Petitioners Brief — Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505)

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0. 14-7505 MAY 28 201

—sipreme out US

FILED

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

TIMOTHY LEE HuRST,

Petiti

Vv.

F’LORIDA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT C ¥ CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

NANCY A. DANIELS

PUBLIC DEFENDER

DAVID A. DAVIS

ASSISTANT PUBLIC

DEF: NDER

Leon County Courthouse

301 South Monrve Street

Suite 401

Tallahassee, FL, 32301

MARK E. OLIVE

LAW OFFICES OF

MARK E. OLIVE, FP .A.

320 West Jefferson Street

Tallahassee, FL 32361

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

CATHERINE M.A. CARROLL

DAVID M. LEHN

FRANCESCO VALENTINI

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

seth. waxman@wilmerhale.com

ErRIc F. FLETCHER

ALLISON TRZOP

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme vio-

lates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment

in light of this Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536

U.S. 584 (2002).

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

oe i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............ccccsssscscssssessescessess vi

STITT nrhiusiihtiatinisciniasbeenntaiasinieniianninpsnanatmmaenidanies 1

TITTY sinicsiascshicsieateittentineiaeieideinitininniinbiniasaubidaias 3

Fee itencensnnemmnemnnen 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED. .........cc.ccsccsessessecsesseeseceee 3

SEIU cenansneresorensemanemainetnnsemennmasemnnenenenmmenenennstes 4

A. Hurst’s Trial, Initial Sentencing, And

Post-Conviction Proceedings ..............:.s0-s--sseeee 4

in ee i recerccereceneersenneeeneseees 6

C. The Decision Under Review .....................000 12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. ...000..0....ccccccccceeeceeseesees 14

a carncintccanincientertndaiteresienatiinnnemnininemmintianinsimiseieinaten 17

Il. FLORIDA’S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME

VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION UNDER

A. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme

Violates The Sixth Amendment Be-

cause The Judge Finds Facts Neces-

sary For Imposition Of The Death

B. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme

Violates The Eighth Amendment Be-

cause It Assigns To The Judge The

Power To Impose The Death Penalty.............. 26

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Il. THE JURY’S ADVISORY VERDICT DOES Not

IMPLY THE FINDING REQUIRED BY RING.............. 31

Ill. Ir THE JURY’S ADVISORY VERDICT ImM-

PLIED THE FINDING REQUIRED By RING,

HuURST’S SENTENCE WOULD VIOLATE THE

CONSTITUTION FOR OTHER REASONS. ........--...0--+++- 34

A. Hurst’s Sentence Would Violate The

Eighth Amendment Because It Would

Have Been Based On Jury Instructions

That Misleadingly Minimized The Ju-

ry’s Sense Of Responsibility.......................0000+. 35

B. Hurst’s Sentence Would Violate The

Sixth And Eighth Amendments Be-

cause The Jury's Supposed Implied

Finding May Have Been Made By Only

Fe iccicatentenccscasioneninninnenimeeseneeses 36

1. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-

2. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments forbid Florida’s simple-

majority rule in capital cases .................++.- 47

C. Hurst’s Sentence Would Be Unconsti-

tutional Because The Aggregate Effect

Of The Defects In Florida’s Capital

Sentencing Scheme Subverts The Ju-

ry’s Deliberative Function.................ccccceeeees 52

CURES cncennrsnnnsrsccenssesecnsensnansemneensenesnseemansenennseninns 54

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

APPENDIX: Pertinent Constitutional and

Statutory Provisions

Sits CI, GIS W Biccccccccsccncscecssscssensnsssevonennnees la

U.S. Const. amend. XIV .........ccccccccecccceseeceececeees la

Fla. Stat. § 775.082 (2011) .....ccccccccccecceeeseeeeseees la

Fla. Stat. $ 921.141 (2010) .........c.cccccccecceceseeseesccee 8a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975)............ccsceeseeee 8

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492

TT hscoriecihcoseietiintinsaasetadisuaiuiadiuabeinaptinaeuniadosavesimeemnesendints 43

Alleyne v. United States,

133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)............. 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 46, 47

Andres v. United States,

ee IE ccrstenvccsencnenesnsnscnnenentnneemennnstntts 28, 38

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404

ee eee 38, 38, 40, 45, 52

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

en 17, 19, 27, 39, 40, 49

Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d

TT ition inerinsinnirepraimiensansiinnadapiciamiainsins 43

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)... 10, 49

Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175 (Fla. 2010) .0.........cccsseccessenseeee 7

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ........ccccccceeeeees 41

Ball v. State, 70 S.E. 888 (Ga. Ct. App.

REREAD SORES ERD verse Tener vO an Oe ETO 42

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) ...........scccccsssesssserereeesees 30

Beck yv. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).............0. 47, 48, 50

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

I Nicatiniiaitdeiaatiiniiniataetnainbipemememmmanes 19, 23, 24, 25, 34

Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693

Sues aTTITTaiiisiiehcittiieesiteiehigainliinianaiaiieatiamsinaniandansl 9, 51

Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314

IIIT siti oinieraiiateaicdgrnesieninaliapeneniniaidienmiannintid 25

Burch v. Louisiana,

441 U.S. 130 (19739) ................... 3, 17, 39, 41, 45, 52, 53

Caldwell v. Mississippi,

ee incisicatccrncenicinteinnininigninmananiittite 16, 35

Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2008)...........0...0..0... 21

Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1988)............... 21, 36

Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1997)................c00000+ i)

Delgado v. State, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 871

Se A a I iceseceeetenccectiniatitenieniiedienteieminenneecensicinis 20

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) .............. 25, 37

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) ............. 27, 48

Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1983)................000 8,9

Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992)......... 21, 22, 31

Ex parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024

I TTT dasa ciricieniitard aeaahacattaidiinninaanneecintnsigimaening 25

Fisher v. State, 291 N.E. 2d 76 (Ind. 1978) ................00 42

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) ..........ccceceeees 48

Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2007)...............-2.. 34

Fulgham v. State, 46 So. 3d 315

ARIE RR Ee Oe a 42

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) .........0-cesesesesees 47

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48

EERE SEY Sa ee aC ON 50

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

RE LEE eee eae 30, 31, 47, 50, 51

Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d

ET eee en 9,21

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986

EEE Se a ee ee TT 48, 49, 50

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957

ERR Een renee eh ae 51

Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) ..............00. 27, 30

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545

indiana ciliata itil deine cealbaitbitienlnataaiinaaias 25

Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197

SESE ASE ee ee EE 38

Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638

RES Ee 13, 19, 22

Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288

ERE ET Ie eT 42

Hurst v. Florida, 537 U.S. 977 (2002)...........ccccsssseeseeeeees 5

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356

EERE es SR wee ena 38, 39, 45, 53

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.

I ail ietriciaarari eat iarratsineesiaiatintiaictati 15, 31, 33

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Kaczmar v. State, 104 So. 3d 990

ESSER ES SR TEt 2 A eee eae 8

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)..............ccccecceeceeeeeees 48

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.

SUITE cctisehaiisdaieninhigsintapiiabintdninaniemennsememmpenanninien 38, 46

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183

STITT ciasvniechiethtesninsinnniasiananitaleiiatbesdiciniibeianitcamuaiiaititvitink 28, 49

McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433

ITT stsisicietesapenescaisemeithitaiaheltidatiinasiabhddtailandatiiainiate 49, 50

Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).............. 47, 50, 51

Motion to Call Circuit Judge to Bench,

Be Tiss liideicsantiaitcitatinipiitaninnpaninnincciasiionci 51

Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53 (1884) 20.0... eeceeeeeeeeees 29

People v. DeCillis, 199 N.E.2d 380

ees Nia hic caeieaseietticiahletetilabanlinnlin iii iireeeiiamesitaeninn 42

People v. Russo, 25 P.3d 641 (Cal. 2001) .............ccceeeeee 42

Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009)... eeeeeee 22

Prieto v. Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 910

as sniinniiiall 43

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) ...........cccccsseecesees 27

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)... passim

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325

ECE re eee a Ce 48

Rodriguez Sanchez v. State, 503 So. 2d

ee 51

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) .0....... ec eeeeeseeee 35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1980)............. 8, 20, 21

Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2011) .................... 8, 20

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,

I i eenieial 47

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) .................cceeeeeee 32

Southern Union Co. v. United States,

I scsi 19, 25, 27

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447

SRST Pn ee COO 22, 26, 29, 30

Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 :

a Sasi atinehceieelntietecioeedaiei pendant 8, 20

State v. Arceo, 928 P.2d 843 (Haw. 1996) ..............c..:.-2 42

State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150

I asinine 42

State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1978) .............:cc0-++ 8,19

State v. Dushame, 616 A.2d 469

LSE eae oO eT 42

State v. Hochstein, 632 N.W.2d 273

ciated 42

State v. Logue, 28 S.E.2d 788

TE Ee aE eT 42

State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538

RACERS Orc onanaee SOI 7, 8, 31, 32, 43

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

ES LAUR ee eee Oe NO IO 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506

IIT isesinesiinpiniieitiaeteitabandaiiemiaanatanitinmininaneeiitmaniebeiiiiaen 24, 46

United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338

a ctieclaicaeenentielil 414

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639

TUTTE isesicthdineisheieniieiiithleaelinaibneenntpanine 15, 18, 22, 23, 31

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78

RR ASR EE ea a 52

Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735

EEE eee ee 8, 9, 20

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510

EES NE en 30

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.

iliac caiman 27, 28, 48, 49

Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct.

TEEN ne ne eT 26, 29

STATUTES AND RULES

I ial 42

I a aacentelalaniiiieniaiens 3

Ba ira sat earniaeibilitiibiehiliniicenidaeeniieh 42

pT EEE aC ee ene eee 42

EE | ee 42

Ark. Code Ann.

a al al 42

a 42

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

I a uininiaciianii 42

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-10-108......................cccccceecsesee 42

Conn. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P § 42-29 o........cccsccesesseseesees 42

BR BR Se eee 42

I a ccumeineoons 42,51

Fla. Stat.

I IID ccccececcecencecreenneennevnnenenseusnsciti 6, 18

§ 921.141 (2010)

ESE I oe ae anne he Mase mee nen 7

Te OE Ere ee 6, 7

ET eee 6, 8, 9, 18, 20

ESET coe a a TR 12

EEE eR ee eRe nM Tre 7,9

EE TESTE eee eae ea Cee 7,18

EEE cetera Eee 42

Idaho Code Ann.

EER RE ee eo ee re ee 42

REITER ESE ee ne a ae aE ee ER 42

RE a ee 42

ee a, Cs FD crrenieincscicnnsenstnsentisnasennoions 42

RR RS 42

EO oe TE 42

I eines 42

ERT 42

La. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 782(A)..........cccccccceccccesseseees 42

Oe | Eee 42

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

SE, Se CI, F. SIGID cccrnnrscnsecisnsiinseniiniiiotatmeniadiaaanaa 42

Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, art. 21 0.0... cceeeseseeenees 42

Ss ibe QIN crincrnesrccesicesneneianieiinntiaidammae 42

a BR, COR. FP. i a ncccscenscissvnniocnineeniniishiiaiaieaniemeanataman 42

Se, Ge, BR. GI ccsssccersensnscnnicnteenniteninensauaesaiiaaianiiai 42

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, sualod. 1(5).........cccccccccesssscoscccssees 42

SS 42

ee. Casa, GR. B, GN, SEA ecncccneniniccisincseduiintieinaiiiaseainaig 42

pe 8 Ee 42

De. CI, CII, BT irvivtcesenninntintanibiiniettemiiagionaane 42

N.C. Gam. Stat. § 1G Ap TRB E (a) ..cccccccsscsssscesecsessscnsesescesonss 42

Re ee eH 42

8 Re § Se Sf eee 42

Peas CAR. Bhs. BED Dirrennncencssenicssnnsninctinatiniiniiiaaaael 42

BEB, Bh. CUR, F. GIG nccceereivisinicnvennctiaiiaaiiaanaal 42

Ae FSS , Re 42

Ee eee ee 42

SOOT, BRN U. GRR, © TGR cccensnssnniensiinnttitienmnaninuiiniiiammamaiaa 42

Re SS | 42

Oe 42

Go. Caria. G0, BB Di cicccrrsenntstensinntiivititeaanieinateliaaniana 42

Pes Be GORI, Fe Ga iececrsnserseitennsiinntinintnneaaiamaana 42

R. for Courts-Martial 1004(a)(2) 00.0... ceccceeeeeeeeee 42

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

ES ESS ee 42

S.D. Codified Laws § 23 A-26-1 ...0...........cccccsceseeseeseneeesens 42

ee aa 42

Tex. Code Crim. P.

EL 42

i ern caatrerettainneaeniaianenennenties 42

Ee 42

Eee 42

EE 42

Ee 42

a 42

EE 42

i nas atetnrtmremnenemnenemmntnnennmnenenes 42

EE Se 42

Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R. § 6.16(a)(2) .........cccccceceresenees 42

Wis. Const.

EEE 42

I EEE 42

a 42

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Se 40

1 Adams, John, A Defence of the

Constitutions of Government of the

United States of America (3d ed. 1797) ..............0-+ 40

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

American Bar Association, Standards of

Judicial Administration Relating to

Pe iiictiecncnennnitineniitenintaicinennntuinmnasnes 46

i Bishop, Joel Prentiss, Commentaries on

the Law of Criminal Procedure (1866) ...............--+. 41

3 Blackstone. Sir William, Commentaries on

the Laws of E-mgland (1768) ...............essereesereereneerees 40

4 Blackstone, Sir William, Commentaries on

the Laws of England (1769) ..........-cssssereeserserensesees 40

Cooley, Thomas McIntyre, A Treatise on the

Constitutional Limitations Which Rest

Upon the Legislative Power of the States

of the American Unt0n (1868) ........c-eseeeeeseeeerenes 41

Devine, Dennis J., et al., Jury Decision

Making: 45 Years of Empirical

Research on Deliberating Groups,

7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 622 (2001) ...............c0000 44

Douglass, John G., Confronting Death: Sixth

Amendment Rights at Capital

Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1967

Ehrhardt, Charles W. & L. Harold

Levinson, Florida’s Legislative

Response to Furman: An Exercise in

Futility?, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology

SN 29

lontcheva, Jenia, Jury Sentencing as

Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311

xvi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Jonakait, Randolph N., The American Jury

Knowlton, Robert E., Problems of Jury

Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa.

is es Sin eiteiencenhceseineniihdnmnennetindintinon 29

Langbein, John H., The Origins of

Adversary Criminal Trial (20038) .............c.-0c-0+-000 27

Lillquist, Erik, The Puzzling Return of Jury

Sentencing: Misgivings about Apprendi,

82 N.C. L. Rev. G21 (2004).........ccccccccccccccssecssecseces 27, 28

Proffatt, John, A Treatise on Trial by Jury

SEER ee er 41

3 Story, Joseph, Commentaries on the Con-

stitution of the United States (1833)................-.-0- 41

Sundby, Scott E., War and Peace in the

Jury Room: How Capital Juries Reach

Unanimity, 62 Hastings L.J. 103 (2010)................. 44

Taylor-Thompson, Kim, Empty Votes in

Jury Deliberations, 113 Harv. L. Rev.

RRM Re TEE UNECE SAO ee 44

Tiffany, Joel, A Treatise on Government,

and Constititional Law (1867) .........0.cccccccceseerereeee 41

2 Wilson, James, The Works of the

Honourable James Wilson, L.L.D.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 14-7505

TIMOTHY LEE HURST,

Petitioner,

Vv.

FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

INTRODUCTION

Under Florida law, a defendant convicted of a capi-

tal felony cannot be sentenced to death unless the State

proves beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statuto-

ry aggravating circumstance. Because the existence of

a statutory aggravator is a condition of the defendant’s

eligibility for a death sentence, its determination must

“be entrusted to the jury.” Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.

584, 597 (2002).

Florida law, however, assigns this factfinding role

to the trial judge. In Florida, the court makes its own

findings as to the existence of aggravating and mitigat-

ing circumstances and conducts its own weighing of

those circumstances before imposing a sentence of its

own determination. In doing so, the court may consider

evidence that was never shown to a jury, and may find

aggravators that were not found by or even presented

to a jury. Only the judge’s written findings of fact are

relevant on appellate review of a death sentence.

Florida juries play only an advisory role. The jury

recommends a sentence of life or death based on its as-

sessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

but that recommendation has no binding effect. More-

over, the jury renders its advisory verdict under pro-

cedures that degrade the integrity of the jury’s func-

tion. Unanimity, and the deliberation often needed to

achieve it, is not necessary; only a bare majority vote is

required to recommend a death sentence. The jury

makes no express findings on aggravating circumstanc-

es. And jurors voting for a death sentence need not

even agree on which aggravating circumstance exists.

In this case, for example, the State presented two

aggravators in arguing that petitioner Timothy Lee

Hurst should be sentenced to death. The jury recom-

mended a death sentence by a bare majority of seven to

five. The jury made no express findings as to any ag-

gravator. It is entirely possible that four jurors found

one aggravator, and three found the other, but that at

least two-thirds of the jurors rejected each. The trial

court made its own findings that each aggravator exist-

ed beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed the death

sentence based on its own weighing of the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances.

Mr. Hurst’s death sentence and the procedures it

resulted from cannot stand. Florida’s capital sentenc-

ing scheme contravenes this Court’s holding in Ring

that findings of fact necessary to authorize a death sen-

tence may not be entrusted to the judge. It departs

from the procedures that apply in every other State

that allows death sentencing. And it undermines the

jury’s basic Sixth and Eighth Amendment functions as

responsible factfinder and voice of the community’s

moral judgment. This case thus arises “at the intersec-

tion of [this Court’s] decisions” according capital de-

fendants basic Sixth and Eighth Amendment protec-

tions in sentencing. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130,

137 (1979). Even if a State can constitutionally assign

the jury only an advisory role, or permit different ag-

gravators to be found by different jurors on different

theories, or allow the jury to find aggravating circum-

stances by a bare majority, a State cannot do all these

things at once without transgressing those constitu-

tional protections.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida

(J A289-321) is reported at 147 So. 3d 435. The order

denying rehearing (J A322) is unpublished but is availa-

ble at 2014 Fla. LEXIS 2652. The judgment of the Cir-

cuit Court, First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia

County, Florida (J A272-288) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Florida entered judgment

on May 1, 2014, and denied a timely motion for rehear-

ing on September 4, 2014. The petition for a writ of

certiorari was filed on December 3, 2014. This Court

has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent provisions of the Sixth and Eighth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Florida

Statutes §§ 775.082 and 921.141 are reproduced in the

Appendix to this brief.

STATEMENT

A. Hurst’s Trial, Initial Sentencing, And Post-

Conviction Proceedings

On May 2, 1998, Cynthia Lee Harrison was killed at

a Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in Escambia

County, Florida, where she worked as an assistant

manager. Petitioner Timothy Lee Hurst, Harrison’s

coworker, was charged with first-degree murder, a cap-

ital felony under Florida law.

At Hurst’s jury trial, the State presented evidence

that on the day of Harrison’s murder, Harrison and

Hurst were scheduled to be at work at 8:00am in prepa-

ration for the restaurant’s opening at 10:30am. JA27-

28. A witness testified that he saw Harrison arrive at

the restaurant between 7:00am and 8:30am and go in-

side, followed shortly thereafter by a man the witness

later identified as Hurst. Jd. Tonya Crenshaw, another

assistant manager, testified that when she arrived at

10:30am, she found the door to the restaurant locked

and another employee waiting outside with a delivery-

truck driver. JA28. Crenshaw testified that when they

entered the restaurant, they discovered that the safe

was open and money was missing. JA28-29. The driver

found Harrison’s body in the freezer. Harrison’s hands

were bound with electrical tape, and she had tape over

her mouth. Harrison had “suffered a minimum of sixty

incised slash and stab wounds” and had “blood stains on

the knees of her pants, indicating that she had been

kneeling in her blood.” JA29. According to the medical

examiner, Harrison’s wounds “were consistent with the

use of a box cutter.” Jd.

Two of Hurst’s friends, Michael Williams and “Lee-

Lee” Smith, testified that Hurst told them he had killed

Harrison and that he had previously talked about

robbing the restaurant. JA29-30. According to Smith,

Hurst showed up at Smith’s house on the morning of

May 2 with a container of money. Smith said he

washed Hurst’s bloody pants and threw away Hurst’s

socks and shoes. JA30.

Smith’s mother discovered the container of money

the next day and contacted the police. JA30. In a gar-

bage can at Smith’s house, the police found a coin purse

containing Harrison’s driver’s license and other per-

sonal items. They also found a bank bag marked with

“Popeye’s” and Harrison’s name, a bank deposit slip

bearing Hurst’s fingerprints, and a blood-stained sock

later determined to have “DNA typing ... consistent

with the victim.” JA30-31. Tape similar to that used to

bind Harrison’s hands and mouth was found in Hurst’s

car, and evidence indicated that Hurst had been seen

with a box cutter several days before the murder.

JA29.

The jury was instructed that it could find Hurst

guilty of first-degree murder under two theories:

“premeditated murder” and “felony murder”—+.e., the

“death occurred as a consequence of and while [Hurst]

was engaged in the commission of Robbery.” Jury In-

structions 3-4, State v. Hurst, No. 98-1795-C (Fla. Es-

cambia County Ct. Mar. 23, 2000). The jury convicted

Hurst of first-degree murder, but its general verdict

form did not specify which theory was the basis of the

conviction. Verdict, State v. Hurst, No. 98-1795-C (Fla.

Escambia County Ct. Mar. 23, 2000). Hurst was not

separately convicted of any robbery in connection with

Harrison’s murder. JA308. After penalty-phase pro-

ceedings, Hurst was sentenced to death. The Supreme

Court of Florida affirmed, JA27, and this Court denied

Hurst’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 537 U.S. 977

(2002).

On post-conviction review, the Supreme Court of

Florida vacated Hurst’s death sentence. JA127. Based

on evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing,

the court held that there was “no reasonable, strategic

reason” for Hurst’s attorney’s failure to investigate or

present evidence concerning Hurs<’s borderline intelli-

gence—reflected in ‘‘an IQ of somewhere between 70

and 78” and “below average adaptive functioning

skills’—or evidence that Hurst suffered from brain

damage consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome. JA179-

187. Counsel’s failure, the court determined, “had an

identifiable detrimental effect on the process of weigh-

ing the aggravation and mitigation in this case.” JA190.

The court ordered that Hurst be resentenced.

B. Hurst’s Resentencing

1. Under Florida law, capital sentencing proceeds

“according to the procedure set forth in § 921.141” of

the Florida Statutes. Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1) (2011).' A

death sentence can be imposed only if that procedure

“yesults in findings by the court that such person shall

be punished by death,” id., including a finding that at

least one statutory aggravator exists, id. § 921.141(3)(a)

(2010). Otherwise, “such person shall be punished by

life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.” /d.

§ 775.082(1).

Under § 921.141, the trial court begins the separate

penalty phase with a jury trial, but the jury’s role is

limited. “After hearing all the evidence,” the jury must

“deliberate and render an advisory sentence” recom-

mending either life imprisonment or death. Fla. Stat.

All citations of Florida Statutes are to the versions in effect

when Hurst was resentenced. The current versions remain sub-

stantially the same in relevant respects.

§ 921.141(2).? Only “a majority vote is necessary for a

death recommendation.” Awlt v. State, 53 So. 3d 175,

205 (Fla. 2010). The jury must consider:

(a) [wJhether sufficient paul aggravating

circumstances exist ..

(b) [wJhether sufficient mitigating circum-

stances exist which outweigh the aggravating

circumstances found to exist; and

defendant should be sentenced to life impris-

onment or death.

Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2); see also id. § 921.141(5)-(6) (list-

ing aggravating and mitigating circumstances).

The jury may “return an advisory sentence in favor

of death [only if] a majority of the jury ... find[s} beyond

a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggra-

vating circumstance.” Ault, 53 So. 3d at 205. Florida

law, however, “does not require jury findings on aggra-

vating circumstances.” State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538,

544 (Fla. 2006). The trial court is actually prohibited

from using a special verdict form that would require the

jury to record its vote on each aggravating factor pre-

sented to it. Jd. at 544-548. Moreover, “{njothing in

[Florida law] ... requires a majority of the jury to agree

on which aggravating circumstances exist.” Jd. at 545.

As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, Florida

law permits a jury to recommend a death sentence

where four jurors believe one aggravator applies, and

The court may admit evidence it deems “probative” and

“relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the de-

fendant ..., regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary

rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair oppor-

tunity to rebut any hearsay statements.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1).

three jurors believe a second aggravator applies, be-

cause in that situation, “seven jurors believe that at

least one aggravator applies.” /d.

Once the jury has rendered its advisory sentence,

the court may impose a death sentence only if it inde-

pendently finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least

one “sufficient” aggravating circumstance exists and

that the aggravators are not outweighed by any miti-

gating circumstances. Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735,

751 (Fla. 2007); see also Kaczmar v. State, 104 So. 3d

990, 1006 (Fla. 2012); Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433, 444

(Fla. 1975); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973). In

making that determination, the court “is not bound by

the jury’s recommendation.” Williams, 967 So. 2d at

751. Instead, the judge has “final authority to deter-

mine the appropriate sentence.” I/d.; Engle v. State, 438

So. 2d 803, 813 (Fla. 1983). Section 921.141(3) directs

that “[nJotwithstanding the recommendation of a major-

ity of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravat-

ing and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence

of life imprisonment or death.” Although the court must

give the jury’s recommendation “great weight and seri-

ous consideration,” the court “must still exercise its rea-

soned judgment in deciding whether the death penalty

should be imposed.” Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197

(Fla. 1980). Thus, “the trial court is required to make

independent findings on aggravation, mitigation, and

weight.” Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 198 (Fla. 2011).

To make those findings, the trial court typically

conducts a separate sentencing hearing before the

judge alone, known as a Spencer hearing, wherein both

sides are given “an opportunity to be heard,” “to pre-

sent additional evidence,” and “to comment on or rebut

information in any presentence or medical report.”

Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-691 (Fla. 1993).

The court may consider evidence and arguments that

were not presented to the jury and may find aggrava-

tors that were not found by or presented to the jury.

Williams, 967 So. 2d at 751; Engle, 438 So. 2d at 813;

see also Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 709 (Fla.

2002); Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 1997).

If the court imposes the death sentence, it must “set

forth in writing its findings.” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3).

And it is those “written findings of fact and the trial

record”—not the jury’s advisory verdict—that “furnish

the basis for [the Florida Supreme] Court’s review of ...

death sentences.” Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833,

839 (Fla. 1988), receded from on other grounds in Fran-

qui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997).

2. Hurst’s resentencing proceeded in accordance

with these provisions of Florida law. On remand, the

trial court first allowed evidence of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances to be presented to the jury.

See JA296. “[TJhe State presented an abbreviated ver-

sion of the trial testimony as to the circumstances of

the murder,” id., and presented two aggravating cir-

cumstances to the jury: that Hurst had murdered Har-

rison while engaged in the commission of a robbery,

and that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious,

or cruel,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(d), (h); see JA959-960.

Defense counsel invited the jury to question whether

there was reasonable doubt as to those aggravating cir-

cumstances and what weight to give them, JA978-980,

and “presented testimony concerning mitigation,”

JA296. In addition to Hurst’s young age at the time of

the murder, Hurst’s lack of prior criminal history, and

other mitigating circumstances, defense counsel con-

tended that Hurst’s capacity to conform his conduct to

law was substantially impaired by low mental function-

ing. JA970-977, 980-981, 984.

Several of Hurst’s relatives and teachers testified

about Hurst’s difficult childhood and limited mental ca-

pacity. For example, during pregnancy, Hurst’s moth-

er, who was just 15 years old at the time, “drank all day,

every day.” JA300. Hurst’s school wanted to place him

in a special-education program, but his mother objected.

JA301. By the time of the murder, Hurst was a 19-year-

old who “had to be reminded to take care of himself ...

[and] to bathe and dress appropriately.” Jd.

Several expert witnesses testified about Hurst’s in-

tellectual disabilities. A psychiatrist opined that

“Hurst has widespread abnormalities in multiple areas

of his brain ... associated with lack of judgment, risk

taking, impulsivity, and immaturity.” JA302. Two psy-

chologists testified that his IQ was as low as 69, and

that he is mentally retarded. JA268-269, 302-304. The

State’s psychologist, however, emphasized Hurst’s past

testing “resulting in ... IQ scores of 76 and 78,” and

concluded “that Hurst does not meet the criteria for

mental retardation.” JA304.°

At the end of the penalty-phase trial, the court in-

structed the jury as to its “duty” “to advise the court”

on Hurst’s sentence. JA207. The instructions empha-

sized that:

the final decision as to which punishment shall

be imposed is the responsibility of the judge. ...

However, the law requires you to render an

advisory sentence as to which punishment

should be imposed ...

* In light of this testimony, the trial court “determin[ed] that

Hurst did not meet the test for mental retardation as a bar to the

death penalty” under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

J A304-306.

Although the recommendation of the jury as to

the penalty is advisory in nature and is not

binding, the jury recommendation must be giv-

en great weight and deference by the Court in

determining which punishment to impose.

JA207-208.

The court then instructed the jury that it could

consider two aggravating circumstances: whether

Hurst had committed the murder while engaged in the

commission of a robbery, and whether the murder was

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.” JA211-212.

The court also listed the mitigating circumstances the

jury could consider, JA213-214, and explained the

weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances

required under § 921.141, JA215. Finally, the court in-

structed that “it is not necessary that the advisory sen-

tence of the jury be unanimous.” /d. Rather, “[i}f a ma-

jority of the jury, seven or more, determine that Timo-

thy Lee Hurst should be sentenced to death, your advi-

sory sentence will be” a recommendation of death.

JA216.

After deliberating for less than two hours, the jury

recommended a death sentence. The vote was seven to

five. JA24-25. The verdict form did not identify any

aggravators found, JA217, and the trial court denied

Hurst’s request “for an interrogatory verdict to specify

the aggravators found and the votes on each,” J A307.

After discharging the jury, the trial court held a

Spencer hearing. JA218, 258. Hurst and the State each

presented sentencing memoranda, but presented no

additional evidence. JA230, 238, 258. Four months af-

ter the Spencer hearing, the court sentenced Hurst to

death. JA271. The court stated that it had “inde-

pendently weighfed] the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances.” JA259. The court underscored that it

had “carefully considered the evidence, the arguments

of counsel, and the relevant legal authority.” JA260.

The court made no mention of the jury’s advisory ver-

dict, except to say it “hald] given [the jury’s recom-

mendation] great weight.” JA271.

In its independent review of the sentencing evi-

dence, the court found and assigned “great weight” to

both aggravating circumstances presented by the

State—that the murder was “committed while [Hurst]

was engaged in the commission of a robbery” and that

the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.”

JA261-263. The court also found and assigned “moder-

ate weight” to three mitigating circumstances: Hurst’s

lack of any significant criminal history, Hurst’s young

age at the time of the crime, and Hurst’s “significant

mental issues”—namely, his “limited intellectual capac-

ity” and the “widespread abnormalities in his brain ...

consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome,” which affect

“judgment and impulse control.” JA263-270. Finally,

the court concluded that, in its judgment, “the aggra-

vating factors applicable to this crime outweigh the

mitigating factors presented.” JA271.

C. The Decision Under Review

On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of Flori-

da, see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(4), Hurst challenged his sen-

tence on several grounds. Among other things, Hurst

argued that, in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584

(2002), “constitutional error occurred in his case because

the advisory jury in the penalty phase was not required

to find specific facts as to the aggravating factors, and

[because] the jury was not required to make a unani-

mous recommendation as to the sentence.” JA307.*

The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hurst’s ar-

guments and affirmed the death sentence. The court

observed that, before Ring, this Court had upheld Flor-

ida’s capital sentencing scheme in Hildwin v. Florida

on the ground that “{tJhe Sixth Amendment does not

require that the specific findings authorizing the impo-

sition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.”

J A309 (quoting 490 U.S. 638, 640-641 (1989)). Florida

courts had subsequently held that “Ring does not re-

quire the jury to make specific findings of the aggrava-

tors or to make a unanimous jury recommendation as to

sentence.” JA307. The Florida Supreme Court “de-

cline{[d] to revisit those decisions in [Hurst’s] case.”

J A308. The court concluded that Hildwin remains good

law because this Court “has never expressly overruled”

it and because “Florida’s sentencing procedures do

provide for jury input about the existence of aggravat-

ing factors prior to sentencing—a process that was

completely lacking in the Arizona statute struck down

in Ring.” JA309-310.

Justice Pariente dissented on the ground that

“there was no unanimous jury finding of either of the

two aggravating circumstances found by the trial

* Hurst also argued that the trial court had erred in rejecting

his assertion of mental retardation as a bar to execution under Af-

kins and refusing to submit the question of mental retardation to

the jury. JA297-298, 306. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected

each of these contentions. JA298-307.

Hurst’s petition for certiorari sought review of his Atkins

claim, including the question whether the factual issues relevant to

an Atkins claim must be submitted to the jury. Because the re-

vised question as to which this Court granted review does not ap-

pear to encompass those issues, this brief does not address them.

judge.” JA314. Justice Pariente observed that a de-

fendant convicted of first-degree murder is not eligible

for a death sentence in Florida unless additional find-

ings of fact are made regarding aggravators and miti-

gators. JA316. And under Ring, all facts necessary for

imposition of a sentence must be found by a jury.

JA316-317. In Hurst’s case, however, “the jury rec-

ommended death by the slimmest margin permitted

under Florida law—a bare majority seven-to-five vote,”

and it was “actually possible that there was not even a

majority of jurors who agreed that the same aggrava-

tor applied.” JA315. In Justice Pariente’s view, that

outcome contravened Ring, id., and raised “possible

Eighth Amendment implications” in light of “Florida’s

outlier status” as the only State that does not require a

unanimous jury finding of an aggravating circumstance

before a death sentence may be imposed, J A319-320.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. In Ring v. Arizona, this Court held that the

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires that the

jury be entrusted with finding all facts necessary for

imposition of the death penalty, including sentencing

aggravators. 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002). Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme, however, assigns that factfinding

responsibility to the trial judge. Although in Florida a

jury renders an advisory verdict recommending a sen-

tence, the jury makes no express findings as to aggra-

vating factors, and its recommendation of death is nei-

ther necessary nor sufficient for imposition of the death

sentence. Rather, the court independently makes its

own findings regarding aggravators and mitigators,

and it is the court’s factual findings—not the jury’s—

that authorize imposition of the death sentence. As this

Court has recognized, a “Florida trial court no more has

the assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to

sentencing issues than d[id] a trial judge in Arizona”

under the scheme struck down in Ring. Walton v. Ari-

zona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990). Consequently, Florida’s

capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amend-

ment just as Arizona’s did.

Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the

Eighth Amendment, too, because it permits the judge

to impose the death penalty. In a concurring opinion in

Ring, Justice Breyer concluded that “the Eighth

Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, make the

decision to sentence a defendant to death.” 536 U.S. at

614. Historically, the power to impose the death penal-

ty was the province of the jury, not the judge. Today,

nearly every jurisdiction that allows for the death pen-

alty requires the jury to impose it. And only imposition

by a jury, which embodies “the community’s moral sen-

sibility,” ensures that the death penalty serves its sole

legitimate penological function of retribution. Jd. at

614-615.

Il. In opposing certiorari in this case, the State

argued that Hurst’s sentence satisfies the Sixth

Amendment because the jury’s advisory verdict im-

plied that “the jury ha{d] ‘necessarily engag{ed] in the

factfinding required for imposition of a higher sen-

tence.” Opp. 15 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526

U.S. 227, 250-251 (1999)). But no such inference can be

drawn. The jury did not render explicit findings on ag-

gravators. It was not required to agree on which, if

any, of the two presented aggravators existed. And

each aggravator could have been rejected by two-thirds

of the jury. In any event, even if the jury had implicitly

made determinate factual findings, that would not cure

Florida’s Sixth Amendment violation because it was

the court’s findings, not the jury’s, that authorized the

death sentence. “Based solely on the jury’s verdict ...,

the maximum punishment [Hurst] could have received

was life imprisonment.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.

IIL. If this Court nonetheless concluded that Flori-

da’s capital sentencing scheme satisfied Ring because

the jury’s advisory verdict recommending death im-

plied the necessary factual findings, Hurst’s death sen-

tence would violate the Sixth and Eighth Amendments

for other reasons.

First, Hurst’s sentence would violate the Eighth

Amendment because the jury instructions would have

misleadingly “minimize[d] the jury’s sense of responsi-

bility for determining the appropriateness of death.”

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985). The

jury was instructed that its sentencing verdict would

be purely advisory and that ultimate responsibility for

determining whether Hurst should be sentenced to

death rested with the trial court. The jury was not in-

structed that a recommendation of death would author-

ize the trial court to impose the death sentence.

Second, Hurst’s sentence would be unconstitutional

because no inference can be drawn from the jury’s rec-

ommendation that more than seven jurors found any

aggravator. Neither the Sixth nor the Eighth Amend-

ment—as incorporated under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment—tolerates a death sentence based on such a slim

vote. Florida’s simple-majority rule contravenes centu-

ries of practice recognizing unanimous verdicts as the

norm in criminal cases. It departs from the uniform po-

sition of the federal system and 49 other States in capi-

tal and non-capital cases. It disregards the bedrock

principle that the jury system is predicated on meaning-

ful deliberations, which a simple-majority vote cannot

safeguard. And it contradicts Florida’s own judgment

that unanimity is necessary for all jury findings of guilt.

This Court has never approved a verdict rendered by a

simple-majority vote for any non-petty offense. It

should not do so now, particularly in a capital case.

Finally, even if the Constitution permitted a death

sentence to be imposed when the jury has been misled

about its responsibility for the defendant’s sentence, or

has found necessary aggravating circumstances by only

a bare majority, or has reached no agreement that any

particular aggravator exists, a system that combines all

of those features cannot stand. Hurst’s sentence was

imposed under a sentencing scheme that undermines

the jury’s deliberative function from every angle. The

aggregate effect of Florida’s procedures prevented the

jury from engaging in the adequate “group delibera-

tion” the Constitution requires. Burch v. Louisiana,

441 U.S. 130, 135 (1979).

ARGUMENT

I. Fvorma’s CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME VIOLATES

THE CONSTITUTION UNDER RING

A. Fiorida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Violates

The Sixth Amendment Because The Judge

Finds Facts Necessary For Imposition Of The

Death Penalty

Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 580 U.S. 466 (2000),

and its progeny, “the Sixth Amendment provides de-

fendants with the right to have a jury find” the “facts

that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which

a criminal defendant is exposed ... beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160

(2013) (quotation marks omitted). In Ring v. Arizona,

this Court applied that principle in the context of capital

sentencing to hold that “the Sixth Amendment’s jury

trial guarantee, made applicable to the States by the

Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the aggravating

factor determination be entrusted to the jury.” 536 U.S.

584, 597 (2002) (footnote omitted).

Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates this

principle because it entrusts to the trial court instead of

the jury the task of “find[ing] an aggravating circum-

stance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”

Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Although in Florida a jury ren-

ders an advisory verdict recommending a sentence

based on its assessment of aggravators, mitigators, and

the balance between them, the jury makes no express

findings as to aggravators, and its recommendation of

death is neither necessary nor sufficient to authorize a

death sentence and therefore does not bring Florida’s

scheme into line with the Sixth Amendment. As this

Court has already observed, a “Florida trial court no

more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with

respect to sentencing issues than d[id] a trial judge in

Arizona” under the capital sentencing scheme struck

down in Ring. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648

(1990). Consequently, as Ring made clear when it inval-

idated Arizona’s scheme, Florida’s scheme is also invalid.

1. Florida law permits the death penalty to be

imposed if and only if the sentencing proceeding “re-

sults in findings by the court that [the defendant] shall

be punished by death.” Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1) (empha-

sis added). The court must find beyond a reasonable

doubt that at least one “sufficient” statutory aggravat-

ing circumstance exists (and that the aggravators are

not outweighed by mitigating circumstances). /d.

§ 921.141(3). “[O]therwise,” Florida law states, the de-

fendant “shall be punished by life imprisonment.” 7d.

§ 775.082(1). Thus, “(t]he aggravating circumstances of

Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6) actually define those crimes ... to

which the death penalty is applicable in the absence of

mitigating circumstances.” State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1,

9 (Fla. 1973). Florida law, therefore, violates the prin-

ciple set down in Ring that States may not entrust the

judge with finding any aggravating circumstances nec-

essary to authorize a death sentence.

Before Apprendi, this Court upheld Florida’s capi-

tal sentencing scheme against a similar Sixth Amend-

ment challenge. In Hildwin v. Florida, the Court de-

clared that because “an aggravating factor here is not

an element of the offense but instead ... ‘a sentencing

factor ...,’ the Sixth Amendment does not require that

the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the

sentence of death be made by the jury.” 490 U.S. 638,

640-641 (1989). But Apprendi, Ring, and subsequent

decisions “have uniformly rejected [the assumption]

that in determining the maximum punishment for an

offense, there is a constitutionally significant difference

between a fact that is an ‘element’ of the offense and

one that is a ‘sentencing factor.”” Southern Union Co.

v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2356 (2012). When “an

aggravating circumstance [is] necessary for imposition

of the death penalty,” as it is under Florida law, it “op-

erate[s] as the functional equivalent of an element of a

greater offense” and therefore must “be found by a ju-

ry.” Ring, 536 US. at 609; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S.

at 482-483, 494 n.19. Hildwin does not survive those

later decisions.”

> Even if Hildwin remained valid, it would not control here

because one of the aggravators there was that the defendant “had

previous convictions for violent felonies,” 490 U.S. at 639, and so it

would fit the exception to Apprendi and Ring for the “fact of a pri-

or conviction.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).

Neither aggravating circumstance presented here fits that excep-

tion.

2. The Florida trial judge’s duty to give “great

weight” to the jury’s “advisory sentence” does not

spare Florida’s capital sentencing scheme from consti-

tutional invalidity under Ring by elevating the jury to

the role of sentencing factfinder, or even quasi-

factfinder. In Florida, authorization to impose the

death penalty derives solely from the trial court’s inde-

pendent findings regarding aggravating and mitigating

circumstances; the jury’s advisory verdict is not neces-

sary or sufficient to authorize the death penalty.

Time and again, the Florida Supreme Court has de-

clared that although the jury’s sentencing recommen-

dation carries “great weight,” the trial judge “must

conduct an independent analysis of the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances,” “regardless of the jury’s

recommendation.” Delgado vy. State, 2015 Fla. LEXIS

871, at *27-28 (Fla. Apr. 23, 2015) (quotation marks

omitted); see also, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (trial

court must determine appropriate sentence

“(njotwithstanding the recommendation of a majority

of the jury”); Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 198 (Fla.

2011) (“{TJhe trial court is required to make independ-

ent findings on aggravation, mitigation, and weight.”);

Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 751 (Fla. 2007) (court

“is not bound by the jury’s recommendation, and is giv-

en final authority to determine the appropriate sen-

tence” (quotation marks omitted)); Ross v. State, 386

So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980) (“The trial court must still

exercise its reasoned judgment in deciding whether the

death penalty should be imposed.”). The trial court is

thus free to consider sentencing evidence and to find

aggravators that were never considered or found by

the jury, Williams, 967 So. 2d at 751; Spencer v. State,

615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993), and to impose the death

penalty even where the jury has recommended a life

sentence, see, ¢.g., Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833,

840 (Fla. 1988), receded from on other grounds in

Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997). And it is

the trial court’s findings, not the jury’s advisory verdict

or any findings arguably implicit in it, that the Florida

Supreme Court reviews. Grossman, 525 So. 2d at 839.

Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court has

made clear that the “great weight” accorded the jury’s

sentencing recommendation does not make the verdict

anything other than purely “advisory,” and it has dis-

missed the suggestion that the jury functions as “de

facto, if not de jure, sentencer” in capital cases. Gross-

man, 525 So. 2d at 839-840. In Combs v. State, for ex-

ample, the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial

court was not required to instruct the jury that “a life

sentence carries substantial weight and that a jury rec-

ommendation of life could be overridden only if virtual-

ly no reasonable person could differ.” 525 So. 2d 853,

855-858 (Fla. 1988). Such an instruction would have

been improper because “the court is the final decision-

maker and the sentencer—not the jury,” and “the ju-

ry’s sentencing recommendation in a capital case is on-

ly advisory.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord

Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (noting

State’s assertion that “in the Florida scheme, the jury

is not ‘the sentencer’ ... because the trial court is not

bound by the jury’s sentencing recommendation”). In

fact, the Florida Supreme Court has criticized trial

judges for relying too heavily on the advisory verdict,

but not for relying too little. Compare Ross, 386 So. 2d

at 1197 (vacating death sentence where “the trial court

gave undue weight to the jury’s recommendation of

death and did not make an independent judgment of

whether or not the death penalty should be imposed”),

with Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473, 483-484 (Fla. 2008)

(no abuse of discretion even though trial court did “not

expressly consider{]} the jury’s recommendation”).

This Court too has repeatedly recognized that, “[iJ]n

Florida, the jury’s sentencing recommendation in a cap-

ital case is only advisory.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468

U.S. 447, 451 (1984); see also Espinosa, 505 U.S. at

1080; Walton, 497 U.S. at 648; Porter v. McCollum, 558

U.S. 30, 40-41 (2009).

3. The Florida Supreme Court nonetheless denied

Hurst’s Ring challenge because “F'lorida’s sentencing

procedures do provide for jury input about the exist-

ence of aggravating factors prior to sentencing—a pro-

cess that was completely lacking in the Arizona statute

struck down in Ring.” JA310 (emphasis added). “Jury

input” may be a fair description of the role played by

the advisory verdict in Florida, but it is insufficient to

satisfy the Sixth Amendment—as this Court has al-

ready recognized.

In Walton, the defendant challenged Arizona’s capi-

tal sentencing scheme under the Sixth Amendment. The

Court began by reiterating Hildwin’s now-rejected dic-

tate that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that

the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the

sentence of death be made by the jury.” 497 U.S. at 648

(quoting 490 U.S. at 640-641). The defendant in Walton

attempted to avoid Hildwin’s implications by distin-

guishing Florida’s scheme from Arizona’s—just as the

court below did here—on the ground that Arizona’s

scheme did not provide for any advisory jury verdict.

This Court deemed that “distinction{] ... not persua-

sive.” Jd. at 648. Because a jury in Florida “does not

make specific factual findings with regard to the exist-

ence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its

recommendation is not binding on the trial judge,” the

Court concluded, a “Florida trial court no more has the

assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sen-

tencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona.” Jd.

Subsequently in Ring, this Court “overrule[d] Wal-

ton to the extent that it allow[ed] a sentencing judge,

sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circum-

stance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”

536 U.S. at 609. Because this Court had rejected the

very distinction the court below sought to draw be-

tween Arizona’s and Florida’s capital sentencing

schemes, Ring’s invalidation of Arizona’s capital sen-

tencing scheme applies with equal force to Florida’s.

Even apart from the Court’s prior recognition that

Florida’s scheme is not meaningfully different from the

Arizona scheme struck down in Ring, the availability of

the jury’s advice—of its mere “input”—does not satisfy

the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court

has repeatedly said that the Sixth Amendment prohib-

its entrusting the judge with “finding” the facts neces-

sary to impose the sentence. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 602;

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005); Al-

leyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160. Across the many cases in

which the Court has considered the role of the jury

since Apprendi and Ring, it has never suggested that

such a Sixth Amendment defect could be cured simply

by having the jury provide advice.

The Court’s silence reflects the reality that an ad-

visory role would not serve the jury’s essential function

in preserving liberty. The jury-trial right “is no mere

procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of

power in our constitutional structure.” Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-306 (2004). Thus, the

“historic role of the jury” has been as “an intermediary

between the State and criminal defendants.” Alleyne,

133 S. Ct. at 2161. When the Sixth Amendment was

ratified, juries functioned as factfinders. Ring, 536 U.S.

at 599. That is the traditional role Apprendi and Ring

restored. But if a State could depart from that tradi-

tion and assign the jury an advisory role while vesting

the judge with responsibility for essential factfinding,

as Florida has, it could “relegate[] [the jury] to making

a determination that the defendant at some point did

something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial in-

quisition into the facts of the crime the State actually

seeks to punish.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 307. For exam-

ple, much as this Court has feared before, under Flori-

da’s view of the Sixth Amendment, “a judge could sen-

tence a man for committing murder even if the jury

convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm

used to commit it[,] or of making an illegal lane change

while fleeing the death scene”—as long as the jury also

offered the judge its recommendation as to whether the

judge should find him guilty of murder. Jd. at 306-307.

If that were permissible, “[t]he jury could not function

as circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice.”

Id. at 306.

4. For the reasons discussed above, Ring’s over-

turning of Walton decisively repudiated Hildwin as

well. But even if that were not so, principles of stare

decisis would not stand in the way of now expressly

overruling Hildwin and holding Florida’s capital sen-

tencing scheme unconstitutional under Ring. “/S/tare

decisis cannot possibly be controlling” where the con-

stitutional precedent involves “a procedural rule [that]

does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior” and where

“the [precedent] has been proved manifestly erroneous,

and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions

of this Court.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,

521 (1995); see also Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 n.5 (“The

force of stare decisis is at its nadir in cases concerning

procedural rules that implicate fundamental constitu-

tional protections.”).

That is the case here. The Sixth Amendment’s bar

against entrusting a judge with finding any circum-

stance necessary to authorize the death penalty is a

fundamental rule of constitutional procedure. Alleyne,

133 S. Ct. at 2163 n.5 (Apprendi “concern[s] procedural

rules that implicate fundamental constitutional protec-

tions”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-306 (right to jury trial

is “a fundamental reservation of power in our constitu-

tional structure”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,

148-149 (1968) (right to jury trial is “fundamental

right”). As detailed above, from Apprendi through Al-

leyne, this Court has adopted and reinforced a view of

the Sixth Amendment that is utterly inconsistent with

Hildwin’s underpinnings—and it has overturned other

similarly aberrant precedents along the way. See Ring,

536 U.S. at 608-609 (overturning Walton); Alleyne, 133

S. Ct. at 2155 (overturning Harris v. United States, 536

U.S. 545 (2002)). Moreover, given that “Apprendi [and

Ring are} now more than a decade old,” any “reliance

interests” Florida might claim in Hildwin “are by this

point attenuated.” Southern Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2357.

Tellingly, the three other States that, at the time of

Ring, had “hybrid systems, in which the jury renders

an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate

sentencing determinations,” Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6,

modified their capital sentencing schemes after Ring to

ensure that the jury makes all findings necessary for

imposition of the death penalty (even if the judge still

selects the sentence). See Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314,

320 (Del. 2003); Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266, 273

(Ind. 2002); Ex parte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024, 1037

(Ala. 2004).

Therefore, because F lorida’s outlier capital sentenc-

ing scheme entrusts to the trial court the task of finding

facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty, and

because the jury’s advisory role does not meaningfully

distinguish Florida’s scheme from the Arizona scheme

struck down in Ring, Florida’s scheme violates the

Sixth Amendment and must also be struck down. This

Court should no longer countenance “the repeated spec-

tacle of a man’s going to his death [in Florida] because a

judge found that an aggravating factor existed.” Ring,

536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).

B. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Violates

The Eighth Amendment Because It Assigns

To The Judge The Power To Impose The

Death Penalty

In a concurring opinion in Ring, Justice Breyer

concluded that “the Eighth Amendment requires that a

jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a de-

fendant to death.” 536 U.S. at 614; see also Woodward

v. Alabama, 134 8. Ct. 405, 406-410 (2013) (Sotomayor,

J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). That conclusion

is correct. In Spaziano, this Court found no Eighth

Amendment violation in Florida’s commitment of capi-

tal sentencing to judges. 468 U.S. at 464-465. But it is

clear that each of the three guideposts of this Court’s

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—history, current

practice, and independent judgment—compels the op-

posite conclusion: juries, not judges, must be responsi-

ble for imposing the death penalty. Nor can Spaziano

be salvaged on stare decisis grounds, for “(t]he force of

stare decisis is at its nadir in cases concerning proce-

dural rules that implicate fundamental constitutional

protections.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 n.5. In answer

to the Court’s question whether Florida’s capital

sentencing scheme violates the Eighth Amendment in

light of Ring, the Court should therefore overrule Spa-

ziano and restore Florida juries to their traditional and

appropriate role as sentencers in capital cases.°

1. Historically, the power to impose the death

penalty was the province of the jury, not the judge.

English criminal law “prescribed a particular sentence

for each offense,” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479, and the

penalty for many felonies was fixed at death. See, e.g.,

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976)

(joint opinion); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,

110-111 (1982); Southern Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2361

(Breyer, J., dissenting). Juries routinely exercised this

sentencing discretion by “issuing ‘partial verdicts’ or

‘downvaluing’ stolen goods”—practices “immortalized

through Blackstone’s colorful phrase, ‘pious perjury.”

Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment

Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1967,

2013 (2005).' In fact, since most eighteenth-century

criminal trials lacked “contested inquiries into guilt or

innocence,” the primary function of the jury trial “was

to decide the sanction.” Langbein, The Origins of Ad-

versary Criminal Trial 59 (2003).

° To the extent the Court suggested in Proffitt v. Florida, 428

U.S. 242, 252 (1976), or Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995),

that jury sentencing is not constitutionally required in capital cas-

es, those suggestions are unavailing for the same reasons that

counsel] in favor of overruling Spaziano.

” Judges did have some power to effect a downward depar-

ture from a jury-imposed death sentence by seeking a royal par-

don. Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgiv-

ings about Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 621, 638 (2004). But no au-

thority suggests that a judge could unilaterally impose a death

sentence against the jury’s verdict.

American juries similarly held unilateral power to

impose the death penalty. For example, in homicide

cases, juries “had the option of (1) convicting the de-

fendant of murder, which carried a mandatory death

sentence; (2) convicting the defendant of manslaughter,

which was not a capital crime; or (3) acquitting the de-

fendant.” Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sen-

tencing: Misgivings about Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. Rev.

621, 648 (2004). In effect, this “g[a]ve the jury not only

the power of conviction, but also the power of execu-

tion.” I/d.; see also lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as

Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311, 323 (2003)

(“More than factfinders, juries decided the fate of the

defendants they convicted.”).

In the early nineteenth century, many American

States became concerned about the harshness of man-

datory death penalties, as well as the rate of “mercy”

acquittals of guilty defendants. Woodson, 428 U.S. at

289-290. The States responded by giving juries more

power over sentencing. The first wave of reforms cre-

ated new categories of homicide, which gave juries

more discretion to convict defendants of non-capital

homicide. Id. at 290. As that option failed to resolve

the concern, States gave juries yet more sentencing au-

thority, “forthrightly granting juries the discretion

which they had been exercising in fact.” McGautha v.

California, 402 U.S. 183, 199-200 (1971), vacated on

other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S.

941 (1972); see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289-290.

2. The jury’s authority over capital sentencing

remained consistent in the twentieth century despite

shifts in American views regarding capital punishment.

See, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 758

(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (jury had power

over sentencing in all but three of 43 States with death

penalty); Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in

Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1100-1101

(1953) (“[Tlhirty-five states and the Federal Govern-

ment provide that the jury shall determine whether the

death penalty shall be imposed, four provide that the

jury may recommend the punishment to be inflicted but

that such recommendation shall not be binding upon

the judge, and six have abolished the death penalty for

murder, leaving only three that still require capital

punishment” (footnotes omitted)).* In Spaziano itself,

this Court recognized that among the States that had

reinstated the death penalty after Furman, “the major-

ity view [was] that capital sentencing ... should be per-

formed by a jury.” 468 U.S. at 463 (30 of 37 jurisdic-

tions with capital sentencing statutes “give the life-or-

death decision to the jury”).

The consensus of other jurisdictions continues to

make jury sentencing the norm in the modern era of

bifurcated (or trifurcated) capital sentencing. In 27 of

the 31 States that maintain the death penalty, as well

as in the federal system, the jury makes the final deci-

sion whether to impose the death penalty. See Wood-

ward, 134 8. Ct. at 407 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari).? Only Florida, Alabama, Dela-

ware, and Montana leave the final sentencing decision

to the court. /d.

* When this Court decided Furman, Florida, too, “gave the

jury complete life-ordeath discretion.” Ehrhardt & Levinson,

Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futili-

ty?, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 10, 17 (1973). Juries in Florida

had authority to choose between death and life sentences for near-

ly 100 years. See Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53, 100 (1884).

* Nebraska, which also left the capital sentencing decision to

the judge, Woodward, 134 S. Ct. at 407, abolished the death penal-

ty by statute enacted on May 27, 2015.

3. Finally, evaluating the relevant penological in-

terests confirms that juries should make the final deci-

sion as to life or death in capital cases. “{UJ]nless a

criminal sanction serves a legitimate penological func-

tion, it constitutes ‘gratuitous infliction of suffering’ in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Baze v. Rees, 553

U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion). Of the

principal functions of criminal sentencing—

rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, and retribu-

tion—only retribution provides a constitutionally de-

fensible basis for application of the death penalty.

Baze, 553 U.S. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring); Ring, 536

U.S. at 614-615 (Breyer, J., concurring).'® But, as Jus-

tice Breyer explained in his Ring concurrence, “{ijn re-

spect to retribution, jurors possess an important com-

parative advantage over judges.” /d. at 615. Juries

“are more attuned to ‘the community’s moral sensibil-

ity” and “reflect more accurately the composition and

experiences of the community as a whole.” /d. (quoting

Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481, 486 (Stevens, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part)). As a result, they more

faithfully “express the conscience of the community on

the ultimate question of life or death” in a specific case.

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). By

contrast, Florida’s transfer of the ultimate sentencing

decision “to a lone government official’s decree,”

Harris, 513 U.S. at 522-523 (Stevens, J., dissenting),

” Rehabilitation does not apply, and incapacitation is accom-

plished by a life sentence without possibility of parole. Baze, 553

U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring); Ring, 536 U.S. at 615 (Breyer,

J., concurring). And “there remains no reliable statistical evidence

that capital punishment in fact deters potential offenders.” Baze,

553 U.S. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Ring, 536 US. at

614-615 (Breyer, J., concurring). Reliance on these interests in

Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461-462, was misplaced.

unmoors the death penalty from its function as an “ex-

press{ion of] the community’s belief that certain crimes

are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that

the only adequate response may be the penalty of

death.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (joint opinion); see also

id. at 183 (“(C]Japital punishment is an expression of so-

ciety’s moral outrage at particularly offensive con-

duct.”). And, in so doing, Florida’s scheme undermines

the reliability of the punishment as a reflection of con-

temporary moral values.

Il. THE JuRY’s ADVISORY VERDICT DOES Not IMPLY THE

FINDING REQUIRED By RING

In opposing certiorari in this case, the State argued

that where the jury has recommended a sentence of

death, “the jury has ‘necessarily engag[ed] in the fact-

finding required for imposition of a higher sentence.”

Opp. 15 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,

250-251 (1999)). On that view, there was no Ring viola-

tion in this case because the jury’s advisory verdict

recommending death implied that it had found at least

one aggravating factor, thereby authorizing the trial

court to impose the death penalty. This contention is

both factually wrong and unavailing under Ring.

1. It cannot be inferred that the jury found any

particular aggravator. The jury certainly did not make

explicit findings on aggravators. See JA217. Florida

prohibits the trial court from “using a penalty phase

special verdict form that details the jurors’ determina-

tion concerning aggravating factors.” State v. Steele,

921 So. 2d 538, 548 (Fla. 2006); see also Espinosa, 505

U.S. at 1080 (“verdict does not include specific findings

of aggravating and mitigating circumstances”); Walton,

497 U.S. at 648 (“[IJn Florida the jury ... does not make

specific factual findings with regard to the existence of

mitigating or aggravating circumstances.”). The trial

court accordingly denied Hurst’s request to use such a

form. J A307.

Nor does the jury’s seven-to-five vote recommend-

ing death support an inference that a majority of jurors

found any one aggravator. Although the jurors were

instructed that they could recommend death only if

they “determine[d] that at least one aggravating cir-

cumstance is found to exist,” JA215, they were pre-

sented with two aggravating circumstances, JA211-212.

And “(nothing in [Florida law] ... requires a majority

of the jury to agree on which aggravating circumstanc-

es exist.” Steele, 921 So. 2d at 545. It is entirely possi-

ble that as few as four jurors found one aggravator and

three found the other, and thus that each aggravator

was rejected by at least two-thirds of the jurors. See

id. (observing that Florida permits this precise scenar-

io); see Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) (“Be-

cause the jury in Florida does not reveal the aggravat-

ing factors on which it relies, we cannot know whether

this jury actually relied on [a particular] factor.”).''

The advisory verdict’s inherent indeterminacy with re-

spect to aggravators—which will exist in every capital

case in Florida except where the jury is presented with

only one aggravator and votes to recommend a death

sentence—precludes the advisory verdict from bring-

ing Hurst’s sentence into line with the Sixth Amend-

ment under Ring because it cannot be said that the ju-

ry has actually found a fact necessary to authorize the

sentence.

'' The jury’s earlier verdict convicting Hurst of first-degree

murder also does not imply that the jury found facts sufficient to

establish any particular aggravator. Supra p. 5.

2. In any event, implicit factual findings—

whether determinate or indeterminate—cannot cure

Florida’s Ring violation because, as discussed, under

Florida law it is the court’s findings alone, not the ju-

ry’s verdict or any findings implied by that verdict, that

authorizes the death sentence.

The State’s contrary argument (Opp. 15) rests on

this Court’s remark in Jones v. United States that the

unanimous jury in Hildwin “made a sentencing recom-

mendation of death, thus necessarily engaging in the

factfinding required for imposition of a higher sentence,

that is, the determination that at least one aggravating

factor had been proved.” 526 U.S. 227, 250-251 (1999).

But Jones does not express the Court’s considered, au-

thoritative judgment about the constitutionality of

Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in general or of a

death sentence after a jury recommendation of death in

particular. In Jones, the Court addressed the Sixth

Amendment to ascertain whether one proposed inter-

pretation of the federal statute before it “would raise

serious constitutional questions” that could be avoided

by adopting a different interpretation. See 526 U.S. at

250-252. The Court did not decide what the Constitu-

tion actually requires. /d. In addition, Jones was de-

cided before Ring and Apprendi, at a time when the

Court was still “endeavor[ing] to distinguish certain

capital sentencing decisions, including Walton,” without

confronting the Sixth Amendment issues it ultimately

resolved in Ring. Ring, 536 U.S. at 600-603.

Ring has since made clear that even if the jury’s

advisory sentence recommending death implied that

the jury here had found at least one aggravator—and

as discussed above, it does not—Hurst’s sentence

would not comport with the Sixth Amendment. Just as

in Ring, the jury’s recommendation of death here did

not authorize a death sentence. “Based solely on the

jury’s verdict”—whether its guilty verdict, its advisory

verdict recommending death, or both—“the maximum

punishment [Hurst] could have received was life im-

prisonment.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 597. “This was so be-

cause”—as discussed above—in Florida, as in Arizona

at the time of Ring, “a death sentence may not legally

be imposed ... unless at least one aggravating factor is

found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt” by the trial

court. /d.; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304 (“When a judge in-

flicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not

allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law

makes essential to the punishment, and the judge ex-

ceeds his proper authority.” (quotation marks and cita-

tion omitted)). Florida bars the use of a special verdict

form for capital sentencing precisely because “requir-

ing specific jury findings on aggravators without guid-

ance about their effect on the imposition of a sentence

could ... harm[] the trial court’s independent determi-

nation of the existence of the aggravating and mitigat-

ing circumstances.” Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79,

102 (Fla. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). The State’s

“implicit findings” theory therefore fails.

I. Ir THE JuRY’S ADVISORY VERDICT IMPLIED THE FIND-

ING REQUIRED By RING, Hurst’s SENTENCE WOULD

VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION FOR OTHER REASONS

If, contrary to the arguments above, the State were

correct that the jury’s advisory verdict satisfied Ring

on the theory that the jury implicitly made the findings

of fact necessary to authorize imposition of the death

sentence, Hurst’s sentence still could not be sustained.

Florida law imposes constraints that would scuttle the

jury’s function as responsible factfinder and bulwark of

the community’s judgment.

A. Hurst’s Sentence Would Violate The Eighth

Amendment Because It Would Have Been

Based On Jury Instructions That Mislead-

ingly Minimized The Jury’s Sense Of Re-

sponsibility

If the jury’s advisory verdict implied the finding

necessary to satisfy Ring, then Hurst’s sentence would

violate the Eighth Amendment because the jury in-

structions would have misleadingly “minimize[d] the

jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the ap-

propriateness of death.” Caldwell v. Mississipm, 472

U.S. 320, 341 (1985); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512

U.S. 1, 8 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, “it is

constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence

on a determination made by a sentencer who has been

led to believe that the responsibility for determining

the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests

elsewhere.” Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-329; see also id.

at 342 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“(TJhe prosecutor’s

remarks were impermissible because they were inaccu-

rate and misleading in a manner that diminished the

jury’s sense of responsibility.”).

Here, the jury was instructed that its sentencing

verdict would be purely advisory and that responsibil-

ity for determining whether Hurst should be sentenced

to death rested with the trial court. Before the jurors

retired to deliberate, the trial court told them that

theirs would be “an advisory sentence,” and that, alt-

hough their recommendation “must be given great

weight,” “the final decision as to which punishment

shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge.”

JA207-208. Nowhere did the court instruct the jury

that its verdict would constrain the court’s sentencing

deliberation, let alone control it. Nowhere did the court

instruct that the jury’s recommendation alone was

sufficient to authorize the court to impose the death

sentence by (implicitly) finding at least one aggravating

circumstance. And nowhere did the court instruct that

the jury’s finding of an aggravator was necessary for

the imposition of a capital sentence.

The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged this

Eighth Amendment concern. In Combs, the court re-

jected a Caldwell objection to Florida’s standard jury

instructions—which have remained substantially the

same as the instructions given here, see 525 So. 2d at

856-857—but did so only because the jury’s sentence

was “only advisory,” such that the instructions were

not misleading. Jd. In doing so, the court acknowl-

edged that if the jury’s verdict were not merely adviso-

ry, then the court “would necessarily have to find that

[Florida’s} standard jury instructions, as they have ex-

isted since 1976, violate the dictates of Caldwell,”

thereby requiring “a resentencing proceeding for vir-

tually every individual sentenced to death in this state

since 1976.” Jd. at 858 (quotation marks omitted).

B. Hurst’s Sentence Would Violate The Sixth

And Eighth Amendments Because The Jury’s

Supposed Implied Finding May Have Been

Made By Only A Simple Majority

In addition, if the jury’s recommendation implied a

factual finding as to aggravating circumstances that au-

thorized imposition of the death penalty, that finding

would not satisfy the Sixth and Eighth Amendments

because no inference can be drawn from the jury’s rec-

ommendation that more than seven jurors found an ag-

gravator. JA215-217. This Court has never accepted

that an element of a serious crime—which is how ag-

gravators must be viewed for Sixth Amendment pur-

poses under Ring, supra p. 19—can be found by a sim-

ple-majority verdict. It should not do so now, and it

should especially not do so in a capital case. Florida’s

simple-majority rule contravenes centuries of jurispru-

dential history recognizing unanimous verdicts as the

norm if ©riminal cases. It stands as the lone outlier

against tne uniform position of the federal system and

49 other States—in capital and non-capital offenses

alike. It lacks the safeguards of fairness that are se-

cured by more demanding voting rules, which find sup-

port in social science addressing the unanimity re-

quirement. And it contradicts Florida’s own judgment

that unanimity is necessary for all jury findings of guilt.

1. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

forbid simple-majority jury verdicts

Allowing the aggravating circumstances that make

a defendant eligible for a death sentence to be estab-

lished by a simple-majority vote violates the right to a

jury trial secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

1. This Court has never approved a simple-

majority rule for jury verdicts in criminal cases. The

guarantee of a jury trial “reflect(s] ... a reluctance to

entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the

citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.” Duncan,

391 U.S. at 156. As this Court has emphasized, by

“(p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried by a

jury of his peers,” the Framers “gave him an inestima-

ble safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prose-

cutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric

judge.” Id.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments fulfill

these purposes in slightly different ways in federal and

state cases, respectively. In federal cases, the Sixth

Amendment requires that all convictions for non-petty

offenses be by a unanimous jury verdict. Andres, 333

U.S. at 748-749; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211-

212 (1903). Thus, Hurst’s sentence could not constitu-

tionally have been imposed in federal court. Ring re-

quires that “the aggravating circumstances necessary

for the imposition of the death penalty” be found by the

jury, 536 U.S. at 609; but Florida does not require una-

nimity for aggravators, and the jury here was instruct-

ed accordingly, JA215-217.

The standard is somewhat different—but no more

tolerant of a simple-majority rule—in state cases. This

distinction results from the Court’s splintered ruling in

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), involving Ore-

gon’s “ten of twelve” rule. In Apodaca, eight Justices

agreed that the right to a jury trial “applied identically”

in federal and state cases. McDonald v. City of Chica-

go, 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14 (2010) (plurality) (citing John-

son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395 (1972) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting in Apodaca)). But because those eight Jus-

tices were evenly divided on whether the Sixth

Amendment required unanimity, Justice Powell’s sepa-

rate concurrence broke the tie, and he concluded that

the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in federal

cases, but that Oregon’s “ten of twelve” rule passed

muster under the Fourteenth Amendment. /d.; John-

son, 406 U.S. at 369-380 (Powell, J., concurring in the

judgment in Apodaca); id. at 381-382 (Douglas, J., dis-

senting); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality); id. at

414-415 (Stewart, J., dissenting). As a result, the per se

unanimity requirement applicable in federal cases does

not extend fully to the States. But the States are still

prohibited from altering their jury systems—including

their voting rules—in a way that threatens the “jury’s

essential feature”: “the ‘interposition between the

accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment

of a group of laymen” and “the community participa-

tion and shared responsibility that results from that

group’s determination of guilt or innocence.” Burch v.

Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 135 (1979).

Apodaca itself casts serious doubt on a simple-

majority rule. While a majority of the Apodaca Court

declined to recognize an across-the-board unanimity

requirement in state cases, another (overlapping) ma-

jority made clear that a simple-majority rule would, at

a minimum, raise great constitutional concerns. See

Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., joined by Bren-

nan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting) (unanimity re-

quired in state court); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380-381

(Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.)

(same); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concur-

ring in Apodaca) (“a system employing a 7-5 standard,

rather than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me

great difficulty”). And Justice Powell recognized that

“{alpproval of Oregon’s 10-2 requirement does not com-

pel acceptance of all other majority-verdict alterna-

tives.” Johnson, 406 U.S. at 377 n.21 (Powell, J., con-

curring in the judgment in Apodaca). With four Justic-

es believing a simple-majority rule unconstitutional,

one Justice expressing “great difficulty,” and another

Justice disclaiming any approval, Apodaca lends no

support to Florida’s simple-majority rule.

2. Each of the factors this Court considers in the

Sixth Amendment context—history, current practice,

and functional considerations, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S.

at 478-484; Burch, 441 U.S. at 138-139—confirms that a

simple-majority rule is inadequate to fulfill the jury tri-

al’s fundamental purposes.

By the eighteenth century, it was well-established

that a guilty verdict in criminal cases required a unan-

imous jury. Sir William Blackstone explained that “the

trial by jury ... is the most transcendent privilege

which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot

be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his

person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his

neighbours and equals.” 3 Blackstone, Commentaries

on the Laws of England 379 (1768); see also 4 Black-

stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343

(1769) (“(Tjhe truth of every accusation ... should af-

terwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of

twelve of [the defendant’s] equals and neighbours,”

quoted in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477). Similarly, John

Adams wrote in 1786 that “it is the unanimity of the ju-

ry that preserves the rights of mankind.” 1 Adams, A

Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the

United States of America 376 (3d ed. 1797). Justice

Wilson concurred in his lectures in 1790-1791: “To the

conviction of a crime, the undoubting and the unani-

mous sentiment of the twelve jurors is of indispensable

necessity.” 2 Wilson, The Works of the Honourable

James Wilson, LL.D. 350 (1804). And James Madison’s

draft of the Sixth Amendment explicitly provided for

the right to trial “by an impartial jury of freeholders of

the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for convic-

tion, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed

requisites.” 1 Annals of Cong. 452 (1789).’*

'2 Whether Madison’s inclusion of “unanimity” alongside the

“other accustomed requisites” of the jury-trial right shows that

Congress intended to constitutionalize a unanimity requirement in

the Sixth Amendment may be debated in light of Congress’s

amendment of Madison’s draft. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409-410

(plurality). But, at a minimum, Madison’s draft confirms that, at

the time of the Founding, more than a bare majority was required.

In the early nineteenth century, Justice Story simi-

larly observed that, in criminal cases, “unanimity in the

verdict of the jury is indispensable.” 3 Story, Commen-

taries on the Constitution of the United States § 777, at

248 (1833). And unanimity—not a bare-majority rule—

continued to define the contours of the right to a jury

trial at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifi-

cation. See, e.g., Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitu-

tional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative

Power of the States of the American Union 320 (1868)

(“The jury must unanimously concur in the verdict.”);

1 Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Criminal Pro-

cedure 532 (1866) (statute authorizing a verdict “upon

anything short of the unanimous consent of the twelve

jurors” is “void”); Tiffany, A Treatise on Government,

and Constitutional Law 367 (1867) (“[T]rial by jury is

understood to mean—generally—trial by a jury of

twelve men, impartially selected, and who must unani-

mously concur in the guilt of the accused before a legal

conviction can be had.”); Proffatt, A Treatise on Trial

by Jury 119 (1880) (“[I]}t is required that th{e] jury shall

be unanimous.”).

The “current jury practices of the several States”

establish that a simple-majority rule is an aberration by

contemporary standards as well. Burch, 441 U.S. at

138. No State, except Florida, applies a simple-majority

verdict rule with respect to the elements of any serious

(i.e., non-petty) crime—much less for capital cases.'’

The federal system and all States but two—Oregon and

Louisiana—require unanimity to convict a defendant of

'S-The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applies to

“non-petty” offenses—i.e., those where imprisonment for more

than six months is authorized. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66,

68-69 (1970).

any non-petty offense.'* The two outliers deviate from

unanimity only to the extent of allowing a ten-to-two

verdict, and even then only in non-capital cases. In cap-

ital cases, both Louisiana and Oregon require unanimity

at all stages. La. Const. art. I, § 17(A); La. Code Crim.

P. Ann. art. 782(A); Or. Const. art. I, § 11.

'* See Ala. R. Crim. P. 23.1(a); Alaska R. Crim. P. 31(a); Ariz.

Const. art. II, § 23; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-126(a), 128; Cal. Const.

art. I, § 16; People v. Russo, 25 P.3d 641, 645 (Cal. 2001); Colo. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 16-10-108; Colo. R. Crim. P. 31(a(3); Conn. Super. Ct.

R. Crim. P. § 42-29; Del. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 31(a); Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.440; Ball v. State, 70 S.E. 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911); State v.

Arceo, 928 P.2d 843, 872 (Haw. 1996); Idaho Crim. Ct. R. 31(a); Ida-

ho Code Ann. §§ 19-2316, 2317; 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-4(0); Ind.

St. Ct. Jury R. 16(a); Fisher v. State, 291 N.E. 2d 76, 82 (Ind. 1973),

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.22(5); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3421; Ky. R. Crim. P.

9.82(1); Me. R. Crim. P. 31(a); Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, art. 21;

Md. R. 4-327(a); Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(a); Mich. Ct. R. 6.410(B);

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(5); Miss. Const. art. 3, § 31; Ful-

gham v. State, 46 So. 3d 315, 324 (Miss. 2010); Mo. Const. art. I, sec.

22(a); State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 155 (Mo. 2011) (en

banc); Mont. Const. art. II, § 26; Neb. Const. art. I, § 6; State v.

Hochstein, 632 N.W.2d 273, 282 (Neb. 2001); Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 175.481; N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. 15; State v. Dushame, 616 A2d

469, 472 (N.H. 1992); N.J. Ct. R. 1:8-9; N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-611(A);

N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 2; People v. DeCillis, 199 N.E.2d 380, 381 (N.Y.

1964); N.C. Const. art. I, § 24; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1201-(a); N.D.

Const. art. I, § 13; Ohio R. Crim. P. 31(A); Okla. Const. art. I], § 19;

Pa. R. Crim. P. 648(B); R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 31(a); State v. Logue,

28 S.E.2d 788, 791 (S.C. 1944); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-26-1; Tenn.

R. Crim. P. 31(a); Tex. Code Crim. P. arts. 36.2%a), 37.02, 37.03;

Utah Const. art. I, § 10; Utah R. Crim. P. 21(b); Va. Const. art. I, §

8; Va. S. Ct. R. 3A:17(a); Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10; Vt. R. Crim. P.

31(a), Wash. Super. Ct. Crim. R. § 6.16(aX2); W. Va. R. Crim. P.

31(a); Wis. Const. art. I, $§ 5, 7; Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288,

290 (Wis. 1979); Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-501. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a). The

Uniform Code of Military Justice requires a unanimous verdict for

capital crimes; a two-thirds majority is required for all other of-

fenses. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a); R. for Courts-Martial 1004(a\2).

The consensus is even stronger with respect to

findings that make a defendant eligible for the death

penalty. The federal system and all other States that

retain the death penalty require that such findings be

made by a unanimous jury. See Steele, 921 So. 2d at

548-549 & nn.3-5.'° The Florida Supreme Court itself

has recognized that Florida is now “the outlier state.”

Id. at 550.

The American system’s rejection of simple-

majority verdict rules is not just well-established; it is

eminently well-founded. This Court has “long been of

the view that ‘the very object of the jury system is to

secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by ar-

guments among the jurors themselves.” Jones v.

United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (quoting Allen

v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896)) (brackets

omitted). As Justice Kennedy explained when sitting

on the court of appeals:

The dynamics of the jury process are such that

often only one or two members express doubt

'S Since Steele surveyed the States in 2005, seven States

(Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New

Mexico, and New York) have eliminated the death penalty, bring-

ing the number of capital-punishment States to 31. Further, while

Steele stated that, in Utah and Virginia, the jury need not neces-

sarily “find each aggravator unanimously,” 921 So. 2d at 549 (em-

phasis added), both require unanimity for the aggravators neces-

sary to make the defendant death-eligible. See Archuleta v.

Galetka, 267 P.3d 232, 259 (Utah 2011) (“{Tyhe fact finder in the

guilt phase must find—unanimously and beyond a reasonable

doubt—the statutory aggravator that makes death a possible sen-

tence”); Prieto v. Commonwealth, 682 S.E.2d 910, 985 (Va. 2009)

(holding, after Steele, that unanimity as to aggravators is re-

quired). In both Utah and Virginia, moreover, “the jury must

unanimously recommend the death penalty.” Steele, 921 So. 2d at

549.

as to [the] view held by a majority at the outset

of deliberations. A rule which insists on una-

nimity furthers the deliberative process by re-

quiring the minority view to be examined and,

if possible, accepted or rejected by the entire

jury. The requirement of jury unanimity thus

has a precise effect on the fact-finding process,

one which gives particular significance and con-

clusiveness to the jury’s verdict.

United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir.

1978). Non-unanimous voting rules compromise this

function—most severely when the voting rule is a sim-

ple majority.

Empirical research confirms that concern. Accord-

ing to a 2001 study, “several consistent findings have

emerged” in research conducted over the last four dec-

ades: Juries not subject to a unanimity requirement

“tend to take less time to reach a verdict, take fewer

polls, ... hang less often,” and most importantly, “cease

deliberating when [the minirnum necessary vote] is

reached.” Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45

Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7

Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 622, 669 (2001) (citations omit-

ted); see also Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury

Deliberations, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1261, 1272-1273 (2000)

(reporting similar findings); see also Jonakait, The

American Jury System 103 (2003). Most troubling, ev-

idence from jurisdictions that do require unanimity—

thus forcing jurors to continue deliberating—shows

that prolonged deliberations affect outcomes. Accord-

ing to one study, when unanimity is required, “a simple

majority of seven votes for death on the first ballot al-

most invariably portends ... that eventually a life sen-

tence will emerge from the jury room.” Sundby, War

and Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries

Reach Unanimity, 62 Hastings L.J. 103, 107-108 (2010).

This case exemplifies the extent to which a simple-

majority rule can undermine the “community partici-

pation” and “shared responsibility” in the verdict that

underpin the right to a jury trial. Burch, 441 U.S. at

135. After four days of testimony, and despite the

gravity of their task, the jurors spent less than two

hours in the jury room before recommending that

Hurst be sentenced to death by the slightest of mar-

gins. JA24-25.

3. Because this Court has never considered the

constitutionality of a simple-majority rule under the

Sixth Amendment, invalidating Hurst’s sentence on

this ground would not require revisiting any of this

Court’s decisions. To the extent the Court views Apo-

daca’s upholding of Oregon’s “ten of twelve” rule as

necessarily approving a seven-to-five rule, however, it

should overturn it.

Apodaca was wrong when it was decided. Justice

Powell’s tie-breaking concurrence rested on the notion

that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate

““Sot-for-jot and case-for-case” every element of the

Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial. Johnson, 406

US. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in

Apodaca). But, as both the dissenters and Justice Pow-

ell himself recognized, this Court had already rejected

the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment incor-

porated only a “watered-down version of [Bill of Rights]

guarantees.” Jd. at 384 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Apo-

daca); see also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J.,

dissenting) (same); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J.,

concurring in the judgment in Apodaca) (acknowledging

the “course of constitutional interpretation” upon which

the Court “ha[d) embarked” in prior cases). Stare deci-

sis considerations are weakened where the relevant

precedent is “inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court

precedent.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704

(1993).

Since Apodaca, moreover, this Court has rejected

Justice Powell’s “watered down” notion of incorpora-

tion. In McDonald, a plurality of this Court confirmed

that “incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to

be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth

Amendment according to the same standards that pro-

tect those personal rights against federal encroach-

ment.” 561 U.S. at 765. Writing separately, Justice

Thomas also concluded that the Fourteenth Amend-

ment makes applicable against the States all the “indi-

vidual rights enumerated in the Constitution.” Jd. at

823 (Thomas, J., concurring). Apodaca thus stands out

as an “exception” that can only be explained as “the re-

sult of an unusual division among the Justices.” Jd. at

766 n.14 (plurality). “/S]tare decisis does not compel

adherence to a decision whose ‘underpinnings’ have

been ‘eroded’ by subsequent developments of constitu-

tional law.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring) (quoting Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521)."°

In sum, stare decisis considerations do not warrant

adhering to Apodaca, which was incorrect when decided

credited by the empirical research, discussed above, showing that

unanimity is instrumental to preserving the traditional jury func-

tion. See supra pp. 44-45. Moreover, while Justice Powell relied

upon the position of the American Bar Association at the time as

support for his conclusion, the ABA has long since reconsidered

and abandoned that position in favor of unanimity. See ABA,

Standards of Judicial Administration Relating to Trial Courts

Standard 2.10 (1992).

and has been undermined by subsequent developments.

They especially cannot do so here, where, in addition,

“a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the

rationale of the plurality” at the time of the decision,

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66

(1996), and the decision involves “procedural rules that

implicate ... fundamental constitutional protections” —

an area where “{tJhe force of stare decisis is at its na-

dir.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 n.5.

2. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

forbid Florida’s simple-majority rule in

capital cases

Even if a simple majority were permissible for jury

verdicts in non-capital cases, it is prohibited by the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases

because it “risks erroneous imposition of the death

sentence.” Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988).

This Court has held that “there is a significant con-

stitutional difference between the death penalty and

lesser punishments,” Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,

637 (1980):

“Death is a different kind of punishment from

any other which may be imposed in this coun-

try. ... From the point of view of the defend-

ant, it is different in both its severity and its fi-

nality. From the point of view of society, the

action of the sovereign in taking the life of one

of its citizens also differs dramatically from any

other legitimate state action.”

Id. at 637-638 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.

349, 357-358 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.)) (brackets

omitted); see also, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181-188 (joint

opinion); id. at 231-241 (Marshall, J., dissenting);

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion). It is therefore

“of vital importance to the defendant and to the com-

munity that any decision to impose the death sentence

be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than ca-

price or emotion.” Beck, 447 U.S. at 637-638.

To that end, this Court has repeatedly invalidated

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “pro-

cedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of

the sentencing determination.” Beck, 447 U.S. at 638

(quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S.

at 301-305 Goint opinion) (States may not impose man-

datory death sentences); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.

325, 335-336 (1976) (joint opinion) (same); Beck, 447

U.S. at 638-646 (States must permit juries to consider

lesser-included non-capital offense); Lockett v. Ohio,

438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (piurality) (States may not con-

strain sentencer’s consideration of relevant mitigating

circumstances); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117 (similar).

History and the “evolving standards of decency,”

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014)—as evi-

denced by current practice and independent judgment,

see id. at 1996-2001—demonstrate that Florida’s sim-

ple-majority rule is too unreliable to establish the fac-

tual predicate for a death sentence.

First, the rule that a death sentence requires a

unanimous jury verdict as to all necessary factual pred-

icates—including all aggravating circumstances—has

“impressive historical credentials.” Ford v. Wain-

wright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986). English and American

history establishes that convictions in criminal cases

traditionally required a unanimous verdict by the jury.

See supra pp. 40-41. This right to a unanimous verdict,

moreover, necessarily extended to all facts necessary to

impose the death penalty because, at least throughout

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, all factfind-

ing—with respect to both guilt and capital sentencing—

remained the exclusive province of the jury. See Ap-

prendi, 530 U.S. at 479; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289-291;

McGautha, 402 U.S. at 197-198; supra pp. 27-28. A

death sentence founded on non-unanimous factual find-

ings would have been unknown to the Framers of the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments alike.

Second, this Court has “pinpointed that the ‘clear-

est and most reliable objective evidence of contempo-

rary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s

legislatures.”” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312

(2002).'’ On the question of jury unanimity, the legisla-

tures’ consensus is overwhelming: All States that re-

tain the death penalty other than Florida, as well as the

federal system, require that a jury establish the eligi-

bility for a death sentence by unanimous verdict. Su-

pra p. 43. Florida’s outlier status is “strong evidence of

consensus that our society does not regard” imposing

death based on a simple-majority vote as “proper or

humane.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.

Third, independent judgment confirms the impro-

priety of a simple-majority rule for aggravating cir-

cumstances in capital cases. As already explained, this

Court’s precedent has long recognized the critical pur-

pose served by jurors’ “comparison of views” and “ar-

guments among ... themselves.” Jones, 527 U.S. at

382; see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,

452 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Jury unanimity

'’ This Court has considered such consensus as an important

component of Eighth Amendment analysis in cases challenging the

procedure for selecting the sentence, as well as in cases where the

propriety of capital punishment was substantively in issue. £.g.,

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294 (joint opinion); Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1996-

1998.

... is an accepted, vital mechanism to ensure that real

and full deliberation occurs in the jury room, and that

the jury’s ultimate decision will reflect the conscience

of the community.”); supra pp. 43-44. This conclusion,

moreover, is confirmed by empirical research indicating

that juries not subject to a unanimity requirement en-

gage in less meaningful deliberation and often end de-

liberations altogether as soon as the minimum neces-

sary vote is reached. Supra pp. 44-45; cf. Hall, 134 S.

Ct. at 2000 (independent judgment “is informed by the

views of medical experts”).'*

Finally, Florida’s own adherence to a unanimity re-

quirement in all other criminal contexts renders its

adoption of the looser simple-majority rule in capital

sentencing “arbitrary and capricious.” Gregg, 428 U.S.

at 188 (joint opinion). This Court often views intraju-

risdictional inconsistencies as relevant under the

Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Beck, 447 U.S. at 636-637

(invalidating Alabama’s failure to instruct capital juries

on lesser-included offenses and noting that “Alabama

itself gives the defendant a right to such instructions

under appropriate circumstances”); Graham v. Florida,

560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010) (explaining when courts should

“compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences

received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction”);

id. at 88 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing “intrajuris-

dictional’ comparison of the sentence at issue” in

'S-That the Eighth Amendment prohibits a unanimity re-

quirement for mitigating circumstances does not alter this analy-

sis. See McKoy, 494 U.S. at 443; Mills, 486 U.S. at 373-374. Re-

quiring different voting rules for aggravating and mitigating cir-

cumstances makes sense because mitigating circumstances, unlike

aggravators, are not factual prerequisites for imposing the death

penalty and do not increase—but generally decrease—the risk

that the death penalty will be imposed.

proportionality analysis); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501

U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (same).

Here, despite the uniquely grave context of capital

sentencing, Florida’s simple-majority rule for capital

sentencing is inexplicably less demanding than the vot-

ing rule Florida applies in all other criminal proceed-

ings. Florida law is clear that “{njo verdict may be ren-

dered unless all of the trial jurors concur in it.” Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.440 (emphasis added); see also Bottoson v.

Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 714 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concur-

ring) (unanimity requirement “has been an inviolate

tenet of Florida jurisprudence since the State was cre-

ated”); Motion to Call Circuit Judge to Bench, 8 Fla.

459, 482 (1859) (“The common law wisely requires the

verdict of a petit jury to be unanimous.”). This unanimi-

ty requirement, moreover, applies to all criminal cases

in which a jury is empaneled—a broad swath that even

includes many misdemeanors. See, e.g., Rodriguez

Sanchez v. State, 503 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1987) (jury unanimity required when defendant charged

with misdemeanor “for the alleged theft of a blouse hav-

ing a value of less than one hundred dollars”).

“The decision to exercise the power of the State to

execute a defendant is unlike any other decision citi-

zens and public officials are called upon to make.

Evolving standards of societal decency have imposed a

correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the

determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a

particular case.” Mills, 486 U.S. at 383-384. Under

Florida law, however, the jury’s decision “on a matter

so grave as the determination of whether a human life

should be taken,” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (1976) (joint

opinion), requires only a majority vote. A Florida jury

must deliberate until it reaches unanimity to convict a

defendant for stealing a blouse, but can recommend a

defendant’s execution without seeking any consensus

as to aggravators beyond a simple majority. The

Eighth Amendment cannot abide such an anomalous,

attenuated standard of reliability.

C. Hurst’s Sentence Would Be Unconstitutional

Because The Aggregate Effect Of The Defects

In Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Sub-

verts The Jury’s Deliberative Function

Even if the many defects identified above could be

tolerated in isolation, they certainly cannot be tolerated

in combination. The “essential feature” of the jury trial

is the “interposition between the accused and his accus-

er of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”’

and the assurance of “community participation and

shared responsibility” in and for the verdict. Burch,

441 U.S. at 135. A jury can serve these ends only if its

procedures promote adequate “group deliberation” and

responsible factfinding. Jd. Here, Florida law relegates

the jury to a purely advisory role in violation of Ring.

But if, as the State suggests, no Ring violation arose be-

cause the jury in fact made implicit findings that author-

ized Hurst’s death sentence, the State would have to

confront the fact that in making those implicit findings,

the jury operated under constraints that combined to

render its deliberations hollow.

As this Court has recognized, procedures that un-

dermine adequate group deliberation are constitution-

ally invalid whether they do so in isolation or collective-

ly. In Burch, this Court invalidated Louisiana’s prac-

tice allowing convictions by a vote of five out of six ju-

rors. The Court had previously held that jury size

could be reduced to six, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.

78 (1970), and had previously upheld a less-than-

unanimous ten-to-two voting rule, Apodaca, 406 U.S. at

411; see also Johnson, 406 U.S. at 364-365 (nine-to-

three rule does not violate Due Process Clause). But

Louisiana’s “five of six” practice at issue in Burch arose

“at the intersection of [the Court’s] decisions concern-

ing jury size and unanimity.” Burch, 441 U.S. at 137.

The Court accordingly focused on the aggregate effects

on the function of the jury of Louisiana’s reduced jury

size and relaxed decision rule. /d. at 138-139. The

Court concluded:

[W]hen a State has reduced the size of its juries

to the minimum number of jurors permitted by

the Constitution, the additional authorization of

nonunanimous verdicts by such juries suffi-

ciently threatens the constitutional principles

that led to the establishment of the size thresh-

old that any countervailing interest of the State

should yield.

Id. at 139. Together, Louisiana’s practices did “not per-

mit the jury to function in the manner required by” the

Constitution, but “threatened the fairness of the pro-

ceeding and the proper role of the jury.” /d. at 137-138.

Similar logic applies here. Even if the various as-

pects of Florida’s capital sentencing scheme identified

above could be constitutional in isolation, Hurst’s sen-

tence would still be invalid because their aggregate ef-

fect undermines any confidence in the quality of the ju-

ry’s deliberations. Assume that, despite Caldwell, a

jury may be misled to believe that its (implied) finding

of an aggravator is merely “advisory” when in fact it is

critical to the availability of the death sentence. As-

sume that, despite the views of a majority of this Court

in Apodaca and every State’s practice with respect to

non-aggravator elements of non-petty crimes, a jury

may find an aggravator by a simple majority. Assume,

finally, that despite Ring, the jury need not even agree

on which aggravator exists—so that as few as four ju-

rors may find one of the presented aggravators while

three jurors find the other aggravator. At a minimum,

the aggregate effect of these procedures would prevent

the jury from conducting the meaningful deliberation

required by the Constitution. Hurst’s sentence thus

cannot be sustained.

CONCLUSION

The Florida Supreme Court’s judgment should be

reversed and Hurst’s sentence should be vacated.

Respectfully submitted.

NANCY A. DANIELS SETH P. WAXMAN

PUBLIC DEFENDER Counsel of Record

DAVID A. DAVIS CATHERINE M.A. CARROLL

ASSISTANT PUBLIC DAVID M. LEHN

DEFENDER FRANCESCO VALENTINI

Leon County Courthouse WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

301 South Monroe Street HALE AND DORR LLP

Suite 401 1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Tallahassee, FL 32301 Washington, DC 20006

(202) 663-6000

MARK E. OLIVE seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

LAW OFFICES OF

MARK E.OLIVE,P.A. ERIC F. FLETCHER

320 West Jefferson Street ALLISON TRZOP

Tallahassee, FL 32301 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

May 2015

APPENDIX

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL

AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury

of the state and district wherein the crime shall have

been committed, which district shall have been previ-

ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-

ture and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with

the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process

for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the as-

sistance of counsel for his defense.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Fla. Stat. § 775.082. Penalties; applicability of sen-

tencing structures; mandatory minimum sentences

for certain reoffenders previously released from

prison

Effective: July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2014

(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony

shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to de-

termine sentence according to the procedure set forth

in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such

person shall be punished by death, otherwise such per-

son shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be

ineligible for parole.

(2) In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is

held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme

Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court

having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced

to death for a capital felony shall cause such person to

be brought before the court, and the court shall sen-

tence such person to life imprisonment as provided in

subsection (1). No sentence of death shall be reduced

as a result of a determination that a method of execu-

tion is held to be unconstitutional under the State Con-

stitution or the Constitution of the United States.

(3) A person who has been convicted of any other des-

ignated felony may be punished as follows:

(a) 1. For a life felony committed prior to October 1,

1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of

years not less than 30.

2. For a life felony committed on or after October 1,

1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of

imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.

3. Except as provided in subparagraph 4., for a life felo-

ny committed on or after July 1, 1995, by a term of im-

prisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of

years not exceeding life imprisonment.

4. a. Except as provided in sub-subparagraph b., for a

life felony committed on or after September 1, 2005,

which is a violation of s. 800.04(5)(b), by:

(I) A term of imprisonment for life; or

(II) A split sentence that is a term of not less than 25

years’ imprisonment and not exceeding life imprison-

ment, followed by probation or community control for

the remainder of the person’s natural life, as provided

in s. 948.012(4).

b. For a life felony committed on or after July 1, 2008,

which is a person’s second or subsequent violation of

s. 800.04(5)(b), by a term of imprisonment for life.

(b) For a felony of the first degree, by a term of impris-

onment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically

provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of

years not exceeding life imprisonment.

prisonment not exceeding 15 years.

(d) For a felony of the third degree, by a term of im-

prisonment not exceeding 5 years.

(4) A person who has been convicted of a designated

misdemeanor may be sentenced as follows:

(a) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a definite

term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year;

(b) For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a defi-

nite term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days.

(5) Any person who has been convicted of a noncriminal

violation may not be sentenced to a term of imprison-

ment nor to any other punishment more severe than a

fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty, except as provid-

ed in chapter 316 or by ordinance of any city or county.

(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter

the operation of any statute of this state authorizing a

trial court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence of im-

prisonment for an indeterminate period within mini-

mum and maximum limits as provided by law, except as

provided in subsection (1).

(7) This section does not deprive the court of any au-

thority conferred by law to decree a forfeiture of prop-

erty, suspend or cancel a license, remove a person from

office, or impose any other civil penalty. Such a judg-

ment or order may be included in the sentence.

(8)(a) The sentencing guidelines that were effective Oc-

tober 1, 1983, and any revisions thereto, apply to all fel-

onies, except capital felonies, committed on or after Oc-

tober 1, 1983, and before January 1, 1994, and to all felo-

nies, except capital felonies and life felonies, committed

before October 1, 1983, when the defendant affirmative-

ly selects to be sentenced pursuant to such provisions.

(b) The 1994 sentencing guidelines, that were effective

January 1, 1994, and any revisions thereto, apply to all

felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after

January 1, 1994, and before October 1, 1995.

October 1, 1995, and any revisions thereto, apply to all

felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after

October 1, 1995, and before October 1, 1998.

(d) The Criminal Punishment Code applies to all felo-

nies, except capital felonies, committed on or after Oc-

tober 1, 1998. Any revision to the Criminal Punishment

Code applies to sentencing for all felonies, except capi-

tal felonies, committed on or after the effective date of

the revision.

(e) Felonies, except capital felonies, with continuing

dates of enterprise shall be sentenced under the sen-

tencing guidelines or the Criminal Punishment Code in

effect on the beginning date of the criminal activity.

(9a) 1.“Prison releasee reoffender” means any de-

fendant who commits, or attempts to commit:

a. Treason;

b. Murder;

ce. Manslaughter;

d. Sexual battery;

e. Carjacking;

f. Home-invasion robbery;

g. Robbery;

h. Arson;

i. Kidnapping;

j. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;

k. Aggravated battery;

|. Aggravated stalking;

m. Aircraft piracy;

n. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a de-

structive device or bomb;

o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical

force or violence against an individual;

p. Armed burglary;

q. Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied

structure; or

r. Any felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, s.

827.071, or s. 847.0135(5);

within 3 years after being released from a state correc-

tional facility operated by the Department of Correc-

tions or a private vendor or within 3 years after being

released from a correctional institution of another

state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any

possession or territory of the United States, or any for-

eign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense

for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1

year in this state.

2. “Prison releasee reoffender” also means any defend-

ant who commits or attempts to commit any offense

listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-r. while the defend-

ant was serving a prison sentence or on escape status

from a state correctional facility operated by the De-

partment of Corrections or a private vendor or while

the defendant was on escape status from a correctional

institution of another state, the District of Columbia,

the United States, any possession or territory of the

United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following in-

carceration for an offense for which the sentence is pun-

ishable by more than | year in this state.

3. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a

prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph

1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sen-

tence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender.

Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by

a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a

prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section,

such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the

sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows:

a. For a felony punishable by life, by a term of impris-

onment for life;

b. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of impris-

onment of 30 years;

c. For a felony of the second degree, by a term of im-

prisonment of 15 years; and

d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of impris-

onment of 5 years.

(b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be re-

leased only by expiration of sentence and shal! not be

eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early

release. Any person sentenced under paragraph (a)

must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence.

imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as author-

ized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provi-

sion of law.

(d) 1. It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders

previously released from prison who meet the criteria in

paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law

and as provided in this subsection, unless the state at-

torney determines that extenuating circumstances exist

which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, in-

cluding whether the victim recommends that the offend-

er not be sentenced as provided in this subsection.

2. For every case in which the offender meets the crite-

ria in paragraph (a) and does not receive the mandatory

minimum prison sentence, the state attorney must ex-

plain the sentencing deviation in writing and place such

explanation in the case file maintained by the state at-

torney.

(10) If a defendant is sentenced for an offense commit-

ted on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree fel-

ony but not a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, and

excluding any third degree felony violation under chap-

ter 810, and if the total sentence points pursuant to

s. 921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sen-

tence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction. How-

ever, if the court makes written findings that a non-

state prison sanction could present a danger to the pub-

lic, the court may sentence the offender to a state cor-

rectional facility pursuant to this section.

(11) The purpose of this section is to provide uniform

punishment for those crimes made punishable under

this section and, to this end, a reference to this section

constitutes a general reference under the doctrine of

incorporation by reference.

Fla. Stat. § 921.141. Sentence of death or life im-

prisonment for capital felonies; further proceedings

to determine sentence

Effective: October 1, 2010

(1) Separate proceedings on issue of penalty.— Upon

conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a

capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sen-

tencing proceeding to determine whether the defend-

ant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment

as authorized by s. 775.082. The proceeding shall be

conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as

soon as practicable. If, through impossibility or inabil-

ity, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing

on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of

the accused, the trial judge may summon a special juror

or jurors as provided in chapter 913 to determine the

issue of the imposition of the penalty. If the trial jury

has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the

sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury

impaneled for that purpose, unless waived by the de-

fendant. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented

as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the

nature of the crime and the character of the defendant

and shall include matters relating to any of the aggra-

vating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in sub-

sections (5) and (6). Any such evidence which the court

deems to have probative value may be received, re-

gardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary

rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a

fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.

However, this subsection shall not be construed to au-

thorize the introduction of any evidence secured in vio-

lation of the Constitution of the United States or the

Constitution of the State of Florida. The state and the

defendant or the defendant’s counsel shall be permitted

to present argument for or against sentence of death.

(2) Advisory sentence by the jury.—After hearing al)

the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an

advisory sentence to the court, based upon the follow-

ing matters:

(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist

as enumerated in subsection (5);

(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist

which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found

to exist; and

ant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.

(3) Findings in support of sentence of death.—

Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of

the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life

imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sen-

tence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings

upon which the sentence of death is based as to the

facts:

(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as

enumerated in subsection (5), and

(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances

to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

In each case in which the court imposes the death sen-

tence, the determination of the court shall be supported

by specific written findings of fact based upon the cir-

10a

cumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and upon the rec-

ords of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. If the

court does not make the findings requiring the death

sentence within 30 days after the rendition of the

judgment and sentence, the court shall impose sentence

of life imprisonment in accordance with s. 775.082.

(4) Review of judgment and sentence.—The judg-

ment of conviction and sentence of death shall be sub-

ject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Flor-

ida and disposition rendered within 2 years after the

filing of a notice of appeal. Such review by the Su-

preme Court shall have priority over all other cases and

shall be heard in accordance with rules promulgated by

the Supreme Court.

(5) Aggravating circumstances.—Aggravating cir-

cumstances shall be limited to the following:

(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previ-

ously convicted of a felony and under sentence of im-

prisonment or placed on community control or on felony

probation.

(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another

capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat

of violence to the person.

death to many persons.

(d) The capital felony was committed while the defend-

ant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commis-

sion of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after commit-

ting or attempting to commit, any: robbery; sexual bat-

tery; aggravated child abuse; abuse of an elderly person

or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm, per-

manent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson;

burglary; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful

lla

throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive de-

vice or bomb.

(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of

avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an

escape from custody.

(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.

(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hin-

der the lawful exercise of any governmental function or

the enforcement of laws.

(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious,

or cruel.

(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was commit-

ted in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner

without any pretense of moral or legal justification.

(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforce-

ment officer engaged in the performance of his or her

official duties.

(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or

appointed public official engaged in the performance of

his or her official duties if the motive for the capital fel-

ony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim’s offi-

cial capacity.

(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less

than 12 years of age.

(m) The victim of the capital felony was particularly

vulnerable due to advanced age or disability, or because

the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial

authority over the victim.

(n) The capital felony was committed by a criminal gang

member, as defined in s. 874.03.

12a

(0) The capital felony was committed by a person des-

ignated as a sexual predator pursuant to s. 775.21 or a

person previously designated as a sexual predator who

had the sexual predator designation removed.

(p) The capital felony was committed by a person sub-

ject to an injunction issued pursuant to s. 741.30 or s.

784.046, or a foreign protection order accorded full faith

and credit pursuant to s. 741.315, and was committed

against the petitioner who obtained the injunction or

protection order or any spouse, child, sibling, or parent

of the petitioner.

(6) Mitigating circumstances.—Mitigating circum-

stances shall be the following:

(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior

criminal activity.

(b) The capital felony was committed while the defend-

ant was under the influence of extreme mental or emo-

tional disturbance.

duct or consented to the act.

(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felo-

ny committed by another person and his or her partici-

pation was relatively minor.

(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under

the substantial domination of another person.

(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the crim-

inality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her

conduct to the requirements of law was substantially

impaired.

(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.

13a

(h) The existence of any other factors in the defendant’s

background that would mitigate against imposition of

the death penalty.

(7) Victim impact evidence.—Once the prosecution

has provided evidence of the existence of one or more

aggravating circumstances as described in subsection

(5), the prosecution may introduce, and subsequently

argue, victim impact evidence to the jury. Such evi-

dence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim’s

uniqueness as an individual human being and the re-

sultant loss to the community’s members by the vic-

tim’s death. Characterizations and opinions about the

crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence

shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evi-

dence.

(8) Applicability.—This section does not apply to a

person convicted or adjudicated guilty of a capital drug

trafficking felony under s. 893.135.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.