Amicus Curiae Brief — Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 50 (2017) (No. 16-1436)

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Nos. 16-1436 & 16-1540

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Sta

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

PROJECT, A PROJECT OF THE URBAN JUSTICE

CENTER, INC., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF

AND ITS CLIENTS, et al.,

Respondents.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

JE T

> 1 f

HE CLERK

_ OKT US —

Petitioners,

v.

STATE OF HAWAIL et al.,

Respondents.

On Writs or CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CouRTsS

or APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS

BRIEF FOR T.A., A UNITED STATES

CITIZEN OF YEMENI DESCENT,

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF RESPONDENTS

SHAIMAA M. HUSSEIN RicHARD D. BERNSTEIN

D. NICOLE GUNTNER Counsel of Record

Marruew R. DoLLAN WILLKIE FARR

WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP

& GALLAGHER LLP 1875 K Street, NW

787 Seventh Avenue Washington, DC 20006

New York, New York 10019 (202) 303-1000

(212) 728-8000 rbernstein@willkie.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

;

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

po Ee ee i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES .............. ili

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ...............-. ]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................... 2

EET TLE reer rT 3

A. President Trump’s Campaign Promise To

I Cao sch PaceSUhneiekbwhienen 3

B. The Amended Order “Deliver|s] On” The

President’s “Campaign Promises.”...... .. 4

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D. The Decisions Below.................... 6

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I. This Court Has Authority To Compare

The Amended Order’s Asserted

Rationale With The Administration’s

Statements And Official Statistics ............ 7

Il. No National Security Rationale Supported

The Extension Of The Travel And

Refugee Bans After This Administration

Achieved “Extreme” Vetting................ 13

2

Table of Contents

Page

A. The Amended Order’s Rationale

Was That “Short” Bans Would

Enable “Adequate” Vetting ............. 14

b. This Administration Implemented

“Extreme Vetting” By June 5,2017...... 14

C. There Is No Vetting Rationale For

The President’s Subsequent June 14,

2017 Extension Of The Bans ............ 18

III. In Accord With The Applicable Statutory

And Constitutional Texts, This Court

Should Enjoin All Prospective Applications

Of The Amended Order’s Illegal Travel

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TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

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Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell,

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Boumedine v. Bush,

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Edwards v. Aguillard,

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Fiallo v. Bell,

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Freytag v. Comm’,

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Galvan v. Press,

pit ®t | rrr yr 11

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,

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Hawaii v. Trump,

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Hirabayashi v. United States,

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Ww

Cited Authorities

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,

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LNS. v. St. Cyr,

533 U.S. 289 (2001). .............-..

Kerry v. Din,

135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)... ........46..

Kleindienst v. Mandel,

Ee

Korematsu v. United States,

323 U.S. 214 (1944)... 2.0... eee eee

McCreary Cty., Ky. v.

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,

545 U.S. 844 (2005) ..... 2... ee eee.

Romer v. Evans,

517 U.S. 620 (1996)... ..........-.-.-.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla,

542 U.S. 426 (2004) ...........60 08.

Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe,

580 U.S. 200 (2000) ................

Steinberg v. Carhart,

530 U.S. 914 (2000)... .........-54-.

Le isd ween eee 9

eheeeseea .28

Vv

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Robel,

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United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

Ee Ee EE 6 666 6c c6 os cecctese ves ences 25

Wong Wing Hang v. L.N.S.,

960 F.3a 715 Gd Cir. 1906) .. 0. cc ce cccnccccccs 11

Statutes

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Gs oncevvensdecentcdsotecans 7, 24, 31

4d Toe Derr re rors 12

82 Fed. Reg. 19380 (Apr. 27, 2017)........ .auasaene 16

Other Sources

American Security Against Foreign Enemies

Act of 2015, H.R. 4088, 114th Cong. (2015)........ 12

v1

Cited Authorities

Associated Press, AROUND THE NATION; White

Supremacist Gets Life for Killing Trooper, N.Y.

Times (Jan. 8, 1986), http://nyti.ms/2wkuBAr .

Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the

Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 Personality

and Soc. Psychol. Rev. 193, 206 (1999)........

Devlin Barrett, Jnternal Trump Administration

Data Undercuts Travel Ban, Wash. Post

(Mar. 16, 2017), http://wapo.st/2nVszOX ......

Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work:

A Judge’s View, 193 (Knopf, 2010)...........

Jonah Engel Bromwich, Alan Blinder, What

We Know About James Alex Fields, Driver

Charged in Charlottesville Killing, N.Y.

Times (Aug. 13, 2017), https://goo.gl/xzKdje. . .

Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the

Judicial Process, 92-93 (1921). ..............

CBS/AP, Who were the London attackers? Chef, clerk

and ‘suspicious’ Italian, CBS News (June 6, 2017

6:46 p.m. EDT), http://cbsn.ws/2g1LWYq.....

Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump’s explanation

of his wire-tapping tweets will shock and

amaze you, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017),

http://wapo.st/2Z00QXZA ....... 6.66. cece ees

vit

Cited Authorities

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) .......

Karoun Demirjian & Jerry Markon, Obama

administration rolls out new visa waiver

program rules in wake of terror attacks, Wash.

Post (Jan. 21, 2016), http://wapo.st/2sERVn1 . ..

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78,

INDEPENDENT JOURNAL (June 14, 1788), available at

http://bit.ly/2xIVLnJ ...... 6-0. e eee eens 10, 32, 33

Derek Hawking, Worried about Trump’s travel

ban, Canada’s largest school district calls

off U.S. trips, Wash. Post (Mar. 24, 2017),

http://wapo.st/2nVbHrP ..........6.--eeees

Senator Mazie K. Hirono, Questions for the

Record following Hearing on March 20-23, 2017

entitled: “On the Nomination of the Honorable

Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice

of the Supreme Court of the United States,”

Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 20-23, 2017),

available at http://bit.ly/2pmtWHD ..........

Aric Jenkins, Sean Spicer Says President

Trump Considers His Tweets ‘Official’ White

House Statements, Time (June 6, 2017),

http://ti.me/2rT57aO .......-.--0 eee eee eee

Farhana Khera and Johnathan J. Smith, How Trump

Is Stealthily Carrying Out His Muslim Ban, N.Y.

Times (July 18, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2u5Ay00J . .

Cited Authorities

Wayne King, Suspect Wanted in Shooting

of Missouri Trooper is Arrested, N.Y. Times

(Apr. 21, 1985), https://goo.gl/xHT1hK ........

Evan Perez, First on CNN: FBI Director James

Comey balks at refugee legislation, CNN

(Nov. 19, 2015), http://enn.it/INgwbik .........

Press Release, The White House Office of the Press

Secretary, Statement from President Donald J.

Trump (Sept. 5, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xM12Zc ...

Responses to Supplemental Questions from

Senators Jeff Sessions, Orrin Hatch,

Charles Grassley, Jon Kyl, Lindsey

Graham, John Cornyn, and Tom Coburn,

available at http://bit.ly/2oI0aAf.............

S. Shapiro, et al., Supreme Court Practice § 6.38

I os wb cccndncasdvecadavestscne

Jake Tapper & Pamela Brown, White House

Effort to Justify Travel Ban Causes Growing

Concern for Some Intelligence Officials,

CNN (Feb. 25, 2017), http://enn.it/2kSAkZB . ..

Ryan Teague Beckwith, Read Donald Trump’s

Speech on the Orlando Shooting, Time.com

(June 13, 2016 4:36 p.m. ET),

ok > Fs

1x

Cited Authorities

Nahal Toosi and Ted Hesson, Visas

to Muslim-majority countries down 20

percent, Politico (May 25, 2017 10:28 EDT),

http://politi.co/2r0OXBHQ............-....65.

Donald J. Trump, President Trump: In my first 100

days, I kept my promise to Americans, Wash.

Post (Apr. 29, 2017), http://wapo.st/2s7BmUg . .

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter

(June 3, 2017 4:17 p.m.), http://bit.ly/2rzYrwd. . .

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter

(June 4, 2017 4:19 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2qQRnle . .

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),

Twitter (June 5, 2017 3:29 a.m.), http://bit.

I 33s5sd¢080b ta seetenchabineresé

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter

(June 5, 2017 6:37 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2rtbEIK ..

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter

(June 5, 2017 6:44 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2etglyy. . . .

U.S. Customs and Border Prot., CBP Releases

Statistics on Electronic Device Searches

(Apr. 11, 2017), http://bit.ly/2oyyLAu..........

Page

x

Cited Authorities

U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Visa Waiver

Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel

Prevention Act Frequently Asked Questions

(June 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/1Tz4wRn .........

U.S. Dep’t of State, Supplemental Questions for

Visa Applicants (2017), http://bit.ly/2wzoatR ...

U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds A

Hearing On The Nomination Of John Roberts

To Be Chief Justice Of The Supreme Court,

109th Cong. (2005), 2005 WL 2214702.........

U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds A

Hearing On The Nomination Of Judge

Samuel Alito To The U.S. Supreme Court,

109th Cong. (2006), 2006 WL 45940 ..........

U.S. Senate Committee On The Judiciary

Holds A Hearing On The Nomination

Of Judge Sonia Sotomayor To Be An

Associate Justice Of The U.S. Supreme

Court, 111th Cong. (2009), 2009 WL 2027308 . .

Visa Waiver Program Improvement and

Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of

2015, H.R. 158, 114th Cong. (2015)............

AliVitali,/n His Words: Donald TrumpontheMuslim

Ban, Deportations, NBC News (June 27, 2016,

4:58 p.m. ET), http://nbenews.to/2vx0d6C .....

Page

x2

Cited Authorities

Page

Chris Wallace, Justice Antonin Scalia on issues

facing SCOTUS and the country, Fox News

Sunday (July 29, 2012), http://fxn.ws/2fZZBiB .. . .33

Howard Witt, Jn Arizona Town, Oklahoma

Bombing Casts Dark Shadow Unwanted

Fame Because Suspect Once Lived There, Chi.

Trib. (June 18, 1995), https://goo.gl/ItHdGN ...... 32

Christopher S. Wren, McVeigh Is Executed

for Oklahoma City Bombing, N.Y. Times

(June 11, 2001), http://nyti.ms/2vaTif6. ........... 32

]

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus files this brief in support of Respondents.

This brief offers a narrow but dispositive basis for

affirming: the Government does not even assert a vetting

justification for the June 14, 2017 extension of the travel

and refugees bans. The purported reason for the bans had

been to enable the Administration to establish “adequate”

vetting. However, this Administration stated that it nad

implemented its own “extreme vetting” procedures by

June 5, 2017—before the extension and while the bans

were enjoined. The Government does not assert that this

Administration’s “extreme vetting” procedures may be

inadequate for nationals of the six countries designated

in the Amended Executive Order (“Amended Order”) or

refugees. Thus, the ongoing bans contradict their own

rationale.

T.A.' is a United States citizen who was raised in

Yemen. T.A. is a Muslim. T.A.’s father and many members

of T.A.’s extended family hold Yemeni passports and

reside abroad. The Amended Order would bar them from

entering the United States. Although the Government

states that banned persons “could” apply for “[clase by

case” waivers under Section 3 of the Amended Order,

1. This amicus brief uses initials, rather than T.A.’s full name,

to reduce the risk of potential! reprisals to T.A. or his family members.

This Court has permitted litigants to use pseudonyms and initials in

similar circumstances. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe,

530 U.S. 290 (2000). No counsel for any party authored the brief in

whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amicus made a

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Petitioners

have filed a blanket letter of consent. Consent from Respondents has

been lodged with the Clerk’s office.

2

Section 16(c) provides that nothing in the Amended

Order provides any “enforceable” right, “substantive or

procedural.” J.A. 1440. The Amended Order does not even

provide for any wnenforceable opportunity to be heard as

to any purported reason to deny a waiver, any timing for

or notification of a denial, much less any reason, or any

ability to appeal a denial.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This brief focuses on one narrow but dispositive

basis for affirming: the Government’s failure even

to assert that the travel and refugee bans are still

justified by vetting concerns after this Administration

implemented its own “extreme vetting.” By June 5, 2017,

this Administration had achieved “extreme vetting,” and

a resulting 55% reduction in visas to nationals of the six

nations designated by the Amended Order, while the travel

ban was completely enjoined. After achieving “extreme

vetting” and the 55% reduction, the President extended

the bans on June 14, 2017. Because the Administration

had surpassed the Amended Order’s goal of adequate

vetting before that extension, there is not even a purported

finding of detriment for the extended bans. Lacking such a

justification, the bans contravene both the statutory limits

on the President and the Establishment Clause.

Part I of this brief demonstrates that this Court’s

function includes comparing the asserted rationale for

the Amended Order with the public record of subsequent

Administration statements and official statistics.

Part [I demonstrates that the Administration’s own

official explanations and fficial statistics negate vetting

3

concerns as a basis for sustaining the ongoing travel and

refugee bans. The Government had represented that the

bans would be “temporary” so that the Administration

could establish vetting procedures that “are adequate

to detect terrorists.” Infra, at 14. Yet, on June 14, 2017,

the Administration extended the bans after it had

established “extreme vetting” by June 5, 2017. Before the

extension, this “extreme vetting” already had resulted in

a 55% reduction in visas to nationals of the six countries

designated by the Amended Order while the travel ban

was completely enjoined.

Part III demonstrates that, in accord with the texts

of the pertinent statutes and the Establishment Clause,

the Court should enjoin all prospective applications of the

Amended Order’s illegal travel and refugee bans.

BACKGROUND

A. President Trump’s Campaign Promise To Ban

Muslims.

President Trump made repeated campaign promises

to order a “shutdown of Muslims entering the United

States ....” J.A. 1050. The President stated during the

campaign that the ban would be dressed up in different

clothes: “I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.” See

J.A. 1015, 1133 (citing Meet the Press (NBC television

broadcast July 24, 2016), transcript available at https://

goo.gl/jHc6aU); see also https://youtu.be/Y RezIlhHA9Veg?t

(Trump to Sean Hannity on July 25, 2016: “People don’t

want me to say Muslim. I guess I prefer not saying it,

frankly, myself. So we’re talking about territories.”).

4

B. The Amended Order “Deliver[s] On” The

President’s “Campaign Promises.”

On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued the

Amended Order. J.A. 1416-1440. The next day, the White

House Press Secretary, in prepared remarks made before

taking questions from reporters, heralded the Amended

Order as the fulfillment of President Trump’s campaign

promises: “President Trump yesterday continue/d/

to deliver on... his most significant campaign

promises: protecting the country against radical /slamic

terrorism.” Brief of Amicus Curiae T.A., Ex. 2, CV.

No. 17-00050-DKW-KJM, Hawaii v. Trump (D. Haw.

Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 201-2 (Press Briefing by Press

Secretary Sean Spicer (Mar. 7, 2017), available at http://

bit.ly/2mW390B) (emphasis added).

Moreover, on March 15, 2017, President Trump

stated at a rally not only that the Amended Order was

a “watered-down version of the first order,” but also

that both Orders were justified by “radical /slamic”

terrorism. J.A. 183 (citing Katie Reilly, Read President

Trump’s Response to the Travel Ban Ruling: It ‘Makes

Us Look Weak’, Time (Mar. 16, 2017), available at http://

ti.me/2009ixe) (emphasis added).

The President’s statements in early June 2017 about

terror attacks in London demonstrate that banning

Muslims is the reason for the Amended Order. Within

an hour of a June 2. 2017 terror attack in London, the

President tweeted that it showed why “[w]e need the

Travel Ban... .” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),

Twitter (June 3, 2017 4:17 p.m.), http://bit.ly/2rzYrwd. He

added the next morning: “We must stop being politically

5

correct.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), T'witter

(June 4, 2017 4:19 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2qQRnle.

But President Trump never had any basis to believe

that any of the three London attackers would be covered

by the Amended Order’s bans. Indeed, the Amended

Order’s bans would not have applied to the London

attackers. One was a British national; another was an

Italian national; and the third was a national of Morocco

and perhaps also had Libyan roots. CBS/AP, Who were

the London attackers? Chef, clerk and ‘suspicious’

Italian, CBS News (June 6, 2017 6:46 p.m.), http://cbsn.

ws/2g1LW Yq (identifying three London attackers as (1)

Khurum Butt, “a Pakistan-born failed customer service

clerk”; (2) Rachid Redouane, “a Moroccan pastry chef

... who claimed to have both Moroccan and Libyan roots”;

and (3) Youssef Zaghba, “an Italian man”).

The Amended Order does not apply to British, Italian,

or Moroccan nationals, or dual nationals who travel under

their status as a national of a non-designated country. See

Pet. Br. at 49 n.160; J.A. 1428 §§ 3(b)(iii), (iv). Moreover,

none of the London attackers had been screened by,

and passed, the equivalent of what President Trump

described on June 5, 2017 as his Administration’s current

“EXTREME VETTING.” /nfra, at 23.

The President’s statements as President about the

London attackers thus confirm that the basis for the

Amended Order’s bans has never been concerns about

the adequacy of vetting procedures, abroad or at home,

for nationals of the six countries or refugees. Rather, the

President’s blunt statements on June 3-4, 2017 show that

the basis for his bans always has been fulfilling his pledge

to ban Muslims.

C. TA.

T.A. is a Muslim and a United States citizen who grew

up in Yemen. When T.A. was eighteen, he returned to the

United States to attend college. He lives here and has

been a videographer.

T.A.’s father, aunts, uncles, and cousins—all of whom

hold Yemeni passports—now live in Jordan, where they

fled as refugees from the ongoing Yemeni Civil War. Many

of them want to travel to the United States to visit T.A.

and their extended family. In particular, T.A.’s cousin, with

whom he is close, wishes to travel to this country to look

at schools and visit his brother, a U.S. citizen, as well as

T.A. The Amended Order would bar T.A.’s father, cousin

and his extended family from traveling to this country.

D. The Decisions Below.

On March 16, 2017, the Maryland District Court

issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of

Section 2(c) of the Amended Order. See J.A. 117, 166.

The Maryland District Court found that “the record

provides strong indications that the national security

purpose is not the primary purpose for the travel ban.”

J.A. 157. The Maryland District Court further found

that the Government had “not shown, or even asserted

that national security cannot be maintained without an

unprecedented six-country travel ban.” J.A. 163-64. The

Fourth Circuit substantially affirmed the decision of the

Maryland District Court and demonstrated at length

that “any national security justification for EO-2 ... was

offered as more of a ‘litigating position’ than as the actual

purpose of EO-2.” J.A. 225.

7

On March 29, 2017, the Hawaii District Court issued

a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Sections

2 and 6 of the Amended Order. J.A. 1163. The Hawaii

District Court found that “the record here” is “full of

religious animus, invective and obvious pretext.” J.A. 1157

(emphasis added).

On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

preliminary injunction against Sections 2(c), 6(a), and

6(b) of the Amended Order. J.A. 1236. The court held that

these Sections contravened a number of provisions of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101

et seq. Among other things, the decision explained that the

Amended Order and the Government have “specifically

avoid{ed} making any finding that the current screening

procedures are inadequate.” J.A. 1203.

ARGUMENT

i. This Court Has Authority To Compare The

Amended Order’s Asserted Rationale With The

Administration’s Statements And Official Statistics.

This Court’s judicial review could stop with comparing

the Amended Order’s asserted rationale with the

Administration’s own public statements and official

statistics. This comparison provides a dispositive basis

for affirming and does not involve either balancing or

substituting this Court’s national security judgment

for the President’s. First, as Part I] demonstrates, the

Administration’s own public explanations and statistics

have severed any connection between (a) the Amended

Order and (b) its purported statutory authority, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(f), and national security rationale. The Amended

8

Order states that its statutory authority rests on the need

to prevent the “detriment[]” of “unrestricted entry into the

United States of nationals” of the six designated countries.

J.A. 1426, 1434 (emphasis added). But before the President

extended the bans on June 14, 2017, the Administration’s

own statements and statistics established that without any

ban, the entry of these nationals and refugees had been

and would remain heavily restricted. Specifically, while

the ban was completely enjoined, the President stated on

June 5, 2017, that his Administration was subjecting all

entrants to “extreme vetting.” See infra, at 17. Indeed,

visa issuances to nationals of the six designated countries

were cut by 55% by April 2017. See infra, at 18.

Second, as Part IT also demonstrates, under the

Establishment Clause, a review of the same public

record shows that the Amended Order’s national security

assertion is, at best, “secondary to « religious objective”

of banning the entry of Muslims. McCreary Cty., Ky.

v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864

(2005). The Government’s national security assertion

has been that temporary bans were ordered to enable

the Administration to establish adequate vetting. Infra,

at 14. But the Administration had established “extreme

vetting” by June 5, 2017. Yet the President subsequently

extended the bans on June 14, 2017. The plain, undebatable

public record of Administration statements and official

statistics therefore debunks that improving vetting is the

primary objective of the Amended Order. There is thus

no need for “judicial psychoanalysis.” Jd. at 862. This is

especially so as it is equally unconstitutional under the

Establishment Clause, whether the primary objective

of a government action is religious discrimination, or an

opportunistic, public appeal to religious prejudice. Cf.

9

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (finding

“violation” where “primary purpose” was “to endorse a

particular religious doctrine”) (emphasis added).

Comparing the Administration’s rationale with its own

subsequent statements and statistics is well within this

Court’s authority. National security is not a “talismanic

incantation” that obviates judicial review. United States v.

Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967). This Court’s “precedents,

old and new, make clear that concerns of national security

and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the

judicial role.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561

U.S. 1, 34 (2010). “Security subsists, too, in fidelity to

freedom’s first principles.” Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S.

723, 797 (2006).

The Government’s argument against considering the

Administration’s own statements and statistics contradicts

the controlling concurrence of Justice Kennedy, joined by

Justice Alito, in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). That

concurrence looked beyond the consular officer’s official

decision to evidence that the particular visa applicant

“worked for the Taliban government, which . . . provides

at least a factual connection to terrorist activity.” Jd. at

2141. That concurrence also stated that courts properly

look beyond the stated reason for the denial of a visa when

there is “an affirmative showing of bad faith... .” Jd. Even

by itself, extending the bans after the purported reason

for them had ended shows bad faith. See Romer v. Evans,

517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (When the “sheer breadth [of

government action] is so discontinuous with the reasons

offered for it that the [action] seems inexplicable by

anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks

a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”)

(emphasis added).

10

In contrast, there were neither explanations by

the President nor official statistics that contradicted a

purported reason in any case relied on by Petitioners. The

visa applicant in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 758

(1972), did not rely on publicly-stated reasons different

from those offered by the sole decision maker, the consular

official. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977)

(“This is not to say... that the Government’s power in this

area [of immigration] is never subject to judicial review.”).

Judicial reliance on the public record of Administration

statements and official statistics for the limited purposes

described above does not open the door to routine legal

challenges to, much less discovery concerning, visa

denials. By definition, reliance on public statements and

public statistics is the opposite of attempting to discover

a secret reason.

The Government properly does not assert that

its constitutional or statutory interpretations in this

case should be accorded deference. Hamilton wrote in

Federalist Paper No. 78 that the function of interpreting

and enforcing the Constitution “belong[s] to” the

judicia] role. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No.

78, INDEPENDENT JOURNAL (June 14, 1788) (“Federalist

No. 78”), available at http://bit.ly/2x1VLnJ. Hamilton

also explained that the judicial role includes deciding

“the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the

legislative body.” Jd. This should be particularly so for the

immigration statutes at issue in this case.

To start, the President’s interpretations of immigration

statutes here would create, at a minimum, serious

constitutional issues. This supplies a reason to reject

11

these interpretations, not to defer to them. See, e.g., .N_S.

v. St. Cyr, 583 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001). See also Wong

Wing Hang v. I.N.S., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966)

(Friendly, J.) “Congress could not have intended” to give

the executive branch authority to rest an immigration

decision “on an impermissible basis such as invidious

discrimination against a particular race or group.”)

(emphasis added).

Constitutional history further cautions against

deference here. The Declaration of Independence lists

“obstructing the laws for Naturalization of Foreigners” and

“refusing to pass [persons] to encourage their migrations

hither” as among the acts of “absolute Tyranny” of

“the present King of Great Britain.” DECLARATION OF

INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). Not surprisingly, Article I,

section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution gives the power to

make rules for immigration “exclusively to Congress,” not

to the executive. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

Deference to the President in interpreting immigration

statutes that give him only limited authority risks

improperly transferring the immigration power conferred

on Congress to the President.

Indeed, President Trump stated on September 5, 2017,

that in the “immigration” context, a President should not

be “able to rewrite or nullify federal laws” by adopting in

an executive order an approach that “Congress repeatedly

rejected ....” But the Amended Order’s travel and refugee

bans do exactly that. Press Release, The White House

Office of the Press Secretary, Statement from President

Donald J. Trump (Sept. 5, 2017), http://bit.ly/2xM12Zc.

12

For example, in 2015, Congress addressed travel

by nationals of the six designated countries. Congress

enacted the Visa Waiver Program Act (“Visa Waiver Act”)

codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12). Congress rejected a ban.’

As implemented by the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”), the Visa Waiver Act requires visas for nationals

of the six designated countries, see Pet. Br. at 5-6, but does

not ban travel. Under the Visa Waiver Act, nationals of the

six countries “go through the full vetting of the regular

visa process, which includes an in-person interview at a

U.S. embassy or consulate.” Karoun Demirjian & Jerry

Markon, Obama administration rolls out new visa waiver

program rules in wake of terror attacks, Wash. Post (Jan.

21, 2016), http://wapo.st/2sERVn1 (emphasis added); U.S.

Customs and Border Protection, Visa Waiver Program

2. The House had passed the American Security Against

Foreign Enemies Act of 2015 (“SAFE Act”). American Security

Against Foreign Enemies Act of 2015, H.R. 4038, 114th Cong.

(2015). It would have banned any refugees from Syria or Iraq absent

personal, unanimous certifications by the Secretary of DHS, the

FBI Director, and the Director of National Intelligence that the

specific refugee was not a security threat. Jd. at § 2(a). The SAFE

Act would have operated as a ban. See Evan Perez, First on CNN:

FBI Director James Comey balks at refugee legislation, CNN (Nov.

19, 2015), http://enn.it/1 Ngw5ik (“Comey has told administration and

congressional officials that the legislation would make it impossible

to allow any refugees into the U.S., and could even affect the ability

of travelers from about three dozen countries that are allowed easier

travel to the U.S. under the visa waiver program, the officials say.”).

But the Senate di€ not pass the SAFE Act, as a cloture vote failed.

See H.R. 4038 (114th): American Security Against Foreign Enemies

Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, http://bit.ly/2w3XhK7. Instead, both

houses of Congress enacted the compromise Visa Waiver Act by

Jarge margins. See Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist

Travel Prevention Act of 2015, H.R. 158, 114th Cong. (2015).

15

Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act

Frequently Asked Questions (June 19, 2017), http://bit.

ly/1Tz4wRn. Since such vetting began, the Government

cites no terrorist attack or attenpted terrorist attack in

this country by any national of any of the six countries.

As the Ninth Circuit held, the Amended Order’s bans

operate to nullify the Visa Waiver Act. See J.A. 1204-05.

Congress also has provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)

(B) “specific criteria for determining terrorism-related

inadmissibility.” Kerry v. Din, 1358. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015)

(Kennedy, J., joined by Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis

added). To hold that the Amended Order’s blanket

travel and refugee bans have statutory authority would

impermissibly nullify the “specific criteria” in Section

1182(a)(8)(B).

The Court should fulfill its judicial role. As has been

attributed to Edmund Burke: “The only thing necessary

for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

See Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the

Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 Personality and Soc.

Psychol. Rev. 193, 206 (1999). This applies to good judges.

II. No National Security Rationale Supported The

Extension Of The Travel And Refugee Bans After

This Administration Achieved “Extreme” Vetting.

When arule is extended after its stated reason is over,

that purported reason cannot support the rule. That is

the story of the national security rationalization for the

travel and refugee bans.

14

A. The Amended Order’s Rationale Was That

“Short” Bans Would Enable “Adequate”

Vetting.

The Government repeatedly has represented to this

Court and the courts below that the reason for the “short”

and “temporary” travel and refugee bans was to allow

this Administration to establish “current screening and

vetting procedures [that] are adequate to detect terrorists

seeking to infiltrate this Nation.” Application (16A1190)

for a Stay, No. 16-1436, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance

Project, at 8, 30 (June 1, 2017) (emphasis added); Brief for

Appellants at 1-2, 10, 12, 36, 43, No. 17-15589, Hawaii v.

Trump (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2017), ECF No. 23; see also Pet. Br.

at 49-50 (bans are a “temporary pause” to “allow a review

precisely to determine whether adequate screening is in

place”). But that rationale cannot sustain the bans. This

is because those bans were extended on June 14, 2017,

after President Trump stated on June 5, 2017 that his

Administration had achieved “extreme vetting” while the

travel and refugee bans were completely enjoined. Indeed,

nothing in the Government’s brief even asserts that, at

the time of the extension, this Administration’s “extreme

vetting” was inadequate somehow either for nationals

of the six countries designated in the Amended Order

because of problems in those countries or for refugees.

B. This Administration Implemented “Extreme

Vetting” By June 5, 2017.

Section 5(a) of the Amended Order was never enjoined.

Pursuant to Section 5(a):

15

The Secretary of State, the Attorney General,

the Secretary of Homeland Security, and

the Director of National Intelligence shall

implement a program, as part of the process for

adjudications, to identify individuals who seek

to enter the United States on a fraudulent basis,

who support terrorism, violent extremism, acts

of violence toward any group or class of people

within the United States, or who present a risk

of causing harm subsequent to their entry.

This program shall include the development of

a uniform baseline for screening and vetting

standards and procedures, such as in-person

interviews; a database of identity documents

proffered by applicants to ensure that duplicate

documents are not used by multiple applicants;

amended application forms that include

questions aimed at identifying fraudulent

answers and malicious intent; a mechanism to

ensure that applicants are who they claim to be;

a mechanism to assess whether applicants may

commit, aid, or support any kind of violent,

criminal, or terrorist acts after entering the

United States; and any other appropriate

means for ensuring the proper collection

of all information necessary for a rigorous

evaluation of all grounds of inadmissibility

or grounds for the denial of other immigration

benefits.

J.A. 1432 (emphasis added).

By June 5, 2017, this Administration had

“implement{ed]” the additional screening and vetting

16

that Section 5(a) of the Amended Order required for

all potential entrants, including nationals of the six

countries and refugees. For example, on March 17, 2017,

the State Department adopted enhanced visa screening

by requiring longer interviews, more detailed questions

by consular officials, and a “mandatory social media

review” by the “Fraud Prevention Unit” if an “applicant

may have ties to ISIS or other terrorist organizations

or has ever been present in an ISIS-controlled territory

....” Brief of Amicus Curiae T.A. at 12, 56, 70, No. 17-

15589, Hawaii v. Trump (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2017), ECF No.

114 (State Dep’t Cable 25814 11 8, 10, 13, available at http://

bit.ly/200wBaqt).*? On April 27, 2017, the Administration

issued a new rule that adds a question to the Electronic

Visa Update System, asking for information associated

with an applicant’s “online presence,” meaning information

related to his or her “Provider/Platform”; “social media

identifier”; and “contact information.” 82 Fed. Reg. 19380

(Apr. 27, 2017). On June 1, 2017, the State Department

promulgated a new supplemental questionnaire for visa

applicants that asks applicants to list (1) every place

they have lived, worked, and traveled internationally—

including how such travel was funded—for the past fifteen

years; (2) every passport they have ever held, including

number and country of issuance; (3) names and birth

dates of all siblings, children, spouses, and partners; and

(4) every social media handle, phone number, and e-mail

address they have used for the past five years. U.S. Dep’t

of State, Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants

(2017), http://bit.ly/2wzoatR. In addition, during the first

six months of the 2017 fiscal year, searches of electronic

3. Even before this Administration, every refugee was vetted

by numerous federal agencies and the office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d

741, 775 n.17 (9th Cir. 2017).

17

devices of international travelers arriving at U.S. airports

increased 36.5%. U.S. Customs and Border Prot., CBP

Releases Statistics on Electronic Device Searches (Apr.

11, 2017), http://bit.ly/20oyyLAu.

President Trump himself has established that his

Administration’s vetting had surpassed adequate while

the travel and refugee bans were fully enjoined and

before the President extended the bans. By April 29,

2017, President Trump wrote that his Administration was

“substantially improvling]| vetting and screening.” See

Donald J. Trump, President Trump: In my first 100 days,

I kept my promise to Americans, Wash. Post (Apr. 29,

2017), http://wapo.st/2s7BmUg (“Visa processes are being

reformed to substantially improve vetting and screening

....) (emphasis added). On June 5, 2017, although the

President disparaged the injunctions against the “Travel

Ban,” President Trump admitted: “/n any event we are

EXTREME VETTING people coming into the U.S. in

order to help keep our country safe.” Donald J. Trump

(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017 6:37 a.m. and

6:44 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2rtbEIK and http://bit.ly/Zetglyy

(emphasis added; capitalization in original). Thus, the

Administration had implemented “extreme vetting” for

all entrants without any ban or any change in vetting

cooperation from any of the six designated countries. The

next day, the White House Press Secretary stated that the

President’s tweets are “considered official statements by

the President of the United States.” Aric Jenkins, Sean

Spicer Says President Trump Considers His Tweets

‘Official’ White House Statements, Time (June 6, 2017),

http://ti.me/2rT57a0.‘

4. Thus, the President’s “official statements” prove that a

March 10, 2017 letter to him from more than 130 generals and national]

18

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Comparing

April 2017—when the Amended Order’s bans were

entirely enjoined—to the 2016 monthly averages, non-

immigrant visa issuances were down 15% among all

countries, 20% among Muslim-majority countries, almost

30% among Arab countries, and 55% among the six

countries designated by the Amended Order. Nahal Toosi

and Ted Hesson, Visas to Muslim-majority countries

down 20 percent, Politico (May 25, 2017 10:28 EDT),

http://politi.co/2r0X BHQ.

C. There Is No Vetting Rationale For The

President’s Subsequent June 14, 2017 Extension

Of The Bans.

Because the Administration had achieved “extreme

vetting” by June 5, 2017, the bans should have ended

without an extension. Under the Amended Order’s plain

meaning, the “Effective Date” of “[t]his order” was

defined as “March 16, 2017,” the travel ban was set to end

“90 days from the effective date of this order,” and the

refugee ban was set to end “120 days after the effective

date of this order.” J.A. 1426-1427; 1439 (emphasis added).

Because the bans had run from “the effective date of this

order”—March 16, 2017—the travel ban was set to expire

security experts from across the political spectrum— including two

former Secretaries of the Department of Homeland Security—had

been correct. That letter explained that the United States would be

able to “implement any necessary [vetting] enhancements without

a counterproductive ban or suspension on entry of nationals of

particular countries or religions.” Brief of Amicus Curiae T.A., Ex.

5, CV. No. 17-00500-DK W-KJM, Hawaii v. Trump (D. Haw. Mar. 14,

2017), ECF No. 201-5 (Nat’l Security Experts’ Mar. 10, 2017 Letter

to President Trump, available at http://politi.co/2kle2FU).

19

on June 14, 2017, and the refugee ban on July 14, 2017. Cf,

¢.g., Freytag v. Conm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (“[t]he

definite article ‘the’ obviously narrows .. .”); Reamsfeld v.

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (“The consistent use of

the definite article in reference to the custodian indicates

that there is generally only one proper respondent .. . .”).

Instead, the President, on June 14, 2017, “revise[d]”

the Amended Order to extend the travel ban until at least

September 24, 2017, and the refugee ban until at least

October 24, 2017. Pet. Br. at 37; J.A. 1442. Therefore,

the ban periods in effect at the time of this Court’s ora]

argument were promulgated after this Administration had

achieved “extreme vetting” and the resulting reduction

in visa issuances.

Consequently, the bans are adrift from any statutory

mooring on which they purport to be based. Section 2(¢) of

the Amended Order rested the travel ban on the statement

that “the unrestricted entry into the United States of

nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and

Yemen would be detrimental to the interests of the United

States.” J.A. 1426 (emphasis added). But the “extreme

vetting” and 55% reduction in visas achieved before the

extension are the opposite of “unrestricted entry.”

5. Indeed, the extension violates President Trump’s campaign

promise: “I don’t want people coming in from the terror countries

... unters they're very, very strongly vetted.” Ali Vitali, /» His Words:

Donald Trump on the Muslim Ban, Deportations, NBC News

(June 27, 2016, 4:58 p.m. E'T), http://nbenews.to/2vx0d6C (emphasis

added). In a Presidential debate, he similarly promised “extreme

vetting from certain areas of the world.” J.A. 1015, 1133 (citing The

American Presidency Project, Presidential Debates: [residential

Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri (Oct. 9,

2016), available at https://goo.gl/ilzf0A).

20

Nothing in the prior Amended Order supports

continuation of the bans after this Administration

implemented “extreme vetting.” The Amended Order had

cited only one example that involved a native of any of the

six designated countries. “[I]n October 2014, a native of

Somalia who had been brought to the United States as a

child refugee and later became a naturalized United States

citizen was sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting

to use a weapon of mass destruction as part of a plot to

detonate a bomb at a crowded Christmas-tree-lighting

ceremony in Portland, Oregon.” J.A. 1424 (emphasis

added). The Amended Order, however, could not claim

that this United States national was radicalized before he

came to this country as a three-year-old “child refugee”

who attempted terrorism sixteen years later. Hawaii v.

Trump, 859 F.3d at 775 n.16. So this lone instance cannot

support a suggestion that vetting for nationals of the six

countries ever was inadequate, much less that it remains

so, despite this Administration’s “extreme vetting.”

The conclusory March 6, 2017 letter from the Attorney

General and Secretary of DHS, cited by Petitioners’

Brief at 7, similarly does not support the extension of the

travel and refugee bans. That letter did not and could

not address whether this Administration’s own “extreme

vetting” procedures, put in place after the March 6, 2017

letter, are currently adequate for nationals of the six

countries and refugees. Even when issued, that letter was

not joined by the then-senior national security officials

with the most anti-terrorism experience—namely, then-

FBI Director James Comey and NSA Director Admiral

Michael Rogers. Moreover, the letter is belied by the

President’s subsequent admissions that the Amended

Order is merely a “watered-down version of the first

21

order.” J.A. 183 (citing Appellees’ Br. 7) (citing Katie

Reilly, Read President Trump’s Response to the Travel

Ban Ruling: It ‘Makes Us Look Weak,’ Time (Mar. 16,

2017), available at http://ti.me/2009ixe); see also Donald

J. Trump (@rea!DonaldTrump), Twitter (June 5, 2017

3:29 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2rDbHzY (“The Justice Dept.

should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the

watered down, politically correct version they submitted

to S.C.”). That first executive order was issued “without

consulting the relevant national security agencies.” J.A.

224 (emphasis added).®

6. Before the Amended Order, a senior White House official

was quoted as stating that “DHS and DOJ are working on an

intelligence report that will demonstrate that the security threat for

these seven countries is substantial and that these seven countries

have all been exporters of terrorism into the United States.” Jake

Tapper & Pamela Brown, White House Effort to Justify Travel Ban

Causes Growing Concern for Some Intelligence Officials, CNN Feb.

25, 2017), http://enn.it/2kSAkZB. Instead, the Government’s vetting

review produced “internal reports” that “contradict th[e] national

security rationale” for the travel ban. J.A. 225. A DHS internal

report, made public on February 25, 2017, concluded that being a

national from one of the six countries is an “unlikely indicator” of

terrorism threats against the United States. J.A. 1051-56. A second

DHS report, dated March 1, 2017, concluded that “most foreign-born,

U.S.-based violent extremists [are] likely radicalized several years

after their entry to the United States.” J.A. 1059. Internal FBI data

also “undermine[d] a key premise of the travel ban” because that data

revealed that “most” foreign nationals who have posed a risk to the

United States came from “countries unaffected” by the Amended

Order. See Devlin Barrett, Internal Trump Administration Data

Undercuts Travel Ban, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017), http://wapo.

st/2nVszOX. In sum, a “significant amount of interna! government

data” demonstrated the travel ban was “not likely to be effective in

curbing the threat of terrorism in the United States.” /d.

22

The June 14, 2017 extension also inexplicably did not

remedy even the most obvious disconnect between the

travel ban and a purported lack of cooperation in vetting

by the six countries. The ban still applies to “nationals

of the six countries without significant ties to the six

designated countries, such as those who left as children

or whose nationality is based on parentage alone... .

Yet nationals of other countries who do have meaningful

|current] ties to the six designated countries . . . fall outside

the scope of Section 2(a).” J.A. 1202—03 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Amended Order would ban travel by a doctor

who is a Sudanese national but who lives, works, and would

be vetted by a U.S. consular official in Saudi Arabia. J.A.

1024 (citing Jane Morice, Two Cleveland Clinic doctors

vacationing in Iran detained in New York, then released,

Cleveland.com (Jan. 29, 2017), available at https://goo.

gl/J8x2iu). But the Amended Order permits travel by a

Saudi national with no job at all who lives, and would be

vetted, in Sudan.

This disparity already had produced absurd results

before the June 14, 2017 extension. Groups of Canadian

girl scouts and school children would not visit the United

States because their groups contain some young people

who reside in Canada but are nationals of the six countries.

See Derek Hawking, Worried about Trump’s travel ban,

Canada’s largest school district calls off U.S. trips, Wash.

Post (Mar. 24, 2017), http://wapo.st/2nVbHrP.

The Government’s brief does not provide even a post

hoc vetting justification for the June 14, 2017 extension of

the bans. This omission is particularly telling as before

the Government’s brief, the Government had received

the 20-day report required by Sections 2(a) and (b) of the

23

Amended Order. Farhana Khera and Johnathan J. Smith,

How Trump Is Stealthily Carrying Out His Muslim Ban,

N.Y. Times (July 18, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2u5Ay0J.

If the Government belatedly argues in its reply

that “extreme vetting” is somehow not enough vetting,

this transparent litigation tactic would be an improper

new reply brief argument. See, ¢.9., S. Shapiro, et al.,

Supreme Court Practice § 6.38, p. 511 (10th ed. 2013).

Most important, any new argument would be even

farther removed from the Amended Order’s rationale

that “detriment” resulted from “unrestricted entry.”

J.A. 1426 (emphasis added). See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635

(government’s “particular justifications” are “jmpossible

to credit” when the “breadth” of government action is “so

far removed” from those justifications).

The unfortunate but inescapable conclusion is that

the actual basis for the June 14, 2017 extension of the

travel and refugee bans was fulfilling the President’s

pledges to ban Muslims. The President as President

has confirmed this. He stated on June 3, 2017 that a

London terror attack by three Muslims who would not

be banned by the Amended Order show why “[wle need

the Travel Ban.” Supra, at 4. The President's linking of

terror by Muslims with his purportedly narrower bans

explains why the President extended the bans after his

Administration achieved “extreme vetting.” Supra, at

18-19. The President’s bans were and are about fulfilling

his pledge to ban Muslims. They are not—and never

were—about the adequacy of vetting for nationals of the

six designated countries or refugees.

24

[III.In Accord With The Applicable Statutory And

Constitutional Texts, This Court Should Enjoin All

Prospective Applications Of The Amended Order’s

Illegal Travel And Refugee Bans.

This is not a case where splitting the baby would be

a Solomonic decision. Consider, for example, a ruling by

this Court that Respondents have standing and prevail on

the merits, but that would restrict injunctive relief so as

to enable bans against travelers and refugees who lack a

prior bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the

United States (hereinafter, “a Prior U.S. Relationship”).

This Court should reject any such restriction for at least

four reasons.

First, the plain meaning of the pertinent INA

provisions precludes restricting their prescriptions to

aliens with a Prior U.S. Relationship. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)

prescribes conditions that apply “|w]henever” the

President seeks to suspend “the entry of any aliens or

any class of aliens ... .” 8 U.S.C, § 1157(a)(2) prescribes

conditions that apply whenever the President seeks to limit

“the number of refugees.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) sets

conditions for denying admission to “/a/ny alien” based on

potential terrorism. (emphasis added). 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)

(A) prescribes that “no person shall... be discriminated

aguinst” based on nationality with four express statutory

exceptions. Jd. (emphasis added). The lack of a Prior U.S.

Relationship is not one of the exceptions. The Visa Waiver

Act applies to all nationals of the six countries. Supra,

at 12.

Second, the express limits imposed by the

Establishment Clause also apply to a government-

25

wide order issued in the United States to deny entry

to foreigners, including those without a Prior U.S.

Relationship. In 1787, the Constitution gave the power

to make laws on foreign immigration to Congress. Two

year's later, the Establishment Clause was proposed for

ratification. It provides: “Congress shall make no law

respecting ax establishment of religion ....” U.S. Const.

Amend. I (emphasis added). That Clause therefore applies

to immigration laws and rules, without any exception

permitting religious discrimination toward those who lack

a Prior U.S. Relationship.

The Government cites United States v. Verdugo-

Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), for the proposition that

“fajliens abroad have no Establishment Clause rights.” Pet.

Br. at 35 n.13. That both misreads Verdugo-Urquidez and

ignores the comprehensive language of the Establishment

Clause. Verdugo-Urquidez was expressly limited to

the Fourth Amendment, “the particular provision[] in

question ... .” 494 U.S. at 273. The Court held that the

reach of the Fourth Amendment was circumscribed by its

use of the term “the right of the people.” /d. at 265. The

Court emphasized that “in some cases, [other| provisions

extend beyond the citizenry.” Jd. at 269.

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which was necessary

for the majority, was even narrower. It held only that,

because it would be “impracticable and anomalous,”

the “Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement should

not apply [abroad] as it does in this country.” Jd. at 277-

78. Justice Kennedy emphasized that in general “the

Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes,

whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.”

Id. at 277.

26

Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment’s

Establishment Clause is not circumscribed by the term

“the right of the people.” This omission is particularly

telling as, in sharp contrast to the Establishment Clause,

the First Amendment’s protection of peaceful assembly

extends only to “the right of the people.” By using the

term “no law” without modification, the Establishment

Clause prescribes a comprehensive limit on government

action whether foreign or domestic.

Nor would it be impracticable or anomalous for the

Establishment Clause to apply to a President’s government-

wide order that is issued in this country and implemented

here and in U.S. consular offices. Our country has long

admitted foreign travelers, immigrants, and refugees,

including those who lack a Prior U.S. Relationship, while

complying with various U.S. laws. Indeed, the inscription

on the Statue of Liberty does not request “your tired,

your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,

if they have a Prior U.S. Relationship.”

Third, when considering a preliminary injunction,

a court envisages what the final judgment likely will

provide. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480

U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary

injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent

injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must

show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than

actual success.”) (citations omitted). Here, the district

court’s final judgment is readily envisioned should the

Respondents prevail in this Court on their standing and

the merits. Such a merits ruling by this Court—unlike

a lower court ruling or a stay pending review—will

conclusively establish the law in every venue that Sections

2(a), 6(a), and 6(b) of the Amended Order violate both

statutory and constitutional limits. The subsequent final

27

judgments of the two district courts ineluctably will

therefore provide declaratory relief to the same effect. It

makes no sense in this case for the final injunctive relief,

or preliminary injunctive relief, to be narrower than this

ourt’s invalidation of Sections 2(c), 6(a), and 6(b).

Such a dichotomy would invite mischief against the

rule of law. Indeed, the Administration states that, should

this Court rule that Sections 2(c), 6(a), and 6(b) “are invalid

on their face,” the Administration would nonetheless

apply those Sections in countless circumstances unless

the Court also enjoins the Administration from such

applications. Pet. Br. at 82-83.

Fourth, were this Court to exclude those without a

Prior U.S. Relationship from the scope of the INA and the

Establishment Clause, the cure would be worse than the

disease. Any President could restrict travel, immigration,

and refugees to foreigners who were Christians, unless a

non-Christian had a Prior U.S. Relationship. Most Jewish

refugees from Hitler could have been banned, and more

than one billion foreign Muslims could be banned now.

Eight Justices of this Court have indicated that he

or she would never join a decision like Korematsu v.

United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Chief Justice Roberts

is typical. The Chief Justice testified that if a case “like”

Korematsu came before the Court, “I would be surprised

if there were any arguments that could support it.” U.S.

Senate Judiciary Committee Holds A Hearing On The

Nomination Of John Roberts To Be Chief Justice Of The

Supreme Court, 109th Cong. (2005), 2005 WL 2214702,

at *22.’

7. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer similarly rejected Korematsu.

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995)

28

Perhaps most instructive is the “Reading List of

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,” entitled “Understanding

Freedom’s Heritage: How to Keep and Defend Liberty,”

which is available at http://bit.ly/2iZXm08 (hereinafter,

“Liberty Reading List”). Justice Kennedy’s Liberty

Reading List ineludes the dissent of Justice Murphy in

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Korematsu “yielded a pass for an

odious, gravely injurious racial classification|.| A Korematsu-

type classification .. . will never again survive scrutiny: Such a

classification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks as

prohibited.”); Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A

Judge's View, 193 (Knopf, 2010) (Korematsu “has been so thoroughly

discredited, that it is hard to conceive of any future court referring

to it favorably or relying on it.”). Justice Alito testified that the

“Japanese internment cases ... were one of the great constitutional

tragedies that our country has experienced... .” U.S. Senate

Judiciary Committee Holds A Hearing On The Nomination Of

Judge Samuel Alito To The U.S. Supreme Court, 109th Cong.

(2006), 2006 WL 45940, at *150-—51. Justice Sotomayor testified that

Korematsu “was wrongly decided.” U.S. Senate Committee On The

Judiciary Holds A Hearing On The Nomination Of Judge Sonia

Sotomayor To Be An Associate Justice Of The U.S. Supreme Court,

111th Cong. (2009), 2009 WL 2027303, at *79. Justice Kagan gave

Korematsu as the example of a “poorly reasoned” Supreme Court

decision. Responses to Supplemental Questions from Senators

Jeff Sessions, Orrin Hatch, Charles Grassley, Jon Kyl, Lindsey

Graham, John Cornyn, and Tom Coburn, available at http://bit.

ly/20oI0aAf. When Justice Gorsuch was asked whether Korematsu has

any precedential value in any case that may come before the Supreme

Court, he testified, “no.” Senator Mazie K. Hirono, Questions for the

Record following Hearing on March 20-23, 2017 entitled: “On the

Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,” Senate Judiciary

Committee (Mar. 20-23, 2017), available at http://bit.ly/2pmtW HD.

See Generally Steinberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia,

J., dissenting) (describing “Korematsu and Dred Scott” as occupying

the worst “place in the history of this Court’s jurisprudence”).

29

Korematsu as what the Ninth Circuit website describes

as containing some of the “key principles that are integral

to our nation’s DNA.” Justice Murphy stated that even

claims by the executive branch regarding military

necessity “must [be] subject” to the “judicial process of

having... reasonableness determined... .” Korematsu,

323 U.S. at 234. That reasonable “relation” was “lacking”

because the internment order simply “assum{ed] that

all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous

tendency to commit sabotage and espionage and to aid

our Japanese enemy.” Jd. at 235. However, no “reason,

logie or experience could be marshalled in support of

such an assumption.” /d.; see also id. at 240 (rejecting

“infer[ence] that examples of individual disloyalty prove

group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against

the entire group”).

What unavoidably remained, Justice Murphy

explained, as the underlying basis for the internment was

“an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-

truths, and insinuations that for years have been directed

against Japanese Americans by people with racial and

economic prejudices—the same people who have been

among the most foremost advocates of the evacuation.” /d.

at 239 (emphasis added). Justice Murphy explained that

even a “military judgment” in wartime that was “based

upon such racial and sociological considerations is not

entitled to the great weight” ordinarily given to military

assessments. Jd. at 239-40. Justice Murphy concluded:

Racial discrimination in any form and in any

degree has no justifiable part whatever in our

democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any

setting but it is utterly revolting among a free

30

people who have embraced the principles set

forth in the Constitution of the United States.

Id. at 242 (emphasis added).*

The Administration likewise has provided no “reason,

logic or experience,” id. at 235, in support of the Amended

Order’s ongoing bans. In particular, there is no support

that nationals of the six countries and refugees may

possess some inherent tendency to commit terrorism in

the United States that this Administration’s “extreme

vetting” would not adequately detect. See Part II, supra.°

Instead of providing any supporting reason, logic, or

experience, President Trump has attempted to intimidate

the federal judiciary: “Jf something happens, blame [the

8. Inthe highest tradition of the bench, Justice Murphy ignored

partisan and personal loyalties. President Roosevelt had appointed

Justice Murphy three times: as Governor General of the Philippines,

Attorney General, and Justice.

9. Then-Candidate Trump attempted to support his proposed

bans by citing the Japanese internment, telling reporters,

“{ Roosevelt] did the same thing.” J.A. 1013 n.15 (citing Jenna Johnson,

Donald Trump says he is not bothered by comparisons to Hitler,

Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2015), https://goo.g1/6G00H7). Taking the wrong

page from history again, President Trump has asserted that Muslims

do not assimilate in Western societies. See Chris Cillizza, Donald

Trump’s explanation of his wire-tapping tweets will shock and

amaze you, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017), http://wapo.st/200QXzA.

Similar assertions about non-assimilation were made to justify the

Japanese internment. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,

96 (1943). The Government’s brief (Pet. Br. at 23) cites Harisiades

v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), which in turn relies in part

on Korematsu and Hirabayashi. See 342 U.S. at 589 n.16, 591 n.17.

jl

judge} and court system.” Brief of Amicus Curiae T.A.,

Ex. 6, CV. No. 17-00050-DKW-KJM, Hawaii v. Tramp

(D. Haw. Mar. 14, 2017), ECF No. 201-6 (Donald J. Trump

(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 p.m.

ET), available at http://bit.ly/20jCwta) (emphasis added).

Such intimidation is antithetical to our constitutional

system. To start, constitutional and statutory constraints

effectively would be discarded if they could be overridden

by a suggestion that folliwing them may increase some

potential risk of terrorism or other horrific violence. If

that were enough, one could ban the purchase of firearms

because the San Bernardino and Orlando terrorists used

guns.!° Or ban the internet because foreign and domestic

terrorists use the internet for recruitment, inspiration, and

planning. Or ban interstate travel by white nationalists

because for decades some of them have crossed state lines

in traveling to commit terrorist attacks.'’ And so on.

10. Indeed, President Trump has used the San Bernardino

and Orlando shootings as support for his bans even though those

terrorists were neither nationals of the six countries nor refugees.

One day after the Orlando shooting, then-candidate Trump cited 8

U.S.C. § 1182(f) as a basis to “suspend immigration from areas of

the world where there is a proven history of terrorism,” explaining

that “I called for a ban after San Bernardino, and was met with such

great scorn and anger but now ... many are saying that I was right

to do so.” Ryan Teague Beckwith, Read Donald Trump’s Speech

on the Orlando Shooting, Time.com (June 13, 2016 4:36 p.m. ET),

http://ti.me/1XSQ8YS.

11. For example, in 1985, David Tate, a member of The Order—

“a violent anti-Semitic group” that “committed armed robberies

_.. and directed counterfeiting operations to finance a ‘war’ against

the Federal Government”—traveled from Idaho to Missouri to

murder a Missouri state trooper. See Wayne King, Suspect Wanted

in Shooting of Missouri Trooper is Arrested, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21,

1985), https://goo.gl/xHT1hK; Associated Press, AROUND THE

32

But this Court addressed “terrorism” in Boumedine

and held: “The laws and Constitution are designed to

survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.

Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system

they are reconciled within the framework of the law.”

Boumedine, 533 U.S. at 798. The Framers decided that

the Establishment Clause is an essential part of that

framework.

As important, this Court must never surrender to

intimidation. As Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 78:

This independence of the judges is equally

requisite to guard the Constitution and the

rights of individuals from the effects of those ill

humors, which the arts of designing men, or the

influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes

disseminate among the people themselves, and

which, though they speedily give place to better

information, and more deliberate reflection,

NATION; White Supremacist Gets Life for Killing Trooper, N.Y.

Times (Jan. 8, 1986), http://nyti.ms/2wkuBAr. In 1995, Timothy

MeVeigh, “a disgruntled Army veteran who went on to declare war on

the United States government,” traveled from Arizona to Oklahoma

to destroy the Alfred P. Murrah Federal! Building. Christopher S.

Wren, McVeigh Is Executed for Oklahoma City Bombing, N.Y. Times

(June 11, 2001), http://nyti.ms/2vaTif6; Howard Witt, /n Arizona

Town, Oklahoma Bombing Casts Dark Shadow Unwanted Fame

Because Suspect Once Lived There, Chi. Trib. (June 18, 1995), https://

goo.gl/1tHdGN. And, recently, James Fields traveled from Ohio to

Virginia to plow his car into a group of counter-protestors at a white

nationalist rally, killing one and injuring others. See Jonah Engel

Bromwich, Alan Blinder, What We Know About Janies Alex Fields,

Driver Charged in Charlottesville Killing, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13,

2017), https://goo.gl/xzKdje.

33

have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion

dangerous innovations in the government.

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, INDEPENDENT

JOURNAL (June 14, 1788) (emphasis added), available at

http://bit.ly/2xlV LnJ.

Likewise, then-Judge Cardozo wrote:

The great ideals of liberty and equality are

preserved against the assaults of opportunism,

the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion

of small encroachments, the scorn and derision

of those who have no patience with general

principles, by enshrining them in constitutions,

and consecrating to the task of their protection

a body of defenders.

Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process,

92-93 (1921) (emphasis added).

Our Constitution inoculates its “body of defenders”

against presidential intimidation. As Justice Scalia said:

“What can he do to me? Or to any of us? We have life tenure

and we have it precisely so that we will not be influenced

by politics, by threats from anybody.” Chris Wallace,

Justice Antonin Scalia on issues facing SCOTUS and

the country, Fox News Sunday (July 29, 2012), http://fxn.

ws/2fZZBiB (emphasis added).

Experience teaches that half-measures do not assuage

autocratic intimidation.’ This Court’s decision should

12. “History will teach us that... of those men who have

overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have

34

resolve this matter once and for all with a prospective

injunction that enforces the full scope of the applicable

statutory and constitutional limits.

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the decisions of the Fourth

and Ninth Circuits.

DATED: September 6, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

SHAIMAA M. Hussein RicHarD D. BERNSTEIN

D. NicoLeE GUNTNER Counsel of Record

Martruew R. DoLLAN WILLKIE Farr

WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP

& GALLAGHER LLP 1875 K Street, NW

787 Seventh Avenue Washington, DC 20006

New York, New York 10019 (202) 303-1000

(212) 728-8000 rbernstein@willkie.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people;

commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.” Alexander Hamilton,

Federalist No. 1, cited in Liberty Reading List. The Bible in Proverbs

28:15 likens a “tyrant” to “a roaring lion, and a charging bear.”

Proverbs 28:15 (International Standard Version). Pastor Martin

Niemiller’s iconic 1946 Lecture, “First They Came,” cited in Liberty

Reading List, illustrates the horrific consequences that can follow

from attempts to appease nascent autocracy.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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