Motion — Perruccio v. Connecticut

Office - Supreme Coug, U.S,

ee. & D

NO. 83-1979 AUG 3 1964

Iu The — STEVAS

Supreme Court Of Che United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

DENNIS M. PERRUCCIO,

Appellant

We

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Appellee

ON APPEAL FROM THE

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

C. ROBERT SATTI

State’s Attorney

New London Judicial District

302 Captain’s Walk

New London, CT 06320

(203) 443-2835

Counsel for Appellee

QUESTION PRESENTED

he Whether appellant's onten-

tions merit plenary consideration?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

Ouestion Presented ..i6sskise cee es i

Taoie CE Contents «i6acdee eee ii

7enbie OF Authorities icaaceeieoneen £23

Motion To Dismiss Or Affirm ...... 1

Statute Inveoiwed . <2 s.kecaieteae ene 2

Statement cE the Cees. sicc kee san ee 2

PROCES. bv kn cn dav 02 Obese eee eee 3

ARG, . os 200046008 ee eee 5

Oe CONNECTICUT GENERAL

STATUTE §53-21 NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.... 5

eo RELATED STATUTES DEFEAT

ANY CLAIM OF VAGUENESS OF

CHALLENGED SECTION.....cccce il

III. NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY

PATTERN IN VIOLATION OF

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT....... 14

CONCLUSION... cccccccnsessesessouce 20

APPENDIX A. wcccccecccccsccssessess 21

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT

APPENDIX B..cccccccvcccccesccecece 23

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY

1ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Pages

Goesey ¥. Marian County.....csees 18

159 U.S. 590

Connally v. General

DE EE COG ince ee ee easenes 7

269 U.S. 385

Haynes v. Mayor of Oradell....... 8

425 U.S. 610

Jaquith v. Commonwealth.......... 9

341 U.S. 439

POTGOM Ve DOGEOFGS. . cc ccc cvessses 12

e4i U.S. 223

Lanzetta v. New Jersey .....ceees 8

206 U.S. 451

EE 8

169 Conn 140

Robinson v. United States ..,.... 8

2a6 tee». 451

a ee ee 7

S23 0.8. 48

UN EE We GOUMOT 2 ccc ce cccescsesces 7

415 U.S. 566

es) a 8

173 Conn 165

re 14

172 Conn 140

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED - CONTINUED

State. VV. MOCOLi.« a's 220 ae eb eee. i3

187 Conn 73

BEGLe Vs FAGMOT ING: 6 oe ee VK ews 5

180 Conn 54

ee a a a ae a a eS 3

187 Conn 73

StGLOOre Vi. COLGWOL) icc ccccssveves 8

175 Conn 586

wWnstted States Vs. MACE LSS <i. ccvceses 7

a67 WU.8; 6i2

Untten States Vv. MASUR. «cs cveess 5

419 U.S. 544

United States v. National Dairy

PEOGOGUCETE COFDOLECION 6 2 iccie ceeds s 5

sta Uina OF

United States V¥. Petrilios.cesrcvrar 6

ee ae |

Teatee SEatee Vi. PONG L1 oc 6d ec ee es 5

423 U.S. 87

United States V¥. ROLNGR< . so ceseccss 6

aoa. U.S. i7

Ciareres CT. Wew TOlRs < ss.ss 4s ea eo eae 8

333 U.S. Sur

1

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1983

DENNIS M. PERRUCCIO, Appellant

Vv.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Appellee

ON APPEAL FROM THE

SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

The Appellee moves the Court to

dismiss the appeal herein, or in the

alternative, to affirm the judgment

of the Supreme Court of the State of

Connecticut on the ground that it is

manifest that the questions on which

the decision of the cause depends are

so unsubstantial as not to need further

argument.

2

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statute involved is Connec-

General Statutes §53-21, set out in

Jurisdictional Statement at p. 7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a direct appeal from the

judgment of the Supreme Court of the

State of Connecticut dated January

31, 1984, sustaining the conviction

of the defendant-appellant of the crime

of Rijsk of Injury (CGS §53-1). Contrary

to the statement in FN 3 of that opin-

ion (J.S. p.27), the defendant was

sentenced to a term of ten years sus-

pended after one year, to be followed

by three years of probation on this

count, and a concurrent term of one

year on the Sexual Assault in the Fourth

Degree count (App. A p. 21)

3

FACTS

The jury might reasonably have

found the following facts: On Octo-

ber 16, 1981, the defendant, a thirty-

eight year old teacher caused the victim

one of his thirteen year old female

students to go to an empty locker room,

allegedly to wet a rag to clean his

desk at the end of a class period.

He went to the room with her and after

the heavy steel door closed, he asked

her for a goodbye kiss. She kissed

him on the cheek. The defendant then

turned her body toward his, and while

forcefully holding her with his left

arm around her back and her arm, he

French kissed her on the mouth, forcing

his tongue into her mouth. At the same

time he put his right hand under-

neath her shirt and felt her breast

outside of her brassiere. He then

4

pushed her bra up and rubbed her then

bare to his touch, breast. Thereafter,

and while still holding her, he started

to put his hand down the back of her

blue jean pants, but she told him not

to and he withdrew his hand. At this

time another person came into the room

and the girl left. The girl didn't

consent to this action. She was fright-

ened and stunned, and didn't know what

to do, and was afraid that he might

hurt her or something. A few days be-

fore, the defendant had asked her if

she wanted to go skating with him,

and she responded she would have to

ask her parents. She was permitted

to go if she brought a friend with

her. (App. B pp. 23-37; J.S. App.

Ap. 26)

5

ARGUMENT

I

CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTE §53-21

NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE

As a general rule, the consti-

tutionality of a statutory provision

being attacked as void for vagueness

is determined by the statutes applic-

ability to the particular facts at issue.

United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87,

92 S. Ct. 316, 46 L. Ed. 2d 228; United

States v. Mazurie,419 U.S. 544, 550,

95 S$. Ct. 710, 42 L. Bad 716; United

States v. National Dairy Products

Corporation, 32/2 U.3. 29, 32-33, $83

S. Ct. 394 9 L. Ed. 24 516; State v.

Pickering, 180 Conn 54, 57, 428 A. 2a

322. To do otherwise, absent the appear-

ance that the statute in question in-

trudes on fundamental constitutional

guarantees, particularly first amend-

Ea

6

ment freedoms, would be to put courts

in the undesirable position of consider-

ing every conceivable situation which

might possibly arise in the application

of complex legislation. United States

~. RMeanes, 362 UiS. 17, 21, BO &. Ct

519 4 L. Ed. 2d 524. That a statutory

provision may be of questionable applic-

ability in speculative situations is

usually immaterial if the challenged

provisions applies to the corduct of

the defendant in the case at issue.

United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S.

ke f, @F SB. CO. i338 Fi Lb. EG. iBT7.

To determine whether or not a

statute is void for vagueness the so-

called "fair warning principle" is used

which mandates that as a matter of due

process a penal statute must be

sufficiently definite to enable a person

5

to know what conduct he must avoid.

State v. Pickering, supra. "That the

terms of a penal statute creating a

new offense must be sufficiently ex-

plicit to inform those who are subject

to it what conduct on their part will

render them liable to its penalties is

a well recognized requirement consonant

alike with ordinary notions of fair

play and the settled rules of law."

Connally v. General Construction Co.,

269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. £265, 70

L. Ed. 322; Haynes v. Mayor of Oradell,

425 U.S. 610, 620, 96 S. Ct. 1755, 48

L. Ed. 2d 243; Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.

46, 49, 96 S$. Ct. 243, 46 LL. Bd. 24

185; United States v. Mazurie, supra;

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n. 8,

94 S. Ct. 1242, 39 L. 2d 605; United

States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74

S. Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989; Winters v. New

York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-516, 68 S. Ct.

665, 92 L. Ed. 840; Lanzetta v. New

Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 &. Ct.

618, 83 L. Ed. 888, Stolberg v. Caldwell,

175 Conn 586, 610, 611, 402 A. 2d 763;

State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn 165, 16/7,

377 A. 2d 263; Mitchell v. King, 169

Conn 140, 142-143, 363 A. 2d 68. If

the meaning of a statute can be fairly

ascertained a statute will not be void

for vagueness since "[mJany statutes

will have some inherent vagueness, for

'fi]Jn most English words and phrases

there lurk uncertainties. Robinson

v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286,

54 S. Ct. 666, 89 L. Ed. 944; Rose v.

Locke, supra 49-50. State v. Pickering,

supra 62. Wharton's Criminal Law and

Procedure by Anderson, §18, pp. 34-35

provides "A statute is not unconsti-

————————

9

tutional as indefinite because it em-

ploys general terms, when such terms

convey to a person of ordinary under-

standing and intelligence an adequate

description of the prohibited act

(citing Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 331

Mass 439, 120 N.E. 2d 189), for im-

possible standards of certainty are

not required (citing United States v.

Petrillo, supra)... If the general

class of offenses to which a statute

is directed can be made constitu-

tionally definite by a reasonable in-

terpretation of the statute, the court

should give the statute such inter-

pretation, for when fairly possible,

the statute should be construed so as

to avoid a danger of unconstitution-

ality. At the same time, in giving

a statute a narrow construction in

16

order to avoid doubt as to constitu-

tionality, the court must avoid a con-

struction which would seriously impair

the effectiveness of the statute in

coping with the evil which it was

designed to correct." (United States

v. Harriss, supra). It is respect-

fully submitted that the statute as

applied to the facts in this case is

not vague or indefinite. Common sense

tells us that the acts of this defendant

amount to those likely to impair the

morals of this thirteen year old girl.

Morals in the context of the

statute, deals with virtuousness in

sexual conduct. As will be set forth

hereafter, there are Connecticut

statutes (which were in effect at the

time of these offenses) dealing with

sex offenses which explicitly prohibit

the conduct of the defendant, and he

11

was, at least constructively, on notice

as to those prohibitions.

I]

RELATED STATUTES DEFEAT ANY CLAIM OF

VAGUENESS OF CHALLENGED SECTION

Connecticut General Statutes.

§53-21 antedated the adoption of the

Penal Code, §§53a-1, et seq. which was

enacted in 1969, to be effective on

October 1, 1971. §53a-2 provides that

"[t]he provisions of this title shall

apply to any offense defined in this

title or the general statutes...

(emphasis added) Part VI of said code

deals with Sex Offenses, §53a-65 (the

first section under this part), sets

forth definitions for certain terms

used in the part. Subsection (3) pro-

vides: "'Sexual Contact' means any con-

tact with the intimate parts of a person

not married to the actor for the purpose

TE

12

of sexual gratification of the actor."

Subsection (8) provides: “'Intimate

Parts' means the genital area, groin,

anus, inner thighs, buttocks or

breasts." (emphasis added).

It is thus apparant that not only

does §53-21, itself, convey suf-

ficiently definite warning as to the

proscribed conduct when measured by

commong understanding and practices";

Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-

232, 71S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. SEG; OUT

the applicable Connecticut statutes

give him "fair-warning"of specifically

prohibited conduct. i.e. the touching

and rubbing of the victim's breast and

the attempt (at least) to have con-

tact with her buttocks, or even possi-

bly her anus, groin or genital area.

Add to this the forced "French kissing"

and hugging while performing the earlier

13

described acts and one could only con-

Clude that such conduct was proscribed

by the statute.

Although defendant in his Juris-

dictional Statement (pp. 16-18), has

cited numerous Connecticut cases dealing

with the "private parts" of the Victim,

he does not cite one holding that the

Risk of Injury statute is limited to

such acts. To the contrary, the Connec-

ticut Supreme Court has frequently held

that such statute has broad application

to many prohibited acts. In State v.

McCall, 187 Conn 73, 92 (1982) it held

that sexual intercourse "

-1s only

one of a multitude of acts that would

Suffice to prove risk of injury'

(emphasis added). In State v. Smith,

149 Conn 487, 490-491), the vic-

tim, a fourteen year old boy was exposed

to drinking parties where he was given

14

beer on one occasion, girls became

drunk and was taken into bedrooms, and

he was the victim of a sexual assault

by a person other than the defendant.

In State v. Hauck, 172 Conn 140 (1976)

the defendant, a school teacher, offered

to give the victim, a girl under 16,

a passing grade if she would allow him

to photograph her in the nude and semi-

nude, which he later did. On one occasion

he touched her private parts.

aaa

NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY PATTERN

IN VIOLATION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Defendant-Appellant further ciaims .

that §53-21 and 53a-73a(a)(1) form an

unconstitutonal statutory pattern.

In addressing this claim, he argues

that the lesser offense (Sexual Assault

in the fourth degree) requires proof

of a specific intent, and thus it is

more difficult to prove and thus less

intrusive conduct may form a basis for

a more serious charge. An examination

of the two statutes clearly establishes

that such reasoning is faulty.

For a violation of §53-21 (Risk

of Injury) the State must prove not

only that the proscribed conduct

occurs, but in addition that such im-

pairs or is likely to impair the morals

of the victim. Such is not required

for proof of a violation of §53a-73a

(a)(1) (Sexual Assault fourth) but only

proof of the touching of intimate parts

for the purpose of sexual gratification

on the part of the actor... (this latter

element, to distinguish it from an un-

intentional or justified touching e.g.

close contact in a crowded elevator

16

or administering CPR on a female).

The former deals with the effect on

the victim (the more serious concern)

and the latter deals with the effect

on the actor - sexual gratification

(less serious concern). To make this

more evident, consider the following

examples:

1) Assume the victim in this case

was the 13 year old school prostitute,

who invited the defendant into the

locker room and enticed him to perform

the acts in this case. Because of her

age, defendant would still be guilty

of Sexual Assault in the fourth degree, :

but would not be guilty of Risk of In-

jury because the acts would not impair

the morals of the child - nor be likly

to do so.

2) Assume the victim, a 13 year

i

Old girl was asleep and the defendant

rubbed her breasts for his sexual grati-

fication, and she did not awake, he

would be guilty of Sexual Assault in

the fourth degree but not guilty, of

Risk of Injury.

3) Assume an innocent 13 year

Old girl, the showing of pornographic

material to her, or taking nude pictures

of her, or allowing her to observe others

perform sex acts, there being no touch-

ing of the girl, herself, would be a

Risk of Injury, but not a Sexual Assault

in the fourth degree.

It should be remembered in the

instant case, the victim was forced;

she did not consent; she was scared

and frightened by defendant's acts.

She was the kind of girl who, before

going skating with defendant had to

18

get her parents permission, and then

could only go if she had another friend

with her. From these facts, and the

jury's observation of her on the stand,

they could reasonably conclude that

the acts of the defendant were likely

to impair her morals.

"(T]he legislature has the power

to define what acts shall constitute

criminal offenses and what penalties

shall be inflicted on offenders... the

expediency of making any such enact-

ment being of a matter of which the

legislature is the proper judge... So

long as it's enactments do not infringe

constitutional rights and privileges

express or necessarily implied, it's

will is absolute.” Wharton's Criminal

Law, supra +16 pp. 25, 26; Coffey v.

Hariean County, i59 U.S. 590, 16 8. Ct.

In the instant matter, there 1s

no unconstitutional statutory pattern.

The Connecticut legislature has (right-

ly) established its concerns for the

protection of children, and has decreed

that the more serious the effect an

offender's conduct has on children,

the more severely it will be punished.

It probably should be noted that

before the Connecticut Supreme Court,

Defendant-Appellant claimed that the

charge, conviction and punishment for

the two subject charges amounted to

a violation of the Double Jeopardy

clause of the Fifth Amendment (J.-S.

App. A. p. 30). He has abandoned this

claim before this Court in that he has

not included it in the Questions Pre-

sented (J.S. p. 1), nor has he briefed

20

it. Your writer, therefore, has not

specifically addressed such issue.

CONCLUSION

The Appellee respectfully submits

that the questions upon which this cause

depends are so unsubstantial as to

merit plenary consideration by this

Court. The decision of the Supreme

Court of Connecticut is not subject

to any reasonable attack. The Appellee

therefore moves the Court to dismiss

this appeal, or, in the alternative,

to affirm the judgment of the Supreme

Court of Connecticut.

Respectfu Submitted,

C. “Robert Satter

Counsel for Appellee

State's Attorney

New London Judicial District

302 Captain's Walk

New London, CT 06320

Telephone: (203) 443-2835

21

APPENDIX A

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NEW LONDON COUNTY, SUPERIOR COURT

June Session, 1982

Hon. Seymour L. Hendel, Judge

No. CR 11-42904

STATE : Upon the informa-

: tion of Harry

VS. : Gaucher, Jr., Esq.

: Attorney for the

DENNIS M. PERRUCCIO : State Judicial

District of Windham

charging the said Dennis M.

Perruccio with the crimes of

1) Injury or risk of injury to

or impairing the morals of a child in

violation of Sec. 53-21 Conn. Gen.

Statutes; 2) Sexual Assault, 4th degree

in violation of Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A)

of said statutes, as on file.

The accused appeared on May 20,

1982 and for the plea said "Not Guilty",

and elected to be tried by A Jury of

six. After a full hearing, the case

was committed to the jury which returned

a verdict of "Guilty" to both counts.

The Court accepted said verdict.

22

The Court thereupon deferred the

imposition of sentence on the accused,

pending the filing of the required pre-

sentence investigation report by the

State Adult Probation Department, and

the case came thence to the present

time, when the said presentence report

having been filed and considered, the

Court then sentenced the accused to

be committed to the Commissioner of

Corrections for the term of 10 years

on Count 1, and 1 year on Count 2 sen-

tences to run concurrently to each other

and with Sentences in Case #21-12683

JD but execution of the said sentence

however, is, suspended as to Count 1l

after one year and the accused is com-

mitted to the custody of the State Adult

Probation Department for the period

of 3 years, and to stand committed until

this judgment is complied with.

Date of Conviction June 2, 1982.

Date of Imposition of Sentence June

29, 1962.

Attest,

Frederick Mahler

Clerk

23

APPENDIX B

EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY

A - Kimberly Nabozny

1. DIRECT EXAMINATION

i, Kim, how old are you?

A. Fourteen.

Q. Okay, and what's your date of

A. December 23rd, 1967.

QO. Okay. Would you keep your voice

up so I can hear you.

A. (Witness nodded head affirma-

Q. All right. Where do you go to

A. Ellis Tech.

Q. And what year are you in?

A. Ninth grade.

7m. 93

*xk*

Q. Okay, and what did you talk

about on Tuesday?

A. He asked me to go skating.

Q.

24

What kind of skating?

Roller-skating.

kkk

Okay. And could you tell me

what he said to you when he asked you

to go

say?

A.

Q.

A.

>~> ”O

A.

skating? What exactly did he

He gave me two tickets in class.

And what did he say?

He asked me to go.

Okay, go with him?

Yeah.

kkk

I told him maybe; I'd have to

ask my parents.

> O

And did you ask your parents?

Yes.

What did they say?

They said as long as I bring

friend.

As long as --

I bring a friend.

TR 95-96

kk

25

Q. He was standing to your right

and you leaned over and kissed him on

the left cheek?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. What did he say

or do after that?

As He said, is that it?

Q. Okay, and what did you say?

A. I didn't say anything.

Q. Then, what did he say or do?

A. He turned me toward him. He

put his left arm around me. Then he

kissed me and went up my shirt with

his right arm.

*k*

Q. Where did he -- tell me what

he did with each of his hands; okay?

A. His left arm was around me,

around my back.

QO. Around you where, your shoulder,

your waist, what?

A. My back.

Q. Around your back. You were both

facing each other?

A. Yeah, after he turned me.

26

Q. Okay. And then what did he

do with his right hand?

A. He went up my shirt.

Q. He went up inside your shirt?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he do with it then?

A. Felt my left breast. And then

he went under my bra, did that again.

Then he hugged me. He tried to go down

the back of my pants. I said, no. Then

he -- he hugged me. He said, friends?

I didn't say anyting. I just said,

friends. And then he let go of me,

and somebody came in, so I left.

Q. Okay. Now, you say with his

right hand he felt your breast outside

your bra?

A. Yes.

. Is that correct?

A. (Witness nodded head affirma-

tively. )

Q. And then did he put his hand

up underneath your bra and feel your

breast?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, how long did he do that?

A. A few seconds.

27

Q. All right. And what did he

do with his hands after that while he

was kissing you? You said something

about behind in your pants?

A. He tried to go down the back

of my pants.

Q. He tried to put his hand ,down

inside your pants in the back?

kkk

Q. And did you at any time give

him consent to touch your breast?

A. No.

Q. He just did it?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did you make any attempt

to stop him?

A. No, I was stunned.

Q. You were stunned?

A. Frightened.

TR 101 - 106

kk*

28 a

2. CROSS EXAMINATION

A. No. He wanted to know what

basically happened.

Q. Who is "he"?

A. Officer Kelly.

Q. And so you told him in the

statement the important things; is that

it?

A. Things that actually happened

when he -- I didn't -- he didn't go

all the way down my pants. That's why

I didn't put that.

Q. I'm sorry, would you talk louder,

please.

A. He didn't go all the way down

my pants. I told him, no; so lI left

that out at the time.

Q. Well, the "he" is Mr. Perruccio?

A. Yes. :

Q. He didn't go all the way down

your pants?

A. Right. He went to try to go

down my pants; and I said, no. So, I

didn't tell Officer Kelly that.

Q. And so he didn't go down your

pants, did he?

A. No. He tried to.

29

TR 121

kk*

Q. And as he turned you, you claim

he immediately tried to put his hand

on to your breast?

A. He kissed me and at the same

time he put his hand up my shirt.

Q. Now, what did you do with your

nands?

A. Just standing there (indi-

cating}

Q. You didn't put your hands around

him?

A. No.

Q. Did you try to kiss him back?

A. No.

Q. You just stood there with

your hands straight by your side and

did nothing (indicating)?

: I didn't know wnat to do. I

was just standing there. I was stunned.

I was frightened. If I didn't do some-

thing -- I didn't know what to do.

Q. But anyway, you didn't put your

arms around him?

A. No.

30

Q Now, you say that he put his

hand then underneath your blouse?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he put it -- you say

he put his hand directly on your breast;

is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That's your claim, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And he also then got his hand

under your bra as well?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he try to take it off?

A. (Short pause.) He moved it

up.

Q. He moved it up?

A. (Witness nodded head affirma-

tively).

kkk

Q. All right. Now you say that

the touching of your breast took how

long?

A. A few seconds.

Q. A few seconds. When you say

"a few seconds,” --

31

A. Maybe to a half a minute at

G. I'm sorry, what?

A. Maybe to a half a minute at

most.

Q. Oh, now it's to a half a,

minute.

A. OkKay.

G, Now, it's to a half a minute?

A If you want to know, if you

want a time limit. Maybe 15, I'm not

exactly sure. I was frightened.

Q. Fifteen?

A. I didn't have a stopwatch on

+p Fifteen minutes?

A. Seconds.

Q. Oh, I'm sorry. Okay, SO you

say anywhere from a few seconds to 15

seconds, to now over a minute?

A. Maybe a half a minute. I don‘t

know, I didn't have a stopwatch on my

hand.

Q. Now during all of this, during

all this time is he still in the process

of kissing you?

A. Yes.

Q. So his mouth is always on your

A. Right. He was Frenching me.

Q. Oh, he was giving you a French

A. Yes, forced it.

Q. And so you opened your mouth

for him to give you a French kiss?

A. He forced it.

Q. He forced your mouth open?

>

Right.

Q. Did you bite his tongue?

A No.

Q. Now when is it then -- when

is it when you then had an embrace,

was it after this kissing and touching?

A. Was does “embrace" mean?

QO. Arms put around each other.

A. He hugged me.

Q. And you put your arms around

As No.

33

Q. Oh, he just hugged you and you

did not hug him back?

A. He hugged me, and he asked me,

friends?

Q. I'm sorry?

A. He hugged me. It depends, which

hug are you talking about, the first

One where he tried to go down my pants

afterwards or the one that -- I didn't

put my arms around him at all. He

hugged me and tried to go down my pants,

and I said no. He hugged me again and

said, friends? And I just said,

friends, so I could get out.

I was hoping he'd let me go because

I was frightened and I was scared be-

cause I wanted to get out of the room.

kkx

A. No, he was not -- he was feel-

ing my breast for a few seconds.

G. A few seconds?

A. Right.

Q. Was he squeezing it, or did

he just touch it?

A. Sort of rubbed it. He sort

of rubbed it

*k*

34

Q. And when he kissed you on the

mouth, where was his left hand?

A. Around my back.

~~

Q. That was over your shoulder

onto your back?

A. Around my back.

Q. Was it under your -- Was it

under your right arm or left arm, or

was it over your back?

A. It was like that. Where he went

like this (indicating).

Q. So his arm was outside --

A. Right.

Q. -- your arm?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you try to pull away

from him?

A. No. I was scared. I was

frightened he might hurt me or some-

thing.

Q. I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.

A. Iwas frightened that he might

hurt me.

Q. Did he make any threats to

you?

TR 139-147

kkk

35

3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. Did you have any opportunity

to avoid his grabbing of your left

breast?

A. No.

Q. He just did it before you could

do anything about it?

A. That's right.

Q. And you had no warning that

he was going to do that; is that right?

A. I had no warning.

O. And you did not give him con-

sent to do that?

A. Wo, i didn’t.

TR 148

xkk*

B - Dennis Perruccio

1. DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. Dennis, you're the accused in

this case?

Q. And how old are you?

36

A. Thirty-nine years old.

Q. What is your date of birth?

A. Six February, 1943.

TR 348

kk*