Opposition Brief — Holloway v. Arkansas State Board of Architects

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No. 04-745

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In The ~~

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

ROBERT D. HOLLOWAY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

ARKANSAS STATE BOARD

OF ARCHITECTS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eighth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

MIKE BEEBE

Arkansas Attorney General

LORI FRENO-ENGMAN

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

Arkansas Bar No. 97042

323 Center Street

1100 Catlett-Prien Building

Little Rock, AR 72201

(501) 682-1314

Attorneys for Respondents

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner’s request for prospective declara-

tory and injunctive relief from the federal district court is

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the grant of

such relief would require the district court to make conclu-

sions directly contrary to the state supreme court decision

against Petitioner.’

* Petitioner frames the question “Whether the Eighth Circuit erred

in affirming the district court’s order dismissing Petitioner’s entire

amended complaint pursuant to the ‘Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’ where

Petitioner’s amended complaint contains a separate count seeking

prospective declaratory and injunctive relief? In so holding, the Eighth

Circuit’s decision directly conflicts with decisions of the Third and

Seventh Circuits.”

LIST OF PARTIES

Arkansas State Board of Architects, John D. Harris,

Blake Dunn, Steve Miller, Beth Leake, Larry Black, Cora

Bradshaw, Eugene Levy, Larry McGowen, Jeff Shannon,

Larry Jegley and Mike Beebe

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Reasons For Denying Review...................csccseeseeeeeeees 4

The Eighth Circuit’s Decision Was Correct And

Does Not Conflict With Decisions In The Third

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Ace Constr. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831 (8th

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Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062 (8th

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Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3rd Cir. 1989)..... 4, 7, 8, 10

Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

ey NG IE cknikdnaceecdpinidsasiuauaclaincintudaedasaaoadel passim

Holloway v. Arkansas State Board of Archt., 352

Ark. 427, 101 S.W.3d 805 (2003).................... 1, 2, 7, 8,11

Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1990).............. 5

Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488 (8th Cir.

IPE ciaicscastesiccen dcihadus taliddhaghatasiaia iaabudassocamcenneaeekieacaas 5, 6, 7

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) ............... 6, 9

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)......passim

Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 346 (7th

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STATUTES

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Arkansas State Board of Architects (“Board”)

received a complaint against Petitioner Robert D. Hollo-

way (“Holloway”) on September 21, 1999, charging that

Holloway, as a non-architect, performed architectural

services for a building project in North Little Rock. Hollo-

way is a licensed engineer. The Board notified Holloway of

the allegations against him and of the Board’s initiation of

an investigation of the allegations. Holloway responded

that he believed his work on the building project was

within the authorized activity of an engineer.

On March 1, 2000, the Board served an order and

notice of hearing on Holloway, alleging that Holloway had

practiced architecture without a license in violation of Ark.

Code Ann. §.17-15-301. The Board conducted a hearing on

May 11, 2000 during which Holloway’s attorney appeared

and argued, among other things, that provisions of the

Arkansas Architectural Act (“AAA”) that define the prac-

tice of architecture are unconstitutionally vague and, as

applied, violate Holloway’s right to due process. After the

hearing, the Board determined that Holloway violated

Ark. Code Ann. § 17-15-301, by engaging in the practice of

architecture without a license, and imposed a $5,000

penalty.

Holloway appealed to the circuit court, reasserting the

same arguments he made before the Board. See Holloway

v. Arkansas State Board of Archt., 352 Ark. 427, 432, 101

S.W.3d 805, 808 (2003). The circuit court affirmed the

Board’s decision in all respects. Holloway appealed to the

Arkansas Court of Appeals, which considered the same

arguments that were presented to the Board and the

circuit court. The court of appeals held that Holloway did

not preserve his constitutional challenges and remanded

the case to the Board for further fact finding and for

consideration of the constitutional issue. The Arkansas

Supreme Court subsequently granted the Board’s petition

for review.

The Arkansas Supreme Court considered the same

arguments Holloway presented to the Board, the circuit

court, and the court of appeals, including Holloway’s

constitutional challenge to the statutes defining the

practice of architecture. Holloway, 352 Ark. at 434-437,

101 S.W.3d at 809-812. The court concluded that these

statutes (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 17-15-102, 17-30-101, and 17-

30-104) were not unconstitutionally vague and did not, as

applied to Holloway, violate due process guarantees. Jd.

Holloway initiated the present action in federal

district court on May 22, 2003 against the Board, its

members, and its executive director in their individual and

official capacities; Larry Jegley, in his official capacity as

the Pulaski County Prosecuting Attorney; and Mike

Beebe, in his official capacity as the Arkansas Attorney

General. Holloway brought his suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that provisions of the AAA defining the

practice of architecture are void for vagueness in violation

of the United States Constitution and that the Board’s

attempts to enforce the provisions against him violate his

right to due process. Holloway requested declaratory

relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and an injunc-

tion enjoining the Board, and Respondents Jegley and

Beebe from enforcing the AAA provisions that define the

practice of architecture.

Holloway asserts that his claims for prospective

declaratory and injunctive relief are not barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine because such relief would not

interfere with the previous state court decision against

him. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Hollo-

way’ argument and affirmed the district court in an

unpublished opinion,’ finding that “Holloway’s claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief were also barred, because

any grant of relief would require the district court to make

conclusions directly contrary to the decision of the state

supreme court.” Pet. at 4a. Holloway filed a petition for

rehearing and for rehearing en banc in the Eighth Circuit,

which denied review on September 3, 2004. This Petition

for Writ of Certiorari was timely filed on November 24,

2004.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The gravaman of Holloway’s Petition for Writ of

Certiorari is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

bar the count of his complaint seeking prospective declara-

tory and injunctive relief solely because the relief is

prospective. Holloway also argues that there is a split in

the circuits on whether claims for prospective relief in

federal court require review of a previous state court

decision, and thus are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.

Respondents maintain that review by this Court is not

necessary because this legal principle is well settled and

treated consistently. The decision of the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals is correct and consistent with the deci-

sions of this Court including the decisions in Rooker v.

? The decision is attached to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as

Appendix A.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Colum-

bia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), as well

as the decisions in Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3rd

Cir. 1989) and Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d

1346 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals correctly held,

like other jurisdictions around the country including the

Third and Seventh Circuits, that a request for prospective

relief in federal court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine when the grant of such relief would require the

district court to make conclusions directly contrary to a

state court judgment.

Petitioner erroneously asserts that there is a conflict

among the circuits on this issue. While results differ based

on the facts and claims presented in each individual case,

the analysis by the Third and Seventh Circuits is consis-

tent with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis. Thus, contrary to

Petitioner’s contention, no conflict exists.

Review should also be denied because in addition to

the fact there is no conflict, the question presented by the

Petition does not raise an important constitutional issue

and because the Eighth Circuit’s decision is correct. For

these reasons, the Petition for Writ of certiorari should be

denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING REVIEW

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION WAS

CORRECT AND DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH DECISIONS IN THE THIRD AND

SEVENTH CIRCUITS

Petitioner claims that Centifanti v. Nix, supra and

Van Harken v. City of Chicago, supra, conflict with the

Eighth Circuit’s holding in the present case. Instead of

presenting conflicts in application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, the cases are entirely consistent with the reason-

ing of the Court of Appeals in this case. Results differ, as

will be seen, only when the prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief sought is not “inextricably intertwined”

with the state court decision and thus, would not interfere

with the state court decision.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied

the reasoning of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra, and

Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, supra, in this

case. After de novo review, the Court of Appeals agreed

that the district court lacked jurisdiction “because Hollo-

way’s federal complaint raised constitutional challenges

already decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court, albeit in

a non-section 1983 action.” Pet. at 4a, citing Bechtold v.

City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997)

(litigant cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman by recasting

lawsuit as § 1983 action). With regard to Holloway’s claims

for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, the Court

of Appeals found that they too were barred “because any

grant of relief would require the district court to make

conclusions directly contrary to the decision of the state

supreme court.” Pet. at 4a, citing Lemonds v. St. Louis

County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000) (Rooker-Feldman

bars indirect attempts to undermine state-court judg-

ments); Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir.

1990) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief).

Federal district courts are prohibited from “exercising

jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are

‘inextricably intertwined’ with specific claims already

adjudicated in state court.” Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492-93,

citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, n.16. A general federal

claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court

judgment “if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent

that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it.

Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a convic-

tion that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to con-

ceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything

other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judg-

ment.” Jd. at 493, quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481

US. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). If the federal

court can only provide relief by determining that the state

court was wrong, it is, in effect, an appeal of the state

court judgment that is prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492. Put another way, a

claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “if the

requested federal relief would void the state court’s judg-

ment or amount to basically a reversal of the state court’s

holding.” Ace Constr. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831, 833

(8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

_ Holloway attempts to circumvent the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine by claiming that “[h]e does not seek expressly or

impliedly to review or overturn any previous state court

decision nor does he seek to stop the enforcement of any

previous state court decision against him in Count V.” Pet.

at 10. The fatal flaw in this argument is that Count V of

Holloway’s federal suit is also an attempt to obtain a

different outcome than the outcome he obtained in state

court. Count V requests a “declaration from [the district

court] that the Arkansas statutes which define the practice

of architecture are void for vagueness and violate the due

process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution.” Pet. at 9 and 43a.

Holloway further requests in Count V that the Court

permanently enjoin the Board and Respondents Jegley

and Beebe from enforcing these statutes “now and in the

future.” Pet. at 43a-44a. The Arkansas Supreme Court

determined that the Arkansas statutes which define the

practice of architecture are not void for vagueness and,

thus, do not violate due process guarantees. Holloway, 352

Ark. at 434-437, 101 S.W.3d at 809-812. Since Holloway’s

request for prospective relief is premised upon a finding

that the subject statutes are unconstitutional, Count V is

in reality an attempt to obtain reversal of the state court

judgment finding the subject statutes to be constitutional.

In other words, Holloway’s request for prospective relief

“succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly

decided the issues before it.” Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 493.

Therefore, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals properly

concluded that Count V was barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with a

case in another appellate court-and is not even in tension

with the cases relied upon by Holloway. For instance, in

Centifanti v. Nix, supra, a suspended attorney who had

been denied reinstatement to the bar, brought a civil

rights action against the Justices of the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court alleging various constitutional defects in

the procedural rules under which the Supreme Court

considers petitions for reinstatement of suspended attor-

neys. Centifanti had been suspended from the practice of

law for five years, after pleading nolo contendere to two

charges of aggravated assault on his wife. Upon comple-

-tion of his criminal probation, Centifanti filed a petition

for reinstatement with the Disciplinary Board of the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. After a hearing, a hear-

ing committee of the Disciplinary Board recommended to

the Board that Centifanti’s petition for reinstatement be

granted. Upon review, the Disciplinary Board recom-

mended Centifanti’s reinstatement. Centifanti then filed

an application for leave to file a brief in support of his

petition for reinstatement with the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania. By letter, the Court denied the petition for

reinstatement to the Bar as well as the application for

leave to file a brief. There was no opinion or statement of

reasons by the court.

The district court viewed Centifanti’s complaint as an

attempt to obtain improper review of the decision of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, rather than a permissible

generalized constitutional challenge to a state law and

dismissed his complaint. The Third Circuit reversed,

finding that Centifanti did not request the district court to

interfere with the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court to deny his petition for reinstatement, or with the

enforcement of that decision. Instead, “he requested an

injunction ordering the state court to correct alleged

constitutional defects in the procedural rules applied in

reaching that decision ... [which,] if granted, could affect

future decisions of the state supreme court, [but] would not

require review of a past decision.” Jd. at 1430.

A key distinction between the Centifanti case and the

present case is the fact that Centifanti did not challenge

the constitutionality of the procedural rules before the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Thus, there was no state

court decision passing on the validity of the rules. In

contrast, Holloway raised constitutional challenges to the

statutes at issue before the Board, the circuit court, the

court of appeals and the Arkansas Supreme Court. Hollo-

way, supra (affirming the constitutionality of Ark. Code

Ann. §§ 17-15-102, 17-30-101, and 17-30-104). In this

regard, the district court observed:

The constitutional claims raised by Holloway in

this case are identical to those he pursued in

state court — that the provisions of the [Arkansas

Architectural Act] defining the practice of archi-

tecture are void for vagueness, and the Board’s

attempt to enforce the provisions against Hollo-

way violate his right to due process. The Su-

preme Court of Arkansas considered and rejected

these claims. See Holloway, 101 S.W.3d at 812

(concluding after a detailed review that “the

statutes Holloway challenges are not void for

vagueness”).

Pet. at lla.

Holloway’s requested relief in Count V for a declara-

tion “that the Arkansas statutes which define the practice

of architecture are void for vagueness and violate the due

process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution” (Pet. at 9 and 43a)

would require review of the state supreme court decision

finding these statutes to be constitutional. This is so even

though the requested request is prospective. Similarly,

although Holloway’s request for a permanent injunctive

enjoining the Board, the prosecuting attorney and the

attorney general from enforcing the subject statutes is

prospective in nature, such relief “is predicated upon a

conviction that the state court was wrong.” Pennzoil Co.,

481 U.S. at 25. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

correctly concluded that “Holloway’s claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief were ... barred, because any grant of

relief would require the district court to make conclusions

directly contrary to the decision of the state supreme

court.” Pet. at 4a (internal citations omitted).

Holloway’s assertion that “[t]he Third Circuit has

specifically recognized that requests for prospectiv> relief

do not require relief of a previous state court decision, and

therefore, do not violate the ‘Rooker-Feldman doctrine’” is

simply wrong. Pet. at 10. Centifanti does not stand for the

proposition that all claims for prospective relief do not

require relief of a previous state court decision and there-

fore, are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Merely because one count of a complaint seeks prospective

declaratory and injunctive relief does not end the inquiry

into whether a district court has subject matter jurisdic-

tion. The prospective relief requested by Centifanti was

not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because such

relief did not interfere with the decision of the Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court in that particular case.

Likewise, Van Harken v. City of Chicago, supra, does

not conflict with the Eighth Circuit’s decision. In Van

Harken, the plaintiffs brought a class action against the

City of Chicago challenging the city’s new system for

adjudicating parking violations. The suit was brought on

behalf of persons who either had been adjudged liable for a

parking violation in contested proceedings and paid their

fines or persons who had received a parking ticket but

whose cases had not been adjudicated. The plaintiffs

alleged that the new procedures violated the due process

clauses of the United States and Illinois constitutions. The

City asserted that the suit was barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. The Seventh Circuit found that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine failed for two reasons. First, it

ruled that the doctrine does not apply to administrative

judgments. Van Harken, supra, at 1349. Second, the court

ct ON

determined that “[i]nsofar as the plaintiffs merely seek a

declaration that the procedures under which the parking

charges against them were, or in the case of those mem-

bers of the class whose cases have not yet been heard will

be, adjudicated are constitutionally inadequate, they are

not barred by Rooker-Feldman because they are not chal-

lenging the judgment in any parking case.” Jd. The court

held that insofar as the plaintiffs sought refunds of the

parking fines imposed upon them, such relief was barred.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district

court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Van Harkin’s request

for declaratory relief because the requested relief did not

interfere with any existing state court judgment, and the

court did not need to entertain any issue which was

actually litigated in state court or any claim that was

inextricably intertwined with such an issue. In other

words, no state court decision was disturbed. The prospec-

tive relief requested in the present case requires a finding

that the state court decision was wrong. Were the district

court to rule that the licensing statutes defining the

practice of architecture are unconstitutionally vague and

violate due process guarantees, as Holloway asks, the

Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Holloway, supra,

would effectively be reversed or voided.

Thus, neither case cited by Holloway conflicts with the

Eighth Circuit’s decision in the present case, nor does

either case detract from the guiding principle for deter-

mining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applica-

ble: where, as in the instant case, the relief requested

requires a determination that the state court decision is

wrong, the issues are inextricably intertwined and the

district court has no subject matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is

consistent with the decisions of this Court as well as the

decisions of the Third and Seventh Circuits. The conflict

asserted by Holloway is without merit as a basis for

review by this Court. Respondents respectfully request

that the petition for writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,