Amicus Curiae Brief — Christie v. Natioal Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 464 (2017) (No. 16-476)

Supreme Court brief2017

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

RECORD

‘ AND

BRUEFS

twig coe ett

t+"

OCT 2

Nos. 16-476 and 16-477

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

CHRISTOPHER J. CHRISTIE, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY,

WY AL., PETITIONERS

?),

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCTATIOON, ET AL.

Né&w JERSEKY THOROUGHBRED HORSEMEN’S

ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER

wv.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC: ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUHT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS

Nok. J. PRANC ISCO

Solicitor General

Connsel of Record

CHAD A. READLER

Acting Ansistant Attorney

General

JEFFREY B. WALL

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitors General

HASUTM M, MOOPPAN

Deputy Assistant Attorney

ys ee

BaiaNn H. FLETCHER

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

ScoTr R. MCINTOSH

PETER J. PHIPIS

Attorneys

Depurtinent of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20540-0001

SuprenweCt Briefs usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

2 2017

worl Tho,

! ;

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act

(PASPA), 28 U.S.C. 3701 et seq., makes it unlawful for

States and other governmental entities to “sponsor,

operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by

law or compact,” sports-gambling schemes. 28 U.S.C.

3702(1). PASPA also prohibits private persons from op-

erating sports-gambling schemes pursuant to state law.

28 U.S.C. 3702(2). The question presented is whether

PASPA’s preemption of state laws authorizing sports-

gambling schemes violates the Tenth Amendment.

(T)

——— ee

Interest of the United States

Statement

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. The Professional and Amateur Sports

CE ileliainisncmisscenctenniornictintnetnicmeiasintunentoes

Argument:

I. Section 3702(1)’s preemption of state laws

IT.

Protection Act

B. The 2012 Act and Christie J

C. The present controversy

authorizing sports-gambling schemes does not

violate the Tenth Amendment..................00000000c00000-

A. The Tenth Amendment does not prevent

Congress from preempting state laws that

conflict with federal statutes....................c0000000.

B. Section 3702(1) preempts state laws that

authorize sports-gambling schemes.................

COSTE REE ERE Ree eT Ree eee ORE Rew e ee

SOS SSSE TOES EO HESS TEE EER mE EE EER ROE EEE EER Me REET RR EOE RRR RR ROR ee

eee hh ae ee eee ee eee? |

C. Section 3702(1) does not compel States to enact

or maintain prohibitions on sports gambling

D. Section 3702(1) validly preempts the 2014 Act .... 20

1. The 2014 Act is preempted by Section

3702(1) because it is an “authorization

I ssetecacsanpeschicicinistiseiiiecaerinindaiisiansciesnaneces

2. Preemption of a specific partial repeal or

other amendment is not commandeering

3. Section 3702(1) does not put States to a

binary choice between maintaining total

prohibitions on sports gambling or

PASPA’s remaining provisions are severable

from Section 3702(1)’s prohibition on state laws

authorizing sports-gambling schemes and

independently preempt the 2014 Act....................+.

A. PASPA’s remaining provisions are severable

(III)

— 31

Table of Contents—Continued: Page

B. Section 3702(1)’s prohibition on state laws that

“license” sports-gambling schemes

independently preempts the 2014 Act.................. 34

ala a laenmedbiiapeimatieimmiapenenianien 36

Appendix — Statutory provision,.................:.sssssscssseseesesseeness la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arizona y. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) ................... 13

Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994).................. 18

Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014)..............:ccceeeeeees 23

County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161

EUIIhinceeahsiistoscasieiasbiatcehiitenaindiiddieaianypdanhasnninitinddidensabanabessies 8, 17, 22

Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils,

Sry Was so a ccciidnnenennnnieion’ 16

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.

Raa et ED COR Ee SRA ave CS ER eee 25

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast

Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,

po Ee ee 19

Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Over-

CAE TE, Se Ct Gir Gt tieciecerntitciticenereens 31, 32

Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009)........0:ceereceeereee: 21

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation

Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) ........cc.scccsescsseonees 13, 14, 16, 24, 29

NCAA v. Governor of N..J., 730 F.3d 208

(3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866

SRS Peaseae Se te IE i Eg SRE AEE SPER ee ence ee passim

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) ....... passim

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) .... 11, 12, 18, 27

Riley v Kennedy, 533 U.S. 406 (2008) .........ccccscceceesseneereeeee 25

Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) ............cccccceeeceeeeeee 12, 15

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 138 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) ..........0.0.00-- 25

Cases—Continued: Page

South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) .................... 15

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) ........00.0000000.- 32

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const.:

Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) ...................... » 11,15

Art. VI, Cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)............ 7, 11, 13, 14, 26

I i itipicdisncpinedusettiieibesiecsotaaasassteonsossenniciadnenensiaiads passim

tS REESIE ITER OE TEN ae aac te Ae A 25

ERIS arr A eo lL Oe eed a 25

N.J. Const.:

Sa a hE 3

eae NS EE Se on ee 3, 23

I I de 3, 23

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701

eae hath del ial a aneccictichotennsentensimcteiesventipinisndesaiceiesssccensniibesibantin 18

ETS TOR a ee ee 18

NEARS Ec ee eee Oe 18

Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act,

III sacs cenciteoasecdemmnpbiaibtpandiiontvasiteevunieteeiaesc 2

ne 1 iellidinintndamdinias 18, la

ee I ttiestevtstictocietontanatetiatinanis 2, 8, 28, 29, 32, 35, 2a

ee er Tes ABR eae Sane passim, 2a

| EE A ae ne ee ee Se passim, 2a

Se ctiechesceassnsintceninderbecnienciniinscbinnsimeisiabiaiialasas 2, 29, 2a

Be TI ances ccceiinsicanoniaincncscedintanseictimoncdibieimendens 2, 3a

RT ee eee 3, 3a

I 5s vecocncsidesonccsnesoevecoenverunsennesnns 3, 3a

I ta, SED «sc .1-.icor ccomssenecusansueessoveuincooesonneess 2, 4a

EE ae ee ee 18, 4a

Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 52 U.S.C. 10304

RES ENE ace Sl en 25

I aeseaurhciclid cinch pin eens 13, 16

Statutes—Continued: Page

BE Ty BD veins esetncsiciacteepetneneneaianent <cntceusiibeiemidaal 25

Be UE, GI svc cccsecevtcsvsisucconsscseonsttretnnesinnbiimeeatiies ean 13

Bb CE FA, Fe setierscnssnesiecsescvcistnniisinimnnncpragentpiteadaaaae 24

BB TE Ge osctcetncinsnivtisisesicniintavnstannionnassinel edulis ane 25

BE TFs ee vices cesnccseccssvisnnasscsciisinatemeseaiaiaaeaamaaaa 16

Be UI Bi aire sechsisscinensivsvivsasinivictiiniisanaananpiataaciaitaee anne 15

BE UT FI ctcaccesisecstcsnssensientecensassensdnitecmamcamanaame 15

Be Tes BI caccccescceicsnsosnesicckstiescniecunseniteniniennsionamiamaaanls 15

Se CE TEs, SD ceiterscnsencsinsancinicissseieamansscbinemiugiiaaliemae 13

SR CEG, Bice ctinssentnnsessilciesteseneesienienitaiatmniemamaaaa al 13

Bh TEE BN wisest sctsiccsiomasmmeeae 16

Ti BD aseciiencn scnsenses vistiisiniiinsiuiceaisaasmeicanaaieema 28

Be has RINE enceeeinenesncsiscenstesninnhithintserksemmmsanniagenaiaenae 13

it te: 5 RE eer OE eee 25

0 CEE. BI winceseseienisinrininsiiteeinnmiamemaianiaies 16

GT CA Be xececcncssnsssstssintinnntiiatiimmmsmaamemlecne 25

GD TEA. TD es cncstersinssestevtiininiiecisiciemmnimeeee 13

ge Fog |: | ernment Re ee | 13

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-10-102(2)(d) (2016) ............ceceeseeeeeeeees 28

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1231(a) (2016) .....0........cccsseeeeeeecerseeees 28

2012 Sports Wagering Act, 2011 N.J. Laws 1723-

FTIEEr scosescssensenantonssnientnivionntanisinnasisinintvegiviaiiaanaesiaennaaaaan 3

N.J. Stat. Ann. (West):

Oe Ce vetiitinisccsiccssrenstenpstniecdieieteleniaccnamemaenanes 3

OE I weesitcecsesticccsnrenteveccsioitsiosinstacieniemmmaanamgiaicean 34

Pe FS ) | ak ani 34

Miscellaneous:

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) .............ccceeeees 17, 22

138 Cong. Rec. 33,828 (1992) .......cccsrcsrcsesreecsceeservsesseessececee 20

1 Oaford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ............0ceceeeeee 17

S. 2460, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014).........ccccesseenes 5, 22, 34, 35,

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

S. Rep. No. 248, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.

ESS 2, 3, 14, 15, 20, 33

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 16-476

CHRISTOPHER J. CHRISTIE, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

No. 16-477

NEW JERSEY THOROUGHBRED HORSEMEN’S

ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has a substantial interest in these

cases because they involve a constitutional challenge to

a federal statute. At the Court’s invitation, the Acting

Solicitor General filed an amicus brief on behalf of the

United States at the petition stage.

(1)

STATEMENT

A. The Professional And Amateur Sports Protection Act

In 1992, Congress enacted the Professional and

Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C.

3701 et seq. At the time, States facing budget problems

were “considering a wide variety of State-sponsored

gambling schemes,” including state sports lotteries and

state-authorized private schemes like “casino-style

sports books.” S. Rep. No. 248, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 5

(1991) (Senate Report). Congress concluded that

“State-sanctioned sports gambling wiould] promote

gambling among our Nation’s young people,” and it

sought to halt the spread of sports gambling “sponsored

or authorized by a State.” Jd. at 4, 6.

PASPA imposes separate restrictions on States and

private parties. States and other governmental entities

may not “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license,

or authorize by law or compact” sports-gambling

schemes. 28 U.S.C. 3702(1). Private parties may not

“sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” sports-

gambling schemes “pursuant to the law or compact” of

a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 3702(2). Subject to

limited exceptions, both sets of restrictions apply to any

“lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or

wagering scheme” based on professional or amateur

sports. 28 U.S.C. 3702; see 28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(4).

PASPA is enforceable only through civil suits for de-

claratory or injunctive relief. The Attorney General

may sue to enjoin violations of the statute, and sports

leagues may seek injunctions against violations involv-

ing their games. 28 U.S.C. 3703.

Congress included a grandfathering provision that

exempted a few then-existing state-run sports lotteries,

28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(1), and casino-based sports-gambling

in Nevada, which was “authorized by a [Nevada] stat-

ute” when PASPA was enacted, 28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(2).

See Senate Report 8. Congress also provided an excep-

tion for casino-based sports gambling authorized by

New Jersey within one year of PASPA’s effective date.

28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(3). New Jersey did not avail itself of

that exception. Pet. App. 4a.

B. The 2012 Act And Christie I

1. New Jersey’s constitution generally provides that

“{njo gambling of any kind shall be authorized by the

Legislature unless the specific kind, restrictions and

control thereof” have been approved by voters. Art. IV,

§ 7, Para. 2. The constitution has long included excep-

tions allowing the legislature to “authorize by law” ca-

sino gambling in Atlantic City and betting at racetracks.

Id. Para. 2(D) and (F). Until recently, there was no

comparable exception for sports gambling, and such

gambling was expressly prohibited by statute. Pet.

App. 4a; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:40-1 (West 2010).

In 2011, New Jersey amended its constitution to al-

low the legislature to “authorize by law” sports gam-

bling at casinos and racetracks. N.J. Const. Art. IV,

§ 7, Para. 2(D) and (F). The legislature may not author-

ize gambling on college events held in New Jersey or

involving New Jersey teams. /bid.

After the amendment, the New Jersey Legislature

enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act (2012 Act), 2011

N.J. Laws 1723-1730. The 2012 Act authorized licensed

casinos and racetracks to conduct sports gambling un-

der the regulatory framework governing their other

gambling activities. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730

F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (Christie J, cert. denied, 134

S. Ct. 2866 (2014).

2. The Nation’s principal professional sports leagues

and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, re-

spondents here, filed a suit challenging the 2012 Act

under PASPA. The defendants, who are petitioners

here, included state officials and the New Jersey Thor-

oughbred Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA), a race-

track operator that wished to conduct sports gambling.

Christie I, 730 F.3d at 217.'

Petitioners did not deny that the 2012 Act conflicted

with PASPA by “licens[ing]” or “authorizling] by law”

sports-gambling schemes. 28 U.S.C. 3702(1). Instead,

they argued that Section 3702(1) violated the Tenth

Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule. The district

court rejected that argument and enjoined the 2012 Act.

Christie I, 730 F.3d at 217.

3. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed.

Christie I, 730 F.3d at 226-237. Contrasting PASPA

with statutes that this Court has found to violate the

anti-commandeering rule, the court noted that Section

3702(1) “does not require or coerce the states to lift a

finger” because “they are not required to pass laws,” “to

expend any funds,” or to “enforce federal law.” Jd. at

231. Instead, “PASPA sets forth a prohibition” barring

States from licensing or authorizing sports gambling.

Ibid. The court emphasized that “statutes prohibiting

the states from taking certain actions have never been

struck down” on commandeering grounds. /bid.

The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ contention

that Section 3702(1)’s preemption of state laws “au-

thoriz[ing]” sports-gambling schemes requires States to

' Although there are some differences between petitioners here

and the defendants in Christie J, see Pet. App. 6a n.2, we refer to

both groups as “petitioners” for simplicity.

enact, maintain, or enforce prohibitions on sports gam-

bling. Christie J, 730 F.3d at 232. The court explained

that, under Section 3702(1), “a state may repeal its

sports wagering ban” or “keep a complete ban,” while

“decid[ing] how much of a law enforcement priority it

wants to make of sports gambling, or what the exact con-

tours of the prohibition will be.” /d. at 233.

C. The Present Controversy

1. Three days after this Court declined to review the

Third Circuit’s decision, the New Jersey Legislature

passed a bill purporting to “partially repeal[]” the

State’s prohibitions on sports gambling to the extent

they applied at racetracks and casinos. Pet. App. 83a

(brackets and citation omitted). Governor Christie ve-

toed that bill, calling it “a novel attempt to circumvent

the Third Circuit’s ruling.” J.A. 128, Two months later,

the legislature passed another bill with the same fea-

tures. S. 2460, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014) (2014 Act). Pet.

App. 218a-222a. This time, the Governor signed the bill

into law.

The 2014 Act purports to repeal all New Jersey gam-

bling laws “to the extent they apply” to sports gambling

that meets five conditions: (1) it is conducted “at a ca-

sino or gambling house” in Atlantic City or a “horse

racetrack”; (2) it consists of wagering by persons “situ-

ated at such location”; (3) the persons placing wagers

are over 21; (4) the operator of the casino or racetrack

consents to the scheme; and (5) the scheme does not in-

clude wagers on New Jersey college events. Pet. App.

219a-220a.

2. Respondents sued again, arguing that the 2014

Act conflicts with Section 3702(1) by “licens{ing]” and

“authoriz[ing] by law” sports-gambling schemes. The

district court held that New Jersey had impermissibly

authorized sports gambling and enjoined state officials

from “giving operation or effect” to the 2014 Act. Pet.

App. 113a; see zd. at 76a-113a.

3. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed.

Pet. App. 47a-75a. The court then granted rehearing en

bane and affirmed by a 9-3 vote. /d. at 1a-46a.

a. The en banc court held that the 2014 Act conflicts

with PASPA because it “authorize[s] by law” sports

gambling. Pet. App. 12a-16a. The court explained that

although the 2014 Act is “artfully couched in terms of a

repealer,” it “essentially provides that, notwithstanding

any other prohibition by law, casinos and racetracks

shall hereafter be permitted to have sports gambling.”

Id. at 14a. Focusing on substance rather than form, the

court held that the 2014 Act “is an authorization.” Jbid.

The en banc court acknowledged that some language

in Christie I suggested that, as a categorical matter, “a

repeal cannot constitute an authorization.” Pet. App.

13a (emphasis added). The court rejected that sugges-

tion as “unnecessary dicta.” Jd. at 23a. It explained

that “a state’s decision to selectively remove a prohibi-

tion on sports wagering in a manner that permissively

channels wagering activity to particular locations or op-

erators is, in essence, ‘authorization.’” Jbid. And be-

cause the court held that the 2014 Act impermissibly au-

thorizes sports gambling, it did not address respond-

ents’ alternative argument, also made by the United

States as amicus curiae, that the 2014 Act “license[s]”

sports gambling by permitting it only at facilities li-

censed to conduct other gambling. Jd. at 16a n.7.

The en bane court reaffirmed Christie J’s holding

that PASPA “does not run afoul of anti-commandeering

principles.” Pet. App. 18a. The court explained that

“PASPA does not command states to take affirmative

actions,” such as enacting or maintaining prohibitions

on sports gambling. /d. at 23a. It added that PASPA

does not put States to a “binary choice” between repeal-

ing their prohibitions on sports gambling entirely or re-

taining total bans. /d. at 24a. Instead, “PASPA allows

states to ‘choose among many different potential policies

on sports wagering that do not include licensing or af-

firmative authorization by the State.’” /d. at 23a (brack-

ets and citation omitted).

b. Judge Fuentes, joined by Judge Restrepo, dis-

sented, concluding that the 2014 Act does not conflict

with Section 3702(1). Pet. App. 27a-34a. Judge Vanas-

kie dissented separately, concluding that Section

3702(1) violates the Tenth Amendment. /d. at 35a-46a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Section 3702(1)’s preemption of state laws au-

thorizing sports-gambling schemes does not violate the

Tenth Amendment.

A. Congress may not commandeer the States by re-

quiring them to enact, maintain, or enforce specific fed-

erally prescribed regulations. It may, however, pro-

hibit States from adopting laws that conflict with fed-

eral policy. Those preemptive statutes constrain the

States’ legislative freedom by placing some policies out

of bounds. And if a State transgresses those boundaries

by amending its laws in a manner that is found to be

preempted, state law may revert to its pre-amendment

status until the legislature can act again. But that is not

commandeering; it is the necessary result of the Su-

premacy Clause.

B. When Congress enacted PASPA, many States

were considering state-sanctioned sports gambling as a

solution to their fiscal probleins. Congress responded

by prohibiting States themselves from operating sports-

gambling schemes and prohibiting private parties from

operating such schemes pursuant to state law. As peti-

tioners do not dispute, those direct federal regulations

of activities affecting interstate commerce do not raise

any Tenth Amendment concern. In Section 3702(1),

Congress also preempted state laws that “license” or

“authorize by law” sports-gambling schemes. Like all

preemptive legislation, that prohibition blocks some

States from adopting their favored policies. It is not

commandeering, however, because it does not conscript

the States to enact, maintain, or enforce any particular

laws. States need only refrain from licensing or author-

izing by law sports-gambling schemes.

C. Petitioners’ primary Tenth Amendment chal-

lenge to Section 3702(1) is that it is not a preemption

provision at all. They incorrectly insist that States “au-

thorize by law” sports gambling whenever they fail to

prohibit it, and that Section 3702(1) thus must be con-

strued as “a direct command to States to prohibit sports

betting.” NJTHA Br. 34-35. To the contrary, when Sec-

tion 3702(1) speaks of “authorization by law,” it natu-

rally refers to “affirmative enabling action.” County of

Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 (1981). And

any doubt about the most natural reading of Section

3702(1) would be eliminated by the cardinal principle

that statutes must be construed to avoid, not create,

constitutional problems. Section 3702 would violate the

Tenth Amendment if it commanded the States to enact

or maintain prohibitions on sports gambling. That

problem evaporates if the statute is construed to

preempt state laws that affirmatively authorize sports-

gambling schemes.

D. Section 3702(1) validly preempts the 2014 Act.

New Jersey wishes to do what PASPA prohibits: to au-

thorize sports gambling at its licensed casinos and race-

tracks. Had New Jersey implemented that policy

through a new provision expressly authorizing those fa-

cilities to engage in sports gambling or granting them

an exemption from its gambling laws, there would be

little question that the State had “authorize[d] by law”

sports gambling. The analysis is no different now that

New Jersey has reached the same substantive policy

through a purported “partial repeal.” The 2014 Act is

preempted because it is, in substance, an “author-

iz{ation] by law” of sports-gambling schemes at a hand-

ful of state-licensed facilities. The fact that Section

3702(1) prevents New Jersey from effectuating this

particular “partial repeal” is not commandeering, be-

cause it imposes no greater constraint on the State’s

legislative freedom than any federal statute disabling a

State from adopting its preferred policy. New Jersey is

free to repeal its sports-wagering laws altogether, to

keep them on the books unchanged, or to amend them

in any manner that does not “license” or “authorize by

law” sports-gambling schemes.

Il. Even if Section 3702(1)’s preemption of state

laws authorizing sports-gambling schemes were invalid,

PASPA’s remaining provisions would be severable and

would independently preempt the 2014 Act.

A. New Jersey asserts (Br. 53) that if Section

3702(1)’s prohibition on state laws authorizing sports-

gambling schemes is invalid, PASPA must be “struck

down in its entirety.” That remarkable assertion in-

verts this Court’s approach to severability. There is no

basis for invalidating PASPA’s remaining provisions

because those provisions would remain fully functional

and would continue to serve Congress’s objectives. In-

deed, the statute’s practical effect would be largely un-

changed. Section 3702(1) would still prohibit States

from operating sports-gambling schemes themselves.

And although a state law authorizing private sports-

gambling schemes would not be expressly preempted

by Section 3702(1), Seetion 3702(2) would still prohibit

any private party from conducting the schemes the law

purported to authorize.

B. Throughout this litigation, respondents and the

United States have argued that the 2014 Act violates

Section 3702(1)’s prohibition on state laws that “license”

sports-gambling schemes because it allows sports gam-

bling only at licensed casinos and racetracks. Petition-

ers have never offered any persuasive response. And

because it is severable, Section 3702(1)’s independent

prohibition on state laws that “license” sports gambling

provides a ready alternative ground for upholding the

Third Circuit’s determination that the 2014 Act is val-

idly preempted.

ARGUMENT

I. SECTION 3702(1)’S PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS

AUTHORIZING SPORTS-GAMBLING SCHEMES DOES

NOT VIOLATE THE TENTH AMENDMENT

This case turns on the fundamental distinction be-

tween commandeering and preemption. Congress may

not require States to enact or maintain federally pre-

scribed regulations. But it may—and routinely does—

prohibit States from adopting laws that conflict with

federal policy. Although those preemptive statutes nec-

essarily constrain the States’ legislative latitude, they

are not impermissible commandeering because they do

not conscript the States to act as federal agents. To be

sure, when a State modifies its laws in a way that a fed-

eral statute does not permit, state law may revert, at

least temporarily, to its pre-amendment status. But

that is not commandeering; it is the necessary conse-

quence of the Supremacy Clause.

New Jersey believes that the State’s economic inter-

ests would be best served by authorizing sports gam-

bling at its casinos and racetracks. Whatever the merits

of that policy, Congress has placed it off limits in an ex-

ercise of its authority to preempt state law in matters

covered by the Commerce Clause. A State prevented

from adopting its preferred policy by such preemptive

federal legislation may be frustrated, but it is not com-

mandeered. And that does not change when the State

tries to evade federal law by adopting the preempted

policy through a “partial repeal” rather than a new en-

actment. At bottom, although petitioners’ objection is

framed in the language of the Tenth Amendment, it

rests on a policy disagreement with PASPA’s preemp-

tion of state law.

A. The Tenth Amendment Does Not Prevent Congress

From Preempting State Laws That Conflict With

Federal Statutes

1. Under the Tenth Amendment, “the Federal Gov-

ernment may not compel the States to implement, by

legislation or executive action, federal regulatory pro-

grams.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925

(1997). That anti-commandeering rule derives from our

constitutional structure, which does not “confer upon

Congress the ability to require the States to govern ac-

cording to Congress’ instructions.” New York v. United

States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).

This Court has twice found a violation of the anti-

commandeering rule, in New York and Printz. The

statute at issue in New York directed States either to

take ownership of nuclear waste or to regulate it accord-

ing to Congress’s instructions. 505 U.S. at 153-154. The

Court invalidated that provision because Congress

lacked authority “to impose either option as a free-

standing requirement”—and, in particular, because the

second option would have “present[ed] a simple com-

mand to state governments to implement legislation en-

acted by Congress.” /d. at 175-176. Similarly, the stat-

ute at issue in Printz “compell[ed] state officers to exe-

cute federal laws” by requiring them to conduct back-

ground checks. 521 U.S. at 905.

Those statutes were invalid because they sought to

conscript the States into enacting or enforcing specific

federally prescribed regulations. And because Con-

gress cannot force States to enact specific regulations,

it also cannot compel them to maintain specific regula-

tions that they happen to have enacted already. That,

too, would allow Congress to “employ state govern-

ments as regulatory agencies.” New York, 505 U.S. at

163. But if a law “does not require the States in their

sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens” and

“does not require state officials to assist in the enforce-

ment of federal statutes,” then it is “consistent with the

constitutional principles enunciated in New York and

Printz.” Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).

2. This Court’s decisions distinguish between imper-

missible commandeering and permissible preemption.

Congress may not require the States to enact or

maintain specific laws, but it is free to preempt state

laws that conflict with federal policy. And if a State

amends its law in a manner that is found to be

preempted, the State cannot claim that it has been com-

mandeered merely because its statutory scheme re-

verts to pre-amendment law until its legislature acts

again.

“A wealth of precedent attests to congressional au-

thority to displace or pre-empt state laws regulating

private activity.” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &

Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981). The con-

stitutionality of such legislation follows directly from

the Supremacy Clause, which makes federal law “the

supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2.

“Under this principle, Congress has the power to pre-

empt state law,” and “[t]here is no doubt that Congress

may withdraw specified powers from the States.” Ari-

zona Vv. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).

Congress exercises that authority in many ways. It

may expressly or impliedly prohibit state laws with par-

ticular features.’ It may bar all state regulation in spec-

ified fields, either to allow exclusive federal regulation

or to implement a deregulatory policy.’ Or it may con-

ditionally preempt state law by “ma[king] compliance

with federal standards a precondition to continued state

regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field.” Printz,

521 U.S. at 926; see, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. In all

of those forms, preemptive federal statutes “obviously

curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make leg-

islative choices respecting subjects the States may con-

sider important.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290. And when a

court finds a state law invalid on preemption grounds, it

* See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 1639i(b) (food labeling); 12 U.S.C. 4122(a)

(mortgages); 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) (medical devices); 21 U.S.C. 387p(a)(2)

(tobacco products).

% See, eg., 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (employee benefit plans); 49 U.S.C.

14501(c)(1) (motor carriers); 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1) (air carriers).

necessarily requires the State to tolerate, at least tem-

porarily, a legal regime different from the one originally

chosen by the legislature—by, for example, reverting to

prior law. As this Court has explained, “the Supremacy

Clause permits no other result.” /bid.

In that circumstance, there is no conflict between the

Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment because

preemptive federal legislation does not compel States to

enact or maintain federally prescribed regulations.

States remain free to adopt any policy that Congress

has not placed out of bounds. And if a court invalidates

a state law that transgresses those boundaries, the leg-

islature is not stuck with the resulting legal regime—

instead, it may choose any policy that is not preempted.

This Court was thus careful to note that the anti-com-

mandeering rule does not disturb the fundamental prin-

ciple that “(t]he Constitution enables the Federal] Gov-

ernment to pre-empt state regulation contrary to fed-

eral interests.” New York, 505 U.S. at 188.

B. Section 3702(1) Preempts State Laws That Authorize

Sports-Gambling Schemes

Congress enacted PASPA in response to a wave of

proposals to use state-sanctioned sports-gambling to ad-

dress the States’ fiscal woes. A few States had already

incorporated sports betting into their state lotteries,

and “[mjany” others were considering following suit.

Senate Report 5. States were also contemplating pro-

posals to authorize and tax private schemes, such as

“bets on sports at off-track betting parlors” and “casino-

style sports books,” /bid. Congress feared that “State-

sanctioned sports gambling” would promote betting by

minors and threaten the integrity of sports, and it deter-

mined that “(t]he answer to State budgetary problems

should not be to increase the number of lottery players

or sports bettors.” Jd. at 4, 7.

Congress did not adopt comprehensive regulations

on sports gambling, which was already subject to vari-

ous state and federal laws. Senate Report 6-7; see, e.¢.,

18 U.S.C. 1084, 1301-1308, 1955. Instead, PASPA fo-

cuses on the particular issue that prompted congres-

sional action: state-sanctioned schemes. PASPA ad-

dresses those schemes through three categories of pro-

hibitions: regulations of the States’ own activities, reg-

ulations of private conduct, and preemption of specified

state laws.

First, Section 3702(1) provides that States may not

“sponsor, operate, advertise, [or] promote” sports-

gambling schemes. Those prohibitions bar States from

incorporating sports betting into their lotteries or oth-

erwise conducting sports gambling themselves. And al-

though those prohibitions directly govern States, the

Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the

States’ own activities affecting interstate commerce

without violating the Tenth Amendment. See Condon,

528 U.S. at 151; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505,

514 (1988). Accordingly, as petitioners do not dispute,

Section 3702(1)’s prohibition on state-run sports gam-

bling raises no commandeering issue.

Second, Section 3702(2) makes it unlawful for a pri-

vate person to “sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote”

a sports-gambling scheme “pursuant to the law” of a

State. Those prohibitions effectively nullify state laws

authorizing private sports-gambling schemes by making

the operation of such schemes a violation of federal law.

But again, as petitioners do not dispute, that prohibition

is entirely consistent with the Tenth Amendment. The

anti-commandeering rule does not “shield[{] the States

from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities

affecting interstate commerce.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291.

Third, Section 3702(1) provides that it is unlawful for

a State or other governmental entity to “license, or au-

thorize by law or compact,” sports-gambling schemes.

Those prohibitions enforce the same federal policy as

Section 3702(2) by expressly preempting state laws that

license or authorize private sports-gambling schemes.‘

Preempting those laws undoubtedly prevents some

States from adopting their favored policies—indeed,

that was the point. But Section 3702(1)’s preemption of

state laws that conflict with federal policy is not imper-

missible commandeering because it does not compel the

States to enact, maintain, or enforce federally pre-

scribed regulations. “PASPA does not require or coerce

the states to lift a finger—they are not required to pass

laws, to take title to anything, to conduct background

checks, to expend any funds, or to in any way enforce

federal law.” Pet. App. 25a (citation omitted). Instead,

a State need only refrain from licensing or authorizing

by law sports-gambling schemes.

C. Section 3702(1) Does Not Compel States To Enact Or

Maintain Prohibitions On Sports Gambling

Petitioners’ principal Tenth Amendment challenge to

Section 3702(1) is that it is not a preemption provision at

* Section 3702(1) differs from the typical formulation of preemp-

tion provisions by specifying that “i]t shall be unlawful” for a State

to license or authorize sports-gambling schemes. 28 U.S.C. 3702(1).

But that is equivalent to the common formulation that “no state

may” enact specified laws. See, eg., 7 U.S.C. 1639i(b); 15 U.S.C.

6760(b); 21 U.S.C. 387p(a)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 300aa-22(e). This Court

“do[es] not require Congress to employ a particular linguistic for-

mulation when preempting state law.” Coventry Health Care of

Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1199 (2017).

all. Instead, petitioners insist that Section 3702(1) must

be construed as “a direct command to States to prohibit

sports betting.” NJTHA Br. 34-35; see N.J. Br. 40

(same). A statute imposing that command would indeed

violate the Tenth Amendment. But Section 3702(1) is

not such a statute. Petitioners’ contrary interpretation

contradicts both Section 3702(1)’s text and the funda-

mental canon that statutes should be construed to

avoid—not create—constitutional difficulties.

1. Petitioners’ argument rests on the premise that a

State “authorize[s] by law” sports-gambling schemes

whenever it does not prohibit them. Petitioners note

that “the word ‘authorize’ can be defined to reach any

circumstance where the legislature ‘permits a thing to

be done.’” N.J. Br. 42 (brackets and citation omitted);

see NJTHA Br. 31. It is true that “the word ‘authorize’

sometimes means simply ‘to permit’” or to fail to pro-

hibit. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161,

169 (1981). But it “ordinarily denotes affirmative ena-

bling action.” bid.” And several textual and contextual

cues confirm that ordinary meaning here.

First, Section 3702(1) speaks not simply of “au-

thoriz[ation],” but of “authoriz{ation] by law.” 28 U.S.C.

3702(1) (emphasis added). The 2014 Act’s selective and

conditional permission to engage in conduct that is gen-

erally prohibited certainly qualifies, but one would not

ordinarily say that private conduct is “authorized by

law” simply because the government has not prohibited

it. Mere “lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activ-

ity does not mean it is affirmatively authorized by law.”

° See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 133 (6th ed. 1990) (“To em-

power; to give a right or authority to act.”); 1 Oxford English Dic-

tionary 798 (2d ed. 1989) (“To give formal approval to; to sanction,

approve, countenance.”).

NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir.

2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).

Second, the phrase “authorize by law” appears in a

list with “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, [and] li-

cense,” all of which convey affirmative approval or en-

couragement. Under the familiar principle that words

are known by the company they keep, the fact that “sev-

eral items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor

of interpreting the other items as possessing that at-

tribute as well.” Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S.

368, 371 (1994).°

Third, Section 3702(1) parallels Section 3702(2),

which makes it unlawful for private persons to conduct

sports-gambling schemes “pursuant to the law” of a

State. 28 U.S.C. 3702(2). One would not naturally de-

scribe a person conducting a sports-gambling operation

that is merely left unregulated as acting “pursuant to”

state law.

Finally, Section 3702(1) applies not just to States,

but to all “governmental entit/ies ]”—a term broadly de-

fined to include any “political subdivision of a State.”

28 U.S.C. 3701(2). If Section 3702(1) were “a direct

command to States to prohibit sports betting” (NJTHA

Br. 34-35), it would impose the same command on ali

covered governmental entities. But petitioners could

not plausibly maintain that Congress commanded every

county, district, and municipality in the Nation to pro-

hibit sports betting.

* That inference is reinforced by the phrase “authorize by law or

compact.” 28 U.S.C. 3702(1) (emphasis added). The Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., permits certain gam-

ing on Indian lands only if it is affirmatively authorized by a “com-

pact” between the tribe and the State. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C) and

(3); see 28 U.S.C. 3701(2), 3704(b) (cross-referencing IGRA).

2. If there were any doubt about the most natural

reading of Section 3702(1)’s text, it would be eliminated

by the “cardinal principle” that a statute must be con-

strued to avoid constitutional problems “unless such

construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Con-

gress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf

Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Cowncil, 485 U.S. 568, 575

(1988). If Section 3702(1) compelled States to enact or

maintain prohibitions on sports gambling, it would vio-

late the Tenth Amendment. That problem evaporates

if the statute is construed to preempt state laws that af-

firmatively authorize sports-gambling schemes. That

by itself provides sufficient reason to reject petitioners’

interpretation.

Petitioners do not deny that their reading of Section

3702(1) would create constitutional difficulties. Just the

opposite: they invite the Court to adopt that reading

becanse it is “obviously unconstitutional” and they wish

to see Section 3702(1) struck down. NJTHA Br. 35; see

N.J. Br. 40. This Court should decline petitioners’ invi-

tation to interpret a statute to manufacture, rather than

eliminate, constitutional problems.

3. Petitioners contend (N.J. Br. 44-45; NJTHA Br.

33-34) that PASPA’s legislative history compels the

conclusion that Congress sought to conscript the States

into maintaining prohibitions on sports gambling. Even

the most convincing legislative history could not over-

come the ordinary meaning of the statutory text or the

canon of constitutional avoidance—let alone both. In

any event, the legislative record, taken as a whole, rein-

forces the conclusion that Congress simply sought to

prohibit sports-gambling schemes bearing a State’s im-

primatur.

Petitioners observe (N.J. Br. 43-44; NJTHA Br. 34)

that PASPA’s supporters sometimes condemned “legal-

ized” sports gambling, e.g., Senate Report 7, or said that

PASPA would prevent States from “allowing” it, 138

Cong. Ree. 33,823 (1992) (Sen. Bradley). But those

statements must be understood in the context in which

they were made. States were actively considering ei-

ther getting into the sports-betting business them-

selves or authorizing selected private parties to do so

for the States’ economic benefit. Senate Report 5.

There is no indication «hat States were considering

broader repeals of their existing prohibitions, and no

suggestion that Congress was concerned about that

possibility. Jbid.; see Resp. Br. 28-29, 39-41. Given that

context, and particularly given PASPA’s text, the refer-

ences to “legalizing” or “allowing” sports betting should

be understood to refer to the proposals under consider-

ation at the time: state-run sports lotteries and state-

authorized schemes at selected venues such as “ca-

sino|s]” or “off-track betting parlors.” Senate Report 5.

D. Section 3702(1) Validly Preempts The 2014 Act

New Jersey wishes to do what PASPA prohibits: to

authorize sports gambling at its licensed casinos and

racetracks, but nowhere else. It could have imple-

mented that policy by passing a statute expressly au-

thorizing casinos and racetracks to engage in sports

gambling, by enacting a new provision granting those

facilities an express exemption from its gambling laws,

or by “partially repealing” those laws to the extent they

apply to sports gambling at casinos and racetracks.

Those three formal paths lead to identical substantive

results.

Had New Jersey followed either of the first two, there

would have been little question that it had “authorize[d]

by law” sports gambling. The new enactment—whether

framed as an authorization or an exemption—would have

been straightforwardly preempted by PASPA. And

New Jersey could not have complained that it was being

required to leave in place laws it had chosen to repeal.

The preemption of New Jersey’s chosen enactment

simply would have left state law as it was before. In-

deed, that is exactly what happened when New Jersey

took a version of the first path in 2012. Christie J, 730

F.3d at 226-237.

The analysis is no different now that New Jersey has

reached the same substantive policy through a nove! for-

mal mechanism crafted “to sidestep federal law.” J.A.

128. After all, “the Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded

by formalism.” Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742

(2009). The 2014 Act is preempted by Section 3702(1)

because it is, in substance, an “authoriz[ation] by law”

of sports gambling. The fact that Section 3702(1) pre-

vents New Jersey from effectuating this particular

“partial repeal” is not unconstitutional commandeering,

because it imposes no greater constraint on the State’s

legislative freedom than any preemptive federal statute

that prevents a State from adopting its preferred policy.

And although Section 3702(1) forecloses New Jersey’s

favored approach to sports gambling, it leaves the State

ample room to select from a variety of policies that are

not impermissible authorizations. See pp. 28-30, infra.

1. The 2014 Act is preempted by S. ction 3702(1) because

it is an “authorization by iu”

The NJTHA contends (Br. 49-57° that the 2014 Act

is not preempted by Section 3702(1) . cause a state law

styled as a “partial repeal” can never be an “au-

thoriz[ation] by law.” Petitioners did not include that

statutory argument in their certiorari petitions, and

New Jersey does not advance it now. Petitioners were

correct to abandon the argument. As the court of ap-

peals held, the 2014 Act is an authorization by law of

sports gambling within the ordinary meaning of Section

3702)(1). A contrary interpretation would eviscerate

PASPA.

Ordinarily, to “authorize by law” is to take some “af-

firmative enabling action,” Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169, or

“to give a right or authority to act,” Black’s Law Dic-

tionary 133 (6th ed. 1990). The mere absence of a legal

prohibition does not suffice. See pp. 17-18, supra. But

New Jersey law as modified by the 2014 Act is not silent

on, or indifferent to, sports gambling. The State gener-

ally prohibits all such gambling, but provides a narrow,

conditional exception tailored to advance the State’s eco-

nomic interests by encouraging sports gambling at a

handful of state-licensed casinos and racetracks. 2014

Act § 1; see Pet. App. 12a-13a.

That regime is naturally described as “authoriz[ing|

by law” gambling at the favored venues. Suppose, for

example, that a State enacted a law providing that “no

person may provide teeth-whitening services, except

that the foregoing prohibition shall not apply to a li-

censed dentist who provides such services to adults.”

One would naturally say that licensed dentists were “au-

thorize[d] by law” to provide teeth-whitening services to

adult patients. And that would be equally true if the

State had enacted a statute providing that “no person

may provide teeth-whitening services” and then “par-

tially repealed” that statute “to the extent it applies to

licensed dentists who provide such services to adults.”

That is essentially what New Jersey has done. Petition-

ers can scarcely disagree, because the 2014 Act was an

exercise of the legislature’s authority under the state

constitution to “authorize by law” sports gambling at ca-

sinos and racetracks. N.J. Const. Art. IV, § 7, Para.

2(D) and (F) (emphasis added).

The NJTHA’s contrary interpretation would gut

PASPA, because virtually any authorization could be

reformulated as a “partial repeal.” For example, the

2012 Act placed sports gambling under New Jersey’s

existing regulatory framework for other gambling. Pe-

titioners conceded that the 2012 Act conflicted with Sec-

tion 3702(1)—indeed, it was “precisely what PASPA

says the states may not do.” Christie I, 730 F.3d at 227.

Yet the 2012 Act could have been reformulated as a stat-

ute “partially repealing” prohibitions on sports gam-

bling to the extent they applied to casinos and race-

tracks that conducted sports gambling in conformity

with the regulations governing their other gambling ac-

tivities. And virtually any other authorization could

likewise be reframed as a “partial repeal” conditioned

on compliance with sufficiently detailed requirements.

States may not evade preemptive federal legislation

through such manipulation of state-law labels.

Petitioners imply (N.J. Br. 3, 10-11) that New Jersey

adopted the 2014 Act in reliance on statements by the

Third Circuit and the United States that PASPA would

allow it “to repeal [its sports-gambling] prohibitions in

whole or in part.” Br. in Opp. 11, Christie v. NCAA,

134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (Nos. 13-967, 13-979, and 13-980);

see Christie I, 730 F.3d at 233. PASPA does indeed

leave States free to modify or repeal their sports-

gambling laws in a variety of ways. See pp. 28-29, infra.

In context, the Third Circuit and the government were

referring to such permissible partial repeals—.e., par-

tial repeals that do not amount to affirmative authoriza-

tions of sports-gambling schemes at a handful of fa-

vored venues. Neither the Third Circuit nor the gov-

ernment suggested that PASPA would allow a gambit

like the 2014 Act or that federal law could be evaded

through state-law labeling. One of the petitioners pre-

viously acknowledged as much: When first presented

with a “partial repeal” like the 2014 Act, Governor

Christie rejected it as a “novel attempt to circumvent

the Third Circuit’s ruling” and “[i]gnor[e] federal! law.”

J.A. 128.

2. Preemption of a specific partial repeal or other

amendment is not commandeering

Petitioners contend (N.J. Br. 36-40; NJTHA Br. 47)

that if Section 3702(1) prevents New Jersey from adopt-

ing the “partial repeal” in the 2014 Act, it is necessarily

commandeering because it compels the State to main-

tain laws it has repealed. That argument rests on a mis-

understanding of the anti-commandeering rule.

a. Congress does not offend the Tenth Amendment

when it “curtail[s] or prohibit[s] the States’ preroga-

tives” through preemptive legislation. Hodel, 452 U.S.

at 290. That remains true whether the State arrives at

the preempted policy by legislating “up” (adding to ex-

isting law) or “down” (repealing existing law). The

Tenth Amendment inquiry turns on the substantive in-

teraction between state and federal law—not the state

law’s label or the process by which it was adopted.

Preemptive federal legislation thus routinely bars

some amendments to state law, including “partial re-

peals.” For example, Congress has prohibited States

from imposing an electricity tax that “discriminates

against out-of-State manufacturers, producers, whole-

salers, retailers, or consumers.” 15 U.S.C. 391. A State

could not evade that prohibition by first providing a

nondiscriminatory tax credit and then, sometime later,

partially repealing that credit to the extent it applied to

out-of-state entities.’ Similarly, if a federal statute pro-

hibited States from penalizing companies for doing

business in a particular country, a State could not par-

tially repeal a tax exemption (or other benefit) to the

extent it applied to companies doing business there. Cf.

Crosby v. Na‘ional Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.

363, 366-374 (2000). Such preemption of particular re-

peals of existing state statutes “follows directly from

the Constitution’s instruction that a state law may not

be enforced if it conflicts with federal law.” Riley v.

Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 427 (2008)."

b. Petitioners err in asserting (N.J. Br. 3-4) that

Section 3702(1)’s preemption of the 2014 Act must be a

commandeering violation because it “compels New Jer-

sey officials to maintain in force, as state law, prohibi-

tions against sports wagering that, as far as the New

’ Equivalent examples could be constructed based on many other

statutes preempting state laws differentiating between specified

classes of entities. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 25b(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. 6733(b);

31 U.S.C. 313(f)(1); 47 U.S.C. 332(¢)(3)(A).

* The Court made that observation in the context of Section 5 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 62 U.S.C. 10304 (Supp. III 2015),

which “routine[ly]” required a State to “administer a law it ha[d)

repealed” because the repealing legislation had been denied pre-

clearance. Riley, 553 U.S. at 427. Section 5’s preclearance require-

ment is an extraordinary measure, enacted pursuant to Congress’s

power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, that

subjects state law to prior federal approval. See Shelby Cnty. v.

Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). But once the federal govern-

ment has withheld such approval, the preemption of a particular re-

peal of state law does not depend on the extraordinary nature of

Section 5. Rather, as the Court observed in Riley, it “follows di-

rectly” from the Supremacy Clause. 553 U.S. at 427.

Jersey Revised Statutes are concerned, no longer ex-

ist.” The Tenth Amendment bars Congress from “com-

mandeer|ing] the legislative process of the States by di-

rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal

regulatory program.” New York, 505 U.S. at 161

(brackets and citation omitted). That sort of comman-

deering occurs when Congress directs States to enact

(or maintain) a particular “regulatory program.” Jbid.

But it is different when, as here, preemptive federal leg-

islation simply prevents a State from giving effect to

some “specific partial repeal” or other amendment. Pet.

App. 24a. In that circumstance, state law may revert to

its pre-amendment condition until the legislature can

act again. But the legislature is not conscripted into

leaving any particular law on the books—it is free im-

mediately to amend its laws again. The State is simply

disabled from adopting the prohibited policy, whether it

does so through a new enactment or a partial repeal.

The point would be obvious if, instead of styling the

2014 Act as a “partial repeal,” New Jersey had enacted

a new statutory provision specifying that the sports-

gambling schemes at issue “are authorized” or “shall be

exempt” from all state gambling laws. Both provisions

would be preempted by PASPA, and both could be ex-

cised without reviving statutory provisions that “no

longer exist.” N.J. Br. 4. To allow New Jersey to avoid

preemption by adopting the same substantive policy

through a different formal mechanism would provide a

roadmap for flouting the Supremacy Clause.

c. Petitioners assert (N.J. Br. 29-30; NJTHA Br.

38-39) that Section 3702(1) should be deemed a com-

mandeering violation because it raises political account-

ability concerns like those described in New York.

There, the Court observed that when “the Federal Gov-

ernment directs the States to regulate,” state officials

may “bear the brunt of public disapproval” even though

it was “federal officials who devised the regulatory pro-

gram.” 505 U.S. at 169. But that concern arises only

when state officials “cannot regulate in accordance with

the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-

empted by federal regulation.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

When Congress preempts state law, it acts “in full view

of the public,” and it is thus Congress that will “suffer

the consequences if the decision turns out to be detri-

mental or unpopular.” /d. at 168. Here, petitioners do

not suggest that there is any confusion among New Jer-

sey voters about which sovereign is responsible for the

State’s inability to authorize sports betting at Atlantic

City casinos.

d. Petitioners also assert (N.J. Br. 36-37) that the

district court’s injunction itself constitutes a comman-

deering violation. The court enjoined state officials

from “giving operation or effect to the 2014 Law.” Pet.

App. 113a. That injunction does not compel the officials

to take specific acts or to bring particular enforcement

actions. Cf. NJTHA Br. 37. It merely requires them to

respect the court’s determination that the 2014 Act is

preempted. That instruction reflects the uncontrover-

sial principle that preempted laws “are ipso facto inva-

lid” and that “all state officials” have a duty “to enact,

enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not

to obstruct the operation of federal law.” Printz, 521

U.S. at 913. An injunction requiring compliance with

that duty poses no independent commandeering con-

cern because “the power of federal courts to enforce

federal law * * * presupposes some authority to order

state officials to comply.” New York, 505 U.S. at 179.°

3. Section 3702(1) does not put States to a binary choice

between maintaining total prohibitions on sports

gambling or repealing their sports-gambling laws

entirely

Finally, petitioners assert that if Section 3702(1)

preempts the partial repeal in the 2014 Act, it leaves the

States “a binary choice of repealing all or none of its

prohibitions on sports gambling.” NJTHA Br. 43-44;

see N.J. Br. 45-48. Petitioners further contend that, by

putting the States to that choice, Congress impermissi-

bly sought to coerce them to maintain total prohibitions

on sports betting. Petitioners are wrong on both counts.

a. Section 3702(1) preempts only state laws that “li-

cense, or authorize by law or compact,” sports-gambling

schemes. That provision leaves States free to adopt a

variety of regulatory approaches to sports gambling be-

tween a complete prohibition and total deregulation.

Most obviously, PASPA is directed only at “lotter[ies},

sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering

scheme[s].” 28 U.S.C. 3702. Because the statute ad-

dresses only those organized “scheme(s],” it does not

reach casual, informal activities such as social wagers

among families and friends. Changes to state laws reg-

ulating such activities do not implicate PASPA at all—

and, indeed, some States do not prohibit social sports

wagering. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-10-102(2)(d)

(2016); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1231(a) (2016).

* Even if the injunction raised concerns, the solution would be to

limit respondents to declaratory relief, not to invalidate Section

$702(1). See 28 U.S.C. 2201(a).

In addition, PASPA addresses schemes, not their

customers. Section 3702’s prohibitions reach those who

“sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” a scheme.

That supply-side focus is confirmed by the absence of

penalties or enforcement mechanisms other than in-

junctive relief. 28 U.S.C. 3703. Accordingly, PASPA

does not prevent a State from repealing or modifying its

criminal and civil laws applicable to those who wager

in—but do not operate—sports-gambling schemes.

More broadly, while a State may not confer a special

right to conduct sports-gambling schemes on a handful

of state-licensed entities, PASPA would not prohibit a

range of deregulatory measures that would not consti-

tute “licens[ing]” or “authoriz[ation] by law.” For ex-

ample, one would not naturally say that a State had “au-

thorize[d] by law” sports-gambling schemes if it elimi-

nated prohibitions on sports gambling involving wagers

by adults or wagers below a certain dollar threshold. A

person who engaged in those activities would not read-

ily be described as acting “pursuant to” state law.

28 U.S.C. 3702(2). And if a State had originally chosen

not to regulate sports gambling at all, its later enact-

ment of laws barring betting by minors or wagers above

a certain threshold would not readily be regarded as

“authoriz[ing] by law” the sports gambling left unpro-

hibited. The result should be the same if a State adopts

an identical regime by repealing existing prohibitions.

b. Petitioners misconceive PASPA in attempting

to analogize it to conditional-spending provisions or

conditional-preemption provisions like the one in Hodel,

452 U.S. at 288. Such provisions seek “to encourage a

State to regulate in a particular way,” and they thus

include express conditions and standards for the regu-

lation that Congress is trying to encourage the State to

adopt. New York, 505 U.S. at 166; see id. at 167-168.

PASPA is not such a statute. It is traditional preemp-

tive legislation that places certain policies—.e., state-

licensed and state-authorized sports-gambling schemes—

unconditionally out of bounds. It does not address

States’ broader policies toward sports gambling, much

less seek to coerce States into leaving their existing pol-

icies in place.

Petitioners assert that it would be “bizarre” for Con-

gress to have barred States from authorizing regulated

sports gambling at casinos, but done nothing to stop the

States from repealing their existing prohibitions alto-

gether or adopting policies that would result in more

sports betting rather than less. N.J. Br. 44; NJTHA Br.

46, 55. There is no anomaly. When it enacted PASPA,

Congress likely assumed that States would largely

maintain their longstanding general prohibitions on

sports gambling, because there was no indication that

States were considering broad repeals. See Resp. Br.

28-29, 39-41. But PASPA is not—and was not intended

to be—a mechanism to coerce States to do so. Instead,

it is a narrow provision focused on the specific proposals

that led Congress to act: state-run sports gambling and

state-sanctioned schemes at casinos and similar venues.

* * * +* *

In the end, petitioners’ commandeering argument

reduces to the assertion (N.J. Br. 4) that Section 3702(1)

is unconstitutional because it leaves New Jersey no “re-

alistic means to repeal state-law prohibitions on sports

wagering applicable at casinos and racetracks” while

preserving those prohibitions in all other contexts. But

the fact that preemptive federal legislation bars a

State’s preferred policy does not amount to impermissi-

ble commandeering. If it did, there would be little left

of the Supremacy Clause.

Il. PASPA’S REMAINING PROVISIONS ARE SEVERABLE

FROM SECTION 3702(1)’S PROHIBITION ON STATE

LAWS AUTHORIZING SPORTS-GAMBLING SCHEMES

AND INDEPENDENTLY PREEMPT THE 2014 ACT

Petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of

any portion of PASPA other than its prohibition on

state laws authorizing sports-gambling schemes. New

Jersey nonetheless asserts (Br. 53) that if that single

prohibition is invalidated, PASPA must be “struck down

in its entirety.” That remarkable assertion inverts this

Court’s approach to severability, which seeks to pre-

serve rather than destroy the legislature’s handiwork.

There is no basis for invalidating PASPA’s other provi-

sions because they would remain fully functional and

would continue to serve Congress’s objectives. And

those remaining provisions also provide an alternative

ground for affirmance, because Section 3702(1)’s prohi-

bition on state laws that “license” sports-gambling

schemes independently preempts the 2014 Act.

A. PASPA’s Remaining Provisions Are Severable

1. “‘Generally speaking, when confronting a consti-

tutional flaw in a statute,’” this Court seeks “‘to limit

the solution to the problem,’ severing any ‘problematic

portions while leaving the remainder intact.’” Free En-

ter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (citation omitted). So long as

the statute remains “fully operative as a law,” its other

provisions may not be struck down unless it is “evident”

that, in light of the Court’s constitutional holding, Con-

gress “would have preferred” no law at all to a law with

the unconstitutional provision severed. /d. at 509 (cita-

tion omitted); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 200,

246, 265 (2005).

The application of that standard is straightforward

here. With the relevant language excised, Section 3702

would provide as follows:

It shall be unlawful for—

(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate,

advertise, promote, license, or authorize by fewer

compact, or

(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or

promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a gov-

ernmental entity,

a [sports-gambling scheme].

28 U.S.C. 3702.

That modified statute would remain “fully operative

as a law,” because no part of it is dependent on the ex-

cised language. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (ci-

tation omitted). It would also function in a manner “con-

sistent with Congress’ basic objectives in enacting

[PASPA].” Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. Indeed, the stat-

ute’s practical effect would be largely unchanged. With-

out the excised language, Section 3702(1) would still

prohibit States from operating sports-gambling

schemes themselves. And although a state law author-

izing private sports-gambling schemes would not be ex-

pressly preempted by Section 3702(1), Section 3702(2)

would prohibit private parties from conducting the

schemes the law purported to authorize. Here, for ex-

ample, even if the 2014 Act were not preempted by Sec-

tion 3702(1), “[Section] 3702(2) would still plainly ren-

der the [2014 Act] inoperative by prohibiting private

parties from engaging in gambling schemes pursuant to

that authority.” Christie /, 730 F.3d at 236 (discussing

the 2012 Act).

2. New Jersey’s contrary arguments are wholly un-

persuasive. First, New Jersey asserts (Br. 56) that

Congress would not have wanted to prohibit private

parties from conducting sports-gambling pursuant to

state law if it could not prohibit States from authorizing

them to do so. That is like saying that without suspend-

ers, there is no need for a belt. Congress prevented

state-authorized sports gambling by both preempting

state authorizations (Section 3702(1)) and prohibiting

the underlying private conduct (Section 3702(2)). With-

out the former, the latter becomes even more important

to achieving Congress’s obvious objective.

Second, New Jersey contends (Br. 54-55) that if Con-

gress had known it could not bar States from authoriz-

ing private sports-gambling schemes, it would not have

prohibited States from licensing those schemes to en-

sure they are “responsibly operated.” But Section

3702(2) independently prohibits private parties from

operating sports-gambling schemes pursuant to a

State’s authorization. Congress had good reason to

preempt state laws purporting to license the schemes it

had independently prohibited private parties from op-

erating.

Finally, New Jersey asserts (Br. 54-55) that Section

3702(1)’s prohibition on state-run schemes is merely

“ancillary” to the prohibition on authorizing private

schemes. In fact, stopping the spread of state-run

schemes like “sports lotteries” was one of Congress’s

primary goals. Senate Report 8; see zd. at 5, 7.

B. Section 3702(1)’s Prohibition On State Laws That

“License” Sports-Gambling Schemes Independently

Preempts The 2014 Act

1. Throughout this litigation, respondents and the

government have argued that the 2014 Act impermissi-

bly “license[s]” sports gambling by allowing it only at

state-licensed facilities. Gov’t Cert. Amicus Br. 17;

Gov’t C.A. Br. 10-13. The Act plainly does so: it repeals

New Jersey’s general prohibitions on sports gambling

only “to the extent they apply” at casinos and race-

tracks. 2014 Act § 1. Under New Jersey law, the oper-

ators of casinos and racetracks must hold state gam-

bling licenses. N.J. Stat. Ann. $§ 5:5-50 (West 2010),

5:12-96 (West Supp. 2011). The State has thus “li-

cense[d]” those facilities to conduct sports-gambling

schemes along with their other state-licensed gambling

operations. The court of appeals did not reach that ar-

gument because it ueld that the 2014 Act is preempted

by Section 3702(1)’s prohibition on “authoriz[ations] by

law.” Pet. App. 16a n.7. But because it is severable,

Section 3702(1)’s independent prohibition on state laws

that “license” sports gambling provides a ready alter-

native ground for affirmance.

2. Petitioners have never identified any sound rea-

son to question that conclusion. First, petitioners have

argued (N.J. C.A. Br. 43-44) that, as a formal matter,

the licenses held by casinos and racetracks are for other

gambling, not sports betting. But when a State issues

licenses to engage in particular activities and then al-

lows licensed facilities (and only licensed facilities) to

engage in additional, closely related activities, it is

simply enlarging the existing licenses.

Second, petitioners have observed (N.J. C.A. Br.

44-45) that state gambling licenses are issued to entities

(casino and racetrack operators), whereas the 2014 Act

applies to venues (casino and racetrack sites). But

PASPA establishes a general bar on licensing “[sports |]

betting, gambling, or wagering scheme[s].” 28 U.S.C.

3702. That language does not draw any distinction be-

tween licensing entities and licensing venues.

Third, petitioners have asserted that the 2014 Act

authorizes sports gambling at two “former racetrack”

sites, one of which is now a shopping mall. 2014 Act § 1;

see NJTHA Br. 12. But the inclusion of those sites does

not alter the analysis. The 2014 Act permits sports

gambling at a racetrack if “the operator of the * * *

racetrack” consents. 2014 Act § 1. It is far from clear

what entity, if any, could qualify as the “operator” of a

defunct racetrack that is now a shopping mall. But even

if the 2014 Act could be construed to permit sports gam-

bling at such a site, New Jersey still has granted a spe-

cial right to conduct sports-gambling schemes on a

group consisting almost exclusively of entities that hold

state licenses to conduct other gambling. That is mani-

festly a licensing scheme, and New Jersey cannot end-

run Section 3702(1) merely by including two previously

licensed sites.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

CHAD A. READLER

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

JEFFREY B. WALL

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitors General

HASHIM M. MOOPPAN

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

BRIAN H. FLETCHER

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

ScoTT R. MCINTOSH

PETER J. PHIPPS

Attorneys

OCTOBER 2017

APPENDIX

1. 28 U.S.C. 3701 provides:

Definitions

For purposes of this chapter—

(1) the term “amateur sports organization”

means—

(A) a person or governmental entity that

sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a

competitive game in which one or more amateur

athletes participate, or

(B) a league or association of persons or

governmental entities described in subparagraph

(A),

(2) the term “governmental entity” means a

State, a political subdivision of a State, or an entity

or organization, including an entity or organization

described in section 4(5) of the Indian Gaming Reg-

ulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2703(5)), that has govern-

mental authority within the territorial boundaries of

the United States, including on lands described in

section 4(4) of such Act (25 U.S.C. 2703(4)),

(3) the term “professional sports organization”

means—

(A) a person or governmental entity that

sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a

competitive game in which one or more profes-

sional athletes participate, or

(B) a league or association of persons or

governmental entities described in subparagraph

(A),

(la)

(4) the term “person” has the meaning given

such term in section 1 of title 1, and

(5) the term “State” means any of the several

States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwea!th

of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands, Palau, or any territory or posses-

sion of the United States.

2. 28 U.S.C. 3702 provides:

Unlawful sports gambling

It shall be unlawful for—

(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate,

advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or

compact, or

(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or

promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a gov-

ernmental entity,

a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or

wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through

the use of geographical references or otherwise), on

one or more competitive games in which amateur or

professional athletes participate, or are intended to

participate, or on one or more performances of such

athletes in such games.

3. 28 U.S.C. 3703 provides:

Injunctions

A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702

may be commenced in an appropriate district court of

the United States by the Attorney General of the

United States, or by a professional sports organization

or amateur sports organization whose competitive

game is alleged to be the basis of such violation.

4. 280U.S.C. 3704 provides:

Applicability

(a) Section 3702 shall not apply to—

(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting,

gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a

State or other governmental entity, to the extent

that the scheme was conducted by that State or

other governmental entity at any time during the

period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending Au-

gust 31, 1990;

(2) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting,

gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a

State or other governmental entity where both—

(A) such scheme was authorized by a stat-

ute as in effect on October 2, 1991; and

(B) ascheme described in section 3702 (oth-

er than one based on parimutuel animal racing or

jai-alai games) actually was conducted in that

State or other governmental entity at any time

during the period beginning September 1, 1989,

and ending October 2, 1991, pursuant to the law

of that State or other governmental entity;

(3) a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme,

other than a lottery described in paragraph (1),

conducted exclusively in casinos located in a munic-

ipality, but only to the extent that—

(A) such scheme or a similar scheme was

authorized, not later than one year after the ef-

fective date of this chapter, to be operated in that

municipality; and

(B) any commercial casino gaming scheme

was in operation in such municipality throughout

the 10-year period ending on such effective date

pursuant to a comprehensive system of State

regulation authorized by that State’s constitution

and applicable solely to such municipality; or

(4) parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), section 3702

shall apply on lands described in section 4(4) of the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2703(4)).

5. §&. 2460, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014) provides:

AN ACT partially repealing the prohibitions, permits,

licenses, and authorizations concerning wagers on

professional, collegiate, or amateur sport contests

or athletic events, deleting a portion of P.L.1977,

c.110, and repealing sections 1 through 6 of

P.L.2011, ¢.231.

BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly

of the State of New Jersey:

1. (New section) The provisions of chapter 37 of

Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, chapter 40 of Title

2A of the New Jersey Statutes, chapter 5 of Title 5 of

the Revised Statutes, and P.L.1977, ¢.110 (C.5:12-1

et seq.), as amended and supplemented, and any rules

and regulations that may require or authorize any

State agency to license, authorize, permit or otherwise

take action to allow any person to engage in the place-

ment or acceptance of any wager on any professional,

collegiate, or amateur sport contest or athletic event,

or that prohibit participation in or operation of a pool

that accepts such wagers, are repealed to the extent

they apply or may be construed to apply at a casino or

gambling house operating in this State in Atlantic City

or a running or harness horse racetrack in this State,

to the placement and acceptance of wagers on profes-

sional, collegiate, or amateur sport contests or athletic

events by persons 21 years of age or older situated at

such location or to the operation of a wagering pool

that accepts such wagers from persons 21 years of age

or older situated at such location, provided that the

operator of the casino, gambling house, or running or

harness horse racetrack consents to the wagering or

operation.

As used in this act, P.L. ,c. (C. ) (pending be-

fore the Legislature as this bill):

“collegiate sport contest or athletic event” shall not

include a collegiate sport contest or collegiate athletic

event that takes place in New Jersey or a sport contest

or athletic event in which any New Jersey college team

participates regardless of where the event takes place;

and

“running or harness horse racetrack” means the

physical facility where a horse race meeting with pari-

mutuel wagering is conducted and includes any former

racetrack where such a meeting was conducted within

15 years prior to the effective date of this act, excluding

premises other than those where the racecourse itself

was located.

2. (New section) The provisions of this act, P.L. ,

ec. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill),

are not intended and shall not be construed as causing

the State to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, li-

cense, or authorize by law or compact the placement or

acceptance of any wager on any professional, collegiate,

or amateur sport contest or athletic event but, rather,

are intended and shall be construed to repeal State

laws and regulations prohibiting and regulating the

placement and acceptance, at a casino or gambling

house operating in this State in Atlantic City or a run-

ning or harness horse racetrack in this State, of wagers

on professional, collegiate, or amateur sport contests or

athletic events by persons 21 years of age or older

situated at such locations.

3. Section 24 of P.L.1977, c.110 (C.5:12-24) is

amended to read as follows:

24. “Gross Revenue”—The total of all sums actual-

ly received by a casino licensee from gaming opera-

tions, [including operation of a sports pool,| less only

the total of all sums actually paid out as winnings to

patrons; provided, however, that the cash equivalent

value of any merchandise or thing of value included in a

jackpot or payout shall not be included in the total of

all sums paid out as winnings to patrons for purposes of

determining gross revenue. “Gross Revenue” shall

not include any amount received by a casino from casi-

no simuleasting pursuant to the “Casino Simulcasting

Act,” P.L.1992, ¢.19 (C.5:12-191 et al.). (ef: P.L.2011,

c.231, 3.7)

4. (New section) The provisions of this act, P.L. ,

ce. (C. ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill),

shall be deemed to be severable, and if any phrase,

clause, sentence, word or provision of this act is de-

clared to be unconstitutional, invalid, preempted or in-

operative in whole or in part, or the applicability there-

of to any person is held invalid, by a court of competent

jurisdiction, the remainder of this act shall not thereby

be deemed to be unconstitutional, invalid, preempted

or inoperative and, to the extent it is not declared un-

constitutional, invalid, preempted or inoperative, shall

be effectuated and enforced.

5. Sections 1 through 6 of P.L.2011, ¢.231

(C.5:12A-1 through C.5:12A-6) are repealed.

6. This act shall take effect immediately.

STATEMENT

This bill implements the decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Na-

tional Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of

New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), wherein the

court in interpreting the Professional and Amateur

Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), 28 U.S.C.

§ 3701 et seg., stated that it does “not read PASPA to

prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports

wagering.” National Collegiate Athletic Association,

730 F.3d at 232. The court further stated that “it is

left up to each state to decide how much of a law en-

forcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling,

or what the exact contours of the prohibition will be.”

Id. at 233 (emphasis added). Moreover, the United

States in its brief submitted to the Supreme Court of

the United States in opposition to petitions for writs of

certiorari in the above-referenced case wrote that

“PASPA does not even obligate New Jersey to leave in

place the state-law prohibitions against sports gam-

bling that it hud chosen to adopt prior to PASPA’s en-

actment. To the contrary, New Jersey ts free fo repeal

thase proltrhitious iv whole or in part.” United States

Krief te the Sapreme Court in Opposition to Petitions

for Writs of Certiorari (Nos. 13-967, 15-979, 13-980),

dated May 14, 2014, at 11 (emphasis added).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.