Amicus Curiae Brief — Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (No. 18-481)
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No. 18-481
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE,
Petitioner,
v.
ARGUS LEADER MEDIA, D/B/A ARGUS LEADER,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC) AND TWENTY
LEGAL SCHOLARS AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
MARC ROTENBERG
Counsel of Record
ALAN BUTLER
ENID ZHOU
MEGAN IORIO
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC)
1718 Connecticut Ave. NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 483-1140
rotenberg@epic.org
March 25, 2019
RS A a PISS
.
TAL. E OF CONTENTS
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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ...........0.00:0000000 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.......000000.....c:cccccceeee 5
Se itinciesnntitiiniiictitiinisnscicristevitienindeniasenamtinns 6
I. The objective definition of “confidential”
commercial information established in
National Parks is necessary to ensure
oversight of government programs that
ns cncdaictnintansnmmpedecspeniuneniincing 9
A. Public access to business records promotes
accountability of government agencies
responsible for enforcement.......................... 1]
B. Public access to technical specifications
and other records from government
contractors enables oversight of data
COMIBCEION POOBTAURG. ....00cccseccecsccusesssenceessesseees 19
Il. The Government’s argument that there is no
Article III standing issue in this case is
inconsistent with the Court’s recent decision in
IT Ot MII iio nitsptnncdineutaabanadabiaicbaseiiimansoeccianids 24
EI vesisestiheiissnpasicenssindvctecnbanciesesslennedetesphaabentay 28
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
ee ee Oe Se Se eitstnccnesiceticcencenanentsnincszesese 8
Buckley v. Valeo,
is Oe ie acnsaitescicldnsndeocesstpinsnewiessantenterertensees 10
Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC,
975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsberg, J.,
aie cennisensesonitnns 8
DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Cuno,
SI iviincvinescksnernicesunennnmmesconeseuie 9, 24
Dep't of Air Force v. Rose,
ST Ree eRe 7
Dep't of State v. Ray,
I as ssaesmunbaminseiaceupenie 7
EPA v. Mink,
I alata inane audeichiebenendl 5
Frank v. Gaos,
ee Rs i I i cirgimcpnened 6, 9, 24, 25, 26, 27
Gaos v. Google, Inc., No. 10-4809,
2012 WL 1094646 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 29, 2012) ....... 25
King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)....... 27
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy,
ESSE 8 eR cee 7
Nat'l Archives & Record Admin. v. Favish,
I I ce cciicealene 5
Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton,
fe &§ YS otis 3.” Raat Sa enenaeemene 7
Spokeo v. Robins,
ES ence mr
STATUTES
49 U.S.C. § 44901(1)(2)(B) .......eccesscsscssessesecsecssesesseesees
OTHER AUTHORITIES
155 Cong. Rec. D644 (daily ed. Jun. 4, 2009)............
156 Cong. Rec. E1,238-E1,239 (daily ed. Jun. 30,
Assessment of Checkpoint Security: Are Our
Airports Keeping Passengers Safe? Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation Sec.
& Infrastructure Protection of the H. Comm.
on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 67 (Mar. 17,
2010) Goint prepared statement of Marc
Rotenberg & Lillie Coney)........................0020006 21,
Bart Jansen, TSA Dumps Near-Naked Rapiscan
Body Scanners, USA Today (Jan. 18, 2013). ......... :
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 13,
Frank v. Gaos, 584 U.S. __ (2019) (No. 17-961) ....
Class Respondents’ Supplemental Brief on
Article III Standing, Frank v. Gaos, 584 U.S.
ee | SE I
Complaint, EPIC v. FTC, No. 18-942 (D.D.C.
7 RE eae
Craig Timberg, Army Now Says It Won't Put
Cameras on Surveillance Aircraft in
Maryland, Wash. Post (Sept. 3, 2014)...................
David G. Savage, The Fight Against Full-body
Scanners at Airports, L.A. Times Jan. 13,
26
24
iv
David Kravets, An Intentional Mistake: The
Anatomy of Google’s Wi-Fi Sniffing Debacle,
Pee Gy Bh, TED weseconecasdusvsunbedisimasshecsnonnersioteans 14
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Privacy Impact
Assessment Update for TSA Whole Body
Imaging, 8 (Jul. 23, 2OOD).............ccccccesecercereeseeeecees 21
EPIC, BROMO GROLG).cccccccccsscccccccccccsesccsccccececesseses 18
EPIC, EPIC FOIA — US Drones Intercept
Electronic Communications and Identify
Human Targets (Feb. 28, 2013) ..............cccccccceeeeees 23
EPIC, EPIC FOIA Case — Army Blimps over
Washington Loaded with Surveillance Gear,
Cost $1.6 Billion (Aug. 29, 2014) ...........0.....000000000 23
EPIC, EPIC FOIA Uncovers Google’s Privacy
Assessment (Sept. 28, 2012)...........ccccccceeeeeseeeeeeeeeees 12
EPIC, EPIC v. Education Department — Private
Debt Collector Privacy Act Compliance (2019 ....... 19
EPIC, EPIC v. Education Department: FOIA
SPUD Gere rvscnevectcsvinsesibvisivintitiscdatinniincnanes 19
EPIC, EPIC v. FTC (Facebook Assessments)
STITT ncascnconscasidenguntstabiguigcdinbacbiaiadaddenagomddadealsuataaane 15
EPIC, In re Facebook (2019) ...............ccccccccccvsssssseeseee 14
EPIC, Investigations of Google Street View
II inceccccinnnsucntenpeapsabiniacsdapdieamuainidumabisatintebsbous Teams 13
EPIC, Whole Body Imaging Technology and
Body Scanners (“Backscatter” X-Ray and
Millimeter Wave Screening) (2019) ................0....06 20
Fed. Commc’ns Comm'n, In the Matter of Google
Inc., DA 12-592, 27 FCC Red. 4012 (2012). ........... 13
Vv
Fed. Trade Comm'n, In the Matter of Google Inc.,
DA 12-592, Notice of Apparent Liability of
Forfeiture Unredacted (April 13, 2012)................. 13
FOIA request from EPIC to Army and Air Force
Exchange Serv. (Oct. 20, 2009) .............................. 17
FOLA Request from EPIC to Dep’t of Homeland
TT ne 21
FOIA Request from EPIC to Fed. Trade Comm'n
Ee 15
ee 8
In re Echometrix (Complaint, Request for
Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief)
TTT tai rnd nin endnahntenennennnboncesersescoceses 17
Jeanne Meserve & Mike M. Ahlers, Body
scanners can store, send images, group says,
EES eT 22
Joe Sharkey, Whole-Body Scans Pass First
Airport Tests, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2009) ............... 20
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug.
ES IS SE 6
Letter from Michael Richter, Chief Privacy
Officer, Product, Facebook and Erin Egan,
Chief Privacy Officer, Policy, Facebook to
James A. Kohm, Esq., Associate Dir. For the
Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Apr. 23,
Letter from Teresa Z. Cavanaugh, Chief,
Investigations and Hearings Division
Enforcement Bureau, Fed. Commce’ns
Comm'n, to Google 2 (April 13, 2012) .................... 13
Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money (1933)........... 10
vi
Lucia Mutikani, Google Fined $25,000 for
Impeding FCC Investigation, Reuters (Apr.
I a 13
Matthew L. Wald, Mixed Signals on Airport
Scanners, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2009).................... 22
Mya Frazier, Big Tech’s Bid to Control FOIA,
Colum. Journalism Rev. (Feb. 2, 2018) ................. 10
Nancy Gohring, Google Kills Buzz,
Computerworld (Oct. 14, 2011) ...........0........0...000. 12
Order, Frank v. Gaos, 586 U.S. ____ (Nov. 20,
I a eects 26
Paul Giblin & Eric Lipton, New Airport X-Ray
Scans Bodies, Not Just Bags, N.Y. Times (Feb
is Ht ocienienirnseicnivdnmenitsitiniitdaaieganiacnidanndstdeadnensningt 20
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook
Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived
Consumers by Failing To Keep Privacy
I, Cn I csuesseonoanaion 14
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC
Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in
Googles Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network
SR SERIE Pate tis ST SE SO 12
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settles
with Company that Failed to Tell Parents
that Children’s Information Would be
Disclosed to Marketers (Nov. 30, 2010)................. 18
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement
by the Acting Director of FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection Regarding Reported
Concerns about Facebook Privacy Practices
GEIL, Sey EI cclnsancettinastinstndembecenriendannlmmeddinentie 17
vil
Reprocessed Independent Assessor's Report on
Facebook’s Privacy Program: For the Period
August 15, 2012 to February 11, 2013,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (June 26, 2018).............. 16
S. Rep. No. 89-813 (1965). ..............ccssseccsesseeeressenees 6,7
Supplemental Brief for the United States As
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Frank v. Gaos, 584 U.S. __ (2019) (No. 17-961) ....26
Transp. Sec. Admin., Whole-Body Imaging (May
i Hat aslanettiattansintetomsasenstininantesiadbuisemeesabammennianng 21
l
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
The Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) is a public interest research center in Washing-
ton, D.C.' EPIC was established in 1994 to focus public
attention on emerging civil liberties issues, to promote
government transparency, and to protect privacy, the
First Amendment, and other constitutional values.
EPIC has filed several briefs before this Court and
other federal courts concerning the federal Freedom of
Information Act. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae EPIC
et al., FCC v. AT&T, 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279)
(arguing that the phrase “personal privacy” in the
FOIA applies to individuals, not corporations); Brief of
Amici Curiae EPIC et al., ATF v. City of Chicago, 537
U.S. 1229 (2003) (02-322) (arguing that FOIA proce-
dures should be updated “in an age of electronic record
keeping”); Brief of Amici Curiae EPIC et al., N.Y.
Times v. DOJ, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-422)
(arguing that OLC opinions should be disclosed under
FOIA).
EPIC is also one of the top FOIA litigators in the
United States. FOLA Project, FOIA Suits Filed by Non-
profit/ Advocacy Groups Have Doubled Under Trump
(Oct. 18, 2018).2 EPIC relies upon access to
' Both parties consent to the filing of this brief. In accord-
ance with Rule 37.6, the undersigned states that no mone-
tary contributions were made for the preparation or sub-
mission of this brief, and this brief was not authored, in
whole or in part, by counsel for a party.
* EPIC is among the top five FOIA litigators in the United
States for the period 2001-2018, as measured by the
2
government documents to pursue its mission: to focus
public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties
issues. Many of EPIC’s government transparency pro-
jects have depended on access to commercial infor-
mation contained in agency documents. See, e.g.,
EPIC, EPIC v. FTC (Facebook Assessments) (2019);*
EPIC, Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
and Drones (2019);4 EPIC, EPIC v. Education Depart-
ment — Private Debt Collector Privacy Act Compliance
(2019);° EPIC, EPIC v. DHS — Body Scanner Com-
plaints (2019).° The documents EPIC obtains through
its FOLA work are reported in the national media. See,
e.g., Davey Alba, The US Government Will Be Scan-
ning Your Face At 20 Top Airports, Documents Show,
Buzzfeed (Mar. 11, 2019);7 Ava Kofman, The FBI is
Building a National Watchlist that Gives Companies
Real-Time Updates on Employees, The Intercept (Feb.
4, 2017);* Spencer Woodman, Documents Suggest Pal-
antir Could Help Power Trump’s ‘Extreme Vetting’ of
Immigrants, The Verge (Dec. 21, 2016);° Charlie
number of cases filed. http://foiapro-
ject.org/2018/10/18/nonprofit-advocacy-groups-foia-suits-
double-under-trump/.
’ https://epic.org/foia/ftc/facebook/.
‘ https://epic.org/privacy/drones/.
®° https://epic.org/foia/ed/.
® https://epic.org/foia/dhs/bodyscanner/complaints/.
7 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/these-
documents-reveal-the-governments-detailed-plan-for.
* https://theintercept.com/2017/02/04/the-fbi-is- building -a-
national-watchlist-that-gives-companies-real-time-up-
dates-on-employees/.
® https://www.theverge.com/2016/12/2 1/14012534/palantir-
peter-thiel-trump-immigrant-extreme-vetting.
3
Savage, Facial Scanning is Making Gains in Surveil-
lance, N.Y. Times (Aug. 21, 2013).!°
EPIC’s brief is joined by the following distin-
guished experts in law, technology, and public policy.
Legal Scholars and Technical Experts
Alessandro Acquisti
Professor, Carnegie Mellon University
Anita L. Allen
Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Phi-
losophy, Vice Provost, University of Pennsylva-
nia Law School
Danielle Keats Citron
Morton & Sophia Macht Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Maryland Carey School of Law
Simon Davies
Publisher, the Privacy Surgeon, Fellow of the
University of Amsterdam,
Founder of Privacy International and EPIC
Senior Fellow
Addison Fischer
Founder and Chairman, Fischer International
Corp.
Hon. David Flaherty
Former Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner for British Columbia
Lorraine G. Kisselburgh
Assistant Professor, Purdue University
Chris Larsen
Executive Chairman, Ripple Inc.
0 https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/2 1/us/facial-scanning-
is-making-gains-in-surveillance. html.
4
Harry R. Lewis
Gordon McKay Professor of Computer Science,
Harvard University
Roger McNamee
Elevation Partners
Dr. Pablo Garcia Molina
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Dr. Peter G. Neumann
Chief Scientist, SRI International Computer
Science Lab
Helen Nissenbaum
Professor, Cornell Tech Information Science
Frank Pasquale
Professor of Law, Univ. of Maryland Francis
King Carey School of Law
Deborah C. Peel, M.D.
President of Patient Privacy Rights
Dr. Stephanie Perrin
President, Digital Discretion, Inc.
Bilyana Petkova
EPIC Scholar-in-Residence; Assistant Profes-
sor, Maastricht University
Bruce Schneier
Fellow and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School
Jim Waldo
Gordon McKay Professor of the Practice of
Computer Science, John A. Paulson School of
Engineering and Applied Sciences
Anne L. Washington
Assistant Professor of Data Policy, NYU Stein-
hardt School
(Affiliations are for identification only)
5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOLA”) estab-
lishes a right of the public to know “what their govern-
ment is up to.” Nat'l Archives & Record Admin. v. Fav-
ish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004). The FOLA is necessary
to enable the public to obtain information “from possi-
bly unwilling official hands.” EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 80 (1973). But “official hands” are often not the
only hands FOIA requesters must grapple with. Pri-
vate companies—as government contractors and ven-
dors—play an integral role in government activities
that impact the privacy of Americans. And these pri-
vate parties, acting on behalf of public agencies and
with public funding, often hide their activities behind
an expansive view of one of the exemptions in the
FOIA. Government agencies are also responsible for
investigating and enforcing privacy obligations on pri-
vate companies that concern the privacy rights of
Americans. Public access to the commercial infor-
mation contained in agency records is therefore neces-
sary to ensure adequate oversight of these enforce-
ment duties.
Petitioner's proposal for a broad, subjective in-
terpretation of “confidential” in Exemption 4 would de-
prive the public, and government watchdogs such as
EPIC, of access to important information about “what
the government is up to.” Under a subjective test, com-
panies could seek to withhold any commercial infor-
mation that they consider confidential without regard
to the public interest in disclosure.
There are also significant jurisdictional ques-
tions that make this case a poor vehicle to address the
Exemption 4 issue. As the Court recently explained in
Frank v. Gaos, 584 U.S. __, 2019 WL 1264582 (Mar.
6
20, 2019), Article III standing must be analyzed by
lower courts in the first instance. Yet the lower courts
did not analyze whether the Food Marketing Institute,
a trade association, had standing to intervene and ap-
peal the district court judgment. In fact, the Petitioner
in this case has a significantly weaker standing claim
than the consumer plaintiffs in Gaos. The Govern-
ment’s arguments in the two cases are also irreconcil-
able. The Court should remand for the lower court to
address standing.
ARGUMENT
“An informed electorate is vital to the proper op-
eration of a democracy.” S. Rep. No. 89-813, 3 (1965).
For this reason, Congress passed the Freedom of In-
formation Act (“FOIA”) in 1966. Senator Long quoted
James Madison as he introduced the bill:
A popular government without popular
information or the means of acquiring it,
is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy
or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance, and a people who mean
to be their own governors, must arm
themselves with the power knowledge
gives.
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Letter from James Madison to W.T.
Barry (Aug. 4, 1822))."!
Congress passed the FOLIA to “overhaul the pub-
lic-disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)” and correct the law’s shift to more of “a
withhoiding statute than a disclosure statute.” Milner
'! Available at https://www.loc.gov/re-
source/mjm.20_0155_0159/?sp=1&st=text.
7
v. Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011). Congress
intended the FOLIA “to pierce the veil of administrative
secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny.” Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361
(1976). While Congress acknowledged that the public’s
interest in transparency would, in some circum-
stances, have to be balanced with competing interests
in privacy, Congress envisioned the FOLA as “a work-
able formula which encompasses, balances, and pro-
tects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest
responsible disclosure.” S. Rep. No. 89-813, 3 (1965).
Thus, the FOLA creates a “strong presumption in favor
of disclosure.” Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173
(1991), and the FOIA’s nine exemptions “must be nar-
rowly construed.” Milner, 562 U.S. at 565.
Nearly thirty-five years ago, the D.C. Circuit
adopted the substantial competitive harm test to de-
termine the scope of “confidential” commercial infor-
mation protected by Exemption 4. Nat? Parks & Con-
servation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The court rejected the same subjective test ad-
vanced by Petitioners. Jd. at 766. The First Circuit, in
adopting National Parks, quoted the House Commit-
tee on Government Operations in its 1978 Report to
similar effect:
disclosure policy cannot be contingent on
the subjective intent of those who submit
information. For example, it clearly
would be inappropriate to withhold all in-
formation, no matter how innocuous,
submitted by a corporation with a blan-
ket policy of refusing all public requests
for information.
8
9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Gover-
nors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1382, 18 (1978)). When the
D.C. Circuit in Critical Mass adopted a subjective test
for a limited subset of records (information given vol-
untarily to government agencies), then-Judge Gins-
burg warned of the perils of allowing such a test:
No longer is there to be an independent
judicial check on the reasonableness of
the provider's custom and the consonance
of that custom with the purposes of ex-
emption 4 and of the Act of which the ex-
emption is part. To the extent that the
court allows providers to render c* tego-
ries of information confidential mer by
withholding them from the public long
enough to show a custom, the revised test
is fairly typed “subjective” . . .
Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871,
885 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Ginsberg, J., dissent-
ing).
A broad, subjective definition of “confidential”
would limit the public’s ability to conduct meaningful
oversight of government surveillance activities and
the government's enforcement of privacy obligations
on commercial entities. The Government now rou-
tinely relies on contractors to develop and deploy sys-
tems used to collect personal data and to conduct sur-
veillance. And regulatory agencies gather commercial!
information from businesses to enforce federal privacy
laws. A subjective confidentiality test under Exemp-
tion 4 would allow companies, acting with taxpayer
dollars on behalf of federal agencies, to conceal
9
information that would otherwise be available to the
public.
There is also significant doubt that the Peti-
tioner has satisfied the standing requirements of Arti-
cle III necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. See
Resp’t Br. 1. As in Frank v. Gaos, 584 U.S. __, 2019
WL 1264582 (Mar. 20, 2019), the Court has “an obli-
gation to assure [itself] of litigants’ standing under Ar-
ticle IIL.” Slip op. 5 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006)). The Petitioner's
standing claim here is much weaker than the unlawful
disclosure injury that the plaintiffs alleged in Gaos.
The records at issue in this case were not even created
by the Food Marketing Institute, and the Institute was
not the entity that provided data to the USDA.
The Court in Gaos found remand was necessary
because the lower courts must address standing in the
first instance, and this case should be no different.
I. The objective definition of “confidential”
commercial information established in Na-
tional Parks is necessary to ensure oversight
of government programs that implicate pri-
vacy.
The public must have access to commercial in-
formation in agency records to conduct effective over-
sight of government programs that implicate privacy.
Federal agencies, across the government, contract
with private companies to build data collection and
surveillance systems. Technical specifications, con-
tracts, and other similar records describing the func-
tions of these systems is provided to the Government
by private companies. These records include commer-
cial information that should be available to the public.
Without access to this information, it would be
10
impossible to verify whether the systems do what the
government says they do, or whether the systems pose
a threat to the privacy of Americans. The government
also obtains commercial information from companies
during the course of investigating potential privacy vi-
olations. Access to commercial information held by
agencies is thus also necessary for the public to evalu-
ate the government's protection of privacy rights.
Companies that build data collection systems
are notoriously secretive. For example, Amazon and
Facebook have requested state and local governments
alert them of open government requests concerning
their business practices immediately upon receipt.
Mya Frazier, Big Tech’s Bid to Control FOIA, Colum.
Journalism Rev. (Feb. 2, 2018).'* Many companies do
not want their work on government surveillance pro-
grams to be revealed.
But “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfect-
ants.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting
Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money 62 (1933)). And
for watchdog groups such as EPIC, access to agency
records, including commercial information provided by
contractors and vendors, is essential to understand
the privacy implications of government activities. A
broad, subjective definition of “confidential” in Exemp-
tion 4 would limit public oversight of the programs of
federal agencies.
'2 https://www.cjr org/business_of_news/facebook-amazon-
foia.php.
1]
A. Public access to business records pro-
motes accountability of government
agencies responsible for enforcement.
Government agencies, including the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (“FCC”), are charged with in-
vestigating business practices that may violate the
privacy rights of consumers. But oversight does not
end with federal agencies. EPIC and other watchdog
organizations rely on the FOIA to inform the public
about emerging privacy issues and to independently
assess the risks these programs pose. Public oversight
of the functions of government—the purpose of the
FOILA—is not possible if the technical details and other
commercial information collected by federal agencies
is not accessible to the public.
The FOIA enables public oversight of agencies’
and businesses’ compliance with privacy laws in sev-
eral ways. First, records from enforcement agencies,
such as the FTC and FCC, can inform the public about
whether companies are engaged in business practices
that threaten consumer privacy. These records contain
commercial information gathered during investiga-
tions and pursuant to consent decrees. Second, agen-
cies compile technical specifications and other infor-
mation that contain commercial information about the
contractors that build and operate government sys-
tems. These records can have implications for over-
sight of both government data collection and of con-
sumer privacy investigations. Businesses typically
seek to withhold this information from the public.
Commercial information EPIC obtained as a re-
sult of FOIA requests submitted to the FTC, the FCC,
and the DOJ has helped improve the effectiveness of
12
these agencies and safeguarded the America public.
For example, EPIC was able to obtain information
about Google’s privacy practices from the FTC in 2012.
EPIC, EPIC FOLA Uncovers Google’s Privacy Assess-
ment (Sept. 28, 2012).'° Google entered into a consent
decree with the FTC in 2010 after it violated users’ pri-
vacy by disclosing their private contact lists. See EPIC,
In re Google Buzz (2019). As part of the settlement, the
FTC required Google to file regular privacy assess-
ment reports with the Commission detailing its steps
to comply with the consent order. Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Prac-
tices in Googles Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network
(Mar. 30, 2011).'* Google shuttered Buzz after the
FTC investigation. Nancy Gohring, Google Kills Buzz,
Computerworld (Oct. 14, 2011).'° The release of
Google’s privacy assessments gave the public greater
insight into the company’s privacy practices and facil-
itated future enforcement efforts.
In another case, EPIC’s FOIA work led to the
disclosure of records that made clear the full extent of
Google’s unlawful collection of private Wi-Fi data.
Google was subject to numerous investigations after it
was revealed that the company had collected private
Wi-Fi data via its “Street View’ vehicles. EPIC,
'S https://epic.org/20 12/09/epic-foia-uncovers-googles-
pri.html.
4 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/201 1/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-
googles-rollout-its-buzz,
'* https://www.computerworld.com/article/2499002/google -
kills-buzz. html.
13
Investigations of Google Street View (2019).'© EPIC
and others wrote to the FCC to urge an investigation;
the Commission ultimately fined Google a mere
$25,000 for obstructing the investigation. Lucia
Mutikani, Google Fined $25,000 for Impeding FCC In-
vestigation, Reuters (Apr. 15, 2012).'7 The FCC ini-
tially released only a heavily redacted version of its re-
port on the investigation. Fed. Commc’ns Comm'n, /n
the Matter of Google Inc., DA 12-592, 27 FCC Red.
4012 (2012). EPIC subsequently filed several FOIA re-
quests seeking disclosure of the full, unredacted re-
port, and disclosure of records from the related Justice
Department investigation. EPIC, Investigations of
Google Street View, supra. In response to the FOLA re-
quests, the FCC released a letter it had sent to Google
rejecting the company’s “very broad request for confi-
dential treatment of the information it submitted” in
response to the Commission’s investigatory inquiry.
Letter from Teresa Z. Cavanaugh, Chief, Investiga-
tions and Hearings Division Enforcement Bureau,
Fed. Comme’ns Comm'n, to Google 2 (April 13, 2012).'*
On April 28, 2012, Google released a complete, unre-
dacted copy of the FCC's report. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
In the Matter of Google Inc., DA 12-592, Notice of Ap-
parent Liability of Forfeiture Unredacted (April 13,
2012).'® Significantly, the full report made clear that
'® https://epic.org/privacy/streetview/.
'7 https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-google-
fine/google-fined-25000-for-impeding-fcc-investigation-
id USBRE83F00Q20 120416.
'* https://transition. fec.gov/foia/Letter-Ruling-Regarding-
Confidentiality-Request.pdf.
'* Available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/docu-
ments/35 1298/fcc-report-on-googles-street-view.pdf.
14
Google had intentionally intercepted payload data for
business purposes and that many supervisors and en-
gineers within the company reviewed the code and the
design documents associated with the project. See Da-
vid Kravets, An Intentional Mistake: The Anatomy of
Google’s Wi-Fi Sniffing Debacle, Wired (May 2,
2012).2°
Records EPIC obtained from the FTC under the
FOIA also raised important questions about whether
the agency has pursued effective oversight of compa-
nies subject to its legal authorities. In 2011 the FTC
opened an investigation into Facebook’s privacy prac-
tices and subsequently entered into a consent decree
requiring the company to implement a comprehensive
privacy program and submit to third-party audits for
20 years. See EPIC, In re Facebook (2019);?' Press Re-
lease, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook Settles FTC
Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing To
Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011).22 Under the
terms of the order, Facebook is required to submit the
independent audits to the FTC, but the FOIA is cur-
rently the only mechanism that ensures those audits
will be made public. In the wake of the Cambridge An-
alytica scandal, EPIC filed a FOLA request to the FTC
seeking documents related to the enforcement of the
consent order, including the full release of all Face-
book privacy assessments. See FOIA Request from
2° https://www.wired.com/20 12/05/google-wifi-fec-investiga-
tion/.
2! https://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/,
22 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/201 1/1 1/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-
consumers-failing-keep,
15
EPIC to Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 20, 2018).”° EPIC
eventually sued the FTC for the release of these docu-
ments. Complaint, EPIC v. FTC, No. 18-942 (D.D.C.
filed Apr. 20, 2018).
As a result of EPIC’s lawsuit, the FTC has re-
leased partially redacted versions of Facebook's pri-
vacy assessments and hundreds of pages of communi-
cations between the Commission and Facebook. The
communications show that when Facebook initially
submitted its first privacy assessment in 2013, the
company enclosed two versions of the privacy assess-
ment—a confidential version and a non-confidential
version with self-selected redactions. See EPIC, EPIC
v. FTC (Facebook Assessments) (2019). Facebook's
non-confidential version submitted to the FTC liber-
ally applied redactions, yet the FTC reprocessed this
assessment in the course of EPIC’s lawsuit and re-
leased much of the information that Facebook had
originally claimed was “confidential.” See, e.g., Letter
from Michael Richter, Chief Privacy Officer, Product,
Facebook and Erin Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Policy,
Facebook to James A. Kohm, Esq., Associate Dir. For
the Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Apr. 23, 2013);”° cf. Inde-
pendent Assessor's Report on Facebook's Privacy Pro-
gram: For the Period August 15, 2012 to February 11,
23 https://www.epic.org/foia/F TC/face book/E PIC- 18-03-20-
FTC-FOIA-20180320-Request.pdf.
“4 https://epic.org/foia/F TC/facebook/.
25 Available at https://epic.org/foia/F TC/facebook/EPIC- 18-
03-20-FTC-FOIA-20181012-FTC-FB-Communications.pdf
(page 19).
16
2013, PricewaterhouseCoopers (reprocessed version
released June 26, 2018).
The FTC’s use of the D.C. Circuit's National
Parks test to reprocess the privacy assessments shows
that much of what Facebook had considered “confiden-
tial” was often inconsequential and would not cause
substantial competitive harm if released to the public.
Without the full release of these assessments,
the public would be left in the dark about the effective-
ness of third-party audits. In the 2017 privacy assess-
ment, which included the period when Facebook knew
of Cambridge Analytica’s illicit data transfer, the au-
ditor erroneously certified that the privacy controls
were operating with “sufficient effectiveness.” In fact,
Facebook knew about the significant breach of persona
data and never informed the FTC. None of the docu-
ments released under the FOIA indicate that Face-
book notified the Commission of its knowledge that
Cambridge Analytica unlawfully harvested the data of
millions of Facebook users. While the FTC reprocessed
EPIC’s FOLIA requests for the privacy assessments and
released more information, significant sections of the
assessments are redacted under Exemption 4. In the
aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, three
years after Facebook discovered the unlawful data
transfer, the FTC launched an open investigation into
Facebook's privacy practices. Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Statement by the Acting Director of
FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Regarding
26 https://www.epic.org/foia/FTC/facebook/EPIC- 18-03-20-
FTC-FOIA-20180626-F B-Assessment-2013.pdf.
17
Reported Concerns about Facebook Privacy Practices
(Mar. 26, 2018).?7
In other instance, the release of records, con-
taining commercial, under the FOIA have led to sig-
nificant changes in agency practices and helped safe-
guard American military families. For example, in
2009, EPIC filed a FOIA request to the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service seeking agency records about
the software program “My Military Sentry,” including
any contracts between the agency and Echometrix,
Inc. FOIA request from EPIC to Army and Air Force
Exchange Serv. (Oct. 20, 2009).2* Echometrix pro-
duced parental control software and promised to mon-
itor children’s online activity. But Echometrix also col-
lected data about children and sold the data to third
parties for market-intelligence research.
EPIC filed a complaint with the FTC in 2009 al-
leging that Echometric had engaged in unfair and de-
ceptive trade practices by representing that its soft-
ware protects children while simultaneously collecting
and disclosing information about children’s online ac-
tivity—a direct violation of the Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act. In re Echometrix (Complaint, Re-
quest for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief)
(Sept. 25, 2009).2” EPIC obtained documents as a re-
sult of its FOLA request that revealed the Defense De-
partment canceled a contract with Echometrix
27 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2018/03/statement-acting-director-ftcs-bureau-con-
sumer-protection.
26 https://epic.org/privacy/echometrix/AAFES FOIA.PDF.
2° http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/Echometrix%20FTC%20Com-
plaint%20final. pdf.
18
following an EPIC complaint to the FTC in 2009. See
EPIC, Echometrix (2015).
As a consequence of EPIC’s FOIA work, the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service removed My
Military Sentry from their online store, stating in an
e-mail to Echnometrix, “[t]he collection of AAFES cus-
tomer information (personal or otherwise) for any
other purpose than to provide quality customer service
is prohibited . .. . Giving our customers the ability to
opt out does not address this issue.” /d.
The FTC also took action against the firm,
based on EPIC’s FOIA work. The Commission eventu-
ally announced a settlement of its charge against
Echometrix requiring the company to not use or share
information obtained through its programs for any
purpose other than allowing registered users to use
their account; destroy the information illicitly trans-
ferred to third-party marketers; and requires standard
report and record-keeping provisions to allow the
Commission to monitor compliance. Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settles with Company that
Failed to Tell Parents that Children’s Information
Would be Disclosed to Marketers (Nov. 30, 2010).*!
EPIC’s access to commercial records helped protect
military families and also ensure that FTC pursued its
enforcement obligations.
In another case, documents EPIC obtained from
the U.S. Department of Education, including
% https://epic.org/privacy/echometrix/.
*! https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2010/11/ftc-settles-company-failed-tell-parents-chil-
drens-information.
19
commercial information, revealed that many private
debt collection agencies maintained incomplete and in-
sufficient quality controls for the data they collect. See
EPIC, EPIC v. Education Department — Private Debt
Collector Privacy Act Compliance (2019).** As govern-
ment contractors, debt collectors must follow the Pri-
vacy Act, a federal law that protects personal infor-
mation. The Department of Education also requires
student debt collectors to submit quality control re-
ports indicating whether the companies maintain ac-
curate student loan information. The documents ob-
tained by EPIC revealed that many companies pro-
vided small sample sizes to conceal possible violations
of the Act. See EPIC, EPIC v. Education Department:
FOIA Documents (2019).** The documents also showed
that many companies did not submit required infor-
mation about Privacy Act compliance to the Depart-
ment of Education. EPIC’s pursuit of the release of
this information allowed for greater public oversight
of the Department of Education in overseeing Privacy
Act compliance with private debt collectors.
B. Public access to technical specifica-
tions and other records from govern-
ment contractors enables oversight of
data collection programs.
Public oversight of government data collection
and surveillance systems also requires access to the
contracts and technical specification records that pri-
vate manufacturers provide the government. Substan-
tial privacy problems that led to bipartisan reform
would not have been uncovered if EPIC and others
*2 https://epic.org/foia/ed/.
* https://epic.org/foia/ed/#foia.
20
could not obtain and analyze agency records that de-
scribe these systems and how they function.
For example, EPIC relied on documents ob-
tained under the FOLIA, including commercial infor-
mation such as technical specifications and contracts,
to assess the privacy implications of the Transporta-
tion Security Administration’s (“TSA”) use of body
scanners in U.S. airports. See EPIC, Whole Body Im-
aging Technology and Body Scanners (“Backscatter” X-
Ray and Millimeter Wave Screening) (2019).** The
campaign against the deployment of body scanners,
which captured nude images of every airline passen-
ger, exemplifies the type of public oversight that would
be nearly impossible if Exemption 4 imposed a broad,
subjective definition of “confidential.” In 2007, the
TSA began testing body scanners in select U.S. air-
ports. Paul Giblin & Eric Lipton, New Airport X-Ray
Scans Bodies, Not Just Bags, N.Y. Times (Feb 24,
2007).*° The TSA’s announcement that it would make
the scanners mandatory for primary screening in all
U.S. airports was met with swift and bipartisan oppo-
sition. Joe Sharkey, Whole-Body Scans Pass First Air-
port Tests, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2009).°° Republican
Congressman Jason Chaffetz introduced an amend-
ment to prohibit the TSA “from using Whole Body-Im-
aging machines for primary screening at airports,” re-
quire the TSA “to give passengers the option of a pat-
down search in place of going through a WBI machine,
information on the images generated by the WBI, the
privacy policies in place, and the right to request a pat-
“ https://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/.
* https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/24/us/24scan. html.
36 https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/busi-
ness/O7road. html.
21
down search,” and prohibit the TSA “from storing,
transferring, or copying the images ” 155 Cong. Rec.
D644 (daily ed. Jun. 4, 2009). The amendment passed
310-118. Id.
In the midst of this public debate, EPIC filed a
FOLA request with the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (“DHS”) for documents regarding the procure-
ment and use of the body scanners. FOLA Request
from EPIC to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 14, 2009)*".
As a result of EPIC’s FOIA suit, the agency released
device specifications, including procurement docu-
ments and contracts with L3 and Rapiscan Systems,
that showed that the scanners were able to store and
transfer images. Assessment of Checkpoint Security:
Are Our Airports Keeping Passengers Safe? Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation Sec. & Infra-
structure Protection of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 111th Cong. 67 (Mar. 17, 2010) (joint prepared
statement of Marc Rotenberg & Lillie Coney) (Herein-
after “EPIC Body Scanner Testimony”).
The documents contradicted the TSA’s previous
representations that the devices could not store or
transmit scans. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Privacy Im-
pact Assessment Update for TSA Whole Body Imaging,
8 (Jul. 23, 2009) (TSA had “the manufacturer disable
the data storage capabilities prior to delivery to
TSA”);** Transp. Sec. Admin., Whole-Body Imaging
(May 28, 2009) (“The image cannot be stored, trans-
mitted or printed, and are deleted immediately once
viewed. In fact, the machines have zero storage
*? Available at https://epic.org/foia/FOLA_041409.pdf.
%8 Available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/pri-
vacy/privacy_pia_tsa_wbiupdate.pdf.
22
capability.”)’ The documents obtained by EPIC also
called into question whether the scanners could detect
powdered explosives. EPIC Body Scanner Testimony.
The story was widely reported and of significant inter-
est to the public. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Mixed
Signals on Airport Scanners, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12,
2009); Jeanne Meserve & Mike M. Ahlers, Body
scanners can store, send images, group says, CNN
(Jan. 11, 2010).*! In the immediate aftermath, Rep.
Chaffetz remarked, “We don't need to look at naked 8-
year-olds and grandmothers to secure airplanes. |
think it's a false argument to say we have to give up
all of our personal privacy in order to have security.”
David G. Savage, The Fight Against Full-body Scan-
ners at Airports, L.A. Times (Jan. 13, 2010).42 Rep.
Chaffetz later used documents that EPIC received un-
der the FOIA, which included commercial information,
to support efforts to limit the use of body scanners in
U.S. airports and to enhance the privacy protections
for travelers 156 Cong. Rec. E1,238-E1,239 (daily ed.
Jun. 30, 2010).*°
Ultimately, public outcry led Congress to re-
quire the TSA to remove all body scanners from U.S.
airports that could not be programmed to produce a
* https://web.archive.org/web/20090528 12 1532/
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/body_imaging.shtm.
” https://www .nytimes.com/2010/01/13/us/13scan-
ners. html.
*! http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/01/1 1/body.scan-
ners/.
2 http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/13/nation/la-na-ter-
ror-privacy 13-2010jan13.
Available at https://www.cougress.gov/crec/2010/06/30/
CREC-2010-06-30-pt 1-PgE 1238-2.pdf.
23
generic human outline of a traveler instead of a nude
image. 49 U.S.C. § 44901(1)(2)(B). The TSA subse-
quently removed the backscatter x-ray body scanners
manufactured by Rapiscan Systems because the com-
pany could not produce the necessary software. Bart
Jansen, TSA Dumps Near-Naked Rapiscan Body
Scanners, USA Today (Jan. 18, 2013).
Many other oversight campaigns have relied on
technical data provided to federal agencies and then
obtained through the FOIA to reform agency practices.
For example, EPIC obtained records from U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection (“CBP”) that included
product specifications for drones; these specifications
showed that Predator B drones operated by CBP are
able to recognize and identify a person on the ground.
EPIC, EPIC FOIA — US Drones Intercept Electronic
Communications and Identify Human Targets (Feb.
28, 2013).*° An EPIC FOIA also revealed that Army
blimps deployed over Washington, D.C., contained ex-
tensive surveillance equipment, including video sur-
veillance capabilities. EPIC, EPIC FOIA Case — Army
Blimps over Washington Loaded with Surveillance
Gear, Cost $1.6 Billion (Aug. 29, 2014). After this
was revealed, the Army publicly committed not to put
cameras on the blimps over the capitol area. Craig
Timberg, Army Now Says It Won't Put Cameras on
“ https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/
01/18/naked-airport-scanners/1845851/.
© https://epic.org/2013/02/epic-foia---us-drones-inter-
cep. html.
https://epic.org/20 1 4/08/epic-foia-case---army-blimps-
o. html.
24
Surveillance Aircraft in Maryland, Wash. Post (Sept.
3, 2014).*7
” m o
These examples show how public access to com-
mercial information is necessary to enable oversight of
government practices that implicate privacy rights. If
the National Parks standard is diminished, Exemp-
tion 4 could prevent the public from accessing this crit-
ical information.
Il. The Government’s argument that there is no
Article II] standing issue in this case is
inconsistent with the Court’s recent decision
in Frank v. Gaos.
There is “a substantial question” about whether
Petitioner has standing to appeal the lower court's
judgment. The standing issue was not addressed by
the lower courts and cannot be resolved by this Court
in the first instance. Frank v. Gaos, 586 U.S. __, 2019
WL 1264582, slip op. at 6 (Mar. 20, 2019) (“We ‘are a
court of review, not of first view.””). The Court has “an
obligation to assure [itself] of litigants’ standing under
Article II1.” Id. at 5 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006). Yet the United States
simply asserts that “petitioner had Article III standing
to appeal.” Br. United States As Amicus Curiae 31
[hereinafter United States Food Marketing Institute
Amicus]. The Government's assertion in this case is
inconsistent with its arguments challenging consum-
ers’ standing to sue for privacy violations in Frank v.
Gaos. The plaintiffs in Gaos have a much stronger
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/20 14/09/03/armys-eyes-in-the-sky-built-to-spot-
people-from-5-kilometers-away/.
25
standing claim than the intervenor-petitioner trade
association in this case, and the Court nevertheless re-
manded Gaos to the lower courts to address standing
in the first instance.
In Frank v. Gaos, the Court granted a Writ of
Certiorari to decide “whether a class action settlement
that provides a cy pres award but no direct relief to
class members satisfies the requirement that a settle-
ment binding class members be “fair, reasonable, and
adequate.” Gaos, 586 U.S., slip op. at 5. The underly-
ing dispute in Gaos concerned consolidated class ac-
tion complaints against Google, alleging that the com-
pany violated users’ privacy by disclosing their search
queries to owners of third-party websites. Jd. at 2.
Google filed several motions to dismiss the complaints,
which were granted in part and denied in part. Jd. at
3. The lower court held, in particular, that one of the
plaintiffs had standing to sue for violations of the class
members’ rights under the Stored Communications
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). Gaos v. Google, Inc., No. 10-
4809, 2012 WL 1094646, *4 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 29, 2012).
The plaintiffs later entered into a settlement with
Googie on behalf of all class members, which “required
Google to include certain disclosures about referrer
headers on three of its webpages” but allowed Google
to “continue its practice of transmitting users’ search
terms in referrer headers.” Gaos, 586 U.S., slip op. at
4. The settlement provided no monetary or injunctive
relief to class members; several class members chal-
lenged the fairness of the settlement. /d. at 4.
The standing issue in Gaos was not raised by
any of the parties during the appeal of the settlement.
Indeed, the issue was not raised at all after the settle-
ment until the United States Solicitor General “filed a
26
brief as amicus curiae supporting neither party” on the
merits in the Court. /d. at 5. The Solicitor General ar-
gued that “There is a substantial question about
whether plaintiffs had [Article III] standing” to pursue
their Stored Communications Act claims. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae 13, Frank v. Gaos, 584
U.S. __ (2019) (No. 17-961) [hereinafter United States
Gaos Amicus Brief]. The basis of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s argument was that the district court did not ap-
ply the Article III standing test articulated by the
Court in Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548
(2016). See United States Gaos Amicus Brief, supra, at
13-15.
The Court ordered supplemental briefing on the
standing issue after oral argument. Order, Frank v.
Gaos, 586 U.S. __ (Nov. 20, 2018) (No. 17-961). And
the parties filed extensive briefs on the issue, raising
“a wide variety of legal and factual issues not ad-
dressed in the merits briefing before [the Court] or at
oral argument.” Gaos, 586 U.S., slip op. at 6. The Class
Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief and explained
that “the alleged wrongful disclosure of individual
communications supports standing here” and that
“centuries of law likewise establish that persons
whose communications are disclosed without authori-
zation ‘need not allege any additional harm beyond’
the disclosure itself. Class Respondents’ Supplemental
Brief on Article III Standing 5, Frank v. Gaos, 584 U.S.
__. (2019) (No. 17-961) (emphasis in original). The So-
licitor General, in contrast, argued that none of the
named plaintiffs has Article III standing to challenge
the unlawful disclosure of their private communica-
tions. Supplemental Brief for the United States As
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Frank v.
Gaos, 584 U.S. __ (2019) (No. 17-961).
27
The Government's position in this case is incon-
sistent with its position in Gaos. The only support of-
fered for the assertion that Food Marketing Institute
has standing to pursue the appeal in this case is the
fact that the USDA “had previously given independent
assurances that it would not disclose store-level re-
demption data” and that the agency “affirmatively as-
sured the court that it would not release that data dur-
ing petitioner's expected appeal.” United States Food
Marketing Institute Amicus, supra, at 34. The Govern-
ment argued that “even though the USDA could have
released the data without a court order requiring dis-
closure,” the Petitioners had standing based on a
“threatened injury of disclosure” because there was a
sufficient likelihood that the injury “would be re-
dressed if petitioner prevailed on appeal.” Jd. 35 (em-
phasis added).
So according to the Government’s brief in Food
Marketing Institute, the disclosure of store purchase
data collected by a federal agency can be an injury-in-
fact to a trade association even though the trade asso-
ciation was not the one that provided the data to the
government and the agency is lawfully permitted to
disclose the data. But according to the Government's
brief in Gaos, the disclosure of an individual's private
communications in violation of federal law cannot pos-
sibly be an injury-in-fact. That is “pure applesauce.”
King v. Burwell, 135 8. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). And even if a lower court could be con-
vinced that the intervenors in this case have standing
to pursue an appeal, that determination cannot be
made by the Court in the first instance. See Gaos, 584
US., slip op. at 6.
28
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, EPIC respectfully ask this
Court to affirm the decision of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case.
Respectfully submitted,
MARC ROTENBERG
ALAN BUTLER
ENID ZHOU
MEGAN IORIO
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC)
1718 Connecticut Ave. NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 483-1140
(202) 483-1248 (fax)
rotenberg@epic.org
March 25, 2019
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.