Slip Opinion — BP America Production Co. v. Burton

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnete) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opimon of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convemence of the reader.

See United States y. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 521, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO., SUCCESSOR IN

INTEREST TO AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., ET AL. v.

BURTON, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND

AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 05-669. Argued October 4, 2006—Decided December 11, 2006

After the Interior Department's Minerals Management Service (MMS)

issued administrative orders assessing petitioners for royalty under-

payments on gas leases they held on Government lands, petitioners

filed an administrative appeal, contending, inter alia, that the pro-

ceedings were barred by 28 U.S. C. §2415(a), which provides in rele-

vant part: “[E]very action for money damages brought by the United

States or an ... agency thereof which is founded upon any contract

..., shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years af-

ter the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions

have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.” (Em-

phasis added.) The Assistant Secretary of the Interior denied the ap-

peals, ruling that §2415(a) did not govern the administrative order.

The District Court agreed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Section 2115(a)s 6-year statute of limitations applies only to

court actions, not to the administrative payment orders involved in

this case. Pp. 5-16. ,

(a) Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally inter-

preted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Read in this way.

§2115(a)s text is quite clear: Its key terms—‘action” and “com-

plaint’—are ordinarily used in connection with judicial. not adminis-

trative, proceedings. See, e.g., Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United

States, 345 U.S. 59, 66. The phrase “action for money damages” re-

inforces this reading because the term “damages” is generally used to

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Syllabus

mean pecuniary compensation or indemnity recovered in court.

Moreover, the fact-that §2415(a) distinguishes between judicial and

administrative proceedings by providing that an “action” must com-

mence “within one year after final decisions have been rendered in

applicable administrative proceedings’ shows that Congress knew

how to identify administrative proceedings and manifestly had two

separate concepts in mind when it enacted §2415(a). Pp. 5-6.

(b) Petitioners’ assertion that §2415(a)'s term “action” is commonly

used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial. proceedings, is not

persuasive. The numerous statutes and regulations cited to docu-

ment this supposed usage actually undermine petitioners’ argument.

since none of them uses the term “action” standing alone to refer to

administrative proceedings. Rather, each includes a modifier, refer-

ring to an “administrative action,” a “civil or administrative action,”

or “administrative enforcement actions.” Section 2415(a)'s references

to “every action for money damages” founded upon “any contract”

(emphasis added) do not assist petitioners, as they do not broaden the

ordinary meaning of the key term “action.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, and West v. Gib-

son, 527 U.S. 212. distinguished. Pp. 6-9.

(c) Petitioners’ suggestion that an MMS payment order constitutes

a “complaint” under §2415(a) is also rejected. Their examples of

statutes and regulations employing the term “complaint” in the ad-

ministrative context are unavailing, since such occasional usage of

the term does not alter its primary meaning. which concerns the ini-

tiation of a civil action. Moreover. an MMS payment order lacks the

essential attributes of a complaint, which is a filing that commences

a proceeding that may result in a legally binding order providing re-

lief. In contrast, an MMS order in and of itself imposes a legal obli-

gation on the party to which it is issued. Given that the failure to

comply with such an order can result in fines of up to $10,000 a day,

see 30 U.S. C. §1719(@), the order plays an entirely different role

from that of a “complaint.” Pp. 9-10.

(d) Any remaining doubts are erased by the canon that. statutes of

limitations are construed narrowly against the government. This

canon ts rooted in the traditional rule that time does not run against

the King. A corollary of this rule is that a sovereign that elects to

subject itself to a statute of limitations is given the benefit of the

doubt if the statute's scope is ambiguous. Bowers v. New York & .Al-

bany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 316.-distinguished. Pp. 10-11.

(ce) The Court disagrees with petitioners’ argument that interpret-

ing §2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions renders §24150)—

which specifies that “|t}he provisions of this section shall not prevent

the United States ... from collecting any claim ... by means of ad-

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 3

Syllabus

ministrative offset’"—superfluous in contravention of the canon

against reading a statute in a way that makes part of it redundant.

Under the Court's interpretation, §2415@) is not mere surplusage,

but clarifies that administrative offsets are not covered by §2415(a)

even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action. To accept pe-

titioners’ argument, on the other hand, the Court would have to hold

either that §2415(a) applied to administrative actions when it was

enacted in 1966 or that it was extended to reach administrative ac-

tions when §2415(1) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of

§2115(a)s text. which has not been amended, refutes the first of

these propositions, and accepting the latter would require the unreal-

istic conclusion that in 1982 Congress proceeded to enlarge §2415 to

cover administrative proceedings by the oblique and cryptic route of

inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative vehicle

from the statute's reach. Pp. 11-14.

(f) Although interpreting §2415(a) as applying only to judicial ac-

tions may result in certain peculiarities, petitioners alternative in-

terpretation would itself result in disharmony. For instance. MMS

oil and gas lease payment orders are now prospectively subject to a 7-

year statute of limitations except with respect to obligations arising

out of leases of Indian land. 30 U.S. C. §1724(b)(1). Given the ex-

hortation that the Interior Secretary “aggressively carry out his trust

responsibility in the administration of Indian oil and gas.”

§1701(a)(4), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to impose a

shorter, 6-year statute of limitations for payment orders regarding

Indian lands. Finally, while cogent, petitioners policy arguments as

to why limiting §2415(a) to judicial actions frustrates the statute's

purposes must be viewed in perspective. For example, because there

are always policy arguments against affording the sovereign special

treatment. the relevant inquiry in a case like this is simply how far

Congress meant to go when it enacted the statute of limitations in

question. Prior to §2415(a)'s enactment, Government contract ac-

tions were not subject to any statute of limitations. See Guaranty

Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132. Absent congressional

action changing this rule. it remains the law. and §2415(a) betrays no

intent to change the rule as it applies to administrative proceedings.

Pp. 14-16.

110 F. 3d 722, affirmed.

Auiro, J.. delivered the opinion of the Court. in which all other Mem-

bers joined, except RoBekTs, C. J.. and BREYER, J.. who took no part in

the consideration or decision of the case.

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinien is subject to formal revision before publication in the

prelumimnary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

myton, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 05-669

BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY, SUCCESSOR IN

INTEREST TO AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS v. REJANE BURTON, ACTING AS-

SISTANT SECRETARY, LAND AND MINERALS

MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

{December 11, 2006]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether administrative

payment orders issued by the Department of the Interior's

Minerals Management Service (MMS) for the purpose of

assessing royalty underpayments on oil and gas leases fall

within 28 U.S. C. §2415(a), which sets out a 6-year stat-

ute of limitations for Government contract actions. We

hold that this provision does not apply to these adminis-

trative payment orders, and we therefore affirm.

|

A

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) authorizes the

Secretary of the Interior to lease public-domain lands to

private parties for the production of oil and gas. 41 Stat.

_A37, as amended, 30 U.S. C. §181 et seg. MLA lessees are

obligated to pay a royalty of at least “12.5 percent in

amount or value of the production removed or sold from

2 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

) Opinion of the Court

the lease.” §226(b)(1)(A).

In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Oil and Gas

Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA), 96 Stat. 2447, as

amended, 30 U.S. C. §1701 et seq., to address the concern

that the “system of accounting with respect to royalties

and other payments due and owing on oil and gas pro-

(luced from such lease sites |was] archaic and inadequate.”

§1701(a)(2). FOGRMA ordered the Secretary of the Inte-

rior to “audit and reconcile, to the extent practicable, all

current and past lease accounts for leases of oil or gas and

take appropriate actions to make additional collections or

refunds as warranted.” §1711(c)(1). The Secretary, in

turn, has assigned these duties to the MMS. 30 CFR

§201.100 (2006).

Under FOGRMA, lessees are responsible in the first

instance for the accurate calculation and payment of

royalties. 30 U.S. C. §1712(a). MMS, in turn, is author-

ized to audit those payments to determine whether a

royalty has been overpaid or underpaid. §§1711(a) and (c);

- 80 CFR §§206.150(c), 206.170(d). In the event that an

audit, suggests an underpayment, it is MMS’! practice to

send the lessee a letter inquiring about the perceived

deficiency. If, after reviewing the lessee’s response, MMS

concludes that. the lessee owes additional royalties, MMS

issues an order requiring payment of the amount due.

Failure to comply with such an order carries a stiff pen-

alty: “Any person who—1) knowingly or willfully fails to

make any royalty payment by the date as specified by [an|

order... shall be liable for a penalty of up to $10,000 per

violation for each day such violation continues.” 30

U.S.C. §1719(c). The Attorney General may enforce

these orders in federal court. §1722(a).

An MMS payment order may be appealed, first. to the

'MMS is not always the auditing body. as MMS may delegate its

authority to the host State or an Indian tribe. 30 U.S. C. §§1732. 1735.

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

Director of MMS and then to the Interior Board of Land

Appeals or to an Assistant Secretary. 80 CFR §§290.105,

290.108. While filing an appeal does not. generally stay

the payment order, §218.50(c), MMS will usually suspend

the order's effect after the lessee complies with applicable

bonding or financial solvency requirements, §243.8.

Congress supplemented this scheme by enacting the

Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness

Act of 1996 (FOGRSFA), 110 Stat. 1700, as amended, 30

U.S.C. §1701 et seg. FOGRSFA adopted a prospective 7-

year statute of limitations for any “judicial proceeding or

demand” for royalties arising under a federal oil or gas

lease. §1724(b)(1). The parties agree that this provision

applies both to judicial actions (‘judicial proceeding|s]”)

and to MMS’ administrative payment orders (“demand|[s]”)

arising on or after September 1, 1996. Ibid. This provi-

sion does not, however, apply to judicial proceedings or

demands arising from leases of Indian land or underpay-

ments of royalties on pre-September 1, 1996, production.

FOGRSFA §§9, 11, 110 Stat. 1717, notes following 30

U.S. C. §1701.

There is no dispute that a lawsuit in court to recover

royalties owed to the Government on pre-September 1,

1996, production is covered by 28 U.S. C. §2415(a), which

sets out a general 6-year statute of limitations for Gov-

ernment contract actions. That section, which was en-

acted in 1966, provides in relevant part:

“Subject. to the provisions of section 2416 of this title,

and except as otherwise provided by Congress, every

action for money damages brought by the United

States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded

upon any contract express or implied in law or fact,

shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six

years alter the right of action accrues or within one

year after final decisions have been rendered in appli-

4 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

‘able administrative proceedings required by contract

or by law, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.)

Whether this general 6-year statute of limitations also

governs MMS administrative payment orders concerning

pre-September 1, 1996, production is the question that we

must decide in this case.

B

Petitioner BP America Production Co. holds gas leases

from the Federal Government for lands in New Mexico's

San Juan Basin. BP’s predecessor, Amoco Production Co.,

first entered into these leases nearly 50 years ago, and

these leases require the payment of the minimum 12.5

percent royalty prescribed by 30 U.S.C. §226(b)(1)(A).

For years, Amoco calculated the royalty as a percentage of

the value of the gas as of the moment it was produced at

the well. In 1996, MMS sent lessees a letter directing that

royalties should be calculated based not on the value of

the gas at the well, but on the value of the gas after it was

treated to meet the quality requirements for introduction

into the Nation’s mainline pipelines.” Consistent with this

guidance, MMS in 1997 ordered Amoco to pay additional

royalties for the period from January 1989 through De-

cember 1996 in order to cover the difference between the

value of the treated gas and its lesser value at the well.

Amoco appealed the order, disputing MMS’ interpreta-

tion of its royalty obligations and arguing that the pay-

ment order was in any event barred in part by the 6-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. §2415(a). The Assis-

tant Secretary of the Interior denied the appeal and ruled

that the statute of limitations was inapplicable.

2=MMS intended this letter to implement its regulations, which re-

quired lessees “to place gas in marketable condition at no cost to the

Federal Government unless otherwise provided in the lease agree-

ment.” 30 CFR §206. 15201) (1996).

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006)

~~

Gr

Opinion of the Court

Amoco, together with petitioner Atlantic Richfield Co.,

sought review in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, which agreed with the Assistant

Secretary that §2415(a) did not govern the administrative

order. Amoco Production Co. vy. Baca, 300 F.Supp. 2d 1,

21 (2003). The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit affirmed, .4moco Production Co. vy. Watson, 410

I’. 3d 722, 733 (2005), and we granted certiorari, 547 U.S.

___ (2006), in order to resolve the conflict between that

decision and the contrary holding of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in OXY USA, Ine. vy.

Babbit, 268 F.3d 1001, 1005 (2001) (en banc). We now

affirm.

I]

A

We start, of course, with the statutory text. Central

Bank of Denver, N. A. vy. First Interstate Bank of Denver,

N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994). Unless otherwise defined,

statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance

with their ordinary meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444

U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Read in this way, the text of §2415(a)

is quite clear.

The statute of limitations imposed by §2415(a) applies

when the Government commences any “action for money

damages” by filing a “complaint” to enforce a contract, and

the statute runs from the point when “the right of action

accrues.” The key terms in this provision—‘action” and

“complaint”—are ordinarily used in connection with judi-

cial, not administrative, proceedings. In 1966, when

§2415(a) was enacted, a commonly used legal dictionary

defined the term “right ef action” as “|t]he right to bring

suit; a legal right to maintain an action,” with “suit”

meaning “any proceeding ... in a court of justice.” Black's

Law Dictionary 1488, 1603 (4th ed. 1951) (hereinafter

Black's). Likewise, “complaint” was defined as “the first or

6 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

. Opinion of the Court

initiatory pleading on the part of the plaintiff in a civil

action.”® Jd., at 356. See also Unexcelled Chemical Corp.

v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 66 (1953) (holding that

filing a complaint, in the ordinary sense of the term,

means filing a suit in court, not initiating an administra-

tive proceeding; “Commencement of an action by the filing

of a complaint has too familiar a history ... for us to

assume that Congress did not mean to use the words in

their ordinary sense”). The phrase “action for money

damages” reinforces this reading because the term “dam-

ages’ is generally used to mean “pecuniary compensation

or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts.”

Black's 466 (emphasis added).

Nothing in the language of §2415(a) suggests that Con-

gress intended these terms to apply more broadly to ad-

ministrative proceedings. On the contrary, §2415(a) dis-

tinguishes between’ judicial and administrative

proceedings. Section 2415(a) provides that an “action”

must commence “within one year after final decisions have

been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings.”

Thus, Congress knew how to identify administrative

proceedings and manifestly had two separate concepts in

mind when it enacted §24 15(a).!

B

In an effort to show that the term “action” is commonly

used to refer to administrative, as well as judicial, pro-

ceedings, petitioners have cited numerous statutes and

“These primary definitions have not changed in substance since

1966. Black's (8th ed. 2001) now defines “action” as “[a] civil or erimi-

nal judicial proceeding” and a “complaint” as “[t]he initial pleading that

starts a civil action and states the basis for the court's jurisdiction. the

basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the demand for relief” /d., at 31, 305.

4Moreover. it seems unlikely that Congress intended administrative

proceedings to commence within one vear after the conclusion of admin-

istrative proceedings.

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

regulations that, petitioners claim, document this usage.”

These examples, however, actually undermine petitioners’

argument, since none of them uses the term “action”

standing alone to refer to administrative proceedings.

Rather, each example includes a modifier of some sort,

referring to an “administrative action,” a “civil or adminis-

trative action,” or “administrative enforcement actions.”

This pattern of usage buttresses the point that the term

“action,” standing alone, ordinarily refers to a judicial

proceeding.

Petitioners contend that their broader interpretation of

the statutory term “action” is supported by the reference

to “every action for money damages” founded upon “any

contract.” 28 U.S. C. §2415(a) (emphasis added). But the

broad terms “every” and “any” do not assist petitioners, as

they do not broaden the ordinary meaning of the key term

“action.”

Petitioners argue that their interpretation is supported

5See, e.g., 12 U.S. C. §85205(a)(1) (statute of limitations for “adminis-

trative action[s] to recover any payment[s] made to a State or local

government for disaster or emergency assistance’); 12 U.S.C.

§1441a(b)(11)(G) (requiring Resolution Trust Corporation to maintain

staff to assist with certain “cases, civil claims, and administrative

enforcement actions’); 15 U.S. C. §78u(h)(9)(B) (Securities Exchange

Act of 1934 provision noting that certain “|f]inancial records ... may be

cisclosed or used only in an administrative. civil. or criminal action’).

See also 7 CFR §3018.400(c) (2006) (Department of Agriculture regula-

tion regarding “administrative action|s] for the imposition of a civil

penalty” for failure to file disclosure forms); 71 Fed. Reg. 7407 (2006)

(to be codified in 12 CFR §1412.2()01)) (Farm Credit System Insurance

Corporation regulation defining “prohibited indemnification payment”

to include reimbursement for a civil money penalty of judgment result-

ing from any “administrative or civil action” instituted by the Farm

Credit Administration); 10 CFR pt. 820. App. A. [X—b (2006) (* Adminis-

trative actions. such as determination of award fees where [Depart ment

of Energy] contracts provide for such determinations. will be considered

separately from any civil penalties that may be imposed under this

Enforcement Policy’).

8 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

Opinion of the Court

by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for

Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), and West v. Gibson, 527

U.S. 212 (1999), but this reliance is misplaced. In Dela-

ware Valley Citizens’ Council, we construed the attorney's

fee provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which author-

izes a “court, in issuing any final order in any action

brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, [to]

award costs of litigation ... to any party.” 42 U.S.C.

§7604(d). We permitted the recovery of fees both for work

done in court and in subsequent administrative proceed-

‘ings. But the pertinent statutory provision in that case

cid not employ the key terms that appear in the statute at

issue here. Specifically, the CWA provision referred to

“litigation,” not to an “action” commenced by the filing of a

“complaint.” Moreover, “the work done by counsel [in the

administrative phase of the case] was as necessary to the

attainment of adequate relief... as was al! of their earlier

work in the courtroom ... obtaining the consent decree.”

A78 U.S., at 558. And we expressly reserved judgment on

the question “whether an award of attorney's fees is ap-

propriate ... when there is no connected court action in

which fees are recoverable.” /d., at 560, n. 5.

West helps petitioners even less. There, we considered

whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC) could order a federal agency to pay compensatory

damages in an administrative proceeding. Section 717(b)

of Tithe VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§2000e—16(b), authorized the EEOC to employ “appropri-

ate remedies,” but did not specifically authorize damages,

and §717(c) authorized a subsequent court action against

an employer agency, 42 U.S. C. §2000e—16(c). In 1991,

Congress added Rev. Stat. §1977A(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.

§198la(a)(1), which provided that “[iJn an action brought

by a complaining pariy under section 706 or 717... the

complaining party may recover compensatory ... dam-

ages.” In West, the defendant agency argued that the

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

enactment of §1981la(a)(1) showed that Congress did not

consider compensatory damages to be “appropriate reme-

dies” in an EEOC proceeding, as opposed to an action

brought by an aggrieved employee. If Congress had

wished to authorize the award of compensatory damages

in an EEOC proceeding, the defendant agency reasoned,

Congress would have so provided in §198la(a)(l), by ex-

pressly cross-referencing §717(c). We rejected this argu-

ment, but in doing so we did not hold that an EEOC pro-

ceeding is an “action” under §198la(a)(1). Rather, we

simply concluded that the EEOC’s authorization under

§717(b) to award “appropriate remedies” was _ broad

enough to encompass compensatory damages. 527 U.S.,

at 220-221.

For these reasons, we are not persuaded by petitioners’

argument that the term “action” in §2415(a) applies to the

administrative proceedings that follow the issuance of an

MMS payment order.

C

~~ We similarly reject. petitioners’ suggestion that an MMS

letter or payment order constitutes a “complaint” within

the meaning of §2415(a). Petitioners point to examples of

statutes and regulations that employ the term “complaint”

in the administrative context. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. §45(b)

(requiring the Federal Trade Commission to serve a “com-

plaint” on a party suspected of engaging in an unfair

method of competition); 29 CFR §102.15 (2006) (a “com-

plaint” initiates unfair labor practice proceedings before

the National Labor Relations Board). But the occasional

use of the term to describe certain administrative filings

does not alter its primary meaning, which concerns the

initiation of “a civil action.” Black's 356. Moreover, even

if the distinction between administrative and judicial

proceedings is put aside, an MMS payment order lacks the

essential attributes of a complaint. While a complaint is a

10 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v, BURTON

Opinion of the Court

filing that commences a proceeding that may in the end

result. in a legally binding order providing relief, an MMS

payment order in and of itself imposes a legal obligation

on the party to which it is issued. As noted, the failure to

comply with such an order can result in fines of up to

$10,000 a day. An MMS payment order, therefore, plays

an entirely different role from that of a “complaint.”®

dD

To the extent that any doubts remain regarding the

meaning of §2415(a), they are erased by the rule that

statutes of limitations are construed narrowly against the

government. EF. 1, DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264

U.S. 456 (1924). This canon is rooted in the traditional

rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi—time does not run

against the King. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,

304 U.S. 126, 182 (1988). A corollary of this rule is that

when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a statute of

limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt

if the scope of the statute is ambiguous.

Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S.

346 (1927), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary.

There, as here, the issue was the scope of a statute of

limitations. The provision in that case, however, provided

that “‘[nJo suit or proceeding for the collection of any such

taxes’” shall commence more than five years after the

filing of the return. /d., at 348-349. The Government

argued that the terms “proceeding” and “suit” were coter-

minous, and urged further that any ambiguity should be

‘There was some question at oral argument whether MMS’ initial

letter might constitute a “complaint” within the meaning of §2115(a).

Petitioners did not advance this argument, and recognized at oral

argument that neither the statute nor the regulations require the

issuance of such a letter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-9. The Government, for its

part, observed that all such a letter does is request information, as the

agency has not yet decided whether to assert a claim. /d., at 28. This

is not a complaint.

Citeas 49 US. (2006) ll

(pinion of the Court

resolved in its favor.

The Court recognized the canon, restating it much as we

have above. /d., at 349. But the Court concluded that the

eanon had no application in that case because the text of

the relevant statute, unlike §2415(a), applied clearly and

separately to “suits” and “proceedings,” and the Court saw

no reason to give these different terms the same meaning.

Id., at 849-350.

1D

We come now to petitioners’ argument that interpreting

§2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would render

subsection (i) of the same statute superfluous. Subsection

(i) provides as follows:

ur

lhe provisions of this section shall not prevent the

United States or an officer or agency thereof from col-

lecting any claim of the United States by means of

administrative offset, in accordance with section 3716

of title 31." 28 U.S. C. §2415(i).

An administrative offset is a mechanism by which the

Government withholds payment of a debt that it owes

another party in order to recoup a payment that this party

owes the Government. 381 U.S.C. §8701(4)(1). Thus,

under subsection (i), the Government may recover a debt

via an administrative offset even if the Government would

be time barred under subsection (a) from pursuing the

debt in court.

Petitioners argue that, if §2415(a) applies only to judi-

cial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings,

there is no need for §2415()'s rule protecting a particular

administrative mechanism (i.e., an administrative offset)

from the statute of limitations set out in subsection (a).

Inveking the canon against reading a statute in a way that

makes part of the statute redundant, see, e.g., TRW Inc. v.

Andrews, 584 U.S. 19, 31 (2001), petitioners contend that

12 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

pinion of the Court

subsection (i) shows that subsection (a) was meant to

apply to administrative, as well as judicial, proceedings.

We clisagree.

As the Court of Appeals noted, subsection (i) was not

enacted at the same time as subsection (a) but rather was

added 16 years later by the Debt Collection Act of 1982.

96 Stat. 1749. This enactment followed a dispute between

the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and

the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)

over whether an administrative offset could be used to

recoup a debt where a judicial recoupment action was

already time barred.

In 1978, in response to a question from the United

States Civil Service Commission, OLC opined that an

administrative offset could not be used to recoup a debt as

to which a judicial action was already time barred. OLC

reached this conclusion not because it believed that

§2415(a) reached administrative proceedings generally,’

but. rather because of the particular purpose of an admin-

istrative offset. “Where [a] debt has not been reduced to

judgment,” OLC stated, “an administrative offset is merely

a pre-judgment attachment device.” Memorandum from

John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, OLC, to

Alan K. Campbell, Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commis-

sion Re: Effect of Statute of Limitations on Administrative

Collection of United States Claims 3 (Sept. 29, 1978), Joint

Lodging. OLC opined that a prejudgment attachment

device such as this exists only to preserve funds to satisfy

any judgment the creditor subsequently obtains. /d., at 4

(citing cases). OLC therefore concluded that, where a

lawsuit is already foreclosed by §2415(a), an administra-

“Indeed, what emerges strikingly from OLC's 1978 opinion is that no

one at the time—neither OLC nor OCC—even contemplated that

§2115(a) applied to administrative procedures in the first instance. Nor

have petitioners pointed to any source demonstrating otherwise.

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

tive offset. that is the functional equivalent of a pretrial

attachment is also unavailable. /d., at 3.

The OCC disagreed. See In the Matter of Collection of

Debts—Statute of Limitations on Administrative Setoff, 58

Comp. Gen. 501, 504-505 (1979). In its view, the question

was answered by

“|t]he general rule ... that statutes of limitations ap-

plicable to suits for debts or money demands bar or

run only against the remedy (the right to bring suit)

to which they apply and do not discharge the debt or

extinguish, or even impair, the right or obligation, ei-

ther in law or in fact, and the creditor may avail him-

self of every other lawful means of realizing on the

debt or obligation. See Mascot Oil Co. v. United

States, 42 F. 2d 309 (Ct. Cl. 1930), affirmed 282 U.S.

A34; and 33 Comp. Gen. 66 (1953). See also Ready-

Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 130 F.Supp. 390

(Ct. Cl. 1955).” Ibid.

That Congress had time-barred the judicial remedy, OCC

reasoned, imposed no limit on the administrative remedy.

The OLC-OCC dispute reveals that, even under the

interpretation of subsection (a)—the one we are adopt-

ing—that considers it applicable only to court proceedings,

subsection (i) is not mere surplusage. It clarifies that

administrative offsets are not covered by subsection (a)

even if they are viewed as an adjunct of a court action.

To accept petitioners’ argument, on the other hand, we

would have to hold either that §2415(a) applied to admin-

istrative actions when it was enacted in 1966 or that it

was extended to reach administrative actions when sub-

section (i) was added in 1982. The clear meaning of the

text of §2415(a), which has not been amended, refutes the

first. of these propositions, and accepting the latter would

require us to conclude that in 1982 Congress elected to

enlarge §2415 to cover administrative proceedings by

l4 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v, BURTON

(pinion of the Court

inserting text expressly excluding a single administrative

vehicle from the statute's reach. It is entirely unrealistic

to suggest that Congress would proceed by such an oblique

and cryptic route.

Petitioners contend that interpreting §2415(a) as apply-

ing only to judicial actions results in a statutory scheme

with peculiarities that Congress could not have intended.

lor example, petitioners note that while they are required

by statute to preserve their records regarding royalty

obligations for only seven years, 30 U.S. C. §1724(f), the

interpretation of §2415(a) adopted by the Court of Appeals

permits MMS to issue payment orders that reach back

much farther.

We are mindful of the fact that a statute should be read

where possible as eflecting a “‘symmetrical and coherent

regulatory scheme,” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 1838 (20007, but here petitioners’

alternative interpretation of §2415(a) would itself result in

disharmony. For instance, under FOGRSIFA, MMS pay-

ment orders regarding oil and gas leases are now prospec-

tively subject to a 7-year statute of limitations except with

respect. to obligations arising out of leases of Indian land.

Consequently, if we agreed with petitioners that §2415(a)

applies generally to administrative proceedings, payment

orders relating to oil and gas royalties owed under leases

of Indian land would be subject to a shorter (i.e., 6-year)

statute of limitations than similar payment orders relat-

ing to leases of other public-domain lands (which would be

governed by FOGRSEFA’s new 7-year statute). Particularly

in light. of Congress’ exhortation that the Secretary of the

Interior “aggressively carry out his trust responsibility in

the administration of Indian oil and gas,” 30 U.S.C.

§1701(a)(A), it seems unlikely that Congress intended to

impose a shorter statute of limitations for payment orders ,

v

Cite as: 549 U.S. (2006) 15

pinion of the Court

regarding Indian lands.

Petitioners contend, finally, that interpreting §2415(a)

as applying only to judicial actions would frustrate the

statute’s purposes of providing repose, ensuring that

actions are brought while evidence is fresh, lightening

recordkeeping burdens, and pressuring federal agencies to

assert federal rights promptly. These are certainly cogent

policy arguments, but they must be viewed in perspective.

lor one thing, petitioners overstate the scope of the

problem, since Congress of course can enact and has en-

acted specific statutes of limitations to govern specific

administrative actions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §5205(a)(1)

(statute of limitations for an administrative action to

recover payments made to state governments for disaster

or emergency assistance). Indeed, in 1996, FOGRSFA

imposed just such a limitation prospectively on all non-

Indian land, oil, and gas lease claims.

Second, and more fundamentally, the consequences of

interpreting §2415(a) as limited to court actions must be

considered in light of the traditional rule exemptire pro-

ceedings brought by the sovereign from any time bar.

There are always policy arguments against affording the

sovereign this special treatment, and therefore in a case

like this, where the issue is how far Congress meant. to go

when it enacted a statute of limitations applicable to the

Government, arguing that an expansive interpretation

would serve the general purposes of statutes of limitations -

is somewhat beside the point. The relevant inquiry, in-

stead, is simply how far Congress meant to go when it

enacted the statute of limitations in question. Here prior

to the enactment of §2415(a) in 1966, contract actions

brought by the Government were not subject to any stat-

ute of limitations. See Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S., at

132. Absent congressional action changing this rule, it

remains the law, and the text of §2415(a) betrays no intent

to change this rule as it applies to administrative proceed-

16 BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. v. BURTON

pinion of the Court

ings. :

In the final analysis, while we appreciate petitioners’

arguments, they are insufficient to overcome the plain

meaning of the statutory text. We therefore hold that the

6-year statute of limitations in §2415(a) applies only to -

court actions and not to the administrative proceedings

involved in this case.

* * w

lor these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BREYER took no part

in the consideration or decision of this case.