Appendix — Evans v. Illinois

In THe

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1984

MICHAEL EVANS,

Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIAM J. HARTE

Wuuuam J. Harte, Loo.

111 West Washington Street

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 726-5015

Attorney for Petitioner,

Micware, Evans

Photex — 444 North Wabash Avenue — Chicago 60611 — 321-0223

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX

Order of Illinois Supreme Court

denying petition for leave to

appeal, entered October 2, 1984 .

Opinion of the Illinois Appellate

Court, First Judicial District,

rendered May 8, 1984 ....+s««. »

Specifications and Certificate

of Probation, entered September

22, 1984 . . . * . . . . * * . . *

Periodic Imprisonment Order,

Entered September 22, 1984... .

35

39

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

MICHAEL EVANS,

Petitioner,

Vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

me ee eee ee ee ee ee

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

App. 1

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK

SUPREME COURT, ILL. 62706

(217) 782-2035

October 2, 1984

Mr. William J. Harte

Attorney at Law

111 W. Washington St., S#2025

Chicago, IL 60602

No. 60476 People State of Illinois,

respondent, vs. Michael Evans,

petitioner. Leave to appeal,

Appellate Court, First

District.

The Supreme Court today has DENIED

the petition for leave to appeal in the

above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue

to the Clerk of the the Appellate Court

on Ocotber 23, 1984.

82-2306

PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-

Appellee,

Ve

MICHAEL EVANS,

Defendant-

Appellant.

JUSTICE DOWNING

the court:

Defendant,

App. 2

Second Division

May 8, 1984

Notice

The text of this opinion

may be changed or

corrected prior to the

time for filing of a

Petition for Rehearing or

the disposition of the

same.

APPEAL FROM THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF

COOK COUNTY.

HONORABLE

DWIGHT MCKAY,

JUDGE PRESIDING.

ee me ee ee ee ee ee eet ee”

delivered the opinion of

Michael Evans, appeals

from his conviction after a bench trial

of three counts

of reckless homicide.

App. 3

(Il11.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.

9-3(a).) The sentence imposed was 30

months probation with the special

condition that defendant serve the first

six months, as well as the weekends of

the final 90 days, in the Cook County

Department cof Corrections. Defendant

contends on review that he was not proved

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and

that the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing the special

condition of his probation,

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on March

24, 1982, Catherine Campbell was waiting

in her Ford van for the traffic light to

change at the intersection of 159th and

Torrence Avenue in Calumet City,

Illinois. Campbell's vehicle was facing

north, occupying the east-center lane of

App. 4

northbound Torrence Avenue. The part of

Torrence Avenue at which she was stopped,

immediately south of the intersection,

consists of four lanes. There is a lane

for turning left onto 159th Street so as

to proceed west; there are two center

lanes for continuing north on Torrence

Avenue; and there is a fourth lane for

either turning right onto 159th Street so

as to proceed east, or for continuing

north and eventually merging with the

east-center lane of Torrence Avenue.

While Campbell waited for the

traffic light to turn green, she noticed

a blue Plymouth automobile pull up

immediately next to her in the

west-center, northbound lane of Torrence :

Avenue. This car, containing four

people, was being driven by defendant.

App. 5

At that same time, Campbell observed a

white Plymouth automobile pull up

immediately next to her on the other side

of her van, occupying what was the fourth

or far east lane of northbound Torrence

Avenue. This vehicle, also containing

four people, was being driven by the

codefendant in the trial below, John

Best. Just before the traffic signal

changed green, Campbell noticed that both

cars on each side of her were inching

forward to a point beyond the painted

traffic line delineating the southern

boundary of the intersection. As soon as

the light turned green, the vehicles

driven by defendant and Best accelerated

at a high rate of speed. Campbell

accelerated at a slower rate of speed

but, within seconds, she had to

cence alate aia ait aii tn

App. 6

"back-off" since Best immediately began

to merge into the east-center lane as he

drove through the intersection heading

north.

Campbell observed the two cars

proceed north up Torrence Avenue,

side-by-side, toward Michigan City

road.! The particular stretch of road

in which defendant and Best were driving

that night was asphalt-paved and “a

little bumpy.” The area itself was

characterized as very dark at the time in

question. According to two Calumet City

police officers, on March 24, 1982 the

posted speed limit along that portion of

Torrence Avenue was either 40 or 45 miles

IMichigan City Road transects Torrence

Avenue at a point approximately one mile

north of 159th Street.

J

App. 7

per hour. Campbell estimated that the

speeds of the two cars driving ahead of

her were between 65 and 70 miles per

hour; whereas, Diane Dougall, a passenger

in defendant's car, estimated that

defendant's speed reached "55, or maybe

more.”

Since it was night, Campbell

eventually lost sight of both vehicles

except for their taillights. Soon

thereafter, by viewing the position of

the respective taillights of each car

less than one-half of a mile away, she

noticed that defendant's vehicle veered

over into the lane occupied by Best's

car. About three or four seconds later,

as Campbell arrived “to abouts where the

tail lights [sic] went into one lane,”

she observed Best's car smoking as it

App. 8

appeared to be hooked to the green car in

the southbound lanes of Torrence Avenue,

approximately one-half mile north of

159th Street.

George Zorich was driving south on

Torrence Avenue at approximately 9:30

p.m. on March 24, 1982. At some point

south of Michigan City Road, he saw

Best's car come across from the

northbound lanes of Torrence Avenue

directly into the southbound lanes and

collide with a blue Chevrolet, being

driven by Sherry Kassee, as it was

proceeding south approximately four car

lengths “in front of Zorich. Following

the collision with Kassee's car, Best's

automobile became airborne and struck

Zorich's vehicle on the hood. Another

car, heading south on Torrence Avenue,

App. 9

then collided with Zorich's vehicle from

behind.

Officer Peter Miller of the Calumet

City police department was dispatched to

the scene of the accident that night.

Upon his arrival, he observed that

Kassee's car, which faced west across the

innermost southbound lane of Torrence

Avenue, had very heavy rear-end damage.

He then saw that Best's vehicle, which

faced south in the outermost southbound

lane of Torrence Avenue, had very heavy

rear-end and right side damage. The car

left skid marks, measuring 150 feet in

length, which extended across the median

from the northbound lanes into the

southbound lanes of Torrence Avenue. As

Officer Miller approached Best's vehicle

he observed the body of Patricia Koerner,

App. 10

who had been riding as a passenger in the

car, pinned in the back seat. The

officer thereafter found the body of

Ronald Gibbs, another passenger in the

Best vehicle, lying in a wooded area

nearby. Sherry Kassee also died as a

result of the injuries sustained when her

car was struck by Best's vehicle.

An April 1982 grand jury charged

defendant and John Best each with three

counts of reckless homicide. Following a

joint bench trial, the trial court found

both offenders guilty as charged.

Defendant's culpability was premised on

the court's belief that "[defendant]

blocked the progress forward of the Best

vehicle *** [and] that Best had to take

evative action of some kind.” At the

sentencing hearing, following arguments

App. 11

presented in aggravation and mitigation,

the trial judge sentenced codefendent

Best to a term of 30 months probation

under the jurisdiction of the Adult

Probation Department of Cook County. A

special condition of periodic

imprisonment was imposed with the option

of serving such term in the Lake County,

Indiana jail if it could be arranged.2

Regarding defendant, the court first

ordered him to surrender his driver's

license so that it could be forwarded to

2The exact length of Best's incarceration

is uncertain since page 625 of the record

is missing and the half-sheet

incorporated into this record only refers

to the sentencing order entered against

defendant. The trial court indicated

that it could possibly order revocation

of Best's Illinois driving privileges;

however, due to the incomplete transcript

of proceedings, it is not clear if the

judge's observation was carried out.

App. 12

the Illinois Secretary of State for

revocation. Defendant was then ordered

to serve 30 months probation under the

jurisdiction of the Adult Probation

Department of Cook County. As a special

condition, defendant was further ordered

to serve the first six months, as well as

the weekends of the final 90 days, of the

probation period in the Cook County

Department of Corrections. From the

orders of conviction and sentence,

defendant now appeals.

I.

Initially, defendant argues that the

evidence adduced at the instant trial

failed to establish his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. We disagree.

In Illinois, a person commits

reckless homicide if, while driving a

App. 13

motor vehicle, he unintentionally kills

an individual and the acts which caused

death are performed recklessly so as to

create a likelihood of death or great

bodily harm to some person.

(I11.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.

9-3(a).) "A person acts recklessly in

this regard when he consciously

disregards a substantial and an

unjustifiable risk that his acts are such

as are likely to cause death or great

bodily harm to some individual and where

such disregard constitutes a gross

deviation from the standard of care which

a reasonable person would exercise in

such a situation." (People v. Bonzi (2nd

Dist. 1978), 65 I11.App.3d 927, 931, 382

N.E.2d 1300, appeal denied (1979), 74

I11.2d 587; see generally, 1I11.Rev.Stat.

App. 14

1981, ch. 38, par. 4-6.) Criminal

liability attaches only to acts of such a

reckless or wanton character as to be

indicative of an utter disregard for the

safety of others under circumstances

likely to result in injury. (People v.

Petersen (4th Dist. 1982), 110 I11.App.3d

647, 659, 442 N.E.2d 941.) The reckless

conduct must be wilful and wanton.

People v. LaCombe (4th Dist. 1982), 104

I11.App.3d 66, 72, 432 N.E.2d 672, appeal

denied, 91 I11.2d 576.

It is defendant's position that the

evidence proffered by the State failed to

prove that his conduct was the actual and

legal cause of the offense for which he

was charged and convicted. It is, of

course, clear that defendant's Plymouth

automobile was not directly involved in

App. 15

the multi-vehicle collision which

resulted in three fatalities on the night

of March 24, 1982. Indeed, defendant's

overt acts at the time in question were

limited to operating his car at an

excessive rate of speed, and veering into

the east lane of northbound Torrence

Avenue in front of Best's car. In order

to secure defendant's reckless homicide

conviction, it was therefore necessary

for the State to prove that he was

legally accountable for the deaths of

the three motorists. One may be held

accountable for the acts of another

without having actively participated in

the overt act. (People v. Ray (5th

Dist. 1979), 80 I11.App.3d 151, 156, 399

N.E.2d 977, appeal denied (1980), 81

I11.2d 586.) We view the present record

App. 16

as adequate to support defendant's

conviction under the complicity theory.

To bring an accused within the

purview of the Illinois accountability

statute, the prosecution-must establish,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1)

either before or during the commission of

an offense, (2) with the intent to

promote or facilitate the commission of

an offense, (3) the defendant solicited,

aided, abetted or attempted to aid

another person in the planning or

commission of an offense. I11.Rev.Stat.

1981, ch. 38, par. 5-2(c); People v.

Underwood (ist Dist. 1982), 108

Ill.App.3d 846, 851, 439 N.E.2d 1080,

appeal denied, 91 I11.2d 579.

Regarding the case at bar, the

evidence clearly showed that on the night

App. 17

of March 24, 1982, defendant and John

Best, two young drivers, engaged in what

is commonly known as street drag racing.

Defendant attempted to refute this fact

by claiming that he proceeded north on

Torrence Avenue from the 159th Street

intersection at a normal speed, and that

his tires screeched as he accelerated

because he disengaged the clutch after

revving the engine in an effort to raise

oil pressure. Catherine Campbell,

however, testified that while she was

waiting at the aforesaid intersection at

the time defendant and Best pulled their

cars up along each side of her, she

noticed that both vehicles were inching

forward to a pcint beyond the painted

traffic line which represented the

southern boundary of the intersection.

App. 18

As soon as the traffic signal turned

green, Campbell observed defendant and |

Best's vehicles accelerate at a high

rate of speed. In corroboration, Diane

Dougall, who was seated in the rear of

defendant's car that night testified that

defendant's acceleration up Torrence

Avenue in the direction of Michigan City

Road caused her to be pushed back into

her seat.

Although the posted speed limit on

the relevant stretch of road was either

40 or 45 miles per hours, Campbell, who

had for three years assisted her husband,

a professional auto racer, estimated that

the speed of the two cars driving ahead

of her on the dark, bumpy road was |

between 65 and 70 miles per hour. It was

Dougall's estimation that defendant's

App. 19

vehicle reached a speed of "55, maybe

more."

We find that this testimonial

evidence established, without question,

that defendant was one of two pueriie

young men bent on an illegal act which

was certainly reckless and dangerous in

character and which would require the use

of force, albeit mechanical, that could

very well result in the unlawful taking

of a human life. As such, we are of the

opinion that defendant was legally

accountable for the deaths of Patricia

Koerner, Sherry Kassee an@ Ronald Gibbs.

Defendant correctly points out that

excessive speed, by itself, is not always

sufficient to sustain a conviction for

reckless homicide. (See, People v.

Ziegler (1st Dist. 1979), 78 I11.App.3d

App. 20

490, 496, 396 N.E.2d 1160, appeal denied

(1980), 79 I111.2d 629.) “However, a

charge of reckless homicide may be

justified by a combination of excessive

speed and other circumstances which would

indicate a conscious disregard of a

substantial risk likely to cause death or

great bodily harm to others, and the

circumstances are such that a reasonable

person wovld act differently under the

same situation.” Bonzi, 65 1I11.App.3d at

931-32.

Here, the indicium of conscious

disregard of substantial risk was

defendant's act of maneuvering his motor

vehicle as he raced north along Torrence

Avenue toward Michigan City Road. Based

upon the testimony of Campbell and

Dougall, the trial court reasonably

a a

App. 21

inferred that when defendant veered over

into the east lane of northbound Torrence

Avenue, he changed lanes in such a

reckless and dangerous manner so as to

cut off Best's automobile. It was thus

perfectly logical and proper for the

court to deduce that Best was forced to

take the evasive action which resulted in

the tragic vehicular collision.

We will not substitute our judgment

for that of the trial court on questions

involving witness credibility and

evidentiary inferences, for the law

commits to the trier of fact the

determination of such issues. (People

v. Akis (1976), 63 I11.2d 296, 298, 374

N.E.2d 73; People v. Ahern (1st Dist.

1983), 119 I1ll.App.3d 532, 536, 456

N.E.2d 852.) "(T] hat determination will

App. 22.

not be reversed unless the evidence is

so improbable as to create a reasonable

doubt of defendant's guilt [citation] .”

People v. Davis (1983), 95 I11.2d 1, 27,

447 N.E.2d 353.

The defendant's right to drive

carried with it the correlative duty to

refrain from reckless or wanton driving

which utterly disregarded the safety of

others. The defendant's driving

certainly did not reach the aforesaid

standard. In light of defendant's utter

disregard for the lives of other

motorists, the lives of his three

passengers and his own life as well, we

conclude that the evidence adduced at

the instant trial was more than

sufficient to estabiish defendant's legal 1

accountability for the three senseless :

App. 23

fatalities. Thus the evidence was

sufficient to establish defendant's guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Il.

The next issue for resolution

concerns the propriety of that part of

the trial court's sentencing order

imposing the special condition that

defendant serve the first six months, as

well as the weekends of the final 90

days, of his probationary period in the

Cook County Department of Corrections.

A.

Defendant contends that the special

condition of his probation was not

warranted in light of mitigative

circumstances.

Our supreme court has firmly

established that the detemination of a

App. 24

sentence is a matter of judicial

discretion and that, absent an abuse of

this discretion, the sentence imposed by

the trial judge may not be altered upon

review. (People v. Willingham (1982), 89

T11.2d 352, 364, 432 N.E.2d 861; People

ve. Cox (1980), 82 111.2d 268, 275, 412

N.E.2d 541.) It is not our function to

serve as a sentencing court; thus, "[a]

sentence imposed within the statutory

limits will not be reduced merely because

we, aS a reviewing court, might have

imposed a different punishment." People

v. Holloway (1st Dist. 1983), 119

I1l.App.3d 1014, 1022, 457 N.E.2d 466,

Citing People v. Perruguet (1977), 68

T11.2d 149, 156, 368 N.E.2d 882.

Reckless homicide is a Class 4

felony. (111.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38,

~ re cell

App. 25

par. 9-3(b)(2).) The permissible

sentence ranges from a one to three-year

term of inprisonment. (I11.Rev.Stat.

1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(7).) The

maximum probationary period for the

commission of a Class 4 felony is 30

months. (I11.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par

1005-6-2(b)(2).) An offender, as a

condition of his probation, can be

sentenced to a term of incarceration not

to exceed six months. (I111.Rev.Stat.

1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3(d).)

Consequently, it is clear that the trial

judge did not transcend the prescribed

statutory framework by requiring that

defendant be imprisoned during the first

six months of his probationary period.

It is suggested that the lower court

was unconcerned with defendant's

App. 26

rehabilitative potential in that it

"arbitrarily" imposed the special

condition of his probation. To the

contrary, however, we discern careful

consideration by the court of defendant's

personal traits, his age, his educational

as well as employment background, his

family situation, and his lack of a

juvenile delinquency record. Indeed, the

imposition of the probationary period

itself, as opposed to a sentence of a one

to three-year term of incarceration, is

clearly indicative of the court's regard

as "to the nature and circumstance of the

offense, and to the history, character

and condition of the offender***,"

(I11.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.

1005-6-1(a).) Further, the sentencing

judge provided defendant's trial lawyer

ee

snmaieitcn ea alam al

OO Ae"

Se ee i onl Te

App. 27

with ample opportunity, which counsel

fully utilized, for argument in

mitigation. Although the record evinces

several significant mitigative

circumstances, the cumulative import of

such attendant conditions is in no way

conclusive. This is because

"rehabilitation and the seriousness of

the offense are to be accorded equal

weight in fixing punishment, and the

prime responsibility for striking the

proper balance between the two factors

rests with the trial court." People v.

Crosser (2nd Dist. 1983), 117 I11.App.3d

24, 32, 452 N.E.2d 857.

Defendant's citation of error

regarding the disparity between his

sentence and codefendant Best's sentence

App. 28 |

must similarly fail.3 "(MJere disparity

in sentences, without more, does not

warrant reduction of the greater sentence

ed hem Rl, a cast Meh aN Bd Ek 8S te

by a reviewing court." (People v. Mick

(5th Dist. 1980), 86 I11.App.3d 1022,

1028, 408 N.E.2d 1079.) Moreover, in

Illinois, a trial court's determination

of the punishment to be imposed involves

consideration of the subjective

circumstances presented in each

individual case, i.e., the defendant's

mentality and general moral character,

his abnormal or subnormal tendencies, and

3It is defendant's averment that,

notwithstanding the incomplete transcript

of record before this court, Best's

sentence of probation was conditioned

only on periodic imprisonment, as opposed

to straight-time incarceration, during

the first six months of his 30-month

probationary period.

ee

App. 29

his natural inclination or aversion to

commit crime. People v. Dukett (1974),

56 I11.2d 432, 452, 308 N.E.2d 590,

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965; People v.

Reese (1st Dist. 1984), 121 I11.App.3d

977, 989, _N.E.2d __.

At defendant's sentencing hearing,

the State proffered evidence that since

August 18, 1982, the date on which

judgment of conviction was entered,

defendant hd been observed speeding and

driving erratically through a residential

area on a number of occasions. In

addition to this aggravating factor

indicative of a lack of remorse, the

trial court also considered "that there

is a greater degree of culpability here

in the driving of Evans as opposed to the

driving of Best. And it was my finding,

App. 30

and still is, that the manner in which

Evans drove compelled Best to do whatever

he had to do to avoid a collision with

Evans."

In essence, Our review of the record

reveals that, taken separately, the two

incarceration requirements of defendant's

special probationary condition were each

based upon the unique objective and

subjective circumstances presented in

this case. Defendant argues that such

imprisonment will have a disruptive

effect on his lifestyle; we feel it

unnecessary to depict the disruption, if

not sheer anguish, that has pervaded the

lifestyles of the victims' families since

the night of March 24, 1982.

App. 31

B.

The final claim of error for review

concerns defendant's contention that

section 1005-7-1(c) of the Unified Code

of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch.

38, par. 1005-7-1(c)) precludes six

months incarceration in conjunction with

a term of periodic imprisonment.

Section 1005-7-1(c) provides in

pertinent part that: "The court shall

not impose a sentence of periodic

imprisonment if it imposes a sentence of

imprisonment upon the deferdant in excess

of 30 days." The sentence here is six

months straight time as a condition of

defendant's probation was, as previously

stated, permissible under the sentencing

provisions of the Unified Code of

Corrections (Il1l.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38,

par. 1005-6-3(d).) Alternatively, the

App. 32

trial court could have ordered the

special condition that defendant serve up

to 18 months periodic imprisonment.

(Il1.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par.

1\005-7-1(d).) However, as the State

concedes, “[ilf straight time of more

than 30 days as a condition of

probation is imposed, [the court] cannot

impose in addition any periodic

imprisonment." People v. McMullen (4th

Dist. 1980), 88 I1ll.App.3d 611, 615, 410

N.E.2d 1174.

The trial court could not impose

six months straight time together with 90

days periodic imprisonment. We believe

the trial court should make the

determination of which special condition

should be imposed. We therefore vacate

the special condition of defendant's

er ae

App. 33

probation and remand this cause for

resentencing within the prescribed

Statutory framework.

IIl.

Under the authority of I11.Rev.Stat.

1983, ch. 53, par. 8 and People v.

Nicholls (1978), 71 I11.2d 166, 374

N.E.2d 194, we assess defendant $50 in

costs for the State's defense of this

appeal, and hereby incorporate it as part

of this judgment. We deny the State's

request for an additional $25 for oral

argument. This denial is predicated on

our interpretations of the per diem

provision of the statute ("For each day

actually employed in the trial of a case,

$25") as referring to an actual trial in

the circuit court, not to an oral

argument on appeal.

App. 34

For the reasons set out herein, the

judgment of this conviction is affirmed,

the sentending order is vacated in part,

and this cause is remanded to the Circuit

Court of Cook County for resentencing.

JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED

IN PART: CAUSE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

STAMOS and PERLIN, JJ., concur.

App. 35

COUNTY OF COOK

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

SIXTH MUNICIPAL DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE )

OF ILLINOIS ) CASE NUMBER

vs. ) 82 C 3247

MICHAEL EVANS )

SPECIFICATIONS AND CERTICATE OF PROBATION

IT IS THIS SENTENCE AND ORDDR (sic) OF

THE COURT that the above named Defendant

having been adjudged guilty fo the crime

of RECKLESS HOMICIDE (3 COUNTS) in the

above captioned case, and further,

haveing (sic, regard to the nature and

circumstances of the offense, and to the

history, character and condition of the

above named Defendant and being of the

opinion that a sentence of probation

would not depreciated (sic) the

seriousness of the Defendant's conduct,

the above named Defendant is sentenced to

App. 36

a period of probation 30 MONTHS unless

terminated sooner if warranted by the

conduct of the offender and the ends of

justice.

The

Sentence

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

conditions of the Probation

shall be as follows:

The Defendant shall not violate

any Criminal Statute of any

jurisdiction.

The Defendant shall make a

report to and appear in person

before the Cook County Adult

Probation Department, 16501

South Kedzie Avenue, Markham,

Illinois, Phone 596-8000 Ext.

576 within two (2) days of this

order and at another time and

place designated by the

Probation Department and in

person appear before the Court

at such time as the Court may

direct or by rule provide.

The Defendant shall refrain

from possessing any firearm or

any other dangerous weapon.

The Defendant shall permit

Probation Officers to visit him

at his home or elsewhere.

App. 37

(5) The Defendant shall comply with

the rules and regulations of

the Adult Probation Department.

(6) OTHER CONDITIONS: The

defendant shall serve the first six

months in CCDOC; the defendant shall

serve the final three months of probation

in periodic imprisonment pursuant to

draft order.

It is further order of this Court

that records of this Probationer be

maintained by the Adult Probation

Department, and if a petition for

revocation of this probation is file such

records of this Probationer, kept in

accordance with statute and this order,

bearing upon the conduct of the

Probationer during his probation period

in compliance with 1973 Illinois Revised

Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 204-4(4).

IT IS SO ORDERED //s//Dwight McKay

JUDGE

DATE 9/22/82

App. 38

The Defendant acknowledges receipt

of the above document setting forth

specifications and conditions of the

sentence of probation and understands a

failure to follow these conditions could

result in revocation of the probation and

re-sentencing up to the maximum penalty

for the crime for which he is on

probation (See 1973 Illinois Revised

Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 1005-6-3.

/s/Michael Evans 415 Saginaw Ave.

(DEFENDANT-PROBATIONER) ADDRESS

App. 39

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE ) Case No. 82 C 3247

STATE OF ILLINOIS,) Charge: Reckless

) Homicide

Vv. ) Date of Sentence:

) 9-22-82

MICHAEL EVANS. ) First Report Date:

Saturday 12-24-83

Term of Periodic

Imprisonment:

Friday at 6:00

P.M. until Sunday

at 6:00 A.M.

PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT ORDER

Upon a finding of guilty and a

judgment of guilty, the defendant is

sentenced to the term of periodic

imprisonment shown above. It is further

ordered that:

1. Defendant shall report to the

Guard House of the Department of

Corrections at 2700 South California

Avenue, Chicago, Illinois at 9:00 A.M. on

ineneeeeiieiiee iene

App. 40

the first report date shown above, unless

otherwise specifically ordered below, and

may remain in custody for the first 24

hours and bring a copy of this Order with

him.

2. The defendant shail be assessed

$12.00 room and board per day unless

waived or modified by the Court.

3. The defendant may be released on

the holidays designated by the Sheriff

unless otherwise provided by the Court.

4. Upon reasonable grounds to

believe there is a violation of this

Order, or the Department of Correction

regulations, or the commission of another

offense, the Sheriff may hold the

defendant in confinement for a court

hearing on the violation up to 48 hours,

unless further ordered by the Court. The

Court retains the power to revoke or

App. 41

modify the provisions of this periodic

imprisonment.

5. Additional orders: (Court

shall note conditions of confinement)

(Monday through Friday with hours

released, weekends only with hours of

incarceration)

The defendant shall serve the last

90 days of his probation serving

weekend inprisonment from Friday at

6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 a.m.

Defendant acknowledges receipt of

this Order and states that he understands

the conditions of his periodic

imprisonment as set forth above.

/s/ Michael J. Evans

415 Saginaw Avenue

9/22/82

ENTER: /s/ Dwight McKay

JUDGE