Amicus Curiae Brief — Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 52 (2017) (No. 16-1161)

No. 16-1161

Dn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

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BEVERLY R. GILL, et al.,

Appellants,

Vv.

WILLIAM WHITFORD, et al.,

Agpemes.

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On PO from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin

a

BRIEF OF CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING

COMMISSION AND FAIRDISTRICTS NOw, INC. AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES

.

Benjamin R. Fliegel

REED SMITH LLP

355 S. Grand Avenue

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 457-8000

bfliegel@reedsmith.com

Brian A. Sutherland

Counsel of Record

REED SMITH LLP

101 2nd Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 543-8700

September 5, 2017 bsutherland@reedsmith.com

Table of Contents

Page

Interest of Amici Curiae................. Saliba asiauscaaaiaasiialasumaesinnaie 1

Summary of Argument........... Gubbeleaddacn sd saki diletaane tudes 2

ERAT AIRE Sele PSE Se AR OED asapaainid Aatahaacivesinian 3

I. Amici Curiae’s Experiences Show That

Neutral Decision-Makers Can Implement

Non-Partisan Standards for Drawing

BROCtOral DIBETICES...............cccccccreccccesccees Nearer 3

A. California’s Citizens Redistricting

Nee abreast 4

3 California’s Standards for

Drawing Electoral Districts ........5

2. California’s Experience ............... 6

B. FairDistricts Now, Inc. ................c.ce00000 i)

1. Florida’s Standards for

Drawing Electoral Districts ...... 10

2. Florida’s Experience.................. 10

LI. Upon a Finding That a Redistricting Plan

Violates Voters’ Rights Through Partisan

Gerrymandering, Neutral Redistricting

Standards Are a Permissible Remedy ........... 14

CINE on ceccccceccses ot ee Lay ahs RO de Thea a 16

i

Table of Authorities

Cases

Brown v. Secretary of State,

668 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2012).............

Davis v. Bandemer,

478 U.S. 109 (1986) ...ccccccccccccseceeeeeeeeseees

In re Senate Joint Resolution of

Legislative Apportionment 1176,

83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012)..........cccccceeees ,

League of United Latin American

Citizens v. Perry,

Ee ie ID vcesccccesssccesesoceesossvores

League of Women Voters of Florida v.

Florida House of Representatives,

132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013).....................

League of Women Voters of Florida v.

Detzner,

172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015)...

League of Women Voters of Florida v.

Detzner,

179 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2015)................0000

Radanovich v. Bowen,

No. 11-cv-09786 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9,

PE Adetiniedacusipecinensssentideveednsisabeiesvubececes

Page(s)

iil

Vandermost v. Bowen,

_ fA FY. . | ewes 4, 5, 6, 8

Vieth v. Jubelirer,

oR it Bf RRP 1, 14, 15

Constitutions and Statutes

ees Fe Ue OS | Se er 4, 5, 6

Cal. Gov't Code $6 GBB1 66 6007. ....0.cccocscccccesececssscccssssees 5

Cal, Gaw't Cardin © iB ccecccccoseccstenciseenssssugapeseniniannnan 5

Cah, Gev't Carte © GIBB, cscccvccccscssssscsseasercsoniatbasmnenanianne 6

yy Be Fe! re 11

Wem. Comet. G6: Tile BD BP cevecsceccssctesetecesrechuenianal 9,10

2 ee. UY US) ere 9,10

Other Authorities

Barry Edwards et al., Jnstitutional

Control of Redistricting and the

Geography of Representation, 79

B. FORD Fe IG UP ccvesntisdctidecicstsastaaae 8

Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm,

California’s New Electoral Reforms:

The Fall Election (Nov. 2012),

ORE OP IIEED ccsesvescsssseserssestestecsansentenuaen 8-9

iv

Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden,

Cutting Through the Thicket:

Redistricting Simulations and the

Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders,

14 Election L.J. 331 (2015) ..............2.-000000-0-0-ssee0s

Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona

and Anti-Reform, 2015 University of

Chicago Legal Forum 477 (2015).................

Raphael J. Sonenshein, When the People

Draw the Lines (League of Women

Voters of Cal. 2012),

|). ae

Viadimir Kogan & Eric McGhee,

Redistricting California: An

Evaluation of the Citizens

Commission Final Plans, 4 Cal. J.

Politics & Policy 1 (2012) .............-.0....002c2 000

15

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!

Since this Court issued its decision in Vieth v.

Jubelirer, the States of California and Florida, which

together account for more than one sixth of the

population of the United States, have amended their

state constitutions to prohibit partisan

gerrymandering. California granted authority to an

independent commission to draw district boundaries

while Florida entrusted its Legislature with that

task. The citizens of both States enacted a

constitutional rule that districts may not be drawn

for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring political

parties. A fundamental premise underlying this rule

is that neutral decision-makers are able to apply it,

in the case of line drawers, or enforce it, in the case of

courts, in a non-partisan manner.

The mission of California’s Citizens Redistricting

Commission and FairDistricts Now, Inc. is to ensure

that electoral districts are drawn in a non-partisan

manner in California and Florida, respectively. Amici

curiae have a strong interest in the outcome of this

case because public confidence in their work depends

on the proposition that rules requiring non-partisan

redistricting can be respected and applied. If this

Court were to conclude that no neutral principles for

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici curiae state that no

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part and that no person other than amici and their

counsel made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission. The parties’ letters

consenting to the filing of amicus curiae briefs have

been filed with the Clerk’s office.

2

drawing electoral boundaries’ exist—that the

redistricting process raises little besides “political

questions”—that conclusion might undercut amici

curiae’s institutional mission. Accordingly, while

amici curiae take no position on the ultimate outcome

of this case, they urge the Court to conclude that

neutral arbiters, including commissions and courts,

can implement redistricting standards in a non-

partisan manner, thereby protecting’ voters’

constitutional rights.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Neutral, non-partisan principles for drawing

electoral boundaries exist. They can be found in the

constitutions of the States of California and Florida,

which expressly prohibit line-drawing for the purpose

of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent or

political party. Instead, in these States, map drawers

must follow traditional redistricting principles such

as contiguity, compactness, and respect for existing

political boundaries. In the experience of amici

curiae, when those who prepare an apportionment

plan seek to avoid partisan considerations, they can

produce a plan that is free from invidious

discrimination based on voters’ political views and

associations.

The decisions of California and Florida voters to

amend their state constitutions to prohibit partisan

gerrymandering strongly suggest that these voters

concluded that, absent legal constraints, redistricting

to favor or disfavor political parties poses a serious

risk of burdening voters’ rights. Amici curiae do not,

however, propose a standard for determining

3

whether a State’s redistricting plan imposes an

unconstitutional burden. Their limited aim is to

assist the Court by providing assurance that neutral

decision-makers proceeding in good faith can apply

redistricting principles in a non-partisan manner.

Thus, while a federal court should intervene in

the States’ redistricting processes only as a last

resort, if it finds that a State’s redistricting plan

violates voters’ constitutional rights, it may provide

redress appropriate to that injury: a plan drawn

without discriminatory partisan intent, using

traditional redistricting principles.

ARGUMENT

I. Amici Curiae’s Experiences Show That

Neutral Decision-Makers Can Implement

Non-Partisan Standards for Drawing

Electoral Districts

The constitutions of California and Florida

prohibit the drawing of electoral maps with an intent

to favor or disfavor a political party. These rules

matter. Amici curiae’s experiences demonstrate that

while applying mandatory redistricting criteria in a

non-partisan manner is not a simple task, neutral

decision-makers can create apportionment plans in

accordance with applicable law and _ without

discriminating against voters based on their political

views or associations.

4

A. California’s Citizens Redistricting

Commission

In 2008 and 2010, California voters exercised

their legislative initiative authority to approve ballot

propositions 11 and 20, respectively, which amended

their state constitution and statutes. As amended,

California’s constitution establishes an independent

commission—the Citizens Redistricting Commission

(“CRC”)}—to draw state legislative districts and

congressional districts. See Vandermost v. Bowen,

269 P.3d 446, 455 (Cal. 2012).

California’s constitution provides that the CRC

shall have fourteen members, composed of five

members of the State’s largest political party

(Democratic), five members of the next largest

political party (Republican), and four members from

neither of these parties. Cal. Const. art. XXI,

§ 2(c)(2). To approve a district map, at least three

members from each of the three groups (i.e., the two

largest political parties in California based on

registration and three votes from members who are

not registered with either of these two political

parties) must vote in favor of it. See id. § 2(c)(5).

California law imposes numerous requirements

designed to prevent political partisans from

“hacking” or infiltrating the Commission. California

citizens may apply to serve as commissioners. To be

eligible, the applicant must have voted in two out of

the last three statewide elections and must have

been registered to vote as a member of the same

political party, or unaffiliated with any party, for the

last five years. Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3). In

5

addition, an applicant is disqualified if, during the

ten years prior to applying, he or she or an

immediate family member was elected or appointed

to or a candidate for state office; or an employee or

consultant to a political party, campaign, or

legislative body; or a registered lobbyist; or a

contributor of $2,000 or more to a congressional,

state, or local campaign. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8252(a)(2).

These requirements guard against partisan attempts

to conceal party affiliation.

An applicant review panel consisting of one

Democrat, one Republican, and one non-partisan

member screens applicants to reduce the pool to sixty

individuals. Certain designated legislative leaders

may thereafter strike, collectively, up to 24 members

of the pool. Three Democrats, three Republicans, and

two from neither party are then chosen by lottery,

and these eight select the remaining six to form the

full fourteen-member CRC. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8252.

1. California’s Standards for

Drawing Electoral Districts

The stated purpose of the ballot proposition

creating the CRC was to “draw districts based on

strict, nonpartisan rules designed to ensure fair

representation.” Prop. 11, as approved by voters,

General Election (Nov. 4, 2008), § 2(d),

https://goo.gl/b6TiJW. As California’s constitution

declares, the CRC is designed to be “independent

from legislative influence ....” Cal. Const. art. XXI,

§ 2(c)(1); see id. § 2(c)(2); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 8251 et

seq.; Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 455-56.

6

California’s constitution provides that “[d]istricts

shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or

discriminating against an incumbent, political

candidate, or political party.” Cal. Const. art. XXI,

§ 2(e). On the flip side of the same coin, producing

competitive elections or partisan symmetry is not a

permissible CRC goal. Instead, the CRC must apply

non-partisan criteria in drawing electoral districts,

including compliance with the United States

Constitution and Voting Rights Act, geographic

contiguity and compactness, and respect for existing

municipal and county boundaries. See id. § 2(d);

Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 457-58. The CRC must

consider the geographic integrit of any local

“community of interest,” exc that such

communities shall not include any relationship with

political parties, incumbents, or candidates. Cal.

Const. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).

The CRC’s redistricting process is open to public

review and comment. Cal. Const. art. XX1, § 2(b)(1).

The CRC engages in outreach seeking to increase

public participation in the process. With limited

exceptions, CRC records are public and available for

inspection, and all proposed maps must be publicly

displayed and available for public comment before

final adoption by the CRC. Cal. Govt Code

§ 8253(a)(7); see also Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 484

(describing the process as “open, transparent and

nonpartisan”).

2. California’s Experience

The process to select the fourteen members of the

CRC took two years to complete. The applicant

7

review panel initially received 36,000 applications. It

required potential candidates to submit a

supplemental application that included ' essay

questions, reference letters, and financial disclosure

statements. [t received and reviewed more than

4,000 supplemental applications, which it narrowed

down to 120 candidates who were invited to

interviews with the panel and legal counsel. After

interviews, the panel reduced the pool to 60

candidates and the Legislature exercised its right to

strike 24 of them. Eight were selected by lottery and

those eight chose the remaining six. This lengthy

selection process produced a commission that reflects

California’s diversity and is well-qualified to handle

its assigned constitutional role.

The two-year selection process was, of course, only

the beginning. The CRC held 34 public hearings in 32

cities throughout California, during which more than

2,700 speakers provided comments. More than

20,000 individuals and groups submitted written

comments or proposed maps. The CRC and its

committees conducted more than 70 meetings that

were open to the public, live-streamed over the

Internet, recorded, and transcribed. Although the

CRC gathered and processed more information and

public input than expected, it published its final

maps on schedule, approving the state maps by a

vote of 13-1 and the congressional map by a vote of

12-2.

The CRC’s final Senate and congressional maps

were the subject of legal challenges in the California

Supreme Court and federal district court. The courts

rejected these challenges to the CRC’s maps. See

8

Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 484; Radanovich v. Bowen,

No. 11-cv-09786 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2012) (ECF No.

15).

Scholars who have studied the CRC’s maps have

concluded that the CRC succeeded in adhering to

constitutionally-mandated redistricting standards.

Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting

California: An Evaluation of the Citizens Commission

Final Plans, 4 Cal. J. Politics & Policy 1 (2012); see

also Barry Edwards et al., Institutional Control of

Redistricting and the Geography of Representation,

79 J. Politics 722, 724-25 (2017). Kogan and McGhee

found that the CRC drew compact districts, respected

municipal and county boundaries, and succeeded in

“nesting” Assembly districts within Senate districts—

all while complying with the Voting Rights Act. See 4

Cal. J. Politics & Policy at 5-16. A contemporaneous

opinion poll found that of those members of the

public who were aware of the CRC’s work, those who

approved of it outweighed those who did not by a

margin of nearly two to one. Raphael J. Sonenshein,

When the People Draw the Lines, at 71 (League of

Women Voters of Cal. 2012), https://goo.gl/ER4RixX.

Although increasing the competitiveness of

electoral districts was not a permissible CRC goal, it

may not be surprising that increased competition can

be a byproduct of following rules that require the

line-drawing entity to disregard incumbency and

partisan advantage. And observers have found that

California districts became more competitive under

the CRC’s non-partisan plans, i.e., the CRC’s districts

included more open seats and closer races as

compared with prior election years. See Eric McGhee

9

& Daniel Krimm, California’s New Electoral Reforms:

The Fall Election (Nov. 2012), https://goo.gl//Whm3iS.

These observations are congruent with studies

showing a statistically significant relationship

between commission redistricting and one measure of

partisan symmetry—the efficiency gap. See Nicholas

O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015

University of Chicago Legal Forum 477, 496-500

(2015).

In sum, although the CRC does not claim to have

produced district maps that are immune from

critique, it has discharged its constitutional and

statutory duties to draw districts in accordance with

the specified criteria and without a purpose to favor

or disfavor any political party, incumbent, or

candidate.

B. FairDistricts Now, Inc.

In 2010, Florida voters approved Amendments 5

and 6, known as the “Fair Districts” amendments,

which are codified as sections 20 and 21 of article [II

of the Florida constitution. League of Women Voters

of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d

135, 189 & n.1 (Fla. 2013). The Fair Districts

amendments did not transfer authority to draw

districts from the Legislature to an independent

commission. Instead, Florida voters enacted

redistricting rules for their Legislature to follow.

Amicus FairDistricts Now, Inc. was formed as a

501(c)(3) organization to monitor the redistricting

process, educate the public about redistricting, and, if

necessary, defend and enforce the Fair Districts

amendments in court.

10

1. Florida’s Standards for

Drawing Electoral Districts

Florida’s constitution provides that, in

establishing congressional and legislative district

boundaries, “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall

be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a

political party or an incumbent/[.]” Fla. Const. art. III,

§§ 20(a), 21(a). This provision does not require the

Legislature to create a “fair plan” or competitive

districts; rather, it requires a “neutral” plan drawn

without the constitutionally-prohibited partisan

intent. In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legisiative

Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 643 (Fla. 2012).

Under the Florida constitution, “there is no

acceptable level of improper intent.” Jd. at 617; see

also League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at

138.

The Florida Legislature must apply non-partisan

criteria in drawing electoral districts, including

compliance with federal law, contiguity and

compactness, and respect for existing political and

geographic boundaries. Fla. Const. art. ITI, §§ 20, 21.

Moreover, districts cannot be drawn to deny or

abridge “the equal opportunity of racial or language

minorities to participate in the political process.” Id.

4 Florida’s Experience

In 2012, after the Eleventh Circuit rejected a

litigation challenge to one of the Fair Districts

amendments (Brown v. Secretary of State, 668 F.3d

1271 (11th Cir. 2012)), the Legislature adopted

legislative and congressional districts. As Florida’s

11

constitution required, the Florida Supreme Court

reviewed the Legislature’s districts for the State

House of Representatives and Senate. Fla. Const. art.

Ill, § 16. The Court approved the House plan. It

rejected the Senate plan as unconstitutional and

directed the Legislature to re-draw it. Jn re Senate

Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176,

83 So. 3d at 684-85.

The League of Women Voters of Florida and other

plaintiffs filed separate actions asserting that the

Legislature drew its congressional and Senate

districts with improper intent to disfavor a political

party, thereby discriminating against voters who

associate with that party based on their political

views. The congressional-districts action proceeded to

trial, after which the trial court found that certain

members of the Legislature had secretly collaborated

with partisan consultants to draw maps with an

intent to favor one political party and disfavor

another. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v.

Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 376-77 (Fla. 2015).

The trial court found that, in cooperation and

collaboration with the Legislature, partisan

consultants arranged for intermediaries to submit, as

their own, maps through the public-participation

process that the consultants had drawn. The trial

court found that this undisclosed arrangement—

consultants using shills to submit highly partisan

maps in collusion with the Legislature—“made a

mockery of the Legislature’s proclaimed transparent

and open process redistricting ....” Jd. at 377 (italics

omitted). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed and

remanded for the re-drawing of a remedial map.

12

After the remand, the Legislature failed to agree

on and enact a remedial plan for congressional

districts and the trial court directed the parties to

submit proposed plans to carry out the voters’ intent

in approving the Fair Districts amendments. The

House, Senate, and plaintiffs each submitted

competing plans. Following hearings on the remedial

plans, the trial court recommended that the Florida

Supreme Court approve the plaintiffs’ proposed plan

and the Court adopted that recommendation, ruling

that the plan would be used for the 2016 elections

and congressional elections thereafter until the next

decennial redistricting. League of Women Voters of

Fla. v. Detzner, 179 So. 3d 258, 297-98 (Fla. 2015).

Around the same time, in 2015, the parties to

the Senate-district litigation entered into a

stipulation and consent judgment. The Senate

conceded in the stipulation that the apportionment

plan adopted to establish Senate districts violated

Florida’s prohibition against drawing districts with

intent to favor or disfavor a political party. In

accordance with the consent judgment, the

Legislature convened a special session to re-draw the

Senate districts. Once again, however,’ the

Legislature could not agree on and enact a remedial

plan—this time for the Senate districts. In the

absence of legislatively-enacted plans, the trial court

considered plans submitted by the parties. It selected

plaintiffs’ proposed plan as the one that best

complied with Florida’s constitutional redistricting

standards. The Senate did not appeal that ruling.

The final Senate and congressional districts are

compact, contiguous, and follow recognizable

13

boundary lines. For example, whereas’ the

congressional map from 2002 split 110 cities and 30

counties into more than one district, the remedial

map splits only 13 cities and 18 counties into more

than one district. The enacted 2012 map, which the

Florida Supreme Court invalidated, would have split

more cities and counties into more than one district

than does the remedial map. In addition, typical

measures of district compactness (Reock, Convex-

Hull, Polsby-Popper) indicate that the remedial

map’s districts are more compact, on average, than

the districts from the invalidated 2012 plan.

In 2016, Florida held its first elections using these

final districts. More candidates ran for election to

Congress and the Senate than ever before. And

congressional and legislative elections were more

competitive in 2016, as compared with prior election

years. For instance, Florida rarely saw serious

competition in congressional races before 2016. But

that year saw five close congressional races, each of

which resulted in a change of party for the district—

three districts previously held by Republicans were

won by Democrats and two previously held by

Democrats went to Republicans. While the districts

were not drawn to create partisan symmetry or

competition, it is not surprising to find that districts

drawn without intent to favor incumbents or political

parties have become more competitive.

14

Il. Upona Finding That a Redistricting Plan

Violates Voters’ Rights Through Partisan

Gerrymandering, Neutral Redistricting

Standards Are a Permissible Remedy

The Constitution does not require proportional

representation. League of United Latin American

Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006). But it

does prohibit redistricting plans that infringe voters’

opportunity for equal participation in elections based

on their membership in a political party. Davis v.

Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1986); see also Vieth

vu. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314-16 (2004) (Kennedy,

J., concurring). And no member of this Court has

suggested that a State has a compelling interest in—

or even a rational basis for—drawing districts for the

purpose of entrenching one political party’s hold on

power. The question, then, is whether a State has

indeed burdened voters’ constitutional rights and, if

so, whether courts can provide a remedy without

becoming unduly entangled in political questions. As

noted, amici curiae address the second of these

questions.

Amici curiae can well understand why courts

would and should be reticent to undertake the

“unwelcome obligation” to devise and impose

redistricting plans. League of United Latin American

Citizens, 548 U.S. at 415 (quotation marks omitted).

To say that neutral decision-makers can apply

manageable non-partisan standards is not to say that

partisans will not try to influence proceedings.

Moreover, courts and commissions can offer no

assurance that their application of non-partisan

15

redistricting standards will not lead to a redistricting

plan that benefits one political party over another.

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

In fact, redistricting unavoidably has political

consequences.

None of this is a reason to conclude that federal

courts cannot provide a remedy, as a last resort,

when a state legislature acts with the intent and

effect of burdening voters’ representational rights

because of their political-party affiliation. There is a

world of difference between drawing districts with an

intent to crush one’s political opponents and drawing

districts with an intent to avoid political

considerations. Much depends on whether the

political consequences that flow from a redistricting

plan are “intended or not.” Ibid.; see also Jowei Chen

& Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket:

Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of

Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 Election L.J. 331, 332

(2015) (making a “crucial distinction between

intentional and unintentional asymmetries in the

transformation of votes to seats”). Drawing districts

with an intent to subject one party's voters to

unequal representation is incompatible with

democratic principles, decreases public confidence in

government, and is likely to burden representational

rights, no matter how courts measure that burden.

The converse is true for drawing districts with an

intent to avoid favoring or disfavoring political

parties.

Thus, after a court concludes that a redistricting

plan violates voters’ rights, it need not identify an

alternative remedial plan that is substantively “fair”

16

to all political parties or one that produces partisan

symmetry. Rather, amici curiae respectfully submit,

it should ensure that districts are drawn without

taking political party, incumbency, or candidacy into

account. In amici curiaes experience, while

application of non-partisan redistricting standards

cannot fully eliminate any and all possibility of

partisan influence, neutral decision-makers can

ensure that they do not act with an intent to burden

voters’ representational rights because of their

political party. Rather than engage in a balancing of

political interests, this approach endeavors to avoid

political questions at the remedial stage altogether.

CONCLUSION

The experiences of amici curiae demonstrate that

neutral redistricting is possible and this Court should

refrain from ruling that no neutral redistricting

principles exist or that redistricting is inevitably

tainted by partisanship.

Courts can provide appropriate redress for

injuries caused by a cognizable partisan gerrymander

through rules which disallow the drawing of districts

for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring political

parties.

17

Dated: September 5, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

Benjamin R. Fliegel

REED SMITH LLP

355 S. Grand Avenue

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 457-8000

bfliegel@reedsmith.com

Brian A. Sutherland

Counsel of Record

REED SMITH LLP

101 2nd Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 543-8700

bsutherland@reedsmith.com