Opposition Brief — V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017 (2016) (No. 15-648)

No. 15-648

In the Supreme Court of the Cnited States

V.L.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

E.L., AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, AS

REPRESENTATIVE OF MINOR CHILDREN,

Respondents.

a ee ee =. eee

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Alabama Supreme Court

RESPONDENT E.L.’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Randall W. Nichols S. Kyle Duncan

Anne Lamkin Durward Counsel of Record

MASSEY, STOTSER DUNCAN PLLC

& NICHOLS, PC 1629 K St. NW, Ste. 300

1780 Gadsden Highway Washington, DC 20006

Birmingham, AL 35235 202.714.9492

205.838.9002 kduncan@duncanpllic.com

rnichols@msnattorneys.com

Counsel for Respondent E.L.

—_—--- sd oe

Stn A oe

Becker Gallagher Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C + 800.890.5001

COUNTERSTATEMENT

OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A “second parent” adoption is one granted to a third

party without severing the rights of the child’s living

parent. V.L. and E.L. were an unmarried couple living

in Alabama. A Georgia court granted V.L. a second

parent adoption of E.L.’s three biological children,

while leaving intact E.L.’s parental rights. Georgia law,

however, provides that children may be adopted by a

third party “only if [the children’s] living parent ... has

voluntarily and in writing surrendered all of his or her

rights to such child[ren}.” Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-5(a).

When the couple subsequently split up, V.L. sought

to enforce the Georgia adoption in Alabama under the

federal Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Alabama

Supreme Court ruled that the Georgia adoption was

not entitled to full faith and credit because the Georgia

court lacked authority—and hence, jurisdiction—to

award a second parent adoption under Georgia law.

The questions presented are:

1. Does a state court owe full faith and credit to a

sister state’s “second parent” adoption, when the

sister state’s law expressly prohibits “second

parent” adoptions?

2. Does a state court owe full faith and credit to a

sister state’s adoption, when the undisputed

evidence shows that the adoptive parent went to the

sister state solely for the purpose of obtaining the

adoption?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS

PRESENTED i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv

INTRODUCTION ' — 1

STATEMENT : a 3

A. Factual Background _. 3

B. Procedural Background

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION . 8

I. V.L.’s petition is not certworthy.

A. There is no split of lower court authority on

the question presented in this case. 8

B. V.L.’s overstated and_ speculative

“harm” argument does not justify granting

certiorari. 12

II. The Alabama Supreme Court correctly refused

to accord full faith and credit to the Georgia

decree. 17

A. The Alabama Supreme Court correctly found

that the defect in the Georgia adoption was

jurisdictional. 17

B. Any presumption of jurisdiction is defeated

by the undisputed fact that E.L. did not

surrender her rights. . 22

ill

C. The Alabama Supreme Court’s examination

of jurisdiction is not foreclosed by res

judicata. 23

D. Alternatively, the Georgia decree was not

entitled to full faith and credit because V.L.

never had a genuine domicile in Georgia. 25

CONCLUSION

. 28

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Adam v. Saenger,

303 U.S. 59 (1938)

In re Adoption of M.A..,

930 A.2d 1088 (Me. 2007)

Matter of Adoption of Robert Paul P.,

471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y Ct. App. 1984)

Amerison v. Vandiver,

673 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. 2009)

In the Interest of Angel Lace M.,

516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994)

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,

546 U.S. 500 (2006)

Armstrong v. Armstrong,

350 U.S 568 (1956)

Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp.,

522 U.S. 222 (1998)

Bates v. Bates,

730 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)

Boseman v. Jarrell,

704 N.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010)

Braxton v. U.S.,

500 U.S. 344 (1991)

California v. Carney,

471 U.S. 386 (1985)

. 19

14

12

24

20, 24

21

26

14, 15

7, 20

Davis v. Davis,

305 U.S. 32 (1938) . 27

Durfee v. Duke,

375 U.S. 106 (1963) J ae

E.L. v. V.L.,

2014 WL 5394513 (Ala. Civ. App.

Oct. 24, 2014) ; ; ~ a

ELL. v. V.L.,

No. 2130683, slip op. (Ala. Civ App.

Oct. 24, 2014) 6

Estin v. Estin,

334 U.S. 541 (1948) : 26

Fauntleroy v. Lum,

210 U.S. 230 (1908) 3, 10, 18, 19

Giancaspro v. Congleton,

2009 WL 416301 (Mich. Ct. App.

Feb. 19, 2009) 10

Hersey v. Hersey,

171 N.E. 815 (Mass. 1930) 10

Hood v. McGehee,

237 U.S. 611 (1915) 2,15

Mack v. Mack,

618 A.2d 744 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) 9, 10

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,

320 U.S. 430 (1943) ; 15

In re Marks,

684 S.E.2d 364 (Ga. 2009) 12

vl

Marshall v. Marshall,

360 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1987)

Milliken v. Meyer,

311 U.S. 457 (1940)

Mills v. Duryee,

11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 481 (1813)

Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, Ltd.,

561 U.S. 247 (2010)

New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,

330 U.S. 610 (1947)

Russell v. Bridgens,

647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002)

Sastre v. McDaniel,

667 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. App. 2008)

Scott v. Scott,

644 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 2007)

Sherrer v. Sherrer,

334 U.S. 343 (1948)

S.J.L.S. v. T.LS.,

265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky App. Ct. 2008)

Stoll v. Gottleib,

305 U.S. 165 (1938)

Thompson v. Thompson,

484 U.S. 174 (1988)

Tolan v. Cotton,

134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014)

24, 25

10, 22

15

21

15

11, 14

25, 26

Vil

Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co.,

308 U.S. 66 (1939) 27

In re Trust Created by Nixon,

763 N.W.2d 404 (Neb. 2009) 10

Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co. v. N.C. Life & Acc. &

Heaith Ins. Guar. Ass’n,

455 U.S. 691 (1982) . 23

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,

559 U.S. 260 (2010) 21

Wheeler v. Wheeler,

642 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2007) 7, 20

Williams v. North Carolina,

325 U.S. 226 (1945) passim

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 17

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1738A 16

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-60(d)(1) 20

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-60(d)(3) 20

Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-2(a) 19

Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-3(a)(3) 7, 25

Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-5(a) 7,9, 12, 18

RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 10 8

viii

OTHER AUTHORITIES

S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.

Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3)

(10th ed. 2013) ; eee whey

1

INTRODUCTION

This case concerns a “second parent” adoption,

meaning an adoption granted to a member of an

unmarried couple that simultaneously preserves the

rights of the biological parent. Such unusual adoptions

are not authorized by the laws of most states and, in

Georgia, they are expressly prohibited by statute.

Nonetheless, a Georgia court granted a second parent

adoption to the petitioner, who at the time was living

with the respondent in Alabama. When the couple

subsequently split up, the petitioner sought to enforce

the Georgia adoption in Alabama under the Full Faith

and Credit Clause. The Alabama Supreme Court

declined, applying the settled rule that a sister state

judgment does not merit full faith and credit if the

issuing court lacked the power to render it. See, e.g.,

Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (a

judgment merits full faith and credit “only if the court

of the first State had power to pass on the merits—had

jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment”).

The petition seeks review of the Alabama Supreme

Court’s decision, but it fails to clear the first hurdle of

certworthiness. It does not show—and does not even

try to show—that the full faith and credit question

actually presented by the decision implicates a split of

authority among lower courts. Instead, the petition

merely claims the Alabama Supreme Court was wrong.

But correcting purported errors from lower courts is

hardly the purpose of this Court’s certiorari

jurisdiction. That is all the petitioner asks the Court to

do, and her petition should be denied for that reason

alone.

2

Beyond that, there is another reason to deny the

petition. If the issue is as important as the petitioner

believes, then this Court would be well served to allow

it to percolate further in the lower courts before

settling it. To date, there has been no percolation at

all—indeed, the court below appears to be the only one

ever to have squarely addressed the issue. It has been

a century since the last time this Court addressed how

the full faith and credit obligation applies to an

adoption decree. See Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611,

615 (1915). And the adoption here is not just any

adoption; it is a singular kind of adoption whose

legality is contested in the states and which is plainly

forbidden by the law of the state whose court issued it.

Before wading into these waters, the Court should

allow other courts to weigh in. Given the petitioner’s

assurances that similar adoptions have been granted in

many states, the full faith and credit issue is likely to

come up in future cases. When there is an actual split

of authority on the issue—something manifestly absent

at present—-the Court could then choose to intervene.

The final reason not to grant the petition is that the

lower court’s decision was correct. The Alabama

Supreme Court repeatedly invoked the settled principle

that full faith and credit permits re-examination of the

jurisdiction, but not the merits, of a sister state

judgment. Carefully applying that principle, the

Alabama court determined that the Georgia court

simpiy lacked power—and hence, jurisdiction—to

award a second parent adoption. This was not, the

court explained, a mere technical defect nor an issue

that went to the adoption’s “merits.” Instead, the

Georgia decree facially violated a basic condition for

adoptions plainly set forth in the Georgia statute. In

3

short, this was not an adoption that the Georgia court

should not have granted; it was one the Georgia court

could not have granted under Georgia law. That is a

jurisdictional defect under the Full Faith and Credit

Clause. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35

(1908) (a merits issue pertains to “the duty of the

court,” whereas a jurisdictional issue pertains to “[the

court’s} power”). The Alabama Supreme Court thus

correctly determined that the Georgia adoption was not

entitled to recognition in Alabama.

STATEMENT

A. Factual Background

Respondent E.L., a lifelong resident of Alabama, is

the biological mother of three children through

artificial insemination. In December 2002 she gave

birth to S.L., and, in November 2004, to twins, N.L.

and H.L. At the time, E.L. was living in Hoover,

Alabama with petitioner V.L, a woman with whom she

had been in a relationship since 1995. V.L. acted as the

children’s parent along with E.L. See generally Pet.

App. 5a; E.L. Aff. 9 2, Mar 11, 2014.

In 2006, V.L. and E.L. decided they wanted V.L. to

adopt the children and make both women legal parents.

According to V.L.’s affidavit, they began researching

which jurisdictions might be “receptive” to that

arrangement. Pet. App. 5a-6a. An attorney advised

them that Georgia was a hospitable jurisdiction, but

that V.L. “needed to be a resident of ... Georgia,

specifically Fulton County, for at least six (6) months to

petition for adoption|.]” Jd. at 6a. In October 2006, V.L.

and E.L. leased a house in Alpharetta, Georgia from

the mother of E.L.’s college friend and subsequently

4

began the adoption process. According to V.L.’s

affidavit, “a background check request was submitted

using the Alpharetta address,” and “lo}n March 26,

2007, a home study was done at the address in Georgia;

per my attorney this was a requirement for petitioning

for adoption.” Jd. Throughout this period, however, the

couple continued to live and work in Alabama, and

spent only two nights in the Georgia house, as

explained in E.L.’s affidavit:

We never moved in|to the Georgia house]. We

never lived there. We spent approximately two

nights there, one before the “home study.” That

night, we packed up the kids in the SUV along

with toys, photographs, refrigerator magnets,

etc. and put these things around our friend’s

house. We hung a bird feeder the children had

made in the backyard. This was done so it would

appear to the home inspector that we lived

there. After the “home study” was done, we

packed up and returned to our home in Hoover,

Alabama. The other night we spent [in Georgia]

was the night before the adoption hearing.

E.L. Aff. 9 5, Mar. 11, 2014; see also Pet. App. 6a-7a

(noting E.L.’s testimony the women “never spent more

than approximately two nights in [the Georgia house],

instead continuing to live and work at their jobs in

Alabama”)

On April 10, 2007, V.L petitioned to adopt the three

children in Fulton County, Georgia. Pet. App. 7a. E.L.

consented to the adoption, but asserted that she did not

“relinquish or surrender any parental rights to the

children.” Parental Consent to Adoption (Apr. 9, 2007),

at 1; Pet. App. 7a. On May 30, 2007, the Georgia court

5

entered a final decree granting V.L.’s petition. Pet.

App. 7a, 64a. The decree specified that V.L. would be

recognized as the children’s “second parent” but that

E.L.’s parental rights as the “legal and biological

mother” were “preserved intact.” Jd. at 64a. While

stating generally that V.L. had “complied with all

relevant and applicable formalities regarding the

[adoption],” Jd. at 63a, the court’s order did not address

whether Georgia law authorized granting an adoption

to V.L. (who was not married to E.L.) while

simultaneously leaving E.L.’s parental rights intact.

Nor did the court’s order address whether V.L. was a

bona fide domiciliary of Georgia.

In November 2011, V.L. and E.L.’s relationship

ended, and, in January 2012, V.L. moved out of the

house the women had shared in Alabama. /d. at 7a.

B. Procedural Background

On October 31, 2013, V.L. filed a petition in a

Jefferson County, Alabama circuit court alleging that

E.L. was refusing her access to the children. She

sought to have the Georgia adoption decree registered

as a foreign judgment, to be declared a legal parent,

and to be awarded custody or visitation. Pet. App. 7a-

8a. The case was transferred to the Jefferson County

Family Court, and E.L. moved to dismiss, inter alia, on

the ground that the Georgia decree did not merit full

faith and credit because the Georgia court lacked

jurisdiction to award the adoption to V.L. Id. at 8a.

Without holding a hearing, the family court denied

E.L.’s motion to dismiss and simultaneously granted

V.L. visitation rights. Jd. E.L. timely appealed to the

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals.

6

Initially, the appeals court agreed with E.L. that the

Georgia court lacked jurisdiction to award an adoption

to a non-spouse without first terminating the rights of

the current parent, and that the Georgia decree was

consequently not entitled to full faith and credit. EL.

v. V.L., No. 2130683, slip op. at 9-13 (Ala. Civ. App.

Oct. 24, 2014).' The court reversed itself on rehearing,

however. Pet. App. 45a. It decided that any defect in

the Georgia adoption went to the merits and not to

jurisdiction, and that the adoption therefore merited

full faith and credit. Jd. at 52a-57a, 59a-60a. However,

the court reversed the family court’s award of visitation

to V.L. The court explained that, before visitation could

be awarded, due process required that E.L. be “entitled

to due notice and an opportunity to be heard on the

matter.” Jd. at 61a. The court thus remanded for “an

evidentiary hearing to decide the visitation issue.” Pet.

App. 61a.

E.L. successfully sought certiorari from the

Alabama Supreme Court, which reversed. Jd. at 5a.

The supreme court acknowledged that, in determining

whether an out-of-state judgment merits full faith and

credit, the court’s “review ... does not extend to a

review of the legal merits of [that] judgment,” but is

instead “limitled) ... to whether the rendering court

had jurisdiction to enter the judgment sought to be

domesticated.” Jd. at lla, 13a. Disagreeing with the

court of appeals, however, the supreme court found

that the defect in the adoption implicated the Georgia

court’s subject matter jurisdiction. After canvassing the

' This opinion has been withdrawn and is unavailable on Westlaw.

See E.L. v. V.L., 2014 WL 5394513 (Ala. Civ. App. Oct. 24, 2014)

(withdrawing opinion).

7

Georgia adoption statutes and jurisprudence, the court

agreed with E.L. that Georgia law “makes no provision

for a non-spouse to adopt a child without first

terminating the parental rights of the current parents.”

Id. at 27a (citing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d 103,

104 (Ga. 2007) (Carley, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari); Bates v. Bates, 730 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Ga. Ct.

App. 2012)). As the court explained, Georgia law makes

termination of the current parent’s rights a necessary

“condition” before an adoption may be granted to a non-

spouse. Pet. App. 30a (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-

5(a)). Consequently, the undisputed failure of E.L. to

surrender her parental rights resulted in a “void”

adoption that the Georgia court “was not empowered to

enter.” Pet. App. 30a.

Because it resolved the case on those grounds, the

Alabama Supreme Court did not reach E.L.’s

alternative argument that the Georgia court lacked

jurisdiction to award an adoption to V.L. because she

never established a bona fide domicile in Georgia. Jd. at

30a n.10; see Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-3(a)(3) (to petition

for adoption a person must, inter alia, have “been a

bona fide resident of [Georgia] for at least six months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition”).

On November 16, 2015, V.L. timely petitioned this

Court for a writ of certiorari. On December 14, 2015,

this Court granted V.L.’s application to recall and stay

the Alabama Supreme Court’s certificate of judgment.

Order in Nos. 15A522, 15A532 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015).

8

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. V.L.’s petition is not certworthy.

A. There is no split of lower court authority

on the question presented in this case.

V.L’s petition does not even attempt to argue that

the decision below implicates a split among lower

courts, thus failing the most elementary test of

certworthiness. See, e.g., Braxton v. U.S., 500 U.S. 344,

347 (1991) (explaining a “principal purpose” of

certiorari jurisdiction is “to resolve conflicts among the

United States courts of appeals and state courts”). She

claims only that the Alabama Supreme Court

misapplied settled law. See Pet. 28 (asserting the

decision is an “unprecedented application of the Full

Faith and Credit Clause”). Even if she were right about

that (and she is not, see infra II), the fact remains that

error-correction is the weakest basis for granting

certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of

certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error

consists of ... the misapplication of a properly stated

rule of law.”); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868

(2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting “error correction

.. is outside the mainstream of the Court’s functions

and ... not among the ‘compelling reasons’ ... that

govern the grant of certiorari”) (quoting S. Shapiro, K.

Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb,

Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed.

2013)) (brackets omitted).

While V.L.’s petition never accurately states it, the

issue in this case is whether a state court owes full

faith and credit to a sister-state adoption decree that

was not merely erroneous but void under the sister-

9

state’s adoption law. See infra II. As the Alabama

Supreme Court found, the Georgia court purported to

award an “adoption” to V.L. that, on its face, negated

the fundamental condition for a Georgia adoption—it

expressly refused to terminate the existing rights of the

children’s current parent. See Pet. App. 30a (noting

that Georgia Code § 19-8-5(a) “defines the condition

that must exist before such superior courts can grant

adoptions to third parties such as V.L.”). That defect,

the court reasoned, went not to whether the Georgia

court should have granted the adoption, but whether it

had the power to grant such an adoption at all. Pet.

App. 30a The court therefore concluded that the defect

implicated the Georgia court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, thus depriving the adoption of full faith

and credit under settled law. Id.

V.L. cites no case, state or federal, that reaches a

different conclusion on a remotely comparable set of

facts. She does not even try. Instead, V.L extravagantly

claims that the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision is a

“gross deviation” from this Court’s (and other courts’)

full faith and credit jurisprudence. Pet. 28. She is

mistaken, see infra II, but the more salient point is that

she avoids asserting that the Alabama decision

conflicts with any decision from this Court or from any

lower court, state or federal. There is good reason for

that. The Alabama Supreme Court simply applied the

settled principle that a judgment merits full faith and

credit “only if the court of the first State had power to

pass on the merits—had jurisdiction, that is, to render

the judgment.” Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.

226, 229 (1945). Every case V.L. cites, see Pet. 28-29,

recognizes that venerable limitation on the Full Faith

and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d

10

744, 750 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (because “[t}he mandate

of [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] is not absolute, ...

liJt is proper for a forum court to examine the

jurisdiction of the deciding court to determine whether

the foreign judgment must be accorded full faith and

credit”) (citing, inter alia, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.

457, 462 (1940)). In the decision below, the Alabama

Supreme Court applied precisely that principle and

found that the Georgia court lacked power to award the

adoption at issue. See Pet. App. 24a (noting this Court’s

“distinction between a _ subject-matter jurisdiction

challenge and a merits-based challenge” under the Full

Faith and Credit Clause) (and discussing Fauntleroy v.

Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 (1908)).

V.L. also mistakenly claims that the Alabama

Supreme Court’s decision is a “stark departure” from

how other state courts have addressed the full faith

and credit due sister-state adoptions. Pet. 30. To the

contrary, the state decisions V.L. cites recognize

exactly the same limitation on full faith and credit as

the one applied by below.’ And, again, V.L. avoids

* See, e.g., In re Trust Created by Nixon, 763 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Neb.

2009) (noting that while “the U.S. Constitution prohibits a

Nebraska court from reviewing the merits of a judgment rendered

in a sister state, ... a foreign judgment can be collaterally attacked

by evidence that the rendering court was without jurisdiction over

the parties or the subject matter”); Giancaspro v. Congleton, 2009

WL 416301, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009) (observing that

“la] state need not give full faith and credit to a judgment issued

by a court that lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the

litigation or jurisdiction over the parties”); Hersey v. Hersey, 171

N.E. 815, 819 (Mass. 1930) (explaining that, with respect to

recognizing an out-of-state adoption, “/clomplete inquiry is

permissible into the circumstances of a judgment of a sister state

1l

claiming that the lower court’s decision conflicts with

any of those cases. In fact, the closest case she cites,

Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002), may

support the Alabama Supreme Court’s analysis. In

Russell, the Nebraska Supreme Court suggested that

a Pennsylvania court may have lacked jurisdiction to

award a non-spousal adoption where the child’s parert

had retained her rights. See id. at 59-60 (considering

whether, due to alleged lack of termination of parental

rights, parent may “collaterally attack the judgment on

the basis that the Pennsylvania court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction”).* Thus, far from showing that the

Alabama Supreme Court’s decision “starkly departs”

from other state courts, V.L.’s cases show it is

consistent with those courts’ treatment of full faith and

credit and adoptions.

Finally, V.L. persistently mischaracterizes the

reasoning of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision,

seeking to create the impression that it would deny full

faith and credit to a wide array of sister-state

adoptions. Principally, she claims the court “adopt[ed]

a new understanding of ‘jurisdiction,” that would

authorize collateral attacks on sister-state adoptions

to determine whether it binds the person against whom it is

invoked,” and confirming that “[t]here may be searching

investigation into the jurisdiction of the court in which the

judgment is rendered, over the subject-matter, or the parties

affected by it, or into the facts necessary to give such jurisdiction”)

(quotations omitted).

* The court did not reach the issue, however, because no evidence

showed the parent’s failure to surrender her rights. Jd. In the

present case, of course, “it is undisputed that E.L. did not

surrender her parental rights[.]" Pet App. 30a.

12

“whenever the issuing court allegedly failed to strictly

comply with a statutory provision.” Pet. 32, 31

(emphasis in original). That is false. In its decision, the

Alabama Supreme Court merely referenced the

common interpretive principle that adoption statutes,

because they are in derogation of common law, should

be strictly construed in favor of the rights of natural

parents. Pet. App. 29a (citing Jn re Marks, 684 S.E.2d

364, 367 (Ga. 2009)); see also, e.g., Matter of Adoption

of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 426 (N.Y. Ct. App.

1984) (explaining that, “because adoption is entirely

statutory and is in derogation of common law, the

legislative purposes and mandates must be strictly

observed”) (citations omitted). The court correctly

applied this principle to determine whether Georgia

law authorized an adoption in favor of a non-spouse

without terminating the existing parent’s rights. See

Pet. App. 30a (interpreting Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-5(a)).

But the court never suggested that any and every flaw

in an adoption qualifies as jurisdictional. To the

contrary, after identifying the specific defect in this

case, the court remarked that “[o]ur inquiry does not

end here, however, as that error is ultimately of no

effect unless it implicates the subject-matter

jurisdiction of the Georgia court.” Pet. App. 28a.

B. V.L.’s overstated and speculative “harm”

argument does not justify granting

certiorari.

V.L. claims that the decision below will “harm

Alabama families” by broadly negating adoptive rights

granted in other states if there is any defect in the

adoption, no matter how minor Pet. 32. More

narrowly, she also predicts that the decision will harm

13

others in her situation because Georgia and other

states grant adoptious that “allow[ |] an unmarried

second parent to adopt without terminating the

existing parent’s rights.” Jd. Neither argument justifies

granting certiorari in this case.

V.L.’s broader harm argument depends on her

distortion of the decision below to mean that “any

Georgia adoption that deviates from statutory

requirements can be collaterally attacked in Alabama.”

Pet. 34 (emphasis in original). As already explained,

that caricatures the Alabama Supreme Court’s

decision. Supra I.A. Far from holding that “any” defect

opens a sister-state adoption to collateral attack, the

lower court held only that a particular defect would do

so—namely, when the decree defies the plain statutory

requirement that the current parent relinquish her

rights. Pet. App. 23a, 28a-30a. That defect, the court

explained, did not result merely in an adoption that

should not have been granted; it resulted in one that

could not have been granted under Georgia law. Id. at

30a (concluding “the Georgia court was not empowered

to enter the Georgia judgment declaring V.L. to be an

adoptive parent of the children”). Contrary to V.L.’s

argument, then, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision

authorizes collateral attacks on adoptions only for a

defect that implicates the issuing court’s jurisdiction,

which is a settled rule in full faith and credit

jurisprudence.

V.L.’s more specific harm argument focuses on the

wrong thing. How often “second parent” adoptions are

granted to unmarried couples (in Georgia or elsewhere)

14

is not the relevant question for certiorari purposes.‘

Instead, the relevant question is whether the granting

of such adoptions has led to lower court decisions

exploring whether they merit full faith and credit in

other states. Yet V.L. cites only one such decision,

Russell v. Bridgens, which, as explained above, may

support the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision but

ultimately did not resolve the issue. See Russell, 647

N.W.2d at 59-60. If this full faith and credit question

arises in future cases, a division of authority may

develop justifying certiorari. V.L.’s inability to cite any

significant number of lower court decisions on this

issue, much less a split of authority, shows that the

moment has not arrived.

Moreover, the Court’s usual practice of allowing an

issue to percolate in lower courts has special force here.

See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 401 n.11

(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that

“percolation allows a _ period of exploratory

consideration and experimentation by lower courts

before the Supreme Court ends the process with a

nationally binding rule”) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). This Court has never considered

whether an adoption merits the “exacting” level of full

faith and credit that adversarial judgments do. Baker

* Such adoptions are evidently granted in some states, but the

reported appellate decisions diverge on whether they are

authorized by state law. Compare, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704

N.E.2d 494, 501 (N.C. 2010) (concluding North Carolina courts

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award a non-spousal adoption

that failed to terminate the rights of the child’s biological parent),

with In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Me. 2007)

(interpreting “ambiguous” Maine adoption statute to allow joint

adoption by unmarried couple).

15

by Thomas v. General Motors Corp. , 522 U.S. 222, 233

(1998). In Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915),

the Court decided only that full faith and credit did not

prohibit Alabama from excluding out-of-state adoptees

from its inheritance laws. Since Hood, decided a

century ago, the Court has never again explored how

full faith and credit applies to adoptions.

The nature of adoption decrees raises difficult

issues under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Most

full faith and credit jurisprudence addresses judgments

(typically money judgments) that are the product of

adversarial proceedings and that can be readily

enforced by another state regardless of the nature of

the underlying claim. See, e.g., Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S.

(7 Cranch.) 481, 483-84 (1813) (addressing credit owed

to a New York debt judgment in District of Columbia

courts); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,

439 (1943) (discussing full faith and credit obligation

requiring enforcement of sister-state judgments “for ...

taxes, or for a gambling debt, or for damages for

wrongful death”). By contrast, an adoption decree is

typically the product of a non-adversarial proceeding;

and, unlike a money judgment, it is largely a forward-

looking decree, forging new relationships that seek

integration into a new state’s family laws. These

characteristics of adoptions may present full faith and

credit issues not encountered with other kinds of

judgments. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,

330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)

(in full faith and credit context, “[clonflicts arising out

of family relations raise problems and _ involve

considerations very different from controversies to

which debtor-creditor relations give rise”). For

instance, they may implicate problems like those long

16

experienced by federal courts when adjudicating

interstate recognition of child custody decrees. See

Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180-81 (1988)

(describing difficulties in applying full faith and credit

doctrine to child custody decrees, leading to enactment

of federal Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1738A).

Furthermore, the specific kind of adoption at issue

in this case—a “second parent” adoption—presents

peculiar difficulties that counsel in favor of awaiting

further percolation. V.L.’s petition asserts that trial

courts “in numerous other states” have granted second

parent adoptions to unmarried couples “without any

appellate authority expressly affirming the validity of

such adoptions.” Pet. 36. A footnote adds that, while a

“majority of states” grant these adoptions to unmarried

couples, “only about ten states have expressly

authorized such adoptions either by statute or case

law.” Id. n.10. What V.L. appears to concede here is

that a significant share of the second parent adoptions

granted to unmarried couples in the United

States—including the one granted by the Georgia court

in this case—are not authorized by state law. Yet she

candidly asks this Court to grant her petition and force

every state to recognize these unauthorized adoptions

under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, despite the

fact that, by her own admission, the laws of “only about

ten states” permit them. Jd. Given the uncertain

legality of second parent adoptions—which V.L.’s own

petition admits—the Court should await further

percolation on the full faith and credit question before

wading into this complex and uncertain area.

17

Il. The Alabama Supreme Court correctly

refused to accord full faith and credit to the

Georgia decree.

Instead of identifying any split on the underlying

question, V.L.’s petition argues only that the Alabama

Supreme Court’s decision was erroneous. She claims

the decision: (1) examined the merits of the Georgia

adoption, in violation the full faith and credit principle

authorizing examination only of the court’s jurisdiction

(Pet. 13-15, 16-18); (2) failed to apply the presumption

that the Georgia court, as a court with subject matter

jurisdiction over adoptions, had jurisdiction to grant

the adoption in this case (id. at 15, 18-20); and

(3) ignored the rule that even jurisdictional collateral

attacks are barred if the issuing court made its own

“jurisdictional determination” (id. at 15-16, 24-26). V.L.

is mistaken on all three grounds.

A. The Alabama Supreme Court correctly

found that the defect in the Georgia

adoption was jurisdictional.

Contrary to V.L.’s argument, the Alabama Supreme

Court recognized and applied the settled rule denying

full faith and credit to a sister-state judgment on the

basis of the judgment’s jurisdictional defects.° Drawing

° See Pet. App. 11a (“emphasizling]” that “our review does not

extend to a review of the legal merits of the Georgia judgment ...

because we are prohibited from making any inquiry into the merits

... by Art. IV. § 1, of the United States Constitution”); id. at 13a

(observing “the question of a court’s jurisdiction over the subject

matter or parties is one of the few grounds upon which a judgment

18

on Justice Holmes’ seminal! discussion from Fauntleroy

v. Lum, the Alabama court observed that the

sometimes “difficult” distinction between jurisdiction

and merits—or as Justice Holmes put it, the question

of whether a statutory requirement is framed in terms

of a court’s “power” or “duty”—ultimately comes down

to “a question of construction and common sense.” Pet.

App. 24a (quoting Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 234-25).

Applying that framework, the Alabama Supreme

Court correctly determined that the Georgia court

lacked power to award the kind of adoption at issue

and that the defect in the adoption was therefore

jurisdictional. The court concluded that the Georgia

adoption statutes “make no provision for a non-spouse

to adopt a child without first terminating the parental

rights of the current parents.” Pet. App. 27a (emphasis

added). Thus, the decree purporting to grant parental

rights to V.L., while expressly preserving the parental

rights of E.L., was “void” because it contravened the

basic “cordition that must exist before [Georgia] courts

can grant adoptions to third parties such as

V.L.”—namely the surrender of rights by all living

parents of the children. Jd. at 30a (citing Ga. Code Ann.

§ 19-8-5(a)). The court properly concluded that this flaw

in the decree was jurisdictional because it went not

merely to the Georgia’s court’s “duty,” but rather to its

“power” to grant the adoption at all. See Pet. App. 30a

(concluding “the Georgia court was not empowered to

enter the Georgia judgment declaring V.L. to be an

adoptive parent of the children”) (emphasis added). In

may be challenged”); id. at 28a (any error in Georgia decree “is

ultimately of no effect unless it implicates the subject-matter

jurisdiction of the Georgia court”).

19

other words, instead of resulting in an adoption that

should not have been entered by the Georgia court, the

defect in this case resulted in an adoption that could

not have been entered under Georgia law. That is a

jurisdictional flaw for purposes of full faith and credit.

See id. at 24a (a merits-based requirement only

“define[s} the duty of the court,” whereas a

jurisdictional requirement “is meant to limit its power”)

(quoting Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 234-35).

V.L. completely fails to engage the Alabama

Supreme Court’s conclusion that the adoption in this

case was void under Georgia law. Instead, she merely

points out that the Georgia court in question had

exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions and says that

“should have been the end of the matter for purposes of

the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” Pet. 16-17 (citing

Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-2(a)). That begs the question. The

fact that the court had jurisdiction over adoptions in

general says nothing about whether the adoption

granted here was within the authority conferred by

Georgia law. As this Court has explained, a general

statutory grant of jurisdiction does not foreclose re-

examining jurisdiction in a particular case if

jurisdiction is “disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by

the record itself.” Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62

(1938). Here the record shows that the adoption

granted to V.L. contravened a basic condition of an

adoption under Georgia law. Pet. App. 30a. The fact

that the court that granted this void adoption had

exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions as a class of cases

cannot create authority where there is none to begin

with.

20

Notably, V.L. does not cite a single decision from a

Georgia court standing for the proposition that the flaw

in the Georgia decree goes only to the merits and not to

jurisdiction. She dismisses statements from a Georgia

Supreme Court Justice and the Georgia court of

appeals strongly suggesting that the Alabama Supreme

Court was right: Georgia courts lack the power to grant

the kind of adoption granted in this case, which is

therefore void. See Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d at 104 (Carley,

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that

Georgia law “specifically proscribes” a second parent

adoption in favor of a non-spouse and questioning

whether courts have “the power to grant such an

adoption under the existing adoption statutes”)

(quoting In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d

678, 681 (Wis. 1994))*®; Bates, 730 S.E.2d at 484 (noting

in dicta that “(t]he idea that Georgia law permits a

‘second parent’ adoption is a doubtful one”) (citing

Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d at 103 (Carley, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari). And she fails to address decisions

from other jurisdictions questioning the power of state

courts to grant second-parent adoptions to persons not

°V_L. argues that Justice Carley would have found that the defect

goes to the merits and not to jurisdiction because he identified it

as a “nonamendable defect” under Georgia Code § 9-11-60(dX3),

instead of § 9-11-60(d)(1) (addressing lack of jurisdiction over “the

person or the subject matter”). Pet. 19-20. V.L. is mistaken. First,

the section referenced by Justice Carley refers, not merely to a

failure to state a claim, but rather to a defect that “affirmatively

show|s] no claim in fact existed.” Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-60(d)(3).

Second, Justice Carley’s opinion emphasized that the defect in

question was not a “technical flaw” in the adoption but rather an

indication that the adoption was “unauthorized” and “specifically

proscribe|d)” by Georgia law. Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d at 104-05

(Carley, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

21

married to the child’s living parent. See S.J.L.S. v.

T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 823 & n.13 (Ky. App. Ct. 2008)

(collecting cases); see also Boseman, 704 N.E.2d at 501

(holding North Carolina courts lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to grant such adoptions).

Instead of discussing any cases about state

jurisdiction to award second-parent adoptions, V.L.

relies on inapposite federal cases that find non-

jurisdictional such requirements as the Title VII

employee threshold (Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500 (2006)), a territorial requirement in the securities

fraud statute (Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, Ltd..,

561 U.S. 247 (2010)), and the requirement of finding

undue hardship before discharging student loan debt in

bankruptcy (United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.

Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)). Pet. 17 The statutory

prerequisites in those cases, however, did not go to the

“tribunal’s power” but only to “whether the allegations

the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.” Morrison, 561

U.S. at 247 (quotations omitted). By contrast, the

surrender of parental rights goes to the power of

Georgia courts to enter an adoption at all. As the lower

court found, an adoption that fails to sever the current

parent’s rights is a legal impossibility under Georgia

law and is therefore void.’

" V.L. also relies on her erroneous claim that the Alabama

Supreme Court held that any statutory error in an adoption

proceeding would leave an adoption open to collateral attack in

other states, thereby “creatl[ing] a massive loophole in the Full

Faith and Credit Clause.” Pet. 22. As explained above, however,

supra I.A, the Alabama Supreme Court limited its holding to

jurisdictional defects and recognized that any error in a sister-

22

In sum, the Alabama Supreme Court correctly

determined that the defect in the Georgia decree

implicated, not (or not only) the merits of the adoption,

but rather the court’s power to award it in the first

place. Thus, the lower court properly recognized that

the Georgia adoption is not entitled to full faith and

credit. See, e.g., Williams, 325 U.S. at 229 (explaining

that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, “[a]

judgment in one State is conclusive upon the merits in

every other State, but only if the court of the first State

had power to pass on the merits—had jurisdiction, that

is, to render the judgment”).

B. Any presumption of jurisdiction is defeated

by the undisputed fact that E.L. did not

surrender her rights.

Alternatively, V.L. argues that the Alabama

Supreme Court was required to apply a “presumption”

that the Georgia court had jurisdiction to award the

adoption to V.L. because, as “a court of general

jurisdiction,” it has subject-matter jurisdiction over

adoptions. Pet. 15. V.L. misunderstands the law. As

she recognizes, this “presumption” of jurisdiction

applies “unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by

the record itself.” Jd. (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at

462). In this case, the Georgia court’s lack of

jurisdiction to award the adoption to V.L. is amply

displayed by “the record itself”: it was “undisputed”

that E.L. did not surrender her parental rights. Pet.

App. 30a. As the Alabama Supreme Court explained,

E.L.’s failure to surrender her parental rights defeats

state adoption “is ultimately of no effect unless it implicates the

subject-matter jurisdiction of the Georgia court.” Pet. App. 28a.

23

the basic “condition that must exist” before a Georgia

court can grant an adoption. Jd. The undisputed record

thus overcomes whatever presumption may operate in

favor of the Georgia court’s jurisdiction.

C. The Alabama Supreme Court’s examination

of jurisdiction is not foreclosed by res

judicata.

Alternatively, V.L. argues that the Georgia court’s

jurisdiction is res judicata because the Georgia court

made a “determination” that it had jurisdiction to

award the adoption without terminating E.L.’s

parental rights. Pet. 15, 24. V.L. is again mistaken.

The rule to which V.L. refers demands, as she

concedes, that the issuing court have “made a

jurisdictional determination that is itself entitled to res

judicata.” Id. at 15. This means that jurisdictional

questions must “have been fully and fairly litigated

and finally decided in the court which rendered the

original judgment’ ” Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co. v.

N.C. Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guar Ass’n, 455 U.S.

691, 706 (1982) (quoting Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106,

111 (1963)). With respect to this case, then, the

question is whether the Georgia court “fully and fairly

litigated” its authority to grant an adoption to a non-

spouse without terminating the parental rights of the

current parents.

The answer is obviously no. Nothing in the adoption

proceedings, or in the decree itself, suggests that the

question of whether Georgia law authorizes the kind of

adoption at issue was even considered, much less “fully

and fairly litigated.” Anticipating this problem, V.L.

struggles to argue that the Georgia court “specifically

24

addressed” jurisdiction in its conclusion of law that

declined to termirate E.L.’s parental rights. Pet. 24.

But that legal conclusion did not address, nor even

mention, the court’s statutory authority to grant the

adoption. Rather, it stated only that it would be

“contrary to the children’s best interests” not to

recognize both women as their legal parents. /d.°

Whether an adoption is in a child’s best interests,

however, is distinct from the prior question of the

court’s authority to grant the adoption in the first

place. See, e.g., Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 681

(“(T]he fact that an adoption—or any other action

affecting a child—is in the child’s best interests, by

itself, does not authorize a court to grant the

adoption.”). Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court did

not question whether the adoption was in the children’s

best interests—which would indeed be a “merits”

determination not re-examinable under full faith and

credit. Rather, the Alabama court questioned whether

the adoption was void because the Georgia court had no

authority to enter it.°

“V.L. also attempts to rely on the Georgia court's finding that she

“complied with all relevant and applicable formalities” for the

adoption petition. Pet. 24. But that boilerplate recitation does not

even mention the court’s authority to grant the adoption; a fortiori,

it cannot amount to a “full and fair litigation” of jurisdiction for full

faith and credit purposes.

*V.L. incorrectly claims that Georgia law forecloses a jurisdictional

challenge to a court’s determination of parental rights by a parent

who participated in prior litigation. Pet. 25. The cases she cites,

however, fail to support that assertion. Amerison v. Vandiver, 673

S.E.2d 850, 851 (Ga. 2009), holds only that under some

circumstances laches may bar a parent’s jurisdi.tional challenge

to a termination of rights. To the extent Marshall v. Marshall, 360

25

In sum, the Georgia court did not address whether

it had jurisdiction to grant the adoption in this case.

Therefore, that court’s jurisdiction was not res judicata

and the Alabama Supreme Court could properly

examine it.

D. Alternatively, the Georgia decree was not

entitled to full faith and credit because V.L.

never had a genuine domicile in Georgia.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision could be

upheld on the alternative ground that the undisputed

record shows V.L. never established a bona fide

Georgia domicile as required by Georgia adoption law.

See Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-3(a)(3) (to petition for

adoption a person must have “been a bona fide resident

of [Georgia] for at least six months immediately

preceding the filing of the petition”); see also, e.g.,

Sastre v. McDaniel, 667 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. App.

2008) (discussing residency requirement for adoptions).

Although E.L. raised this issue, the Alabama Supreme

Court resolved the full faith and credit issue on other

grounds. See Pet. App. 30a n.10 (declining to consider

E.L’s alternative argument that “the Georgia judgment

is also void because E.L. was not a bona fide resident of

Georgia”).

A party’s failure to establish a domicile supporting

a sister state judgment is a ground for denying full

faith and credit to that judgment. See, e.g., Williams,

325 U.S. at 237 (North Carolina properly resisted full

S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1987), ever supported the proposition V.L. asserts,

the decision is no longer good law. See Scott v. Scott, 644 S.E.2d

842, 844 (Ga. 2007) (overruling Marshall).

26

faith and credit to Nevada divorce where “the evidence

demonstrated that petitioners went to Nevada solely

for the purpose of obtaining a divorce and intended all

along to return to North Carolina”); Estin v. Estin, 334

U.S. 541, 543 (1948) (explaining that “while the finding

of domicile by the court that granted the [divorce]

decree is entitled to prima facie weight, it is not

conclusive in a sister State but might be relitigated

there”); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 578

(1956) (allowing Ohio challenge to Florida divorce

judgment on basis of lack of domicile).

Here, the record shows without contradiction that

V.L. never established a bona fide domicile in Georgia.

Instead, she and E.L. leased a Georgia home solely to

provide a temporary setting for the “home study”

required by the adoption process. See supra A. All the

while, however, V.L. continued to live and work in

Alabama and never intended to live in Georgia. Pet.

App. 6a-7a; see also, e.g., Sastre, 667 S.E.2d at 673

(“bona fide resident” in Georgia adoption statutes

means having “a single fixed place of abode with the

intention of remaining there indefinitely”) (quotations

and citations omitted). Because “the evidence

demonstrate|[s] that [V.L.] went to [Georgia] solely for

the purpose of obtaining [the adoption] and intended

all along to return to [Alabama],” Alabama courts

would have been justified in denying full faith and

credit to the Georgia adoption. Williams, 325 U.S. at

237 (brackets added).

It is true that this Court has held, in the divorce

context, that a party to the divorce cannot thereafter

collaterally challenge the original court’s “finding of

jurisdictional facts ... made in proceedings in which the

27

[challenger] appeared and participated.” Sherrer v.

Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948). That principle,

however, would not preclude a court from denying full

faith and credit to the adoption decree in this case on

the basis of V.L.’s lack of domicile. The rule barring

collateral attacks on jurisdictional facts is triggered

only if the court issuing the original judgment actually

adjudicated the jurisdictional question at issue. See,

e.g., Durfree, 375 U.S. at 112 (where “the question of

subject-matter jurisdiction had been fully litigated in

the original forum, the issue could not be retried in a

subsequent action between the parties”) (citing Davis

v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S.

165 (1938); Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.

66 (1939)); see also, e.g., Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 356 (full

faith and credit bars re-litigating “findings of

jurisdictional fact made by a competent court”). In this

case, nothing in the Georgia adoption proceedings or

the decree itself suggests the issue of V.L.’s domicile

was litigated at all. Furthermore, the Georgia decree

makes no findings regarding V.L.’s domicile.

In sum, because V.L.’s Georgia domicile was not

litigated in the Georgia proceedings, no full faith and

credit principle would prevent Alabama courts from

examining whether V.L. actually established a bona

fide domicile sufficient to support the adoption. The

record in this case provides only one possible answer to

that question: V.L. “went to [Georgia] solely for the

purpose of obtaining [the adoption] and intended all

along to return to [Alabama].” Williams, 325 U.S. at

237 (brackets added). The Full Faith and Credit Clause

does not require Alabama courts to recognize an

adoption obtained by such jurisdictional

gamesmanship.

-~ =! = aa ~

28

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

S. Kyle Duncan

Counsel of Record

DUNCAN PLLC

1629 K St. NW, Ste. 300

Washington, DC 20006

202.714.9492

kduncan@duncanpllc.com

Randall W Nichols

Anne Lamkin Durward

MASSEY, STOTSER

& NICHOLS, PC

1780 Gadsden Highway

Birmingham, AL 35235

205.838.9002

rnichols@msnattorneys.com

Counsel for Respondent E.L.