Opposition Brief — National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission

: Office - Supreme Court. US. |

FILED

(D) OCT 26 i904

No. 84-504 ALEXANDER L. STEVAS

: mentee mee

.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, i984

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE UTILITY

CONSUMER ADVOCATES, ef al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND

TELEGRAPH COMPANY IN OPPOSITION

HOWARD J. TRIENENS MICHAEL BOUDIN*

ALFRED A. GREEN J. MICHAEL HEMMER

JUDITH A. MAYNES DavIiD H. REMES

JOSEPH J. STRELKOFF COVINGTON & BURLING

295 North Maple Avenue 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Basking Ridge, N.J.07920 P.O. Box 7566

Washington, D.C. 20044

(202 ) 662-6000

October 26, 1984 * Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Be Ae EI FO TRE CASE vnccccccccccvccccscccccccscssse 2

ai ES be oe o 6 8)” ay een 6

ARGUMENT .......... ee a 6

I. Section 205(4) Imposes No General Obii-

gation on the FCC To Employ Trial-Type

Oral Hearings To Determine Industry-Wide

Policy for the Future, and Neither Appellate

Decisions Nor Prior FCC Practice Establish

SOMME i TROGIIIE oasiissisicecncssissensccencsensevsonss 6

II. NASUCA’s Claim That an Oral Hearing

Was Required in the Particular Circum-

stances of This Case Is Mistaken and Does

not Present any Issue Appropriate for Re-

ee I chccncensatisccineenrectinitions Y

A MIT: cidnicrcoantintdlakinsecnsbnenbeeuclpiiacsnsten-anienebs 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C.

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843

NN aide iia caidas aeaeaia ia aha bli isan 11

AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 875 CU9TE ) .........cc..00cescessesss... passim

Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d

Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975) 9

Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778

ean SENN Sica ORD MY SME )

Computer and Communications Industry Ass’n v.

FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C: Cir. 1982), cert.

Mattie, 103 S.C. ZIP CEDES } vnsescnsncsesc.ses2.s:.. 8

Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .... 8,12

NARUC v. PCC, No. GA+95 ....0....00.s0sessssssccngrenmses 2

il

North Carolina Utilities Comm’n v. FCC. 552

F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US.

SOOO RETEN. sss

United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410

Misa SAE ROTA D: necidinndnaccisageet anes

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

Q55 WE. SIGE TOGL coincide

Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC,

513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 422

Ries A 4 SPSS .cccueciciinccee.. ci ee

STATUTES AND Court RULES:

Communications Act, Section 205( a), 47 U.S.C.

§ 205(a) ( 1982) inh saiesiseciapelaalinstena inl ied niee tcamtnane

Interstate Commerce Act, Section 1(14)(a), 49

UBM. FO 14a) C Gr ie

ets: CR, TE RF cs... ccanscenmce ee eee

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS:

In re AT&T, 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976), aff'd in

part and rev‘d in part, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C.

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981) ..

Interstate Rates of Return for the Interstate

Services of AT&T Communications and Ex-

change Telephone Companies, FCC Docket

BOG, TONE sc ccisnicassseevebaeineene a ee

Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related

‘Tariffs, FCC Docket No. 83-1145 oo.ccccccccccecceee.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Davis, K., Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed.

SWPPP sssivsceceaiesannpiiadiuieatieaa ana ee

Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Pa.

L. Rev. 1267 ( V9TS) ....cccccccecosecereee pieale iain

passim

9,12

passim

-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84-504

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE UTILITY

CONSUMER ADVOCATES, ef al.,

Petitioners,

V.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND

TELEGRAPH COMPANY IN OPPOSITION

Pursuant to Rule 22.1 of the Rules of this Court,

respondent American Telephone and Telegraph Company

(“AT&T”) opposes the petition for certiorari filed by the

National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates

(“NASUCA”) and_ the South Carolina Consumer

Advocate.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of a broad-gauged rulemaking

proceeding conducted by the Federal Communications

Commission to resolve major questions of policy. In the

orders under review, the FCC established for the future a

new industry-wide structure for interstate rates to recover

the interstate costs of local telephone companies originat-

ing and terminating interstate calls. NASUCA’s claim is

that Section 205(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.

§ 205(a)—which authorizes the FCC to prescribe charges

for telephone service “after full opportunity for hear-

ing’—required the Commission to utilize trial-type orai

hearings rather than rely on evidence submitted in notice-

and-comment rulemaking.' The Court of Appeals re-

jected that claim. Pet. App. 52a-55a.2

1. For many years, AT&T in cooperation with local

telephone companies provided interstate telephone service

in the United States. During this period, AT&T filed

interstate rates with the FCC concurred in by the local

companies and, out of the revenues generated, recouped

its own costs and compensated the local companies for the

use of their facilities :in originating and terminating inter-

state calls.

Beginning in the 1970s, changes in federai policy led

to the entry of other common carriers providing interstate

telecommunications service (e.g., MCI, Sprint, SBS) who

also use local telephone company facilities to originate

and terminate their calls. It quickly became clear that the

1 NASUCA also claims that the FCC lacked authority to provide,

in the orders under review, that certain fixed interstate costs be

recovered from end users through fixed monthly charges. This is the

same claim made by NARUC in its petition in No. 84-95 and AT&T

has responded to it in an opposition filed September 19, 1984.

2“Pet. App.” refers to Appendix A to the petition for certiorari in

NARUC v. FCC, No. 84-95, which also seeks review of the Court of

Appeals’ decision. Appendix A reprints the lower court’s opinion.

3

local telephone companies were being compensated by

different carriers and other users through a variety of ad

hoc and inconsistent pricing arrangements. Accordingly,

the FCC instituted this rulemaking ( Docket No. 78-72) to

determine central policy issues and establish a rate struc-

ture that would rationally and equitably divide the inter-

state costs of local telephone companies consistent with

the FCC’s objectives, including the preservation of univer-

sal service.

In Docket No. 78-72, the FCC was not concerned

with setting the ultimate rates that particular local tele-

phone companies would charge for the use of their

facilities to originate and terminate interstate calls. Its

task was to develop rate structure policies applicable

across the board to all carriers and customers based on

legislative-type judgments as to the interstate rate struc-

ture that would secure the FCC’s goals. These policies,

designed for prospective application, were to be imple-

mented through tariffs filed by the local telephone com-

panies subject to scrutiny and challenge under ordinary

statutory procedures.

2. The FCC issued its notice of inquiry and proposed

rulemaking in Docket No. 78-72 in 1978 and over the next

four years the Commission refined the issues through four

supplemental notices of inquiry. These notices, and other

requests or opportunities for comment, elicited thousands

of pages of submissions, including a vast amount of

relevant factual information. The opportunity to submit

such evidence was virtually unlimited. Scores of parties

participated at one stage or another of the rulemaking

proceedings, and the FCC received thousands of pages of

comments on its proposed rules from members of the

general public.

After an exhaustive review and thorough analysis of

the comments, the FCC in February 1983 issued an order

4

adopting basic rate structure policies for recovering inter-

state costs of local telephone companies. This order was

followed by a number of reconsideration petitions

challenging various aspects of the Commission’s plan, and

in August 1983 the Commission revised its initial plan in

several basic respects. After receiving further petitions for

reconsideration, the FCC revised the pian still further in

February 1984. See Pet. App. 27a-32a.

Under the Commission’s plan, certain fixed interstate

costs of the local telephone companies will eventually be

paid through fixed monthly charges by end users who

cause those costs. End users are grouped into three

classes—residential, single-line business, and multi-line

business end users. Such charges for residential and

single-line business end users are not yet in effect but will

be phased in beginning in June 1985.4 Charges for multi-

line business end users have gone into effect and vary from

company to company subject to a ceiling of 36 per

month.S Those tariffs are presently under review in pend-

ing Commission proceedings.®

3 It is the end user charges, designed to recover those fixed costs

caused by subscribers, which concern NASUCA. Under the FCC’s

plan, other fixed costs of the local telephone companies, attributable

to specific interstate carriers, would be paid by those carriers. Traffic

sensitive costs, which vary with the traffic generated by each interstate

carrier, are ultimately to be apportioned among the interstate carriers

on the basis of usage.

4 Tariffs setting end user charges for residential users and single-

line businesses have not been filed although the FCC has determined

that those charges should not exceed $4.00 per line through 1990. In

a proceeding sti: underway, the FCC is considering exemptions to this

end user charge so far as may be necessary to protect universal

service.

5 Despite NASUCA’s references to $6 as a rate ( Pet. 20 n.9, 28-

29), it is in fact a generally applicable ceiling and the actual rates filed

by individual companies vary.

§ Investigation of Access and Divesture Related Tariffs, FCC

Docket No. 83-1145. See aiso Interstate Rates of Return for the

Interstate Services of AT&T Communications and Exchange Tele-

phone Companies, FCC Docket No. 84-800.

«ill

3. When the FCC adopted its decision in Docket No.

78-72, numerous parties sought judicial review challeng-

ing different aspects of the decision. NASUCA did not

itself petition for review but it did file an intervenor’s brief

seeking reversal. It claimed, so far as pertinent here, that

Section 205(a) of the Communications Act, which author-

izes the Commission to prescribe charges for telephone

service “after full opportunity for hearing,” required the

Commission to utilize trial-type orai hearings rather than

rely on notice-and-comment procedures.” In June 1984,

the Court of Appeals issued a lengthy per curiam decision

affirming the FCC on all of the basic questions presented

below. Pet. App. 19.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals rejected

NASUCA’s claim of procedural error. It observed that

the FCC was not prescribing specific revenue requirements

or determining the legality of specific rates, but instead

was undertaking “broad-gauged rulemaking to develop

policies fer the interstate [telephone] market and it set

prospective, policy-implementing rules.” Pet. App. 54a.

The court found NASUCA’s position unsupported by case

law or past agency practice, and the court held that the

procedures followed “in this extraordinary matter” were

appropriate. Jd. The court observed that requiring a trial-

type hearing in a multi-party proceeding involving policy

issues as complex as those here would have rendered the

rulemaking “almost interminable,” precluding the agency

from establishing a policy for the 1980s. Jd. at 55a.

? During the agency proceeding NASUCA had not asserted that

trial-type oral hearings were required by statute, nor identified specific

issues warranting such hearings. Instead, in a single pleading filed

‘four years after Docket No. 78-72 had begun, NASUCA simply said

in general terms that it thought that the importance of the case

warranted “an oral argument or evidentiary proceeding.” NASUCA

Response to Fourth Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, August 6, 1982,

p. 8.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Certiorari is not warranted in this case. Sup. Ct. R.

17. NASUCA’s claim that Section 205(a) required the

F “C to utilize trial-type oral hearings is untenable in light

ot United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S.

224 (1973). This Court there construed a similar rate

setting provision of the Interstate C..ramerce Act and held

that notice-and-comment procedure: suffice where an

agency is designing industry-wide rates for future appli-

cation. The decisions of the Courts of Appeals squarely

support notice-and-comment procedures for _ policy-

implementing agency rulemaking.

In this case, the FCC accumulated a vast amount of

evidence through its notice-and-comment procedures. This

course was well within its discretion in view of the

prospective policy-related character of the issues and the

industry-wide scope of the proceeding. The reasons

belatedly offered by NASUCA for an evidentiary hearing

are unpersuasive, measured against the discretion of the

agency in structuring its own proceedings. The main

issues listed by NASUCA as appropriate for an eviden-

tiary hearing primarily relate not to the docket now under

review but to the tariff proceedings that are currently

underway at the agency and are not yet final.

ARGUMENT

I. Section 205(a) Imposes No General Obligation on

the FCC To Employ Trial-Type Oral Hearings To

Determine Industry-Wide Policy for the Future, and

Neither Appellate Decisions Nor Prior FCC Practice

Establish Such a Requirement.

NASUCA’s basic procedural claim is that Section

205(a) required the FCC to utilize a trial-type oral

hearing in this case. Pet. 17-30. That section empowers

the FCC to prescribe charges “after full opportunity for

hearing.” The difficulty with NASUCA’s reliance on Sec-

tion 205(a) is that this Court rejected precisely the same

argument in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway,

410 U.S. 224 (1973). This Court there held that Section

1( 14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act did not require

the ICC to hold trial-type oral hearings before establishing

incentive per diem rates for rail carriers.

This Court in Florida East Coast upheld the agency’s

use of notice-and-comment rulemaking because the in-

centive rates were “applicable across the board to all of

the common carriers by railroad subject to the Interstate

Commerce Act,” and “[n]o effort was made to single out

any particular railroad for special consideration based on

its own peculiar circumstances.” 410 U.S. at 246. The

decision noted that the factual determinations the agency

made were for use in “the formulation of a basically

legislative-type judgment, for prospective application

only, rather than in adjudicating a particular set of

disputed facts.” /d. That language applies with equal

force in the present case.®

The FCC, in determining future policy through

ruiemaking proceedings, has repeatedly decided industry-

wide issues without trial-type oral hearings. The Courts of

Appeals have repeatedly sustained such decisions. Exam-

ples include the FCC’s introduction of intercity private line

competition, the creation of a registration program for

customer-provided terminal equipment, and the decision

8 Florida East Coast's analysis was applied to Section 205(a) in

AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 22-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.

875 (1978), where the Second Circuit found that trial-type oral

hearings were not required for decisions establishing industry-wide,

prospective policy.

to detariff enhanced services and terminal equipment.

The FCC’s procedures in this case were therefore con-

sistent with its own prior practice in resolving major policy

issues, as wel! as with judicial precedent.

NASUCA asserts that in a prior FCC proceeding,

reviewed in Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.

1975), the FCC did employ a trial-type evidentiary hear-

ing in exercising its power to determine an appropriate

rate of return for AT&T. Nader involved the setting of a

rate of return for an individual company, however, not the

establishment of industry-wide policy; as the Court of

Appeals observed in this case, “the FCC [here] pre-

scribed no specific revenue requirement and did not

determine the legality of specific rates.” Pet. App. 54a.

More important, Nader did not hold that the FCC was

required to have an evidentiary hearing even in the

proceeding there involved, for no such issue was ever

raised in the case. 10

Similarly, there is no basis for NASUCA’s claim that

the FCC has acknowledged the need for trial-type oral

hearings in prior FCC proceedings similar to this one.

The main case cited by NASUCA (Pet. 24-25) invoived

solely a decision on the lawfulness of the particular rates

used by a single carrier.'! Trial-type oral hearings in cases

9 E.g., Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693

F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2109 (1983);

AT&T v. FCC, supra; North Carolina Utilities Comm’n v. FCC, 552

F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. ), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977); Washington

Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).

10 The Nader language quoted by NASUCA ( Pet. 22-23) was in

fact addressed to the question whether the FCC had power to

prescribe rates of return. AT&T had not challenged the procedure

used and the court therefore had no occasion to decide what minimum

procedures would be appropriate.

11 In re AT&T, 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in

part, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920

(1981).

i aa i

9

involving the specific rates of a specific carrier might

arguably be required under Florida East Coast, but this ts

not such a case. Even if the two proceedings were

identical (which they are not), “[t]he mere fact that an

agency has once regarded evidentiary hearings as appro-

priate does not bar it from adopting another policy when

changing or mew circumstances require a _ different

approach.”’!2

In sum, NASUCA has no support for its claim that

Section 205(a) or prior precedent and practice required

trial-type oral hearings in this case. There is no conflict

with any decision of this Court or any other Court of

Appeals. On the contrary, the decisions of both (e.g.,

Florida East Coast; AT&T v. FCC) support. the Commis-

sion and confirm the correctness of the affirmance below.

II. NASUCA’s Claim That an Oral Hearing Was Re-

quired in the Particular ( ircumstances of This Case

Is Mistaken and Does not Present any Issue Appro-

priate for Review by This Court.

NASUCA appears to suggest that the facts of this

case required a trial-type oral hearing even if it was not

generally required by statute or past practice. But it is

now settled under Vermont Yankee that the agency has

substantial discretion in applying provisions of the act it

administers and devising the procedures for doing so.'%

The FCC had ample basis in this case for employing

notice-and-comment procedures and it did not abuse its

discretion under the Vermont Yankee standard.

In this case, the FCC was not resolving a narrowly

focused factual issue concerning an individual carrier

where adjudicative procedures might be useful. Rather, it

12 Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1265 (3d Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975).

13 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,

543-48 (1978). See also Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778

(1984).

10

was making legislative-type judgments in setting policy for

the entire industry. Given the range and nature of the

issues, the number of parties, and the need to examine

successive modified proposals, notice-and-comment

rulemaking was eminently suited to the agency’s task.

Even with this efficient procedure, Docket No. 78-72 took

six years. It is doubtful whether the proceeding would

ever have been completed if trial-type oral hearings had

been employed. '4

The notice-and-comment procedures utilized by the

FCC did not deprive it of evidence. Enormous quantities

of evidence, including detailed statistics, financial infor-

mation, descriptions of new developments in the industry,

instances of threatened harm, and the like, were presented

in numerous comments. The FCC took this information

into account both in structuring its original plan and in

modifying it several times. The court below specifically

held that the FCC’s determinations were “rationally

grounded and sufficiently supported by evidence.” Pet.

App. 19a. Because the FCC could secure the necessary

information in this way, its decision to use notice-and-

comment rulemaking was clearly rational.

Nevertheless, NASUCA asserts that a trial-type oral

hearing was required because of the importance of the

case. Pet. 29-30. But the utility of trial-type hearings does

not depend on the abstract importance of a case but on the

nature of the issues, the scope of the proceeding, and the

nature of the action proposed.'5 As Florida East Coast

14 The FCC stressed the need to place a new rate structure into

effect before the adverse consequences of the existing system of ad hoc

compensation arrangements became irreversible. See Pet. App. 31a.

15 See, e.g., Florida East Coast Railway, supra, 410 U.S. at 245

(question is whether proceeding is “for the purpose of promulgating

policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand,” or “to adjudicate

disputed facts in particular cases on the other”). See also AT&T v.

FCC, supra, 572 F.2d at 22; i K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,

§ 6:23 at pp. 561-62 (2d ed. 1978); Friendly, “Some Kind of

Hearing,” 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1314-15 (1975).

11

made clear, trial-type oral hearings may be required to

adjudicate a narrow factual claim involving a single party

and yet be wholly unwarranted for determining broader

and more far-reaching issues affecting a whole industry or

market. 410 U.S. at 244-46.

General determinations of policy, based on

legislative-type considerations, are the least appropriate

subjects for trial-type oral hearings. As Judge Leventhal

said in an analogous context, such issues involve expert

opinion and forecasting and “cannot be decisively re-

solved by testimony.”'6 Practically all of the most impor-

tant policy decisions by the Commission in recent years

have, as already noted, employed the same procedures

used in this case, namely, notice-and-comment rather than

trial-type oral hearings. The decisions thus reached have

been sustained in circuit after circuit and this Court has

repeatedly denied certiorari. See p. 8, n. 9, above.

NASUCA’s other argument for trial-type oral hear-

ings in this case rests on its list of six issues it now says

should have been the subject of such a hearing. Pet. 26-

27. The principal issues specified by NASUCA are the

“capital structure” for telephone companies, their “in-

vestment level,” their proper “‘[rate of] return,” and their

“level of operating and maintenance expenses.” Pet. 26.17

These are, of course, matters that vary from company to

company in the industry and bear on the specific tariff

rates ultimately charged by those companies. Such ques-

tions were not and did not have to be decided in order to

16 American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.) (en

banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966), quoted in AT&T v. FCC,

supra, 572 F.2d at 23. ,

17 The Commission clearly did not need to have a trial-type oral

hearing in order to interpret its own Separations Manual, or to

estimate the number of telephone lines in the country. Compare Pet.

26-27.

12

resolve the basic questions of industry-wide policy and

rate structure with which the FCC was concerned in this

docket. 18

The FCC in substance resolved the policy and rate

structure issues in this docket and then left the local

telephone companies to frame and submit tariffs consistent

with this new structure. The Nader case, relied on by

NASUCA itself, is one of many precedents affirming the

agency’s authority to decide only issues essential to the

case before it and to reserve other issues for subsequent

proceedings. See 520 F.2d at 195-96. Here, the Commis-

sion proceeded rationally by determining the issues of rate

structure in this docket and reserving for individual tariff

proceedings other questions bearing on the lawfulness of

the individual rates offered by the local telephone com-

panies. '9

Finally, the question whether the FCC acted ration-

ally and within its discretion in selecting procedures to

resolve this case is clearly not a question appropriate for

review on certiorari. On such a particularized question,

there is and can be no conflict with prior decisions of this

Court or a Court of Appeals in any other circuit. To the

extent prior decisions are relevant, Vermont Yankee estab-

lished a standard of deference to the agency in its choice

of procedures and the lower court respected that discretion

in this case. There is no warrant for further review.

18 The issues of concern to the FCC were, for example, whether

to make cost-causing customers pay their own costs; whether to

provide a discount for allegedly inferior access; whether to impose a

cap on end user charges; whether to require FX users and “leaky

PBX” users to contribute to interstate costs; whether and when to

allow rate averaging and whether to establish a universal service fund.

19 NASUCA repeatedly refers to the FCC’s estimate that certain

fixed interstate costs will be “approximately $8.5 billion in 1984” as if

this were a component of a final determination of a specific rate for a

specific company. Pet. 19, 26-27. In fact, the figure was merely a

gross estimate of the pertinent costs of all local telephone companies

taken together; it did not determine the actual revenue requirement of

any individual company, a matter which will be resolved in the tariff

proceedings.

13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

HowarbD J. TRIENENS MICHAEL BOUDIN*

ALFRED A. GREEN J. MICHAEL HEMMER

JupitH A. MAYNES Davip H. REMES

JosEePH J. STRELKOFF COVINGTON & BURLING

295 North Maple Avenue 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Basking Ridge, N.J. 07920 P.O. Box 7566

Washington, D.C. 20044

(202) 662-6000 |

October 26, 1984 * Counsel of Record

RULE 28.1 LISTING

American Telephone and Telegraph Company,

which has no parent company, retains a

i minority interest in two companies that

have outstanding securities in the hands

of the public - Cincinnati Bell Inc. and

The Southern New England Telephone Company.