Opposition Brief — Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co.
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Supreme Court, U.S.
Laink, E D
OCT 16 1905
NO. 85-454 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
in the
Supreme Court
of the
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
SOL MUNCZ SIBAJA, et al.,
Petitioners,
VS.
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY’S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
LEANNE FRANK PFLAUM
MICHAEL B. BUCKLEY
CORLETT, KILLIAN, HARDEMAN,
McINTOSH & LEVI, P.A.
Attorneys for Respondent Dow
116 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33130
(305) 377-8931
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court below was correct in affirming
the dismissal of this action on the grounds of forum non
conveniens with respect to the specific and unique
facts presented here.
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES
SAUL MUNOZ SIBAJA and RAFAELA ARRIETA
PORRAS, ROBERTO CERDA AGUILAR and SINAI
TORRES ROSALES, VICENTE FLORES VALVERDE
and MARIA MAYELA VEGA FIGUREROA, BOLIVAR
ARIAS MORA, ALFONSO CAMPOS RODRIGUEZ and
MARIA JIMENEZ BENAVIDES, JUAN BAUTISTA
VASQUEZ and MARIA ISABEL CHAVARRIA SALAS,
VICTOR SOLIS ROJAS and ROSA BADILLA PEREZ,
MIGUEL CHAVARRIA ZUNIGA, JOAQUIN ZAMORA
ARRIETA, TACITO CAMPOS GARCIA and
YAMILETH NURIS VILLEGAS DIAS, SEGUNDA
RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ and MARY ELIZONDO
UMANA, ELIECER ACOSTA MONTERO and EMMA
JIMENEZ RAMIREZ, MANUEL CHAVES NUNEZ
and MIREYA RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, CARLOS
GARITA SANDI and MELITINA GONZALEZ, EDWIN
GOMEZ CASTRILLO and ODILI TORRES ACUNA,
MAGIN FERNANDEZ GARCIA and PAULA CORTEZ
GOMEZ, MEFTALI ARAYA GARITA and LEDA
ESPINOZA GAMBOA, MARGARITO ZUNIGA
GUTIERREZ and ANAIS SANCHEZ ROJAS, DANIEL
LORIA MORERA and PETRA BERTA NAVARRETE
TORRES, MIGUEL ZUNIGA PENA and MARIA DE
LA CRUZ GONZALEZ GONZALES, ISAIAS SANCHEZ
RIVERA and FIDELIA ALVARADO SOLORZANO,
AUGUSTO LEITON RODRIGUEZ and MERCEDES
RODRIGUEZ ARRIETA, ANGEL LOBO ROJAS and
MARGOT VARELA RAMIREZ, CASIMIRO LOPEZ
SANDOVAL and ALEJANDRINA VEGA
VILLALOBOS, JOSE SOSSA SOSSA and FLORY
ALFARO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO GUTIERREZ
ZUMBADO and MARIA DE LOS ANGELES,
GERARDO PERAZA GARRO and NELLY UMANA
il
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ARIAS, ELIAS HERNANDEZ BADILLA, BENEDICTO
CAMPOS CORRALES, MARIO SOLANO JIMENEZ,
BOLIVAR ARIAS MORA, PEDRO JIMENEZ
MURILLO, JOSE GAMBOA RODRIGUEZ, RODRIGO
GARITA SANDI,
Represented by:
Russell W. Budd, Esq.
Jane N. Saginaw, Esq.
Baron & Budd
Dallas, Texas
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Represented by:
Henry Burnett, Esq.
Thomas F. Martin, Esq.
Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley,
Banick & Strickroot, P.A.
Miami, Florida
Burt Ballanfant, Esq.
Shell Oil Company
Litigation Section
Houston, Texas
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,*
Represented by:
Edward Corlett, III, Esq.
Michael B. Buckley, Esq.
Leanne Frank Pflaum, Esq.
Corlett, Killian, Hardeman,
McIntosh & Levi, P.A.
Miami, Florida
*A list of DOW’S subsidiaries and affiliates as of September,
1985 is set out in the appendix.
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF
QUESTION PRESENTED ................ oh i
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES ............. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................ se, oe
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................... Vv
OPINIONS BELOW ............... lel aeees eee
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT ............. 2
<y¥ vglyy - 9! 4.) 0) | Se 2
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THECASE ....... 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. There is no important federal question of
en ET ne ne Gr ea ps 4
II. This case does not involve fundamental
error of law ofexceptionalimportance... 8
SPE SL Cio or ee rev Ne Chae oh eae os 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................. 13
APPENDIX
LIST OF DOW’S AFFILIATES
BIUED BUSEEPAA RAED 5 cw oe cece eee A-1
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent,
654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980) ..............
Alexander v. Richardson Merrill, Inc.,
542 F.Supp. 93 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) ..........
Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,
389 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1980) ...............
Ciprari v. Cruzerio,
232 F.Supp. 433 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).........
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner,
GRP ts WR so eee eee
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947), rev'g 153 F.2d 883,
170 A.L.R. 319 (2d Cir. 1946) ............
Hadlich v. American Mail Line,
82 F.Supp. 562 (N.D. Cal. 1949)..........
Hanna v. Plumer,
SOG a IE oo honk cn ebb
Hodson v. A. H. Robbins, Co.,
528 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1981).........
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)
Cases Pages
Houston v. Caldwell,
368 So.3d GEB ie. 1978) .. . «0. ccc ncs. . &F
Klaxton v. Stentor Electric Co., Inc.,
RE: Ge IE oe oa eke dS ae ens 5
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
GS Ti EE © x50 sda Gee vasae 3, 4, 7
Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co.,
376 F.Supp. 1054 (D. Md. 1974) .............. 9
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
SRT UE Sa Oe sks Voces eeNe inn ee caawess 10
Southern Railway Co. v. McCubbins,
196 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) ............ 7
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
GEG TEE. TEE = os hc be ka ohne eae 10
vi
TABLE CC” ACTHORITIES (Continued)
Pages
STATUTES
Be Aes EE CRUD ne ce evade e adios 2
Civil Code of Costa Rica,
Articles 6 and 1045-48 ...... eae cca eee
Labor Code of Costa Rica,
Pptieeee BIO ae ww... i een As
Code of Civil Procedure of Costa Rica,
NP ate. 0 ee ea rene a et oe. ae
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
Moore, Federal Practice and Procedure,
IIE i ee ie ta ee el a oy 10
Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
I ha ee a ee ae 5
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federai Practice
and Procedure, §4506 (1981) ............00.0.... 5
in the
Supreme Court
of the
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
SOL MUNOZ SIBAJA, et al.,
Petitioners,
VS.
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and
SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
The Respondent, The Dow Chemical Company,
prays that the Petition for Certiorari be denied.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
is published at 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985). It is
accurately reproduced in the Petitioners’ appendix.
Rehearing was denied by the Eleventh Circuit at 765
F.2d 154 (11th Cir. 1985). The opinion of Judge King in
the Southern District of Florida is not published. It is,
however, accurately reproduced in the Petitioners’
appendix.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional requisites are adequately set
forth in the Petition.
STATUTES INVOLVED
While the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. §1652
(1982), as set forth in the Petition, is implicated in this
case, it was not specifically argued below. Further, it
was not specifically construed by the lower courts.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants are fifty-eight (58) Costa Rican citizens.
During the course of their employment in Costa Rica
they claim injury when exposed to certain pesticides
manufactured by The Dow Chemica] Company (hereinafter
Dow) and/or the Shell Oil Company (hereinafter Shell).
Plaintiffs brought suit in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Court in Dade County, Florida—a forum that has no
connection with this litigation. Along with the complaint,
Petitioners served in-depth interrogatories and requests
for production pertaining to the merits of this case.
Respondents removed this case to the Southern
District of Florida and moved to dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens. In support of these motions
Respondents served detailed affidavits containing facts
pertinent to the “public and private interest factors”
which are to be considered under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947), rev'g 153 F.2d 883. 170 A.L.R. 319 (2d Cir. 1946).
Petitioners responded to these motions to dismiss. The
Southern District of Florida granted these motions and
dismissed the case based upon the federal jurisprudence
pertaining to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The dismissal was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit
and a request for rehearing was denied.
Petitioners, in their “Statement of the Case” say
that the “only issue” is whether this case should be
tried on its merits under the Florida rules of forum non
conveniens or dismissed by application of the federal
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Respondents
vigorously deny that this case would be tried on its
merits by the Florida state courts. Respondents also
vigorously dispute that the Florida doctrine of forum
non conveniens would be applied to this case by a
Florida court. This argument is set forth in more detail,
infra.
ARGUMENT —
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.
THERE IS NO IMPORTANT FEDERAL
QUESTION OF LAW PRESENT
The issue in this case is narrow and unique to its
facts. No amount of rhetoric can convert it to warranting
review on certiorari. There is no important question of
federal law present. The Petitioners’ argument to the
contrary is based upon an erroneous premise.
Petitioners assert that an important federal question
is present because the Supreme Court has previously
recognized a significant Erie question when federal
and state rules of forum non conveniens diverge.
Petitioners cite a footnote from Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n. 13 (1981) for this proposition.
Petitioners then argue here, under Houston v. Caldwell,
359 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1978) the Florida rules of forum non
conveniens would preclude dismissa} of this case. Thus,
Petitioners contend that there is a significant Erie
question involving constitutional notions of federalism
because, they assert, the “accident of diversity”
determines the outcome of this case.' Thus, Petitioners
argue that there is a significant Erie —therefore federal —
question presented here.
‘It is true, apparently, the only state where the doctrine of
forum non conveniens arguably might differ from the federal
jurisprudence pertaining to that doctrine is the State of Florida.
See, e.g., Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147.
155 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
Petitioners’ argument contains a crucial and fatal
flaw. Its primary premise is incorrect. The Florida
rules of forum non conveniens, which Petitioners claim
would preclude dismissal, would not even apply in this
case even if it were tried in the Florida state courts. If
the District Court were to apply Florida law in this
case —which it certainly must do with respect to
substantive law —it would be bound to apply the entirety
of Florida law. This would necessarily include the
application of Florida’s rules pertaining to conflicts, or
choice of substantive law. See Klaxton v. Stentor Electric
Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Day & Zimmermann, Inc.
v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). See also the many cases
cited at Wright, Miller & Cooper, 19 Federal Practice
& Procedure, §4506 at 73 n. 37 (1981). Thus, the Federal
District Court in the Southern District of Florida applying
Florida’s substantive law would be bound to apply the
Florida rules pertaining to choice of substantive law.
Contrary to the implication in the Petition, Florida
courts would choose to apply the substantive law of
the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts, which
would be Costa Rica. See Bishop v. Florida Specialty
Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (2d) §§ 145-146 (1971).°
It is quite clear that Florida law would require
application of the substantive law of Costa Rica. The
only way a Florida court would apply its own rules
pertaining to forum non conveniens, on the present
"Restatement of Conflict of Laws (2d) §146 (1971) provides
that, “[iJn an action for personal injury the local law of the state
where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship. . . .” /d.
0
0 ST
facts, would be if forum non conveniens were a procedural
concept. Here, Petitioners are vigorously disputing that
forum non conveniens is procedural. It is Petitioners
who assert that forum non conveniens is a substantive
concept. Thus, it is clear that the Florida courts would
never apply the Florida law of forum non conveniens to
this case. Accordingly, the very heart of Petitioners’
argument —that Florida rules of forum non conveniens
would apply to this case and would preclude dismissal —
is destroyed. It is, thus, evident that the Petition lacks
merit and should be denied.’
Further, Petitioners again assert, that the “accident
of diversity” interferes with what they call the opportunity
of the Florida courts to resolve this matter which the
Petitioners amazingly call a matter with which Florida
has a fundamental interest. In fact, nothing can be
more incorrect. Florida has absolutely no contact with,
nor interest in, this lawsuit. This was correctly observed
by both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit.
This entire litigation has nothing to do with the State
of Florida and it is quite unfair to burden the courts
and the citizens of this state with this litigation. Neither
Shell nor Dow are Florida corporations and neither
Shell nor Dow have their principal place of business in
Florida. Moreover, the Petitioners themselves are foreign
citizens and they have no true interest in litigating in
‘A Florida court applying Costa Rican rules pertaining to
forum non conveniens would dismiss this case. Jurisdiction of
Costa Rican courts is strictly territorial. See Civil Code of Costa
Rica, Articles 6 and 1045-1048; Labor Code of Costa Rica, Articles
210-212; Code of Civil Procedure of Costa Rica, Articles 1-7. Thus,
if the tort took place elsewhere, jurisdiction would not be entertained.
It is, therefore, clear that such a hypothetical Florida court applying
Costa Rican law would similarly dismiss this case.
the State of Florida other than, perhaps, the fact that
Dade County, Florida is traditionally recognized as a
high verdict area. It has consistently been held that a
plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to much deference
when the plaintiffs are from a foreign country. Reyno,
supra, 454 U.S. at 255.
Moreover, giving the Petitioners the benefit of
doubt, and assuming, arguendo, that the Florida law of
forum non conveniens would apply to the case if tried
in the Florida state courts, the result would not be any
different. That is, Houston v. Caldwell, supra, would
not preclude dismissal here. Houston v. Caldwell involved
a plaintiff who was resident of West Palm Beach, Florida.
With respect to such a suit by a Florida citizen, the
court observed that, naturally, there was a “fundamental
interest in resolving controversies involving [Florida|
citizens.” 359 So.2d at 861. Such a “plaintiff's choice of
venue is usually favored if the election is one which has
been properly exercised under the applicable [venue]
statutes.” Jd. at 860.
Additionally, the decision in Southern Railway Co.
v. McCubbins, 196 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) is
directly on point and mandates dismissal, under the
Florida doctrine of forum non conveniens, where the
plaintiff was not a Florida resident; the tort occurred
outside Florida; and the defendant was not incorporated
in Florida and did not have its principai place of business
in Florida, but the defendant did have an office and
agent in Dade County, Florida and it conducted business
in the State of Florida. In McCubbins the Florida doctrine
of forum non conveniens mandated dismissal. It can
readily be seen that McCubbins is much more closely
on point than Houston v. Caldwell. Therefore, even
assuming, arguendo, that the Florida doctrine would
apply, it would require dismissal. Accordingly, the result
would be the same as under the federal doctrine.
For the above reasons it is apparent that the
Petitioners’ argument is defective. That argument is
premised upon the assumption that under Florida rules
of forum non conveniens the Petitioners would proceed
to judgment. However, as indicated above, this premise
is incorrect because (a) Florida law of forum non
conveniens would not even apply; and (b) assuming,
arguendo, that it did, the Florida law of forum non
conveniens would mandate dismissal just as is the case
under the federal doctrine. Thus, there is no significant
Erie question present. Accordingly, there is no significant
federal question present here.
II.
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF LAW OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE.
The Eleventh Circuit was correct in its conclusion
and in its analysis. The Eleventh Circuit was following
the more substantial weight of authority in finding
that the federal rules of forum non conveniens apply in
this case. There can be no doubt that forum non conveniens
is a procedural concept for Erie purposes. It is a
“housekeeping ru ©” of the federa] district courts. In
large part the doctrine focuses upon the convenience
and the docket of the court applying the doctrine.
Clearly the concerns addressed by the doctrine would
make it “anomalous for [a federal] court to apply anything
but federal principles [of forum non conveniens].”
Alexander v. Richardson Merrill, Inc., 542 F.Supp. 93,
98 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). Some federal courts have squarely
and succinctly held that, for purposes of Erie, forum
non conveniens is a procedural concept. “Forum non
conveniens is a procedural doctrine that is governed
by federal rather than state law even in cases where
jurisdiction is granted on diversity of citizenship.” Ciprari
v. Cruzerio, 232 F.Supp. 433, 442 (S.D. N.Y. 1964). Accord,
' Hodson v. A. H. Robbins Co., 528 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Va.
1981); Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F.Supp.
1054, 1060 (D. Md. 1974); Alexander vu. Richardson Merrill,
Inc., supra.
Forum non conveniens, as recognized by the
Petitioners, is an incidence of venue. “Venue is an
incidence of procedure.” Hadlich v. American Mail Line,
82 F.supp. 562, 563 (N.D. Cal. 1949). The doctrine pertains
to the “public interest factors” associated with the
federal courts themselves. It has nothing to do with
private rights created by state substantive bodies of
law. Professor Moore also recognized that forum non
conveniens is procedural in the Erie context. Moore
states that,
this doctrine is but a facet of venue. Because
of that, because the doctrine affects the trial
convenience of the federal court and their
dockets and because of the mobility of the
federal judiciary on a national scale, they should
be independent of state doctrines of forum
non conveniens, fashioned for courts operating
on a state scale. Forum non conveniens is
procedural and the new code so treats it. Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins does not require conformity
9
ae
by the federal courts to the practice of the
states in this matter.
Moore, 1A Fed. Prac. and Pro. §0.317(2) at 3232-33
(1981) (emphasis added).
Petitioners’ argument is based upon what they
perceive to be an inadequate Hanna v. Plumer “outcome-
determinative” analysis by the Eleventh Circuit. However,
this court recognized in Hanna itself that the “ ‘outcome-
determination’ analysis was never intended to serve as
a talisman.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67
(1965). More importantly, Hanna only controls where a
federal rule directly conflicts with state law. This was
recognized in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740 (1980). Walker dealt with Federal Rule 3 which
pertains to when an action is “commenced.” The court
found that Rule 3 did not conflict with state law on the
subject. Thus, the court held “[sjince there is no direct
conflict between the federal rule and the state law, the
Hanna analysis does not apply.” Jd. at 752. Instead, the
case was controlled by Erie and Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Accordingly, the Petitioners’ argument that the
Eleventh Circuit committed a fundamental error of
law is incorrect. First, the Eleventh Circuit was quite
correct in holding that forum non conveniens is not a
substantive concept for purposes of Erie. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit was correct in applying the federal
rules pertaining to that doctrine. Secondly, the Petitioners’
argument in this respect is premised upon what they
perceive was an inadequate “outcome-determinative”™
analysis which, Petitioners claim, was mandated by
Hanna v. Plumer. However, Hanna only controls when
10
a case presents a direct conflict between a federal rule
of civil procedure and a state law on the same topic.
Such is not the case here.
Indeed, it is anomalous for a federa! court to be
constrained by state rules pertaining to forum non
conveniens since it is a doctrine affecting the court
itself. It is illogical that federal district courts, operating
on a national scale, should be bound to apply the various
state jurisprudence pertaining to state doctrines of
forum non conveniens. Thus, logic, Professor Moore
and various federal court decisions are cited in support
of Respondents’ contention that the federal rules of
forum non conveniens apply to this case. On the other
hand, Petitioners cite nothing directly in support of
their illogical contention. Rather, their argument is
convoluted and is based in large part upon a decision —
Hanna — which is inapposite with respect to the present
facts.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the petition should be denied.
CORLETT, KILLIAN,
HARDEMAN, McINTOSH
& LEVI, P.A.
Attorneys for Respondent Dow
116 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33130
(305) 377-8931
By __/s/ E.S.Corlett, WI
E.S. CORLETT, Ili
By __/s/_ Michael B. Buckley
MICHA®L B. BUCKLEY
By _/s/_ Leanne Frank Pflaum
LEANNE FRANK PFLAUM
and
By . ls) Jane M.Gootee _
JANE M. GOOTEE
The Dow Chemical Company,
of counsel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIF'Y that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Respondent’s Brief in Opposition was
mailed this 15th day of October, 1985, to: JANE N.
SAGINAW, ESQ. and RUSSELL W. BUDD, ESQ., Baron
& Budd, 8333 Douglas Avenue, 10th Floor, Dallas, Texas
75225 and HENRY BURNETT, ES@Q., Fowler, White,
Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot, P.A., City National
Bank Building, 25 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida
33130; BURT BALLANFANT, ESQ., Shell Oil Co.,
Litigation Section, 900 Louisiana, Room 4794, Houston,
Texas 77001.
CORLETT, KILLIAN,
HARDEMAN, McINTOSH
& LEVI, P.A.
Attorneys for Dow Chemical Co.
116 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33130
(305) 377-8931
By _/Ss/ Leanne Frank Pflaum
LEANNE FRANK PFLAUM
| 13
Appendix
oe ee
NON-FULLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES
AND AFFILIATES OF THE
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1985
Subisidaries and affiliates owned both directly and
indirectly have been included. The company underlined
is the direct owner of the companies listed below it.
“Dow’s” percent ownership is indicated by each company.
SUBSIDIARIES
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
Alamo Land Company, Ine. (56%)
Gruppo Lepetit S.p.A. (99%)
L.LF.E. (Laboratorios Industriales Farmaceuticos
Ecuatorianos (59%)
Laboratorios L.I.F.E. del Salvador S.A. (59%)
Negocios e Industrias S.A. “Neisa” (59%)
Pacific Chemical Berhad (51%)
Pacific Cable Products Sendirian Berhad (26%)
Ivon Watkins-Dow, Ltd. {51%)
Societe Industrielle de Plastic el de L’acier S.A.
(99%)
The Cynara Company (90%)
DOW CHEMICAL A.G. (A.G. owned 100% by
The Dow Chemical Company)
Petroquimica-Dow S.A. (70%)
App. 1
AFFILIATES
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
Dow Corning Corporation (50%)
Dowell Schlumberger Corporation (50%)
Dowell Schlumberger Incorporated (50%)
Compagnie des Services Dowell Schlumberger (50%)
E] Dorado Terminals Company (50%)
Agro-Quimica Maringa (20%)
Bank Mendes Gans (29%)
Chemi-Trol Chemical Company (23%)
DOKI (49%)
Estireno Del Zulia C.A. (25%)
Ibachem, Ltd. (40%)
Oasis Pipeline Company (30%)
Package Machinery Company (29%)
Total Raffinaderij Nederland N.V. (20%)
Zoo Agro de Venezuela C.A. (49%)
Al Miyah Chemicals (Ltd.) (49%)
Baratek (80%)
Boersele Hydrocracker B.V. (45%)
Insul/Crete Company, Inc. (50%)
Joliet Trust Company (50%)
Long Beach Trust Company (50%)
Metal Mark, Inc. (50%)
Oronzio De Nora Impianti Elettrochemici S.A. (50%)
Sinor Corradini Navarra S.A. (90%)
Technovest Corp. (20%)
DOW CHEMICAL, A.G. (A.G. is owned 100% by The
Dow Chemical Company)
Polychem, Ltd. (25%)
App. 2
CORAL NAVIGATION (Coral is owned 100% by The
Dow Chemical Company)
Chief Shipping Company (50%!
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, LTD. (Ltd. is owned
100% by Dow Chemical A.G.)
Cromarty Petroleum Company, Ltd. (50%)
DOW CHEMICAL CANADA, INC. (Canada, Ince. is
100% owned by The Dow Chemical Company)
Schlumberger Canada, Inc. (50%)
Fort Saskatchewan Ethylene Storage Limited (50%)
Lawrason’s Chemical, Ltd. (20%)
Wabiskaw Explorations Limited (50%)
MALIGNE RESOURCES LIMITED (Maligne is 100%
owned by Dow Chemical Canada, Inc.)
MT Partnership (50%)
DOW CHEMICAL AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED (Africa is
100% owned by Dow Chemical A.G.)
J.V. Chemicals (50%)
DOW CHEMICAL INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
COMPANY (Energy is 100% owned by The Dow
Chemical Company)
Scotdril Offshore Co. (50%)
App. 3
DOW CHEMICAL S.p.A. (S.p.A. is 100%
owned by Dow Chemical A.G.)
Corradini Poliuretani S.p.A. (100%)
DOW CHEMICAL IBERICA S.A. (Iberica is 100%
owned by Dow Chemicai A.G.)
Transformadora De Etileno (50%)
Dow Quimica S.A. (Quimica is 100% owned by
The Dow Chemical Company)
Estireno del Zulia C.A. (25%)
Expanso Correctora De Seguros Ltda (33%)
DOFINCO, INC. (Dofinco is 100% owned by
The Dow Chemical Company)
DCS Capital Partnership (50%)
DCS Capital Corporation (100%)
DOW FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
(Financial Services is owned 100% by The Dow
Chemical Company)
Dow Banking Corporation (82%)
Dow Scandia Holdings Limited (52%)
Dow MBF Limited (57%)
MBF Factors SDN. BHD. (26%)
MBF Leasing BHD. SDN. (10%)
MBF LEASING (S) Pte. Ltd. (49%)
App. 4
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.