Motion — National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel

Supreme Court brief1985

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

| Pores si Court, us. |

FIlUSD

et ee, e

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED freeRNOT . srevae

OCTOBER TERM, 1984 pe weetet

_. _ The National Association For The Advance-

» ment of Colored People, Inc., et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

South Carolina, ex rel. Michael Roland

Daniel, et al.,

Bee Me Appellees.

ae ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

ae.” DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

me OF SOUTH CAROLINA

i) | MOTION TO DISMigs

: ‘

|... Corley Singletary Porter Post Office Box 11867

+ and Dibble, P.A. Columbia, SC 29211

Terrell iL. Glenn* (303) 753-7268

M. Crum

! Office Box 11390

= Columbia, SC 29211

(803) 799-9800

Attorneys for Appellees, §§ Attorney for Appellee

~Déniel, Dennis, and Sheheen

Joseph A. Wilson, II* Treva G. Ashworth*

|» Charles W. Gambrell, Jr. Post Office Box 11549

cy Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211

_. - Columbia, SC 29211 _ . (803) 7538-2072

, 283) 758-2072

a ! Attorneys for Appellee Attorney for Appellee

sf Schwartz Ellisor

*Counsel of Record

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1934

The National Association For The Advance-

ment of Colored People, Inc., et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

South Carolina, ex rel. Michael Roland

Daniel, et al.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

MOTION TO DISMISS

McNair Glenn Konduros David Rudd

Corley Singletary Porter Post Office Box 11867

and Dibble, P.A. Columbia, SC 29211

Terrell L. Glenn* (303) 7538-7268

M., Elizabeth Crum

Post Office Box 11390

Columbia, SC 29211

(303) 799-9800

Attorneys for Appellees, Attorney for Appellee

Daniel, Dennis, and Sheheen

Williams

Joseph A. Wilson, II* Treva G. Ashworth*

Charles W. Gambrell, Jr. Post Office Box 11549

Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211

Columbia, SC 29211 (803) 758-2072

(803) 758-2072

Attorneys for Appellee Attorney for Appellee

Schwartz Ellisox

*Counsel of Record

7 esi elie

eit tisk th bBo ea

. als 7 ?

4 :

a 7

—

, hee ee. me

ae ee

}

baa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ge 2

ee ar 3

EEE eee ee ee 3

Constitutional and Statutory

EN, re 4

mumaeese GE CMO COBE.... wc ccc reverses 5

Argument:

1. This appeal should be dis-

missed since appellants admit that

the order appealed herein has been

vacated and thus any action by

this Court is an advisory

Te eee GA a 5 6 ee woe 8 A Kae eo 10

2. This appeal should be dis-

missed for want of jurisdiction as

the order objected to is not final

and none of the cited statutes

confers jurisdiction in this

3. This appeal should be dis-

missed because it seeks relief

that is either redundant or which

appellant should have obtained by

prompt action in the court below

FE OTe CRC CETL TETT Ee Fey

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,

(Be Oe. i gs eee re eee 14

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,

a cea ee eh cs 0 6-0 8 9 4 ee 21

Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v.

Interstate Commerce Commission,

SiS Wiha. Se Re a ha ek EAS Oe Os 17

Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523

(10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,

U.S. , 104 &. CE. 1049

CEOS oc cies certo cadavers she ecnanrees 18

Di Bella v. United States, 369

De Ran CRD ss Ober eee ee ees at, SS

Golden v. Zwicker, 394 U.S. 103

S RO oko 5k ee Ke Le eee 14

Gunn v. University Committee, 399

re | OB |) ar reer re eee 20

Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L.

| ie: Ak. } errr re Ce ooo ee 14

Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds

Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir.

WS i ok hb 6 oa se eee ee ee eee 12

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.

Se NS ik bm 6A ARR 14

North Carolina v. Rice, 404

Vis Bee CEPR) + sks vdeewrewsen 14, 15, 16

Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582

et) reer rere ee eee 12

Theodoropoulos v. Thompson-Starrett

Co., 438 F.426 3350, Soe. (ae Cit.

1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905

Oly, PREPS Tere ee C Ie Cae PREC SPREE ll

United States v. Alaska S.S. Co.,

253 UB. TES CERRO Pec eee ee eee eo renr 15

United States v. Ferreira, 13

How._40, 14 L. BG. SB (iSSE)..... ka, aid

United States v. Munsingwear,

ce. ES ee Be | ere ery 25, 26

STATUTES

28 O.B. 6. 3 Re ee sae REE RTS 20

20 U.8.6. 3 Bes ces cd dh caweeceee ase 22

€2:0.B.C. 5 UOT seis ce eee sen 28, 23

42 0.4.0. 9 19) sia 21

MISCELLANEOUS

Correspondence and Public Papers

of John Jay, 486 (1891).......ccccees 13

U. S. Constitution, Article III,

Sagtion:>S.. Gieee 3. 6 sceccixe 33; Bax 27

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil

ee Ree eae 19

ee eer |

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

The National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People, Inc., et

al.,

appellants,

versus

South Carolina, ex rel. Michael Roland

Daniel, et al.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Rule 16.1(a) of

the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States, appellees Michael Aozend

Daniel, Rembert C. Dennis, and Marshall

Williams, Robert J. Sheheen, Raymon

Schwartz, Jr., and James B. Ellisor

move the Court to dismiss the appeal

herein on the ground that this appeal

is not within the Court's

jurisdiction.

Opinion Below

The July 31, 1984, opinion of

the district court is set forth in

appellants' jurisdictional statement at

pages 3a to 5la. The July 31, 1984,

order of the district court which is

the subject of this appeal is set forth

in appellants' jurisdictional statement

at pages Sia and 52a. The order

vacating the July 31, 1984, order of

the district court and the opinion

attached thereto are set forth in

appellants' jurisdictional statement—at

pages 53a through 63a.

Jurisdiction

This appeal is not within the

jurisdiction of the Court. No statute

permits this appeal directly from the

22 EEE

district court. No statute or

constitutional provision permits this

appeal from an order that has_ been

vacated by the district court.

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved

The pertinent provision of the

United States Constitution, Article

III, Section 2, Clause 1, is set forth

in appellants' jurisdictional statement

at a. The pertinent statutory

provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and 42

U.S.C. § 1973c, are set forth in

Appendices A and B to appellees' motion

to dismiss.

Statement of the Case

Appellees Dr. George Graham,

H. Sam Stilwell. and W. Richard Lee

instituted this action on June 13,

1984, against certain named state

officials to obtain a court ordered

interim reapportionment plan for the

South Carolina Senate so that elections

could be held for these offices in

1984. The NAACP and several of its

members intervened as plaintiffs and

Joe Wilder intervened as a defendant.

The district court set an expedited

‘The General Assembly of

South Carolina had passed a permanent

statutory plan and submitted it to the

District Court for> the District of

Columbia for preclearanc® under 42

U.S.C. § 1973c in 1983. That court had

scheduled the trial for October 22,

1984, a date too late for elections to

be held under the statutory plan in

1984.

schedule for filing of briefs on the

issues raised in the pleadings and for

proposed reapportionment plans. The

district court, after determining that

it should exercise \ its equitable

jurisdiction to adopt 5 wees for use in

Senate elections in 1984, received the

plans of parties to the suit. None of

the plans presented were the same as

the statutory plan then under considera-

tion for Section 5 preclearance in the

District Court for the District of

Columbia.

The district court held a

trial on the merits on July 26, 27, and

30, 1984. The Court gave each party an

opportunity to present proposed plans

for use in the 1984 elections and to

present whatever evidence he desired in

support of his plan and in opposi-

tion to all other parties' proposed

plans.

On July 31, 1984, the district

court entered an order which adopted an

interim reapportionment plan for the

South Carolina Senate and which set a

schedule to enable the State to hold

Senate elections in 1984.* Along

with that order the district court

filed an opinion which explained the

reasons that the Court had decided to

exercise its equitable jurisdiction in

the manner it did. Subsequent to the

district court's adoption of an interim

reapportionment plan, the General

Assembly of South Carolina passed and

the Governor signed S. 1093 adopting a

permanent reapportionment plan for the

*That schedule provided for

candidate filing to begin on August 13,

1984, and squeezed all other neces-

Sary steps into the time remaining

prior to the general election date.

South Carolina Senate and a schedule of

elections for 1984 only. Act 626 of

1984. The Attorney General granted

Section 5 preclearance to the plan but

objected to the schedule for 1984

Senate elections contained in the Act,

J. S. App. 57a, a schedule identical to

the one contained in the district

court's order. ite

Thereafter, defendants Daniel,

Dennis, and Wittens moved the district

court to vacate its order that 1984

Senate elections be held under the

interim court-adopted plan to permit

the 1984 elections to proceed under Act

626. Since the Attorney General had

objected to the schedule contained in

Act 626, which was identical to the

schedule in the district court's July

31, 1984 order, Daniel, Dennis, and

Williams also moved the court to amend

the schedule in the July 31, 1984

order.’

The district court vacated

that part of the July 3lst order which

adopted an interim plan, thereby permit-

ting the plan in Act 626 to be used in

1984, and amended the schedule to

provide new deadlines for the conduct

of Senate primaries and preparation for

the general election in 1984.

*Insufricient ime remained

to recall the Gengral Assembly,

introduce and pass new statutory

schedule and have it precleared in time

for the senate electidns to be held on

the general election day in 1984.

;

Argument

i. This appeal should _ be

dismissed since appellants admit that

the order appealed herein has_ been

vacated and thus any action by this

Court is an advisory opinion.

In their jurisdictional

statement appellants admit that the

order they seek to appeal has_ been

vacated and superseded by a subsequent

order of the same court and that their

appeal is therefore moot. J.S. 12-13,

15. Appellants nevertheless wish to

appeal the opinion of the district

court that was filed with the vacated

order, an opinion which is neither part

of, nor related to,,any extant order of

the district court.

No operative portion of the

July 31, 1984, order remains. The

decree contained in the July 31, 1984,

order has been vacated or superseded in

its entirety by the August 13, 1984,

order. Consequently, no appeal of the

vacated July 31, 1984, order is

necessary or appropriate. Battle v.

Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir.

1983), cert. dismissed, v.38. ;

104 S. Ct. 1019 (1984); Theodoropoulos

v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 418 F.2d 350,

353, (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398

U.S. 905 (1970).

Appellants seek to avoid this

compelling conclusion by stating that

parts of the July 31, 1984, order were

not vacated by the district court.

That contention is manifestly errone-

ous. Neither component of the July 31,

1984, order remains to be executed.

The plan was vacated and the schedule

was amended.

Rate tae

Dich tn vei balan

Appellants confuse the

concepts “order” and "opinion." The

terms are not synonymous. An order is

a directive issued by a court to the

parties. An opinion is a_ court's

statement of reasons for its order. or

judgment. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S.

582, 587 (1933). The parts of the July

3lst opinion that appellants contend

were not vacated are not part of the

district court's order but are merely

reasons that explain its order.

Appellate courts review

judgments, decrees, and orders, not

mere opinions or statements of reasons

for orders. United States v. Ferreira,

13 How. 40/ 14 L. EG. 42 (1851);

Highland Supply Corp. Vv. Reynolds

Metals Co., 327 F. 2d 725, 729 (8th

Cir. 1964). This appeal should be

dismissed because the order of July 31

no longer remains for this Court to

review. Review of the opinion is not a

judicial function, United States v.

Ferreira, 13 How. at 47. Review of the

vacated order would be purely hypotheti-

cal.

In their insistence on this

appeal of a vacated order, appellants

ask this Court to violate a principle

articulated by the first Chief Justice

of this Court: a prohibition against

advisory opinions. Issuance of

opinions unrelated to a controversy

_betveen two parties is not a judicial

fenevion and accordingly will not be

performed by the Court. Correspondence

and Public Papers of John Jay, 486

(1891). This fundamental limitation on

action by the Court, derived from

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, has

been consistently and repeatedly

adhered to in the nearly two centuries

Since Chief Justice Jay declined

Secretary OL State Jefferson's

invitation to express the Court's views

on hypothetical issues. E.g., North

Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971),

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346

(1911); Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1

L. Ed. 436 (1792).

When an issue is not moot, it

involves a substantial controversy of

"immediacy and reality," Golden v.

Zwicker, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969),

which "admit[s] of specific’ relief

through a decree of a _ conclusive

character, as distinguished from an

Opinion advising what the law would be

on a hypothetical state of facts."

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,

300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). Since the

district court's order has been

vacated, a decree of this Court would

have no effect on the parties. Appel-

lants concede that the August 13, 1984,

order, which vacated the July 31, 1984,

order, rendered this appeal moot. J.S.

15. The import of the appeal becoming

moot is that all allegations of error

in the district court's reasoning

behind its order are also moot. Battle

v. Anderson, 708 F. 2d at 1527.

"Mootness is a jurisdictional

question because the Court is not

empowered to decide moot questions or

abstract propositions.'" North Caro-

lina v. Rice, 404 U.S. at 246, quoting

United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253

G.g. 43, ié (€23020). The lack of

power to review moot issues results

from the prerequisite in Article III,

Section 2, Clause 1 that judicial power

be exercised only in a case or contro-

versy. North Carolina v. Rice, 404

U.S. at 246. By admitting that this

appeal is moot, appellants admit this

Court's lack of jurisdiction to hear

this appeal. North Carolina v. Rice,

404 U.S. at 246.

$ This appeal should _ be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction as

the order objected to is not final and

mone of the cited statutes confers

jurisdiction in this Court.

Appellants have appealed this

case directly from a three judge

district court in South Carolina. Noa

Statute permits them to by-pass’ the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ and

bring this appeal directly to this

court. Furthermore, appellants have

PRESET 2 Ee eS neon se ee eee

taken this appeal from a conditional,

interim order of a three judge district

court. No authority exists to permit

the appeal of such a non-final order to

either this court or the circuit court

of appeals.

"The general principle of

federal appellate jurisdiction, derived

from the common law and enacted by the

First Congress, requires that review of

nisi prius proceedings await’ their

termination by final judgment." Di

Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121,

124 (1962). Absent an express statu-

tory exception, only final judgments

and final decrees may be appealed.

Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. Vv.

Interstate Commerce Commission, 215

U.S. 216 (1909). The July 31, 1984,

order is not a final judgment from

which an appeal may be taken.

SNE iA AT A ORAS EAD OD AI SAE aie pO SEAS RTE (aE FOORS

eleciths

5 Ca Nish SAILS 9 oe POA

To be final a judgment "must

terminate the litigation between the

parties on the merits of the case, so

that, if there should be an affirmance

here, the court below would have

nothing to do but to execute the

judgment or decree which had _ been

rendered." Benjamin v. DuBois, 118

U.S. 46, 48 (1886). In this case, as

in Benjamin v. DuBois, the order at

issue is not one which could be

executed if it were affirmed. The

final order in this case, which has

been implemented, was filed August 13,

1984, and effects completely different

relief from the July order. fThe July

31, 1984, order is clearly not a final

order and, therefore, is not within

this Court's jurisdiction. Baltimore

and Ohio R.R., 215 U.S., 216.

Appellants seek to deprive the

Court of several of the advantages of

the final judgment rule by appealing a

vacated order. The mootness”~ that

resulted from subsequent circumstances

in this case is a common occurrence

that works to the advantage of

appellate courts by eliminating the

need for many appeals. Wright and

Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil Section 3907 at 432.

The finality requirement and

prohibition against piecemeal appeals

is intended to "discourage undue

litigiousness and leaden-footed

administration of justice," Di Bella

v. United States, 369 U.S. at 124.

This appeal of an order that has been

vacated is an excellent example of

undue litigation that clogs the

judicial system.

Moreover, no statute confers

jurisdiction on the Court to Rar this

appeal directly from the district

court. Neither statute cited by appel-

lants in favor of jurisdiction is appli-

cable. Section 1253 of Title 28

permits direct appeals to this Court

only from orders of three judge courts

that grant or deny injunctions. Since

the July 31, 1984, order has been

vacated, it neither grants nor deni?s

an injunction. Accordingly, this Court

has no power under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to

accept this appezi. Gunn v. University

Committee, 399 U.S. 383, 390 (1970).

No jurisdiction exists under

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1973c, either. Section 5

confers jurisdiction on the District

Court for the District of Columbia, but

no other district court, for the

purpose of issuing declaratory

judgments concerning the purpose and

effect of voting changes, and confers

jurisdiction on this Court to hear

direct appeals of such declaratory

judgment actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

This is not a Section 5

declaratory judgment action and is not

on appeal from the District of

Columbia. The South Carolina district

court has no jurisdiction under Section

5. Section 5 grants exclusive

jurisdiction of actions, thereunder to

the district court in the District of

Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Jurisdic-

tion for the district court in South

Carolina to enjoin violations of

Section 5 is conferred only by 42

¥.6.¢. § 19735 (4) and that section does

not provide for direct appeals to this

Court. Accordingly, the Voting Rights

Act does not, in Section 5 or else-

where, confer jurisdiction on _ this

Court to hear a direct appeal from a

three judge district court in the

District of South Carolina. But see

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393

U.S. 544 (1969).

The requirement that this

matter be heard by a district court of

three judges is contained not in

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as

the district court erroneously

concluded, but in 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

That section also does not permit

direct appeals to this Court. If the

July 3lst order were a final order, the

appeal would lie to the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals, not directly to this

Court from the district court.

# This appeal should _ be

dismissed because it seeks relief that

is either redundant or which appellants

should have obtained by prompt action

in the Court below but did not.

The finality requirement also

permits district courts the opportunity

to correct mistakes since ordinarily

only the final order in a case is

appealable. In this case, the district

court, having recognized that reappor-

tionment is primarily a legislative

function, foresightfully provided that

if a statutory plan became available

before candidate filing began under the

court's interim plan, the parties could

ask that its order be vacated. J.S.

App. 5la-S2a. The contemplated condi-

tion occurred and the district court

vacated its plan on August 13, 1984.

The district court also superseded the

remainder of its July 31, 1984, order,

which had provided a schedule for 1984

Senate elections under the court-

adopted plan, with an entirely new

schedule for use with the permanent

statutory plan. J.S. App. 53a et.

seq. This Court would serve no

judicial purpose and waste. judicial

resources by accepting this appeal from

a conditional interim order that the

district court has already vacated.

The relief sought here is_' redundant.

The order of July 31 having been

vacated and superseded the opinion

which supported its conclusion is of no

effect. To reason otherwise is_ to

grant to the district court the power

to render advisory opinions.

Appellants cite no case that

suggests. they are entitled tc the

relief requested. Each of the cases

they cite on page 16 of their

jurisdictional statement involves’ an

appeal from a final order or judgment,

which remained extant at the time of

the appeal. Appellants seek to appeal

from a conditional interim order which

has been vacated by the court below.

Each of the cases they cite had become

moot between the time judgment was

entered and the appeal was heard. this

case ,is not moot; only the issue of the

July 31, 1984, order is moot. There-

fore, the relief granted in the cases

appellants cite, remand with directions

to dismiss the action, is

inapptopriate.

Moreover, the relief appel-

lants seex should be denied for the

Same reason that remand was denied in

United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S.

36 (1950), the case upon which they

principally rely. Appellants, like the

United States in Munsingwear, could

have asked the district court for the

relief they seek from this Court. They

failed to take advantage of that

available remedy. Appellants, having

slept on their rights, now want this

Court to do for them what they could

have done for themselves. United

States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at

40-41. As. this Court concluded in

Munsingwear, the request should be

denied.

Conclusion

This appeal is a waste of

judicial resources. It is the epitome

of the kind of piecemeal litigation

this Court has consistently refused to

permit, and exemplifies the reasons

this Court generally reviews only final

orders of the lower courts. The issue

herein is moot, by appellants' own

admission. Appellants seek from this

Court an advisory opinion on

hypothetical questions. Jurisdiction

to hear this appeal is not conferred by

any statute and is precluded by the

limitations in Article III, Section 2,

Clause 1 of the Constitution.

Appellees Daniel, Dennis, and

Williams, Sheheen, Schwartz, and

Ellisor respectfully submit that this

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this

appeal and, therefore, appellees'

motion to dismiss should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

McNAIR GLENN KONDUROS CORLEY

SINGLETARY PORTER AND DIBBLE, P.A.

Terrell L. Glenn*

M. Elizabeth Crum

Post Office Box 11390

Columbia, SC 29211

(803) 799-9800

THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

James P. Fields, Jr.

Helen T. McFadden

Post Office Box 142

Columbia, SC 29202

(803) 758-8989

Attorneys for Appellees

Daniel, Dennis & “7illiams

David Rudd

Post Office Box 11867

Columbia, SC 29211

(803) 758-7268

Attorney for Appellee

Sheheen

Joseph A. Wilson, II*

Charles W. Gambrell, Jr.

Post Office Box 11549

Columbia, SC 29211

(803) 758-2072

Attorneys for Appellee

Schwartz

Treva G. Ashworth*

Post Office Box 11549

Columbia, SC 29211

(803) 758-2072

Attorney for Appellee

Ellisor

*Counsel of Record

Appendix A

28 U.S.C. § 1253. Direct appeals from

decisions of three judge courts

Except as. otherwise provided by law,

any party may appeal to the Supreme

Court from an_- order granting or

denying, after notice and hearing, an

interlocutory or permanent injunction

in any civil action, suit or proceeding

required by any Act of Congress to be

heard and determined by a district

court of three judges.

Appendix B

42. 3.8.8, § 1973c. Alteration of

voting qualifications and _ procedures;

action by State or political

subdivision for declaratory judgment of

no denial or abridgement of voting

rights; three-

judge district court; appeal to Supreme

Court

Whenever a State or political subdivi-

Sion with respect to which the

prohibitions set forth in section

1973b(a) of this title based upon

determinations made under the first

sentence of section 1973b(b) of this

title are in effect shall enact or seek

to administer any voting qualification

or prerequisite to vocing, or standard

practice, or procedure with respect to

voting different from that in force or

effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever

a State or political subdivision with

respect to which the prohibitions set

Fee in section 1973b(a) of this title

\pased upon determinations made under

the secon” sentence of ‘sjction 1973b(b)

of this title are in effect shall enact

or seek to administer any voting

qualification cr prerequisite to

voting, Or standard, practice, or

procedure with respect to voting

different from that in force or effect

on November 1, 1968, or whenever a

State or political subdivision with

respect to which the prohibitions set

forth in section 1973b(a) of this title

based upon determinations made under

the third sentence of section 1973b(b)

of this title are in effect ‘shall enact

or seek to administer any voting

qualification or prerequisite to

a a

voting, or standard, practice, or

procedure with respect to voting

different from that in force or effect

on November 1, 1972, such State or

subdivision may institute an action in

the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia for a

declaratory judgment that such

qualification, prerequisite, standard,

practice, or procedure does not have

the purpose and will not have the

effect of denying or abridging’ the

right to vote on account of race or

color, or in contravention of the

guarantees set forth in section

1973b(f£)(2) of this title, and unless

and until the court enters’ such

, Judgment no person shail be denied the

right to vote for failure to comply

with such qualification, prerequisite,

standard, practice, or procedure:

Provided, That such qualification,

prerequisite, standard, practice, or

procedure may be enforced without such

proceeding if the qualification,

prerequisite, standard, practice, or

procedure has been submitted by the

chief legal officer or other appro-

priate official of such State or

subdivision to the Attorney General and

the Attorney General has not interposed

an objection within sixtv days after

such submission, or upon good cause

shown, to facilitate an expedited

approval within sixty days after such

Submission, the Attorney General has

affirmatively indicated that such

objection will not be made. Neither an

affirmative indication by the Attorney

General that no objection will be made,

nor the atocner General's failure to

»bject, nor a declaratory judgment

entered under this section shall bar a

subsequent action to enjoin enforcement —

of such qualification, prerequisite,

standard, practice, or procedure. In

the event the Attorney General

affirmatively indicates that no

objection will be made within the

sixty-day period following receipt of a

submission, the Attorney General may

reserve the right to reexamine’ the

submission if additional information

comes to his attention during’ the

remainder of the sixty-day period which

would otherwise require objection in

accordance with this’ section. Any

action under this section shall be

heard and determined by a court of

three judges in accordance with the

provisions of section 2284 of Title 28

and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme

Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.