Jurisdictional Statement — Tickel v. Georgia

Supreme Court, U.S.

97-3109 FILED

JUL 30 3987

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

Case No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF

THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1986

WILLIAM E. TICKEL, JR., Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Appellee

On Appeal from the

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

WILLIAM EE. TICKEL, JR.

Appellant In Propria Persona

Route i, Box e295

Calhoun, Tn. 37309

(615) 336-3383

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

i. Can the Appellant, a natural unen-

franchised person, sui juris, be compelled

into statutory (maritime) jurisdiction in

order to exercise a common law right?

2. Does Appellant meet the definition

of “person” as defined in OCGA 40-i-i when

that definition clearly pertains. only to

Statutory persons and/or “natural persons"

who have acquired statutory status?

3. Can the Appellant be forced to grant

jurisdiction in order to exercise his right

to counsel of choice?

4%. Was Appellant “informed of the na-

ture and cause of the accusation" when the

trial court refused to specify the type of

jurisdiction exercised and the stipulations

by which the court assumed personal jJjuris-

diction over the Appellant?

5. Were Appellant’s common law rights

violated when the trial court forced Appel-

lant to trial with a statutory panel of six

persons instead of a common law jury?

-i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......+4 5.8 « i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....+ ++ 26 « « &&

TABLE OF AUTHORTIES ......... ti)

CPINIONS BELOW ...... . see e i

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED... 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....... .«. . 10

PLENARY CONSIDERATION ........ . 25

~~~ 5 6 «6 6 es © © «© © «© © «© « @

APPENDICES

Appendix

Appeals Court of Georgia Opinion(s) -g¢-

Supreme Court of Georgia Opinion -8-

Notice of Appeal “ge

Affidavit of Status “—>

Some Misstatements -§-

Certificate of Filing and Service “9°

li

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES

United States Constitution

ll a re ce

Article I, Sec i0 ie 6 2 o 2 2. 2

Article IV, Sec 2 ; Appendix 4 -1i-

Articie V, Bill of Rights . = i6

Articie VI, Bill of Rights . 17, 20

Amendment i3 ...... «6 « « « « §

Amendment 14... . 5, 8 9, 15, 214

Georgia Constitution (1983 version)

Articie I, Paragraph XI (bD). . . 21

CASES

Catiin v. U.S.,

eS Ge 8289, 828s (89ESG) « « « 6 8 0 «2 es

Covington & L.T. Road Co. v. Sandford,

164 US 578 (1896) i aoe lah i4

Dred Scott v. Sanford,

19 How. 393 ha ar ey ee Appendix 4 -1-

Grosjean v. American Press Co.,

S90 Ge Baa. SeS-€49e0s « «© « 8 6 «8 8 i4

Hague v. CIO,

307 US 496, 509 a oe Appendix 4 -2-

Hale v. Henkel,

201 US 43, 47 a a a eee ee ee ee ee 13

Hawkins v. State of Ga.,

336 SE 2d 220 ey Un nf Se ee ey ae? 22, 23

CASES

Hunter v. Martin,

i Wheat 305, 324 : Appendix 4 -1i-

Johnson v. U.S.,

€25 US 405 (1912) ee lee a eee 16

M’Culloch v. Maryland,

4 Wheat 316, 324. Appendix 4 -1i-

Patton v. U.S.,

261 US 276, 2868 » «© « « « O& 28, &@2@ 23

The Slaughter House Cases.

683 US 395, 408 a ae Appendix 4 -2-

Twining v. New Jersey,

211 US 78, 96-111 — se) 4 i3

U.S. v. Anthony,

24 Fed. Case 629 (1873). Appendix 4 -2-

Van Valkenburg v. Brown,

43 Cal 43, 47 (18672)... Appendix 4 -2-

Williams v. Florida,

399 US 78, 86 oe ewe ewe eon & Ce OF

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

116 US 356 (18686) : =. oles Oe eee i4

OTHERS

Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,

4th BGition, 4679 .. ee eee 13, 20

Commentaries on the Constitution,

Justice Joseph Storey, Volume 1,

De Campo Press Reprints . Appendix 4 -1t-

STATUTES

od hd era i3, 16

a et | ee | ee

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeais of

the State of Georgia, Tickel v. State,

Case #% 73964 (Bi-35), was filed on February

3, 1987 and was “NOT TO BE OFFICIALLY RE-

PORTED.”

Appellant's Motion for Rehearing was

denied on March 2, 1967. A “concurring

specially” opinion by Justice Deen was filed

on the same date and made a part of the

court's original opinion of February 3,

1967. These opinions are included with this

Statement as Appendix 1.

The Supreme Court of the State of Geor-

gia issued no opinion (Case # 44474) with

their denial on April 30, 1987 of Appel-

lant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the Court of Appeals. A reproduction of the

post card sent is included as Appendix 2.

Page 1

GROUNDS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION

Nature of the Proceeding

The instant cases are either common iaw

crimes without a corpus delecti, or maritime

crimes with an unknown stipulation granting

jurisdiction. Appellant was unabie to oDd-

tain any statement from the trial court or

the appellant courts on the type of juris-

diction exercised by the trial court, or the

cause and nature of the accusations. They

appear, however, to be @™aritime crimes ad-

Binistered by a liegisiative tribunal.

Appellant was charged with two counts

of Driving With WNo License, two counts of

Operating a Vehicle With WNo License Plate,

and one count of Improper Passing. Appel-

lant was found guiity by the District Court,

fined $3500.00 and court costs, and piaced

on twenty-four months probation

Date of Order of Rehearing.

The initial appeal to the Court of Ap-

peais was docketed on October x, 1966;

heard on January i2. 1987; and denied on

Page 2

February 2, 1967. A Motion for Rehearing was

filed with the Court of Appeais of Georgia

on February 10, 1967 and denied on March 2,

1967

Date of Judgment to be Reviewed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Geor-

gia denied Appellant's Petition for Certior-

ari to the Appeais Court of Georgia by or-

der filed April 30, 1967.

Date of Notice of Appeal

The Notice of Appeal was filed with the

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia on May

22, 1967. A true copy of the Notice of Ap

peal was filed with the Appeals Court of the

State of Georgia as the court possessed of

the record. An additional copy was filed

with the District Attorney of Ocmuigee Dis-

trict pursuant to Rule 10.4, and a copy was

filed with the Attorney General of Georgia

pursuant to Rule 26.4(c). A copy of the

Notice of Appeal is included in this State~

ment as Appendix 43.

Page 3

Provisions Conferring Jurisdiction.

This Appeal is made pursuant to 28 USC

ieS7 (2) which provides that final judgments

made br’ the highest court of a State may be

reviewed “where is drawn in question the va-

lidity of a statute ..,. on the 6round of it

being repugnant to the Constitution, ... and

the decision is in favor of its validity."

Appellant is, and was at the instant

time, a common law resident of the State of

Tennessee as comtemplated by Article IV,

Section 2 of the United States Constitution.

The Supreme Court of Georgia refused to

grant Appellant’s Petition Of Certiorari.

That court has therefore rendered its deci-

sion in the instant case by assenting to the

Judgment of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

This Court has ruled that these conditions

render such judgments final. See Catlin

vs United States, 524 US 229, 233 (1954).

Page 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Preamble to the United States Con-

stitution is concise and _ clear. It estab-

lishes beyond question to whom the organic

Constitution applies. This Court has_ af-

firmed on many occasions that the judicial

citizenship recognized by the organic Con-

stitution is different than the _ legislative

citizenship bestowed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Appendix 4.

This case will contrast the rights due

a natural, unenfranchised person, i.e. 4a

member of the sovereign body, and the le-

gislative privileges granted the Fourteenth

Amendment citizen.

The Constitution specifically forbids

the States from certain conduct in Article

I, Section 10. One such prohibition is in

Clause i whereby "No State shall ... pass

any... Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts.” The State of Georgia has vio-

lated that prohibition in the application of

Page 5

commercial statutes to tne Appellant, a nat-

ural, unenfranchised _ person, sui juris. The

State of Georgia would force the Appellant

to “voluntarily” stipulate to maritime con-

tract in order to exercise a common law

right.

Nor does the zeal of the State of Geor-

gia in applying statutory law to the Appel-

lant, to the deprivation of his natural

rights, stop’ there. The State of Georgia

forced the Appellant to represent himself

In Propria Persona by denying Petitioner

counsel of his choice who could plead the

threshold question § of jurisdiction without

giving Jurisdiction. This "“Ceten~-ée* is

contrary to every tradition of American jur-

ispurdence, and is a direct violation of the

Appellant’s right to counsel of choice as

specifically guaranteed by the Sixth Article

of the Bill of Rights, and Appellant's fund-

amental right of Common Law “due process" as

guaranteed by the Fifth Article of the Bill

of Rights.

Page 6

The State of Georgia refused to inform

the Appellant of the “nature and cause of

the accusation" as required by Article Six

of the Bill of Rights. The Appellant spec-

ifically asked the trial court, in written

and verbal piea, for the following particu-

lars concerning the instant charges: Under

what jurisdiction was the Appellant. being

forced to appear? Common law? Admiralty?

Equity? If Common Law, where is the Corpus

Delecti? If Admiralty, by what stipulation

of the Appellant did the court gain juris-

diction? Appellant could not plead or de-

fend without this information. The trial

court, and every appellant court, has re-

fused to answer these questions concerning

the “mature and cause of the accusation."

The State of Georgia violated Appel-

lant’s Sixth Article right to a common law

jury. Appellant was tried in the instant

case, over objection, Dy a_ statutory. panel

of six legislative persons rather than

twelve peers as spelled out by this Court in

Page 7

Patton Vv. 7 .S., 281 US 276, 288 and

further defined in Williams Vv. Florida,

399 US 78 at 86 in its application through

the Fourteenth Amendment to those subject to

legislative Jurisdiction.

It must be specifically noted that this

appeal is outside the purview of the Thir-

teenth and subsequent related amendments.

Appellant is not a citizen as contemplated

by the Fourteenth Amendment, and has never

claimed any rights under civil law. An

Affidavit attesting to Appellant’s status

and class of citizenship is included with

this Statement as Appendix 4. Appellant’s

class of citizenship is a matter of stipu-

lated and uncontested fact in the instant

case.

Appellant totally and completely dis-

claims any contention that may arise alleg-

ing that the Thirteenth and any subsequent

amendments are a basis for jurisdiction in

the instant appeal, or a basis for adjudi-

cation of the instant appeal. Appellant’s

Page 8

citizenship

owes

the

those

is

a matter of natural right and

nothing to the Fourteenth Amendment and

legislative citizenship it offers to

thus

contempiated.

Page 9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant is a free, white citizen of

the State of Tennessee as_ specifically de-

fined by the Preambies of the Constitutions

of Tennessee and the United States. See

Affidavit of Status, Appendix 4,

This issue was raised at arraignment by

the Appellant. In both written pleadings

Submitted prior to the arraignment, and at

the arraignment itself, Appellant appeared

by Special Appearance and denied the _ juris-

diction of the court over his person by rea-

son of his undiminished class of citizen-

ship. The issue was raised again at the mo-

ee eee

tion hearing on jurisdiction and rights.

Appellant continued to raise this issue

at each level of the appellate process. The

trial court refused to address the _ issue.

This 1s not’ surprising. The trial court is

a statutory court which has no power to de-

cide constitutional law. The trial court in

the instant case 18 a creature of the legis-

Page 10

ee

lature, and must follow the will of its cre-

ator, as the Article I tribunals of the Uni-

ted States must do the will of the Congress.

Appellant, in support of his claims to

be an unenfranchised, natural person, sul

juris, produced evidence that he held no

state, federal, or national franchise, and

no license or other privilege. This evi-

dence vas produced, with the supporting

affidavits, at each stage of the proceed-

ings. Appellant’s status-at-law and class

of citizenship was never challenged or de-

nied by the trial court, the district at-

torney, nor any of the appellate courts.

The Georgia Court of Appeals did par-

tially acknowledge Appellant’s arguments by

stating that, "se we adopted appellant’s

view, we would have two types of citizens in

this state: first-class, superior, sovereign

unenfranchised persons with unrestricted

rights to travel. .., and second class, in-

ferior, enfranchised persons who possess the

right to travel but are subject ude” The

Page iti

Appeals Court then rejected Appellants view

because ”" .... special preference for some,

whether racial, sexual, or with reference to

the “rules of the road" -- does not and can-

not exist in the administration of justice

in this state." See Appendix i, p. 2-3 of

"Concurring Specially Opinion." This opin-

ion 1S not rooted in law, but in the pre-

vValling mores of socialist and proletariat

equality brought into popularity by the _ fic-

tion of law that ALL natural persons,

regardiess of circumstance, have the status

of Fourteenth Amendment Citizens of the Un-

ited States and are therefore subject to the

whims of the legislature, even to the denial

and degradation of natural rights.

The trial court presumed jurisdiction

with no explanation and forced Appellant to

trial. In so doing, the trial court not on-

ly violated other rights belonging to the

Appellant but did, in fact and law, misapply

the Georgia Statutes as they are written

Page i2

En ee

to the Appellant. Appellant pointed out to

the trial court, and to all levels of the

Appellate Courts that the definition of

"person" as defined in Georgia Code 40-i-1

did not apply to the Appellant. The defini-

tion of "person" in Code Section 40O-1i-1

reads as_ follows:

4O-1i-1. Definitions.

As used in this title, the term:

(38) “Person” means every natural per-

son, firm, copartersnhip, association,

or corporation.

Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, i4th Ed.

(1879) defines the term "person" as_ follows:

© ese The term, as is seen, is more exten-

sive than man, - including artificial be-

ings, «.. as well as nmatural beings. But

when the word “persons" is spoken of in

legislative acts, natural persons will be

intended, unless something appears in the

context to show that it applies to artifi-

cial persons.” (Emphasis added.)

In Hale Vs. Henkel, 201 US 43, 74

Page 13

this Court ruled that there is a clear dis-

tinction between an individual and a corpo-

ration, and that one of those differences

was that the individual “may stand on >his

rights as a citizen... and [{H)is power to

contract is unlimited _...."

This Court has also ruled that the

meaning of the word “person” as used in the

14th Amendment is not to be restricted by

the definition of the word "citizens," and

includes all within the United States

regardless of race, color, and nationality.

See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 116 US 356

(1866). And has additionally ruled that

corporations are persons within the meaning

of the constitutional provisions of the i4th

Amendment which forbid the deprivation of

property without due process of iaw. See

Covington & LT. Road Co. v. Sandford,

164 US 578 (1896); Grosjean v. American

Press Co., 297 US 233, 244 (1936) and

cases cited. It iS important to also note

that the "due process of law" guaranteed by

Page i4

the 14th Amendment is not the same “due

process of law" recognized by Articie V of

the Bill of Rights. The “due process” of

the i4th Amendment is in accordance with the

Roman civil law while that of the Fifth

Article is in accordance with the common

law. Fourteenth Amendment “due process"

consist of "notice and opportunity for

hearing” and does not require the presence

of judge, jury, or even 4a judicial pro-

ceeding. It may be administered "as

appropriate” to the case at “hand. See

Twining Vv. New Jersey, 2311 US 78, 96-

111.

It is then clearly established that

there is a difference between the rights of

(unenfranchised) matural persons and juris-

tic persons. Therefore, any natural person

included in the same list, and which does

not distinguish between them, must neces-

sarily have the same status as a firm,

copartnership, association or corporation.

Any other explanation of “person” would

Page 15

immediately render such a statute constitu-

tionally suspect Appellant is not such a

person as defined in Georgia Code 40-i-1.

During the jurisdictional hearing Ap-

pellant demanded the right to counsel of

choice who was not a licensed attorney to

plead the threshold issue of jurisdiction.

This demand was denied even though

appearance of a member of the bar to plead

jurisdiction for the Appellant would have

granted jurisdiction. Thus Appellant was

forced to represent himself. Appellant did

not appear Pro Se, but In Propria

Persona. Appellant's pleadings, both oral

and written, to the trial court pointed out

the violation of Appellant's Fifth Article

right to common law “due process," and his

Sixth Article right to counsel of choice.

These pleadings were denied by the trial

court without comment or reason. The Court

of Appeals likewise denied Appellant's right

to counsel of choice. The <Appeais Court de-

Page 16

nial did not answer the threshold question

of Jurisdiction The court simply stated

that. “The trial court properly denied Mr.

Tickel the right to be “represented” in 42

superior court by a non-licensed person unm

versed in the law."

Articie VI of the Bill of Rights guar-

antees that the accused “be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation." Appel-

iant has not, to this date, received re~

sponse in any form from any Court in answer

to Appellant's Notices, Demands, Pleas, Mem-

erandums, Briefs, and Motions for an exX~

planation of the nature of the charges and

the cause of the accusation.

Appellant was unable to obtain an an-

swer from the trial court stating the nature

of its specific jurisdiction concerning the

instant charges, i.e., under what specific

jurisdiction was the court forcing the Ap-

pellant to appear? Common Law? Equity? Ada-

miraity?

Page i7

en ne ee

After the arraignment, Appellant tried

again to obtain an answer from the court on

the nature of its jurisdiction. Appellant

submitted A Statement for the Record Con-

cerning the Arraignment, in which” Appel-

lant specifically asked the trial court to

answer five questions: All are paramount in

determining "the mature and cause of the

accusation." No answers to the questions

have ever been supplied, either verbally or

in writing, by any court.

The trial court insisted it had "an-

swered" the questions by reaffirming what

the Appellant had already made a matter of

record: Appellant had no driver's license

and no tag on the vehicle in question. The

sterile recital of the indictment does not

Satisfy the requirement of informing the

accused if no plea is entered by the ac-

cused. See Johnson Vv. United States,

eeS US 405 (1912).

The trial court refused to answer the

Page 18

question: In what type of court is the Ap-

pellant being forced to appear? The trial

court refused to answer the question of how,

lf the court was an equity or maritime

court, the Appellant had stipulated to those

jurisdictions; and how if it were a common

law court, the charges were common liaw

crimes? Not being specifically informed of

the nature of the court into which the

accused is dragged is a clear violation of

the restraints placed on government by

Article VI of the Bill of Rights; for in

truth, without this information, how can the

accused defend himself? Is it not true that

the jurisdictions encompass different rules

and procedures? Is it not true that a valid

defense in the common law would be without

merit in Admiralty? How can the type of

jurisdiction in which an accused is forced

to appear be withheld?

The Appeals Court ruled that the Appel-

lant understood the nature and cause of the

charges. This ruling was made because the

Page 19

Appellant "admitted" during the jurisdiction

hearing that he Knew which numbered. sections

of the Code he was being accused of violat-

ing; and that his lack of understanding

"arose solely out of his contention that he

was an unenfranchised person who was not

properly before the court."

The Appellant entered the trial court

in special appearance and continued to con-

test jurisdiction. After being forced to

trial, Appellant demanded a common law jury

of twelve peers.

In all criminal prosecutions the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and

public trial, by an impartial jury bits

Article VI of the Bill of Rights, Uni-

ted States Constitution.

In all cases before the Fourteenth

Amendment, and its application to 14th

Amendment citizens, the word "jury" was de-

fined thusly:

The number of jurors must be twelve; and

it is held that the term jury in the con-

stitution imports, ex vi termim, twelve

men." Bouviers Law Dictionary, supra,

p. 771.

Page 20

[...Jwe first imquire what 1s embraced Dy

the phrase "trial by jury.” That 1t means

a trial by jury as understood and applied

at common law, and includes all the es-

sential elements as they were recognized

in this country and England when the Con-

stitution was adopted, is not open to

question. Those elements were - (i) that

the jury should consist of twelve men,

neither more nor less; wae “ Patton Vv.

U.S., 261 US e276, 286.

Georgia's Constitution allows the

General Assembly to “prescribe any number,

not less than six, to constitute a trial

jury in courts of limited jurisdiction and

in superior courts in misdemeanor’ cases."

Georgia Constitution, Article | Bill of

Rights, Para. na (dD). The Georgia

Constitution was rewritten in 1945, 1976,

and 1983. All three of these "new"

Constitutions were written under the purview

of the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifi-

cally, the 1983 Georgia Constitution’s lib-

erty with the number of jurors required, and

the General Assembly’s passage of OCGA 15-

412-i23 placing the number of jurors in

Appellant’s case at six is not lawful when

Page ei

applied to the Appellant. Note that

Patton’s right to a twelve-man jury

was “not open to qestion." And yet ae six-

person statutory panel was acceptable in

the Williams case below:

We hold that the i2-man panel is not a

necessary ingredient of “trial by # jury,”

and that respondent’s refusal to impanel

more than the six members provided for by

Florida law did not violate petitioner’s

Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the

States through the Fourteenth. Williams

Vv. Florida, 399 US 78 at 86.

The Appeals Court stated that the

Appellant claims that the jury should have

consistent beliefs with Appellant. This is

not true. Appellant held (as = secondary

issue) that a Common Law jury must _ 0be

composed of peers; and that statutory

citizens sitting on statutory juries are not

peers of a full Preamble Citizen. This” was

dismissed as having -no merit, but without

case cite.

Hawkins Vv. State, 23553 Ga. App.

172 (336 SEed 220) was cited to justify the

ruling that a six-person "sry" did not

Page 22

violate Appellant’s Common Law rights. In

Judge Deen’s own words, "The Common Law of

England in force on May 14, 1776 was adopted

in Georgia on February e5, 1784." And that

"Appellant’s individual rights under the

Common. Law se... were not violated." How is

this possible if, according to a ruling Dy

this Court that a Common Law jury’s com-

position of twelve ("neither more nor _ less")

is not open to question? Patton, supra.

Hawkins and Williams were obviously

Fourteenth Amendment Citasena and not en-

titled to Common Law rights, but only to

Statutory privilege. This is the only = ex-

Planation that reconciles the two apparently

conflicting statements. Such a ruling in

the instant case is not possible.

The Court of Appeals opinion for this

case is filled with misstated assertions and

contentions of the Appellant. Some are

Outrageously incorrect. Appellant’s effort,

to this point, has been to conform to this

Page 23

Court’s rules, and at the same time, “undo"

the most incorrect. Many, however, are only

subtly misapplied, misstated, or out-of-con-

text. It is an impossible task for the Ap-

pellant to correct these deviations in the

short space of this Statement. The Appel-

lant can only make it a matter of record

that these things have been made a matter of

record; and that they were pointed out in

Appellant’s pleading to the Georgia Supreme

Court. That pleading is not included here.

Appellant therefore asKs this Court to make

future reference to Appellant’s pleadings to

ascertain their content if a contradiction

seems to be present. Appendix 5 of this

statement shows two such examples of the Ap-

peals Court’s "mis-statements”".

Page 24

THE REQUIREMENT FOR PLENARY CONSIDERATION

This is not a traffic citation case.

The trial court understood the issues, and

obviously believed the Appellant was right.

Fines of $3500.00, court costs, and two

years probation are not meted out to first-

time offenders for driving without a driv-

er’s license.

The Constitutional Law at the core of

this case strikes at the very heart of the

legal tyranny which has been imposed by un-

restrained legislative power. Even the

courts have been constrained to enforce

legislative edict. Article I tribunals, un-

der the appearance of Article III courts,

rountinely and legally strip away the rights

of a once free _ people.

This case is about the recovery of Ilib-

erty. Is it possible for a Preamble Citizen

to lawfully recover his birthright? Or has

the fiction of law that all natural persons

are now residents of the District of Colum-

Page 25

bia progressed to the point of no return,

regardless of the efforts made by that per-

son to make that return?

Tyranny in any form is_ still tyranny.

It matters not if nmatural rights are denied

by a distant King or by an elected legisla-

ture. This case is about the organic law of

the United States, and how and when it can

be lawfully claimed or lawfully denied.

Appellant requests that this appeal be

heard with briefs and oral presentations

from ail parties so that the law and facts

can be ruled on by this august body. The

Constitution demands no less.

Page 26

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the Appellant requests that

this Court docket this case, order the _ sub-

mission of briefs, the hearing of oral argu-

ments, and thereafter rule on the issues of

law herein presented.

Dated this 28th day of July in the year

of Our Redemption, and by the Grace of Our

Lord, Jesus Christ, 1987.

Respectfully Submitted,

WiMaw E. Arch Ln

WILLIAM E. TICKEL, JR.

Appellant In Propria Persona

Route i, Box 295

Cainoun, Tn. 37309

(615) 336-3363

Page 27

FEB 3 1967

NOT TO BE

OFFICIALLY REPORTED

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

738694. Tickel v. The State. (Bi-35)

BIRDSONG, Chief Judge.

William E. Tickel, Jr. was convicted by

jury of two counts of driving without a lic-

ense, two counts of driving without having a

license plate on his vehicie and one count

of illegal passing in a no passing zone. He

was sentenced to serve twelve months pro-

bated upon the payment of a $3,500 fine. He

brings this appeal enumerating seven assert-

ed trial errors.

The facts of this case are not in

contention and clearly establish that Mr.

Tickel, a legal resident of the state of

Tennessee but at work on construction in

this state, passed another car on a hill to

the left side of a solid yellow line (i.e.,

a no passing zone) under the constant view

Appendix i

-{-

of a patrolman in an approaching patrol car.

Upon being stopped by the patrolman, Mr.

Tickel candidly admitted that ne did not

possess a driver's ,icense and had upon the

rear of his car a tag reading “Common Law

i776" but one not issued by any licensing

Jurisdiction.

What distinguishes this case from other

cases involving issues of traffic violations

is Mr. Tickel’s contention that he is an un-

enfranchised matural person who is subject

only to the original laws adopted by the

United States at its inception as a nation.

He contends that as an unenfranchised nat~-

ural person, laws adopted by the individual

states subsequent to the adoption of the

fundamental laws are applicable to unen-

franchised, natural persons only if they

consent thereto. Thus, Mr. Tickel contends

that laws enacted for public safety by in-

dividual states are in effect laws of con-

tract. In exchange for the enhanced safety

offered by the State through its _ police,

Appendix i

-2-

ee

fire, and medical regulations (paid for by

taxes), the franchised citizen of the state

accepts not only the protection but the duty

to submit to the laws used to enforce and

guarantee these protections. His argument

continues to the effect that a State cannot

compel a matural citizen to enter into 4a

such a contract and if the natural, unen-

frachised citizen does not accept the con-

tract with its terms, the natural citizen is

not bound by the laws used to enforce the

contract. Within the premise argued by Mr.

Tickel, the enactment of traffic laws by a

State can only be intended by the State to

regulate the conduct of those franchised

citizens submitting themsieves to those

regulations. A further facet of Mr. Tick-

els's argument is that while it is possibie

for an unenfranchised, natural citizen to be

subject to rules of navigation (i.e, travel

upon the highways of the United States),

this is a matter of maritime law solely

within the province of the United States.

Appendix i

-3-

Therefore it 1s his contention that the

legislative acts of a subordinate juris-

diction are not applicable to a natural

citizen of the United States. Mr. Tickel

offered evidence that he had repudiated any

connection with the Social Security System,

had no driver’s license or license tag, nor

did he acKnowledge a birth certificate on

file in the State of Texas. It is within

the general context of these propositions

that Mr. Tickel offers his seven enumera-

tions of error. Held:

1. Mr. Tickel contends that because he

is mot a citizen of Georgia and harmed no

one, nor did he violate any “basic common

law" to which as a natural citizen of the

United States he is subject, the trial court

unlawfully coerced him under an improper as~-

sertion of police power before the court and

illegally exercised jurisdiction over his

person. He contends the State did not prove

that he was a “person” subject to the "con-

tractual" ‘traffic laws of this_ state. He

Appendix i

-4-

argues the trial court was obligated to

inform him whether the court was acting as a

court of equity, civil court on a contract

matter or attempting to exercise maritime

powers or a commen law court enforcing the

general law and whether the alleged infrac-

tions were violations of a contract, laws of

navigation or common law. It is contended

the failure to give such advice denied him a

fair trial. He likewise argues that he was

entitled to be represented by counsel of his

choice, such counsel to hold views” similar

to his own. The only person Mr. Tickel

could offer as counsel was not a _ licensed

eenner of any bar, nor could he be, for a

license would not allow the counsel to be

an .unenfranchised natural citizen. Being a

layman required to defend himself, Mr.

Tickel urges error in the refusal of the

trial court to inform Tickel during the pro-

gress of the trial when an objection was

appropriate or when procedurally to act in

an ampropriate way. Mr. Tickel further con-

Appendix i

-5-

tends that inasmuch as he is subject only to

the “common law" he was denied his lawful

rights by being tried Dy a jury of six fra-

ther that the common law jury of i2 and fur-

ther his "“peers" should hold consistent be-

liefs. Lastiy, Hr. Tickel argues the pun-

isnment imposed by the trial court was harsh

and vindictive because he (Tickel) was only

exercising the right of any citizen, 4.0.,

the right to challenge "city MNhall."

We find no merit in any of these enum-

erations. It 1s clear that the State of

Georgia May require owners of motor venhic-

les to obtain a license tag for such ve-

hicle with certain exceptions not here ap-

Plicable. OCGA 40-2-20., Likewise, OCGA 40-

6-46 proscribes passing in a no passing

zone. OCGA 40-5-20 (a) States that no

person shall drive a motor vehicle upon a

highway of this state without a valid driv-

ers’s license. The evidence is clear that

Mr. Tickel violated each of these statutes.

It likewise equally is clear that Mr. Tickel

Appendix i

-6-

ls a person subject to such laws when he

voluntarily exercises the right to drive up-

on the highways of this. state. Jonnston vv.

State, 236 Ga. 370, 371 (223 SE2d 808).

Likewise, it is clear from the tran-

script that Mr. Tickel understood the charge

and in what manner the State contended he

violated the charge and in what manner the

State contended he violated the several

Statutes. Mr. Tickel’s lacK of understand-

ing of the charges arose soiely out of his

contention that he was an _ unenfranchised

person who was not- properly before’ the

court. The law has no special niche’ for

those who would create a special category of

citizenship mor owes any explanation as to

why its laws should apply equally to all

citizens.

The trial court properly denied Mr.

Tickel the right to be "represented" in a

superior court by a non-licensed person un-

versed in the law. Lebrun iv. State, 255 Ga.

406 (2) (339 SE2d 227).

Appendix i

-T-

The trial court also properly refused

to act as advocate for Mr. Tickel which

would have been the result if the trial

court sua sponte advised Tickel of the

proper time to consider objections, motions

or other procedural = actions.

OCGA 15-12-125 provides for a six-mem-

ber jury in misdemeanor cases. This action

was consistent with constitutional safe-

guards. See HawkKins _v. State, 255 Ga. App.

172 (336 SE2d 220). member

We will not consider the issue of ex-

cessiveness of the sentence, which was well

within the parameters of OCGA i7-10-3. Mr.

Tickel was convicted of five misdemeanors.

With exceptions not here relevant, a mis-

demeanor is punishable by a fine not to

exceed $1,000, imprisonment not to exceed 12

months or both. OCGA 17-10-e. A sentence

was imposed by a trial court acting within

its discretion which is within the _ limits

prescribed by law for the offenses charged

and found guilty is lawful and fails with-

Appendix i

-§-

out the jurisdiction of this court to review

for error or the trial’s court refusal to

reduce it. Bolden v. State, i148 Ga. App.

wea, 287 # (3) (251 SEe2d 165); Jackson Vv,

State, i142 Ga. App. 565 (1) (236 SE2d 549);

Anderson v. State, i129 Ga. App. i (198 SE2d

329); Bowman _v. State, 91 Ga. App, 52, 54

(7) (85 SE2d_ 66).

Judgment affirmed. Deen, Pd. and

Pope, a. ¢oncur.,

Appendix i

-9-

73894. TICKEL v. THE STATE. (Bi-35)

DEEN, Presiding Judge, concurring spec-

lally.

While concurring fully with the major-

ity opinion, I feel compelled to set forth

other pertinent facts and observations to

answer appellant’s contention that we have

ignored and failed to address his main and

"overriding questions of constitutional law"

to the effect that he is not the type of

"person" subject to and bound by Georgia

law.

He was operating his vehicle on the

highways of Georgia without a driver’s li-

cense, passing on a double yellow line, and

had no valid license plate, although he did

have a tag on his car reading “Common Law

1776." Appellant contends he is a natural-

born white freeman who 1s an_ unenfranchised

citizen under Dred Scott Vv. Sandford, 19

How. 393 (1857), as opposed to what he terms

a 14tn-Amendment-enfranchised citizen. He

Appendix i

-10-

has demanded his rights under the common

law, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights of

1689, the Articles of Confederation, the

Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Con-

Stitution, the Bill of Rights of i787, and

the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Demand was made at the trial level for

a judge “who is not a Mason or a Jew." He

rejected the former because, he alleged,

Masons take an oath that if one “gets the

sign... he will... honor the request _ of

any other Mason... regardless of the law

involved wa The latter, he averred, in

taKing the Jewish oath of Kol Nidre on the

Day of Atonement each year, would vow, "No

matter what he’s done to anybody, as long as

it wasn’t a Jew, it wasn’t wrong." This

demand was denied by the trial court, and we

affirm.

The Supreme Court of Georgia transfer-

ed this case to this court because the is-

sues presented concern only "an application

of the Constitution." The Common Law of

Appendix i

-{i-

England in force on May 14, 1776, was

adopted in Georgia on February 25, 1784.

Neither appellant’s individual rights under

the Common Law, nor his Equal Protection

rights under the i4th Amendment to the US.

Constitution and Article I, Section i, Para-

graph II, of the Georgia Constitution have

been violated. If we adopted the appel-

lant’'s view, we would have two types of

citizens in this state: first-class, sup-

erior, sovereign unenfranchised persons with

unrestricted rights to travel but without

any responsibility to uphold the state penal

statutes, and second-class, inferior, en-

franchised persons who possess the right to

travel but are subject to state law.

Discrimination on i.e., special preference

for some, whether racial, sexual, or with

reference to the "rules of the road" -- does

not and cannot exist in the administration

of justice in this~ state. "In the court

house, the standard of justice for both

sexes fall races and persons} is the same.

Appendix i

-{2-

Like the sun, the law shines on all who are

in the same place with equal warmth and

splendor.” Boland v. Klink, 63 Ga. 448, 453

(1879). The latter case goes on to hold

that even “the most charming and attractive

woman in the universe, loaded down with

misfortune, is not to prevail as a_e suitor

where she is in the wrong, be her adversary

whom he may." (Empnhasis”~ supplied.)

One of the first judges on this court,

Judge Powell, has expressed it well: "But

the prime cardinal essential of juridic jus-

tice is expressed in the homely’ colloquial-

ism, Feed everybody out of the same

spoon.” Lanham v. Presley, 7 Ga. App. 839

(68 SE 446) (1910). Justice LumpKin, in

contrasting the theory of government in

Great Britian with that of the United

States, has emphasized that here "the

Supreme power resides in the people. There,

the government is master of the people; here

the people are masters of the governement."

Beall iv. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 215 (1850). It

Appendix i

-{3-

follows that all our people are subject to

the same rights and responsibilities under

the law. This is still the posture of our

law. Therefore, we have no alternative but

to affirm.

Judgment affirmed. Pope, J., concurs.

Deen, P.J., concurs specially.

Appendix i

-1{4-

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Atlanta, March 2, 1987

The Court of Appeals met pursuant to adjour-

ment. The following order was passed:

73694. William E. Tickel, Jr. v. The State

Upon consideration of a motion for rehear-

ing filed on behalf of appellant in the a-

‘ove case, it is hereby ordered that the _ sp-

special concurrence attached hereto be at-

tached to the original majority opinion dat-

ed February 3, 1987, it is further ordered

that page 7 attached hereto be substituted

for page 7 of the original opinion dated

February 3, 1987. Motion for rehearing is

hereby denied.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta Mar 2 1987

I certify that the above is a true extract

from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of

Georgia. Witness my signature and the. seal

of said court hereto affixed the day and

year last above written.

S/ Victoria McLaughlin. Clerk.

Appendix i

-15-

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VIDSYORS 4O LYNOD AW3YdNS “301440 S.NYRID

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF GEORGIA

WILLIAM E. TICKEL, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant

Case No. 44474

STATE OF GEORGIA,

)

)

)

Vs. )

)

)

Plaintiff-Appellee. )

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Comes now, WILLIAM E. TICKEL, JR., a

natural unenfranchised person, Sul Juris,

and gives notice to this Court that

Appellant will file an Appeal to the Supreme

Court of the United States from the Order

entered by this Court on April 30, = i987

denying Certiorari to the Appeals Court of

the State of Georgia (Case # 73894) which

erroneously upheld Appellant’s conviction in

Criminal Admiralty by the Superior Court of

Wilkinson Co., Georgia (Indictment ge-7"

564i & 5644).

I

This Notice of Appeal is filed pursuant

to Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court

of the United States, and in lieu of Rule 16

Appendix 3

tin

0 OOOO OO EE E——VO

Dated this 22nd day of May in the year

of Our Redemption, and by the Grace of Our

Lord, 1987.

Respectfully Submitted,

S/WILLIAM E. TICKEL, JR.

Appellant Sui Juris

In Propria Persona

Route i, Box 295

Calhoun, Tn. 37309

(615) 336-3383

Appendix 3

— 4-

AFFIDAVIT OF STATUS

STATE OF TENNESSEE )

)

COUNTY OF MCMINN )

I, WILLIAM €E. TICKEL, JR., do hereby § freely

dispose, affirm, and state the following to

be true to the best of my Knowledge and 0be-

lief:

i) That I was born on December 23, 1928

in Laredo, Texas, County of Webb, to William

E. and Marie Victoria Tickel.

2) That I have lived in McMinn County,

Tennessee since January of 1982.

3) That I am part of the posterity, in

blood, of "We the People,” as specifically

contemplated in the Preamble of the United

States Constitution. See Commentaries on

the Constitution of the United States,

Justice Joseph Storey, Volume Re De Capo

Press Reprints (1970) at page 443-447. See

also Dred Scott Vv. Sanford, 19 How.

393; Hunter v. Martin, i Wheat 305 at

324; M’Cullocn v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316

at 405.

4) That I am a natural born, white,

United States of America Citizen de jure as

specifically defined in Dred Scott V.

Sanford, i19 How. 393.

5) That I am a common law citizen of

the State of Tennessee as contemplated Dy

Article IV, Section 2 of the United States

Constitution.

6) That I am not a citizen as contem-

Plated and defined by the Fourteenth (14th)

Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States of America, and that my rights are

not subject to purview through the 14th

Amendment. See Van Valkenburg v. Brown,

Appendix 4

-{-

43 Cal 43, 47 (1872); United States Vv.

Rhodes, 27 Fed. Cas. 785, 794 (1866);

United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Cas.

829, 830 #£(1873); The Slaughter House Ca-

ses, 8&3 US 395, 408; Twining . Vv. New

Jersey, ett US 78, 96; Hague Vv. Cri,

307 US 496, 509.

7) That I have no contracts of any

Kind, whether actual, quasi, pseudo,

adhesion, or implied which limit, Walve,

hinder, impede, impair, or negate any of my

Constitutional and Common Law Rights as

specifically declared in the organic

Constitution of the United States of

America; or which bring my Rights into

purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.

8) That I have no insurable interests

held by any county, state, or federal

government.

- 9) That I am not engaged in business,

trade, commerce, or industry in any manner,

or in any capacity, and am not’ therefore

subject to the jurisdictions of equity,

mercantile equity, maritime (admiralty), or

executive chancery.

10) That I enjoy no privilege of

limited liability for the payment of debts.

11) That I exercise my right to work

Pursuant to the common law as a trader-at-

law, on a cash basis, without recourse to

Lawful Money through no fault of mine,

but due to an Act of Congress, HJR i192 of

June 5, 1933, and the practices of the

Federal Reserve (a privately owned

corporation) since December é3, 1913 untii

the present.

12) That I claim all of my rights at all

times, including my right to time, and that

I do not waive any of my rights at any time

for any reason whatsoever.

Appendix 4

-2-

FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT:

Subscribed and affirmed Nunc Pro

Tunc the 23rd day of December in the year

of our Lord, i949.

Dated this 28th day of July in the year

of our Lord, 1987.

Site €. avd \.

WILLIAM EE. TICKEL, JR.

Witnessed as affirmed by the affiant on the

above date.

Witnesses:

#4 », an inhabitant

of 7. -

Fn £ anv » an inhabitant

of Taw re. 3 $22,

S Bae a) anol , an inhabitant

Appendix 4

-3-

TWO MISSTATEMENTS

OF THE GEORGIA APPEALS COURT

Judge Deen, in his concurring opinion,

states that "Neither appellant's individual

rights under the Common Law, nor his Equal

Protection rights under the i4th Amendment

to the _ U. Ss. Constitution and... , have :

been violated." (Emphasis added). Appellant

has never, never, never, claimed that any-

thing under the Fourteenth Amendment has

been violated. Appellant has no need of the

Fourteenth Amendment and repeats again for

the record that it 1s a matter of record

that Appellant 1s not a Fourteenth Amendment

Citizen and his Common Law Rights are not

subject to purview through that Amendment.

Appellant is puzzled by Judge _ Deen's

lengthy affirmation of a trial court deci-

sion which was not appealed. Demand was made

by the Appellant at trial level for a judge

"who is not a Mason or a Jew." The demand

was overruled; and has not been referenced

Appendix 5

~4-

by the Appellant, the State, or the courts

since its denial. The reason for its inclu-

sion by the learned judge is obvious. Peti-

tioner feels obliged, under the circumstan-

ces, to set the record straight. It is Ap-

pellant’s personal belief that the Oath of

Kol WNidre is in conflict with the Oath

of Judges as required in OCGA 15-6-6. It

1s impossible for the same person to Keep

faith with both.

Nor is it a secret that the Masonic Or-

der 1S secret; and requires its members to

swear to secret oaths. The unkKnown - quantity

of those oaths make any judge who has sworn

them suspect. What assurances do the _ people

who stand before the court Nave that’ those

secret oaths are not also in conflict with

the Cath of Judges, supra.?

Appendix 5

-2-

sent abd te

ee Te ee ee eee ee

AFFIDAVIT OF FILING AND SERVICE

ETT te A Nad

I, William E. Tickel, Jr., Appellant In

Propria Persona, do hereby dispose, affirm,

and state the following to be true to the

best of my Knowledge and belief:

1) That forty (40) copies of this

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT were _ posted to

the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the Un-

ited States at 1 First St, N.E., Washington,

D.C. by Certified Receipt (Express Delivery)

First Class Mail on July 29, 1987 and that

I have said certification in my _ possession.

2) That thirty-nine (39) copies of the

original STATEMENT were returned to me

on August 3, 1987 for correction and subse-

quent resubmission in order for the case to

be docketed.

3) That forty (40) copies of the cor-

rected JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT have

been posted on the date indicated below to

the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United

States at 1 First St, N.E., Washington, D.C.

by Certified Receipt (Express Delivery)

First Class Mail.

4) That in accordance with Rule _ 33,

three (3) copies of this JURISDICTIONAL

STATEMENT have been posted by First Class

Mail to each of the addressees listed on the

date indicated below.

MICHAEL J.. BOWERS

Attorney General of Georgia

State Capitol Building

Atlanta, Ga. 30334

(404) 656-4566

JOSEPH H. BRILEY

District Attorney, Ocmulgee Circuit

P.O. Box 361

Gray, Ga. 31032

(912) 986-3166

a

-{-

ClerK, Supreme Court of Georgia

Room. 572

244 Washington Street

Atlanta, Ga. 30334

Clerk, Appeals Court of Georgia

433 State Judicial Building

Atlanta, Ga. 30334

FURTHER AFFAINT SAITH NOT:

Dated this 2Z]th day of August in the

year of Our Lord, 1987.

William EE. Tickel, Jr.

Subscribed to before me on the 14th

day of August , 1987.

My Commission expires on 3-25-90

Appendix 6

-2-

ane