Reply Brief — Felt v. First Bank of South Dakota
Supreme Court brief1985
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
CASE NO.
IN
SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES
OCTOBER
IVEN L. FELT and WILMA FELT,
Petitioners,
v.
FIRST BANK OF SOUTH DAKOTA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
PETITIONERS’ BRIEF IN REPLY
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Richard Hopewell Horace R. Jackson
Wesley D. Schmidt Gene N. Lebrun
[on the brief] Lynn, Jackson, Shultz
423 S. Phillips Ave. & Lebrun, P.C.
Sioux Falls, S.D. P.O. Box 8110
57102 Rapid City, S.D. 5/7709
[605] 334-0982 [605] 342-2592
Petitioners’ Counsel Respondent's Counsel
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF FACTS &
PROCEDURAL HISTORY .
ARGUMENTS
Re
Ads
eee
IV.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED
BY RESPONDENT'S CONTINUING FAIL-
URE TO COMPLY WITH 15 U.S.C.
Seco ems Beet ovo a we es
PETITIONERS STATE CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
BY 15 U.S.C. §1639 ,
PETITIONERS STATE CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
BY 15 U.S.C. §1635
PETITIONERS STATE CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
BY 42 U.S.C. §1983
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Pages
Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342 E1875) . 4435
First Bank v. Felt, 368 N.W.2d 588
[s.D, 2eeek. «3 Agi pare 1,3,4
Jones v. Trans Ohio, 747 F.2d 1037
(6th Cir. 1984) nae? 4,3
Fourth, Seventh & Fourteenth Amend-
ments to U.S. Comstitetiq§® 2. « «> 8
15 U.8.C. 816338 . ¢ 4-328 452 5
18 U.S.C. 6163) .. 6.34 42
1% U.S.C. SEORG ss 6 oe eee eee 4,8
42? U.S.C. $2983 2s eos eee
STATEMENT OF FACTS -l-
AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In reprint at pages 28a-47a of Respon-
dent's Brief, Petitioner Iven Felt executed
the following promissory notes in favor of
First Bank in Lemmon, South Dakota:
Date Sum Payment due
7-13-79 $15,300. 12-1-82
5-4-81 39 269. 11-1-81
5-4-81 25/000, 11-1-81
5-4-81 60/000 11-1-81
5-16-81 7°000 11-1-81
6-8-81 3/500 11-1-81
Petitioner Wilma Felt co-signed the promis-
sory notes above marked with asterisks.
The history of the Parties’ banking
relationship and status of Respondent's
state court action for summary judgment on
the foregoing notes is found in First Bank
of South Dakota v. Felt, 368 N.W.2d 588, 590-
S.D. :
"The Defendants Iven and Wilma Felt
have made various transactions with
Plaintiff First National Bank for
about 20 years. Defendants have
always made one payment a year in
the fall or after selling the farm
products. But after 6 years of no
crops -- hail and drought -- there
wasn't much to pay with. Even af-
ter Defendants made a good sized
payment in the fall of 1981, Plain-
tiff wanted more collateral on the
notes at the bank, car title and a
third mortgage on the land. Defen-
dants felt that if their collateral
had been enough to loan the credit
on, it still should be sufficient.
After making a security check the
end of June, 1982, the Bank Presi-
dent asked what would Defendants do
if the Bank foreclosed. Defendant
Iven Felt said he couldn't see why
the Bank couldn't work with him,
he could pay it back. But a few
days later, July 6, 1982, the Sher-
iff served Defendants a Summons and
Complaint."
In their Answer to Respondent's foregoing 6
July 1982 Complaint for recovery on the
aforesaid promissory notes in the Eighth
Judicial Circuit Court of South Dakota in
and for Perkins County, Petitioners filed
a counterclaim based on 15 U.S.C. §§1635
and 1639.
On 12 December 1983, Petitioners ini-
tiated this action before the U.S. District
Court of South Dakota, and on Respondent's
25 January 1984 motion, the Court, without
findings of fact and conclusions of law,
dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint by order of
2 February 1984:
"for the reason that Plaintiff's
Complaint does not state a claim
upon which relief may be granted”.
By per curiam 18 July 1984 decision of
the Eighth Circuit Judges of the U.S. Court
of Appeals, the District Court's order was
affirmed on the ground that:
"The allegations of the complaint
center on non-compliance with i5
U.S. C. §1635, which provides a
right of rescission as to consu-
mer credit transactions in which
a security interest is acquired
or retained in real property used
as the residence of the person to
whom credit is extended. The se-
curity interests involved in this
case were in livestock, feed and
equipment, not real estate. There-
fore, 15 U.S.C. §1635 is inapplica-
ble, and the district court pro-
perly dismissed the complaint".
On 23 July 1984, Respondent renewed in
state court its motion for summary judgment
on the promissory notes herein; on which mo-
tion summary judgment in the amount of
$157,795.05 was granted by the state court
on 4 September 1984; which summary judgment
was the subject of Petitioners' appeal in
First Bank of South Dakota v. Felt, supra.
Pursuant to Petitioners' 25 September
1984 motion for enlargement of time, this
Court's Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun
herein granted Petitioner 30 additional days
to file the petition for writ of certiorari
herein. Said petition was receipted by
this Court's Clerk on 14 November 1984.
Aforesaid pending petition by the Pe-
titioners to this Court and appeal to the
Supreme Court of South Dakota notwithstand-
ing, Respondent initiated the 7 February
1985 issuance of a writ of execution order-
ing the Perkins County Sheriff to satisfy
Respondent's aforesaid $157,795.05 summary
judgment by levy:
" , . . out of the personal proper-
ty of said Judgment Debtor, and if
sufficient personal property can-
not be found, out of the real pro-
perty belonging to Defendants
By its 6 March 1985 letter referred to
in its 9 May 1985 letter on file herein to
ulin
this Court's Assistant Clerk Edward C.
Schade, Respondent confirmed with Mr. Schade
that the 13 November 1984 petition for writ
of certiorari herein was a "dead file".
On 8 March 1985, the Perkins County
Sheriff seized by levy and thereafter sold
all the equipment and livestock on Respon-
dents' land in partial satisfaction of the
aforesaid $157,795.05 summary judgment.
On 22 May 1985 First Bank of South Da-
kota v. Felt, supra at 592, heldthat Peti-
tioners state claims for relief under 15
U.S.C. §1640, and remanded said claims to
the state trial court for further proceed-
ings.
ARGUMENTS
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED BY
RESPONDENT'S CONTINUING FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH 15 U.S.C. §§1635, 1639
At page 1 of its Brief, Respondent as-
serts that Petitioners' 15 U.S.C. §1639
claim is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations in 15 U.S.C. §1640(e). Respon-
der:t therewith fails to address the ques-
tion of whether this statutory provision was
subject to the doctrine of equitable tol-
ling. The Sixth Circuit has held that the
statute is subject to the doctrine of eq-
uitable tolling. Jones v. Trans Ohio Sav-
ings Association, 747 F.2d 1037, 1041 (6th
Cir. 1984). Under this doctrine, the sta-
tute of limitations [15 U.S.C. §1640(e)] is
tolled when a defendant fradulently conceals
the facts which give rise to the cause of
action. This federal fradulent concealment
rule was first enunciated in Bailey v.
«Se
Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (21 Wall.) 22 L.Ed 636
(1875). The Sixth Circuit in Jones conclu-
ded that:
"For application of the doctrine of
fradulent concealment, the one year
period will begin to run when the
borrower discovers or has had a rea-
sonable opportunity to discover the
fraud involving the complained of
TILA violation. To conclude other-
wise would be to accede to the ma-
chinations of those who would hope
to thwart Congress' purpose and the
ability of the federal courts to
ensure that purpose's fruition; the
prevention of fraud in consumer
credit rransactions". Jones v.
Trans Ohio Savings Association,
747 F.2d at L041.
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that De-
fendants fradulently concealed the facts
which would have given rise to the cause of
action. They concealed these facts by their
failure to make the disclosures required by
15 U.S.C. 1635 and 15 U.S.C. 1639. Inasmuch
as no disclosure has ever been made, the
Court should find that the statute was tol-
led by the fraud of the Defendants in fail-
ing to disclose until the Plaintiffs should
reasonably have discovered the facts which
make up their cause of action.
II. PETITIONERS STATE CLAIM UPON WHICH RE-
LIEF CAN BE GRANTED BY 15 U.S.C. §1639
On the face of five promissory notes
(RB(35a-47a)) which are the subject of Pe-
titioners' 15 U.S.C. §1639 claim herein, Re-
spondent failed to disclose to Petitioners
information required by 15 U.S.C. §1639(a)
(4) (7) (8) (b) :
"(a) Any creditor making a consumer
loan or otherwise extending consu-
mer credit in a transaction which
is neither a consumer credit sale
nor under an open end consumer
credit plan shall disclose each of
the following items, to the extent
applicable:
(4) . . . the amount of the fi-
nance charge
(7) The default, delinquency,
or similar charges payable in
the event of late payments.
(8) A description of any se-
curity interest held or to be
retained or acquired by the
creditor in connection with
the extension of credit, and a
clear identification of the
property to which the security
interest relates
(b) . . ., the disclosures required
by subsection (a) of this section
shall be made before the credit is
extended, and may be made by dis-
closing the information in the note
or other evidence of indebtedness
to be signed by the obligor."
III. PETITIONERS STATE CLAIM UPON WHICH RE-
LIEF CAN BE GRANTED BY 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635
15 U.S.C. §1635(a) in part provides:
e el hl Cl ce COMBUMOT credit
transaction in which a security in-
terest, including any such interest
arising by operation of law, is
acquired in . . . the residence of
the person to whom credit is exten-
ded, the obligor shall have the
right to rescind the transaction
following the .. . delivery
of disclosures required under this
section and all other material dis-
closures required under this part
". (emphasis added.)
To be noted in greater specifics at
page 3, supra, a state court writ of execu-
tion on 7 February 1985 ordered the county
sheriff to satisfy Respondents’ summary
judgent on the promissory notes at issue
by levy and sale on Petitioners' property.
Through this operation of law, Respondent
retains the right to have Petitioners'
residence sold in satisfaction of the bal-
ance purportedly owing on the aforesaid
state summary judgment. Petitioners are
therewith vested by 15 U.S.C. §1635(a)
with the right to rescind their credit
transaction herein with Respondent, and the
right to be notified by Respondent in the
promissory notes (RB(28a-47a)) of the par-
ticulars of their right to so rescind the
notes.
As Respondent has failed to make the
foregoing disclosures, Petitioners state a
claim by which relief can be granted pursu-
ant to 15 U.S.C. §1635.
IV. PETITIONERS STATE CLAIM UPON WHICH RE-
LIEF CAN BE GRANTED BY 42 U.S.C. §1983
Under color of unconstitutional and ul-
tra vires state statutes, executive actions
and judicial proceedings on record with the
Perkins County Circuit Court (Civ. 82-1030;
Cr. 85-03) and decisions of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court (584-00110) of South Dakota,
Respondent continues to deprive Petitioners
sle
of their rights under the U.S. Constitution:
to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures "" guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment ;
"of trial by jury" guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment; and
“of . . « liberty, or property,
without due process of law...
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
On this motion that this Court take
judicial] notice of the state criminal and
civil proceedings against Petitioners de-
scribed at pages 1-4, 7 supra, and on fur-
ther motion that their Complaint and prayers
for relief be hereby amended to conform with
facts and statutory claims of this brief and
any decision that may be forthcoming by this
Court; Petitioners pray that this Court:
(1) grant Petitioners’ hereby renewed:
(a) 12 December 1983 motion for
summary judgment in favor of Pe-
titioners against Respondent for
relief provided by 15 U.S.C.
§§1635, 1639, 1640 and 42 U.S.C.
§1983, and
(b) 12 December 1983 and 6 January
1984 motions to rescind and nullify
the credit transactions (RB(35a-47a))
and purported security agreements
(RB(19a-27a)) with Respondent, and
therewith
(2) remand Petitioners’ summary judg-
ment on matters of law back to the
U.S. District Court of South Dakota
for determination by trial of dam- .
age amounts Respondent is obligated
to pay Petitioners pursuant to 15
U.S.C. §§1635, 1639, 1640 and 42
U.S.C. §1983.
If this Court does not grant Petition-
ers' foregoing motions and prayer, Petition-
ers in the alternative pray that this Court
grant Petitioners’ petition for writ of cer-
tiorari to review the decisions by the U.S.
District Court of South Dakota and the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit dismissing Petitioners’ Complaint; and
award Petitioners their costs and disburse-
ments, together with any other relief which
the Court shall deem just and equitable
toward restoring Petitioners’ federal con-
stitutional and statutory rights in pursu-
ing their action herein.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of
September, 1985.
Richard Hopewell
Wesley D. Schmidt
[on the brief]
423 South Phillips Avenue
Sioux Falls, S. D. 57102
[605] 334-0982
Counsel for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On 20 September 1985 by first class
mail, postage prepaid, I served three copies
of this Petitioners’ Brief in Reply to
oitw
Respondent's Counsel of record:
Horace R. Jackson
Gene N. Lebrun
Lynn, Jackson, Shultz & Lebrun, P.C.
P.O. Box 8110
Rapid City, S.D. 57709
[605] 342-2592
Counsel for Respondent
/s/ Richard Hopewell
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.