Opposition Brief — Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia

ile Supreme Court, U.S,

fi? EBILED

NO. 85-528 |

OCT 25 1985

JOSEPH F. SPANIOW, JR.

IN THE x

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1985

RONALD L. GOLDFARB,

Petitioner,

v.

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM G. BROADDUS

Attorney General of Virginia

JAMES T. MOORE, Ill

Deputy Attorney General

GREGORY E. LUCYK*

Assistant Attorney General

101 North 8th Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

(804) 786-3809

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

BEST AVAILABLE COPY at

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of

the United States Constitution prevent the Virginia Supreme

Court from attaching reasonable conditions promoting

attorney competence to the grant of a discretionary license

to practice law so long as any applicant may gain admission

_to the Virginia bar by taking and passing the bar examination.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..........0.. sdéaiipedeeerbosesees evsencnnanenesedl i

TABLE OF CONTENTS SeSeeeeeeeeeeeeee Seeeseseseeseeoeeee eeeseeeeeeoeoeeeece ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ........scccccccccsees evcesananecosecs ecnswetias ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...... skeeeqnavenee sonesoncensqonss ee |

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .........ccccscseees secconcepcessevencannas 4

REASON FOR DENYING THE WRIT .........cccocccsecccesecsccccses 5

1. Petitioner's Due Process claim

has been previously considered

and rejected by this Court .........cccccccscccesees eoccces 5

2. The analysis by the court of

appeals of the commerce clause

issue is consistent with prior

decisions of this Court ........ccccccsccsecccesecccsccsecses 6

3. The case is unique, is limited

in scope and has no application

outside the discretionary bar

BAMISSION CONTEXT ..crcccrccccserccssccescessccscsecscccccores 9

CONCLUSION SSSSSSSSHSSSSSSESSSSSSSSSSSSESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSOSCESCES |

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Brown v. Sapreme Court of Virginia,

359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.),

aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973) ........ceesees ssicmamseacsdnanel

(ii)

Page

Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia,

414 U.S. 1034 (1973),

summarily aff'g 359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D. Va.) ........ stoveees smell

Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia, et al.,

766 F.26 BSH (4th Cir. 1965) .cccccccccccccccccccccscecces seanaein oni

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,

421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975) ......00 pocenessoovanseee ccecccocccssece LO

Hanover Fire Ins. v. Carr,

272 U.S. 494 (1926) ....cccroccrcerecssesescceees cocccccccccccccccccsoscece 8

Hicks v. Miranda,

422 U.S. 332, 343-345 (1975) ........cccccsorecceee scenceessemesuene

Hoover v. Ronwin,

__ U.S. _, 80 L.Ed.2d 590, 600 n.18 (1984) ...........00. one

In re Jadd,

391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984) .....cccccccccccecccccccerseeed

Leis v. Flynt,

439 U.S. 438, 444 1.5 (1979) ....c.ccccccccccrccrccccrcccccsercsccccoeel

Looney v. Crane,

S45 U.S. 178 (1917) coccccccccccccccccescccccccccecccsoce ebeneenenie consensual

Matter of Brown,

Sk S&S ly, siinchstiiiiiiinialiaitas a pieuiiaaiidas eneundell

Norfolk and Western R. Co. v. Beatty,

423 U.S. 1009 (1975)

summarily aff'g 400 F.Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.) ...... cocwusessossuuse 11

Pike v. Bruce Church,

SOE Dade BET GAOT OD Srctscccevescccccssccncseceeccsesccocevccccovecocccceocel

(iii)

Souix Remedy Co. v. Code,

I i a cen cenonnonnnnnnnnanensenoonsnbense 8

South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunicke,

104 S.Ct. 2237 (1984) .........0.. pendenestecseues podaceesnosveocbocesodsed 6

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,

105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985) ......cececeees iia eatiahh pemanaennnansamencenqcsnntil 9

United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul,

and Pac. R. P. Co.,

‘$a: U.S. 311 (1931) .......... cocccccceceeceococees arccecccocccceccocoosoose 7

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State of Kansas,

216 U.S. 355 (1909) ..ccccccccrcocccscccccccccccccsoccoccecccsoccoscccocsoee 7

Statutes:

Va. Code § 54-67 ......ccccoccsoosereens eeccecceces cocccsecoesececcesseceseos 1

Constitutional Provisions:

Art. 1, § = eeeceeeeeesoeeeeeeeoeeeee eeeeeeeese eeeeeeone eeseeeeeeeeeoeee eeeeeeeeeoeeoe 1

Ast. 1, BB ecccces piienineemenanthnuctinnamatie seonpiiensones eepnepenquanests evenscedlll

Rules:

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 12(b)(6) SOOHOSOEESE OEE EEEESEEO HOE EEESEEEEEEEESEEESEEEOEEEES eoccccocoocecoes b

Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia

Rule 1A81 cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccsccccescocvcccccoccccsocsocees passim

Other Authorities:

Hafter, Toward the Multistate Practice

of Law Through Admission by Reciprocity,

53 Miss. Lid. 1, 44 (1983) ..cccccccccccccccccccccccccoccscccserccceccccees 9

(iv)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner seeks this Court's review of an order of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

affirming the action of the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virg .a in dismissing petitioner's

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) for faiiure to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The district court action was filed by petitioner

Ronald L. Goldfarb on May 18, 1984, against respondents the

Supreme Court of Virginia, its Clerk and Executive

Secretary. Petitioner challenged the validity of Supreme

Court Rule 1A:1 as violative of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

and the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8 of the United States

Constitution. Rule 1A:1 was adopted pursuant to the Court's

discretionary authority under Va. Code § 54-67 to admit

attorneys from other jurisdictions without examination.

Petitioner challenges subpart (d) of that rule, which requires

the Supreme Court to determine “whether the

applicant...[iJntends to practice full time as a member of the

Virginia Bar." Respondents moved for dismissal or

abstention, and after argument on the motions, the district

court granted the motion to dismiss.

The court of appeals thereafter affirmed, Goldfarb v.

Supreme Court of Virginia, et al., 766 F.2d 859 (4th Cir.

1985), holding that petitioner's due process challenge had

been raised and rejected in Brown v. Supreme Court of

Virginia, 359 F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034

(1973), a case which it described as "essentially identical to

the present action.” 766 F.2d at 861. The court endorsed the

prior court's findings and concluded that "the requirement

rationally served the interest of Virginia in insuring the

The purposes of the full time practice requirement were

explained by the Supreme Court in Matter of Brown, 213 Va.

282 (1972). The court defined its rule to mean "that an

applicant must show that he intends to open an office in

Virginia for the practice of law and to regularly engage in the

practice of law in this state.” Id. at 286, n.3. (Emphasis in

original.) Among the considerations which made necessary

the Virginia rule was the need to ensure that out of state

attorneys who sought admission without examination would

"familiarize themselves with the rules of local practice and

procedure.” Id. at 286. The court was concerned that the

demands of an out of state practice and "the infrequency of

{en attorney's] contacts with Virginia law would stand in the

way of his becoming a proficient Virginia practitioner.” Id. at

287.

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competence of attorneys practicing in the Commonwealth,"

766 F.2d at 862.

As to petitioners commerce clause challenge, the

court held that the rule does not constitute "an undue burden

on interstate commerce" in relation to its putative local

benefit of promoting "familiarity with Virginia law among

attorneys who have not passed the state bar examination."

766 F.2d at 862. Noting that Virginia could have required all

lawyers, including Goldfarb, to take and pass the bar

examination, the court concluded that the state should not be

penalized for offering the full time practice option in lieu of

examination as an alternative "that many attorneys may find

less onerous." 766 F.2d at 863.

Finally, the court rejected petitioner's contention that

for commerce clause purposes, the admission without

examination alternative must be scrutinized in isolation of

other aspects of Virginia's bar admission program. The

question presented, as defined by the court, was whether

Virginia's bar admission policies assert "unreasonable control

over interstate commerce." 766 F.2d at 864. Because the

availability of the bar examination is a necessary element in

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defining the extent of that assertion, the court concluded

that the examination alternative must be incorporated into

its Commerce Clause analysis. This being so, the court

properly found that because any attorney may gain admission

by taking and passing the bar examination, the Commerce

Clause is not offended by the admission without examination

alternative.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts of this case are not complicated. Petitioner

is an attorney licensed to practice law in several states. He

resides in Virginia but maintains his office in the District of

Columbia. Because he occasionally has clients in Virginia, he

wants to become a member of the Virginia State Bar (VSB).

In January, 1983, he applied to the Virginia Supreme

Court for admission to ‘the VSB without examination. In

response to an inquiry from the Supreme Court's Executive

Secretary, he stated that he planned to maintain offices in

both Virginia and the District of Columbia. His application

was denied because he did not intend to practice full time in

Virginia but rather would divide his practice between Virginia

and the District. Following that denial, petitioner filed this

lawsuit. It is undisputed that petitioner has not been denied

the right to sit and take the Virginia bar examination. If he

were admitted to the bar by examination, the full time

practice requirement would not apply. Further, petitioner is

not preciuded presently from representing clients in Virginia

courts pro hac vice, so long as he affiliates a local counsel.

REASON FOR DENYING THE WRIT

1, Petition: s Due Process’ claim has been

previous): sonsidered and rejected by this Court.

This Court has already found that the Virginia full

time practice requirement for reciprocity admission satisfies

due process. In Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359

F.Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973) a

three judge federal panel upheld this rule against an equal

protection and due process challenge, finding that the

requirement rationally served the interest of Virginia in

insuring the competence of attorneys practicing in the

Commonwealth. This Court summarily affirmed the panel's

decision. There is nothing unique or different about the case

at bar which suggests that this claim should be relitigated.

2. The analysis by the court of appeals of the commerce

clause issue is consistent with prior decisions of this

Court.

Petitioner argues that the court's decision below

cannot be reconciled with prior cases of this Court

considering the commerce clause. This contention has no

merit. The significant difference between this case and the

commerce clause cases relied upon by petitioner is that here,

petitione? is not absolutely foreclosed from maintaining his

practice in the District while at the same time practicing

freely in the courts of Virginia. He as an alternative

available to him which will permit him to achieve that result,

and that is simply taking and passing the bar exam. There

were no similar alternatives available to the complainants in

the commerce clause cases cited by petitioner. Thus, in

South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104

S.Ct. 2237 (1984), the "primary manufacture within Alaska" -

requirement was an absolute prerequisite to the purchase of

Alaskan timber. Absent compliance with the in-state

manufacture requirement, the complainant was absolutely

barred from purchasing the low priced Alaskan wood. There

is no such absolute bar in petitioner's case. Similary, in Pike

v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970), Arizona law required all

Arizona canteioupes to be packed at a plant in that state.

Absent compliance, the complainant was prohibited from

shipping them beyond state lines. There is no such absolute

prohibition in petitioner's case.

Petitioner's “unconstitutional conditions" argument

likewise merits no consideration by this court. His effort to

equate the "privilege" of admission without examination with

the "privilege" of doing business recognized in the commerce

clause cases is contrived and misrepresents those decisions.

Again, the "conditions" imposed on doing business in the

commerce clause cases represented an absolute bar to the

noncomplying business interest. See United States v.

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pac. R. P. Co., 282 U.S.

311 (1931) (ICC's grant of authority to reorganized

corporation to issue securities subject to condition not

authorized by statute; noncompliance with the illegal

condition would have voided the issue); Western Union

Telegraph Co. v. State of Kansas, 216 U.S. 355 (1909) (statute

required payment of charter fee based upon percentage of

corporation's entire authorized capital stock for payment into

state's permanent school fund as a condition of doing business

within state); Hanover Fire Ins. v. Carr, 272 U.S. 494 (1926)

(required payment of a 2% gross receipts tax in order to do

business within state); Looney v. Crane, 245 U.S. 178 (1917)

(imposition of tax upon out of state corporations according to

amount of authorized capital stock as a condition of doing

business within state); Souix Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S.

197 (1914) (denied foreign corporations right to sue in state

court; tantamount to a denial of right to do business).

In each of these cases cited by petitioner, the

"condition" struck down by this Court represented an absolute

bar to doing business within the state. Petitioner is not so

foreclosed from doing business in Virginia. As the district

court and the court of appeals concluded, he need only take

and pass the bar examination. It is the availability of this

alternative which sets this case apart from all those cited by

petitioner. The examination requirement may cause

petitioner some minor inconvenience, but it clearly does not

violate his ec» .utional rights, and does not justify granting

the writ in this case.

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