Opposition Brief — United Nuclear Corp. v. Thomas
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Supreme Court, U.S.
Ay , FILED
) ¢ 7] 4 1986
19
Nos. 85- 1276, 85-1280 and 85- APR
JOSEPH E. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1985
Ly
Vv
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, AND UNITED
NUCLEAR CORPORATION, ET ‘ALIA, CHAUN-
CEY KEPFORD (PRO SE),
Petitioners,
v.
LEE-M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondents.
ty
Vv
Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
LY.
_ 4
INTERVENOR—RESPONDENTS |
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND’S AND
SIERRA CLUB’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
ty
Ww
Rosert E. YuRNKE
Counsel of Record vd \
Environmental Defense Fun!
1405 Arapahoe Avenue \ /
Boulder, CO 80302 oe
(303) 440-4901 a
Counsel for Intervenor- Respondent
=
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333 /
( )
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ei OR ORG be ky dt: ec cara aene a il
I RU tcc chan tcasscnneteconcemonrbiamergucnioen 2
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED . 2
ye ek Re glace 3
A. The Evidentiary Record Supports Congress’
Decisions to Require Standards ........................ ee
1. Radiological Risks Associated With Tail-
ings Stare ead Se oes sade 4
2. Risks From Nonradioactive Toxie Sub-
SI cdi tenets cso ihigistePacactnclgninetacente koa 7
B. Statutory and Regulatory Background .......... ae
REASONS WHY UNC’S AND AMC’S PETITIONS
SHOULD BE DENIED .. nites 10
A. The Decision Below Is Not At Odds With The
Statutory Command Or With Prior Decisions
ee CN oh Sr ee a ae
1. No Agency Finding of dec otameill is Re-
SRE ERE irk eaeeace ark Sevan aN fate 10
2. EPA Did Not Exceed Its Statutory Au-
SN chr pandtbidianis ck lasiaiactian eal eaetibot 15
B. The EPA Standards Will Be Implemented
Without Causing Conflict Among Federal
IN oe Sontebasiccnenisteaes. aa
THE KEPFORD (PRO SE) PETITION ww .)=—(20
1. OMB ’s Role In The Rulemaking 0000... 20
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis Not Consistent
With UMNTECA _..._._..__. ses ne . 23
SPIE asa entieeycoicagetincech tera ceniahieniasinlarpoerecisarnaneaoe ne 30
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Pages
CASEs: |
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.Don-
oven, 462 UB, 468 (1861) 2... eee 24
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980)... 10 |
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 1124 |
(20th Cir. 1908) eee 27 |
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 |
we, Eee TIROR) eee Suk - Te
Rodriguez v. Compass likes Co., 451 U.S. 596
CY cies essence eden mde 15
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, _ |
foc. 426 CS. 1 (1976) eee 18, 19 |
Watt v. Alaska, 451-US. 20 (1961)... ee 12 |
FEDERAL STATUTES: | ;
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as
amended, , |
2 USC. 41 ef Oe. occa 9 eee eae an 10 |
9 DAS: SP) cntcase oe = upene mune eee 11
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970
84 Stat. 2086, 5 U.S.C. App., 1132 (1982) 16
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of
1978, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2014 et seg.; 42 U.S.C24§ 7901-7942 .... 9
#8 UBS; 4 Rta) occ 13, 14, 29
4 USC. (2320) ee 8,9, 13, 14
42 UBS: 4$7901(b) (1), (3): eee 13
——————
iil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Pages
FrepERAL ReGuLATIONS AND NOTICES:
40 C.F.R. Part 192, Subparts A-E ow. . 3,9
ee oes (ieee) ») 2¢
en ee tfoeey OD
48 Fed. Reg. 590 (1983) | 25 22
48 Fed. Reg. 45926 (1983) 00. nee
49 Fed. Reg. 46425 (1984) Caan 20
50 Fed. Reg. 41852 (1985) occcccccseceeee, 19
LEGISLATIVE History:
Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978:
— on H.R. 11698, H.R. 1229, H.R.
12938, H.R. 13049, H.R. 13650 Before the Sub-
committee on Energy and Power of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 400 (1978) _. 8
H.R. Rep. No. 1480 (Part I), 95th Cong... 2d
Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code,
Cong. & Ad. News ...... SS aeewian 85k, 1, SO
H.R. Rep. No. 1480 (Part IT), 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978), spat in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. ewe nat oes i eundy 14, 17
H.R. Rep. No. 97-884. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47
7~ (1982) ...... aR, a Oy ode OOS
H.R. 13650, 124 Cong. Ree. 36687 (1978) 17,18
H.R. 13650, 124 Cong. Ree. 38230 (1978) 18
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations, Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce, H.R. 98-98, September
27-28, 1983 . 21
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Pages
MISCELLANEOUS:
D.C. Thomas & K. G. MeNeill, Risk Nstimates
for the Health Effects of Alpha Radiation }
(1982) (prepared for Atomic Energy Control
Boara of Canaca) — 28 SARI cole eek STE 6
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for
Remedial Action Standards for Inactwe
Uranium Processing Sites (EPA, December,
p __,_RRER ERE rn tee Bae ec Ae Acer nO NO ICONS I OD Se 21
1 Final Environmental Impact Statement for
Remedial Action Standards for Inactive
Uranium Processing Sites (KPA, October 1982) 22, 23
1 Final Environmental Impact Statement for
Standards for the Control of Byproduct Ma-
terials from Uranium Ore Processing (EPA,
September 1983) 200. Sw eee eM Ae
Fina! Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA, Sep
I a See 23
National Academy of Sciences, The ‘Effects
on Populations of Exposure to the Low Lev-
els of Ionizing Radiation (1980) sete 6
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1 Final Gen-
eric Environmental Impact Statement on
Uranium Milling (September, 1980) ou. . 4,6
Nos. 85-1279, 85-1280 and 85-6404
“y
Vv
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1985
ray
Vv
AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, AND UNITED
NUCLEAR CORPORATION, ET ALIA, CHAUN-
CEY KEPFORD (PRO SE),
Petitioners,
v.
LEE M. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondents.
a oO —
Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
ray
Vv
INTERVENOR—RESPONDENTS
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND’S AND
SIERRA CLUB’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
“ty
Vv
The American Mining Congress (‘‘AMC’’), United
Nuclear Corporation, et al (‘‘UNC’’), and Chauncey Kep-
ford (pro se) each separately petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review two closely related judgments of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
2
The judgments below were entered on September 3, 1985.
Rehearing was denied on October 30, 1985.
The Environmental Defense Fund and Sierra Club
were petitioners and intervenor-respondents in the cases
below. For the reasons stated herein, the Environmental
Defense Fund and Sierra Club respectfully urge that
UNC’s and AMC’s petitioners for a writ of certiorari be
denied, and that Chauncey Kepford’s be granted.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court below, upholding (with one
exception not relevant here) the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s standards for cleaning up uraninm mill tail-
ray
Vv
ings at abandoned tailings sites, is reported at 772 F.2d
616. The opinion of the court below, upholding the agen-
ey’s standards for disposal of yranium mill tailings at
active mill sites, is reported at 772 F.2d 640. The En-
vironmental Protection Agency notices of final rulemak-
Ying were published at 48 Fed. Reg. 590 (January 5, 1983)
~~ and 48 Fed. Reg. 45926 (October 7, 1983). These materials
have been reproduced by both UNC and AMC, and filed
with their petitions.
—_'
Vv
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Relevant portions of the Uranium Mail Tailings Radi-
ation Control Act of 1978, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014 and at scattered sections thereafter, and at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7901-7942, are reprinted in petitioners’ appendices. The
Environmental Protection Agency’s Standards for Rem-
edial Actions at Inactive Uranium Processing Sites (‘‘In-
active Site Standards’’) and the agenecy’s Knvironmental
Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings at
SN a ae
3 \
Licensed Commercial Processing Sites are codified at 40
C.F.R. Part 192 and are reprinted in petitioners’ appen-
dices.
=
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitions filed by American Mining Congress and
United Nuclear Corporation have one attribute in com-
mon: both misrepresent the seriousness of the health risks
associated with uncontrolled uranium mill tailings.’ As
a consequerce, it is necessary to set the record straight to
understand the threat to the public presented by radiation
and other toxic substances released to the environment as
byproducts of the process for extracting uranium oxide
from uranium ore,
A. The Evidentiary Record Supports
Congress’ Decision to Require Standards
Most uranium mills produce partially refined uranium,
called ‘‘yelloweake,’’ by processing finely crushed uranium
ore through a series of acid baths that leach out 80 to 90
percent of the uranium isotopes. Since the uranium con-
tent of the ore averages only about 0.15 percent, virtually
the entire bulk of the ore that is mined and processed is
discarded as waste known as ‘‘tailings.’’ 48 Fed. Reg.
45926, 45927. With the exception of the extracted uranium,
most of the radioactivity in the mined ore remains in the
tailings because radium, thorium and other isotopes in the
chain of radioactive decay are not extracted.2 The tail-
1. Currently, only one major thorium mill is licensed,
while there are twenty-six active uranium mills. This brief uses
the term “uranium mill tailings’ or ‘mill tailings’ to refer to
the waste product of both uranium and thorium mills.
2. Most of the uranium recovered from crude ore is uran-
ium-238, which naturally decays over time to lead-206 (a stable,
or nonradioactive element). Most of the intermediate decay
(Continued on following page)
a
ings also contain residues of a variety of hazardous sub-
stances that are used in the extraction process or that are
produced as a result of exposing all the minerals in the
ore to an acid bath. In short, the tailings bear little re-
semblance to the physically and chemically stable ore-bear-
ing formation from which they are derived.3
As of January 1983, there were twenty-seven licensed
uranium mills, of which fourteen were operating. 48 Fed.
Reg. 45927. By that date, 175 million metrie tons of
uranium mill tailings had accumulated at the active mill
sites. Jd. Based on Department of Energy statistics, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that
an additional 175 million metrie tons of tailings will be
generated in this country by the year 2000. Finally, an
other twenty-six million metric tons of tailings remain to
be disposed of at the twenty-six abandoned mill sites desig-
nated for clean-up under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radi-
ation Control Act (UMTRCA). 48 Fed. Reg. 592.
1. Radiological risks associated with tailings
While mill tailings emit both radioactive particulates
and gamma radiation to the ambient atmosphere, total
exposure estimates show that the release of radon gas to
the atmosphere is the single greatest hazard to human
health. 48 Fed. Reg.
chemically inert, gas that is produced by the radioactive
598 Radon its a radioactive, but
(Continued from previous page)
products in the uranium series become part of the tailings.
Thorium-230 is the radionuclide with the longest half-life, and
it decays to form radium-226, and then to radon-222. 1 Final
Environmental Impact Statement for Standards for the Control of
Byproduct Materials from Uranium Ore Processing 3-2 to 3-3
(Sept. 1983) (hereinafter ctied as Active Site EIS),
3. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1 Final Generic
Environmental Impact Statement on Uranium Milling at 4 (Sept.
1980) (hereinafter cited as Generic Impact Statement).
oN
®
5
decay of radium, which in turn is the product of the decay
of thorium. Radon has a half-life of 3.8 days so that after
12 days, 90% of it will decay to polonium, a solid that
stays put. When radon ik formed in the undisturbed for-
mations from which uranium ore is extracted, most of it
decays and remains locked in the earth before it can dif-
fuse to the atmosphere. But when radium in the uranium
ore is bonght to the surface and pulverized in the mill for
processing, radon is released directly to the atmosphere.
Radon is released in much higher concentrations from tail
ings piles than it is from undisturbed soil and rock: radon
emissions from an acre of tailings are about 200 to 900
times greater than from an acre of undisturbed soil, 1 Ac-
tive Site EIS at 3-5. Asa result, the air above and down
wind of piles contains much higher radon concentrations
than would otherwise be present as a result of background
emissions from the earth. Jd.
Radon gas presents a unique hazard to human health
because it diffuses readily into the atmosphere from tail-
ings and exposes the cell layer lining the lung to a concen-
trated dose of radiation. Monitoring studies’ performed
downwind from abandoned tailings piles show radon levels
) to 12 times greater than ‘‘normal’’ background con-
centrations.
Radon undergoes eight radioactive decay events be-
fore it transforms into nonradioactive lead. Three of these
decay events produce alpha particles* and oceur within
one hour after the first. Unlike radon, these ‘‘daughter’’
4. Alpha particles are composed of four nuclear particles
(neutrons and protons) and therefore have many times greater
mass and weight than do gamma or beta radiation. Thus, alpha
particles can do significant damage to any cell they penetrate,
including causing changes in the genetic code of a cell which
can make it become cancerous.
6
isotopes are electrically charged and, if inhaled, will stick
to the bronchial epithelium—an especially vulnerable tis-
sue.’ For persons exposed to above-normal radon levels,
the lungs are continually bombarded by excess alpha radi-
ation as radon and its daughters decay.
Consequently, radon is recognized as a potent car-
cinogen. As EPA concluded, epidemiological studies of
underground miners demonstrate that there is a substan-
stantially increased risk of lung cancer due to elevated
exposure to radon decay products. 48 Fed. Reg. 45928.
Working from the best available scientifie evidence, EPA
developed a methodology for correlating excess risk of
fatal lung cancers with radon exposure. While EPA con-
ceded that its estimates of risk from inhalation of radon
decay products exceed those of some agencies, EPA’s risk
estimate is essentially identical to that prepared by a sub-
committee of the National Academy of Sciences® and is
about 20% lower than that of the Atomie Energy Control
Board of Canada.’ Id. EPA also concluded that a linear
dose response curve should be used in quantifying risk
from radon, even though a linear dose response curve may
underestimate risk at low exposure levels.
From its analysis, EPA reached several concinsions
of importance here. First, lung cancer attributable to
radon exposure is the dominant radiation hazard from
tailings. The risk of fatal lung cancer for persons exposed
¢outinuously to radon concentrations found near a tailings
pile is as high as 2 persons in. 100, Jd. at 45929. Second,
——"
5x See 1 Generic Impact Statement at C-4,
6. Naftonal Academy of Sciences, The Fffects on Popula-
tions of Exposure to Low Levels of lonizing Radiation (1980).
7. D.C. Thomas & K.G. McNeiil, Risk Estimates for the
Health Effects of Alpha Radiation (1982) (prepared for Atomic
Energy Control Board of Canada).
7
based on models for the cumulative risk to all exposed pop-
ulations, the radon released from inactive tailings piles,
uncontrolled existing piles at active mill sites and new
tailings expected to be added by year 2000 would cause
more than 800 lung cancer deaths per century. Id.; 48
Fed. Reg. 593. And third, EPA showed that its standard
for tailings disposal would reduce thé risk for maximally
exposed populations to only about 1 in\1000. 48 Fed. Reg.
45937, in
- 2. Risks from nonradioactive toxic substances
While the threat of ground water contamination en-
gendered less scientific debate, the risk associated with
nonradioactive toxic substances is no less real. Mill tail-
ings can contain, depending upon the ore source and the
chemical reagents used in the milling process, high con-
centrations of toxic substances such as arsenic, lead, selen-
ium, and molybdenum. 1 Active Site EIS at 3-8. And be-
cause the tailings consist of both liquids and solids, toxic
substances can leach from a disposal site and can migrate
through the underlying soil to contaminate ground water.
Indeed, ground water contamination is known to have oe-
curred at eifht inactive and seven active uranium mill sites
and may be occurring at others, where monitoring investi-
gations have not yet been conducted. 48 Fed. Reg. 45931.
As a consequence, the EPA’s standards establish a regu-
latory program for detecting and cleaning up ground water
contamination.
B. Statutory and Regulatory Background
‘*From the early 1940’s through the 1970’s there was
little official recognition of the hazards presented by these
tailings. Federal regulation of the industry was mini-
mal.’’® Nevertheless, evidence was accumulating that the
8. H.R. Rep. No. 1480 (Part 1), 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 11
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7433.
8
front end of the nuclear fuel cycle posed real risks to
human health and the environment. The health risks
linked to misuse of tailings in the construction of houses
and other structures gave an added impetus for congres-
sional action. And by the time Congress began hearings
on uranium mill tailings, the record was compelling. In
testimony before Congress, EPA stated that radon gas is
‘‘a very carcinogenic material,’’ and that even if con-
trolled to twice background the risk of lung eancer ‘‘is 100
times higher than the risk we get from the air pollutants
vinyl chloride or benzene which are very carcinhogenic.’”
[EPA ultimately selected a standard that reduces radon
emissions only to a level that is tiventy times background. }
In response to the evidence before it, Congress deter-
mined that ‘‘{l]egislation is needed now to stabilize and
eontrol all such tailings in a safe and environmentally
sound manner and to minimize or eliminate radiation
healih hazards to the public.’ Title I of the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 established
a program for reclamation of mill tailings at inactive mill
sites by the U.S. Department of Knergy. To deal with
active mill sites, Title II direeted EPA to establish stand-
ards of general application ‘‘for the protection of the pub-
lic health, safety, and the environment from radiological
and nonradiological hazards associated with’’ uranium
processing and disposal of byproduct materials (tailings).
42 U.S.C. § 2022(b) (1).
9. Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978: Hearings on
H.R. 11698, H.R. 1229, H.R. 12938, H.R. 12535, H.R. 13049, H.R.
13650 Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 2d Sess. 400 (1978).
10. H.R. Rep. 1480 (Part 2), 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7456.
9
On January 3, 1983, EPA issued final standards for
disposal of tailings at inactive mill sites. EPA set nu-
merical limitations on radon emissions from the piles and
also set standards for cleaning up homes and other struc-
tures constructed with tailings. 48 Fed\ Reg. 590-604; 40
C.F.R. Part 192, Subparts A-C. The radon emission limi-
tation requires installation of ‘‘covers’’ over the tailings
to trap the radon long enough.for it to decay before it is
released to the air, but the standards do not specify the
details of cover design o ndate use of specific cover
materials. 48 Fed. 39%. The residential standard
requires the removal of tailings used as landfill or used
in concrete to build basements, foundations, patios and
driveways. I[d., 595-96.
On October 7, 1983, EPA issued nearly identical radon
standards for disposal of tailings at active mil! sites. 48
Fed. Reg. 45926-45927; 40 C.F.R. Part 192, Subparts D-E.
As it had done for inactive sites, EPA coneluded that tail-
ings should be controlled to reduce radon emissions to 20
picocuries per square meter per second (20 pCi./m?/sec),
but left to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the respon-
sibility for determining what measures must be imple-
mented to ensure achievement of this standard at specific
sites. 48 Fed. Reg. 45933. Unlike the inactive site stand-
ards, EPA also promulgated primary and secondary stand-
ards for preventing or remedying ground water contam-
ination. Those standards are modeled upon the standards
issued pursuant to Subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, as amended, (also known as the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act) as Congress directed in UMTRCA.
42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(2). Thus, mill licensees are required
to monitor for ground water contamination and must un-
dertake corrective action if groundwater contamination in
excess of specified concentrations is discovered.
10
REASONS WHY UNC’S AND AMC’S
PETITIONS SHOULD BE DENIED
A. The Decision Below Is Not At Odds With The
Statutory Command Or With Prior Decisions Of
This Court
UNC maintains that EPA ignored congressional in-
tent and a prior decision of this Court by failing to make
a threshold finding of ‘‘signifieance.’’ AMC maintains
that EPA violated congressional intent by setting stand-
ards that apply within the boundaries of mill sites. Both
petitioners clearly are wrong. In these two respects,
EPA’s standards are not in conflict either with the language
of the statute, with the congressional intent, or with prior
decisions of this Court.
1. No agency finding of significance is required
UNC relies heavily on this Court’s decision in [ndus-
trial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene case) for the
proposition that prior to regulating releases of radioac-
tive and other hazardous substances from mill tailings,
EPA must independently assess the health risks associ-
ated with those emissions and then determine whether the
health benefits to be gained from regulation are ‘‘signifi-
eant.’’ The Benzene decision clearly does not apply here.
In that case this Court was construing a differcut statute.
This Court’s decision in the context of that statute does
not govern the statutory scheme before the Court in the
present case.
Benzene reversed the decision of the Geecretary of
Labor to reduce permissible levels of worker exposure
to benzene under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seg. (SOSH Act’’) That statute
11
delegates ‘‘broad authority to the Secretary to promul-
gate different kinds of standards’’ to reduce exposure to
all sorts of hazardous materials in the workplace. Ben-
zene, 448 U.S. at 611. The purpose of that Act is ‘‘to as-
sure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to
preserve our human resourees.’’ 29 U.S.C. §651(b). The
statute applies, in one estimate, to sixty million workers,
Benzene, 448 U.S. at 691 (Marshall, J. dissenting), and
embraces regulation of the full range of carcinogenic and
toxic substances found in the workplace.
No single rationale was adopted by a majority of the
Court in Benzene. But in response to a decision to re-
duce exposure to benzene based solely on the agency’s
policy of reducing exposure to carcinogens, the Court read
section 3(8) of the OSH Act to require
the Secretary to find, as a threshold matter, that the
toxic substance in question poses a significant health
risk in the workplace and that a new, lower standard
is therefore ‘‘reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.’’
Denzene, 448 U.S. at 614-15 (quoting section 3(8) of the
Act) (emphasis added).
This Court’s decision, remanding the benzene stand-
ard to the Secretary for a threshold finding of ‘‘signifi-
eance,’’ turned on the precise terms of the Act’s language.
The central question addressed by Benzene was whether
evidence that a contaminant is a carcinogen, without any
regard for the magnitude of the potential hazard it posed
to workers, a legally sufficient factual predicate for the
Secretary to exercise his discretion to commence the stand-
ard-setting process under the OSH Act. The Court held
12
that a judgment regarding the degree of hazard was re-
quired before the Secretary could find that a new standard
was ‘‘reasonably necessary.’’ This Court did not, in the
Benzene case, establish a general rule of law of sweeping
scope that includes within its purview statutes, such as
the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, in which
Congress has already decided that regulations were neces-
sary.
UMTRCA was enacted by Congress to deal with the
specific health hazards attributable to mill tailings at both
abandoned and active mill sites. Congress had deter-
mined, before the Act was passed, that radioactive emis-
sions from tailings pose a serious threat to human health
and that they should be stabilized and controlled. Unlike
the OSH Act, Congress did not merely authorize the Ad-
minstrator of the EPA to evaluate whether regulatory ac-
tion is needed and then set standards if he found them to
be ‘‘reasonably necessary or appropriate.’? Rather Con-
gress mandated action by EPA and set an ambitious sched-
ule for promulgation of standards. The realm of discre-
tion left to the Administrator was substantially narrowed
compared to the OSH Act. The threshold question of
whether to regulate was already decided. The only re-
maining issue is to what degree.
“Statutory analysis must begin, of course, with the
language of the statute.’”’ Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,
965 (1981). The language of UMTRCA leaves little doubt
as to Congress’ intent. The express purposes of this Act
are to provide
(1) in cooperation with the interested states, Indian
tribes, and the persons who own or control inactive
mill tailings sites, a program of assessment and
remedial action at such sites. .¥.
13
(2) a program to regulate mill tailings during urani-
um or thorium ore processing at active mill operations
and after termination of such operations in order to
stabilize and control such tailings in a safe and en-
vironmentally sound manner and to minimize or elimt-
nate radiation health hazards to the public.
42 U.S.C. § 7901(b) (1), (2) (emphasis added).
In order to ensure achievement of those purposes,
Congress mandated EPA, in virtually identical language,
to promulgate ‘‘standards of general application for the
protection of public health, safety, and the environment
from radiological and nonradiological hazards’’ associated
with mill tailings at both active and inactive mill sites. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2022(a), (b). Further, Congress established in
the Act a comprehensive program— including the details of
site ownership and creation of indemnity funds—for
carrying out stabilization, control, and disposal of tailings,
leaving little doubt of the legislature’s intention.
This legislative scheme reveals no indication that Con-
gress intended that, at the outset, EPA should determine
whether generally applicable standards are needed. Con-
gress merely delegated to EPA the authority to determine
how mill tailings were to be reclaimed. The legislative
history and the policies that Congress sought to imple-
ment buttress that conclusion. See Federal Election
Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981).
In its diseussion of need, the House Interior Com-
mittee stated that tailings ‘‘contain many naturally-
occurring hazardous substances, both radioactive and
nonradioactive,’’ including radon gas. H.R. Rep. No.
1480 (Part 1), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7433. Thus, the
Committee stated that (MTRCA ‘‘is intended to protect
14
the public health and safety and the environment from
hazards associated with’’ uranium tailings. Jd. at 13, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7435. And
the Committee certainly envisioned promulgation of stand-
ards of general application by EPA. Id. at 16-17, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7438-7439. The
Commerce Committee report mirrors these statements of
congressional intent. H.R. Rep. No. 1480 (Part 2), 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 29, 34-35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7456, 7461-7462.
Not only is there no explicit evidence that Congress
intended EPA to make a ‘‘significance’’ finding, there also ©
is no implicit evidence to that effect. Petitioners’ efforts
to pull this case within the principles enunciated by the
plurality in the Benzene case are unavailing." In this
instance, EPA did what Congress directed it to do: it
evaluated the sources and pathways of human exposure to
toxie substances, and issued standards to reduce radiation
health hazards.
The 1982 amendments to UMTRCA do not counsel a
different conclusion. Pub. L. No. 97-415, § 22(b), 96 Stat.
at 2080. codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2022(a), (b). The Confer-
ence Report emphasizes a the amendments were in-
tended merely to clarify that when EPA set standards it
should ‘‘consider the risk to public health, safety, and the
environment, the environmental and economic costs of
such standards of regulations, and such other factors as
EPA or NRC, respectively, determine to be appropriate.’”’
11. Petitioners somewhat disingenously suggest that in
this case EPA maintained that it must set standards “without
_ regard to the significance ot’ risks. United Nuclear Corpora-
tion, et al., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14. To the con-
trary, EPA examined a range of standards and weighed a number
of factors, including an assessment of health risks attributable
to radiation and other health hazards released from the tailings.
15
H.R. Rept. No. 884, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1982). The
conferees certainly never indicated that they wished to
impose another hurdle to promulgation of standards or
that they intended to make discretionary the duty to set
standards. Indeed they expressed strong disappointment
that EPA had failed to meet the statutory deadline for
standards, and reemphasized that ‘‘EPA and NRC recog-
nize as their paramount responsibility protection of the
public health and safety and the environment.’’ Id. at 47.
Viewed as a whole, the language of UMTRCA and
the record of the legislative process demonstrate that
Congress expected swift issuance of standards to eliminate
or minimize health hazards from mill tailings. Congress
manifestly did not impose a threshold burden of finding
that those risks are ‘‘significant,’’ since Congress already
decided that standards were required. Thus, the teach-
ings of the Penzene case are inapposite. The regulated
community no doubt finds the EPA standards unwelcome.
But petitioners’ effort to draw into question the agency’s
authority has no basis. Petitioners’ recourse properly is
to Congress, not to this Court.”
2. EPA did not exceed its statutory authority
AMC takes a different tack in challenging EPA’s
standards. AMC asserts that the language used in
UMTRCA, requiring issuance of ‘‘standards of general
application,’’ should be read to preclude standards that
operate within the confines of a mill site. As with the
12. As the Court has said before, it should “reject a theory
that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never mentioned by
Congress during the legislative process, that does not comport
with Congress’ intent and that restricts ... a remedial Act... .”
Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596 (1981), quoting
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 278-79
(1977).
16
other industry petition, AMC can point to no explicit or
implicit statement that supports their position.
It is true, as petitioners point out, that prior to enact-
ment of UMTRCA, EPA’s authority under the Atomic
Energy Act was limited by the 1970 Reorganization Plan’
to issuance of ‘‘generally applicable environmental stand-
ards’’ that were specifically defined as limits on exposure
‘tin the general environment outside the boundaries’’ of
regulated facilities. But the UMTRCA legislative his-
tory makes clear that Congress intended to close a large
gap in regulation of health risks associated with mill tail-
ings, and that EPA standards were to play an important
role in this new regulatory structure. UMTRCA does not
adopt the language from the 1970 reorganization plan and
does not limit EPA’s standards to areas outside the bound-
aries of mill tailings sites. The legislative history con-
tains no hint that Congress intended such a result.
On the contrary, the bill reported out of the House In-
terior Committee would have accomplished the result AMC
contends for here had it not been amended. The Interior
Committee bill mandated promulgation of generally ap-
plicable standards ‘‘for the protection of the general en-
vironment outside the boundaries of’’ uranium tailings
sites. H.R. Rep. No. 1480 (Part 1), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at
7433.'* But the bill reported out by the Commerce Com-
13. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086, 5
U.S.C. App. p. 1132 (1982).
14. Even had that provision been enacted into law, it
would not have barred issuance of standards that apply within
the boundaries of a mill site if EPA determined such standards
bona needed to protect the environment outside the site boun-
aries.
17
mittee a few weeks later, drafted to reconcile several dif-
ferent bills, did not include that limitation. H.R. Rep. No.
1480 (Part 2), 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 24 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 7450. Instead, the
bill enacted into law mandates issuance of ‘‘standards of
general application’’ which are then to be implemented by
NRC and the Department of Energy—without any limita-
tion of the sort petitioners would have this Court engraft
on the unambiguous statutory language.
Not only did Congress not limit EPA’s authority in
the manner argued by AMC, Congress contemplated stand-
ards that could be applied within mill site boundaries.
First, it would have made no sense to limit EPA’s author-
ity at inactive mill sites to set standards that apply out-
side the boundaries of inactive tailings piles. These piles
long since had been abandoned and were to be cleaned up
with federal and state funds. Yet Congress used vir-
tually identical language in directing promulgation of
standards at both active and inactive sites. Congress re-
jected a geography-hased limitation on standards. Con-
gress clearly required a functional separation between
EPA’s role in standard-setting and the NRC/Department
of Energy role in implementing those standards, but the
fact that the NRC and DOE are charged with the duty to
implement EPA’s standards does not support a conclusion
that EPA’s standards are not to apply on-site.
Second, following House passage of H.R. 13650, that
bil! was put before the Senate, 124 Cong. Ree. 36687 (1978),
which already had considered its own bill. Senator Garn
proposed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to
the House-passed bill, ad. at 36688, which had been ‘‘co-
99
ordinated in advance with the House. Again, that bill
18
made no mention of any site-boundary limitations on
EPA’s authority.
Senator Randolph, chairman of the Environment and
Public Works Committee, cosponsored the Garn amend-
ment. Senator Randolph stated that the section-by-see-
tion analysis of a similar Senate bill (S. 2584) provided
the basis for his support of H.R. 18650. 124 Cong. Ree.
36697 (1978). That analysis ‘‘attempted to further de-
fine’’ the relative roles of NRC and EPA, and stated that
‘““TEPA] is... to prescribe general standards of perform-
ance, not specific management requirements and nof site-
specific.’”’ Id. In elaborating on that analysis, Senator
Randolph stated his understanding that EPA’s standards
could include general standards for site design and prepa-
ration; general pile stabilization standards; and limita-
tions on emissions from mill tailings ‘‘in the air or ground
or surface waters. ...’’ Jd. EPA’s limit on the release of
radon from tailings is clearly consistent with the meas-
ures deseribed by Senator Randolph.
AMC is unable to point either to statutory language
or to legislative history to support the theory it advances
before the Court. The Act and its history simply do not
support petitioner’s argument that the lower court’s deci-
sion is at odds with congressional intent.
Petitioner’s reliance upon Trai v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group, Tuc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976), is sim-
ilarly misplaced. In Train, the court of appeals concluded
that EPA was required by the Clean Water Act to regu-
late discharges of radioactive pollutants, including “source,
15. The Garn amendment was adopted and passed by the
Senate, 124 Cong. Rec. 36699 (1978). Subsequently, the House
approved the Senate bill with only slight modifications not rele-
vent here. /d. at 38230.
19 \
byproduct, or special nuclear materials” as defined by th
Atomic Energy Act. In doing so, the appellate court re-
lied exclusively on the statute’s language, and ignored ex-
plicit guidance found in the legislative history to the effect
that such discharges are not covered by the Clean Water
Act. Train, 426 U.S. at 11. On the basis of those legis-
lative materials, this Court reversed the appellate court
decision.
The contrast between 7J'rain and the law of this case
is compelling. There is no evidence from the legislative
materials that in enacting UMTRCA Congress intended
to artificially constrain EPA to the issuance of stand-
ards that apply only outside the boundaries of a mill. In
fact, the contrary is true. Consequently, there does not
exist in this case either a conflict between the Tenth Cir-
euit’s decision and prior decisious of this Court or an er-
roneous construction of a federal law the purpose of which
Avas to prevent or minimize human exposure to radioactive
and other toxie substances.
B. The EPA Standards Will Be Implemented With-
out Causing Conflict Among Federal Agencies
AMC also contends that the EPA standards will dis-
rupt the administrative framework for regulating uranium
mills and mill tai’ . However, this argument does not
withstand eareful sc-atiny and ean be eagily disposed of.
On October 16, 1985, the Nuclear Ht
mission issued final rules to conform its mill tailings re-
quirements to the EPA standards. 50 Fed, Reg. 41852-
41866 (Oct. 16, 1985). During that proceeding the indus-
try petitioners made much the same arguments as they
advance before this Court. See 50 Fed. Reg. 41853-54
(legal arguments on EPA/NRC jurisdictional issue). In
gulatory Com-
response, the Cominission concluded that “EPA generally
20
acted within its jurisdiction and found the [AMC] argu-
ments flawed.” Jd.
Thus, the Commission already has completed one
round of rulemaking to adopt and enforce the EPA stand-
ards, and has begun a second round of rulemaking to deal
with EP.A’s ground water protection requirements, 49 Fed.
Reg. 46425 (Nov. 26, 1984). It appears that the agencies
do not share AMC’s concern that EPA’s standards may
disrupt implementation, They appear to be resolving the
difficulties that are inherent in inter-agency coordinatioa
and there is no basis for assuming that the agencies will
not continue to cooperate in carrying out the mandate of
UMTPRCA.
THE KEPFORD (PRO SE) PETITION
Kepford presents two questions: 1) the illegality of
executive office intervention in the rulemaking, and 2)
KEV A’s failure to identify, analyze and consider alterna-
iives for tailings disposal that would guarantee long-term
control consistent with Congressional intent. Both ques-
tions deserve review by this Court.
1, OMB’s Role in the Rulemaking
Kepford argues that the Executive, through the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (“OMB”), uneconstitu-
tionally interfered in the decision delegated by law to the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
The central premise underlying Kepford’s argument is
that the Exeeutive may not direct executive branch of-
ficials to act contrary to law. The ultimate inquiry we
believe, is whether OMB’s unquestioned influence over the
final decision'® resulted in a rule thee violated the Con-
eressional mandate of UMTRCA. We think it did.
16. EPA never disputed Kepford’s claim below that OMB
directly influenced the outcome of the Agency’s decision in the
rulemaking.
21
OMB pressure was aimed at foreing EPA to adept
a cost-benefit approach to setting health standards.'’ It
succeeded. EP A’s initial mill tailings proposal contained
no balancing of costs vs. benefits, but rather considered
costs only in the context of choosing from among those reg-
ulatory options that would achieve the health protection
goal defined by the Agency on the basis of cancer risk."
17. In sworn testimony on September 27, 1983, before the
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, John E.
Danie! explained that OMB pressured EPA to take a cost-beneiit
approach in the uranium tailings rulemaking contrary to the ad-
vice of EPA attorneys. Mr. Daniel was chief-of-staff to the Ad-
ministrator, Anne Burford, at the time of those events. An ex-
cerpt from the hearing transcript is quoted here:
Mr. Gore: Do you know of any instances in which
OMB directed EPA to take regulatory action which the
Agency believed was contrary to a specific statute?
Mr. Daniel: * * *
The other example | would cite to you, Mr. Gore, is
with respect to something called uranium mill tailings. * * *
EPA’s role in this is purely one of setting the health stand-
ard for a person that would be exposed to the tailings pile.
In terms of the costs that were involved, ultimately it would
be the Department of Energy that would have paid for
those through proposed funds. So the check, the cost-bene-
fit analysis of this, was in the hands of the Congress. Our
job is just to set the health standards.
But we were urged to set different kinds of standards
that would have been based on the cost of doing these
cleanups of these miil tailings piles that were out of line
with what the statute told us, at least on the basis of advice
we were getting from our lawyers at EPA, as to the con-
straints on the Agency to sei the standards.
Mr. Gore: Did you tell them that would be a violation
of the law?
Mr. Daniel: We did.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions, Committee on Enorgy and Commerce, 11.R. 98-98, Sep-
ternber 27-28, 1983. See also the letter from OMB to EPA cited
by Kepford.
18. Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Remedial
Action Standards for Inactive Uranium Processing Sites at 8-6
(EPA, December, 1980).
\
22
But the final rule specifically relied on what HPA de-
scribed as an “optimized cost-benefit” approach. 48 Fed.
Ree. 591 (January 5, 1983). Although EPA in the in-
active site rulemaking never explained what it meant by
“optimized cost-benefit,” or how it went about calculating
which regulatory option best fit the “optimized cost-bene-
fit” approach, the Ageney had fully succumbed to OMB’s
pressure to weigh costs directly against health benefits,
and abandoned the approach of defining health protection
voals first, then looking for the most cost-effective way of
meeting those goals.
The consequence of the OMB approach was KPA’s
rejection of standards it had initially proposed that were
far more protective of health than the final standards.
EPA’s initial limit on the release of radon from tailings
would have reduced radon emissions to two times the nat-
ural radon emissions from undisturbed earth. 46 Ted.
Reg. 2559, col. 1-2 (January 9, 1981). This standard, EPA
concluded, would “virtually eliminate” all lung cancer
deaths attributable to radon from tailings.’? In contrast,
EPA’s final standard for both inactive and licensed tail-
ings piles, based on OMB’s optimized cost-benefit ap-
preach, allows radon emissions 20 times higher than nat-
ural emissions. Aceording to EPA, the final standards
will allow about 35 deaths per century for the first 16
centuries, and then many more deaths during the next S00
to 1,000 centuries.”°
19. 1 Final Environmental Impact Statement for Remedial
Action Standards For Inactive Uranium Processing Sites at 101
(EPA, October, 1982) (“Inactive EIS”).
20. EPA calculated that its relaxed radon standard for active
piles would allow about 25 deaths per century, and permissible
radon releases from inactive tailings piles would cause 10 deaths
ner century. Inactive Site FEIS, vol. 1, 101; Active Site FEIS, vol.
(Continued on following page)
53
mt
EPA also claims to have relied on OMB’s cost-benefit
approach as the reason for substantially weakening the
standard that triggers the removal of tailings from homes
and other structures. EPA’s indoor radon standard would
not trigger cleanup even when individual lung caneer risks
areas high as 1.3-in-100 (about 1-in-65). Inactive Site EIS,
Table 7-1, 108.
2. Cost-benefit analysis not consistent with
UMTRCA
Clearly, the 1983 Amendment to UMTRCA directed
921
EPA to “eonsider costs. But as this Court has held,
authority to consider costs is not the same as authority to
(Continued from previous page)
1, 10-6. EPA only considered the fatalities that will result from
the radon released during the period of compliance with the
standard, i.e., the first i0 centuries, Inactive Site EIS, 98-100;
even though EPA concedes that tailings will continue to emit
radon at approximately the current rate for about 1,000 cen-
turies. Inactive EIS, 16-17. Presumably this is because the rule
only requires tailings controls to be effective for 200 to 1,000
years. As Kepford has argued, EPA has not explained its deci-
sion not to account for the rapid increase in deaths that will
occur after the first 10 centuries when the earthen covers erode.
In calculating future fatalities EPA also assumes that no new
tailings will be created after year 2000, even though EPA pro-
jected that total tailings will double by year 2000 as a result of
continuing production.
21. EPA performed a2 cost impact analysis that shows the
industry could afford to achieve the standards that would pre-
vent all deaths. EPA found that the costs of the more stringent
standards might, at most, force only one small mill to close.
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (“PRIA”), Table 5.5, 5-12. EPA
also found it would cost $120,000 per life saved to eliminate
virtually all fatalities, compared to $80,000 per life saved for the
standard EPA chose. Average Cost Per Death Avoided, Table
4.6, FRIA, 4-11. EPA found that the cost of both standards was
acceptable in reference to the costs the public savs it is willing
to pay to save a life: “all control methods fall helow the lower
end of the empirical range.’ FRIA, 4-12. EPA also decided
that the $0.07 to $0.09 added to each homeowner’s monthly
utility bill that would result from choosing to prevent all deaths
was certainly not a basis for rejecting that option.
24
base decisions on a formalized cost-benefit analysis. “When
Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-bene-
fit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face
of the statute.” American Teztile Manufacturers Insittute
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 488, 510 (1981). Here none of the
statutory indicators identified by this Court in Donovan as
providing authority for cost-benefit analysis are present.
As the Court in Donovan recognized, cost-benefit an-
alysis gives the decision-maker virtually unbridled dis-
cretion to select the outeome by the value assigned to ben-
efits. Where the benefit is not valued in the marketplace,
such as the value of human life, the degree of health pro-
tection to be provided has no bounds.
The Court rejected the argument that the OSH Act
required cost-benefit analysis in setting worker health
standards because
... Congress itself defined the basic relationship be-
tween costs and benefits, by placing the ‘‘benefit’’ of
worker health above all other considerations save
‘those making attainment of this ‘‘benefit’’ unachiev-
able. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and
benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different bal-
ance than that struck by Congress would be inconsist-
ent with the command set forth in [the Act]. Thus,
cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the
statute because feasibility analysis is.
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 488, 509 (1981). Given Congress’ principal focus on
protecting health from radiation, and its directive to con-
trol tailings to the ‘‘maximum extent allowed by the state
4 39
of -the art,’’? the same principle applies to UMTRCA.
In addition to the lack of statutory language authoriz-
ing cost-benefit analysis, the conference committee report
accompanying the 1983 amendment makes clear that Con-
gress had no intention of delegating to EPA unfettered
discretion to weigh health benefits against costs.
25
Moreover, in adopting the language | requiring consid-
eration of cost], the conferees intend neither to divert
EPA and NRC from their principal foeus on protect-
ing the public health and safety nor to require that the
agencies engage in cost-benefit analysis or optimiza-
tion.
H.R. Rept. No. 97-884, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1982).
Congress did not authorize the ‘‘cost-benefit’? approach
which EPA says it used to select the radon standard in
this ease. EPA’s rulemaking decision is clearly inconsist-
ent with the mandate of the 1978 Act to ‘‘eliminate radia-
>]
tion health hazar's to the public.’’ It is also incon
sistent with the express intent of the 1983 amendment to
authorize consideration of cost, but not in an unbounded
cost-benefit analysis.
In the legislative history of the 1978 Act, Congress
declared its intent that hazards associated with mill tail-
ings should be reduced to the degree achievable by the
use of state-of-the-art technology, 1.e., by what is feasible:
Uranium mill tailings disposal sites should in all
cases be controlled and regulated ... to the maximum
extent allowed by the state of the art, to insure that
the publie and the environment will be protected from
the hazards of the tailings for as long as they may
remain a hazard.
H.R. Rept. No. 95-1480 (Part I) 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18
(1978). Thus to the extent Congress intended EPA to
consider factors other than the human health and environ-
mental protection goals of the 1978 Act, they were lim-
ited to consideration of the degree of control achievable
by appheation of the ‘‘state of the art.’’ Clearly, costs
were not to be weighed against the health protection bene-
fits achievable by use of feasible control measures. If
’
public exposure to ‘‘radiation health hazards’’ could feas-
thly be ‘‘eliminated,’? such as would be achieved by adop-
26
tion of the 2 pCi standard (according to EPA), then that
level of protection should have been required. If the ra-
diation health hazards could not be feasily eliminated,
9
then “‘radiation health hazards’’ were to be ‘‘minimized’”’
to the extent feasible.
The congressional directive to ‘‘eliminate’’ if feasible,
or otherwise minimize radiation heaHh hazards was not
compromised by the 1983 amendment authorizing consid-
eration of costs. First, it is important to note that the
language defining the central policy of the Act to ‘‘min-
imize or eliminate radiation health hazards to the publie’’
was not amended, or otherwise undermined by the amend-
ment. On the contrary, the conferees made it extremely
clear that they had no intent ‘‘to divert EPA and NRC
from their principal focus on protecting the public health
and safety... .’? H.R. Rep. No. 97-884, supra, 47. They
made a special effort in the committee report to emphasize
that
fa]t all times, the conferees fully intend that EPA
and NRC recognize as their paramount responsibility
protection of the public health and safety and the en-
vironment.
Id. 47 (emphasis added). These declarations of the econ-
ference committee demonstrate that by adding authority
to consider cost, Congress did not amend by implication
or otherwise compromise or undermine the hasie policy
goal of the 1978 Act.
This conclusion is also supported by the committee’s
approval of the regulatory approaches taken hy hoth NRC
and EPA prior to the deliberations of the conferees. The
committee debates on the cost amendment occurred in
August 1982, and the committee report was printed in
September. At that time, more than four months prior to
pee en
97
EPA’s first decision to adopt a cost-benefit approach for
setting radon standards in the inactive site rulemaking,
the committee saw itself as merely providing authority
for the approaches that both NRC and EPA had previous-
ly adopted in dealing with the cost question:
The conferees note that this language reflects ac-
curately the current regulatory approach of the agen-
cies. The language agreed to by the conferees should
not result in any delays of establishment of remedial
action standards. EPA, for example, has already
advised the conferees that it is considering costs in
formulating its inactive site requirements. In addi-
tion, the NRC has testified before Congress that it,
too, took costs into account in promulgating its Uran-
ium Mill Licensing Requirements.
H.R. Rept. No. 97-884, supra, 47.
In order to understand what Congress thought it was
approving, it is necessary to review the public positions
both agencies had taken prior to the summer of 1982. In
the case of the NRC, it had adopted final tailings disposal
standards pursuant to UMTRCA. 45 Fed. Reg. 65521 (Oc-
tober 3, 1980). In review proceedings before the Tenth
Circuit, as well as in the rulemaking, the NRC argued that
costs were relevant only to the extent they were consid-
ered as part of a determination that the standards ave
‘feasible,’ i.e., both technologically and economically feas-
ible.* The committee members made frequent references
22. NRC’s interpretation of UMTRCA was affirmed by a
panel of the Tenth Circuit in an opinion handed down on March
23, 1982, or about four months prior to the deliberations of the
conference committee. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. NRC, 673
F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1982); vacated pending rehearing en banc.
The order granting rehearing was issued after publication of the
conference report. Further proceedings in that case have been
stayed pending further action by the NRC in response to the
EPA regulations that are the subject of this proceeding.
28
to the opinion of the panel of the Tenth Circuit sustain-
ing NRC’s regulations and were obviously aware of both
the NRC’s argument and the panel’s approval of the
NRC’s position. In fact, the committee report went out of
its way to state that the cost amendment was not intended
to ‘‘affect[] any pending litigation or appeal of judicial
decisions based on the fundamental missions or respon-
sibilities of the agencies.’” H.R. Rept. No. 87-884, supra,
47. It would appear that the committee specifically in-
tended to approve the NRC’s interpretation of the Act
and not disturb the March 1982, opinion of the Tenth
Circuit with regard to that question.
The official pronouncements of EPA on the cost ques-
tion prior to the summer of 1982 were consistent with the
NRC’s position and gave no warning of the major shift
in poliey that would be revealed months later in the final
inactive site standards. EPA had initially proposed a
2 pCi standard for radon emissions from inactive piles
(46 Fed. Reg. 2562, January 9, 1981), and explained in its
draft EIS, p.8-6, that the Ageney was justified in consid-
ering other factors, such as cost, once a marginal level of
health benefit is achieved. Thus in choosing between
standards at 2 pCi and 0.5 pCi, EPA considered cost a
relevant factor because either standard would ‘‘avert vir-
tually al! these cancer deaths [from radon].’’ EPA’s pro-
posal had rejected cost as a factor in determining the ac-
eeptability of less stringent standards that would allow
many cancer deaths.
While there is no discussion by the committee of
EPA’s 1981 proposal that would suggest the committee
members were as aware of EP.A’s earlier treatment of the
issue as they were of the NRC’s interpretation of the Act
affirmed hy the Tenth Cireuit, the committee nonetheless
29
expressed approval of EPA’s approach. The committee’s
obvious satisfaction with EPA’s initial approach is fur-
ther evidenced by enactment of the last sentence of 42
U.S.C. 2022(a) as part of the 1983 amendment. That
amendment directed DOE to proceed with implementation
of the remedial action program at the inactive sites based
on EPA’s proposed standards if final EPA action was
not forthcoming by the revised statutory deadline.
At no point prior to the committee’s deliberations was
there any hearing testimony or other communication from
EPA that revealed an intent to abandon the earlier ap-
proach and adopt the cost-benefit approach used here.
If the conferees were aware of OMB’s July 1982 letter
to EPA, it would appear that the committee’s specific
rejection of cost-benefit analyses in the report must have
been designed to put the OMB demand to rest. Unfor-
tunately, EPA has ignored the committee’s intent and has
carried its economic justification for rejecting more pro-
tective standards far beyond the limits authorized hy the
1983 amendment.
EPA’s use of OMB’s ‘‘optimized cost-benefit’? ap-
proach for setting health protection standards under
UMTRCA is not consistent with the statute, legislative
history or the prior decision of this Court. Foisted on
EPA over the opposition of Agency attorneys who, ac-
cording to John Daniel, were of the opinion that it was
illegal, the optimized cost-benefit approach is now appear-
ing in many other contexts of agency decision-making.
This ease presents an uncommon opportunity to decide
whether Congress ever intended to allow the Administrator
unbridled discretion to sacrifice achievable health benefits
solely on the basis of cost. Kepford is right: OMB may
not coerce EPA to use cost-benefit analysis to set health
30
standards when the statute does not authorize cost-hene-
fit analysis.
——()——_
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, UNC’s and AMC's petitions for
a writ of certiorari should be denied, and the Kepford pe-
tition should be granted.
Respectfully subinitted,
Rosert E. Yuunxe
Counsel ef Record
James B. Martin
Environmental Defense Fund
1405 Arapahoe Avenue
Boulder, CO 80302
— (808) 440-4901
Counsel for Intervenor-Respondents
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