Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dugger v. Delta Airlines

Supreme Court brief1985

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84- 1588 erTcus

APR 6 1985

NO.

AKEXANOER t. STEVAS

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

TERM 5

TEDDYE DUGGER, PETITIONER

DELTA AIRLINES, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM

THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS

Sonja L. Salo, Esquire

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 )

(404) 688-3085

eT SN, oR rath Ser aera ED a AA PT Tc NS

SR RR EE EE ELD DE ET ED

APPELLATE PRINTING SERVICES. INC. HERITAGE BLDG . RICHMOND. VA (804) 643-7789

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether Official Code of

Georgia Annotated §34-6A-1 et seq,

Georgia Equal Employment for the

Handicapped Act, when construed _= and

applied to permit an employer’ to

terminate a person who is injured on the

job and becomes handicapped without

allowing said person to bid for another

job position where the employer has

established intra-company job transfer

procedures for all employees, is a

denial of a handicapped person's rights

to equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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OPINION

The Superior Court of Fulton

County, Georgia on October 14, 1983,

Civil Action File No. C-89198, granted

Summary Judgment to the Defendant.

The Georgia Court of Appeals

on November 15, 1984, Case No. 68534,

affirmed the ruling of the Superior

Court of Fulton County, Georgia.

The Georgia Court of Appeals

on December 10, 1984, Case No. 68534,

denied the Appellant's Motion for

Reconsideration.

The Supreme Court of Georgia

on January 10, 1985, Case No. 41867,

denied the Appellant's Petition for Writ

of Certiorari.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Georgia

Court of Appeals was entered on November

15, 1984. A timely Motion’ for

Reconsideration was filed on November

26, 1984. On December 10, 1984 the

Georgia Court of Appeals denied the

Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 27, 1984 the Appellant filed

a Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme

Court of Georgia which was denied on

Janaury 10, 1985.

This Court's jurisdiction is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Official Code of Georgia

Annotated §34-6A-4. Georgia Equal

Employment fcr the Handicapped Code.

Refusal to hire, discharge of,

discrimination, etc, against

handicapped individuals;

refusal to refer handicapped

individuals for employment;

discrimination by labor

organizations; discrimination

in training programs;

discrimination in

advertisements for employment.

(a) No employer shall fail or

refuse to hire, discharge, or

discriminate against any handicapped

individual with respect to wages, rates

of pay, hours or other terms and

conditions of employment because of such

person's handicap unless such handicap

restricts that individual's ability to

engage in the particular job or

occupation for which he or she is

eligible; nor shall any employer limit,

segregate, or classify handicapped

individuals in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any

handicapped individual of employment

opportunities or otherwise affect

employee status because of such person's

handicap, unless such handicap

constitutes a bona fide and necessary

reason for such limitation, segregation,

or classification. This subsection

shall not be construed to require any

employer to modify his physical

facilities or grounds in any wayor

exercise a higher degree of caution for

a handicapped individual than for any

person who is not a_ handicapped

individual, nor shall this subsection be

construed to prohibit otherwise lawful

employment practices or requirements

merely because such practices or

requirements affect a greater proportion

of handicapped than nonhandicapped

individuals within the area from which

the employer customarily hires his

employees.

(b) No employment agency,

placement service, training school or

center, or labor organization shall fail

or refuse to refer for employment or

otherwise discriminate against

individuals because of their handicap.

shall exclude or expel from its

membership or otherwise disriminate

against individuals because of their

handicap; nor shall a labor crganization

limit, segregate, or classify its

membership or classify or fail or refuse

to refer for employment any handicapped

individual in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any

handicapped individual of employment

opportunities, would otherwise

affectsuch person's employee status or

employment applicant status, or would

adversely affect such person's wages,

hours, or conditions of employment

because of such person's handicap.

(d) No employer, labor

Organization, or joint labor-management

committee controlling apprenticeship

programs or other training or

retraining, including on-the-job

training programs, shall discriminate

against any individual because of such

individual's handicap, in the admission

to or the employment in any program

established to provide apprenticeship or

other training.

(e) It is discrimination for

an employer to print or publish or cause

to be printed or published a notice or

advertisement relating to employment by

such employer, which advertisement or

notice indicates any preference,

limitation, specification, or

discrimination based on handicap, except

that such notice or advertisement may

indicate a limitation or specification

based upon handicap if the criteria is

job related, (Coce 1933, §66-504,

enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 1803, §2.)

Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution:

"No state shall make 0or

enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law;

nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff/appellant was

Originally employed by the defendant

company in November of 1965 as a flight

attendant. During the course of her

employment she sustained two (2)

on-the-job back injuries wherein she was

placed on worker's compensation for an

extended period of time. As the result

of said injuries the plaintiff/appellant

became handicapped as defined in

0.C.G.A., §34-6A-2, and was unable to

return to her position as a flight

attendant.

At the time ° the

plaintiff/apellant was released to

return to work the defendant company had

a written policy which allowed all

employees the opportunity to bid for job

openings within the corporate structure,

extended sick leave policies and

retraining programs. The

plaintiff/appellant was not given an

Opportunity to review and bid _ for

current job openings within the

corporate structure and was told if she

did not accept a reservations clerk

position, in an area referred to as

"sick bay", at a lower rate of pay, she

would be terminated.

Under threat of termination,

the plaintiff/appellant accepted _ the

reservation clerk position and,

subsequently, twelve (12) days later was

terminated for excessive absenteeism.

The plaintiff/appellant had been an

employee of the defendant for sixteen

and one-half (16 1/2) years.

On July 13, 1982,

plaintiff/appellant filed this action

alieutes violations of the Georgia Equal

Employment for the Handicapped Act,

O.C.G.A., §34-6A-1, et seq, in that she

was discriminated against because of her

handicap basing said act of

discrimination on the fact that she was

not given an opportunity to bid for

Other job openings within the corporate

structure for which she was eligible,

not given an opportunity to procure

extended sick leave and not given an

Opportunity for retraining, employment

Opportunities given to non-handicapped

employees.

Discovery was initiated and

the defendant refused to produce

information which would prove that the

defendant company denied to the

plaintiff/appellant equal employment

opportunities. A Motion to Compel was

filed by the plaintiff/appellant and

prior to ruling on said Motion’ the

Superior Court of Fulton County = on

October 14, 1983 granted Summary

Judgment to the defendant, interpreting

O.C.G.A. §34-6A-4(a) as not requiring

the employer to consider a handicapped

individual for each and every position

that she may be arguably qualified to

£iil.

From the inception of this

case the plaintiff/appellant has

contended, via complaint, Motions to

Compel, Response to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment, Appeal to the

Georgia Court of Appeals, Motion for

Rehearing and Petition for Certiorari to

the Supreme Court of Georgia, that she

was being denied equal protection of the

law.

The decision of the Georgia

Court of Appeals is, on its’ face,

denying to the handicapped employees of

the State of Georgia the same employment

Opportunities as non-handicapped

emplyees.

Specifically, the Georgia

Court of Appeals held that if a person

is injured on the job, and_ becomes

handicapped as a result of said injury

and can no longer perform the job he was

doing at the time of the injury, that

the employer, who has~ established

intra-company job transfers for

non-handicapped employees, is under no

obligation to allow that person an

Opportunity to bid for another position

within the company which he may be

eligible to fill.

The Supreme Court of Georgia

refused to grant Certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The question sought to be

reviewed is one of general impoicance to

all handicapped persons in the State of

Georgia and the United States.

If the decision of the Georgia

Court of Appeals in the case at bar is

allowed to stand, handicapped persons in

the State of Georgia will be denied the

same employment Opportunities as

non-handicapped individuals.

The Georgia Court of Appeals

in its decision in the case at bar on

first impression interpreted 0.C.G.A.

§34-6A-4 as a balancing of interests of

society in providing an opportunity for

handicapped people to work, and the

interests of the employer to maintain

freedom to hire and maintain employees

who can best perform the duties of a

particular job.

There can be no question that

the interest of an employer to maintain

freedom to hire and maintain employees

who can best perform the duties of a

particular job is a valid consideration,

however, where the employer provides

intra-company job transfers to

non-handicapped employees and the

handicapped employee may be “eligible”

to perform the duties of a different job

than the particular job he held at the

time he was injured and became

handicapped, the interests of society in

providing an opportunity for handicapped

persons to work mandates the handicapped

person be given equal employment

opportunities.

The Georgia Court of Appeals

by it's decision in the case at bar is

allowing employers of the State of

Georgia to use a person's body until it

becomes "mangled and worn" and_ then

‘discard the “mangled and worn" body if

he can no longer perform the job he had

at the time of the injury, thereby

disallowing him the same employment

opportunities as non-handicapped

employees.

The plaintiff/appellant was

not in the lower Court and is not in

this Court asking that the Courts

mandate that the employers of the State

of Georgia exercise a greater degree of

caution in regard to handicapped people,

she is merely asking the Court to

guarantee to handicapped persons equal

employment opportunities to enable the

handicapped individuals’ the fullest

participation in the social and economic

life of this country and their right to

engage in remunerative employment.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of

Certiorari should issue to review the

judgment of the Georgia Court of

Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

ace i;

fn. va ae

SONJA L. SALO

ATTORNEY FOR

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30393

(404) 688-3085

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF FULTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have

this date served a true copy of the

within and foregoing Petition for Writ

of Certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court upon Hunter Hughes, Esq.,

by depositing same in the United States

Mail in an envelope with sufficient

postage thereon and properly addressed

as follows:

Hunter Hughes, Esq. Gregory Riggs, Esq.

Rogers & Hardin Delta Airlines, Inc.

32nd Floor Law Department

101 Marietta Tower Hartsfield Atlanta

Atlanta, Ga. 30335 International Airport

Atlanta, Georgia

30335

This the Aé day of beg .

1985. f/ at ay,

Pi oo

, ae,

SONJA/L. SALO

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 688-3085

APPENDIX

Pein

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

TEDDYE DUGGER, § CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, § CASE NO. C-89198

vs. §

DELTA AIR LINES, §

IMC ss §

Defendant. §

ORDER

The within and foregoing MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT has been brought

before this court by defendant DELTA

AIR LINES, INC.

After hearing the motion and con-

sidering the argument of counsel and

reviewing all appropriate material, the

court finds as follows:

Plaintiff was originally employed

by defendant in November 1965 as a

flight attendant.

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

On March 10, 1979 plaintiff suf-

fered a back injury while in the course

of her employment.

On November 10, 1980 plaintiff

reinjured her back while riding in a

limousine resulting in the loss of 76

working days in 1980, 365 working days

in 1981 and 105 working days up to

April 1982.

Since plaintiff was determined to

be physically unable to resume her

duties as flight attendant defendant

offered plaintiff the position of

Reservations Clerk indicating refusal

to accept the position would ultimately

led to plaintiff's termination.

Plaintiff returned to work on

April 15 as a Reservations Clerk.

secon A CAN LRTI i Cie ie ae ORLA Tigo

bd tri ne New seme

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

Defendant shows that a work sta-

tion was set up for plaintiff to allow

her to work while either standing or

sitting and that plaintiff was further

authorized to lie down for up to 1 3/4

hours each day.

Defendant further shows that by

2:00 p.m. on each working day plaintiff

was in substantial pain.

On April 27, 1982 plaintiff was

asked to resign due to poor dependabil-

ity; upon plaintiff's refusal to resign

her employment was terminated.

Defendant shows that at the time

of her termination, plaintiff was phy-

Sically unable to perform her job.

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

Plaintiff was subsequently

adjudged totally disabled at the time

of discharge by the State Board of

Workers Compensation.

Plaintiff filed her complaint

claiming that her termination was in

violation of the Georgia Equal Employ-

ment for the handicap code, O.C.G.A.

34-6A-1.

Defendant asks the court to grant

the subject motion on the grounds that

plaintiff has no claim under the

Georgia Equal Employment for the

Handicapped Code.

The only issues of fact material

to a resolution the present motion

involves facts relevant to defendant's

compliance with the handicap statute.

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

According to 0.C.G.A. 34-6A-4(a)

no employer shall ... discharge ... any

handicapped individual ... because of

such person's handicap unless such

handicap restricts that individuals

ability to engage in the particular job

Or occupation for which he or she is

eligible ... nor shall this subsection

be construed to prohibit otherwise

lawful employment practices or require-

ments merely because such practices or

requirements affect a greater pro-

portion of handicapped that non-handi-

capped individuals".

This statute clearly allows an

employer to discharge an individual

because of his handicap if that handi-

cap restricts the ability to engage in

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

the particular job for which the indi-

vidual i eligible. The plaintiff has

cited as a disputed issue whether there

were other positions within defendant

company which plaintiff could perform.

Such an issue is not material to the

case and therefore need not be con-

sidered by the court in regard to the

subject motion. The defendant's con-

tention as to other issues not directly

related to the requirement of the

Statute are similarly without merit.

The only factual issue material to the

case involve whether in fact the plain-

tiff's ability to perform was restrict-

ed as to the particular job in ques-

tion.

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

Plaintiff contends that there is a

material issue of fact as to whether

she was physically capable of perform-

ing "a job for which she was eligible".

However plaintiff has substantially

misstated the issue since the statute

required that the individual be capable

of performing "the particular job or

occupation for which he or she is

eligible” rather than "a job" as plain-

tiff has stated. The distinction is

Significant since the statute does not

require the employer to consider the

handicap individual for each and every

position that he may arguably be quali-

fied to fill; the statute only seeks to

prohibit action by the employer against

the handicapped where the employees

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

handicap does not restrict her ability

to perform the specific job for which

she is eligible.

Upon consideration of the relevant

facts, the court concludes that there

is no issue of material fact in this

case. The law governing this case as

set forth in 0.C.G.A. 34-6A-4(a)

requires a determination as to whether

the facts demonstrate that plaintiff's

handicap restricted her ability to do

the particular job in question. Defen-

dant has shown by plaintiff's deposi-

tion that plaintiff's condition did in

fact severely restrict her ability to

perform her particular job assignment.

In the absence of some showing to the

contrary, the court must conclude that

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

plaintiff's condition did substantially

restrict her ability to perform her job

and therefore, that defendant's dis-

charge of plaintiff was not in viola-

tion of the Georgia Equal Employment

. for the Handicapped Code, 0.C.G.A. 34-

6A-1.

THEREFORE, defendant's MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT is hereby granted.

This the 14th day of Oct., 1983.

ISAAC JENRETTE

JUDGE SUPERIOR COURT

ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Copies: Pl's Atty: Sonja L. Salo

Suite 970 Sussex

Place

148 International

Blvd.

Atlanta, GA 30303

ss iaiecaeiiiaeaneeeiaiaeiiaaiialiaaan

CIVIL ACTION

CASE NO. C-89198

Def's Atty: Hunter R. Hughes

Rogers & Hardin

Thirty-Second Floor

101 Marietta Tower

Atlanta, GA 30335

Gregory L. Riggs

Delta Airlines,

Inc.

Law Department

Hartsfield Atlanta

International

Airport

Atlanta, GA 30320

GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS

68534. DUGGER v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.

P-114

POPE, Judge.

Appellant Teddye Dugger brought

Suit against appellee Delta Air Lines,

Inc., her former employer, alleging

that Delta had violated the Georgia

Equal Employment for the Handicapped

Code, OCGA Ch. 34-6A. She claimed that

Delta had discriminated against her by

discharging her because of her handi-

cap. After a period of discovery,

Delta moved for summary judgment which

was granted by the trial court.

The record shows that Dugger had

been employed by Delta for a number of

years as a flight attendant. Dugger

injured her back on the job in March

1979 and reinjured it in work-related

activity in November 1980. As a result

of these injuries, Dugger missed work

for approximately the next year and a

half. During this period Dugger

received workers’ compensation bene-

fits, medical payments, accident pay,

sick pay, vacation pay, and supplement-

al disability payments from Delta, the

total of which exceeded $45,000. When

it became apparent that Dugger was, and

for the foreseeable future would be,

unable to resume her duties as a flight

attendant, Delta offered her a position

as a reservations clerk. Although

reservations clerks ordinarily perform

their duties while seated and work a

routine eight-hour day, Delta made the

following arrangements to accommodate

Dugger's physical disability. Dugger's

work station was arranged so that she

could perform the job while sitting or

while standing in order to decrease the

fatigue and pain caused by her injured

back. In addition, Dugger was given

permission to use a bed provided by

Delta to lie down for up to 1-3/4 hours

per work day. During the eight days

Dugger was employed as a reservations

clerk, she missed four days due to

illness and appointments associated

with her back injury. She testified

that by 2:00 p.m. of each day she

worked, she was in extreme pain. She

further testified that at the time she

held the reservations clerk job she

felt she was totally disabled from

working in the position.

OCGA § 34-6A-4(a) reads as fol-

lows:

"No employer shall fail or refuse

to hire, discharge, or discriminate

against any handicapped individual with

respect to wages, rates of pay, hours,

or other terms and conditions of

employment because of such person's

handicap unless such handicap restricts

that individual's ability to engage in

the particular job or occupation for

which he or she is eligible; nor shall

any employer limit, segregate, or

classify handicapped individuals in any

way which would deprive or tend to

deprive any handicapped individual of

employment opportunities or otherwise

effect employee status because of such

person's handicap, unless such handicap

constitutes a bona fide and necessary

reason for such limitation, segrega-

tion, or classification. This subsec-

tion shall not be construed to require

any employer to modify his physical

facilities or grounds in any way or

exercise a higher degree of caution for

a handicapped individual than for any

person who is not a handicapped indivi-

dual, nor shall this subsection be

construed to prohibit otherwise lawful

employment practices or requirements

merely because such practices or

requirements affect a greater propor-

tion of handicapped than nonhandicapped

individuals within the area from which

the employer customarily hires his

employees." It is this statute which

Dugger alleges Delta violated in dis-

charging her from the job as a reserva-

tions clerk. Dugger alleges that Delta

had a duty under the statute to provide

her with the opportunity to select

another job within Delta for which she

was eligible. She contends that such

jobs exist and that she was and is

eligible to fill them. We find several

problems with this reading of the

statute and with her contentions in

conjunction with the facts in the

record.

The statute is obviously a balanc-

ing of the interests of society in

providing an opportunity for handi-

capped people to work, and the inter-

ests of employers to maintain the

freedom to hire and maintain employees

who can best perform the duties of a

particular job. Employers are not

~m«cequired to modify facilities or to

exercise a greater degree of caution in

discharge was simply the result of the

handicap uncoupled with inability to do

that particular job.

The record before us shows that

Dugger could not perform consistently

in the job of reservations clerk

because of her persistent back pain, in

spite of Delta's modification of her

work station and other accommodations

voluntarily made by Delta. On the

record before us, we find that Delta

did not violate OCGA § 34-6A-4(a) in

discharging Dugger. Although Dugger

claims that Delta discriminated against

her by not allowing her additional sick

leave, or to bid on other jobs or an

opportunity to train for a different

job, she has produced no evidence to

rebut Delta's evidence that she was

treated in the same manner as any other

Delta employee would be under the same

regard to a handicapped worker than

would be done for an able-bodied

worker. An employer simply must not

discriminate in employment decisions

unless the person's handicap restricts

his or her "ability to engage in the

particular job or occupation for which

he or she is eligible." An employer is

not required under this law to hire or

maintain a person who cannot perform

the duties of the job because of that

person's handicap. In a case such as

the one at bar, which involves dis-

charge, the word "eligible" in the

Statute must necessarily refer to the

particular job held by the individual

before discharge. Thus, the material

issue to be determined is whether the

individual was discharged because of an

inability to perform the job held as a

result of the handicap, or whether the

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circumstances. "When a motion for

Summary judgment is submitted and

Supported by evidence, the adverse

party may not rest his case as made but

must set forth specific facts and

present his case in full in order to

show there is a genuine issue of trial.

[Cits.]" Alghita v. Universal

Investment & Mfg. Co., 167 Ga. App.

562, 566-567 (307 SE2d 99)(1983).

Therefore, we find that the trial court

did not err in granting Summary judg-

ment to Delta. |

Judgment affirmed. Banke, P. J.,

and Benham, J., concur.

IN THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF GEORGIA

TEDDYE DUGGER, §

Plaintiff/ §

Appellant, §

vs. § CASE NO.: 68534

DELTA AIR LINES, §

INC., §

Defendant/ §

Appellee. §

MOTION FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW the Appellant, in the

above styled case, by and through her

attorney, Sonja L. Salo, pursuant to

Rule 48 of the Rules of the Court of

Appeals of the State of Georgia, and

moves this Honorable Court to recon-

sider the decision entered on November

15, 1984. The Appellant states that

the Court has overlooked a material

fact, and erroneously construed

a i, iil ha ae

O.C.G.A. §34-6A. In Support thereof

the Applicant attaches a Brief in

Support of Motion for Rehearing.

WHEREFORE, the Appellant Prays to

this Honorable Court to grant the

Appellant's Motion for Rehearing and

reconsider their decision based on the

Brief and evidence filed and the

attached Brief.

Respectfully Submitted,

SONJA L. SALO

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 688-3085

IN THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF GEORGIA

TEDDYE DUGGER, §

Plaintiff/ §

Appellant, §

vs. § CASE NO.: 68534

DELTA AIR LINES, §

INC., §

Defendant/ §

Appellee. §

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appel-

lant certifies to this Court that after

careful examination of the opinion of

this Court rendered on November 15,

1984 in the above styled case, counsel

believes that a fact was overlooked by

this Court and the Court erroneously

construed and misapplied 0.C.G.A. §34-

6A to the facts of this case.

SONJA L. SALO

Sworn to and Subscribed

Before Me this 26th day

of Nov. 1984.

NOTARY PUBLIC

IN THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF GEORGIA

TEDDYE DUGGER, §

Plaintiff/ §

Appellant, §

vs. § CASE NO.: 68534

DELTA AIR LINES, §

INC., §

Defendant/ §

Appellee. §

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REHEARING

I. THE APPELLANT COURT HAS

OVERLOOKED A MATERIAL FACT.

In this Court's Opinion of Novem-

ber 15, 1984, the Court has stated that

the material issue to be determined,

where it has been alleged that the

Defendant violated 0.C.G.A. § 34-6A et

seq., is “whether the individual was

discharged because of an inability to

perform the job held as a result of the

handicap, or whether the discharge was

simply the result of the handicap

uncoupled with the inability to do the

particular job.”

This case came before the Georgia

Court of Appeals on an appeal based on

the lower Court granting the Defen-

dant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In

relying on a Motion for Summary Judg-

ment, the Court does not try the case

but merely determines from the record

whether there are any genuine issues of

fact. Flander v. Columbia Nitrogen

Corp., 135 Ga. App. 21, 217 SE 2d 363

(1975). Any doubt must be resolved in

favor of the respondent, Boston Inc.

Co. v. Barnes, 120 App. 585, 171 SE 2d

626 (1969), even if the respondent

would have the burden of proof at

trial. Whitehead v. Capital Auto Co.,

239 Ga. 640, 238 SE 2d 104 (1977).

Major issues as to the Plaintiff/

Appellant's physical condition at the

time of her termination, whether she

was Classified or segregated in any way

which would tend to deprive her of

employment opportunities to affect her

employee status because of her handi-

cap, and whether she was given the same

treatment as non-handicapped indivi-

duals still remain on this case.

In the "Plaintiff's Reply to

Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's

Response to Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment", the Plaintiff/

Appellant submitted evidence to the

lower Covrt, exhibit A, which was a

portion of testimony given by Pauline

Collier, Reservations Clerk Supervisor

for Delta Airlines (Attached hereto for

the Court's convenience) wherein

Pauline Collier stated that there are

minimum standards of productivity and

that the Plaintiff/Appellant was one of

the best ones she had regardless of the

fact she (Plaintiff) was in excruciat-

ing pain.

In Plaintiff's Brief in Response

and Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment, exhibit 2, Dr. C.

David Scheibert, neurologist, (Attached

hereto for the Court's convenience)

indicates that she was capable of

working and her work activity would

increase within 2 months.

ISSUE OF FACT: Was the Plaintiff/

Appellant terminated because she could

not perform the job as a reservations

clerk, or was she terminated because

she was a handicapped individual

uncoupled with her ability to perform

the job?

In the opinion written by this

Court, the Court has stated that tne

Plaintiff/Appellant has produced no

evidence to rebut Delta's evidence that

she was treated in the same manner as

any other Delta employee would be under

the same circumstances, therein defeat-

ing her claim that she was discriminat-

ed against by not allowing her addi-

tional sick leave, or to bid on other

jobs or an opportunity to train for a

different iob. The Court further

stated that there was a “period of

discovery" prior to Delta moving for

Summary Judgment and when a Motion for

Summary Judgment is submitted and

supported by evidence, the adverse

party may not rest his case as made but

must set forth specific facts and

present his case in full in order to

show there is a genuine issue of trial.

Prior to the Defendant filing a

Motion for Summary Judgment, on or

about March 3, 1983, the Plaintiff/

Appellant filed Requests for Production

of Documents, (Attached hereto for the

Court's convenience) wherein the Plain-

tift/Ropetiant, among other things,

requested that the Defendant produce

the "Standard Practice Handbook" which

would be used as evidence to show

disparate treatment in that non-handi-

capped employees were allowed certain

sick leave, bidding rights and addi-

tional job training. The Defendant, on

or about the 5th day of April, 1983

filed their objections claiming that

the documents requested were irrelevant

to the subject matter of this section.

(Attached hereto for the Court's con-

venience).

On May 9, 1983 the Plaintiff filed

a Motion to Compel. Prior to the lower

Court ruling on the Plaintiff's Motion

to Compel, the Defendant filed his

Motion for Summary Judgment and the

Court granted same on October 14, 1983

without ruling on the Plaintiff's

Motion tc Compel.

0.C.GA- §15-6-21(b) states:

TIME FOR DECIDING MOTIONS;

FILING AND NOTIFICATION;

NONCOMPLIANCE GROUNDS OF

IMPEACHMENT:

In all counties with

more than 100,000 inhabi-

tants, it shall be the duty

of the judge of the superior,

state, or city court, unless

providentially hindered or

unless counsel for the Plain-

tiff and the Defendant agree

in writing to extend the

time, to decide promptly,

within 90 days after the same

have been argued before him

Or submitted to him without

argument, all Motions for new

trial, injunctions, demur-

rers, and all other motions

of any nature.

Had the \lower Court ruled on the

Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Compel

holding that the material sought was

"not relevant", then the lower Court

would have been reversed by this Court

as the evidence is in fact relevant to

the determination of disparate treat-

ment. Had the lower Court ruled on the

Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Compel

holding that the material sought was in

fact relevant, then the Plaintiff/

Appellant could have submitted to the

Court additional evidence to raise a

material issues of fact.

The Plaintiff/Appellant is caught

in a position where one Court, contrary

to the laws of the State of Georgia,

has failed to rule on a Motion to

Compel and now this Court is using the

lower Court's refusal to act against

the Plaintiff/Appellant as a basis to

affirm the granting of the Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment. Have the

scales of justice become so unbalanced?

Because we do not have before us

the "Standard Practice Handbook" which

would show the number of sick days

given employees, the sick leave proce-

dures, whether an employee is suspended

prior to termination, whether an

employee may bid or retrain for other

positions, whether the Reservations

Clerk Department is in fact a "Sick

bay" used to segregate ill and handi-

capped employees, there is no way to

make a determination as to whether the

Plaintiff/Appellant was treated in the

Same manner as non-handicapped employ-

ees under the same circumstances.

The Court's failure to rule on the

Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Compel,

coupled with the statement of the

Plaintiff/Appellant's supervisor,

Surely indicate issues of fact as to

whether the Plaintiff/Appellant was

discharged because vof an inability to

perform the job held as a result of the

handicap, or whether the discharge was

Simply the result of the handicap

uncoupled with the inability to do that

particular job.

II. THE APPELLANT COURT HAS

ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED

O.C.G.A. §34-6A et seq.

This Court had held that an

employer is not required under 0O.C.G.A.

§36-6A et seq. to'hire or maintain a

person who cannot perform the duties of

the job because of that person's handi-

cap, and that the word "eligible"

refers to the particular job held by

the individual before discharge. How-

ever, in this same opinion this Court

has stated that 0O.C.G.A. §34-6A et seq.

is obviously a balancing of interests

of society in providing an opportunity

for handicapped people to work, and the

interests of employers to maintain the

freedom to hire and maintain employees

who can best perform the duties of a

particular job.

There can be no question under

that theory that an employer should not

be straddled with an employee who

becomes "mangled and worn", however,

the purpose and intent of O.C.G.A.

§34-6A et seq. is to guarantee to the

handicapped individuals the fullest

participation in the social and econo-

mic life of the state and to guarantee

their right to engage in remunerative

employment. The very basis of the

Georgia Equal Employment Opportunity

for the Handicapped Act is to provide

equal treatment for the handicapped.

Where a corporation provides job

transfers to all non-handicapped

employees who wish to change jobs

within the corporate structure, then to

deny a handicapped person the same

opportunities is on its face discrimin-

ation and in direct violation of

O.C.G.A. §34-6A et seq.

In the case at bar, the Plaintiff/

Appellant was not requesting that

facilities be modified or that the

Defendant exercise a greater degree of

caution in regard to her than non-

handicapped employees.

By interpreting 0O.C.G.A. §34-6A et

seq., as stated in this Court's opinion

of November 15, 1984, the Court is not

only allowing an employer to use a

person's body until it becomes mangled

and worn and discard that person like

an old shoe, but they are also foster-

ing employment practices which allow

employers of this state to provide

greater benefits to non-handicappeGd

Diiiiii cr

employees than are provided to handi-

capped employees. Again, have the

scales of justice become so unbalanced?

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing

argument, the Plaintiff/Appellant Prays

that this Honorable Court reconsider

their decision of November 15, 1984,

reverse the Trial Court and remand the

case for trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

SONJA L. SALO

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

—ss ow

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this

date served a true copy of the within

and foregoing Motion for Rehearing with

Brief in Support thereof upon Hunter

Hughes, Esq., by depositing same in the

United States Mail in an envelope with

sufficient postage thereon and properly

addressed as follows:

~~ 0 ee ee ee

Hunter Hughes, Esq.

Rogers and Hardin

32nd Floor

101 Marietta Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30335

This the 26th day of Nov., 1984.

SONJA L. SAL ¥

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Feb. 10, 1982

Wausau Ins. Companies

P.O. Box 105067

Atlanta, Ga. 30348

ATTN: Linda Lee

RE: Teddye J. Dugger

Delta Airlines, Inc.

Accident Date: Nov. 10, 1980

Claim Number: D66-147502

Dear Ms. Lee,

Ms. Teddye Dugger has stated that she

had a past fall and another episode of

low back pain some years before her

present problem and further details may

be obtained from her. From her history

there was no lasting problem nor any

known impairment or subsequent diffi-

culty until the onset of her problem

while working with Delta Airlines.

Since seen on Jan. 18, 1982 Ms. Dugger

has announced that she wishes to return

to work with Delta Airlines on or about

Feb. 15, 1982.

In consideration of her illness and

present neurological state it is felt

that her medical impairment of the body

as a whole is approximately 10%.

It has been stated in December and

January 1982 that it is felt that this

patient is capable of light work activ-

ity and this would be presumed to mean

lifting in proper position limited to

20 pounds weight for the next 1 to 2

months followed by a gradual increase

RE: Teddye J. Dugger

to lifting in proper position without

flexing the back up to as much as 40

pounds if required but not on a repeti-

tive basis. In addition, the patient

has done well as far as maintaining a

more normal weight and will continue to

avoid flexion of the back. She is also

to remain on a walking and exercise

program. The patient also states that

she is at this time able to be in an

active state for approximately 4 to 5

hours at which time she has increasing

discomfort as previously noted. This

responds well to a short rest period of

1/2 hour to 45 minutes according to her

statement and she can then continue a

second 4 hour period of activity. With

chis information you and Delta Airlines

can decide whether or not she can

function in a capacity that is of

service to them. It is anticipated

that with the passage of one to two

months that the patient will be able to

increase work activity with lifting

limited in proper position to 40 pounds

as noted above. There are no other

suggestions at this time and it is felt

that this framework will allow decision

as to the patient's work position and

RE: Teddye J. Dugger

hopefully ability to progress to moder-

ate activity as described.

Sincerely,

C. David Scheibert, M.D.

CDS/lc

cc: Delta Airlines

Dr. John Johnson

Atty. Richard Lodge

mail? Are there any numbers that

you deal with in what you expect

your people to do?

Yes, sir; there are minimum

standards of productivity.

How did she do?

She was one of the best ones I

had.

Did she complain about any pain

while she was on the job?

Yes, she did tell me about

excruciating pain she was exper-

iencing.

MR. MCDONALD: That's all I have.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. SALO:

Ms. Collier, you stated she

indicated on April the 15th, 1982

that she was not prepared to work

that day?

Yes.

Q Was she to report to work that

day?

A I have no idea. Ms. Dugger

advised me that she did not come

to work, she came for an interview

or she came to try to see one of

our vice-presidents. She had no

idea that she was going to be

assigned to work that day.

Q When were you notified by anyone

‘ with Delta that she was to work

for you?

A That day after she arrived.

Q She had come to your office prior

to your receiving any

«¢3-

EXHIBIT "A"

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

TEDDYE DUGGAR,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION FILE

vs. NO. C-89198

DELTA AIR LINES,

INC.,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AND CONTINUING

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Georgia

Civil Practices Act, the plaintiff,

Teddye Dugger (hereinafter referred to

as “Dugger") hereby requests that the

defendant, Delta Airlines, Inc. (here-

inafter referred to as "Delta"),

produce the following documents at

10:00 a.m., on the llth day of April,

1983, for inspectivn and copying at the

offices of Sonja L. Salo, Suite 970,

Sussex Place, 148 International

Boulevard, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, or

at such other place and time as may be

mutually agreed upon by counsel.

This Request for Production of

Documents shall be deemed continuing to

the fullest extent permitted by the

Georgia Civil Practices Act.

DEFINITIONS

1. As used herein, the "plain-

tiff" shall mean Teddye Dugger, her

agents, representatives, attorneys and

assigns.

2. As used herein, "defendant"

refers to Delta Airlines, Inc., its

officers, directors, employees, agents,

representatives and attorneys.

3. As used herein, “person” shall

mean any individual, firm, partnership,

corporation, proprietorship, govern-

mental body or entity, business asso-

ciation or other entity or organiza-

tion.

4. As used herein, "document"

shall mean any tangible thing in or

upon which information is or may be

stored or transmitted, including

without limitation any book, letter,

memorandum, report, inter- or intra-

office communication, working paper,

draft, tape, disk or other data of any

kind or description.

DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED

Any and all written memoranda from

any department head within the Delta

corporation to the Delta Personnel

Department in reference to job openings

within the respective departments from

August, 1981 to April 15, 1982.

"Job Openings Bulletins" from

August, 1981 to April 15, 1982.

Titles and descriptions of all job

openings within the Delta Corporation

from August, 1981 to April 15, 1982.

Any and all correspondence between

Employee Services and Department Heads,

Employment and the Manager of Equal

Opportunity, stating whether a particu-

lar job opening during August 1981 to

April 15, 1982 should be open for bid.

All bids submitted by employees

for job openings from August, 1981 to

April 15, 1982.

Copies of any and all tests

administered to applicants for employ-

ment or administered to employees

seeking or under consideration for

transfer from August, 1981 to April 15,

1982.

Employee files for the following:

Lavern R. Rukensall

Rubin J. Jordan

Cornelius Hill

John Evers

Ann Benguria

Carl Fowler

Catherine Copeland

Reba Nash

Julius Bryan

Marc Gahala

Amly McCure

Gail Rollins

Denise Dixon

Carlos Armstead

Gary Hamilton

Dawn Zormeier

Kevin Gooding

Thomas R. Carnal

Richard Connor

James V. Wiggins

Sheryl Wilson

Tricia McGill

Deborah Harkness

Jerome Moore

Treslie Dixon

Ronald Jones

Cynthia Schiller

Claudia Morgan

Virginia Brent

Theodore B. King

Gary L. Meade

Celic F. Doyle

Leon Smith

Cynthia Cochrane

Judy Ott

Patsy Yancey

Lucic Callahan

Edward Robinson

Harry Curtis

Wayne Newell

Cathy Adams

Luther Young

Edgar Boone

Cheryle Beals

Erick Tautzenhiser

Norman King

Cynthia Brown

Patricia Phillips

Ann Pullen

Brian Alford

John Eivers

Kathleen Dillon

Cherisse E. Means

Terri C. Tee

Debra Wonder

Dorothy Dollar

Albertis Timmons

Michelle Broome

Eric Hartenstein

Deborah Tisdale

Marvin Yates

Teri Christian

Kathy Dykes

William E. Mielke

L. C. Jackson

Samuel Mattson

Jenc Mullin

Lovi Wilson

Claire Joyce

Natalie Ghanatchis

George Cooper

Gloria Davis

Marcia Norwicki

Joseph Porter

Barbara Dale

Rollie Smith

Carlos Walladores

William C. Norris

Janette Hart

Franklin Bussey

Vickie Mason

David Hunter

Carlyss Conners

Holly Bennett

Philip Culotta

Vincent Cinguemoni

Jon Ellsworth

Siglinde Jackson

Vansita Anthony

Robert Farley

Cynthia Brown

Hughey Billups

Ann Hammonds

Benjamin McFelding

Kathy Dicorte

Lou Goldstein

Tom Montayre

Cris Frauley

Sue Wammock

Corlyss Connors

Charles Gardner

Siglinda Jackson

Sandra Noojin

Billie Anderson

Louise Pelicone

Eric Johnson

Olivia Sange

Bruce Carter

Elaine Ludwiczck

Joyce Grundon

Robert T. Hancock

Charlene Pickett

Card Wiiliams

Gary D. Nicholson

Carolyn Gilmore

Evelyn C. Thomas

Karen Nance

Cyunthia Anderson

Willie F. Russell

James H. Rogers

Ronald Nall

Stephanie Speir

Pamela Parker

Edward O'Hearn

Wenita DeSpot

Marian Wells

Joe Vance

Donna Crane

Steve Daniels

Teddye Dugger

A copy of Delta's Affirmative

Action Plan for the handicapped.

A list of all job openings within

Delta Corporation not otherwise listed

under the Job Openings Bulletin from

August, 1981 to April 15, 1982.

10.

Any and all documentation reflect-

ing criteria for obtaining leave of

absence for personal reasons or physi-

cal reasons.

ll.

Flight Attendant Handbook.

12.

Standard Practice Handbook.

13.

Employment files of all persons

transferred within the Delta corpora-

tion from August, 1981 to April 15,

1982.

14.

Any and all written correspondence

between In-Flight Service Department

and Manager - Equal Opportunity con-

cerning Teddye Dugger.

15.

Any and all written correspondence

between the Reservations Department and

the Manager of Equal Opportunity

concerning Teddye Dugger.

SONJA L. SALO

Counsel for Plaintiff

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Boulevard

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

404/688-3085

-~ STATE OF~GEORGIA

COUNTY OF FULTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ate ab iA

This is to certify that I have

this day served counsel for the oppos-

ing party in the foregoing matter with

6 APSE tat a EAI ET y

a copy of the Plaintiff's Second and

Continuing Request for Production of

Documents, by depositing the same in |

the United States Mail, properly sealed

and stamped.

This the 3 day of March, 1983.

SONJA L. SALO

Counsel for Plaintiff

Suite 970, Sussex Place

148 International Boulevard |

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 :

404/688-3085

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

TEDDYE DUGGAR,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION FILE

vs. NO. C-89198

DELTA AIR LINES,

INC.,

ee eee eee ee ee

Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS

TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AND CONTINUING

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

COMES NOW Defendant, Delta Air

Lines, Inc. ("Delta") and files the

following responses to Plaintiff's

Second and continuing Request for

Production of Documents:

GENERAL OBJECTIONS

To the extent that any of the

Plaintiff's Second Continuing Requests

for Production seek information that is

privileged or that is subject to the

attorney-work product doctrine, Delta

objects to the production of such

documents. Delta further objects to

the production of any documents at the

offices of counsel for Plaintiff.

Delta will produce those documents as

indicated below in its Responses to

each Request at the General Offices of

Delta Air Lines, Atlanta, Georgia.

Delta hereby incorporates by

reference these General Objections into

each of its responses to Plaintiff's 15

Requests.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for any and all written memor-

anda from any department head within

Delta Air Lines to the Deita Personnel

Department in reference to job openings

within the respective departments from

August 1981 to April 15, 1982, on the

grounds that the documentation sought

is irrelevant to the subject matter of

this action and is not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence, and that the

production of such documents would be

unduly burdensome and oppressive.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for production of "Job Openings

Bulletins" from August 1981 to April

15, 1982 on the grounds that the |

documentation sought is irrelevant to

the subject matter of this action and

is not reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence.

This Request is also objected to on the

grounds that it is vague and ambiguous.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for all bids submitted by

employees for job openings from August

1981 to April 15, 1982 on the grounds

that the documentation sought is

irrelevant to the subject matter of

this action and is not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence, and that the

production of such documents would be

unduly burdensome and oppressive.

Delta also objects on the grounds that

as written the request is ambiguous and

subject to numerous interpretations.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for copies of any and all tests

administered to applicants for employ-

ment or administered to employees

seeking or under consideration for

transfer from August 1981 to April 15,

1982 on the grounds that the documenta-

tion sought is irrelevant to the

subject matter of this action and is

not reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence,

and that the production of such docu-

ments would be unduly burdensome and

oppressive. Delta will produce the

requalification materials related to

the Plaintiff's qualification as a

Delta flight attendant.

Delta agrees to make available to

Plaintiff and her attorney, at Delta's

General Offices, at a reasonable time

to be determined by agreement of the

parties, relevant, nonprivileged

portions of Delta's personnel files on

the persons listed in Request No. 7 of

Plaintiff's Second and Continuing

Request for Production of Documents.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for production of a copy of

Delta's Affirmative Action Plan for the

handicapped (a document required by

Federal law) on the grounds that the

documentation sought is irrelevant tot

he subject matter of this action and is

not reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence.

Delta further objects to the production

of this documentation on the grounds

that it is privileged and is not

subject to discovery as a matter of

public policy.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for production of a list of all

job openings with Delta Air Lines not

otherwise listed under the Job Openings

Bulletin from August 1981 to April 15,

1982 on the grounds that the documenta-

tion sought is irrelevant tc the

subject matter of this action and is

not reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence.

The request is objected to on the

grounds that it would be unduly burden-

some and oppressive to produce such

documents. The Request as written is

also objected to on the grounds that it

is ambiguous.

10.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for production of any and all

documentation reflecting criteria for

obtaining leave of absence for personal

reasons or physical reasons on the

grounds that the request is vague and

overbroad; that much of the documenta-

tion sought is irrelevant to the

subject matter of this action and is

not reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence;

and further, that the production of

such documentation would be unduly

burdensome and oppressive. Delta

agrees to make available to Plaintiff

and her attorney, at Delta's General

Offices at a reasonable time to be

determined by agreement of the parties,

those portions of Delta's Standard

Practices which reflect criteria for

obtaining leave of absence for personal

or physical reasons.

ll.

Delta agrees to make available to

Plaintiff and her attorney at Delta's

General Offices at a reasonable time to

be determined by ayreement of the

parties, a copy of Delta's Flight

Attendant Handbook.

12.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for production of the "Standard

Practice Handbook" on the grounds that

there is no such document. To the

extent that Plaintiff seeks all of

Delta's standard practices, Delta

objects in that much of the documenta-

tion sought is irrelevant to the

subject matter of this action and

evidence. Delta has already produced

substantial portions of its Standard

Practices to Plaintiff.

13.

Delta objects to Plaintiff's

request for employment files of all

persons transferred within the Delta

corporation from August 1981 to April

15, 1982 on the grounds that the

documentation sought is irreievant to

the subject matter of this action; is

not reasonably calculated to lead to

the siecovery of admissible evidence;

and that the production of such docu-

ments would be unduly burdensome and

oppressive. Delta also objects to this

Request in that it does not define the

term "transfer" and failing to do so,

the Request is ambiguous. Delta has

numerous types of inter-office and

intra-office transfers, as well as

inter-departmental transfers, and thus

the Request is, among other things,

ambiguous.

14.

There exists no written corres-

“ondence between the In-flight Service

Department and the Manager-Equal

Opportunity concerning Teddye Dugger.

15.

There exists no written corres-

pondence between the Reservations

Department and the Manager of Equal

Opportunity concerning Teddye Dugger.

This 5th day of April, 1983.

ROGERS & HARDIN

By:

HUNTER R. HUGHES

ROGERS & HARDIN

A Partnership of

Professional Corporations

Thirty-Second Floor

101 Marietta Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30335

(404) 522-4700

GREGORY L. RIGGS

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.

Law Department

Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport

Atlanta, Georgia 30320

(404) 765-2611

Attorneys for Defendant

Delta Air Lines,

Inc.

, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I have

this day mailed a copy of the foregoing

Defendant's Response and Objections to

Plaintiff's Second and Continuing

Request for Production of Documents by

depositing same in the United States

mail, with adequate postage thereon and

addressed as follows:

Sonja L. Salo, Esq.

Suite 970 - Sussex Place

148 International Boulevard

Atlanta, Georgia 30320

This 5th day of April, 1983.

ROGERS & HARDIN

By:

Hunter R. Hughes

Attorney for Defendant

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

Atlanta, December 10, 1984

The Honorable Court of Appeals met

pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

68534 Teddye Dugger v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc. (C-89198)

Upon consideration of the motion

for a rehearing filed in this case, it

is ordered that it be hereby denied.

Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office

Atlanta, December 10, 1984

I certify that the above is a true

extract from the minutes of the Court

cf Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my Signature and the seal

of said court hereto affixed the day

and year last above written.

Alton Hawk, Clerk.

nl GA een

Clerk's Office

Supreme Court of Georgia

Atlanta, January 10, 1985

Case No. 41867 Dugger v. Delta Air

Lines, Inc.

The Supreme Court today denied the

writ of certiorari in this case.

All the justices concur, except

Smith, J., not participating.

Very truly yours,

JOLINE B. WILLIAMS, Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.