Amicus Curiae Brief — Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Cicio
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ou SEP 1 1 2003
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No. 03-69
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
VYTRAHEALTHCARE AND BRENT SPEARS, M.D.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
BONNIE CICIO,
Respondent.
On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UnNitep STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Brier OF Amici CuRIAE THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH
PLANS, INc., THE HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
THE AMERICAN BENEFITS COUNCIL AND THE NEw YORK
HEALTH PLAN ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
RICHARD E. RAMSAY HAROLD N. ISELIN
Deputy General Counsel Counsel of Record
American Association of Henry M. GREENBERG
Health Plans CoucH Wuite, LLP
1129 Twentieth Street, N. W. 540 Broadway
Suite 600 P.O. Box 22222
Washington, D.C. 20036 Albany, New York 12201
(202) 778-3230 (518) 426-2600
Counsel for Amici Curiae
(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)
182926 ce
COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859
ANGELA J. FRANKLIN
HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA
1201 F. Street, N.W. Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 824-1600
Lynn DUDLEY
AMERICAN BENEFITS COUNCIL
1212 New York Ave., N.W.
Suite 1250
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-6700
PAUL MACIELAK
New York HEALTH PLAN ASSOCIATION
90 State Street, Suite 825
Albany, New York 12207
(518) 462-2293
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Cited Authorities .............0 ee eee il
Statement of Interest ........... ccc eee eeenees l
Reasons for Granting the Petition ............-. 2
I. The Decision Below Undermines Congress’
Policy Of Inducing Employers To Offer
Health Benefits ..........cccccescseces 6
Il. The Decision Below Raises Immediate
Practical Problems For Administrators Of
Employee Benefit Plans That Will Ultimately
Harm Plan Participants .............-+5: 14
Conclusion ...... Or errr eT Tere 18
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998), cert denied,
328 UE GRGRIOED 05 s0khd darks
Caffey v. Unum Life Ins. Co.,
302 F.34 S76 GS Cae Bee ca daceee esi eeiiss
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
319 U.S. 386 (URGE osnceueeee ens ee es
Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Oklahoma, Inc.,
77 F.3d 1270 (10" Cir.), cert. denied, 519 US.
S16 (1996) «00 cccnaeneeeeeee ees
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.,
965 F.2d 1321 (5" Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1033 (1DRE) «accutane
Danca v. Private Health Care Sys.,
ISS F.36 8 CE" Cae We coos eee
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,
332 U.S. 1463 GARE) cckascane eee
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
462 U.S. 1 (9967) ciacdeeeee eee
Great-West Life and Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204 (GORD .diccciceeee ee ee
Page
15
12
10
10
il
Cited Authorities
Page
Haynes v. Prudential Health Care,
Se: 12
Howard y. Coventry Health Care of Iowa, Inc.,
Ce Tt a > | 12
Hull v. Fallon,
188 F.3d 939 (9" Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
ES ey a ne eee ae 9-10
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
8 Be Ee a eee 7, 11
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plans, Inc.,
ee Oe OF A FOG) wc ccc eens 10
Land vy. Cigna Healthcare of Florida,
__ F.3d _, No. 02-15549, 2003 WL 21751247
gg 12
Marks v. Watters,
ee We Ow OO” Ce, ZOOS) cc cc cceanncs 12
New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
RE.) 10
Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001), cert.
denied sub nom. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa.,
Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins., Co.,
Re 4 12
Pegram v. Herdrich,
IS ee ee ee ee
iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
Rie ee Gi, eer rrr errr rere ere or passim
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
DOS FOG DOG C96 Ct. BOOED voces ccvcsncccce 12
Roark v. Humana, Inc.,
307 F.3d 298 (5" Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed,
71 U.S.L.W. 3791 (U.S. June 3, 2003) (No. 02-
1826), and petition for cert filed sub nom. Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, _U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June
BE, BOs le. TE 8 kc kace ce istiadeees 12
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
SOR ee Ree eee 10, 11
Tolton v. American Biodyne,
ee bore a er err 10
Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.,
ew. Bea 2) 12
Federal Statutes
ERISA (29 U.S.C.)
of of Peerrerrrerr re errr rr re ere ]
2 Peet ree ce eT Cee Pere eee 6
Bb errr rrr er eer er rr 3,9, 11
Bi TT CTT Eee eT Tere TET T Cy passim
Cited Authorities
Other Authorities
Employee Benefit Research Institute, Special Report
and Issue Brief, EBRI Research Highlights: Health
Damas OGY BONG) osc cccsiennsacdosncans
Matthew J. Binette, Comment: Patients’ Bill of
Rights: Legislative Cure-All or Prescription for
Disaster?, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 653 (2003) ........
The Business Council of the State of New York,
Compensation Data New York 2003 (2003) ....
Shannon P. Duffy & Randall J. Peach, Split
Decisions, The Legai Intelligencer (April 6,
BOOED 2 6000b0055 50s eeeateeeee
Milt Freudeinheim, Employees Paying Ever-Bigger
Share for Health Care, N.Y. Times, September 10,
Be TRS 06.0844 ke teehee
Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA
Enacted?, U.S. Senate, Special Comm. On Aging,
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974: The First Decade (Comm. Print 1984) ...
The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research
and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits:
2002 Annual Survey (2002) ............20005.
William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of
State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans:
An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 Tex. L. Rev.
ee Pe Pre ee he ne
Page
14
17
12
17
v1
Cited Authorities
Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research and
Experimental Therapies: Payment Due, But From
Whom?, 3 DePaul J. Health Care L. 441 (2000)
eoonoe uu eeo+Qgeget8t@ ee Oe eee Cece ee Cee eecan es 8 2484 28'S 8 2
Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Recent Second
Circuit Decision on HMO Liability, N.Y.L.J.
(Daw. 80, DD noi cs ccvunecudeaverc enue
“Small Business Health Fairness Act”: Hearing on
HR. 660 Before the Subcom. On Employer-
Employee Rel. of the House Comm. On Educ. &
the Workforce, 108" Cong. (Mar. 13, 2003) ....
120 Cong. Ree. F9,900 CIPI ocak eases vv ankeds
120 Cong. Ree. 4295 €1974E) «05 ccc ccceccvcctnas
H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 12 (1974), reprinted in
1974 USCC. SRO osckysaaecinsdaseve
Page
16
11
er
l
STATEMENT OF INTEREST'
The American Association of Health Plans, Inc. (““AAHP”’),
the Health Insurance Association of America (“HIAA”), the
American Benefits Council (the “Council’’) and the New York
Health Plan Association, Inc. (““NYHPA’’) (collectively “Amici’’)
submit this brief in support of the Petitioners, Vytra Health Plans
Long Island, Inc. and Brent Spears, M.D.
AAHP is the national association for the managed health
care community. AAHP’s mission is to advance health care
quality and affordability through leadership in the health care
community, advocacy and the provision of services to member
health plans. Its membership includes health maintenance
organizations (“HMOs”), preferred provider organizations, third
party health plan administrators, health care utilization review
organizations, prepaid limited health service plans, and other
integrated health care delivery systems. AAHP represents more
than 1000 managed health care organizations serving nearly 160
million Americans, the majority of whom are participants or
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001, et seq.
HIAA is based in Washington, D.C., and is one of the largest
associations of health insurance companies in the world. HIAA
is the nation’s most prominent trade association representing
the private healthcare system. Its nearly 300 members provide
health, long-term care, dental, disability, and supplemental
coverage to more than 100 million Americans. It is the nation’s
premier provider of self-study courses on health insurance and
1. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), letters of consent from all
parties to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of the
Court. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, Amici state that this brief was
not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that no
person or entity other than Amici, their members, or their counsel made
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
managed care. HIAA advocates a private, market-based health
insurance system and is dedicated to promoting federal and state
health care policies that maximize the quality, affordability,
accessibility, and responsiveness of medical services provided
to the nation’s health care consumers.
The Council is a broad-based, non-profit trade association
founded in 1967 to protect and foster the growth of this nation’s
privately sponsored employee benefit plans. The Council’s
members include both small and large employer-sponsors of
employee benefit plans, including many Fortune 500 companies.
Its members also include employee benefit plan support
organizations, such as actuarial and consulting firms, insurers,
banks, investment firms, and other professional benefit
organizations. Collectively, its more than 250 members sponsor
and administer plans covering more than 100 million plan
participants and beneficiaries.
NYHPA is the New York State association for the vast
majority of health plans offering coverage to residents of New
York State. Its membership consists of HMOs, health insurers
and prepaid health service plans that serve more than six million
New Yorkers, as well as residents of neighboring states, the
majority of whom are participants or beneficiaries of employee
benefit plans under ERISA. NYHPA has worked closely with
public policy officials to develop balanced and innovative
approaches that increase health plan accountability for coverage
decisions while maintaining affordable health care coverage.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The foundation of this country’s health insurance system is
employer-sponsored health care coverage. See Employee Benefit
Research Institute, Special Report and Issue Brief, EBRI
Research Highlights: Health Benefits 5 (May 2003) (“Currently,
employment-based health insurance is the most common form
3
of health coverage in the United States.”’). “Employer-sponsored
healthcare reaches nearly two out of every three Americans,
including active workers, retirees, and their dependents.”
The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and
Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits: 2002 Annual
Survey 1 (2002). Employers do not sponsor this coverage
because of a government mandate. Rather, employers voluntarily
undertake the obligation to administer and pay for their
employees’ health benefits. The voluntary nature of employer-
sponsored health care coverage, and the extent and continued
vitality of this system, are a direct result of the policy choices
Congress made when it adopted ERISA.
Indeed, Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in large measure
to induce employers to offer and maintain benefit plans for their
employees. Congress recognized that uniform federal rules and
oversight would encourage the growth of employee benefit
plans. To allow employers to provide uniform benefits across
all states without having to conform to varying state regulatory
environments, Congress included two crucial provisions in
ERISA: § 514(a) and § 502(a). 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1132(a).
The former is a broad preemption statute; the latter a civil
enforcement provision that is the “exclusive vehicle for actions
by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper
processing of a claim for benefits.” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
For years following this Court’s decision in Pilot Life,
employers made benefit decisions with the knowledge
that ERISA ‘preempted state law claims against benefit plans.
Courts held that § 514(a) and/or § 502(a) preempted virtually
all state claims, including those against plan administrators
for making alleged medically-based eligibility determinations.
As a consequence, employers were able to provide health care
coverage to their employees without having to comply with fifty
sets of state laws. Multi-state employee benefit plans were able
4
to treat similarly situated employees the same regardless of their
state of residence. The environment was one in which incentives
existed for employers to provide health benefits to their
employees. In fact, by 2001, the percentage of workers covered
by employment-sponsored health insurance grew to 73.7%.
Employee Benefit Research Institute, supra 14.
But the stability and predictability in the law that existed
since Pilot Life — and served the needs of both employers and
employees (including union benefit plans) — is eroding because
of decisions such as that of the court below in Cicio v. Vytra,
321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit’s decision has
created a cloud of uncertainty over the countless decisions that
plan administrators must make every year and undermines the
national uniformity of employee benefits plans. This is true not
only for medical necessity decisions — whether an otherwise
covered service is medically necessary for a given patient —
but also for interpretations concerning explicit contract
exclusions of experimental treatments, which, by definition, are
not clinically proven and may even be dangerous.
Allowing state claims against plan administrators, even in
cases where it is alleged that a decision reflects medical
judgment, will now inject the ever-changing law of fifty different
States into an area that has been governed exclusively by federal
standards. Faced with different state liability rules, employee
benefit plans will be forced to treat similarly situated employees
differently based on the state in which the participant resides.
Additionally, benefit plans will be forced to engage in costly
risk management as they weigh the language of the benefits
plan and the judgment of plan administrators against the risk of
state law claims. Law suits will proliferate and employer costs
will increase as benefit plans absorb increased litigation
expenses.
5
Most importantly, a fifty-state patchwork scheme of ERISA
enforcement will harm the people who Congress sought to
protect —- the 131 million Americans who participate in group
health plans governed by ERISA, all of which are voluntarily
sponsored. See “Small Business Health Fairness Act”: Hearing
on AR. 660 Before the Subcom. On Employer-Employee Rel. of
the House Comm. On Educ. & the Workforce, 108" Cong.
(Mar. 13, 2003) (statement of Ann. L. Combs, Ass’t. Sec’y. for
Employee Benefits Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Labor) (stating that
ERISA protects “approximately 2.5 million private, job-based
health plans and 131 million workers, retirees and their
families”). The cost of health care coverage will increase while
its availability will decrease. Co-payments, co-insurance and
deductibles will rise and plan benefits will be reduced or
eliminated. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149-50
(2001) (“Requiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant
laws of 50 states and to contend with litigation would undermine
the congressional goal of ‘minimizing the administrative and
financial burdens on plan administrators’ — burdens ultimately
borne by the beneficiaries.’’).
The disuniformity created by the decision below is
compounded by the confusion that now exists in the lower courts
regarding the impact of this Court’s decision in Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) on state-law claims such as the
one at issue here. Like some other courts, the court below
mistakenly relied upon the dicta regarding “mixed” treatment
and eligibility decisions in Pegram. However, Pegram was not
a preemption ruling and nowhere in that decision did this Court
imply it was overruling Pilot Life and its progeny, which is
controlling in this case.
Accordingly, this Court’s review is needed to clarify its
decision in Pegram and restore Congress’ policy of inducing
employers to provide voluntarily health care coverage to
employees by ensuring the uniform administration of health
benefits and the exclusivity of ERISA’s remedy scheme.
ee
6
I. THE DECISION BELOW UNDERMINES
CONGRESS’ POLICY OF INDUCING EMPLOYERS
TO OFFER HEALTH BENEFITS
This Court’s immediate review is necessary to settle the
law in an area where uniformity and predictability are
imperative. Congress intended that ERISA preemption would
enable plan administrators to make eligibility determinations
without having to refer to fifty sets of state laws. All this has
now changed with the recent decisions of the court below and
other lower courts. Such decisions undermine Congress’ policy
choice in ERISA of inducing employers to offer health benefits
by ensuring the uniform administration of health benefits and
the exclusivity of ERISA’s remedy scheme.
After more than a decade of debate, Congress enacted
ERISA in 1974 in large measure to encourage employers to
offer and maintain benefit plans for their employees. See Michael
S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, U.S. Senate,
Special Comm. On Aging, The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974: The First Decade, at 25 (Comm. Print
1984). Although ERISA comprehensively regulates such plans,
it leaves in place the voluntary nature of plan sponsorship.
Compare Great-West Life and Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (noting that ERISA is a
“comprehensive and reticulated statute’), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(a) (“this subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit
plan if it is established or maintained’) (emphasis added).
The existence of employee benefits — such as a health care
program — is dependent upon employers’ willingness to create
employee plans.
Congress was mindful that, to the extent government
regulation increased benefit plan costs, the result would be to
encourage termination of existing plans and discourage
7
formation of new benefit plans. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 4295
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Ullman) (“Generally, it would appear
that the wider or more comprehensive the coverage, vesting,
and funding, the more desirable it is from the standpoint of
national policy. However, since these plans are voluntary on
the part of the employer and both the institution of new pension
plans and increases in benefits depend upon employer
willingness to establish or expand a plan, it is necessary to take
into account additional costs from the standpoint of the
employer.”). In order to further the “public interest in
encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans,” ERISA
established uniform regulation and imposed federal oversight
in this area. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54; see Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at
148 (“One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers
‘to establish a uniform administrative scheme which provides a
set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and
disbursement of benefits.’’’).
Congress also recognized that plans and their sponsors faced
fifty sets of complex and conflicting state laws and regulations.
See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)
(stating that Congress’ goal in enacting a preemption provision
was to minimize “the administrative and financial burden of
complying with conflicting directives among State or between
States and the Federal Government ... , [and to prevent] the
potential for conflict in substantive law . . . requiring the tailoring
of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of
each jurisdiction”). Finding that inconsistencies in laws and
regulations resulted in administrative inefficiencies and costs
that ultimately hurt plan participants, Congress concluded that
“employee benefit plans would prosper best if regulated by the
federal government without state involvement.” William J.
Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating
to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514,
62 Tex. L. Rev. 1313, 1313-14 (1984); see H.R. Rep. No.
8
93-533, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650 (“The uniformity of decision which the act is designed to
foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to
predict the legality of the proposed actions without the necessity
of reference to varying state laws.”’). That policy judgment has
been aptly summarized by this Court:
An employer that makes a commitment
systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a
host of obligations, such as determining the
eligibility of claimants ... [and] making
disbursements. .. . The most efficient way to meet
these responsibilities is to establish a uniform
administrative scheme, which provides a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims
and disbursement of benefits. Such a system is
difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is
subject to differing regulatory requirements in
differing States. A plan would be required to ...
process claims in a certain way in some States but
not in others... .
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
See also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 (“{u]niformity is impossible
...1f plans are subject to different legal obligations in different
states”).
Congress sought to achieve the goal of creating a uniform
body of benefits law through a broad preemption clause.
See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997)
(reviewing the Court’s many previous acknowledgements that
ERISA’s preemption provision is “clearly expansive,” has a
“broad scope,” an “expansive sweep,” is “broadly worded,”
deliberately expansive” and “conspicuous for its breadth”).
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “‘any and all” state laws that
“relate to” an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
Se eed
9
ERISA’s legislative history highlights the intended broad
scope of § 514(a) and Congress’ concern with the negative effect
that litigation would have on employee benefit plans. For
example, Senator Jacob Javits, one of ERISA’s authors,
expressed concern that a narrow preemptive scope would
increase the “possibility of endless litigation over the validity
of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation,” and
that “(t]he emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal
interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate
plans . . . required the displacement of State action in the field
of private employee benefit programs.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942
(1974). Congress hoped to avoid “opening the door to multiple
and potentially conflicting State laws” by preempting them. /d.
Also, in lieu of a multiplicity of state remedies, Congress
included a civil enforcement provision in § 502(a) of ERISA.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Sixteen years ago, in Pilot Life, this Court
held that the provisions of § 502(a) are the “exclusive vehicle
for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits.” 481 U.S.
at 52. The Court thus established a categorical rule: § 502(a)
preempts any state-law claim that purports to provide
different or additional judicial remedies for a wrongful denial
of benefits. /d. at 54. Applying this rule, the Court found that
§ 502(a) preempted state-law contract and tort claims filed
against an insurer for the “‘bad faith” denial of disability benefits.
Id. at 55-56.
In the wake of Pilot Life, employee benefit plans were able
to make health benefit decisions confident that they would not
be subject to alternative state law remedies. Time and time again,
the circuit courts recognized that ERISA sections 514(a) and/or
502(a) preempt state law claims that challenge an ERISA plan’s
claims decisions, including claims determinations based on plan
provisions that limit coverage to medically necessary treatments
or condition coverage on pre-certification. See, e.g., Hull v.
LL eT aT eee
10
Fallon, 188 F.3d 939 (8" Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189
(2000); Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., 185 F.3d 1 (1* Cir.
1999): Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plans, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482
(7" Cir. 1996); Cannon v. Group Health Serv. Of Oklahoma,
77 F.3d 1270 (10® Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 816 (1996); Tolton
v. American Biodyne, 48 F.3d 937 (6" Cir. 1995); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5" Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1033 (1992). For years, this stability in the law provided
plan administrators with the certainty and predictability they
needed to plan and administer health benefits budgets.
To be sure, this Court has revisited the scope of ERISA
preemption since deciding Pilot Life. At no time, however, has
the Court departed either from the core principle that § 514(a)
preempts state laws and remedies that disrupt the uniform
administration of an employee benefit plan or “Pilot Life's
categorical preemption rule” under § 502(a). Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379-80 (2002). For example,
in New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Plans, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), the Court
narrowed the reach of preemption but, importantly, reaffirmed
that “(t]he basic thrust of [ERISA’s] preemption clause. . . was
to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the
nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”
Id. at 657. Whatever the outer limits of ERISA preemption might
be, the Court reaffirmed that ERISA preempts state laws or
causes of action that would undermine the uniform application
of benefits. Jd. at 668 (a state law that would “force an ERISA
plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage” would
likely be preempted under ERISA).
Travelers is of a piece with all of this Court’s preemption
decisions which have consistently emphasized the importance
of uniformity and the preeminence of ERISA’s enforcement
mechanisms. Most recently, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran, this Court again stated that ERISA preempts state laws
or causes of action which supplement or add to the remedies
11
available under ERISA, holding that a law that “provided a form
of ultimate relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial
remedies provided by ERISA ... patently violates ERISA’s
policy of inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring a
predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary
conduct.” 536 U.S. at 379.
But the goals of predictability and uniformity that Congress
sought to implement by broad preemption — and which this
Court accomplished in Pilot Life —— have been severely
undermined by the decision of the court below. By permitting
state law claims concerning alleged medically-based eligibility
determinations, the Second Circuit has authorized the
application of substantive state law to the administration of plans
providing health care benefits. “[T]he significance of the holding
by the Second Circuit cannot be overstated. . . . [I]ts protection
of state law causes of action regarding medical practice and
health care are monumental.” Thomas A. Moore & Matthew
Gaier, Recent Second Circuit Decision on HMO Liability,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at 3. If applied everywhere, plan
administrators would be required to make eligibility
determinations under common law regimes that vary from one
state to the next. The impact will be particularly acute on regional
or national plans whose beneficiaries reside in different states.
These plans will be subject to different and potentially
conflicting liability laws, thereby “requiring the tailoring of plans
and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each
jurisdiction” — exactly the result Congress sought to prevent
through the enactment of § 514(a) and § 5U2(a). Jngersoll-Rand
Co., 498 U.S. at 142.
The disuniformity created by the Second Circuit’s decision
is compounded by the confusion that now exists in the lower
courts regarding the impact of this Court’s decision in Pegram
v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) on state-law claims such as
the one at issue here. Since Pegram was decided, at least seven
federal circuit courts and two state courts of last resort have
aa te trace ear eee
12
addressed whether state law claims challenging alleged
medically-based eligibility determinations are preempted by
ERISA, and have handed-down conflicting decisions based on
conflicting rationales. See Land v. Cigna Healthcare of Florida,
__ F3d_, No. 02-15549, 2003 WL 21751247 (11" Cir. July
30, 2003), Marks v. Watters, 322 F.3d 316 (4" Cir. 2003); Haynes
v. Prudential Health Care, 313 F.3d 330 (5" Cir. 2002); Roark
v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5" Cir. 2002), petition for cert.
filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3791 (U.S. June 3, 2003) (No. 02-1826),
and petition for cert. filed sub nom. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
— US.L.W. — (US. June 20, 2003) (No. 02-1845); Caffey v.
Unum Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576 (6" Cir. 2002); Howard v.
Coventry Health Care of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442 (8" Cir. 2002);
Pryzbowki v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001);
Villazon vy. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842
(Fla. 2003); Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001),
cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Healthcare Sys.of Pa., Inc. v. Pa.
Hosp. Ins. Co., 536 U.S. 938 (2002).
Thus, plan administrators must now divine not only the
applicable federal law, but also the underlying state law in those
jurisdictions that, like the Second Circuit, have subjected benefit
decisions to state law causes of action. The difficulty of
this task cannot be underestimated. Consider, for example,
Pennsylvania, where the Third Circuit is at loggerheads with
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 2001, the Third Circuit
held that ERISA preempts a state law claim for negligent delay
in providing treatment, concluding that Pegram did not change
the preemption analysis. Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273. That same
year, by contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked
Pegram in holding that ERISA did not preempt a state law claim
for medical malpractice where the benefit plan administrator
makes a “mixed eligibility and treatment decision.” Pappas v.
Asbel, 768 A.2d at 1095-96. This situation has now become
untenable for plan administrators in Pennsylvania. See Shannon
P. Duffy & Randall J. Peach, Split Decisions, The Legal
Intelligencer, April 6, 2001, at 1 (““What’s a Pennsylvania lawyer
13
to do now that two of the highest courts in the land ...
have issued conflicting back-to-back opinions on the
issue of when [a plan administrator] can be hit with a medical
malpractice suit?”’).
Similarly, the court below was divided over the meaning
of the dicta in Pegram that “mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions” made by HMOs acting through their physician
employees are not fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229. Seizing on that language, the majority
held that if a state law malpractice action against an HMO is
based on a “mixed eligibility and treatment decision,” it is not
subject to ERISA preemption so long as the state law cause of
action involves allegations of faulty medical judgment. Cicio,
321 F.3d at 102. This was a significant misreading of Pegram,
which was not a preemption ruling, as this Court itself
recognized. 530 U.S. at 236-37. As Judge Calabresi’s dissent
points out:
[Pegram ’] well intentioned dicta can only make
sense where the underlying negligence also plausibly
constitutes medical maltreatment by a party who can
be deemed a treating physician or such a physician’s
employer, as was the case in Pegram. Where, as here,
no such relationship existed, there is no apparent
reason, in state or federal law, for treating the
unlawful coverage decision any differently from any
other unlawful coverage that is not based on medical
error.
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 109 (Calabresi J., dissenting).
In sum, an employee benefit plan can no longer maintain a
nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans
because in many states the plan administrators must now
reference state law rules. This Court’s immediate review is
necessary to restore the stability and consistency in the law that
Congress found necessary to encourage employers to offer health
benefits to their employees.
wan ew al
14
II. THE DECISION BELOW RAISES IMMEDIATE
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR ADMINISTRATORS
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS THAT WILL
ULTIMATELY HARM PLAN PARTICIPANTS
The decision below creates real and immediate operational
issues for multistate employee benefit plans that will ultimately
harm plan participants. Requiring plan providers to design their
programs in an environment of differing state standards will
complicate the administration of plans and increase the cost of
health care coverage. In response, many employers will have
no alternative but to reduce coverage to plan participants.
Likewise, permitting state law claims will result in increased
lawsuits arising out of benefit determinations that will drive-up
the cost of administering and providing health care coverage
and further undermine employers’ willingness to provide
coverage voluntarily. As one commentator has noted:
Removal of ERISA preemption and adoption of
more state liability laws could lead to an environment
where HMOs and managed care plans are defending
a number of lawsuits against a number of different
plaintiffs in a number of different states arising under
a number of different types of causes of action.
This is exactly the environment from which
Congress was trying to protect employee benefit
plans generally when it enacted ERISA in 1974.
See Matthew J. Binette, Comment: Patients’ Bill of Rights:
Legislative Cure-All or Prescription for Disaster?, 81 N.C.L.
Rev. 653, 693-94 (2003).
Such practical problems are illustrated by the very type of
procedure at issue in this case. Vytra denied coverage of the
double cell stem transplant on the grounds that it was an
experimental treatment and, as such, was excluded from
coverage under the express terms of the insurance contract.
I _E-
15
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 88. In essence, the employee benefit plan had
determined that there was insufficient clinical research or
experience demonstrating that the treatment was efficacious or
even safe for patients. Prior to the decision below, Vytra’s
determination would have been the same regardless of the
jurisdiction in which a plan beneficiary resided; it would not
cover this type of procedure. Now, Vytra must consider a range
of factors. It first must determine what the law is in the
jurisdiction in which the employee resides. If the employee
resides outside the Second Circuit — for example in New Jersey
— Vytra then may be able to administer the plan as contracted.
If the employee resides in New York, however, Vytra must
consider the applicability of the underlying state law and the
degree to which state law claims might exist.
The situation is further complicated by the difficulty of
assessing the applicability of state law to experimental treatments
or other new medical technology developments. In effect, a plan
administrator must speculate as to how state law judges and
juries will evaluate experimental treatments and new medical
technology for which there will exist no precedent. No reliable
standards exist for a plan administrator to gauge how state law
will apply to such determinations.
This is especially problematic because medical
professionals often make claims regarding the efficacy of
unproven, risky therapies only to see such claims eventually
disproven by clinical trials. Instructive, on this point, is Bast v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003 (9" Cir. 1998),
cert denied, 528 U.S. 870 (1999), which involved a state law
claim against a plan administrator that denied as experimental
autologous bone marrow transplant (“ABMT”’) procedures to
treat a woman’s breast cancer. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the state law claim was preempted by ERISA, notwithstanding
that an oncologist had recommended ABMT procedures.
Id. at 1005, 1007-08. Notably, clinical trials subsequently
16
demonstrated that ABMT does not confer any greater chance of
survival than conventional therapy. Patricia C. Kuszler,
Financing Clinical Research and Experimental Therapies:
Payment Due, But From Whom?, 3 DePaul J. Health Care L.
441, 457-462 (2000) (recounting history of ABMT). By that
time, as many as 30,000 women had received the treatment, at
considerable risk to their health — in fact, the treatment carried
a death rate as high as 7.4%. Jd. at 460-61.
Further, requiring benefit plan administrators to apply
varying statutes and common law definitions of “experimental
treatments” — to the extent such definitions exist — will limit
the flexibility now enjoyed by benefit plan administrators to
tailor plans to meet employers’ and employees’ needs and
budgets. It also may result in one state being able to dictate plan
designs on a nationwide basis.
In any event, the decision below and the more general
confusion of the law in this area forces plan administrators to
treat similarly situated employees differently. Although most
employee benefit plans seek to provide the same coverage to
all similarly situated employees, plan administrators must now
consider whether to allow some employees to receive
certain treatments out of fear of litigation even though a
similar employee in a different state is not allowed the very
same treatment.
For example, the employee benefit plan at issue in this case
had an exclusion for experimental treatments. Prior to the
Second Circuit’s decision, an employee benefit plan in the
downstate New York region could apply that exclusion
uniformly regardless of whether its employees lived in
New York, New Jersey or Connecticut. Under the Second
Circuit’s decision, however, an employer will have to abide by
a new set of rules, which are based on different state common
law causes of action and different state standards as to what is
appropriate medical care. Employers must therefore do precisely
17
what Congress sought to prevent: predict the legality of a
proposed action by referring to varying state laws.
Employers subject to the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction will
likely respond in two ways — both harmful to employees. Some
employers may discontinue health care coverage rather than face
the uncertain rules, litigation and higher costs that now apply to
coverage determinations. Other employers may increase
employee contributions or restrict benefits to counter-balance
the higher risks employers now face. See Milt Freudeinheim,
Employees Paying Ever-Bigger Share for Health Care, N.Y.
Times, September 10, 2003, at Al (reporting on authoritative
study showing that almost 2/3 of large employers with employer-
sponsored health plans raised the amounts that employees are
contributing to the cost of their health plans this year, and 79%
say they will do so again in 2004); The Business Council of the
State of New York, Compensation Data New York 2003 (2003)
(survey of New York employers reflects that, in a
12-month period ending in April 2003, more than 1/3 of
employers increased the employee portion of health insurance
premiums, and nearly 1/3 increased deductible levels). In either
case, the decision below will undermine Congress’ goal of
encouraging employer-sponsored health coverage.
Every day plan administrators must make benefits decisions.
These decisions are now being made under a cloud of uncertainty
and risk of second guessing by state judges and juries.
The situation is unworkable for plan administrators and their
inevitable reaction may well have profound and unintended
consequences for beneficiaries. Accordingly, Amici respectfully
request that the Court grant the petition for certiorari to
reestablish clear guidance not only for lower courts, but also
for the plan administrators now confronted with the uncertainty
and disuniformity Congress sought to avoid.
18
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
\
RICHARD E. RAMSAY
Deputy General Counsel
American Association of
Health Plans
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 778-3230
Lynn DUDLEY
AMERICAN BENEFITS COUNCIL
1212 New York Ave., N.W.
Suite 1250
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-6700
Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD N. ISELIN
Counsel of Record
~ Henry M. GREENBERG
Coucu Wuire, LLP
540 Broadway
P.O. Box 22222
Albany, New York 12201
. (518) 426-2600
ANGELA J. FRANKLIN
HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA
1201 F. Street, N.W. Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 824-1600
PAUL MACIELAK
New York HEALTH PLAN
ASSOCIATION
90 State Street, Suite 825
Albany, New York 12207
(518) 462-2293
Counsel for Amici Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.