10 (1962). Therefore,
in the instant case, the Fourth
Circuit was required to apply South
Carolina law regarding negligence,
60
a \A
icy
ag
7 .
‘Se
s trie
_
1
t
evidence,
issues to
the
+
subm1
to
c
Whitaker,
required
294
CO /
1t10Nn
a
Plant
Under South Carolina law,
contributory negligence only
becomes a matter of law when the
evidence admits but one reasonable
inference. House v. European
Health Spa, 239 S.E. 2d 653, 269
Sst 644 ‘is7y 7) 2 Williams a
Kinney, 226 8.8. #G@ 5353, 467 S.€.,
163 (1976). Where evidence on the
issue of contributory negligence is
susceptible to more than one
reasonable inference, the issue
Fourth Ci Teust ignored the
Tanah , x } 14 \%
applicable law of South Carolina by
/
4
finding contributory negligence on
the part of Mr. Rawl as a finding
of law. There was clearly more
than one reasonable inference to be
drawn from the evidence, therefore
the issues of negligence and
62
contributory negligence were
questions of fact for the trier of
fact, rather than questions of law.
The Fourth Circuit failed to
even address whether the District
Court's decision as to its findings
of no contributory negligence on
the part of Mr. Rawl was a
reasonable inference from the
record. The court merely concluded
from its de novo review of the
record, that Mr. Rawl was
contributorily negligent "as a
matter of law", thereby igncring
the applicable law of South
Carolina.
Certiorari should be granted
1ssue of the reviewability of
findings of negligence as findings
far
O Tract.
Conclusions
For the above reasons, a writ
ade BPEL REGIE ER rpaer
pe
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no. i aa le a le alate a ag nae i ai | cries ideas actos o "
distin:
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h
ppe
:
A DE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) CERTIFICATE OF FILING
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON )
PERSONALLY appeared before ne G. Danie! Bowling, who being duly sworn,
deposes and says that he has knowledge of the mailing of the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari in the case of Julian W. Rawl, as Administrator of the Estate of
Edwin E. Rawl, Jr. vs. United States of America to the correct address for the
Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. for
filing.
That said original and forty (49) copies were placed in a package with prepaid
first class postage by depositing said package and contents in the United States
Mail at Charleston, South Carolina on “March 22, 1986.
That to his knowledge the said original and forty (40) copies were mailed
within the sixty (69) day time period for filing.
CG. Datel Bowling
Counsel of Record
Sworn to before me this 22nd day of March, 1986.
6
“NotaryPubli the Stape of South Carolin
a
“ly Commiss: 7 LIFES
dulv sworn, deposes anc says -opies of the attached
sf the Estate of Edw . Kawi, VS. td
hereinafter named, at the place and address, by placing said Copies a package
with repaid first acs set 7 4 by depositing sa 4 package a 4 tant<
the United States Mail at Charleston, South Carolina purs ant to Rules 28.4 and
28. Sof the Rules of the Supreme Court. Affiant further states thata rties
.
“ea ZL @ Ha é,
Solicitor General!
Department
Washington,
Sworn to before me this 22nd day of March, |98€
4.) %
Lf? Si A“? c
hig © etkberss | ee
“far for > 4 Ce ae . ° ar
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