Amicus Curiae Brief — China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018) (No. 17-432)

No. 17-432

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

CHINA AGRITECH, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

MICHAEL RESH, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGES

AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

ANDREW N. GOLDFARB

Counsel of Record

JOHN J. CONNOLLY

ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP

1800 M Street, NW, Ste. 1000

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 778-1800

agoldfarb@zuckerman.com

Counsel for Amici

February 28, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE RULE PROPOSED BY

PETITIONER COULD BURDEN

DISTRICT COURTS WITH

DUPLICATIVE CLASS ACTIONS

DURING THE TOLLING PERIOD................. 4

Il. DENYING AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING

TO FOLLOW-ON CLASS ACTION

CLAIMS WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO

AN INCREASE IN DUPLICATIVE

INDIVIDUAL FILINGS BY ABSENT

CLASS MEMBERS OF A PRIOR

PUTATIVE CLASS THAT WAS NOT

SI ccidiitinacdlineldiceincctlosnitapinteisepbiectanesusswesons 8

Il. DISTRICT COURTS UTILIZE A

VARIETY OF TOOLS, INCLUDING

COMITY, TO ADDRESS AND

PREVENT THE ENDLESS RE-

LITIGATION OF CLASS

I le cintccersniiassasiciclsscinuiinsiotemennih 11

ID iieddict tists cicssctinetesnsninnibihadchiciadinineiGades 14

ul

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.

REE TES MRS DS SR passim

Baker v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 11 C 6768,

2013 WL 271666 (N.D. Ill. 2013).........0...000..0.... 12

Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607 (9th Cir.

2015), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).............00..... 13

Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796,

I eT aemieuneunoainn 9

Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137

Be I ietictinsinininsiistiaiaieblnieeiaititiniaiinatintteninsie 6

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States

Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.

1979), overruled on other grounds, Animal

Legal Defense Fund v. FDA, 836 F.3d 987 (9th

Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States,

Se ee re ctsciertencesencinataseusstectiotancosse 11

EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d

Heibel v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 2:11-CV-

00593, 2012 WL 4463771 (S.D. Ohio Sem*. 27,

eee

Ott v. Mortg. Inv'rs Corp. of Ohio, 65 F. Supp. 3d

BOGE GAA GR, SB cect eencennicrsnnninnntennvevinennmnnieacenies 12

Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d

SEG Qin GI TID cerevecevevscvssrssevvaviinasiensiinlimniioneen 10

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins.,

RE Be: Se i cccserisanetisensenssovseceacsseuvinicetedennciie 2

Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011)....2, 4, 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE

LITIGATION § 2.11 cmt. reporter’s notes (AM.

CO TEE, Ge ceseencerssenncautnieovsniesscsenesinsitnsegatiicens 12

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 177 (1959).......... 7

RULES

PE i Me On B cctccccnsiccinseeeseniacduniitiecenineedtbhiainn 2, 10

PE Te Gs Ry Ba iiveseccectcesserestnetsscsiercetennedioiian 13

eS Re ee ere passim

TREATISES

2 William B. Rubenstein, NEWBERG ON CLASS

ACTIONS § 5:3 (5th ed. 2012)...................cc00eeeeeees 10

1

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE'

Amici curiae are former federal district court

judges who have experience adjudicating class action

cases. The attached Appendix contains a list of the

amici along with biographical information for each.

Amici are interested in this case because of their

years of service to the federal judiciary and their

ongoing commitment to ensure that federal judges

have the means to manage their caseloads and

dispense equal justice under law to all litigants.

Amici urge the Court to uphold the decision below

and to hold that, upon the failure of an earlier class

action that tolled the claims of absent class members

pursuant to American Pipe & Construction Co. v.

Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), an absent class member

acting within the tolled period may subsequently file

a class action complaint and is not limited to

pursuing an individual claim.”

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court has repeatedly instructed that Rule 22

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “automaticaily

applies ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the

United States district courts.” Shady Gruve

' All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No

counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and

no person or entity other than amici or their counsel made e

monetary contribution for the preparation or submission of tr

brief.

2 Amici take no position on the merits of this or other class

actions.

2

Orthopedic Assocs. v. Alistate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 400

(2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1) (emphasis in

original). While complex and time-consuming, class

actions are an efficient mechanism to adjudicate

common claims that affect numerous individuals or

entities. That remains the case even in circumstances

where a class action is timely only because a prior

(failed) class action tolled the claims of the putative

class members under the rule of American Pipe.

Amici acknowledge Petitioner's concerns about

“stacked” class actions. In many instances,

permitting a follow-on class action outside the

original limitations period may not be just or

prudent. District judges have ample means to

identify such cases and to decline requests to

adjudicate them on a collective basis. And decisions

after Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011), in

which this Court instructed federal courts to employ

“principles of stare decisis and comity” to mitigate the

effects of repetitive litigation, show that district

courts have used the tools available to them. But a

rule that bans class actions, in all situations, from

the reach of American Pipe tolling would not promote

justice. Such a rule would impair the integrity and

symmetry of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

needlessly deny litigants access to a form of

aggregate litigation that is also an important case-

management device for district judges.

A holding by this Court that the American Pipe

rule does not apply to a subsequent class claim by a

member of a prior, putative class action could cause

unnamed class members in pending and future class

actions, before the expiration of the statute of

limitations or statute of repose, to file (i) protective

3

class actions, simply to preserve their claims, or (ii)

individual actions with greater frequency after the

failure of a putative class action, since absent class

members will not have their claims preserved by the

filing of a class claim. The early protective class

filings may complicate the already difficult process of

choosing a lead plaintiff, including in securities cases,

by forcing a district court to address more plaintiffs

who seek to represent the putative class. Further, a

substantial increase in multidistrict litigations could

ensue if unnamed class members choose to file

independent class suits in districts most convenient

for them, but which might differ from the district in

which the class case is proceeding. A_ single,

consolidated class action could thus become subject to

an MDL procedure that would expend more of the

judiciary’s time and resources than necessary.

Finally, a flat ban on class actions while

individual actions are still cognizable could lead to

unjust results. If the individual claims are

meritorious but too costly or complex to adjudicate on

an individual basis, it is hard to see why they should

be rendered worthless merely because a prior class

action failed on technical grounds. Alternatively, in

some cases the individual claims will be both

meritorious and economical, in which case courts

might expect an onslaught of individual claims.

Again, it is difficult to see why litigants should be

prohibited from seeking, or courts from adjudicating,

those claims on a class basis within the strictures of

Rule 23. Indeed, the defendant might want to proceed

on a class basis, and Rule 23 accommodates that

possibility. It is not clear how Petitioner's proposed

rule would operate in unusual but not inconceivable

circumstances such as counterclaim class actions and

A

defendant class actions, and whether it would

preclude or discourage some class litigation that

would be beneficial to all parties. In the view of

amici, prudence warrants leaving district judges with

discretion—to be exercised with due regard for this

Court’s instruction in Smith v. Bayer—to grant or

deny class certification for either party, in view of all

the circumstances, including those that prompted the

failure of the prior class action or actions.

ARGUMENT

I. THE RULE PROPOSED BY PETITIONER

COULD BURDEN DISTRICT COURTS

WITH DUPLICATIVE CLASS ACTIONS

DURING THE TOLLING PERIOD

Class actions present a range of particular

challenges for federal district courts to manage.

Even before they can consider the merits of class

certification, district courts encounter early case

management issues that are often complex and hotly

contested. For example, courts must decide how to

efficiently manage and resolve the spate of class

filings that follow an event that might have harmed

hundreds or thousands (or even tens of thousands) of

individuals or entities in similar fashion. In certain

types of class actions, such as securities class actions

subject to the Private Securities Litigation Reform

Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737

(“PSLRA”), district courts must oversee the fierce

competition among plaintiffs or groups of plaintiffs

vying to be the lead. District courts must also

consider whether to consolidate multiple actions for

pretrial proceedings under the aegis of the Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation.

5

After addressing the early-case management

issues, and determining a plan for class discovery,

district courts must decide whether to certify a class

by applying Rule 23(a) and 23(b) to determine

whether class treatment is appropriate. Under Rule

23(a), this includes determining whether the named

plaintiff has claims that are typical of those of the

proposed class, whether the named plaintiff and

proposed class counsel can adequately represent the

class, and whether there are questions of law or fact

that are common to the class and susceptible to proof

by common evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). District

courts must also ensure that the class fits one of the

types of classes under Rule 23(b). And district courts

must do this all while ensuring that the rights of

absent class members are adequately protected.

While class actions present administrative

challenges, they remain an important way for district

courts to resolve claims that, if litigated plaintiff by

plaintiff, would clog the district courts with myriad

overlapping if not identical actions.

In American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v.

Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), this Court concluded

that the running of a statute of limitations should be

suspended for the claims of absent class members

during the pendency of a class action complaint. Each

of those decisions was grounded in part on the

concern that a contrary rule would induce potential

class members “to file protective motions to intervene

or to join in the event that a class was later found

unsuitable.” American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553; see also

Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 353-54. In essence,

the American Pipe rule vindicates the case

management principles embedded in Rule 23. Cal.

6

Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct.

2042, 2051 (2017) (citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at

556). As the Court observed in American Pipe, a

“federal class action is no longer ‘an invitation to

joinder’ but a truly representative suit designed to

avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of

repetitious papers and motions.” 414 U.S. at 550.

In the experience of amici, American Pipe tolling

has played a salutary role for district courts’

management of class action while protecting the

rights of absent class members. The American Pipe

rule promotes efficient administration of justice by

making it unnecessary for absent members of the

putative class to file protective actions or intervention

motions once a class action encompassing their

claims has been filed.

The rule urged by Petitioner would diminish these

benefits. Class members would have to worry that a

pending class action will fail, such as on procedural

or technical grounds, and the statute of limitations

will thereafter bar further class-based claims.

Cautious class members therefore may file protective

class actions, perhaps in the same district and

perhaps in other districts. As a result of the PSLRA’s

publication requirement, potential members of

securities class actions may receive early notice of the

litigation and ready access to counsel. When a

securities class action is filed, plaintiffs’ lawyers have

an obligation, as well as an incentive, to notify

potential class members of the action. Many of these

potential class members contact one or more of the

plaintiffs’ firms who are competing to represent the

lead plaintiff. If this Court finds Rule 23 inapplicable

to claims timely brought after the expiration of

7

American Pipe tolling, it seems likely that plaintiffs’

counsel will advise potential class members that they

cannot merely sit by and assume that their rights are

protected.

In the context of securities class actions, many

securities are held through funds operated by

professional managers. Investment managers are

fiduciaries who have a duty to keep investors

informed of rights and opportunities associated with

their investments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TRUSTS § 177 (1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to

the beneficiary to take reasonable steps to realize on

claims which he holds in trust.”). As a result, they are

likely to monitor Business Wire and other sites that

publish notices of class action filings. After learning

of a class action involving securities held by their

investors, investment professionals may feel

obligated to tell their clients—particularly those

whose claims may be too small to justify individual

actions—that they should form a judgment about

whether the filing of a protective class action

complaint is advisable. At minimum, this imposes

additional costs on investors, and it could impose

additional burdens on the courts if investment

professionals push investors to protect their rights by

filing class complaints.

Amici cannot quantify the anticipated rise in

separate class filings if the Court holds that

American Pipe tolling extends the statute of

limitations only for individual claims but not class

claims. But protective class actions will cause

needless administrative and possibly substantive

burdens on district judges as they ascertain how to

manage them during the pendency of another class

8

action addressing the same topic. Of course, district

courts have the ability to stay or transfer common

claims, and amici are unaware of data that would

illuminate just how many protective class actions

would be filed if Petitioner's rule prevails. But amici

believe there is no reason to tempt fate when other

solutions are readily available.

Il. DENYING AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING TO

FOLLOW-ON CLASS ACTION CLAIMS

WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO AN INCREASE

IN DUPLICATIVE INDIVIDUAL FILINGS

BY ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS OF A

PRIOR PUTATIVE CLASS THAT WAS

NOT CERTIFIED

Amici are also concerned that Petitioner's proposed

rule would create problems of case management and

fairness in the post-tolling period, when individual

claims remain cognizable but class claims, according

to Petitioner, are extinguished. Like many class-

action defendants, Petitioner no doubt believes that

the elimination of the class action device will result in

reduced liability and expense because only a small

fraction of absent class members will file individual

claims. This may well be true, because one of the

chief purposes of Rule 23 is to provide a mechanism

for adjudicating claims that are too small to pursue

on an individual basis. But it is difficult to justify

Petitioner's rule on an abstract scale of justice. Under

the rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit in this case, a

defendant will be subject to what is effectively an

extended statute of limitations for both class actions

and individual actions—actions raising issues that

the defendant already knows about from the prior

action in which a class was not certified. On the other

9

hand, were Petitioner to prevail, plaintiffs with

small-value claims would effectively be left without

any meaningful remedy because the cost of filing and

pursuing an individual claim exceeds its potential

benefit. Weighing those two outcomes, fairness

suggests that class actions should be allowed.

If, however, individual claims of absent class

members are cost effective, then presumably many

will be filed within the limitations period tolled under

American Pipe. Here too it is difficult to see why the

elimination of the class device is prudent or fair. For

district judges, the management of a single class

action is usually easier than 1,000 individual actions

filed by individuals who would ordinarily be members

of a class. Indeed, as a condition of certifying a class

under Rule 23(b)(3), a district court must find that a

class action would be a superior method for fairly and

efficiently adjudicating the controversy. For plaintiffs

as well the benefits are obvious. But even defendants

have some grounds to retain the class device in this

situation. In some cases defendants may prefer a

class action over manifold individual actions. See

Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799

(7th Cir. 2013) (where defendant argued that most

washing machine purchasers did not experience mold

problems, “that was an argument not for refusing to

certify the class but for certifying it and then entering

a judgment that would largely exonerate Sears—a

course it should welcome, as all class members who

did not opt out of the class action would be bound by

the judgment”). In many cases the class device

permits a class settlement that is the optimal result

for all parties. In addition, class actions are

sometimes asserted as counterclaims, in particular in

10

response to debt collection actions by large

corporations. See Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts,

552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008). Eliminating that

possibility could leave consumers without an

important defense in some situations. Rule 23 also

permits “defendant class actions,” in which the

plaintiff impels a group of defendants to litigate as a

class. See 2 William B. Rubenstein, NEWBERG ON

CLASS ACTIONS § 5:3 (5th ed. 2012) (observing that

certain securities cases are litigated as defendant

class actions because of economies achieved by one

rather than multiple determinations of whether a

registration statement contained a _é material

misrepresentation). It is not clear what if any effect

Petitioner's proposed rule would have on such

actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (“One or more

members of a class may sue or be sued as

representative parties ....”) (emphasis added).

Amici believe Petitioner's proposed rule would

impair the symmetry and balance of Rule 23 in

particular and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

as a whole. Eliminating one component of the rules

from certain types of actions will lead to mischief and

injustice in particular situations. Amici believe it is

better to allow litigants to avail themselves of all

forms of actions allowed under the Federal Rules, and

let the district courts decide, on a case-by-case basis,

the litigation form that promotes a just, speedy, and

inexpensive resolution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

Again, amici cannot quantify the number of

individual post-tolling filings that are likely to occur

if this Court were to reverse the decision below and

hold that a subsequent class action cannot benefit

from American Pipe tolling. But from the standpoint

11

of efficient judicial administration, denying litigants

access to Rule 23 is likely to force district courts to

manage more, essentially identical claims, or will

leave individuals with smaller claims without a

practical mechanism for pursuing redress.

Ill. DISTRICT COURTS UTILIZE A VARIETY

OF TOOLS, INCLUDING COMITY, TO

ADDRESS AND PREVENT THE ENDLESS

RE-LITIGATION OF CLASS

CERTIFICATION

Petitioners refer to comity as a “loose doctrine”

with the potential to prevent duplicative class

litigation that is “weak at best.” Pet. Br. at 49. But a

doctrine that is subject to the discretion of district

courts is not thereby toothless: courts recognize that

judicial efficiency and avoiding conflicting judgments

among federal! courts are important values, and apply

comity-based doctrines to further those objectives.

E.g., EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971-72 (3d

Cir.1988) (discussing contours of “first-filed” rule):

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (in relations among federal

district courts, “the general principle is to avoid

duplicative litigation”); Church of Scientology of Cal.

v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750

(9th Cir. 1979) (applying comity doctrine flexibly to

defer to decision in later-filed action in another

district, recognizing that the purpose of comity is “to

avoid placing an unnecessary burden on the federal

judiciary, and to avoid the embarrassment of

conflicting judgments”) (citation omitted), overruled

on other grounds, Animal Legal Defense Fund v.

FDA, 836 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016).

12

And district courts’ decisions in wake of Smith v.

Bayer show that district courts have taken seriously

this Court’s instruction to exercise comity. Decisions

on follow-on class actions confirm that the district

courts are fully capable of limiting repeat litigation of

failed class claims, while making considered

judgments about follow-on class claims that differ in

a meaningful respect from the prior failed class and

thus are inappropriate for summary rejection.

Respondents’ brief (at 41-43) identifies examples of

both types. For example, in Baker v. Home Depot

USA, Inc., No. 11 C 6768, 2013 WL 271666, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2013), the plaintiffs brought class

claims on behalf of purchasers of chemically treated

wood. The defendant moved to strike the class claims,

asking the court to apply principles of comity to

decisions of five other courts that had declined to

certify a class in “materially identical” cases. The

district court granted the motion, finding that the

class allegations suffered the same deficiencies under

Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) as the other cases. And in Ott

v. Mortg. Investors Corp. of Ohio, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d

1046, 1063-64, 1066 (D. Or. 2014), the district court

considered itself “compelled to honor the principles of

comity” “in order to save the resources of the courts

and parties.” The Ott court viewed the denial of

certification of the same class in a prior case as

setting “a rebuttable presumption against

certification of the same classes in this court.”* Even

* As Respondents note, the American Law Institute has

suggested a standard by which to exercise comity: a district

court should give a “rebuttable presumption” of correctness to a

prior court's non-certification decision when deciding whether to

certify a similar class. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE

LITIGATION § 2.11 cmt. reporter's notes (AM. LAW INST. 2010).

13

though, “were th[e] court writing on a clean slate, it

would agree with plaintiffs' interpretation” of the law,

the district court applied comity to follow the prior

decision of a fellow district court in the Ninth Circuit

and dismissed the plaintiff's class claims.

On the other hand, comity does not (and should

not) require that district courts give dispositive

weight to the decisions of prior courts addressing the

certification of a similar, even identical class,

particularly where such prior decisions rest on

grounds that do not go to the fundamental

certifiability of the class. Thus, in the wake of Smith

v. Bayer, district courts have also found sound

reasons to break from past decisions where the

follow-on case is distinguishable in a meaningful

respect. See, e.g., Heibel v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No.

2:11-CV-00593, 2012 WL 4463771 (S.D. Ohio Sept.

27, 2012).

When a district court agrees, in the exercise of

comity, that a follow-on class action suffers similar or

identical defects as a prior failed class, the Federal

Rules give the court procedural tools to prevent

further re-litigation of class certification. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D) (district court

may issue orders that “require that the pleadings be

amended to eliminate allegations about

representation of absent persons”).

Amici reiterate that they are neutral about the

substantive issues raised by the parties in this

litigation. Based on their collective experience and

See also Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607, 617-19 (9th Cir.

2015) (Bea, J., concurring in the result), rev'd and remanded on

other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).

14

judgment, however, amici believe that affirming the

court below and finding that American Pipe tolling

applies to claims brought under Rule 23, not just

individual actions, would facilitate the efficient

administration and management by district courts of

the disputes brought before them.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court should sustain

the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW N. GOLDFARB

Counsel of Record

JOHN J. CONNOLLY

ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP

1800 M Street, NW, Ste. 1000

Washington, DC 20036

202 778 1800

agoldfarb@zuckerman.com

la

APPENDIX

List of Amici

The Hon. Frank C. Damrell, Jr. (ret.) served on

the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California from 1997 to 2011. He served on

the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation from

2008 to 2011. Judge Damrell is currently a mediator

and arbitrator with JAMS.

The Hon. William Royal Furgeson, Jr. (ret.)

served on the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas from 1994 to 2013. He

served on the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation, was President of the Federal Judges

Association, and was a member of the Judicial

Resources Committee of the Judicial Conference of

the United States. Judge Furgeson is currently Dean

of the University of North Texas at Dallas College of

Law.

The Hon. Nancy Gertner (ret.) served on the

United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts from 1994 to 2011. Judge Gertner is

currently a Professor of Practice at Harvard Law

School.

The Hon. G. Patrick Murphy (ret.) served on the

United States District Court for the Southern District

of Illinois from 1998 to 2013, including serving as

chief judge from 2000 to 2007. Judge Murphy is

currently a partner at Murphy & Murphy, LLC.

2a

The Hon. T. John Ward (ret.) served on the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

from 1999 to 2011. He served on the Judicial

Conference Committee on Court Administration and

Court Management from 2003 to 2009. Judge Ward is

currently Of Counsel to Ward Smith & Hill, PLLC.

The Hon. Alexander Williams, Jr. (ret.) served on

the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland from 1994 to 2014. Judge Williams is

currently on the faculty of the Howard University

Law School.