Amicus Curiae Brief — United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674)
Supreme Court brief2016
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 15-674
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF OF FORMER FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
AND HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICIALS
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES
MARTIN S. LEDERMAN MICHAEL J. GOTTLIEB
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW Counsel of Record
CENTER ALEXANDER I. PLATT
600 New Jersey Ave. NW JOSHUA RILEY
Washington, D.C. 20001 ALEXANDER TABLOFF
(202) 662-9937 BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
5301 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20015
(202) 237-2727
mgottlieb@bsfllp.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE...............ccccecccceeeseeeseneees l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. ...........::cccccccsesseeeeseeeeeeeees 2
II.
DEFERRED ACTION POLICIES HAVE BEEN AN
ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH’S ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION LAW FOR DECADESG...................0.00000 5
A. Deferred Action Policies Have Been
A Common Feature of Immigration
Enforcement Since the 1950s ...................000008 5
B. Deferred Action Programs Promote Sensible
Immigration Policy Objectives ..................... 11
ALLOWING ALIENS WITH DEFERRED ACTION TO
APPLY FOR WORK AUTHORIZATION IS AN
IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ..........ccccccseeeeeeeseeeeees 20
A. The Executive's Longstanding Policy of
Allowing Aliens with Deferred Action To
Apply for Work Authorization Is the Product
of Extensive Administrative, Legislative, and
Penis TPS OR IIIT ccccscccccssstusinssscatmacsenasaan 21
B. Authorizing Certain Aliens With Deferred
Action To Work Is Consistent With
Established Immigration Policy Objectives .37
CORREA IIR c0ccccncsnssveccnnioseccescnsneanonitestoneiéiosmenmmianiimaln 40
APPENDIX
‘3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Barnhart v. Walton,
EEE 40
Canas-Garcia v. McKinnon,
1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14946,
83-cv-2077 (D. Mass. Jul. 13, 1984).................0000000. 27
Diaz v. INS,
648 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Cal. 1986) ............................ 27
Gilana v. Smith,
1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16824,
81-cv-3829 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 1981)..............0000000c00. 27
Heckler v. Chaney,
ESSERE EE 3
Hotel & Rest. Employees Union,
Local 25 v. Smith,
846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ...............ccccccccccceeceeeees 6
STATUTES
ik .cnusnsuensnsceneane 36
i ssssenmainnoscncnnes 36
i siemneeennes 37
0 Ee 26, 29, 33, 34
Immigration and Nationality Act,
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) ................... 34
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act,
Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (1964) ................... 23
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
ee ne 22
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 93-518,
RE RE RE er Diehl t 23
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703............... 23
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat.
RR EI IER IS EERIE Fa a SU enn 23
Immigration Reform and Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
RRR at PD ER LE Pe ee cee passim
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
ny 10
Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
se tt ccovscicsticchinseniniinsieadeicetasideasieiinaisabeiontimans 36
Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) .................... 36, 37
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
REGULATIONS
ars Ue IAD sceniisisiccisseiteitsnissssieinininsbabeiaebiciaitinbanaiiteaiaiiacanaiai 24
gf 8 Ee eran an ee eee passim
44 Fed. Reg. 43,480 (Jul. 25, 1979) ................000 23, 24, 38
45 Fed. Reg. 19,563 (Mar. 26, 1980)................ccccceeceeeees 24
46 Fed. Reg. 25,079 (May 5, 1981) ............cc00000 24, 25, 39
46 Fed. Reg. 55,920 (Nov. 13, 1981) ..........ccccccerseeeseeerees 39
51 Fed. Reg. 39,385 (Oct. 28, 1986) .................cc.scseeeeeeees 25
51 Fed. Reg. 45,338 (Dec. 18, 1986) .........cccccccessesesseoeeee 33
52 Fed. Reg. 2115 (Wan. 20, 1987) ................sccsssereseseesees 32
52 Fed. Reg. 8762 (Mar. 19, 1987)...................ccccccceeeeeees 32
52 Fed. Reg. 16,216 (May 1, 1987) ......ccccccccccsecsesesoes 32, 39
52 Fed. Reg. 46,092 (Dec. 4, 1987) .....cccccccceeoeen cseseee26, 34
56 Fed. Reg. 41,767 (Aug. 23, 1991)...............cccccceeeeeeeee 21
60 Fed. Reg. 66,062 (Dec. 21, 1995) .0...........ccccccccssereeeeeee 9
61 Fed. Reg. 13,061 (Mar. 26, 1996)..............ccccccccseseeeee 35
62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997)...................cc0cccccceeee 37
75 Fed. Reg. 33,446 (Jun. 11, 2010) ........cccccccccoscsessesseens 33
75 Fed. Reg. 58,962 (Sep. 24, 2010) ......................... 32, 33
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
nT Ts cateameiensinnicenseioubensmatineinane 27
SEs TIT TTT caceectritceciaceenasicatahiteaiesliabaslaaanbimebbadanseia 28
Illegal Aliens: Hearings Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the H. Comm on the Judiciary,
Ea a 22, 28
BR A) aT ITT ccsinntasccssiuetidintbeiemoaiaiiiedctentenneetl 28
ey es IE cccvncinisicinsisanhuncdsddnnnsniniciemannioniiennete 29
REE REE EES ESM eae een eee 29
EES eee Season rere 29
ee ts IE cracireriransevanianentitncieeninnniasenisemenecied 29
S. 3074: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
On Immigration and Naturalization of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
REET SE EES BOLT OEIC eae eee 29
BN SE UIT hcichenecpneiahceailinsionniesesbbepeiidandetaneaten tain sbtemnibaseeanes 29
Alien Adjustment and Employment Act of
1977: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978) ..........ccc0-e0-e0eee0ee0e- 29
BERNE SEER 8 See oe Oe ee ee 29
res I inser davecincsancsnricttriestnsesnacled 29
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Immigration Control and Legalization
Amendments (H.R. 3080): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Immigration,
Refugees and Int'l Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
(1DGB).. .cccccccescccccccccccecssccccsossocessoosecsccsesooscecees
Implementation of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
ce 8, eee
Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 Oversight: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Immigration, Refugees,
and Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989)..................+.
Immigration Act of 1989: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. On Immigration,
Refugees, and Int'l Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
(RGB) .cccccccccerccecccssosescnsscessccosescocssscossosososcooes
Written Testimony of Stephen Legomsky
before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary
(PSD. BB, DOUG) ..cccoccrccreccscccssccscesccveessncescesees
Page(s)
pecceesecssoes 31
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
BRIEFS
Brief for United States as Petitioner,
Heckler v. Chaney,
No. 83-1878, 1984 WL 565477
a 14
PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS
President Dwight Eisenhower, Statement
Concerning the Entry into the United
States of Adopted Foreign-Born
8 RE een 6
President Ronald Reagan, Statement on
Signing the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOCS. 1533 (Nov. 6, 1986) ................000000. 17, 38
President George H.W. Bush, Statement
on Signing the Immigration Act of
1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
ee es en I cavdateiamatoonninendl 10
OTHER AUTHORITIES
American Immigration Council, Executive
Grants of Temporary Immigration
Relief, 1956-Present (Oct. 2014) .............000ccccccccceeeeeeees 6
Sam Bernsen, Leave to Labor, 52 No. 35
INTERPRETER RELEASES 291 (Sep. 2,
RMR ae es Pe Se Pe 21, 22
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, General
Counsel, INS, to Comm’r, Legal
Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion (Jul. 15, 1976) ............. 12, 14
Sam Bernsen, Updating the Immigration
Law, 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 203
ETERS aN cet e 10 BPE ese Pals AE Einar ea 22
Andorra Bruno et al., Congressional
Research Serv., Analysis of June 15,
2012 DHS Memorandum, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United
RID i GO Ci ili cececcsccccccccsccncszacescccvccccecesonees 6
Memorandum from Bo Cooper, General
Counsel, INS, to Comm’r, INS Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion (Jul. 11,
RRR AIC 5 Ps OEE IE Ta eee 12, 13, 17, 18
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Circular Letter No.
I i a cessieemseeeienedein 14
Executive Office of the President, Council
of Economic Advisers, The Economic
Effects of Administrative Action on
RA TE TS SAD Bee RES 38
FAIR, Supplemental Statement Regarding
the Permissible Scope of the Attorney
General’s Authority to Grant Work
Authorization (Jan. 29, 1987) ..........ccccccccecccceeeeeveeeees 33
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Memorandum from William Howard,
Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All
OPLA Chief Counsel, Prosecutorial
Discretion (Oct. 24, 200B)............-.ccsececseseceess 15, 16, 18
INS, Preliminary Working Draft of
Regulations on Powers and Duties of
Service Officers and Employment
Authorization (Jan. 20, 1987) ............cc.cccccccccccceseseees 32
INS Reverses Family Fairness Policy, 67
No. 6 INTERPRETER RELEASES 153
NS a sepeuiaoenionidieninnion 7
Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of
Homeland Security, to Leon
Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 20,
SUITE tnaiiciciceicebescaatiedietesiibatidiadiiding hidadsbigiadebiamapedebeniie 12, 17, 19, 38
Deborah Levy, The Alien Rights Law
Project, 27 HOWARD L.J. 1265 (1984)................ 24, 25
Letter from Robert McConnell, Dep’t of
Justice, to Hon. Romano Mazzoli (Apr.
IEEE Aidsninddocpeicaliniveddnennaninespebaiannbeuninausieiciiipneiniantne 27
Memorandum from Gene McNary,
Comm’r, INS, to Reg’] Comm'rs,
Family Fairness (Feb. 2, 1990)...................0...+. passim
Memorandum from Doris Meissner,
Comm’r, INS, to Reg’! Dirs., Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17,
PETIT dnchstctddbadnadnedetinihipiniantineiedennsemadsiammnienianens 15, 18
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Memorandum from Julie Myers, Assistant
Sec’y of Homeland Security, to Field
Office Dirs., Prosecutorial and Custody
a actsaddsehadinadeuutins 19
Letter from Seema Nanda, Dep't of
Justice, to David R. Burton, National
Small Bus. Ass’n (Sep. 10, 2012) ...................cceceeeeees 31
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano,
Sec’y of Homeland Security, to David
V. Aguilar,, Exercising Prosecutorial
pe re 14, 15
Letter from Alan Nelson, Comm’r, INS to
Romano Mazzoli (May 14, 1984) .................cccceeeeeees 27
Alan Nelson, Comm’r, INS, Legalization
and Family Fairness: An Analysis
NS SII oie ncicecccaineniapancheeapibenaanibiniiguichsenintiiveie 7, 8,19
Jeffrey Passel et al., As Growth Stalls,
Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Becomes More Settled, Pew Research
ERA EER SG UE RS NEES eee eee ae i)
USCIS, Interim Relief for Certain Foreign
Academic Students Adversely Affected
by Hurricane Katrina, Frequently
Asked Questions (Nov. 25, 2005). ............cccccccceeeeseees 11
USCIS, Press Release, USCIS Announces
Interim Relief for Foreign Students
Adversely Impacted by Hurricane
Ne I c Hitis. BI ecciccaciivciiecsoncsscsciocctssinvessonesinse 35
xl
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Memorandum from Paul Virtue, INS, to
Reg’! Dirs., Supplemental Guidance on
Battered Alien Self-Petitioning Process
and Related Issues (May 6, 1997).....................00-.00++ 11
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!
Amici served in senior positions in the federal
agencies charged with enforcement of US.
immigration laws under both Democratic and
Republican administrations.
Paul Virtue served as General Counsel of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS” or “the Service”) from 1998 to 1999.
INS is the predecessor agency to the federal offices
within the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) that now have responsibility for enforcing
the nation’s immigration laws. He also served as
Executive Associate Commissioner from 1997 until
1998 and Deputy General Counsel from 1988 until
1997.
Bo Cooper served as General Counsel of INS
from 1999 until 2003.
Roxana Bacon served as Chief Counsel of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
from 2009 to 2011.
Seth Grossman served as Chief of Staff to the
General Counsel of DHS from 2010 to 2011, Deputy
General Counsel of DHS from 2011 to 2013, and as
Counselor to the Secretary at the same agency in
2013.
/
' Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), all parties have
consented to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6,
amici certify that no counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no persons other than amici curiae or
their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation
or submission.
2
Stephen H. Legomsky served as Chief Counsel
of USCIS from 2011 to 2013 and as Senior
Counselor to the Secretary of DHS on immigration
issues from July to October 2015.
John R. Sandweg served as Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
from 2013 to 2014, as Acting General Counsel of
DHS from 2012 to 2013, as Senior Counselor to the
Secretary of DHS from 2010 to 2012, and as Chief
of Staff to the General Counsel of the same agency
from 2009 to 2010.
As former leaders of the nation’s primary
immigration enforcement agencies, amici are
familiar with the historical underpinnings of the
deferred action and work authorization policies at
issue in this litigation. Amici’s experience
demonstrates that prosecutorial discretion plays a
vital role in the rational enforcement of federal
immigration law, which has historically established
laudable policy objectives backed by inadequate
enforcement resources. Amici’s experience is that
the exercise of executive discretion in the
immigration context is vital to advancing the
national security interests, humanitarian values,
and rule of law principles underlying federal
immigration law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For more than half of a century, the Executive
Branch has developed and implemented policies
designed to delay—in many cases indefinitely—the
enforcement of deportation and other aspects of
federal immigration law. Administrations of both
Republican and Democratic Presidents have relied
on these policies to enforce federal immigration
3
laws in a manner that is efficient, rational, and
humane. While these policies have at times
generated political controversy, until recently their
legal underpinnings did not. That is because, as a
general rule, the ordering of enforcement priorities
is a “special province of the Executive.” Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).
Throughout this period, the Executive Branch
has ordinarily allowed aliens with deferred action
to apply for authorization to work while they
remain in this country. This policy, which is
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14), was the subject
of extensive deliberation in the 1970s and 1980s,
including several rounds of notice and comment
rulemaking by INS. These executive deliberations
were recognized and ratified by Congress through a
series of enactments during and after the same
period.
The decision of the divided court of appeals
panel threatens to upend the sensible enforcement
policies on which federal immigration officials have
relied for decades. The Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(“DAPA”) program is the same in its basic
attributes as numerous deferred action policies that
preceded it. As with DAPA, nearly all prior deferred
action policies exercised prosecutoria! discretion in
order to focus enforcement efforts on the highest
priority cases consistent with federal immigration
policy, while allowing for work authorization for
individuals who will likely remain in the country
for at least some duration.
Executive discretion to establish enforcement
policies is especially important in the immigration
4
context because scarce resources are available to
implement myriad federal immigration policies and
because the selection of enforcement priorities has
potentially severe consequences for national
security, the employment market, and _ the
preservation of family unity. Prosecutorial
discretion is just as important, and just as lawful,
when it is used to establish priorities that may
affect large numbers of persons as it is when it
affects only individual cases. Reversal of the
decision below is vital to ensure that immigration
enforcement priorities are determined by the
Executive Branch officials to whom Congress has
committed such discretion, rather than by judicial
fiat.
5
ARGUMENT
I, DEFERRED ACTION POLICIES HAVE BEEN AN
ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH’S ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION LAW FOR DECADES
For more than half of a century, federal
immigration officials have exercised enforcement
discretion through policies that permit “deferred
action,” “extended voluntary departure,” “parole,”
or “deferred enforced departure” for various classes
of aliens. Notwithstanding the variation in
terminology, these programs are fundamentally
alike: each enables certain classes of otherwise
removable aliens to remain temporarily in (or, in
the case of parole, to enter) the United States and,
in most cases, to support themselves while they are
present by working lawfully. In amici’s experience,
the objectives Congress sought to achieve via the
federal immigration laws would be thwarted if
Executive Branch officials were suddenly deprived
of the discretion to use such policies.
A. Deferred Action Policies Have Been A
Common Feature of Immigration
Enforcement Since the 1950s
In 1956, President Eisenhower “paroled”—i.e.,
authorized the admission into the United States
of—roughly one thousand foreign-born children
who were adopted by American citizens overseas
but who were precluded from entering the United
States because of statutory quotas. The President
explained that he had been “particularly concerned
over the hardship” that these quotas imposed,
especially on members of the U.S. armed forces who
were “forced to leave their adopted children behind”
6
following tours of duty. On the advice of the
Attorney General and Secretary of State, the
President adopted the parole policy “pending action
by Congress to amend the law.” See President
Dwight Eisenhower, Statement Concerning the
Entry into the United States of Adopted Foreign-
Born Orphans (Oct. 26, 1956) available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=10677.
As the Cold War entered its second decade, the
Eisenhower Administration began to use the parole
power as an instrument of foreign policy. For
example, President Eisenhower ordered the parole
of Cubans fleeing that countrys oppressive
communist regime—a program continued by the
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations, and
which ultimately permitted over six hundred
thousand otherwise ineligible aliens to enter the
United States. American Immigration Council,
Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief,
1956-Present (Oct. 2014).
The Ford and Carter Administrations each
made grants of “extended voluntary departure,”
meaning that they “temporarily suspend{ed]
enforcement” of deportation for ‘particular group[s]
of aliens.” Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, Local 25
vu. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en
banc); Andorra Bruno et al., CRS, Analysis of June
15, 2012 DHS Memorandum, ' Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals
Who Came to the United States as Children (2012).
The Reagan and George H.W. Bush
Administrations continued and broadened deferred
action. In 1986, following passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Pub.
7
L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), the Reagan
Administration also launched the “Family
Fairness” program. IRCA had established a
pathway to lawful status for certain aliens who
otherwise were present without authorization in
the United States, see id. at § 201, 100 Stat. at
3445, but the Act did not state whether INS should
continue to deport the relatives of aliens who might
qualify for lawful status under the new law—and
the legislative history makes clear that the
omission was a deliberate legislative decision. See
S. Rep. 99-132, at 16 (1986) (“It is the intent of the
Committee that the families of legalized aliens will
obtain no special petitioning rights by virtue of the
legalization.”); see also INS Reverses Family
Fairness Policy, 67 No. 6 INTERPRETER RELEASES
153 (Feb. 5, 1990) (“What to do when some but not
all members of an alien family qualify for
legalization has been a controversial issue since the
beginning of the amnesty program.”). Confronting
that question, INS Commissioner Alan Nelson
acknowledged that there was “nothing in [IRCA or
the legislative history] that would indicate
Congress wanted to provide immigration benefits to
others who didn’t meet the basic criteria, including
the families of legalized aliens.” Alan Nelson,
Legalization and Family Fairness: An Analysis
(Oct. 21, 1987), reprinted as 64 No. 41 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1191, 1201 (“Nelson Statement”). INS
therefore lacked express statutory authority to
grant resident status to aliens who did not
otherwise qualify for it. Id.
The fact that IRCA did not provide express
statutory authority to INS to alter the status of
non-qualifying aliens, however, did not mean that
8
the Act required the Service to deport all such
persons, or precluded such persons from working.
The Reagan Administration recognized a
distinction between granting permanent resident
status, which the Attorney General could not do
without statutory authorization, and merely
deferring removal actions against certain
unlawfully present aliens, which the law
empowered the Attorney Genera! to do. Jd. As
Commissioner Nelson explained:
INS is' exercising the Attorney
General’s discretion by allowing minor
children to remain in the United
States even though they do not qualify
on their own, but whose parents (or
single parent in the case of divorce or
death of spouse) have qualified under
the provisions of IRCA. The same
discretion is to be exercised as well in
other cases which have specific
humanitarian considerations.
Id.
President George H.W. Bush’s Administration
expanded the Family Fairness Program in 1990 by
instructing that “[vjoluntary departure will be
granted to the spouse and to unmarried children
under 18 years of age, living with the legalized
alien, who can establish” that they meet certain
criteria, including residence in the United States
for a specified period of time and the lack of a
felony conviction. Memorandum from Gene
McNary, Comm’r, INS, to Reg’] Comm’rs, Family
Fairness (Feb. 2, 1990), reprinted as 67 No. 6
INTERPRETER RELEASES 153, 165 App. I (“McNary
9
Memo”); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 66,062, 66,063 (Dec.
21, 1995) (“The Service created the Family Fairness
policy as a means of precluding the separation of
family members by deferring their deportation.”).
The Service also made clear that aliens who
qualified under the Family Fairness Program
would be eligible to work. See McNary Memo.
Contemporaneous government estimates
indicated that as many as 1.5 million aliens were
expected to be eligible under the expanded Family
Fairness program. See Immigration Act of 1989:
Hearing before the Subcomm. On Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the H. Comm.
On the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 49 (1990) (Mr.
McCollum: “Do you have any idea, any estimates of
how many people we are talking about who are the
immediate relatives legalized under the IRCA Act?
....” Mr. McNary: “Well, we are talking about 1.5
million under IRCA.”); see also id. at 56 (Mr.
Morrison: “Mr. McNary, you used the number 1.5
million IRCA relatives who are undocumented but
who are covered by your family fairness policy. Do I
have that number right?” Mr. McNary: “Yes.”).
Publicly available estimates indicate that this
figure was approximately forty percent of
undocumented aliens in the United States at the
time. See Jeffrey Passel et al., As Growth Stalls,
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Becomes More
Settled, Pew Research Center (2014) available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/20 1 4/09/201 4-09-
03_Unauthorized-Final.pdf (estimating that 3.5
10
million unauthorized immigrants lived in the
United States in 1990).?
Shortly after implementing the expansion of
Family Fairness, President Bush issued a signing
statement accompanying his approval of the
Immigration Act of 1990. That Act granted the
Attorney General power to grant “temporary
protected status” to allow otherwise deportable
aliens to remain in the United States “because of
their particular nationality or region of foreign
state of nationality.” Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 302,
104 Stat. 4978, 5030. President Bush objected to
language purporting to make this the “exclusive”
avenue for providing such relief, stating: “I do not
interpret this provision as detracting from any
authority of the executive branch to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in suitable immigration
cases.” See President George H.W. Bush, Statement
on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY
CompP. PRES. Doc. 1947 (Nov. 29, 1990).
Recent Administrations have continued to
employ deferred action. For instance, President
Clinton’s Administration authorized deferred action
2 Although fewer people ultimately applied for Family
Fairness than the Administration was predicting—in part
because the subsequently-enacted Immigration Act of 1990
offered preferable remedies—the point is that the
administration “saw no legal barrier to going forward .. . [njor
was there an outcry from either Congress or the general
public.” Written Testimony of Stephen Legomsky before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary 24-25 (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/fc3022e2-6e8d-403f-
a1 9c-25bb77ddfbO9/legomsky-testimony. pdf (“Legomsky
Testimony’).
11
for aliens who might prove eligible for permanent
relief through the Violence Against Women Act. See
Memorandum from Paul Virtue, INS to Reg’! Dirs.,
Supplemental Guidance on Battered Alien Self-
Petitioning Process and Related Issues at 3 (May 6,
1997) (“Virtue Memo”) (noting that “[b]y their
nature, VAWA cases generally possess factors that
warrant consideration for deferred action”).
President George W. Bush likewise provided
deferred action for foreign students affected by
Hurricane Katrina who were unable to fulfill their
F-1 visa’s full-time student requirement, and
simultaneously suspended employer verification
requirements for those students, as well. USCIS,
Interim Relief for Certain Foreign Academic
Students Adversely Affected by Hurricane Katrina,
Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ files/
files/pressrelease/F1Student_11_25 _05_FAQ.pdf.
These examples are by no means exhaustive.
Amici have identified nearly forty examples of such
policies, each of which is listed in the Appendix to
this brief. The consistency and frequency with
which the Executive has employed deferred action
policies underscore the central role the practice has
played in promoting sensible enforcement of the
federal immigration laws.
B. Deferred Action Programs Promote
Sensible Immigration Policy Objectives
Over the past several decades, Administrations
of both political parties have repeatedly defended
deferred action policies by invoking straightforward
and consistent legal and policy arguments. As
officials charged with enforcing U.S. immigration
12
laws have explained, deferred action policies are
necessary to make the most efficient use of limited
enforcement resources, to achieve consistent
enforcement of federal immigration law, and to
promote humanitarian and family values.
1. Deferred Action Is Necessary To
Make The Most Efficient Use Of
Limited Enforcement Resources
Like the numerous exercises of prosecutorial
discretion in the immigration context that preceded
it, DAPA responds to the reality that Congress has
not allocated to DHS and DOJ sufficient resources
to remove every person who is not authorized to be
in the United States. Compare Memorandum from
Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Security, to Leon
Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion, at 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf (““DAPA
Memo”) (“Due to limited resources, DHS and its
Components cannot respond to all immigration
violations or remove all persons illegally in the
United States.”) with Memorandum from Sam
Bernsen, General Counsel, INS, to Comm’r, Legal
Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, at 1 (Jul. 15, 1976) (“Bernsen Memo”)
(“There simply are not enough resources to enforce
all of the rules and regulations presently on the
books. As a practical matter, therefore, law
enforcement officials have to make policy choices as
to the most effective and desirable way in which to
deploy their limited resources.”), and Memorandum
from Bo Cooper, General Counsel, INS, to Comm’r,
INS Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, at 2 (Jul.
11, 2000) (“Cooper Memo”) (“[{L]imitations in
13
available enforcement resources ... make it
impossible for a law enforcement agency to
prosecute all offenses that come to its attention.”).
Resource constraints require senior immigration
officials to decide how funding and personnel can be
allocated and deployed in the manner most likely to
advance the multiple objectives of our federal
immigration laws. As_ described supra, _ the
Executive Branch for decades has been required to
prioritize enforcement objectives, in a manner
similar to DAPA, and it has consistently and
successfully defended the legality of such actions.
In 1984, the Reagan Administration’s attorneys,
arguing before this Court, set forth a compelling
defense, equally applicable here, of the Executive's
exercise of prosecutorial discretion:
In deciding whether to undertake
enforcement action, an agency must do
far more than merely determine
whether there is a sound factual and
legal basis for proceeding. The agency
must decide which enforcement
strategy will best carry out its
statutory mandate and must decide
how to allocate its scarce resources. It
must compare the importance and cost
of various potential cases, as well as
the likelihood of success in each of
those endeavors. . . . After considering
these and other factors, an agency
may rationally decide to pursue highly
visible cases. Or it may decide to
undertake action in a much larger
number of cases. Evaluating the
relevant factors and developing a
14
sound enforcement’ strategy are
quintessentially the functions of a
regulatory agency. They are not
appropriate for judicial review.
Brief for United States as Petitioner, Heckler v.
Chaney, No. 83-1878, 1984 WL 565477, at *17-18
(U.S. Aug. 16, 1984).
Like its predecessor deferred action policies,
DAPA reflects the Executive’s determination that
enforcement of the immigration laws will be most
effective if the government’s limited resources are
used to prosecute and remove individuals who pose
the greatest threats to public safety and national
security instead of those who do not pose such
threats, who belong to families residing peacefully
and productively in the United States for many
years, and who have already developed strong ties
to this country and to their communities.
DAPA employs the same type of enforcement
strategy that Congress has authorized the
Executive to make for decades. As early as 1909, a
DOJ circular advised officers not to proceed in
immigration cases unless “some substantial results
are to be achieved thereby in the way of betterment
of the citizenship of the country.” See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Circular Letter No. 107 (Sep. 20, 1909)
(quoted in Bernsen Memo at 4). DAPA reflects a
similar judgment that deferred action is necessary
in order to best advance the ends of the
immigration laws, national security, and public
safety, in light of the limited resources available.
Compare Memorandum from Janet Napolitano,
Sec’y of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, at 1 (Jun. 15,
15
2012) (“[Ajdditional measures are necessary to
ensure that our enforcement resources are not
expended on these low priority cases but are
instead appropriately focused on people who meet
our enforcement priorities.”) with Memorandum
from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to Reg’! Dirs.,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, at 4 (Nov. 17,
2000), reprinted as 77 No. 46 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1661, App. I (“Meissner Memo”) (“Like all
law enforcement agencies, the INS has finite
resources, and it is not possible to investigate and
prosecute all immigration violations. The INS
historically has responded to this limitation by
setting priorities in order to achieve a variety of
goals. These goals include protecting public safety,
promoting the integrity of the legal immigration
system, and deterring violations of the immigration
law. ... An agency’s focus on maximizing its impact
under appropriate principles, rather than devoting
resources to cases that will do less to advance these
overall interests, is a crucial element in effective
law enforcement management.”).
The need for prosecutorial discretion has grown
more acute as increasingly sophisticated threats to
the homeland have emerged and the number of
potential targets for enforcement actions has
surged. In the years after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the Principal Legal Advisor of ICE
under President George W. Bush urged that “we
must prioritize our cases to allow us to place
greatest emphasis on our national security and
criminal alien dockets.” Memorandum from
William Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to
All OPLA Chief Counsel, Prosecutorial Discretion,
16
at 8 (Oct. 24, 2005) (“Howard Memo’). He
elaborated:
It is clearly DHS policy that national
security violators, human rights
abusers, spies, traffickers in both
narcotics and people, sexual predators
and other criminals are removal
priorities. It is wise to remember that
cases that do not fall within these
categories sometimes require that we
balance the cost of an action versus
the value of the result. Our reasoned
determination in making prosecutorial
discretion decisions can be a
significant benefit to the efficiency and
fairness of the removal process.
Id.
DHS, of course, could have refrained from
removing these individuals without granting
deferred action. But deferred action policies
advance homeland security and public safety
objectives because they draw individuals from out
of the shadows and into the open. These individuals
provide their names, addresses, and histories, and
the government performs background checks to
assure public safety. Communities are safer when
undocumented immigrants who are either victims
of crimes or witnesses to crimes feel secure enough
to report the crimes to the police rather than avoid
contact for fear of being deported. See Legomsky
Testimony at 29. DAPA, which reflects this
Administration’s decision “to prioritize threats to
national security, public safety, and _ border
17
security,” is consistent with this approach. See
DAPA Memo at 3.
2. Deferred Action Policies Are
Necessary To Achieve Consistent
Enforcement of Federal Immigration
Law
The U.S. immigration system depends on the
dedicated efforts of tens of thousands of federal
employees—from border patrol agents and career
prosecutors to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security. These employees
are frequently called upon to make important
decisions that shape the implementation and
enforcement of the law, the security of the nation,
the safety of the public, and the future of families.
See Cooper Memo at 3 (“{INS] exercises
prosecutorial discretion thousands of times every
day.”).
Policy statements’ setting forth the
Administration’s enforcement priorities are
necessary to coordinate these efforts in service of a
common objective, namely, “to establish a
reasonable, fair, orderly, and secure system of
immigration into this country and not to
discriminate in any way against particular nations
or people.” President Ronald Reagan, Statement on
Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1533 (Nov. 6,
1986). Amici’s experience is that policy statements
like DAPA are necessary to avoid an immigration
system in which similarly situated aliens are
treated differently based solely on happenstance.
They also provide public transparency on important
policy decisions.
18
Policy statements that guide enforcement
discretion have played an important role in
promoting consistency in the treatment of
individuals in the immigration system. When the
Family Fairness Program was created, the INS
Commissioner explained that a policy statement
was necessary “to assure uniformity in the granting
of voluntary departure and work authorization for
the ineligible spouses and children of legalized
aliens.” McNary Memo at 164. Senior officials in
subsequent Administrations have similarly noted
the importance of deferred action policy statements
as an effective tool to promote uniformity and
consistency in the enforcement of the law. See, e.g.,
Meissner Memo at 2 (“A statement of principles
concerning discretion . . . contribute[s] to more
effective management of the Government’s limited
prosecutorial resources by promoting’ greater
consistency among the prosecutorial activities of
different offices[.]”); Howard Memo at 3 (“I]t is
important that we all apply sound principles of
prosecutorial discretion uniformly throughout our
offices and in all of our cases, to ensure that the
cases we litigate on behalf of the United States,
whether at the administrative level or in the
federal courts, are truly worth litigating.”); Cooper
Memo at 8 (“{A]ppropriate policy guidance,
reinforced by training, is necessary in order for a
law enforcement agency to carry out an
enforcement function properly. Such guidance
serves a variety of policy goals, including promoting
public confidence in the fairness and consistency of
the agency’s enforcement action[.}”).
19
3. Deferred Action Policies Promote
Humanitarian Values
Sound enforcement of the immigration laws
requires attention to the humanitarian policy
objective of promoting family unity. As INS
Commissioner McNary explained: “It is vital that
we enforce the law against illegal entry. However,
we can enforce the law humanely. To split families
encourages further violations of the law as they
reunite.” McNary Memo.
Immigration officials at all levels have been
called upon for decades to exercise prosecutorial
discretion in a manner that is faithful to the rule of
law without sacrificing the preservation of, and
respect for, family units to the greatest extent
practicable. See, e.g., Memorandum from Julie
Myers, Assistant Sec’y of Homeland Security, to
Field Office Dirs., Prosecutorial and Custody
Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007) (“Myers Memo”)
(discussing treatment of nursing mothers and
stating that “[flield agents and officers are not only
authorized by law to exercise discretion within the
authority of the agency, but are expected to do so in
a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement
process’); see also Nelson Statement at 1200. The
Family Fairness Program, discussed supra, is one
salient example of how federal immigration officials
have attempted to avoid unnecessary harm to
family unity.
DAPA’s aim of preserving family unity in cases
that do not threaten public safety is consistent with
the policy objectives that have guided federal
immigration enforcement efforts for decades. E.g.,
DAPA Memo at 3 (explaining that aliens who
20
“commit serious crimes or otherwise become
enforcement priorities” are ineligible). Amici’s
experience demonstrates that the best approach to
achieving rational and effective enforcement of our
immigration laws is to prioritize threats to public
safety and national security, while simultaneously
demonstrating compassion for families whose
members pose no substantial risks and who have
developed ties to the communities in which they
live.
II. ALLOWING ALIENS WITH DEFERRED ACTION TO
APPLY FOR WORK AUTHORIZATION IS AN
IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW
Federal law provides that an “alien who has
been granted deferred action, an act of
administrative convenience to the government
which gives some cases lower priority,” may apply
for work authorization by showing “economic
necessity for employment.” 8 C.FR. §
274a.12(c)(14). This thirty-five-year-old regulation
codifies a policy that has been in place for even
longer, and it reflects extensive legislative,
administrative, and public deliberations that
warrant judicial deference. The policy was
reexamined and reaffirmed following extensive
public comment and congressional action in 1986 to
outlaw the employment of “unauthorized” aliens;
and Congress has subsequently ratified the
practice.
21
A. The Executive’s Longstanding Policy of
Allowing Aliens with Deferred Action
To Apply for Work Authorization Is the
Product of Extensive Administrative,
Legislative, and Public Deliberations
The decision to allow aliens with deferred action
policies to apply for work authorization was neither
accidental nor anomalous. To the contrary, the
availability of work authorization for such aliens
was a deliberate choice that was first made in the
1970s, repeatedly affirmed over the following
decades by administrations of both parties, and
ratified by Congresses that were well aware of the
policy.
1. INS Has Allowed Aliens With
Deferred Action to Apply for Work
Authorization Since at Least the
1970s
In 1975, INS’s General Counsel explained that
the Service authorized certain aliens to work in
cases “when we do not intend or are unable to
enforce the alien’s departure,” even though such
work authorization “doesn’t make his illegal stay
here any less illegal.” Sam Bernsen, Leave to Labor,
52 No. 35 INTERPRETER RELEASES 291, 294-95 (Sep.
2, 1975). Such authorizations were not given
“automatically,” but rather, “[t]he alien has to come
to the Service and make a request.” Id. at 295.3
3 The same is true today for aliens with deferred action. See 8
C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(14) (requiring that aliens with deferred
action establish “economic necessity” in order to receive
employment authorization); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 41,767,
41,781 (Aug. 23, 1991) (rejecting a proposal to eliminate the
22
By the late 1970s, INS work authorizations were
common, and served a host of important functions
for both aliens and employers. Although in the
1970s there was not yet any blanket legal
prohibition on the employment of undocumented
aliens, permitting certain classes of undocumented
aliens to obtain work authorization, including those
with deferred action, served several objectives.
First, in 1972 Congress made _ work
authorization a prerequisite for certain aliens to
obtain a Social Security number. See Social
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 §
137, 86 Stat. 1329, 1364 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(B)(i)(D); 44 Fed. Reg. 10,369,
10,371 (Feb. 20, 1979) (adding 20 C.F.R. §
422.107(e)); see also Bernsen, Leave to Labor, at
294. Employers then, as now, were much less likely
to hire aliens “off the books,” and to avoid full
remittance of Social Security payments and other
taxes attributable to such aliens, if the aliens had
Social Security numbers that allowed them to work
“above board.”4
Second, agricultural workers had a _ special
reason to seek work authorization: as of 1974,
federally registered farm labor contractors were
economic necessity requirement for aliens with deferred
action).
* INS had even launched a “voluntary” pressure campaign to
discourage employers from hiring aliens who lacked such
authorization. See Sam Bernsen, Updating the Immigration
Law, 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 203, 204-06 (1986); Illegal
Aliens: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm on
the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1020 (1971 & 1972).
23
prohibited from facilitating the hiring of any alien
“not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or
who has not been authorized by the Attorney
General to accept employment.”® Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Amendments Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-518 § 11, 88 Stat. 1652, 1655 (1974).®
Finally, as of 1976, aliens who “continue(d] in or
accept[ed] unauthorized employment” were barred
from obtaining an adjustment of status.
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571 § 6, 90 Stat. 2703, 2706
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)); see also
44 Fed. Reg. 43,480 (Jul. 25, 1979) (describing this
provision’ as legislative recognition of the Attorney
General's preexisting authority to grant work
authorization).
6 Prior to 1974, the statute prohibited these farm labor
contractors from facilitating the hiring of any alien who was
“violating the provisions of the immigration and nationality
laws of the United States.” Farm Labor Contractor
Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 88-582 § 5(b), 78 Stat. 920, 922
(1964).
6 IRCA subsequently repealed this language, which became
mostly redundant in light of IRCA’s broader employer
sanctions provisions. IRCA, § 101(b)(1)(C), 100 Stat. at 3372;
see also Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470, §§ 106 & 523, 96 Stat. 2583, 2589-90,
2600 (1983).
7 INS actually cited to Public Law 95-571, but the context
makes it clear that the reference is to 94-571. See 44 Fed. Reg.
at 43,480.
24
2. In the Early 1980s, INS Codified its
Work Authorization Policy for
Categories of Aliens Not Authorized
To Be in the United States, Including
Those with Deferred Action
In 1979, INS “for the first time codiflied]
existing employment authorization procedures,”
publishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register.
44 Fed. Reg. at 43,480. The proposal provided that
“fajn alien who, as an exercise of the Service’s
prosecutorial discretion, has been allowed to
remain in the United States for an indefinite or
extended period of time will . . . be eligible to apply”
for work authorization. Id.; see also id. (proposing 8
C.F.R. § 109.1(b)) (“An alien who is not maintaining
a lawful nonimmigrant status may apply for
employment authorization if he ... has been
granted permission to remain in the United States
for an indefinite or extended period of time by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.”).
The next year, after giving “[clareful
consideration” to public comments, INS published a
“significantly modified” proposal. 45 Fed. Reg.
19,563 (Mar. 26, 1980). This revised version made
no mention of the Service’s “prosecutorial
discretion,” or of INS’s longstanding practice of
making work authorization available to aliens
whose removal had been deferred. The Federal
Register contains no explanation for this omission.
Comments on the revised proposal expressed
“concern” that it “did not adequately cover all
categories [of] nonimmigrants who are permitted to
work while in the United States.” 46 Fed. Reg.
25,079, 25,080 (May 5, 1981); see also Deborah
25
Levy, The Alien Rights Law Project, 27 HOWARD
L.J. 1265, 1277 (1984). The final rule, published a
few months after President Reagan took office,
restored work authorization eligibility for the
category of aliens that had been omitted in the 1980
revised proposal, namely, “[a]ny alien in whose case
the district director recommends consideration of
deferred action, an act of administrative
convenience to the government which gives some
cases lower priority.” 46 Fed. Reg. at 25,081.8
3. Congress Affirmed INS’s Work
Authorization Rule When it Enacted
the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986
In 1986, the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (“FAIR”) filed a petition for
rulemaking, seeking to rescind the 1981 rule that
allowed aliens subject to deferred action to apply
for work authorization. 51 Fed. Reg. 39,385 (Oct.
28, 1986). FAIR asserted that INS had “acted
beyond its statutory authority and contrary to the
purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act” by
allowing “illegal or temporarily present aliens to
apply for and receive work authorization.” Jd. at
39,386; see also id. at 39,387 (“The granting of work
authorization to deportable aliens and
nonimmigrants not authorized by statute to work
allows such aliens to compete directly with
8 The current regulations contain language that is virtually
identical to that added in 1981. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)
(“An alien who has been granted deferred action, an act of
administrative convenience to the government which gives
some cases lower priority.”).
26
American workers for jobs. This is in direct conflict
with the purpose for which the [Immigration and
Nationality Act] was enacted.”). INS published
FAIR’s petition in the Federal Register and
solicited public comments. Jd.
Before the Service acted on FAIR’s petition,
Congress intervened and_ ratified INS’s
interpretation of its legal authorities. The 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”)
prohibited employers from employing aliens not
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” or
“authorized to be . . . employed by [the Immigration
and Nationality Act] or by the Attorney General.”
IRCA, § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3368 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)) (emphasis added). This
language reaffirmed the Attorney General’s
authority to grant work authorizations as well as
the manner in which INS had been exercising that
authority—a practice that Congress declined to
limit in any way. See 52 Fed. Reg. 46,092, 46,093
(Dec. 4, 1987) (“[T]he only logical way to interpret
this phrase is that Congress, being fully aware of
the Attorney General’s authority to promulgate
regulations, and approving of the manner in which
he has exercised that authority in this matter,
defined ‘unauthorized alien’ in such fashion as to
exclude aliens who have been authorized
employment by the Attorney General through the
regulatory process, in addition to those who are
authorized employment by statute”).
Congress had notice of the 1981 regulations
when it passed IRCA. In addition to the publicly-
noticed FAIR petition mentioned above, the
Service’s claim of work authorization authority was
highlighted directly to Congress and included in the
27
Act’s legislative history. See Letter from Robert
McConnell, DOJ, to Romano Mazzoli (Apr. 4, 1983),
included in Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1983, Hearings before the Subcomm. On
Immigration, Refugees and Intl Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1450 (1983)
(“INS currently has authority to define classes of
aliens who may be employed in the U.S.”); Letter
from Alan Nelson, Comm’r, INS, to Romano
Mazzoli (May 14, 1984), included in INS Oversight
and Budget Authorization for Fiscal Year 1985:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Immigration,
Refugees, and Intl Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 357 (1984) (explaining that
INS regulations “set forth eligibility and criteria for
employment authorization”). Moreover, INS’s work
authorization regulations had also already been the
subject of litigation when Congress deliberated
upon and enacted IRCA. E.g., Diaz v. INS, 648 F
Supp. 638 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Canas-Garcia v.
McKinnon, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14946, 83-cv-
2077 (D. Mass. Jul. 13, 1984); Gilana v. Smith,
1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16824, 81-cv-3829 (N.D. Il.
Dec. 24, 1981).
IRCA marked the culmination of years of
legislative deliberations about the Attorney
General’s power to issue work authorizations for
aliens. In 1971, the Nixon Administration
introduced legislation prohibiting the employment
of “aliens who are illegally in the United States or
are in an immigration status in which such
employment is not authorized.” H.R. 2328 § 26
(1971). But at a hearing before “Subcommittee
Number 1” of the House Judiciary Committee, an
organization representing “American Business”
28
warned that “(t]he phrasiology ‘in violation of law
or in an immigration status in which such
employment is not authorized’ is not sufficiently
flexible to allow the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to continue present
treatment of aliens who work in certain categories.”
Illegal Aliens: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of
the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1243-45
(1971 & 1972) (statement of the American Council
of Int'l Personnel, Inc.). When the INS General
Counsel was later asked by the same Subcommittee
about INS’s “administrative permissiveness in
allowing certain aliens to undertake employment,”
he insisted that the language in_ the
Administration’s proposed bill was intended to
cover all cases where INS had _ authorized
employment. Id. at 1344.
The Subcommittee decided to remove any
possible ambiguity left by the Administration’s
“phrasiology.” It reported a new version of the bill
that prohibited employment of “any alien in the
United States who has not been lawfully admitted
to the United States for permanent residence,
unless the employment of such alien is authorized
by the Attorney General.” H.R. 16188 (1972)
(emphasis added) (as reported in H.R. Rep. 92-
1366, at 12 (1972)); see also H.R. Rep. 92-1366, at 1
(1972) (“The purpose of this bill is to make it
unlawful to knowingly hire aliens who have not
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
are not authorized by the Attorney General to work
while in the United States.”). Subsequently
proposed employer sanctions bills, up to and
including the law that was ultimately enacted as
IRCA in 1986, all recognized the Attorney General’s
29
power to grant work authorizations. See IRCA, §
101(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)); see
also H.R. 982 § 2 (1973) (reported in H.R. Rep. 93-
108, at 2 (1973)); H.R. 8713 § 2 (1975) (reported in
H.R. Rep. 94-506, at 26 (1975)); S. 2252 § 5 (1978)
(quoted in Alien Adjustment and Employment Act of
1977: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 3 (1978)).°
Armed with full knowledge of INS’s assertion of
work authorization authority, as well as ample
opportunities to rescind or invalidate the same,
Congress ratified the Service’s policy. Indeed, in a
separate provision in IRCA, Congress demonstrated
a clear understanding that the Attorney General
had authorized work for aliens whose removal had
been deferred—and that such authorization would
make an alien eligible for lawful employment under
IRCA.
Congress had earlier considered an amendment
to a draft of IRCA that would have made it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
any alien who had been authorized to work. See 130
9 One further change in the proposed language before IRCA is
worth mentioning. In 1976, testimony noted that the new
wording used in the 1972 bill ignored the fact that the INA
was itself a source of work authorization. S. 3074: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Immigration and Naturalization of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 103 (1976)
(statement of Stanley Mailman, Ass’n of Immigration and
Nationality Lawyers). Thus, in 1982, the House Committee
reported a bill penalizing the employment of aliens not
authorized either “by this Act or by the Attorney General.”
H.R. 6514 (1982) (reported in H.R. Rep. 97-890, at 41 (1982)).
That is the substance of the provision Congress eventually
included in IRCA.
30
CONG. Rec. 15,935 (Jun. 12, 1984). Congress,
however, ultimately enacted a narrower version of
the amendment, which provided protection against
discrimination to only lawful permanent residents,
temporary residents, refugees, and asylees. See
IRCA § 102 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)). A comparison between IRCA’s non-
discrimination provision, which covers a subset of
aliens who are authorized to work, and the
employer sanctions provision, which extends more
broadly, highlights the relevant distinction:
Employer Sanctions, | Nondiscrimination,
§ 101(a)(1) § 102
‘lawfully § admitted “lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, | for permanent residence,
or... authorized to be | is granted the status
. employed by [the | of an alien lawfully
INA] or by _ the | admitted for
Attorney General.” temporary residence
under section
245A(a)(1), is
admitted as a refugee
under section 207, or
is granted asylum
under section 208"
Advocacy groups had complained that the
narrowed version of the non-discrimination
provision excluded from coverage “certain non-
immigrant aliens, paroled aliens, aliens with
extended voluntary departure status, and other
classes of persons authorized to work but not
—
31
included in the specific categories delineated by the
anti-discrimination provision.” See Immigration
Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Immigration, Refugees
and Intl Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 127 (1985) (statement of Richard
Fajardo, MALDEF). But Congress retained the
narrower version and deliberately excluded from
the anti-discrimination protection that subset of
aliens who, although not lawful permanent or
temporary residents, refugees, or asylees, were
nonetheless authorized to work by the Attorney
General, including those aliens with deferred
action. Cf. Letter from Seema Nanda, DOJ, to
David Burton (Sep. 10, 2012) available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2
012/09/27/161.PDF (explaining that aliens who
qualify for the DACA program are not protected
from citizenship status discrimination under
IRCA).
4. INS Reaffirmed its Work
Authorization Rule Immediately
Following IRCA’s Passage, After
Extensive Notice and Comment
Shortly after Congress enacted IRCA, INS
‘began to solicit input on regulations to implement
the law. See Implementation of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law
of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 36-
37, 60-61 (1986). The Service took an
“unprecedented step to permit and encourage as
much public input as possible,” circulating an
“internal draft [of] preliminary regulations prior to
their formal publication in the federal register.” 52
32
Fed. Reg. 2115 (Jan. 20, 1987). The draft
regulations maintained work authorization
eligibility for aliens with deferred action and also
added a new group: “An alien who is a member of a
nationality group granted extended voluntary
departure.” See INS, Preliminary Working Draft of
Regulations (Jan. 20, 1987), reprinted at 32
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACTS LEGISLATIVE
AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, No. 127 (Supp. 1997).
While the Service’s draft regulations were being
circulated, INS officials made “[m]Jany public
appearances .. . to inform and solicit comments
from interested parties.” 52 Fed. Reg. 8762 (Mar.
19, 1987). After reviewing and_ evaluating
“numerous comments” from a “wide cross-section of
society,” INS published its proposed rules, which
retained eligibility for work authorization in the
deferred action and extended voluntary departure
contexts. Id. Subsequently, after again considering
comments on its proposed rules from “a very broad
spectrum of American society [that] included
private citizens; agricultural, business, industrial
and labor organizations; Congressional sources and
governmental entities at the federal, state, and
local levels; educational institutions; voluntary
agencies; interest groups and organizations; and
law firms,” INS promulgated final rules, which once
again provided for work authorization for aliens
with deferred action and extended voluntary
departure. 52 Fed. Reg. at 16,216, 16,220, 16,227.19
'0 USCIS later substituted “deferred enforced departure” for
“extended voluntary departure.” See 75 Fed. Reg. 58,962,
58.990 (Sep. 24, 2010) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11));
see also 75 Fed. Reg. 33,446, 33,457 (Jun. 11, 2010)
33
As INS was promulgating its final rules on
IRCA, FAIR’s petition to rescind the 1981
regulations remained pending. Shortly after
Congress enacted IRCA, INS extended the
comment period on the FAIR petition, noting that
IRCA’s recognition of the Attorney General’s power
to grant work authorization “appears to have a
direct bearing on the issues to be resolved.” 51 Fed.
Reg. 45,338, 45,338 (Dec. 18, 1986). FAIR itself
submitted a supplemental memorandum in which it
argued that IRCA’s enactment supported the
petition to rescind the rule. See_ FAIR,
Supplemental Statement Regarding the Permissible
Scope of the Attorney General’s Authority to Grant
Work Authorization (Jan. 29, 1987), FAIR Records,
1867-2006, George Washington Univ. Gelman
Library, Collection No. MS2195, Box 95, Folder 2.
INS thereafter denied FAIR’s petition, having
considered comments from a “wide spectrum of
interested parties, ranging from local to national! to
international governmental entities, and from
private individuals to business and educational
institutions to public interest groups.” 52 Fed. Reg.
46,092 (Dec. 4, 1987). INS pointed both to the
Attorney General's general authority to enforce the
immigration laws and establish regulations, as well
as IRCA’s more specific recognition of the Attorney
General’s power to grant work authorizations. /d.
at 46,093 (discussing Immigration and Nationality
Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 163, 173-
(explaining that the reference to extended voluntary
departure had become “obsolete” and proposing new
regulation covering deferred enforced departure).
34
74 (1952); IRCA § 101(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(h)(3)). With respect to the latter, INS
explained:
[T]he only logical way to interpret this
phrase is that Congress, being fully
aware of the Attorney General’s
authority to promulgate regulations,
and approving of the manner in which
he has exercised that authority in this
matter, defined “unauthorized alien”
in such fashion as to exclude aliens
who have been authorized
employment by the Attorney General
through the regulatory process, in
addition to those who are authorized
employment by statute.
52 Fed. Reg. at 46,093.11
'' The INS also noted that “most of the classes” permitted to
apply for work authorization “are very small to begin with,”
and that “the total number of aliens authorized to accept
employment is quite small and the impact on the labor
market is minimal.” 52 Fed. Reg. at 46,093. INS did not in
any way suggest, however, that the number of eligible aliens
was relevant to the question of its legal authority, nor did INS
indicate that there would be grounds for rescinding the
longstanding practice if and when the number of aliens
eligible for deferred action were to increase, as it had in the
past.
35
5. Since 1987, INS Has Consistently
Permitted Aliens With Deferred
Action to Apply For Work
Authorization, And Congress Has
Left This Policy Undisturbed
In the years following IRCA’s passage, INS
continued to grant work authorization to aliens not
authorized to be in the United States, including
aliens covered by many of the policies discussed
above. E.g., McNary Memo (“Work authorization
will be granted to aliens who qualify for voluntary
departure” under the expanded Family Fairness
program); 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061 (Mar. 26, 1996)
(inviting VAWA self-petitioners to apply for work
authorization after obtaining direct action status,
notwithstanding the fact that the original VAWA
statute did “not direct the Service to provide
employment authorization based solely on the filing
or approval of a_ self-petition”); USCIS, Press
Release, USCIS Announces Interim Relief for
Foreign Students Adversely Impacted by Hurricane
Katrina (Nov. 25, 2005) (“Katrina-impacted foreign
academic students not covered by the Notice and
their dependents (F-2 visa holders) may request
deferred action and apply for employment
authorization based on economic necessity.”). In
addition to aliens with deferred action, current
regulations allow for work authorization for aliens
with deferred enforced departure, applicants for
adjustment of status, and even certain aliens
already subject to removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§
274a.12(a)(11), (c)(9), (c)(10).
FAIR complained to Congress about this
practice. See Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
36
On Immigration, Refugees, And International Law
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 597
(1989) (statement of Daniel Stein, FAIR) (criticizing
the regulations providing for work authorization for
aliens “given deferred action, applicants for
political asylum, aliens granted extended voluntary
departure, parolees, applicants for adjustment of
status, asylees, and a whole host of classifications
attributed to administrative and processing delay’).
Yet Congress declined to rescind or even question
the agency’s authority.
To be sure, Congress has periodically limited the
classes of aliens eligible for work authorization, but
it has never altered the longstanding policy that
aliens subject to deferred action may apply for work
authorization, despite the legislature’s knowledge
of that longstanding and transparent policy. E.g.,
Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 130005(b), 108 Stat. 1796,
2028 (1994) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1158(d)(2)) (asylum applicants); Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-585 (1996)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3))
(detained aliens). Congress even enacted a
provision in 1996 in which it recognized the
agency’s practice of authorizing some aliens already
subject to removal orders to work. Id. § 305(a)(3),
110 Stat. at 3009-600 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7)). Actions such as these—and
Congress’s failure to limit the agency's well-known
asserted authorities and practices—belie
Respondents’ argument (Br. in Opp. at 32-33) that
Congress has limited the Secretary's power to
confer work authorization so as to encompass only
37
those classes of aliens that the INA itself specifies
as eligible for such authorization. !?
B. Authorizing Certain Aliens With
Deferred Action To Work Is Consistent
With Established Immigration Policy
Objectives
The longstanding regulations governing work
authorization reflect sensible policy concerns, which
became even more acute in 1986 when Congress
prohibited employers from hiring aliens without
work authorization. Absent work authorization,
aliens, particularly those of modest means, would
likely have no lawful way to support themselves or
their families, and might therefore become a
burden on those closest to them. Permitting aliens
without means to remain in this country while
12 Another example is also telling. In 1996, Congress for the
first time established time-limits for grants of “voluntary
departure”—another category of aliens not authorized to be in
the United States who have long been eligible for work
authorization under the regulations. See Pub. L. No. 104-208
§ 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-596 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A)). Since, under INS's
regulations, aliens with voluntary departure could be granted
work authorization for the period of the voluntary departure,
this legislation effectively restricted the duration of work
authorizations for those aliens. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,216,
16,227 (May 1, 1987) (adding 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(12)).
Because Congress did nothing to restrict the availability of
work authorization in connection with deferred action, INS
explained that deferred action might be available where
voluntary departure no longer was, and that, if deferred
action were granted, “employment authorization may be
granted under the provisions of §274a.12(c)(14).” 62 Fed. Reg.
10,312, 10,325 (Mar. 6, 1997).
38
denying them permission to work would also cause
economic distortions. Aliens in this position might
turn to illegal work for lower wages in exploitative
conditions, causing downstream effects on the labor
market, including adverse effects on American
workers. See Executive Office of the President,
Council of Economic Advisers, The Economic Effects
of Administrative Action on Immigration at 10
(2014).
Aliens with deferred action may obtain work
authorization only if they can show “economic
necessity” as defined by federal poverty guidelines.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(14), (e). This condition
ensures that those aliens who remain in the
country but who lack the means necessary to
support themselves are able to earn a living
through legitimate, above-board employment. The
rule is consistent with the policy objective of
ensuring that aliens who are not subject to
deportation will live in the “sunlight” instead of
“the shadows.” See Reagan, IRCA Signing
Statement; see also DAPA Memo at 3.
The economic necessity condition has been a
part of the work authorization rule from the very
beginning. INS’s first proposed rules in 1979 would
have granted authorization only “if the alien
establishes to the satisfaction of the district
director that he is financially unable to maintain
himself during that period.” 44 Fed. Reg. at 43,480.
Though commenters expressed “opposition” to this
requirement, arguing that it would “unduly burden
the alien and Service,” INS retained it, limiting
authorization to that subset of aliens with deferred
action who could establish “to the satisfaction of the
district director that he/she is financially unable to
39
maintain himself/herself and family without
employment.” 46 Fed. Reg. at 25,080-081. INS
chose to “alleviate” the complained-of “burden” by
clarifying the standard, adopting the “Community
Service Administration Income Poverty Guidelines”
as “the basic criteria to establish economic
necessity for employment authorization requests
where the alien’s need to work is a_ factor”
(including aliens with deferred action). 46 Fed. Reg.
at 25,080.13
Following IRCA, INS re-promulgated its rule
and included both the “economic necessity”
requirement and the reference to the poverty
guidelines. 52 Fed. Reg. at 16,228. This language
remains on the books today. 8 C.F.R. §§
274a.12(c)(14) & (e).
Allowing aliens whose removal has _ been
deferred to work upon a showing of economic
necessity is a sensible tool employed for decades by
both Republican and Democratic administrations to
advance the humanitarian and economic objectives
underlying the federal immigration laws. These
policies were adopted carefully and thoughtfully
over the course of decades, and they have been
identified, studied, and ratified by Congress,
including after the 1986 enactment of IRCA. At a
minimum, the regulations reflect the Executive
Branch’s longstanding interpretation of the legal
authorities granted to INS and DHS by federal
'S INS later updated its regulation to acknowledge legislation
requiring the Secretary of HHS to update these guidelines
periodically. See 46 Fed. Reg. 55,920, 55,921 (Nov. 13, 1981)
(citing Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 673, 95 Stat. 357, 512 (1981)).
40
immigration laws. As such, they are worthy of this
Court’s deference. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 220 (2002).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.
MARTIN S. LEDERMAN
GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
600 New Jersey Ave, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 662-9937
March 8, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL J. GOTTLIEB
Counsel of Record
ALEXANDER I. PLATT
JOSHUA RILEY
ALEXANDER TABLOFF
BOIES, SCHILLER &
FLEXNER LLP
5301 Wisconsin Ave, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20015
(202) 237-2727
mgottlieb@bsfllp.com
APPENDIX"*
Type of Class of No.
Year Action Aliens Affected Comments
1956 | Parole Orphans 923 Legislation
adopted by was pending
U.S. citizens
abroad
1956 | Extended Third Unknown | See U.S. ex
-72 Voluntary preference visa rel. Parco v.
Departure petitioners Morris, 426
(EVD) F. Supp. 976,
979-80 (E.D.
Pa. 1977)
1956 | Parole Hungarians 31,915
-58
1959 | Parole Cubans 621,403
-72
1962 | Parole Chinese 15,100
-65
1975 | Parole Vietnamese, Nearly
-79 Cambodians, 360,000
and Laotians
1976 | EVD Lebanese Unknown
1977 | Suspended | “Silva 250,000
Deportation | letterholders”
1977 | EVD Ethiopians At least Extended in
15,000 1982
14 Sources: CRS Report, supra; Karl R. Thompson, Principal
Deputy Assistant Att'y General, OLC, Memorandum Op., for
the Sec’y of Homeland Security and the Counsel to the
President, The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the
United States and to Defer Removal of Others (Nov. 19, 2014);
Am. Immigration Counsel, Executive Grants of Temporary
Immigration Relief, 1956-Present (Oct. 2014).
1977 | Parole Soviet Union Over Issued after
-80 ‘| nationals 50,000 statutory
cap on
conditional
entries was
met
1978 | EVD Ugandans Unknown
1978 | EVD Nurses Unknown | 43 Fed. Reg.
2776
1979 | EVD Nicaraguans 3,600
1979 | EVD Iranians Unknown
1980 | EVD Afghans Unknown
1981 | EVD Polish 7,000 Extended in
1984 and
1987 1987
1987 | AG directed | Nicaraguans 150,000- | Legislation
INS to 200,000 was pending
refrain from
deportation
1987 | Indefinite Certain Over Nelson
Voluntary children and 100,000 Statement;
Departure spouses of families see also
aliens eligible discussion
for legalization above
under IRCA
(“Family
Fairness”)
1989 | Deferred Chinese 80,000
Action &
1990 | Deferred
Enforced
Departure
(DED)
1990 | Voluntary All spouses 1.5 McNary
departure and children of | million Memo; see
aliens eligible also
for legalization discussion
under IRCA above
(“Family
Fairness”)
1991 | DED Persian Gulf 2,227
1992 | DED Salvadorians 190,000 Issued after
expiration of
legislative
grant of
temporary
protected
status.
1997 | DED Haitians 40,000 Legislation
was pending |
1997 | Deferred VAWA Unknown | Virtue Memo
action beneficiaries
1998 | Temporary | Salvadorians, | 150,000 Hurricane
deportation | Guatemalans, Mitch
suspension | Hondurans,
and
Nicaraguans
1999 | DED Liberians 10,000 Issued after
expiration of
legislative
grant of
temporary
protected
status
2001 | Parole, “T” and “U” Unknown
-02 deferred visa applicants
action, and
stays of?
removal
2005 | Deferred Students Unknown | Legislation
Action affected by was pending
Hurricane
Katrina
2007 | DED Liberians 10,000 Issued after
expiration of
legislative
grant of
temporary
protected
status
2007 | Executive Nursing Unknown | Myers Memo
discretion mothers
2009 | DED Liberians Unknown
2009 | Extended Foreign born Unknown | Memo from
deferred spouses and Donald
action children under Neufeld,
the age of 21 of USCIS, to
United States Field
citizens who Leadership,
had died Guidance
Regarding
Surviving
Spouses of
Deceased
U.S. Citizens
and Their
Children
(Sep. 4,
2009)
2010 | Parole Haitian Unknown | Haitian
orphans in the earthquake
process of
being adopted
2011 | Deferred Victims of Unknown
action human
trafficking and
sexual
exploitation
2011 | DED Liberians 3,600
2012 | Deferred Foreign born Up to 1.8 | Legislation
action individuals million was pending
who entered
the United
States before
their 16%
birthday and
were under the
age of 31 as of
June 2012
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.