Amicus Curiae Brief — Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 50 (2017) (No. 16-1436)
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Supreme Court of the United States
7 —
DONALD J. TRUMP,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
Petitioners,
V-
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ET AL.,
Respondents.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
Petitioners,
Vv.
HAWAII, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS
BRIEF OF AMIC] CURIAE
HARDWIRED GLOBAL; [IRAQI CHRISTIANS ADVOCACY AND
EMPOWERMENT INSTITUTE; CHINA AID;
THE MANDAEAN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP; YAZDA -
A GLOBAL YAZIDI ORGANIZATION; GREGORY DOLIN;
IRINA TSUKERMAN; AND KATHERINE LITVAK
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY
Bruce D. Abramson, Counsel of Record
Gregory Dolin
University of Baltimore Schoo! of Law
1420 North Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 22101
(410) 837-4610
gdolin@ubalt.edu
Counsel for Amici Curiae
GibsouMoore Appellate Services, LLC
206 Eaat Cary Sitreet® Richmond, VA 23219
804-248-7770 ¢ www.gibiteonmoore.net ow™
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PRIOE Ul UN ae
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I i cnccncsesseseresines sneveeseeses ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE............0600..6cc0ccceeenees l
a . ncsenneneensunte 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 6
Nee as csncteudniucanercceciees 7
[. Asylum is Inextricably Entwined with
EEE OD 7
A. Adherents of Minority Faiths Are
Most Vulnerable to Persecution................. 8
1. The Treatment of Jews and Other
Religious Minorities in the USSR........... 9g
2. The Treatment of Religious
Minorities in Some Middle Eastern
a acssssndtcortonen 12
B. Proving Individualized Persecution
on the Basis of Religion is Often
Quite Hard, Even for Members of
sec csdaseebines 17
Il. Preferences For Persecuted Religious
Minorities Have Long Been Part of the
in asndpnpennesevnsveoson 19
A. The Lautenberg Amendment is a
Strong Precedent for Extending
Preferential Treatment to Minority
ET oie ccccdandebscdasouedecsessenesese 21
ai ae
B. The Executive Branch is Statutorily
Required to and has been Prioritizing
Certain Groups of Potential Refugees
BU Into ciciseisiSeidh dea cassiiusbsniiemmerapnnapdoconie 23
Ill.Preferencing Adherents of Particular
Religions in the Context of the Refugee
Program Does Not Constitute Invidious
Discrimination Against Other Religions ...... 25
IV.Holding that Religious Preferences in
the Context of the Refugee Program
Violate the Establishment Clause Will
Result in Further Endangering the Most
TU i rae 32
CONCLUSION ................. saasannebashnnnehboah-ahed aniebagliddaaci 34
_ iti -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General,
745 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990) ..................
Ahmadshah v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2005)...................
Almario v. Attorney General,
872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989)...................
Bangura v. Hansen,
434 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2006) ................0..
Carcieri v. Salazar,
555 U.S. 379 (2009) ........ OEE aD BG NA Jer MERTEN
Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
ee I enstntisctnssesesivensrictesete -
Fiallo v. Bell,
ey ee OD eciersnenscncescntenmstssemnenioned
Harchenko v. I.N.S.,
379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004) .........00000....
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
ly Se E fehnisocacesicsissnsevasdontanant
N.S. v. Cardoza—Fonseca,
Be a Pe EINE ncrccccncenenscescessncnsmanics
ILN.S. v. Elias—Zacarias,
BEE RP. Se CED ceciccsccnssccccnccccsoncsuenezes
Page(s):
ibbicieniinies 27
conan 27
- 14 —
LN.S. v. Stevic,
A i a pa iaemeakanmninions 3
Larson v. Valente,
RE ID: EES REO ee eee 25
Li Sheng Wu v. Holder,
Se Se Oe I EI, BR iciiins cece cinncccndedssuconveces 18
Lolong v. Gonzales,
484 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2007).......... SEM ovale 18
Mathews v. Diaz,
EET NR RE SERED A SEE AI 31
Mejia—Paiz v. I.N.S.,
ee ee ROD casi nss ctieonnidinbemien ives’ 19
Nagoulko v. L.N.S.,
cae Oe Ce ee, BO ooins cnc necoscsevscoccosss 19
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
ed ehdniginaevmsonesanens 27
Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo,
I cadaeintpebdadnneie 3
Sessions v. Morales—Santana,
og Sle A aA erie aree manne tars 30
Shah v. .N.S.,
SSO F.3a 1068 ths Cir. BOOO) ......0000.0cccccc..cccccess: 19
Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
4 S|, STARS een e eT 29
United States v. Flores—Villar,
536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff,
I a ss ieeedaieaidanotenina 30
United States v. Vasquez,
Te ee ee Ce Ws Gv oooeve cred ecabcssesecasecdecccs. 27
Washington v. Trump,
No. 17-141 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, a, SORT 4, 25
Washington v. Trump,
2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 3, 2017),
stay denied by, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)...... 4
Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder,
G35 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2011)............................. 19
Statutes:
RE di aa 25
ers agar oi) passim
I ie SS ad 26
er te I 8 ci) passim
I ne 24
EES Ee, 5
B UI.©. © RABBI IED oo ncecevnvccsecsssencecscscsesccoscccce. 5
Sr OP) ee 20
Nia RAO TET OE ea A I! ALES 23
EET I Re LIE ENS IRs ed Hes, 8 24
Regulations:
I OU goo le tet hr a 18
eT sr ET 18
GAs ID ono cccnancsccecseseessccseccecee. 32
ee Ee 19
Constitutional Provision:
| FC ae passim
tg ea
Administrative and Executive Materials:
EO-1 13,769
82 Fed. Reg. 8,977,
ey SE. EEE BD scascccnectonssesacespsveesers 4, 5, 23,28
EO 2 13,780
82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) .............ceeeeeeeees 5
Legislative Materials:
118 Cong. Rec. 12,941 (Apr. 17, 1972) ............... eee 17
135 Cong. Rec. H3734 (July 13, 1989)............... 12, 23
H. Rep. No. 101-122, at 3—4 (1989) .................ceeeees 21
Statutes at Large:
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89—732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966)........... 20
Immigration Act of 1980,
ee I cnertesnaeuguoeeeseieles 8, 22
Immigration Act of 1990,
I ee mpsauell celal 20
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
Pub. L. No. 82—414,
I as cecelniesenan ns dempenvierieeih 8
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-316,
A chouil cahenignioeeieinen 7,8
Lautenberg Amendment,
Pub. L. No. 101—167,
103 Stat. 1195, 1266 (1988)...........scecceee--o0 passim
= vii —
Lautenberg Amendment,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 253 (2004) ..... 23
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 1010 (1959).............. 8
International Material:
U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human
Rights, “They Came to Destroy”: ISIS
Crimes against the Yazidis at
8-9, A/HARC/32/CRP.2 (2016)...........:.cceeeeeereeeeneees 14
U.S. Dep't of State, Jran 2015 International
Religious Freedom Report
Bi I ce 15, 16, 17
U.S. Dep’t of State, Proposed Refugee
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017,
a IIE <i ceteveisusiddiipiabentedbepsoseibensenns ... 24, 25, 26
U.S. Dep’t of State, Syria 2015 International
Religious Freedom Report at 5 (2016)..........:.....:008+ 13
U.S. Dep’t of State, Yemen 2015 International
Religious Freedom Report at 6 (2016)..............+: 13, 14
Books:
Alex Inkeles, Social Change In
Soviet Russia, 254—65 (1968) ............ccccecsessscseeese 10
Documents on Ukrainian—
Jewish Identity and Emigration,
1944-1990, 200-01
(Vladimir Khanin, ed. 2002)...............:eeceeeeeees 10-11
— vill —
Richard S. Levy, Antisemitism: A Historical
Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution
Se IE sic ic ddaduleacadddicdehidsebtishdsesdiveraens
Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language
NEE) IPUNE Fides cnn rntsp secesnrantdxécennnsssecsseseanee
Journals:
John Moroz Smith, The Jcon and the
Tracts: A Restrained Renaissance of
Religious Liberty in Ukraine,
2001 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 815, 820 (2001)................
Joseph Kulesa, Paradise Lost: The Impact of
the Changed Country Conditions in Post-
Soviet Ukraine on Pending Religious Asylum
Proceedings in the United States,
6 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 6, n.74 (2004) ........
Lance Hampton, Step Away from the Altar,
Joab: The Failure of Religious Asylum Claims
in the United States in Light of the Primacy of
Asylum Within Human Rights,
12 Transnat'l L. &
Contemp. Probs. 453, 462 (2002) .....................
Lynn D. Wardle, The "Withering Away" of
Marriage: Some Lessons from the Bolshevik
Family Law Reforms in Russia, 1917-1926,
2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 469, 480 (2004)..........
Nicholas Merlin, Jmmigration Policy and the
Expedited Removal Rule: “Equality for
Some, Justice for None”
16 St. Thomas L. Rev. 163, 165 (2008) ...............
ume
20
- i =
Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966:
3Mirando Por Los Ojos De Don
Quijote O Sancho Panza?,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 910 (2001)...........c0.c...0e00 20
Victor Rosenberg, Refugee Status for Soviet
Jewish Immigrants to the United States,
19 Touro L. Rev. 419, 426—28 (2003) ............ 21, 22
Newspaper Articles:
Amanda Erickson, Russia just effectively
banned Jehovah's Witnesses from the country,
WashingtonPost.com,
2017 WLNR 12246791 (Apr. 20, 2017).............. 12
Amy Louise Kazmin,
Soviet Jews Study Their Lost Religion,
L.A. Times at Al4 (Sept. 14, 1989) .................... li
Eliza Griswold, Js This the End of
Christianity in the Middle East?,
N.Y. Times Magazine at 31 (July 22, 2015).. 15, 16
Michael Pizzi & Nuha Shabaan, Sunnis Fill
Rebel Ranks, but Also Prop Up Assad Regime,
USAToday.com (Aug. 1, 2013).............:eeeeeeees 17-18
Obituaries, Erhard Milch, 79, Luftwaffe Chief,
BE hc BUD GE Sree GT, By ROOD sv ccicc in ccciscescessescss 18
Reuters, Historian: Jewish
Officers Fought For Nazis,
Chicago Trib. at 14 (Apr. 3, 1997)...............cceee0 18
Websites:
Angus Crawford, Jraq's Mandaeans
“Face Extinction,” BBC (March 4, 2007), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east
Si Is snndcsseppiesesvensscnneepnbinsubdesetssbaidansensel aneey ss 15
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Russian
Prosecutors Raid Second Jewish Educational
Institution (June 15, 2015), available at
http://www.jta.org/2015/06/15/news-
opinion/world/russian-prosecutors-raid-
second-jewish-educational-institution-2.................. 12
Keith Armes, Chekists in Cassocks; The
Orthodox Church and the KGB, 1
Demokratizatsiya 72 (1991), available at
https://www?2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/
demokratizatsiya%20archive/01-04_armes.pdf....... 10
Zvi Gitelman, Why They Fought: What Soviet
Jewish Soldiers Saw and How It is Remembered
at 4, 20—21 (Nat’l Council for Eurasian and
E. European Research, 2011), available at
https://www.ucis. pitt.edu/nceeer/2011_824-
I laa ane is derligglamnnnd nba nees 11
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporaryv—
I oc. os pausnedebcuiubeciadmensepacscnsae am
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!
Amici curiae are groups and _ individuals
committed to upholding American ideals of providing
refuge to those persecuted on the basis of religious
beliefs.
Hardwired Globa! is a non—profit organization
dedicated to promoting religious liberty and
counteracting religion—based discrimination
worldwide.
Iraqi Christians Advocacy and Empowerment
Institute is a non—profit organization dedicated to
ensuring safety and human dignity of Iraqi
Christians and other minority groups both in Iraq and
the global Diaspora.
China Aid is an international non—profit Christian
human rights organization committed to promoting
religious freedom and the rule of law in China as well
as supporting Chinese Christians and their families
who have experienced persecution at the hands of
their government.
ihe Mandaean Human Rights Group is a non—
profit organization that works with Sabian Mandaean
community, an ethno-religious, ling»tistic minority
and an indigenous people from Irag and Iran.
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part and no party of counsel for a party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. No persons other than amici curiae or their counsel
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
The parties have all either filed blanket waivers with the Court
or have explicitly consented to the filing of this brief.
sO
- ] Yazidi Organization is a non—
profit multi-national Yazidi global organization
established in the aftermath of the Yazidi Genocide in
2014, to support the Yazidi ethno-religious minority
and other vulnerable groups.
Gregory Dolin. lina Tsukerman, and Katherine
Litvak are former refugees from the former Soviet
Union who were beneficiaries of the Lautenberg
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 101—167, § 599D, 103 Stat.
1195, 1265 (1989).
Amici have no direct stake in the outcome of the
present litigation. Amici take no position on the
various provisions of the President’s Executive
Orders on immigration on direct appeal. Amici have
joined, however, to address a provision of those orders
raised in some lower courts, and that may factor into
the present litigation. Amici believe that it is entirely
proper for the United States to extend preferential
protection to persecuted adherents of minority
religions. In this brief, amici explain that such
preferences have been part of American refugee policy
for decades, are fully supported by statutory
language, do not offend the Establishment Clause,
and have been an effective tool to combat religious
persecution around the globe. Amici also highlight
the likely detrimental consequences on persecuted
religious communities if the Respondent’s and certain
other amici’s arguments concerning the alleged
incompatibility of religious preferences in refugee
cases and the Establishment Clause are accepted.
~~ 2
INTRODUCTION
The United States has a long and proud history of
sheltering those seeking refuge from oppression in
their home countries.
Since 1947 the United States has had a
congressionally enacted immigration and
naturalization policy which granted
immigration preferences to ‘displaced persons,’
‘refugees,’ or persons who fled certain areas of
the world because of ‘persecution or fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion.’ Although the language
through which Congress has implemented this
policy since 1947 has changed slightly from
time to time the basic policy has remained
constant—to provide a haven for homeless
refugees and to fulfill American
responsibilities in connection with the
International Refugee Organization of the
United Nations.
Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 52 (1971).
In recognition and continuation of that history and
tradition, in 1980, Congress passed, and the President
signed, a comprehensive Refugee Act. Pub. L. No. 96—
212, 96 Stat. 102 (1980). The Act (and predecessor
legislation) permits the Executive Branch to extend
asylum in the United States to those individuals who
have suffered “persecution or [have] a well—founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” Jd. § 201 (codified in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)); see also I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
414-421 (1984) (discussing refugee policy prior to
1980). Under the Act, only hardships resulting from
4 =
“persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion” serve as a basis for asylum. Jd. Other
hardships, no matter how severe, do not provide a
basis for asylum. See /.N.S. v. Elias—Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 481-83 (1992). Thus, a person displaced from his
home country as a result of war or natural disaster,
though a “refugee” in the colloquial sense of the term,
is not a “refugee” within the language of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. /d. at 482.
On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued
Executive Order No. 13,769 (“EOQ-—1”) which placed
certain restrictions on the admission of refugees into
the United States. Section 5(b) of that order directed
“the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security ... to prioritize
refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of
religious-based persecution, provided that the
religion of the individual is a minority religion in the
individual's country of nationality.” Exec. Order
13,769, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” §5(b), 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,977, 8,979 (Jan. 27, 2017). Almost
immediately, the States of Washington and
Minnesota filed suit to enjoin § 5(b) and other
provisions of that order arguing that the section
violated the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution. See Complaint, Washington v.
Trump, No. 17-141 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017), ECF,
1. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted an
injunction, which the Ninth Circuit declined to stay.
Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash.,
Feb. 3, 2017), stay denied by 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir.
2017).
te pS
As the litigation over EO-1 was pending, President
Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,780 (“EO--2”)
which rescinded the original order and replaced it with
similar, but somewhat modified directive. Exec. Order
No. 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg.
13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Although EO-2 no longer directs
the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to
“prioritize refugee claims made by individuals”
belonging to minority religions in their home country,
it clarified the reasons for EO—1 doing so. See EO—2, §
1(b)(iv). Given that statement, and given the separate
statutory requirement that available refugee visas be
“allocated among refugees of special humanitarian
concern to the United States in accordance with a
determination made by the President,” 8 U.S.C. §
1157(a)(3), the question of whether the Government
can preferentially grant asylum? to the adherents of
minority relitions remains live.
2 As a technical matter, a refugee and an asylee are not fully
synonymous. A refugee is someone who applies for a refugee visa
while outside of the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42),
whereas an asylee is someone who applies while within the
United States. Jd. § 1158(a). However, because the standard for
granting the application is the same in both cases, see td. §
1158(>)(1)(B)G), in this brief, the terms are _ used
interchangeably.
_
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The United States has a long and proud history of
offering asylum to those seeking refuge from religious
persecution. This refuge is most often sought by those
who belong to minority faiths in their native land.
From the time of the Pilgrims and the Quakers,
America has been a safe haven for adherents of
minority religions.
That adherents of minority faiths are
disproportionally likely to seek asylum is not a
surprise. The ability to oppress rather than be
oppressed is frequently correlated with the relative
size of two populations. Because too many members
of too many faiths insist that the Truth of their faith
entitles them to oppress those who deny it, the
combination of religious differences and minority
status can serve as a pretext for brutality. The
decades-long policy of the United States, as
expressed in statutory language and executive
actions, has thus been to give preferences in the
processing of refugees to adherents of minority
religious faiths.
Such an approach is necessary because the
United States cannot admit every otherwise-
qualified person seeking asylum. Sadly, in any given
year, there are significantly more individuals in the
world persecuted “on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion,” than can be admitted to the
United States. As a result, the Government must
select some rational basis for prioritizing the
admission and rejection of otherwise qualified
asylum seekers. Without denying the plight of any
asylum seeker, it is entirely reasonable to conclude
*
ms P
that adherents of minority religions face graver
dangers than do other refugees. Aligning United
States policy with that recognition fulfills the
Congressional command that asylum be extended to
“refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States,” and is fully consistent with the
Establishment Clause. A decision prohibiting the
government from extending particular solicitude to
the adherents of minority faiths would do more than
substitute the Court’s judgment for that of the
political branches. It would result in exposing those
most vulnerable to persecution to additional and
unjustifiable risk of harm.
ARGUMENT
I. Asylum is Inextricably Entwined with
Religious Practices.
Unlike most other government benefits, asylum is
often granted because of the applicant’s religious
beliefs. Indeed, “religion is the only universal basis
for asylum.” Lance Hampton, Step Away from the
Altar, Joab: The Failure of Religious Asylum Claims
in the United States in Light of the Primacy of Asylum
Within Human Rights, 12 Transnat'l L. & Contemp.
Probs. 453, 462 (2002) (emphasis added). Religion—
based asylum has been recognized from the earliest
days of the American colonies. The Quakers and
Mennonites settled in Pennsylvania after escaping
persecution in their home countries. The Roman
Catholics came to Maryland to avoid harassment in
Great Britain. Jews fleeing the Inquisition sought
haven in New York when it was still New Amsterdam.
Though there was no formal “refugee” status or
asylum procedure in the U.S. law until the middle of
the 20% century, see Pub. L. No. 85—316, 71 Stat. 639
ate
(1957),° the practice of admitting and preferencing
immigrants fleeing religious persecution has a much
longer pedigree.4
When Congress first defined “refugee,” it explicitly
conferred the status on people who fled their country
of residence because of persecution on “account of
race, religion, or political opinion.” Pub. L. No. 85—
316, § 15(c), 71 Stat. 639 (1957) (emphasis added).
This definition, though somewhat broadened,
remains the law today. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(defining “refugee” as someone persecuted “on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.”).
A. Adherents of Minority Faiths Are Most
Vulnerable to Persecution
Throughout history, minority faiths have suffered
ostracism or worse in repressive societies. It should,
therefore, be uncontroversial to note that in countries
3 In 1950, Congress prohibited removal] of aliens who would
be subject to physical persecution, but did not grant these
individuals any legal status, nor did it create a system for people
outside of the United States to apply for similar protections. See
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 23, 64 Stat. 1010
(1950). Similarly, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
gave the Attorney General the authority to withhold deportation
of people to places where they may be physically persecuted.
Again, this provision did not confer a legal status on the
beneficiary nor was it applicable to people outside of the United
States. See Pub. L. No. 82~414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 214 (1952).
* Admittedly, the commitment to the “historic policy of ...
respond[ing] to the urgent needs of persons subject to
persecution in their homelands,” Pub. L. No. 96—212, § 101(a),
94 Stat. 102 (1980), has sometimes been honored more in the
breach than in practice.
i an
where people are persecuted “on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion,” minorities falling
into one or more of those categories suffer the brunt
of the maltreatment.® Although examples sadly
abound, the amici wish to focus on two exemplars
with which they have special familiarity and which
provide an appropriate context for analyzing policies
that favor minority religions over others in the
context of immigration.
1. The Treatment of Jews and Other
Religious Minorities in the USSR
The former Soviet Union was well known for being
inhospitable to dissent in any form. Adherence to a
faith or philosophy other than Communism was
considered dissent. The Soviet government thus
destroyed entire religious communities. See Lynn D.
Wardle, The "Withering Away” of Marriage: Some
Lessons from the Bolshevik Family Law Reforms in
Russia, 1917-1926, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 469, 480
(2004). At best, the Soviets practied internal
deportation to remove religious adherents from their
usual places of abode. At worst, religious adherents
were executed.
Although the USSR was formally atheist,
traditional Russian Orthodoxy was tolerated and
sometimes coopted, particularly after the beginning of
— _
* Occasionally, a minority group will seize or possess enough
power and persecute the majority. Because such circumstances
are the exception rather than the rule, it is appropriate for U.S.
policy and law to address them on a case-by-case basis.
~ 20
World War II. See John Moroz Smith, The Jcon and
the Tracts: A Restrained Renaissance of Religious
Liberty in Ukraine, 2001 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 815, 820
(2001). On the other hand, minority religions,
including Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian
Orthodox churches, were suppressed, their property
confiscated, and their adherents jailed. See Alex
Inkeles, Social Change In Soviet Russia 254-55
(1968) (noting that “[a]ll of the minority religions
[had], of course, been the object of repressive
measures.”).
Most notorious, perhaps, was the Soviet treatment
of Jewish citizens. Some forms of discrimination were
legally codified, while others were practiced as a
result of secret Communist Party edicts. For
example, ritual circumcision—a rite practiced by the
Jewish community for millennia—-was forbidden.
Saturday school attendance was compulsory despite
the conflict with the Jewish Sabbath. See Joseph
Kulesa, Paradise Lost: The Impact of the Changed
Country Conditions in Post-Soviet Ukraine on
Pending Religious Asylum Proceedings in the United
States, 6 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 6, n.74 (2004).
Religious rites were virtually impossible to perform.
On Yom Kippur—the holiest day in the Jewish
calendar—the militia and plain—clothed KGB officers
often erected roadblocks and detained people on the
way to their synagogues. See Documents on
6 Indeed, many of the Soviet-era officials in the recognized
Russian Orthodox Church have long been thought to be officers in
the KGB. See Keith Armes, Chekists in Cassocks: The Orthodox
Church and the KGB, 1 Demckratizatsiya 72 (1991), available at
https://www?2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%2
Oarchive/01-04_armes.pdf.
~_ . rs
Ukrainian—Jewish Identity and Emigration, 1944—
1990, 200-01 (Vladimir Khanin, ed. 2002). Because
of the official hostility to Judaism, many cities with
sizable Jewish populations went years (or decades)
without any ordained rabbis to minister to the Jewish
community. See Amy Louise Kazmin, Soviet Jews
Study Their Lost Religion, L.A. Times at Al4 (Sept.
14, 1989). Institutions of higher learning had
“unspoken” and “unofficial” but very real quotas for
the admission of Jewish students, and certain
universities and jobs were all but closed to Soviet
Jews. See Richard S. Levy, Antisemitism: A Historical
Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution (vol. 1) 725
(2005). With World War II having a central role in
the historiography of the USSR, the Soviet
government promoted the myth that Jews did not
serve in combat units and instead “lay low on the
home front.” See Zvi Gitelman, Why They Fought:
What Soviet Jewish Soldiers Saw and How It is
Remembered at 4, 20-21 (Nat’l Council for Eurasian
and E. European Research, 2011), available at
https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2011 824-03¢__
Gitelman pdf.
Although the Soviet government at various times
undertook campaigns against other minorities (e.g.,
Chechens and Crimean Tatars), the division of the
country into ethnically—based constituent Republics
and autonomous regions allowed most ethnic
minorities to constitute a majority in a part of the
country where such overt discrimination against
them became harder, if not altogether impossible.
Jews were among the few minorities lacking an
enclave within the USSR where they constituted a
majority (others included Evangelical Christians,
Ukrainian Catholics, and Ukrainian Orthodox).
a Tn
Discrimination against them was _ therefore
nationwide.? See 135 Cong. Rec. H3734 (July 13,
1989) (statement of Rep. Lipinski).®
2. The Treatment of Religious Minorities in
Some Middle Eastern Countries
Because portions of the challenged Executive
Order relate exclusively to Muslim—majority
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the
conditions under which that region’s minority faiths
labor should be discussed. The Department of State
and various NGOs agree that minority faiths are
heavily discriminated against in that part of the
world.
For example, according to a Department of State
report on Syria, “[t]he Alawite—led government and
its Shia militia allies killed, arrested, and physically
abused Sunnis and members of targeted religious
? Although in 1928, the Soviet government established the
Jewish Autonomous District around the Far East city of
Birobidzhan, at no point did the Jewish population of the
“Jewish Autonomous District” exceed 17% of the region’s total
population. This is because the district was intentionally
established in a region that was geographically remote from any
Jewish population centers.
8 As a result of continued discrimination of minority faiths
in present day Russia, see, e.g., Amanda Erickson, Russia just
effectively banned Jehovah’s Witnesses from the country,
WashingtonPost.com, 2017 WLNR 12246791 (Apr. 20, 2017);
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Russian Prosecutors Raid Second
Jewish Educational Institution (June 15, 2015), available at
http://www. ita. erg/20 13/06/15/news-opinion/world/russian
-progecuturs-raid-second-jewish-educationsal-institulien-2, the
U.S. government has continued to extend preferential
treatment to adherents of certain minority faiths in Russia.
See Part II.A, post.
co Eas
minority groups, and intentionally destroyed their
property.” U.S. Dep't of State, Syria 2015
International Religious Freedom Report at 5 (2016).
Although the government of Syria continues to
tolerate Christians, non-state actors such as ISIS®
have “tortured and beat [Christians in a village near
Aleppo] before crucifying them.” See id. at 10. The
minority Druze community has suffered a similar
fate. Id. The victims have been targeted solely for
their faith. Jd. The small Jewish communities of
Aleppo and Damascus have likely ceased to exist. Jd.
at 2~-3. ISIS has also committed atrocities against
Shiites, allegedly in retaliation for “the government's
‘massacres of Sunnis.” Jd. at 9. However, unlike the
Christian, Jewish, or Druze population of Syria, the
Shia who are threatened by ISIS are at least
somewhat able “to relocate to _ traditional
[government] strongholds.” /d. at 14. It is only the
powerless minority religions who can find no refuge
anywhere in Syria.
The plight of minority religions in Yemen is also
deplorable. For example, the small Jewish
community has endured “continued harassment ... by
the local population, including [] throwing stones and
coercion to convert to Islam. Jewish students
reportedly continued to stay away from public schools
due to social pressures and security concerns.” U.S.
Dep’t of State, Yemen 2015 International Religious
Freedom Report at 6 (2016). The “concerns over
8 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also known as
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or by its name in Arabic,
al—Dawla al—Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, abbreviated as
Daesh. It is the latter name that the State Department uses in
its reports.
fig ae
security and the children’s future” has prompted
“members of the Jewish community [to] depart]
Yemen” and become displaced persons. Id.
Christians in Yemen have seen their spiritual leaders
flee and their churches burned. Jd. Members of the
Bahai faith have been arrested, tortured, and held
without charges for indefinite periods. Jd. at 1, 3—4.
All of these groups, together, comprise less than 1% of
the Yemeni population, and have nowhere within
Yemen to seek protection. Jd. at 2.
Iraq is a home to a number of minority religious
communities, and is also a place where some of the
worst atrocities against the adherents to minority
faiths is taking place. As the United Nations Office of
High Commissioner for Human Rights reports, ISIS
fighters have conducted mass executions of Yazidi
men and teenage boys, while forcing women and
children to watch. U.N. Office of High Comm/’r for
Human Rights, “They Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes
against the Yazidis at 8-9, A/HRC/32/CRP.2 (2016).
The survivors were forcibly converted to Islam. Jd. at
9. Women and girls between the ages of nine and
sixty have been sold into sexual slavery, id. at 9-16,
while women over the age sixty have been summarily
executed. Jd. at 11. Young children have been
routinely beaten, molested, and, in case of males,
conscripted to fight as child soldiers. Jd. at 16-19.
ISIS has attempted to destroy the entire Yazidi
culture through the destruction of temples and
shrines, id. at 19, and forcibly transferring the Yazidi
population out of their ancestral homes. Jd. These
horrors have been visited on the Yazidi community
solely because they are Yazidi. The Sunni Arabs of
the region have not been subjected to the same
treatment at the hands of ISIS. See, e.g., id. at 30 (“No
~ oa
other religious group present in ISIS-controlled areas
of Syria and Iraq has been subjected to the
destruction that the Yazidis have suffered. Arab
villagers who did not flee Sinjar in advance of the ISIS
attack were allowed to remain in their homes, and
were not captured, killed, or enslaved.”).
Nor are the Yazidis the only minority faith that is
facing virtual annihilation in Iraq. For example, Iraqi
Mandaeans’° who until recently numbered between
60,000 and 70,000 are now “facing extinction” as a
result of rehgion—based attacks by ISIS. See Angus
Crawford, Iraq's Mandaeans “Face Extinction,” BBC
(March 4, 2007), available at http://newa.bbe.
co.uk//hi/world/middle east/6G412453.stm. In Iraqi
regions overrun by ISIS, Christians were given “a
choice: They could either convert or pay the jizya, the
head tax levied against all ‘People of the Book’:
Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews. If they refused,
they would be killed, raped or enslaved, their wealth
taken as spoils of war.” Eliza Griswold, Js This the
End of Christianity in the Middle East?, N.Y. Times
Magazine at 31 (July 22, 2015).
Unlike Syria, Yemen and Iraq, Iran is not in the
midst of a civil war. Yet the mistreatment of religious
minorities in Iran is both common and well
documented. The Iranian government has repeatedly
confiscated non—Islamic religious texts, including
Bibles. U.S. Dep’t of State, Jran 2015 International
10 Mandaeans are adherents of Mandaeism, a Gnostic
religion that developed in t e first three centuries of the
Ccmmon Era. See generaily Kurt Rudolph, Madaeism (Brill,
1978).
~~” a
Religious Freedom Report at 13—15 (2016). In 2015,
“Christians, particularly evangelicals and converts,
continued to experience disproportionate levels of
arrests and high levels of harassment and
surveillance,” and are required to register with the
police and are prohibited from holding services on any
day other than Sunday. Jd. at 13. The Bahai
community is particularly hard-hit. They “are
banned from government employment and from all
leadership positions in the military. They are not
allowed to participate in the governmental social
pension system. Bahais cannot receive compensation
for injury or crimes committed against them and
cannot inherit property.” Jd. at 6. The Bahais are
often prosecuted on trumped—up charges, they cannot
assemble, be employed in a number of professions, or
bury their dead in accordance with their customs. Id.
at 9-10, 15, 18-19. Numbering less than one—half of
one percent of the population, the Bahai have no
ability to protect themselves in Iran. Indeed,
“falccording to law, Bahai blood may be spilled with
impunity, and Bahai families are not entitled to
restitution,” whereas “(t]he law authorizes collection
of ‘blood money’ as restitution to families for the death
of Muslims.” Jd. at 2. 7.
Other Middle Eastern states, especially those
where ISIS is active, also present peculiar and
heightened dangers to individuals professing a
minority faith (7.e., Christianity, Bahai, Judaism,
disfavored sects of Islam, and others). Adherents to
minority religions within the region face a
significantly higher risk of violence and death from
both government and non—government actors than do
followers of the majority religion. See Griswold, End
of Christianity, supra.
i =
B. Proving Individualized Persecution on the
Basis of Religion is Often Quite Hard, Even for
Members of Minority Religions
While discrimination against members of minority
faiths writ large is a common occurrence in certain
regions, it does not mean that every adherent of that
faith is personally persecuted.
Some Soviet Jews succeeded despite the obstacles
the government placed in their way. There were
Jewish doctors, lawyers, musicians, chess champions,
etc. See 118 Cong. Rec. 12,941 (Apr. 17, 1972)
(statement of Rep. Halpern).
In Saddam Hussein’s Irag, Deputy Prime Minister
Tariq Aziz was a Chaldean’ Christian,
notwithstanding the regime’s heavy anti-Christian
discrimination—including the ethnic cleansing of
several towns during the Anfal campaign of 1988.
Iran reserves at least three parliamentary seats for
Christians, notwithstanding the Iranian
government’s harassment of Christian churches and
the limitations it places their ability to function. Jran
2015 Report, supra at 5.
In Syria, though the Assad regime has abused and
discriminated against Sunni Muslims, many Sunnis
support the regime in large part because of the
success they have achieved as individuals. See
Michael Pizzi & Nuha Shabaan, Sunnis Fill Rebel
Ranks, but Aise Prop Up Assad_ Regime,
USAToday.com (Aug. 1, 2013).!!
11 This sort of alliance between individual Sunnis and an
anti-Sunni regime reiterates one of the differences between a
targeted minority faith and a targeted majority. A minority
- 18 —
Though evidence of life under ISIS remains
sketchy, it is likely that at least some non—Sunnis
escape individualized discrimination. After all, even
Nazi Germany could point to a Field Marshal with a
Jewish parent—Erhard Milch.!2 See Obituaries,
Erhard Milch, 79, Luftwaffe Chief, N.Y. Times at 32
(Jan. 29, 1972).
Discrimination against a group thus need not
translate into discrimination against every member of
that group. Asylum seekers hoping to avail
themselves of American protection, however, must
show that they have personally “suffered past
persecution or ... ha[ve] a well-founded fear of future
persecution ... on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion” as an individual. 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b); Li Sheng Wu v. Holder, 737 F.3d 829, 832
(lst Cir.2013); Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173,
1178 (9th Cir. 2007); Harchenko v. I.N.S., 379 F.3d
405, 410 (6th Cir. 2004). The burden of proving this
fear rests with the applicant. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a);
I.N.S. v. Cardoza—Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 456 (1987).
In many circumstances then, applicants are
unable to show individualized “past persecution.” Cf.
regime seeking to govern a country where another group
constitutes a significant numeric majority must find many allies
among its majority citizens. Such alliances are far less
imperative for a majority group dominating a minority.
'2 The legal machinations that permitted Milch to escape the
fate of other Jews and to climb the highest rungs of German
military command caused Hermann Goering to famously quip “I
decide who is a Jew.” Reuters, Historian; Jewish Officers Fought
For Nazis, Chicago Trib. at 14 (Apr. 3, 1997).
38
Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding that witnessing the beating of co-
workers is insufficient to establish past persecution);
Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder, 635 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[AJn asylum applicant cannot rely on
“derivative persecution” to establish that he was
subjected to persecution in the past.”).
The “well—founded fear of future persecution”
would be equally difficult to prove if each applicant
were required to show that he personally received
threats of harm “because, ‘an authentic refugee is
often limited in his ability to offer direct corroboration
of specific incidents of persecution.” Shah v. IL.N.S..
220 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mejia-—
Paiz v. I.LN.S., 111 F.3d 720, 722 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997));
see also Ahmadshah v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 917, 920—21
(8th Cir. 2005). For this reason, regulations
implementing the Congressionally—created system
for admitting refugees permits an applicant to carry
the burden by showing that he or she belongs to a
group of persons against whom “there is a pattern or
practice ... of persecution ... on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion” in the applicant's
home country. 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(2)(iii). In other
words, when it comes to discrimination on the basis of
religion, showing that the applicant is an adherent of
a persecuted faith may suffice to qualify for asylum.
Il. Preferences For Persecuted Religious
Minorities Have Long Been Part of the U.S.
Law
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts
have long realized that in many instances it will be
nearly impossible for an asylum seeker to prove
~~
individualized persecution. As a result, Congress has,
on numerous occasions, exhibited particularized
concern for individuals in certain social groups by
providing them with an eased path towards asylum.
The earliest example of such solicitude is the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966, passed in the wake of
Communist takeover of Cuba. Pub. L. No. 89—732, 80
Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(2017)). The revolution caused a number of Cubans to
go into exile. “In order to enhance the resettlement of
refugees, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act
of 1966, providing for employment and education,
opportunities not generally accorded other refugee
groups.” Nicholas Merlin, Immigration Policy and the
Expedited Removal Rule: “Equality for Some, Justice
for None”, 16 St. Thomas L. Rev. 163, 165 (2003).
Recognizing the brutality that Communist dictators
often visited upon opponents (or even suspected
opponents) of the regime, Congress resolved to
provide preferential treatment to Cuban exiles,
without extending the same to asylum seekers from
other parts of the world. See Note, The Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966: sMirando Por Los Ojos De
Don Quijote O Sancho Panza?, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 902,
910 (2001). The courts have uniformly rejected the
numerous challenges to that Act. See Merlin, supra,
at 165; 177-80.
More recently, Congress has created specia!
privileges for additional groups. See, e.g.,
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101—649, § 303
(granting Temporary Protected Status to citizens of
El Salvador). Of particular relevance to the present
case is Congress’ action in 1989, when it enacted what
became known as the “Lautenberg Amendment.”
= BE ax
Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599D, 103 Stat. 1195, 1265
(1989).
A. The Lautenberg Amendment is a Strong
Precedent for Extending Preferential
Treatment to Minority Religions
In the late 1980s, with the loosening of emigration
rules in the Soviet Union, the number of Soviet
citizens (especially Jewish ones) seeking asylum in
the United States rose quickly. H. Rep. No. 101—122,
at 3—4 (1989). Unsurprisingly, the number of cases
lacking material proof of individualized past or future
persecution witnessed a corresponding increase.
Victor Rosenberg, Refugee Status for Soviet Jewish
Immigrants to the United States, 19 Touro L. Rev.
419, 426-28 (2003). Some American officials argued
that a large portion of the Sov’ :t Jewish émigrés were
not “refugees,’ but ‘| ] rather, prospective immigrants,
and as such, they should enter this country according
to the requirements of our own immigration laws.”
Id. at 427 (quoting written testimony of Immigration
and Nationalization Service Commissioner Alan
Nelson).
As a result, the percentage of Soviet Jewish
applicants denied refugee status grew from barely 1%
to a high of 37%. H. Rep. No. 101-122, at 5. At the
same time, the discriminatory policies of the Soviet
government, see Part 1.A.1, ante, continued. H. Rep.
No. 101—122, at 3.
Congress responded to this dilemma by passing
legislation giving preferential treatment to Soviet
citizens belonging to several minority religions. Pub.
L. No. 101—167, § 599D, 103 Stat. 1265. The
Lautenberg Amendment (named after its chief
sponsor, Sen. Frank Lautenberg) lowered the burden
ml ke
of proof required to obtain asylum for Soviet Jews,
Evangelical Christians, Ukrainian Catholics, and
Ukrainian Orthodox. Jd. Followers of these minority
religions no longer had to prove a “well—founded fear
of persecution,” but merely to “assert[ ] such a fear
and assert[{] a credible basis for concern about the
possibility of such persecution.” Jd. § 599D(b)(2)(A-—
B). Other Soviet citizens did not receive the same
preferential status.!3
The legislative history of this provision explains
why Congress felt it necessary to treat adherents of
some religions differently from others. For instance,
presaging the passage of the Amendment, a majority
of U.S. Senators urged the Administration to classify
“all Soviet Jews as refugees,” because of “the history
of anti-Semitism in Russia and the Soviet Union.”
Rosenberg, supra at 432. The House Judiciary
Committee report accompanying one of the bills that
eventually became the Lautenberg Amendment noted
that although “[tj]he Soviet state has always
maintained a _ hostile stance toward religion,”
including the Russian Orthodoxy, “Soviet Jews and
Evangelicals” were subject to particular hardships.
H. Rep. 101-122, at 5. At the same time, the report
recognized that the “United States does not have the
capacity to accept all Soviet citizens who wish to
emigrate....”. Jd. Given the limited capacity, the
Committee believed that groups subject to particular
hardships should be prioritized. Jd. Recognizing the
tenuous status of Soviet reforms and the precarious
‘8 The Lautenberg Amendment also offered the same status
to certain categories of the citizens Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599D(b)(2)(C).
i.
position of the minority religions, Congress ultimately
passed the Act, though it acknowledged that there
had been “tremendous improvement in terms of
religious practices in the Jewish community as well
as Jewish emigration patterns; Jand) in terms of
Baptists and Evangelicals being allowed to establish
their own seminary and publish their own literature,”
as well other religious practices. See 135 Cong. Rec.
H3735 (July 13, 1989)(statement of Rep. Henry). In
doing so, Congress explicitly rejected the argument
raised by the opponents of the bill that the approach
violates the “fundamental principle of treating all
immigrants equally.” Jd. (statement of Rep. Smith).
In keeping with the original purpose of aiding
particularly vulnerable religious minorities, the
Lautenberg Amendment’s coverage has expanded
since it was passed. In 2004, Congress extended it to
include religious minorities in Iran. Pub. L. No. 108—
199, § 213(1)(C), 118 Stat. 3, 253 (2004).
B. The Executive Branch is Statutorily Required
to and has been Prioritizing Certain Groups of
Potential Refugees for Decades
Even though, unlike the Lautenberg Amendment,
Section 5(c) of the EO—1 was not enacted by Congress,
it stands on equally strong footing. As an initial
matter, INA § 207(a)(3) directs the President to
allocate the admission slots “among refugees of
special humanitarian concern to the United States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3). This direction necessarily
means that while there may be individuals who are
eligible for refugee status, they may not receive a visa
because they are not of “special humanitarian
concern.”
a
The Department of Homeland Security has
followed that Congressional direction by establishing
three separate priority tiers for the admission of
refugees. The first order priority is reserved for
individualized cases and is available for “persons ...
with compelling protection needs, for whom
resettlement appears to be the appropriate durable
solution.” U.S. Dep't of State, Proposed Refugee
Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, at 7 (2016) (“FY 2017
Admissions”). The second order priority is given to a
particular group of people based on “whether the group
is of special humanitarian concern to the United States
and whether individual members of the group will
likely be able to qualify for admission as refugees
under U.S. law.” Jd. at 8. As required by INA § 207(d)
and 8 U.S.C. § 1157(d), these designations are updated
on a yearly basis. /d. at 1. Furthermore, new “[g]roups
may be designated as Priority 2 during the course of
the year as circumstances dictate, and the need for
resettlement arises.” Jd. at 8. Currently, this category
includes, inter alia, beneficiaries of the Lautenberg
Amendment with close family in the United States,
members of persecuted religious minorities from Cuba
and Iran, certain categories of ethnic minorities from
Burma, Bhutanese living in Nepal, and Congolese
living in Rwanda. ZJd. at 9-11.!4 The designation of
other religious minorities for priority treatment is
consistent with the requirements of INA § 207 and
historical practice of the Executive Branch.
‘4 The third priority tier is reserved for “to members of
designated nationalities who have immediate family members in
the United States who initially entered as refugees or were
granted asylum.” FY 2017 Admissions, supra, at 12. Currently,
22 nationalities are eligible for this tier. Jd. at 14.
wo enw
Ill. Preferencing Adherents of Particular
Religions in the Context of the Refugee
Program Does Not Constitute Invidious
Discrimination Against Other Religions
The Respondents have argued that giving
preference in refugee admissions to the adherents of
minority religions impermissibly “tilt[s] the scales in
favor of Christian refugees at the expense of
Muslims.” Motion for TRO, at 12, Washington v.
Trump, No. 17—141 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017), ECF,
3. According to the Respondents, this violates the
Establishment Clause because “one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.” Jd. at 11 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244 (1982)). Such an approach is contrary
to history and inconsistent with the principles
underlying longstanding American refugee policy.
The United States refugee policy is based on
several principles. First, individuals are eligible for
asylum only if they are persecuted “on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42). Though other individuals may be in dire
straits because of war or natura] disasters in their
home country, as a matter of law they do not qualify
for the refugee status.!®
15 Individuals who experience threats to personal safety as
a result of an armed conflict or natural disaster may be
eligible to obtain Temporary Protected Person status (“TPS”).
See 8 U.S.C. § 244. Currentiy, 10 countries are designated for
TPS: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. See
hitps://www users. gov/humanitarian/eyporsrey—-prerected—status.
=
The second principle recognizes that the United
States cannot admit all those who would otherwise
qualify for asylum. Congress has thus required the
President to set an annual limit on the number of
refugee admissions. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2). That limit
is consistently set far below the number of people who
could potentially qualify for refugee status. For
example, the current conflict in Syria alone has
produced over 6 million displaced persons.'®
Undoubtedly, many of these individuals fled Syria
because of the dangers of war, rather than
persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” Nonetheless, even if only 5% of the total
number fled because of persecution, that number of
individuals would be nearly three times the entire
Fiscal Year 2017 refugee limit.'? See FY 2017
Admission, supra at 5.
'6 According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
“there are at least 10 million people worldwide who are not
recognized as nationals of any state and are therefore stateless.”
FY 2017 Admissions, supra, at 2. Because of their status, these
individuals are deprived of basic civil rights including ability to
“access police protection and systems of justice.” Jd. Many of
these individuals could qualify for asylum in the US, id.:
however, the United States cannot possibly admit all of these
individuals.
‘7 The FY 2017 limit itself is the highest annual limit in over
20 years, see Department of State, Office of Admissions—
Refugee Processing Center, Refugee Admissions by Region
Fiscal Year 1975 through 30-Jun-2017, available at
JAwwew wa psnet.org/s/Granh—Refuvee—Ad missions—since—
19 7 5 7 317 Xs.
~ 97 —
The third principle follows directly from the
second. Recognizing that the United States cannot
absorb all of the world’s refugees, Congress has
directed the President to allocate the admission
slots “among refugees of special humanitarian
concern to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1157(a)(3)(emphasis added). Something is special
only when it is “[dJjistinguished by some unusual
quality.” Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language 2186 (3d
ed.1961) (1986 rptg.); see also 1756, Inc. v. Attorney
General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14 (D.D.C. 1990) (“An item
is special only in the sense that it is not
ordinary...”); United States v. Vasquez, 279 F.3d 77,
81 (1st Cir. 2002)(recognizing that “special” is a
synonym of “unusual or atypical.”). All persecuted
individuals in the world certainly deserve sympathy
and, where possible, help. But not every such
individual is of “special” or “unusual” humanitarian
concern to the United States. A construction that
established a single level of concern applicable to all
persecuted persons would impermissibly “rob the
term ‘[special’] of its independent and ordinary
significance,” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
338-39 (1979). Because courts “are obliged to give
effect, if possible, to every word Congress used,”
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009)
(quoting id. at 339), such a construction would be
erroneous.
These three principles, which together form the
basis of U.S. refugee policy, emphasize the need to
choose whom to admit. Because choosing people who
are particularly vulnerable to persecution because of
their status as a religious minority is consistent with
America’s core principles and history, it has been
Tae os
American policy for decades. President Trump’s
Executive Orders simply continue and reiterate that
policy.
Respondent’s complaint that Section 45(b), which
operates worldwide, see EO-2, § 1(b)(iv), favors
Christians “at the expense of Muslims” makes sense
only if the majority of the world’s refugees arrive
fleeing Muslim-majority countries.'* As a matter of
simple math, the principle of favoring targeted
minority faiths can work against Muslims only if
Muslims are responsible for the majority of the
discriminatory targeting.
The logic driving Respondents’ argument is thus
disturbing on two points. First, Respondents simply
presume the disproportionate culpability of Muslims
in creating the world’s refugees. Second, Respondents
argue that the Establishment Clause prohibits
American immigration policy from preferencing
people facing discrimination if and only if the
discrimination is rooted in religion. We share neither
Respondents’ dismal opinion of Muslims nor their
‘8 While Muslims from the Middle East may be
disadvantaged, Muslims fleeing most countries in Europe, East
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, or the Americas would be
preferenced. See EO-2, § 1(b)(iv). Furthermore, § 5(b) does not
preclude the recognition that there are different strains within
Islam and that, for example, [ranian Sunni Muslims or Saudi
Arabian Shia Muslims, each being a minority within their
respective countries, may benefit from preferences for minority
religions. Jd. Furthermore, even if EO-1’s § 5(b) were limited to
the Middle East, and even if it treated Islam as a uniform whole,
the Respondents are incorrect in their assertion that the
minority preference provision benefits only Christians. The
Bahai, Yazidis, Jews, and other minority faiths would reap the
same benefits.
—
inverted reading of the First Amendment. Cf. Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.
Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017) (“Free Exercise Clause did
guard against the government's imposition of ‘special
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status.” (quoting Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872,877 (1990)).
Furthermore, Respondents have not differentiated
between the preferences at play here and those in the
Lautenberg Amendment, special policies that give
preferences to Cuban refugees, or any other group
that currently receives preferences in refugee
processing. Preferences do not automatically
incorporate invidious discrimination. Rather, they
indicate an American government offering refuge to
the people it has determined need it most (without
disregarding the very rea! suffering of others).
Because adherents of minority faiths are least likely
(at least among those claiming persecution on the
basis of religion) to be in a position to protect
themselves, prioritizing their applications over others
is not only entirely consistent with the Constitution,
the statutory language, and historical practice, it is
indeed the only way to allocate the available refugee
slots on the basis of relative need. The only
alternative would be some form of lottery among those
who qualify for asylum, thus giving everyone an equal
chance at a refugee visa. Such a luck-based approach
would ignore the Congressional edict that
“{aJdmissions [of refugees] shall be allocated among
refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
- 30 —
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3).'9 In addition,
Congress explicitly rejected such an approach during
the debates leading to the Lautenberg Amendment.
See Part II.A, ante.
Finally, while it is true that not every adherent of
a minority faith always has higher risk of persecution
than every follower of a majority religion, and
therefore preferences to the former group may well be
over—inclusive, Congress is not required to create a
perfect system for. prioritizing immigration
applications. See United States v. Flores—Villar, 536
F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008), affd, 564 U.S. 210
(2011) and abrogated on other grounds by Sessions v.
Morales—Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (holding
that “in light of the virtually plenary power that
Congress has to legislate in the area of immigration
19 It is ironic that in the days immediately following
President Trump’s issuance of EO-1, numerous press reports
drew upon the experience of the MS St. Louis. The 900
passengers on that ship were Jews fleeing Nazi Germany in
1939-—-shortly before the outbreak of the second World War.
Because of immigration quotas then in place, the U.S. rejected
their petitions for admission, and returned them all to Europe.
Nearly all contemporary commentators view FDR’s decision in
this matter as a tragic error—almost certainly employing
hindsight bias about the genocide awaiting their return. Yet
under the standard that Respondents urge, the passengers of the
St. Louis would have qualified merely as German citizens
complaining about the regime then running their country—not
Jews fleeing an imminent campaign of extermination.
as//iwww.th nrc con/palitics/archive/201 7/O1/jewish-
refugees-in-the- nalb14742/
https: Ihererer. washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/201 7/01
/29/a-ship-full-of-refugees-fleeing-the-nazis-once-begged-the-u-
s-for-entry-they-were-turned-back/?utm_term=.5dd72530bfa6 .
and citizenship” its classifications survive judicial
review even when “the fit is not perfect.”).
It is well settled that “in the exercise of its broad
power over immigration and _ naturalization,
‘Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). Courts “uphold[] immigration
statutes so long as they are ‘conceivably related to the
achievement of a federal interest.” Bangura ov.
Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Almario v. Attorney General, 872 F.2d 147, 152 (6th
Cir, 1989)). Thus, although in a given year,
preferencing adherents of minority religions may
come “at the expense of Muslims,” “[t]hose are ... the
consequences of the congressional decision not to
accord preferential status to this particular class of
aliens,” a “decision [that] remains ... ‘solely for the
responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the
power of this Court to control.” Fiallo, 430 U.S. at
788-89 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Congress gave the President the authority to
designate particular groups as being of “special
humanitarian concern” to the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157(a)(3). Bestowing this status on adherents of
minority faiths is both reasonable and consistent with
long-standing practices. The Court should not stray
from precedent. The Court should allow the politica!
branches to determine which groups are most in need
of American protection. Indeed, the Appellants can
cite no case from any court holding that religion—
based preferences in any immigration context violate
the Establishment Clause.
—
IV.Holding that Religious Preferences in the
Context of the Refugee Program Violate the
Establishment Clause Will Result in Further
Endangering the Most Vulnerable Groups
A decision holding that the Constitution prohibits
preferencing adherents of minority religions in the
asylum context would be worse than merely contrary
to this Court’s own precedents and decades of
Congressional and Executive Branch practice. It
would further endanger the very individuals most in
need of American protection.
It does not diminish the plight of millions of
displaced persons throughout the world to
acknowledge that the adherents of minority religious
faiths often have nowhere to go in their home
countries. In the Middle East, most Sunni and Shia
Muslims can find at least some semblance of
protection in certain parts of their home countries.
Adherents of minority faiths often cannot.2° Whereas
Syria, lraq, and numerous other countries in the
Middle East and North Africa have both majority—
Sunni and majority-Shia areas and cities, the
region’s many other faiths have no such sanctuaries.
Jews have been all—but—eliminated from every
country in the region, and consolidated into Israel.
Christian majority areas exist only in Lebanon, and
to a far smaller extent, Egypt. The Bahai, Yazidis,
and numerous smaller religions are majorities
nowhere. See Part I.A.2, ante.
20 In some cases, if internal relocation is feasible, the applicant
may be denied asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(b).
33
The sad but fundamental truth is that the United
States cannot accept every refugee seeking admission
and cannot save every person in need of saving. Hard
and heart-wrenching choices need to be made.
Everyone appears to be in agreement that, given a
ceiling on the number of refugee admissions, the
process is in essence a “zero-sum game,” in which the
grant of asylum to one person means someone else
eligible for the same status will not get it. By calling
into question preferential treatment for the adherents
of minority faiths, all the Court will do is substitute
its own choices for those of Congress and the
Executive Branch. Withdrawing these preferences
will not allow more people to enter the United States.
It will simply redistribute the probability of
admission from some people and groups to others.
Worse still, though the availability of asylum is a
“zero-sum game,” the effect of it is not. For instance:
granting a refugee visa to someone who is not
persecuted denies that slot to someone who is
persecuted. The number of refugees admitted does
not change, but admitting an unqualified person
condemns the qualified one whose slot was given
away to continued privations and possibly even death
at the hands of his oppressors. This outcome would
undermine “the historic policy of the United States to
respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to
persecution in their homelands,” Pub. L. No. 96-102,
§ 10l(a). Far from creating an idea] world where
neither of these two hypothetical individuals is
oppressed (one because he was never persecuted and
the other because he received asylum), it would create
a world where the persecuted individuals remain
persecuted. The Constitution cannot possibly compel
such an outcome.
aw
Such a hypothetical misallocation of an asylum
slot to a fully unqualified applicant is, concededly, a
straw man. Amici do not dispute that many members
of majority faiths in refugee camps qualify for asylum.
Nonetheless, some qualified people face graver
danger than others merely because of who they are or
how they worship. The United States should remain
free to recognize the different levels of danger, and
prioritize the extension of its protection to those it has
determined are most vulnerable. Denying the
Government the opportunity to preferentially protect
those who are the least likely to obtain protection in
their home countries solely because of how they
commune with their Creator would greatly increase
the risk of harm to these individuals. The Court
should not consign them to this unenviable fate.
CONCLUSION
Individuals forced to flee their countries and seek
asylum in an unknown land are some of the most
vulnerable people in the world. Regrettably, the
United States cannot accept every refugee in the
world (nor can any other country). Because there are
significantly more refugees in the world than can be
admitted to the United States, the U.S. Government
must decide which qualified individuals to admit.
Some of the people seeking refuge in this country are
particularly susceptible to, and defenseless in the face
of, persecution and discrimination in their countries
of origin. Members of religious minorities fall into
that group far too often.
—
In determining the validity of the President's
Executive Orders, the Court should be careful to avoid
making it more difficult for the United States to
protect religious minorities, lest it make the world
even more inhospitable to those who are already most
vulnerable.
Respectfully submitted,
August 22, 2017 /s/ Bruce D. Abramson
Bruce D. Abramson
Counsel of Record
Gregory Dolin
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE
SCHOOL OF LAW
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 22101
(410) 837-4610
gdolin@ubalt.edu
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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