Motion — Brewer v. City of Winston-Salem

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_ Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

84-152 FILED

NO. AUG 25 1984

IN THE }

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

HENRY BREWER, et al.

CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM, N.C., et al.

On Appeal From the North

Carolina Court of Appeals

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Roddey M. Ligon, Jr.

Counsel of Record

WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE

Post Office Drawer 84

Winston-Salem, NC 27103

(919) 721-3600

APPELLATE PRINTING SERVICES. INC . HERITAGE BLDG . RICHMOND. VA (804) 643-7789

~ BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Ronald G. Seeber

Ralph D. Karpinos

City Attorney's Office

115 City Hall

Winston-Salem, NC 27101

(919) 727-2056

Attorneys for Appellees

August 20, 1984

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... .ccccccccsece

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT............

III. REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE

APPEAL OR AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE NORTH

CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS.....

A. Applicable Supreme

ee EMC Fcc e sce es

B. The Decision of the

North Carolina Court

of Appeals Is Consistent

With the Law of the

Supreme Court.....ccccccce

Cc. The North Carolina

Appellate Court Do Review

Annexations to Determine

Reasonableness and Com-

pliance With Due Process

as Well as Other Consti-

tutional Standards........

IV. CONCLUSION... .cccccccccsvccscccce

APPENDICES

EEE ER SUES bce ce SW eccesess

Appendix Debeeeeedeosseoceveses

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... cccccccccce

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat 15

Baldwin v. oty of Winston- 4, 5,

Salem, 710 F.2d 132, cert. fy

denied 104 . Ct. 536 (1983)

Citizens Committed to Oppose 18

Annexation v. City of

Lynchburg, 528 F. a3 816 (4th

Cir.), application denied

423 U.S. Te (1976

Forsyth Citizens Opposing ae

Annexation, et al. v. City Sec Be

of Winston-Salem, et al., 67 », 24,

N.C.App. 165, 312 S.E.2d 517 28

ee denied so ’

315 S.E.2da 701 (1984)

Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 18

463 F.2a 54 aa Cars), GOEt.

denied 408 U.S. 1039 (1972)

Gaskill v. Costlow, 270 N.C. 27

686, 155 S.E.2dq 148 (1967

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 6, 10

U.S. 339 (1960) he Gee

At, a9

Hawks v. Town of Valdese, 299 27

N.C. 1, 2601 S.E.2q 90 (1980)

Cases:

Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d

184 (4th Cir.) cert. denied

439 U.S. 959 (1978)

Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa,

439 U.S. 60 (1978)

Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S.

161 (1907)

In re Annexation Ordinance,

303 N.C. 220, 2/8 S.E.2d

(1981)

In Re Annexation Ordinance

Adopted by the City of

Charlotte, 284 N.C. 442, 452

202 S.E.2d0 143, 149 (1974)

In Re Annexation Ordinance

No. 866, 253 N.C. 637, 640-41,

117 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1961)

In Re Annexation Ordinance

#D-21927, 303 N.C. 220, 278

S.E.2d 224 (1981)

In re Durham Annexation

Ordinance, 66 N.C.App.

473, 311 S.E.2d 898 (1984)

iii

Page

6, 13,

14, 16,

2, 6,

7, 10,

li, 12,

a3, 15,

16, 17,

18, 19

24-25

28-20

Cases:

In Re Ordinance of Annexation

1977-4, 296 N.C. 1, 19, 249

S.E.2q 698, 708 (1978)

Moody v. Carrboro, 301 N.C.

8, S.E. 265 (1980)

Raintree Homeowners Assoc. v.

City of Charlotte, 543 F.Supp.

625 (W.D.N.C. 1982), aff'd.

710 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.) cert.

denied, 104 S.Ct. 536 (1983)

Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S.

53. 575 (1964)

Sailors v. Board of Education,

387 U.S. at 108 (1967)

Texfi Industries, Inc. v. City

of Fayetteville, 301 N.c. l,

269 S.E. 1 (1980)

Thompson v. Whitley, 344 F.Supp.

480 (E.D.N.C. 1972)

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Appellees are the City of Winston-

Salem, North Carolina, and its Mayor and

members of its governing board. Pursuant

to Rule 16 of the Supreme Court Rules,

Appellees move the Court to dismiss the

appeal seeking review of the decision of

the North Carolina Court of Appeals in

the case of Forsyth Citizens Opposing

Annexation, et al. v. City of Winston-

Salem, et al., 67 N.C.App. 165, 312 S.E.

2d 517, pet. denied, N.C. ¢ Sas

S.E.2d 701 (1984) [which is referred to by

Appellants in their Jurisdictional

Statement as Brewer, et al. v. City of

Winston-Salem] on the ground that said

appeal does not present a substantial

federal question. In the alternative,

Appellees respectfully move the Supreme

Court of the United States to summarily

affirm the decision of the North Carolina

Court of Appeals on the basis that the

decision of the North Carolina Court is

in accord with constitutional principles

and requirements. In support hereof,

Appellees respectfully submit the follow-

ing statement of the case and argument.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants ask the Supreme Court of

the United States to accept jurisdiction

of a decision of the North Carolina

Court of Appeals. Relying on Hunter v.

Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), Raintree

Homeowners Assoc. v. City of Charlotte,

543 F.Supp. 625 (W.D.N.C. 1982), aff'd,

710 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104

S.Ct. 536 (1983), and In re Annexation

Ordinance, 303 N.C. 220, 278 S.E.2d 224

(1981) and applicable North Carolina

statutes, the North Carolina Court of

Ts)

Appeals upheld the trial court's decision

that North Carolina's annexation laws and

Appellees' actions thereunder were consti-

tutionally sound. Forsyth Citizens Oppos-

ing Annexation, et al. v. City of Winston-

Salem, et al., 67 N.C.App. 165, 312 S.E.2d

517, pet. denied, 3.¢c. » was

S.E.2d 701 (1984). The Supreme Court of

North Carolina dismissed the appeal and

denied Appellants' petition for discretion-

ary review.

Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court

of the United States was given on July 24,

1984 and Appellants submitted their Juris-

dictional Statement on July 27, 1984.

Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of the

United States Supreme Court, Appellees

submit this motion to dismiss the appeal

or affirm the decision of the North

Carolina Court of Appeals.

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

At the outset Appellees ask this Court

to take note that this is the second time

these Appellants have asked the Supreme

Court of the United States to consider this

case. Baldwin v. City of Winston-Salem,

710 F.2d 132 (4thCir.), cert. denied, 104

S.Ct. 536 (1983) involved challenges to four

annexations in the Cities of Winston-Salem

and Charlotte, North Carolina. One of the

four cases, Brewer v. City of Winston-Salem,

was a challenge to the same annexation as

this case. The unreported decision of

Erwin, J., United States District Court

Judge for the Middle District of North

Carolina dismissing that case is set forth

in Appendix A. The four cases were consoli-

dated in a per curiam decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-

cuit and this Court on December 5, 1983,

denied the petition for writ of certiorari.

The questions presented in that petition

for writ of certiorari are set forth as

Appendix B and demonstrate that the issues

raised in Appellants' Jurisdictional State-

ment are virtually the same as in the

Baldwin case. The briefs submitted by

Appellants then, and now, are substantially

the same.

The annexation involved in this appeal

went into effect on May 1, 1984. Thus,

the residents of the annexed areas have

been receiving City services since that

date, and have been subject to City taxa-

tion since that date.

The decision of the North Carolina

Court of Appeals is consistent with the

decisions of the Supreme Court of the

United States interpreting the Fourteenth

Amendment as it applies to annexations.

No substantial federal question therefore

exists and this appeal should be dismissed.

North Carolina's annexation statutes, and

in particular N.C.G.S. 160A-50(f), give

substantial protection against arbitrary,

capricious and unreasonable acts by a

municipality. Protections afforded by

North Carolina's statutes comport with due

process. The provisions of 160A-50(f) and

the statutes incorporated therein amount

to a requirement that North Carolina Courts

determine whether an annexation is reason-

able. Forsyth Citizens, supra, at 166,

312 S.E.2d at 518. The decision of the

North Carolina Court of Appeals is con-

Sistent not only with Hunter, but also

with the subsequent cases of Gomillion

v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) and

Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S.

60 (1978).

Contrary to Appellants' allegations,

the scope of judicial review of annexations

in North Carolina is not limited. Case law

makes it abundantly clear that the North

Carolina courts will review and decide the

constitutivcnality of annexations and the

annexation statutes.

III. REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE

APPEAL OR AFFIRMING THE DECISION

OR OLINA

A. Applicable Supreme Court Decisions.

The law applicable to this case is

clearly set out by the United States

Supreme Court in the case of Hunter v.

Pittsburgh, supra. Hunter questioned

the validity of an annexation based

upon a Pennsylvania statute which per-

mitted a larger municipality to annex a

smaller one despite the fact that a

majority of the citizens of this smaller

municipal corporation desired not to be

annexed. The plaintiffs in Hunter chal-

lenged the annexation on a number of

grounds, including due process grounds

similar to those raised in this case.

Hunter at 168-169.

This Court upheld the annexation with

the following governing principles:

Municipal corporations are

political subdivisions of the

state, created as convenient

agencies for exercising such

of the governmental powers of

the state as may be intrusted

to them. For the purpose of

executing these powers proper-

ly and efficiently they usual-

ly are given the power to ac-

quire and manage personal and

real property. The number,

nature and duration of the

powers conferred upon these

corporations and the territory

over which they shall be exer-

cised rests in the absolute

discretion of the state.

Neither their charters, nor

any law conferring govern-

mental powers, or vesting in

them property to be used for

governmental purposes, or au-

thorizing them to hold or man-

age such property, or exempting

them from taxation upon it,

constitutes a contract with

the state within the meaning

of the Federal Constitution.

The state, therefore, at its

pleasure may modify or with-

draw all such powers, may take

without compensation such

property, hold it itself, or

vest it in other agencies, ex-

pand or contract the territori-

al area, unite the whole or a

part of it with another munici-

pality, repeal the charter and

destroy the corporation. All

this may be done, conditionally

or unconditionally, with or with-

out the consent of the citizens,

or even against their protest.

In all of these respects the

state is supreme, and its legis-

lative body, conforming its ac-

tion to the state Constitution,

may do as it will, unrestrained

by any provision of the Consti-

tution of the United States.

Although the inhabitants and

property owners may, by such

changes, suffer inconvenience,

and their property may be less-

ened in value by the burden of

increased taxation, or for any

other reason, they have no right,

by contract or otherwise, in the

unaltered or continued existence

of the corporation or its powers,

and there is nothing in the Feder-

al Constitution which protects

them from these injurious conse-

quences. The power is in the

state, and those who legislate

for the states are alone re-

sponsible for any unjust or

oppressive exercise of it. Id.

at 178-79.

Thus, in Hunter, this Court made it abso-

lutely clear that the extension of municipal

boundaries was a matter governed by state

rather than federal law.

Appellants have gone to great lengths

in an effort to create the illusion that

the legal principles supporting Hunter have

been eroded and that Hunter should have

"little continuing precedential force.”

(Jurisdictional Statement, p. 30) Their

theory as to Hunter's demise is contra-

dicted by two recent decisions of this

Court reaffirming Hunter.

In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra, this

Court affirmed the basic principles of

Hunter. While the Supreme Court originally

decided to hear that case in order to

consider issues under both the Fourteenth

and Fifteenth Amendments, its decision

was based solely upon the Fifteenth Amend-

ment (voting rights denied on the basis of

race). In doing so, the Gomillion Court

expressly held:

Thus, a correct reading of

the seemingly unconfined dicta

of Hunter and kindred cases is

not that the State has plenary

power to manipulate in every

conceivable way, for every con-

ceivable purpose, the affairs

of its municipal corporations,

but rather that the State's

authority is unrestrained by

the particular prohibition of

the Constitution considered in

those cases. 364 0.S. at 344

(emphasis added).

Gomillion expressly recognizes Hunter

to be good law. Gomillion expressly recog-

nizes that Hunter holds that the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause does not ap-

ply to annexations by municipal corporations

and re-affirms that holding. The proposi-

tion bears restatement: Gomillion expressly

affirms Hunter's holding that a state's

authority to modify the boundaries of its

political subdivisions is "unrestrained"

by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause.

The Gomillion opinion makes it clear

that its decision in reference to the

Fifteenth Amendment does not alter the

Hunter decision as to the application of

the Fourteenth Amendment—". . .[I]f one

principle clearly emerges from the numer-

ous decision of this Court dealing with

taxation, it is that the Due Process

Clause affords no immunity against mere

inequalities in tax burden, nor does it

afford protection against their increase

as an indirect consequence of a State's

exercise of its political power." Id.

at 343. “When a State exercises power

wholly within the domain of state

interest, it is insulated from federal

judicial review." Id. at 347.

The constitutional principles

established by Hunter were most recently

reaffirmed by this Court in Holt Civic

Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, supra. While

Appellants have quoted one statement from

Holt out of context suggesting that Hunter

has been "qualified by later cases" (Juris-

dictional Statement. p. 38), they fail to

recognize that Holt represents a strong

affirmation of the underlying principle

that the circumstances presented by this

case raise no issue of Fourteenth Amend-

ment due process rights.

In Holt, the plaintiff organization

challenged a state statute authorizing

municipalities to exercise certain powers

over persons and property within three

miles of their city limits. Persons

residing within the affected extra-

territorial area could not vote for the

city's elected officials. The Supreme

Court dismissed the challenge to the state

statute on the grounds that it lacked sub-

stantive merit as it “alleged no claim

cognizable under the United States Consti-

tution." Id. at 66,

In reaching its determination in Holt,

this Court held that persons within the

extraterritorial area did not have the con-

stitutional right to vote on municipal

policies affecting the persons and property

within the subject area. Id. at 69-70.

"Thus stripped of its voting rights attire,

the equal protection issue presented by

appellants becomes whether the Alabama

statutes giving extraterritorial force to

certain municipal ordinances and powers

bear some rational relationship to a

legitimate state purpose." Id. at 70.

In this regard, the Court noted the

followina:

Govexnment, observed Mr.

Justice Johnson, ‘is the

science of experiment, '

Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat

, , and a

State is afforded wide

leeway when experimenting

with the appropriate allo-

cation of state legislative

power. This Court has often

recognized that political sub-

divisions such as cities and

counties are created by the

State ‘as convenient agencies

for exercising such of the

governmental powers of the

State as may be entrusted to

them'. Hunter v. Pittsburgh,

207 U.S. 161, 178. See also,

e.g., Sailors v. Board of —

Education, 3&7 U.S. at 108

(1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377

U.S. 338, (1964). In

Hunter v. Pittsburgh, the

Court discussed at length the

relationship between a State

and its political subdivi-

sions, remarking: 'The num-

; ber, nature and duration of

the powers conferred upon

[municipal] corporations and

the territory over which they

shall be exercised rests in

the absolute discretion of the

State.' Ibid. While the

broad statements as to state

control over municipal cor-

porations contained in

Hunter have undoubtedly been

qualified by the holdings of

later cases such as Kramer v.

Union Free School Dist., supra,

we think that the case contin-

ues to have substantial consti-

tutional significance in em-

phasizing the extraordinarily

wide latitude that States have

in creating various types of

political subdivisions and con-

ferring authority upon them.

Holt at 71 (footnote omitted).

Thus, it is clear that Hunter is alive and

well, and is still the governing law as to

the questions involved in this case.

This Court concluded "that Alabama's

police jurisdiction statutes violate

neither the Equal Protection Clause nor

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment." Id. at 75. Obviously, the

same holding is appropriate in this case.

As in Holt, the state statute challenged

by Appellants is a reasonable exercise of

North Carolina's power to provide for muni-

cipal government. Therefore, pursuant to

Hunter and Holt, the statute is not subject

to this constitutional challenge.

B. The Decision of the North Carolina Court

of Appeals Is Consistent With the Law of

the Superme Court.

The decision of the North Carolina Court

in this case, Forsyth Citizens Opposing Annexa-

tion v. City of Winston-Salem, follows the prin-

ciples of Hunter, Gomillion, and Holt Civic

Club and thus no federal question exists.

Further, the decision involves the one of the

same annexations and the same issues involved

in Baldwin v. City of Winston-Salem, 710 F.2d

132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 536

(1983). The Fourth Circuit in Baldwin deter-

minted that the Fourteenth Amendment is not

violated where, the "proposed annexation does

not impinge on fundamental rights or create

suspect classifications." Indeed, the

Fourth Circuit's ‘conclusion in this regard

was based on the fact that the allegations

of the plaintiffs in Baldwin, even if true,

did not raise a colorable claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Baldwin at 135. As

the Fourth Circuit pointed out, the excep-

tions to Hunter which have been recognized

by the United States Supreme Court in

Gomillion and Holt have not been all al-

leged in this case. "No suspect classifi-

cation or fundamental right is therefore

implicated and the ordinances thus do not

abridge the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution." Baldwin at

135. See Raintree, 543 F.Supp. 625. See

Brewer (Appendix A). See also Citizens

Committed to Oppose Annexation v. City of

Lynchburg, 528 F.2d 816 (4th Cir.), appli-

cation denied 423 U.S. 1043 (1976);

Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 463 F.2d

54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 408 U.S. 1039

(1972); Thompson v. Whitley, 344 F.Supp.

480 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (three-judge district

court).

The North Carolina Court of Appeals

followed these principles in Forsyth Citi-

zens Opposing Annexation. N.C.G.S. 160A-

50(f) and the provisions incorporated

therein, the Court said, "amount to a

requirement that the courts determine

whether an annexation is reasonable."

Id. at 166. 312 S.E.2d at 518. Statutory

appeal procedures comport with due process

and none of -the allegations in Gomillion

Or Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 959 (1978),

were involved. Following this Court's

decision in Hunter, the North Carolina

Court of Appeals thus properly affirmed

the trial court's judgment upholding the

annexation.

C. The North Carolina Appellate Courts

Do Review Annexations to Determine

Reasonableness and Compliance With

Due Process as Well as Other Consti-

tutional Standards.

Appellants' reyuest for review by this

Court is also based on their assertion

that under North Carolina law judicial re-

view of annexations is limited and that

the North Carolina Appellate Courts will

not review the constitutionality or reason-

ableness of municipal annexations. (Juris-

dictional Statement, pp. 40-48). The Ap-

pellants are simply incorrect with reference

to this basic premise. It is very clear

from the decisions of the North Carolina

Supreme Court and Court of Appeals that

annexations are subject to judicial review

for alleged constitutional infirmities, in-

cluding the general complaints of unreason-

ableness raised by Appellants.

The first decision concerning the con-

stitutionality of the annexation statutes

at issue in this case considered all manner

of constitutional questions, including

whether those statutes violated due pro-

cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment

of the United States Constitution. In Re

Annexation Ordinance No. 866, 253 N.C. 637,

640-41, 117 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1961). In

this seminal decision, it was held that the

procedures provided by the statutes are sub-

stantial ones which protect the rights of

newly-annexed citizens:

It certainly cannot be

considered a mere shell or

ritual of conformity when

the governing body of a mu-

nicipality, in good faith,

obtains all the information

required by the Act, with

respect to the character of

the area or areas to be an-

nexed, the density of the

resident population therein,

the extreme boundaries there-

of, and the percentage of

such boundaries which are

adjacent or contiguous to

the municipality's boun-

daries, which must be at

least one-eighth; and

further provides or makes

provision to extend all of

the governmental services

to the newly annexed area

or areas; comparable to the

services provided for the

residents within the city

prior to annexation of the

new area or areas. 253 N.C.

at 647, 117 S.B.2d at 802.

In view of its judicial review of and in-

terpretation of the statutes, the North

Carolina Supreme Court held that they were

not in violation of due process.

The petitioners contend

that by reason of these an-

nexations in the manner in

which they have been brought

about, they have been de-

prived of their liberty and

property without due process

of law, in violation of Arti-

cle I, Section 17 of the

Constitution of North Caro-

lina and the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of

the United States. The record

in these proceedings does not

support the petitioners'

contention in this respect.

Certainly it would seem that

they do not desire to have

their respective properties

subject to the levy of city

taxes. Even so, where addi-

tional territory is annexed

in accordance with the law,

the fact that the property

of the residents in such area

will thereby become subject

to city taxes levied in the

future, does not constitute

a violation of the due pro-

cess clause of the State and

Federal Constitutions. 253

N.C. at 651-52, 117 S.E.2d

at 805.

With respect to whether or not the

North Carolina court will review "“reason-

ableness", the North Carolina Supreme

Court said in Moody v. Carrboro, 301 N.C.

318, 271 S.E.2d 265 (1980): "The review

(of annexations) is afforded pursuant to

G.S. 160A-50 and serves as a safeguard

against unreasonable and arbitrary ac-

tion by the annexing municipality."

The principle that compliance with a

constitutional statute establishes

constitutional reasonableness was recog-

nized by Judge McMillan in Raintree Home-

owners Association v. City of Charlotte:

N.C.G.S. 160A-50(f) and

the provisions incorporated

therein, amount to a re-

quirement that the Supeior

Court determine whether an

annexation is reasonable.

The language of the provi-

sions does not speak in terms

of arbitrariness, capricious-

ness or unreasonableness.

However, the effect of the

statute is to give substantial

protection against arbitrary,

capricious and unreasonable

acts by the city.

Id. at 629. Accord Forsyth Citizens Oppos

ing Annexation, et al. v. City of Winston-

Salem, supra.

The willingness of the North Carolina

Supreme Court to consider constitutional

questions which are properly raised in

state court proceedings is fully il-

lustrated by its consideration of a

Winston-Salem annexation. In Re

Annexation Ordinance #D-21927, 303 N.C.

220, 278 S.E.2d 224 (1981). In that

case, the North Carolina Supreme Court

considered several constitutional ques-

tions and addressed generalized griev-

ances concerning the "reasonablenss" of

the annexations and held: (1) that the

annexation statutes were not an unconsti-

tutional delegation of authority by the

state to the governing boards of munici-

palities; (2) that the statutes were not

unconstitutionally vague; (3) that the

fact that persons residing within the an-

nexed areas did not get to vote on the

matter did not violate either due process

or equal protection; (4) that the resi-

dents of the annexed areas were protected

in their rights to receive municipal ser-

vices such that no constitutional ques-

tions were at issue in that regard;

(5) that unilateral annexation was not

unconstitutional as “taxation without

representation" pursuant to either due

process or equal protection guarantees;

and, (6) that the annexation statutes were

not unconstitutional on the grounds that

judicial review is provided by a judge

Sitting as trier-of-fact, rather than by

way of a jury trial. 303 N.C. at 224-30,

278 S.E.2d at 228-30.

It is obvious from this North Caro-

lina Supreme Court decision and numerous

other cases that the North Carolina courts

have frequently reviewed constitutional

issues in annexation cases. For example,

the state courts have considered the ap-

plicability of due process guarantees of

the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, in addition to those guaran-

tees provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.

E.g., Moody v. Town of Carrboro, supra.

The state courts have applied an equal

protection analysis in appropriate in-

stances (unlike the annexations herein

challenged). E.g., Texfi Industries,

Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C.

1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980). The North

Carolina Supreme Court has demonstrated

its willingness to declare annexations

to be invalid. E.g., Hawks v. Town of

Valdese, 299 N.C. 1, 261 S.E.2d 90 (1980);