Amicus Curiae Brief — King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114)

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JAN 28 205

No. 14-114 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DAVID KING, ET AL..,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES, ET AL..,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND

STATE LEGISLATURES AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

DOUGLAS T. KENDALL

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA*

SIMON LAZARUS

BRIANNE J. GOROD

CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

1200 18 Street NW

Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-6889

elizabeth@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

January 28, 2015 * Counsel of Record

AN MRR rn BP met eae ER i ae Rp RRR ENTERED

WiLSON-EPesS PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WasHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF AR-

GUMENT

ARGUMENT

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CONGRESS NEVER INTENDED—OR

SUGGESTED TO THE STATES—THAT

TAX CREDITS WOULD ONLY BE

AVAILABLE TO INDIVIDUALS WHO

PURCHASED INSURANCE ON STATE-

RUN EXCHANGES

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Il. STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

NEVER UNDERSTOOD THE TAX CRED-

ITS TO BE LIMITED TO STATE-RUN

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APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A: LIST OF CONGRESSIONAL

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(1)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Halbig v. Burwell,

758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated,

No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir.

EU cee ee 15

Halbig v. Sebelius,

27 F. Supp. 3d 1(D.D.C 2014)... )

Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclama-

tion Ass'n,

| 22

NFIB v. Sebelius,

bg ee Lb ee 11

United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Shef-

field, Ala.,

GE BP Fe CRT ina soesnesndssecsscccccccssesscenes 20

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

Ne Be ee PS exccasosivecucacersceencensnacensnss 9

Statutes and Regulations

26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) .-.....ccceseesceeeseeseeeeee 6

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIID)......-..-..-. 10

eae Com ft || ee ;

42 U.S.C. § 18041(C)(1) ...cescccceseesesseseeseesesseeees 6

43 U.3.C. $B 160B61-1G0GE ............00.00.ccccesceees 6

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont'd.

Page(s)

423 U.S.C. $ 1Q0D 1G), swcnssdccsntsssussareeaneee 2,6

76 Fed. Reg. 41,866 (July 15, 2011).............. 20

75 Fed. Reg. 45,584 (Aug. 3, 2010)..........0.... 25

Pub. L. No. 112-56, § 401, 125 Stat. 711

CIDE TBD 11 ssevcccsasudunecsnansenoueenesdnscuaicnnaanaae 20

Legislative Materials

155 Cong. Rec. $11,964 (Nov. 21, 2009)....... 13

155 Cong. Rec. $12,543 (Dec. 6, 2009).......... 10

155 Cong. Rec. $12,764 (Dec. 9, 2009).......... 13

155 Cong. Rec. $12,779 (Dec. 9, 2009).......... 13

155 Cong. Rec. $13,375 (Dec. 17, 2009)) ...... 13

156 Cong. Rec. H2207 (Mar. 22, 2010)......... 10

H. Comms. on Ways and Means, Energy

and Commerce, and Educ. and Labor,

Health Insurance Reform at a Glance:

The Health Insurance Exchanges (2010),

available at http://housedocs.

house.gov/energycommerce/EXCHANGE.

WES ..20<2<scescesesainesondessenseaseeenseiiina aaa 11, 12

House Committee on the Budget Holds a

Markup on the Reconciliation Act of

2010, 111th Cong. (2010), 2010 WL

94 LOT. vacecciasrxvcermeenniedditnitieeiiatidieics 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont'd.

Page(s)

H.R. Rep. No. 112-254 (2011), available at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-

112hrpt254/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt254.pdf ..... 21

S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1205(a) (2009).......... 18

Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-18-

10, Technical Explanation of the Revenue

Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of

2010” (2010), available at https://www.

jct.gov/publications. htm]?func=select&id

a anesncnisionoeniacn 12

Books, Articles, and Other Authorities

Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid,

Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hu-

man Servs., No. 11-400 (11th Cir. Jan.

10, 2012), 2012 WL 1066561 ....................... 27

Cal. HHS, Public Comments to HHS on the

Planning and Establishment of State-

Level Exchanges (Oct. 4, 2010), available

at https://www.statereforum.org/sites/

default/files/california-1.pdf....................... 25

Catherine Rampell, Mr. Health Care Man-

date, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2012......... eked 19

Christine Monahan, Halbig v. Sebelius and

State Motivations To Opt for Federally

Run Exchanges, CHIRblog (Feb. 11,

2014), http://chirblog.org/halbig-v-

sebelius-and-state-motivations-to-opt-for-

federally-run-exchanges?/ .........................+. 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont'd.

Page(s)

David D. Kirkpatrick, Health Lobby Takes

Fight to the States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28,

2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/

29/health/policy/29lobby.html?_r=0 ..........

David Merritt, Why States Should Move

Forward With Health Insurance Ex-

changes, Daily Caller (Mar. 13, 2012),

dailycaller.com/2012/03/13/why-states-

should-move-forward-with-health-care-

exchanges/#ixzz2mjT 2jiZe ...................00.005

Democratic Policy & Comme'ns Ctr., Pas-

sage of Affordable Care Act Was Open

and Transparent. After Passage of the

Law, Proof That ACA Works (Dec. 9,

2014), http://www.dpcc.senate.gov/?p=iss

EE siccananiciaussienreicobaceusncechannensdlietudataes

Eric Whitney, Despite Setbacks, Bipartisan

Support Remains For Colorado Ex-

change, npr.org (Mar. 18, 2014),

http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/20 1 4/03/

18/290092059/despite-setbacks-

bipartisan-support-remains-for-colorado-

IEE ccccntaganticnstisinninentinnaatiinaaemes

Erin Toner, Scott Walker's Medicaid Ma-

neuver, Kaiser Health News (Nov. 19,

2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/

wisconsin-governor-scott-walker-

embraces-parts-of-obamacare/...................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - coat’d.

Page(s)

Families USA Amicus Brief, Halbig v.

Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00623-PLF (D.D.C.

Nov. 12, 2013), ECF No. 48-1 ....................

Governor Walker Addresses WMC Busi-

ness Day in Madison, WI, Wisconsin Eye

(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.wiseye.org/

videoplayer/vp.html?sid=9595...................

Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon,

Another ObamaCare Glitch, Wall St. J.,

Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/

articles/SB1000142405297020368750457

RI RE Raa tL Lt AP

Letter from CBO Director Douglas W.

Elmendorf to Rep. Darrell E. Issa (Dec. 6,

2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/

files/43752-letterToChairmanlIssa.pdf ......

Letter from Lloyd Doggett et al. to Presi-

dent Barack Obama (Jan. 11, 2010),

available at http://www.myharlingen

SE i iciiciokentrsenensacncsvecstichicsaenen

Letter from Senator E. Benjamin Nelson to

Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. (Jan. 27,

2015), http://theusconstitution.org/sites/

default/files/briefs/Senator_Casey_re_

King v_Burwell-27_JAN_2015.pdf ...........

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont’d.

Page(s)

Letter from Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.,

to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson (Jan. 27,

2015), http://theusconstitution.org/sites/

default/files/briefs/150127_Letter_to_

Senator_Nelson_re_King_v_Burwell.pdf.

Nat] Governors Ass'n, Implementation

Timeline for Federal Health Reform Leg-

islation (2010), available at

http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/fi

les/pdf/1003HEALTHSUMMITIMPLEM

ENTATIONTIMELINE.PDF.....................

Nat'l Governors Ass’n, State Perspectives

on Insurance Exchanges: Implementing

Health Reform In An Uncertain Envi-

ronment (2011), available at

http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/fi

les/pdf/1 L1OSNGAEXCHANGESSUMMA

Ohio Health Care Coverage & Quality

Council, Report of Health Benefits Ex-

change Task Force, available at

https://www.statereforum.org/sites/defaul

t/files/

hbe_pros_cons_10_2_10_-_final_2.pdf.......

Philip Rucker, Sen. DeMint of S.C. Is Voice

of Opposition to Health Care Reform,

Wash. Post, July 28, 2009, http://articles.

washingtonpost.com/2009-07-28/politics/

36871540_1_health-care-reform-health-

care-fight-health-care ..................c00sssesss000,

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont'd.

Page(s)

President Barack Obama Holds a Townhall

Event, Nashua, New Hampshire, Roll

Call (Feb. 2, 2010), 2010 WL 358122 ........

Rep. Joe Sestak, News Release, Rep. Ses-

tak Votes for Final Passage of Historic

Health Care Reform Legislation (Mar. 23,

2010), 2010 WLNR 6031395....................4.

Sen. Mark Pryor, Press Release, On Senate

Passage of Health Care Reform (Dec. 24,

2009), 2009 WLNR 26018100....................

Sen. Mary Landrieu, Breaking: Landrieu

Supports Passage of Historic Senate

Health Care Bill (Dec. 22, 2009), 2009

EE SIE kevesnnstodcieecdacevideanianninantennes

Sen. Russell Feingold, Sen. Feingold Issues

Statement on Health Care, Education Af.-

fordability Reconciliation Act of 2010

(Mar. 25, 2010), 2010 WLNR 6142152......

Steve Mistler, Outspoken Critic of

Obamacare Helped To Turn LePage

Against State Exchange, Portland Press

Herald, Nov. 23, 2014,

http://www.pressherald.com/2014/11/23/o

utspoken-critic-of-obamacare-helped-to-

turn-lepage-against-state-exchange/.........

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont'd.

Page(s)

Tex. Dep’t of Ins. & HHS Comm'n, Public

Comments to HHS on the Planning and

Establishment of State-Level Exchanges

(Oct. 4, 2010), available at

https://www.statereforum.org/sites/defaul

II cht teecetecait sachs cdatcacoeemvenins

Theda Skocpol, Why Congressional Budget

Office Reports Are the Best Evidence of

Congressional Intent About Health Sub-

sidies, Scholars Strategy Network (Jan.

2015), http://www.scholarsstrategynet

work.org/content/why-congressional-

budget-office-reports-are-best-evidence-

congressional-intent-about-health- ...........

Timothy S. Jost, Health Insurance Ex-

changes: Legal Issues, O’Neill Inst. at

Geo. U. Legal Ctr. (2009), available at

http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi

/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=o

ME SII. osc ccsndcnesereccssscasssesnanensass RAG tL LAS Ie

Vaughn Hillyard, Politics Wasn't Only Rea-

son Why Some GOP-Led States Didn't Set

Up Own Exchanges, NBC News (Dec. 4,

2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/

first-read/politics-wasnt-only-reason-

why-some-gop-led-states-didnt-

Be I iis i hictiene nada atincastutstaceiee benimbaniamatean

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - cont'd.

Page(s)

Written Testimony of Professor Jonathan

Gruber before the Comm. on Oversight

and Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Repre-

sentatives (Dec. 9, 2014),

http://oversight. house.gov/wp-content/

uploads/2014/12/Gruber-Statement-12-9-

NE ITI sinsiccscorcccisnsiccidtasseistasteenrias 19

WSJ Live Presents: Gov. Scott Walker In-

terviewed, Wall St. J. Video (Mar. 27,

2013), http://www.wsj.com/video/ws)-live-

presents-gov-scott-walker-interviewed/

1BC163BF-68C2-4351-9DFF-CCFO3AE5

RARE Ae ISCO SCT ES ce SE 8 RA a A 30

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

Amici are members of Congress who are current

and former leaders of the committees that crafted the

ACA and the House and Senate leaders who melded

the respective committee versions into the bill that

was ultimately enacted. Amici also include members

of state legislatures who served during the period

when their governments were deciding whether to

create their own Exchanges under the ACA.? Based

on their experiences, amici are familiar with the

statute and with the debates that took place in Con-

gress regarding enactment of the statute and in state

legislatures regarding its implementation.

Amici have an interest in ensuring that the ACA is

construed by the courts in accord with its text and

purpose. In that regard, amici submit this brief to

address Petitioners’ assertion that the tax credits at

issue in this case were intended to encourage States

to set up their own health benefit Exchanges under

penalty of withdrawal of crucial tax credits and sub-

sidies for lower-income residents. As amici know

from their own experiences, Petitioners’ assertion is

inconsistent with the text and history of the statute.

It is also inconsistent with its most fundamental pur-

! The parties have consented to the filing of this brief and their

letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Under Rule

37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amici state that no counsel for a

party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or

party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prepa-

ration or submission of this brief. No person other than amici or

their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or

submission.

2 Amici who no longer serve in Congress or a state legislature

join solely in their individual capacities as former members of

Congress and state legislatures.

pose to make health insurance affordable for all

Americans by providing tax credits for low and mid-

dle-income individuals, wherever they reside, and

with the ACA’s interdependent statutory scheme,

which critically depends on the availability of these

tax credits for low and middle-income individuals

who purchase insurance on the new American Health

Benefit Exchanges (“Exchanges”) created by the Act.

Amici well understand, as they well understood when

the legislation was under consideration in Congress

and state capitals, that, without premium assistance

tax credits and subsidies, the Exchanges themselves

would be rendered inoperable, and, indeed, the effec-

tiveness of other major components of the law, such

as guarantees of affordable insurance for people with

pre-existing health conditions and the “individual

mandate” to carry insurance or pay a penalty, could

be gravely jeopardized.

A full listing of congressional amici appears in Ap-

pendix A, and a full listing of state legislator amici

appears in Appendix B.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection

and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), a landmark law

dedicated to achieving affordable “near-universal

coverage,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D). Toward that end,

the ACA provides that individuals can purchase com-

petitively-priced health insurance policies on Ameri-

can Health Benefit Exchanges (“Exchanges”), and it

authorizes federal tax credits and subsidies for low

and middle-income individuals who purchase insur-

ance on the Exchanges. Amici are members of Con-

gress who served while the ACA was being passed

and members of state legislatures who served while

their state governments were deciding whether to

create their own Exchanges. Amici know from per-

sonal experience that the ACA’s core purpose is to

achieve universal health care coverage, that Ex-

changes are critical to achieving that goal, and that

the provision of tax credits and subsidies to low- and

middle-income Americans is indispensable to the ef-

fective functioning of the ACA.

Petitioners seek to invalidate the Internal Revenue

Service regulation confirming that the ACA’s premi-

um tax credits are available to all qualifying individ-

uals, regardless of whether they purchase insurance

on a state-run or federally-facilitated Exchange, on

the ground that the statute authorizes tax credits on-

ly for individuals who purchase insurance on Ex-

changes “established by the State.” In other words,

according to Petitioners, individuals who would oth-

erwise qualify for the tax credits should be denied

that benefit if they purchase insurance on a federally-

facilitated Exchange.

Because the textual basis for this argument is so

weak (Petitioners isolate a four-word phrase con-

tained in two subclauses rather than considering the

text of the statute as a whole), they impute to Con-

gress—in effect, to congressional amici themselves—

the purpose of deliberately prescribing tax credits on-

ly on state-run Exchanges, as a means of encouraging

States to set up their own Exchanges. This objective,

they claim, was so important that Congress drafted

the ACA in a way that would guarantee the collapse

of non-state-run Exchanges, even though that would

drastically curb, rather than broaden, access to

health insurance. Amici submit this brief to demon-

strate that the purpose attributed to the statute by

Petitioners was, in fact, never contemplated by the

legislators who enacted the law, nor by the state offi-

cials charged with deciding whether to establish their

own Exchanges.

The text, purpose, and history of the statute ail

support amici’s position. To start, the provision pre-

scribing the credits explicitly makes them available

to all “applicable taxpayers,” and defines “applicable

taxpayers’ based on income, not State of residence.

Petitioners rely on one four word phrase in two sub-

clauses setting out the formula for calculating the

amount of the tax credit to argue that tax credits

should not be available in States with federally-

facilitated Exchanges. Even in isolation, the lan-

guage on which Petitioners rely provides, at best,

ambiguous support for their interpretation, but read

in the context of the remainder of the provision, not

to mention the statute as a whole, it is clear that the

provisions at issue plainly prescribe tax credits and

subsidies for participants in all Exchanges, federally-

facilitated and state-run.

In any event, based on our collective experience in

Congress, congressional amici know that it would

make no sense to hide such an important condition in

such an obscure subsection if our intent, as Petition-

ers claim, was to make clear to state legislators that

premium assistance credits and subsidies would be

unavailable if their State failed to set up its own Ex-

change. Indeed, congressional amici know from their

experience drafting and enacting this legislation that

Congress imposed no such condition. The purpose of

the tax credit provision was to facilitate access to af-

fordable insurance through all Exchanges, state-run

or federally-facilitated, and to ensure that all Ex-

changes could work with other fundamental compo-

nents of the law in order to provide universal access

to insurance. It was not, as Petitioners would have it,

to incentivize the establishment of state Exchanges

above all else, and certainly not to thwart the overall

statutory scheme and Congress’s fundamental pur-

pose of making insurance affordable for all Ameri-

cans.

Just as amici members of Congress never sent

States the message that they needed to set up their

own Exchanges for their citizens to qualify for the tax

credits, amici state legislators never understood Con-

gress to be sending that message based on their re-

view of the statute and the legislative record. To the

contrary, amici state legislators understood that tax

credits would be available to their citizens regardless

of whether their States set up their own Exchanges.

State governments identified numerous implementa-

tion issues in the period immediately following the

law’s enactment, but the possibility that the failure to

set up a state-run Exchange would preclude that

State’s citizens from enjoying the tax credits and sub-

sidies was never one of them. Indeed, some amici

served in States that declined to set up their own Ex-

changes; had amici thought there was even a possi-

bility that their constituents would lose access to

these tax credits unless the State established its own

Exchange, they would have vigorously advocated for

a state-run Exchange citing this potential conse-

quence.

In sum, as amici know from their own experience

and as the record reflects, the availability of tax cred-

its under the ACA should not turn on whether an in-

dividual purchased insurance on a federal or state

Exchange. Rather, such credits should be available

to all qualified individuals regardless of where they

live. Such a conclusion is the only one consistent

with the ACA’s text, purpose, and history. Indeed, if

the Court were to accept Petitioners’ version of the

statute, it would render inoperable not only the sys- ~

tem of Exchanges, but other critical aspects of the

law—such as the individual mandate and the provi-

sions guaranteeing coverage for people with pre-

existing conditions—further e idence that such in-

terpretation is wholly without merit. This Court

should affirm the judgment of the court below.

ARGUMENT

The Affordable Care Act’s express goal was to make

health care insurance available to all Americans.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D). To achieve that

goal, the statute provides for the establishment of

Exchanges on which individue!s can purchase health

insurance. Under the statute, each State may estab-

lish its own Exchange, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1), or if a

State chooses not to establish an Exchange, the Sec-

retary of Health and Human Services is directed to

establish “such Exchange” in its. stead, id.

§ 18041(c)(1). The ACA also creates tax credits for

low- and middle-income Americans to ensure that

they can afford to purchase insurance on the Ex-

changes, see id. §§ 18081-18082, and it sets out a

formula for calculating the amount of the credit,

which is partially determined by the “monthly premi-

ums for ... qualified health plans . . . enrolled in

through an Exchange established by the State,” 26

U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).

Petitioners argue that because the provision setting

out the formula for calculating the amount of the

credit refers to “an Exchange established by the

State,” the tax credits are available only to individu-

als who purchase insurance on state-run Exchanges.

Pet’rs Br. 3. In other words, such credits are not

available to individuals who purchase insurance on a

federally-facilitated Exchange. According to Petition-

ers, the statute was structured this way because its

drafters calculated that the availability of the tax

credits would induce States to establish their own

Exchanges, and they placed so high a priority on this

objective that they structured the Exchange provi-

sions to override—indeed, to empower state officials

to disable the Exchanges and thereby thwart—the

law’s core purpose of promoting universal access to

affordable health insurance. Jd. at 43.

As amict can attest, that was never the purpose of

the tax credit provisions, which is clear from the de-

bates within Congress over the ACA’s enactment and

in state capitols over its implementation. Indeed, it

was widely understood that the tax credits would be

available to all Americans who satisfied the statute’s

income criteria regardless of where they lived. If, as

Petitioners argue, the threat of cutting off access to

insurance for upwards of 80% of the individuals ex-

pected to gain access through the Exchanges was a

“stick” to encourage state officials to establish state

Exchanges, Congress surely would have communicat-

ed to the States that the availability of the tax credit

turned on the establishment of a state Exchange, and

the States would have understood that message. Nei-

ther event happened.

I. CONGRESS NEVER INTENDED—OR SUG-

GESTED TO THE STATES—THAT TAX

CREDITS WOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE

TO INDIVIDUALS WHO PURCHASED IN-

SURANCE ON STATE-RUN EXCHANGES

A:nici members of Congress chaired the committees

that crafted the ACA and led the two chambers as the

respective committee versions were melded into the

bill that was ultimately enacted, or they were other-

wise actively involved in the debate concerning the

ACA. They know from that experience that the tax

credits are indispensable to the statute’s goal of af-

fordable health insurance for all Americans and Con-

gress accordingly prescribed such credits for all

Americans, regardless of whether they purchased

their health insurance on a state-run or federally-

facilitated Exchange. Petitioners’ contrary conjec-

ture, that the tax credits were primarily a tool to en-

courage States to establish Exchanges (Pet’rs Br. 2-

3), is simply false, as the text and history of the stat-

ute make clear.’ In fact, during the debates over the

ACA in Congress, no one suggested, let alone explicit-

ly stated, that a State’s citizens would lose access to

the tax credits if the State failed to establish its own

Exchange. Petitioners do not—and cannot—explain

how the tax credits could have encouraged States to

establish Exchanges if state officials were never told

that availability of the credits turned on whether or

not a State created its own Exchange.‘

The text of the statute makes clear that tn. state

establishment of an Exchange was never viewed as a

condition for the availability of tax credits. Indeed,

as one court has noted, “[o}ne would expect that if

Congress had intended to condition availability of the

tax credits on state participation in the Exchange re-

gime, this condition would be laid out clearly in. .

3 Significantly, even as Petitioners’ argument critically depends

on the idea that the tax credits were a tool to encourage States

to establish Exchanges, multiple States supporting Petitioners

have suggested just the opposite, i.¢., that States deliberately

chose not to set up Exchanges to avoid receipt of the tax credits.

See Oklahoma et al. Amici Br. 2, 16; Indiana & 39 Ind. Pub. Sch.

Corps. Amici Br. 2.

‘ Instead of focusing on the tax credit provision, Petitioners

point to other provisions as evidence that Congress uses “car-

rots” and “sticks” to encourage state action. See, e.g., Pet’rs Br.

32. No one disputes that Congress can use such tools; the ques-

tion is whether Congress did so here. Congress did not.

the provision authorizing the credit.” Halbig v. Sebe-

lius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 n.12 (D.D.C. 2014). Yet Pe-

titioners point to nothing in that provision that would

have indicated to States that their citizens would lose

access to the tax credits if the State failed to set up

its own Exchange. Instead, Petitioners point only to

language in the technical formula for calculating the

amount of the credit that the subsidy provisicn ex-

pressly makes available to “applicable taxpayer/s],”

regardless of State of residence. And even that lan-

guage does not suggest, let alone state unambiguous-

ly, that the failure to set up a state-run Exchange

would result in loss of the tax credit. Drawing the

connection between the tax credits and the Exchang-

es so obliquely—especially in the context of other

language in Section 36B(a) expressly making the

credit available to all applicable taxpayers, regard-

less of where they live—would hardly have made

sense if, as Petitioners argue, the purpose of the tax

credit was to induce States to establish their own Ex-

changes. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531

U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“[Congress] does not . hide

elephants in mouseholes.”).®

Nor did members of Congress say anything during

the extensive debates about the bill to suggest that

States would need to set up their own Exchanges if

they wanted their citizens to have access to the tax

credits. Indeed, the ACA was the subject of a historic

amount of study and debate in both houses of Con-

5 Moreover, as the Government notes, “[hjad Congress intended

to impose that consequence, it would surely have spelled that

out in [the section} which sets forth States’ options for establish-

ing Exchanges . . . so that States could evaluate the implications

of their choice.” Resp’ts Br. 24. Yet Congress did not.

gress,® and if, as Petitioners argue, members of Con-

gress had intended to use the tax credits to encourage

States to set up their own Exchanges, surely someone

at some point would have suggested as much,’ espe-

cially since, contrary to Petitioners’ claim otherwise

(Pet’'rs Br. 43), there was widespread awareness that

many States might not set up their own Exchanges,

see, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H2207 (Mar. 22, 2010)

(statement of Rep. Michael Burgess); 155 Cong. Rec.

S12,543 (Dec. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Tom Co-

® For example, the Senate Finance Committee held 53 meetings

on health reform, in addition to a seven-day markup of the bill

(the longest Finance Committee markup in 22 years), and when

the bill came to the floor, the Senate spent 25 consecutive days

in session on health reform (the second longest consecutive ses-

sion in history). Democratic Policy & Comme'ns Ctr., Passage of

Affordable Care Act Was Open and Transparent. After Passage

of the Law, Proof That ACA Works (Dec. 9, 2014),

http://www.dpcc.senate.gov/?p=issue&id=328. Similarly, over

the course of a year, the House held 79 bipartisan hearings and

markups on the bill, spending nearly 100 hours in hearings and

hearing from 181 witnesses. Id.

7 Petitioners assert that “nowhere does the legislative history

reject .. . Medicaid funds for states that decline to expand eligi-

bility. This reinforces the legal poini that such legislative histo-

ry ‘amens’ are irrelevant, and the practical point that the ACA’s

legislative history does not discuss all important issues.” Pet’rs

Br. 40. But this is an apples and oranges comparison. The ACA

Medicaid expansion was simply an incremental modification of a

half-century old conditional grant program, the nation’s largest.

Indeed, al] the ACA did was add “individuals . whose in-

come .. . does not exceed 133 percent of the poverty line” to pre-

existing categories of Medicaid-eligible individuals that States

were required to cover to receive Medicaid funding. See 42

U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIID. The legal effect of this addi-

tion thus required no explanation. That in no way explains why

Congress would have failed to make clear the conditional avail-

ability of new tax credits for individuels as part of a brand-new

health exchange arrangement.

burn); see also NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,

2665 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ.,

dissenting) (noting that “Congress thought that some

States might decline ._ . to participate in the opera-

tion of an exchange”); cf. Pet’rs Br. 14 (describing the

State establishment of an Exchange as a “controver-

sial responsibility”). Yet no one did.

In fact, everyone understood that tax credits would

be available to purchasers on all of the Exchanges,

federal and State. For example, on March 20, 2010,

the three House committees with jurisdiction over the

ACA issued a summary fact sheet explaining how the

Exchanges would operate under the Senate bill as

amended by the then-pending reconciliation lan-

guage. That fact sheet, while recognizing that there

would be both state-run and federally-facilitated Ex-

changes, drew no distinction between them.’ Specifi-

cally, it explained that the Senate bill would “create

* See also, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Health Lobby Takes Fight

to the States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com

/2009/12/29/health/policy/29lobby.htm1!?_r=0; Philip Rucker, Sen.

DeMint of S.C. Is Voice of Opposition to Health Care Reform,

Wash. Post, July 28, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com

/2009-07-28/politics/3687 1540_1_health-care-reform-health-care-

fight-health-care; Letter from Lloyd Doggett et al. to President

Barack Obama (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.

myharlingennews.com/?p=6426. Petitioners’ amici also point to

Congress's failure to “authorize funding for the creation of fed-

eral Exchanges” as evidence that Congress assumed all States

would set up their own Exchanges. Jonathan H. Adler & Mi-

chael F. Cannon Amici Br. 34. This is wrong. See Resp'ts Br. 42

n.14 (explaining that Congress “provided funding for federally-

facilitated Exchanges” (citing HCERA § 1005, 124 Stat. 1029)).

® See H. Comms. on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce,

and Educ. and Labor, Health Insurance Reform at a Glance: The

Health Insurance Exchanges 1 (2010), available at

http://housedocs. house .gov/energycom merce/EXCHANGE pdf.

state-based health insurance Exchanges, for states

that choose to operate their own exchanges, and a

multi-state Exchange for the others,” and that “[t]he

Exchanges”—that is, all of them—would “make

health insurance more affordable and accessible for

small businesses and individuals.”'!° The fact sheet

also noted that the ACA “[p]jrovides premium tax

credits,” but did not suggest that they would only be

available on state-run Exchanges.!! To the contrary,

the summary stated the only criterion for the tax re-

hef was income level.!2

Similarly, on March 21, 2010, the Joint Committee

on Taxation explained that the statute “creates a re-

fundable tax credit (the ‘premium assistance credit’)

for eligible individuals and families who purchase

health insurance through an exchange.”'* The sum-

mary’s explanation that the credit would be available

to individuals who purchased health insurance

through “an exchange” made clear that the tax credits

would be available to all qualifying Americans, re-

gardless of whether their State set up its own Ex-

change.

Senators also consistently indicated that the credits

would be available to all individuals who purchased

insurance on an Exchange, be it state-run or federal-

ly-facilitated. The manager of the ACA, Senator Max

Baucus, noted that “[uJnder our bill, new exchanges

10 Id.

1! Jd. at 2.

12 Td.

‘3 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-18-10, Technical Ex-

planation of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of

2010” 12 (2010), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.

htm!?func=select&id=48 (emphasis added).

will provide one-stop shops where plans are present-

ed. . And tax credits will help to ensure all Ameri-

cans can afford quality health insurance.” 155 Cong.

Rec. $11,964 (Nov. 21, 2009).'4 Likewise, Senator

Dick Durbin, the Senate Majority Whip, described

the availability of the tax credit in broad terms that

made clear the only qualifying criterion was income

level. According to Senator Durbin, “[t]his bill says, if

you are making less than $80,000 a year, we will

give you tax breaks to pay [health insurance] premi-

ums.” Jd. $12,779 (Dec. 9, 2009).'5 President Obama,

too, indicated that the only criterion for qualifying for

the tax credits would be income.!®

Significantly, even ACA opponents in Congress rec-

ognized that that the only criterion that determined

eligibility for the tax credits would be income. Con-

gressman Paul Ryan, for example, asserted on March

'4 Senator Baucus also subsequently noted that “[a]bout 60 per-

cent of those who are getting insurance in the individual market

on the exchange will get tax credits,” 155 Cong. Rec. $12,764

(Dec. 9, 2009), an estimate that could only be accurate if tax

credits were available in all States.

'S Many Senators noted that the tax credits would be broadly

available to help low- and middle-income Americans afford

health insurance regardless of where they lived. See, e.g., 155

Cong. Rec. $13,375 (Dec. 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. Tim John-

son); Sen. Mary Landrieu, Breaking: Landrieu Supports Passage

of Historic Senate Health Care Bill (Dec. 22, 2009), 2009 WLNR

25819782; Sen. Mark Pryor, Press Release, On Senate Passage

of Health Care Reform (Dec. 24, 2009), 2009 WLNR 26018100;

Sen. Russell Feingold, Sen. Feingold Issues Statement on Health

Care, Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Mar.

25, 2010), 2010 WLNR 6142152; see also Rep. Joe Sestak, News

Release, Rep. Sestak Votes for Final Passage of Historic Health

Care Reform Legislation (Mar. 23, 2010), 2010 WLNR 6031395.

16 President Barack Obama Holds a Townhall! Event, Nashua,

New Hampshire, Roll Call (Feb. 2, 2010), 2010 WL 358122.

15, 2010, that the tax credits were a “new open-ended

entitlement that basically says that just about every-

body in this country—people making less than

$100,000, you know what, if your health care expens-

es exceed anywhere from 2 to 9.8 percent of your ad-

justed gross income, don’t worry about it, taxpayers

got you covered, the government is going to subsidize

the rest.”!7 Further, Ryan expressly stated that

“(f]rom our perspective, these state-based exchanges

are very little in difference between the House ver-

sion—which has a big federal exchange . . . But what

we're basically saying to people making less than

[400% of the] FPL. . . don’t worry about it. Taxpay-

ers got you covered.” '®

Tellingly, in response to member requests from

both parties, the Congressional Budget Office per-

formed 68 budgetary impact analyses during the

2009-2010 legislative debate over the ACA, and in

each one, it assumed that the tax credit would be

available to all individuais who purchased insurance

on an Exchange, regardless of whether the Exchange

was federally-facilitated or state-run. These CBO

analyses were of critical importance because many

members of Congress made their vote for the ACA

contingent on CBO’s conclusion that the ACA was

deficit neutral. Yet “no one in either party objected or

\? House Committee on the Budget Holds a Markup on the Rec-

onciliation Act of 2010, 111th Cong. (2010), 2010 WL 941012

(statement of Rep. Paul Ryan). While Congressman Ryan

signed onto an amici curiae brief in support of Petitioners in this

case, that brief nowhere disputes the universal congressional

understanding that tax credits would be available in all States.

Tellingly, that brief does not address at all the question of Con-

gress’s intent or understanding with respect to the issue in this

case.

18 Td.

asked for alternative estimations assuming partial

subsidies at any point in the 111th Congress.” Theda

Skocpol, Why Congressional Budget Office Reports

Are the Best Evidence of Congressional Intent About

Health Subsidies, Scholars Strategy Network (Jan.

2015), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org

/content/why-congressional-budget-office-reports-are-

best-evidence-congressional-intent-about-health-.

Indeed, as the director of the Congressional Budget

Office later stated, “[T]he possibility that those sub-

sidies would only be available in states that created

their own exchanges did not arise during the discus-

sions CBO staff had with a wide range of Congres-

sional] staff when the legislation was being consid-

ered.” Letter from CBO Director Douglas W. Elmen-

dorf to Rep. Darrell E. Issa (Dec. 6, 2012),

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43752-

letterToChairmanlssa. pdf.

Ignoring all of this evidence, Petitiomers argue that

“the ‘scant legislative history’ that exists for the ACA

supports the proposition that Congress conditioned

subsidies on state creation of Exchanges to induce

states to act.” Pet’rs Br. 40 (internal citation omit-

ted). Petitioners offer four pieces of alleged evidence

to support that proposition. In fact, none do. See

Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2014),

vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir.

Sept. 4, 2014) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“{Petitioners]

have no credible evidence whatsoever to support their

subsidies-as-incentive theory.”); Pet. App. 7la (“the

lack of any support in the legislative history of the

ACA indicates that [Petitioners’ interpretation of sec-

tion 36B] is not a viable theory” (emphasis added)).

To start, Petitioners assert that “when the Senate

began to consider state-based Exchanges, a promi-

nent expert . . . proposed ‘tax subsidies for insurance

only in states that complied with federal require-

ments.” Pet’rs Br. 41. But the “proposal” to which

they point was an unpublished academic paper, a pa-

per that, critically, is nowhere mentioned in the vo-

luminous record of the ACA debates. Moreover, even

if that paper had been considered by the actual legis-

lators who enacted the ACA (which again it was not),

it would not support Petitioners’ position. The paper

actually suggested multiple ways in which Congress

could encourage state participation in the Exchanges.

Specifically, it stated that “Congress could . . . provide

a federal fallback program to administer exchanges

in states thet refused to establish complying ex-

changes. Alternatively it could . . . offer[) tax subsi-

dies for insurance only in states that complied with

federal requirements.”'? As amici know and the rec-

ord reflects, Congress chose the former option.

Second, Petitioners claim that “the Senate commit-

tees working on ACA legislation took up [the sugges-

tion in that academic paper}.” Jd. But to support this

assertion, they cite a provision drafted by only one of

the committees involved in drafting the ACA, and the

committee that took it up (HELP) was not the com-

mittee (Finance) that was the source of the Exchange

provisions relevant to this appeal. Thus, the provi-

sion is irrelevant to interpreting the Finance Com-

mittee-drafted provisions at issue here. Moreover, as

Petitioners acknowledge, that provision did not even

condition subsidies on State establishment of Ex-

changes; rather, it provided subsidies to States that

adopted “certain ‘insurance reform provisions.” /d.

It does not help Petitioners to argue that “[t]he Fi-

19 Timothy S. Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues,

O'Neill Inst. at Geo. U. Legal Ctr., at 7 (2009), available at

http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi’articl

e=1022&context=ois_papers (emphasis added).

nance Committee .. simply conditioned subsidies on

state creation of Exchanges, as opposed to their adop-

tion of insurance reforms” (id.) because those are en-

tirely different policies. Thus, all the draft HELP

provision shows is that Congress knows how to draft

conditional grant provisions when it wants to do so.

See Resp’ts Br. 48 n.18 (noting that the condition in

the HELP bill was “set forth in a provision expressly

directed to the States—not buried in the formula for

the credit available to a particular individual”). It did

not do so here.

Third, Petitioners argue that the “House had no

choice but to pass the Senate bill” with the provision

making tax credits conditional “after ACA supporters

lost their filibuster-proof majority when Scott Brown

won a special Senate election in January 2010.”

Pet’rs Br. 42. Congressional opponents of the ACA

make a related argument, stating that the language

in Section 36B was the result of “lengthy negotia-

tions” that were necessary because the absence of a

filibuster-proof majority made “compromise within

the Democratic caucus .. necessary” to ensure the

bill’s passage. Cornyn et al. Amici Br. 13, 12. These

arguments have no basis in fact: the pertinent text

was not part of any “compromise.” See Letter from

Senator E. Benjamin Nelson to Senator Robert P. Ca-

sey, dr., at 2 (Jan. 27, 2015),

http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/S

enator_Casey_re_King_v_Burwell-27_JAN_2015.pdf

fhereinafter Nelson Letter] (explaining that there

was no such compromise because he “always believed

that tax credits should be available in all 50 states

regardless of who built the exchange, and the final

law also reflects that belief as well” (emphasis in orig-

inal)).2° Rather, it was included in the bill reported

by the Senate Finance Committee on October 19,

2009, see S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1205(a) (2009), and it

was at no point a focus of controversy or even atten-

tion. The provision was not amended after ACA sup-

porters lost their filibuster-proof majority because, as

previously discussed, no one then interpreted the

provision in the way Petitioners now do.?!

Fourth, Petitioners assert that the “incentive func-

tion [of the subsidies provision] was well understood

by, among others, Jonathan Gruber,” an economist at

M.I.T., who they claim was a “leading ACA architect

and HHS consultant who helped draft the legisla-

tion.” Petrs Br. 42. In fact, Gruber’s role was

providing economic modeling and similar technical

20 Senator Nelson wrote the cited letter in response to a letter

from Senator Casey asking him about Petitioners’ assertions

that “the [ACA] was intentionally designed to deny tax credits to

people in states with federally facilitated exchanges in order to

‘induce’ the states into operating their own exchanges” and that

it “was designed this way because [Senator Nelson] and other

urtnamed ‘centrist Senators’ insisted upon this structure.” Let-

ter from Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr., to Senator E. Benjamin

Nelson (Jan. 27, 2015), http://theusconstitution.org/sites

/default/files/briefs/150127_Letter_to_Senator_Nelson_re_King_

v_Burwell.pdf. In response to this query, Senator Nelson ex-

plained that he “advocated for flexibility to the states to es-

tablish state-based exchanges with a federal exchange as a

backup,” but “[i]n either scenario — a state or federal exchange —

our purpose was clear: to provide states the tools necessary to

deliver affordable healthcare to their citizens, and clearly the

subsidies are a critical component of that effort regardless of

which exchange type a state chooses.” Nelson Letter 1-2.

21 Indeed a national Exchange—with an option for States to

form their own exchanges—was a key component of the House

bill, and the House would not have allowed the bill to survive

had it understood the Senate version to eliminate tax credits on

federally-facilitated Exchanges.

information and analysis; he was certainly not a

“leading ACA architect,” and in no way a drafter of

the legislation, as Gruber himself has acknowledged.

Written Testimony of Professor Jonathan Gruber be-

fore the Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, U.S.

House of Representatives 1 (Dec. 9, 2014),

http://oversight. house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/

12/Gruber-Statement-12-9-ObamaCare1.pdf (explain-

ing that he “ran microsimulation models”).22 Moreo-

ver, the only citation for this suggestion is one state--

ment Gruber made in 2012 long after the law was

enacted—a statement that he has made clear was

taken out of context and does not, properly under-

stood, mean what Petitioners claim it means, id. at

1-2. As he has explained, he has a “long-standing

and well-documented belief that [the ACA] . must

include mechanisms for residents in all states to ob-

tain tax credits” and, in fact, his “microsimulation

model for the ACA expressly modeled for the citizens

of all states to be eligible for tax credits, whether

served directly by a state exchange or by a federal ex-

change.” Id. at 2. Incredibly, Petitioners do not cite

(or even name) any of the “others” who purportedly

understood the subsidies provision to work this way,

let alone any members of Congress who actually

passed the law. That Petitioners rely so heavily on

Gruber’s statement as evidence in support of their

22 Tellingly, the newspaper article that Petitioners cite for the

proposition that Gruber “helped congressional staff ‘draft the

specifics of the legislation” (Pet’rs Br. 4) explained that his “as-

signment” to help members of Congress draft the legislation

“primarily involved asking his graduate student researchers to

tweak his model’s software code.” Catherine Rampell, Mr.

Health Care Mandate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2012, at B1.

claim only underscores their inability to find any

support in the actual legislative record.?°

In fact, the ACA’s legislative history makes clear

that Congress has never sought to make the availa-

bility of tax credits conditional on States establishing

their own Exchanges. Congress has three times

amended the section at issue here and each time the

legislation, and the accompanying budgetary predic-

tions, reflected the understanding that the subsidies

would be available on all Exchanges.24 Because these

amendments were to the specific provision at issue in

this appeal, this history is not subsequent legislative

history and is directly relevant to the question before

this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs

of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 110, 135 n.25 (1978).

Most significantly, Congress amended the provision

to change the way subsidies (in all States) are calcu-

lated after the IRS had proposed the rule that al-

lowed subsidies for customers using federally-

facilitated Exchanges and after HHS had proposed a

parallel rule on the obligations of Exchanges, 76 Fed.

Reg. 41,866 (July 15, 2011). See Pub. L. No. 112-56,

§ 401, 125 Stat. 711, 734 (2011). As amici know from

their own experience, members of Congress were well

aware of these regulations. Yet the report on the bill

amending the subsidy calculation provisions—just

like the many statements by members of Congress

23 It is worth noting that Petitioners abandoned one of the pur-

portedly key pieces of legislative history evidence on which they

relied before the court below, i.e., the informal exchange be-

tween Senator Baucus and Senator Ensign. Br. for Appellants

at 45, King v. Sebelius, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), 2014 WL

882811, at *45.

24 For a full discussion of these amendments, see Families USA

Amicus Brief at 24-26, Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00623-PLF

(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013), ECF No. 48-1.

preceding the ACA’s passage—assumed that the cred-

its would be available to all individuals who satisfied

the income criteria. The report stated without quali-

fication that the “premium assistance credit is avail-

able for individuals . with household incomes be-

tween 100 and 400 percent of the Federal poverty

level.”25 More specifically, the report referenced es-

timates of the cost of the subsidies by the Congres-

sional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on

Taxation that reflected—and quantified—the shared

understanding that the ACA prescribed premium as-

sistance on all Exchanges in all States.?6

In the absence of any specific statements that the

tax credits were a tool to encourage state action, Peti-

tioners infer that this must be the case because Con-

gress had no other way to induce the States to partic-

ipate. See, e.g., Pet’'rs Br. 14 (“limiting subsidies to

state-established Exchanges was the best, and per-

haps the only, way Congress could accomplish both

nationwide subsidies and state-run Exchanges’”).?’

But in fact the principal mechanism applied here—

2 H.R. Rep. No. 112-254, at 3 (2011), available at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt254/pdf/CRPT-

112hrpt254.pdf.

26 Id. at 12.

27 Petitioners also point to other “carrots” and “sticks” they say

Congress used to “induce states to establish Exchanges volun-

tarily.” Pet’rs Br. 2. But none of these inducements to establish

Exchanges are conditional grants, and the conditional grant

provisions that are in the ACA were included for purposes en-

tirely unrelated to the Exchanges. For example, Petitioners

point to the prohibition on tightening of Medicaid eligibility

standards, which is part of the Medicaid expansion provisions

(id.), but, as the Government explains, that measure was a tem-

porary one that had nothing to do with encouraging the States

to set up their own Exchanges, Resp’ts Br. 29.

giving States the option of establishing a program

compliant with federally prescribed criteria, but

providing for federal operation of the program in any

State that failed to do so on its own—is often used by

Congress. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &

Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). States

frequently (in fact, usually) opt to operate such pro-

grams rather than cede control to the federal gov-

ernment because maintaining control leaves the

States with the discretion to tailor federally pre-

scribed programs to local needs.

Indeed, in making the decision whether to establish

state-run Exchanges, some governors acknowledged

that they preferred for their States to set up their

own Exchanges for these very reasons. For example,

“Republican Gov. Brian Sandoval told the Las Vegas

Review-Journal . . . that Nevada’s decision to run its

own exchange—and take as much control of the in-

surance system as possible under the law—was the

right one.”28 Likewise, Kentucky Governor Steve

Beshear stated ‘at “[a]nytime a large scale program

of this nature kicks off there are concerns along the

way, but we feel that our state-centered process al-

lowed us to address those.”29 And proponents of set-

% Vaughn Hillyard, Politics Wasn't Only Reason Why Some

GOP.Led States Didn't Set Up Own Exchanges, NBC News (Dec.

4, 2013), http://(www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/politics-

wasnt-only-reason-why-some-gop-led-states-didnt-v21755208

(emphasis added).

29 Jd. (emphasis added). In the same vein, the Republican co-

sponsor of the legislation creating Colorado's Exchange ex-

plained, “[T]o me, and to the business community, creating. . a

state exchange close to home in a pro-market manner was the

best solution for us.” Eric Whitney, Despite Setbacks, Bipartisan

Support Remains For Colorado Exchange, npr.org (Mar. 18,

2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/20 1 4/03/18/290092059/

ting up state Exchanges emphasized this factor. For

example, one opinion piece noted that “if states do not

move forward on their own, the federal government

will. Because of this fact alone, states should move

forward with creating their own exchanges. It’s bet-

ter for states to exert some control over the structure

of their exchanges than to abdicate control to Wash-

ington.”°° Thus, the loss of regulatory control was

well established as a highly potent incentive for

States to set up their own Exchanges, contrary to Pe-

titioners’ assertions that the threat of nullifying pre-

mium assistance tax credits and subsidies was “the

best, and perhaps the only, way” to induce States to

set up their own Exchanges, see Pet’rs Br. 14. In

short, Petitioners’ conjecture that “[a]bsent such a fi-

nancial incentive, it was unlikely that all states”

would set up their own Exchanges (id.) is both illogi-

cal and totally lacking in record support.

Thus, Petitioners offer nothing to refute what the

record shows and what amici know from their own

experience: the purpose of the tax credits was not to

encourage States to set up their own Exchanges. In-

deed, making the tax credits conditional on state es-

tablishment of the Exchanges would have empowered

hostile state officials to undermine the ACA’s core

purpose. It defies commonsense for Petitioners to

suggest that amici and other architects of the ACA

sought to encourage such a perverse result.

despite-setbacks-bipartisan-support-remains-for-colorado-

exchange.

% David Merritt, Why States Should Move Forward With Health

Insurance Exchanges, Daily Caller (Mar. 13, 2012), dailycall-

er.com/2012/03/13/why-states-should-move-forward-with-health-

care-exchanges/ixzz2mjT 2jiZe.

This is no minor point—by blocking qualified indi-

viduals from receiving premium tax subsidies, as Pe-

titioners’ version of the ACA would allow, state oppo-

nents of the ACA could prevent the law from deliver-

ing immensely valuable benefits to large numbers of

low- and moderate-income individuals and families.

Moreover, it would render the Exchanges inoperable,

even for participants not entitled to tax credits or

subsidies, and thus raise premiums and curtail in-

surance offerings across the entire market for indi-

vidual insurance. Eliminating premium assistance

would undermine other aspects of the law crucial to

achieving health care reform, including the individu-

al mandate and the insurance reforms ensuring cov-

erage of pre-existing conditions, preventing arbitrary

terminations, and addressing other well-known in-

surance industry abuses.

It bears emphasis that the tax credits are not mere-

ly, as Petitioners suggest, related in some nonspecific

manner to the “amorphous ‘purpose” of “making sub-

sidies universally available so that health coverage

will be ‘affordable.” Pet’rs Br. 33. Rather, the credits

are indispensable to effectuating other specific com-

ponents of the statutory scheme (including the provi-

sions just discussed) that are themselves indispensa-

ble to the statute’s fundamental goal of making

health care affordable for all Americans. For the in-

terdependent scheme Congress designed to work

properly, those tax credits must be available to a!l

Americans, regardless of where they live.

Il. STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NEVER

UNDERSTOOD THE TAX CREDITS TO BE

LIMITED TO STATE-RUN EXCHANGES

Just as Congress never told the States that their

citizens would lose access to the tax credits if they did

not set up their own Exchanges, members of state

governments never understood the statute to operate

in that way based on their review of the statute and

the legislative record. Amici members of state legis-

latures were involved in the debates in their States

over whether to set up Exchanges and thus know

from their own experience that, even before the IRS

promulgated its regulation confirming that tax cred-

its would be available to purchasers on both state-run

and federally facilitated Exchanges, no one in the

States understood access to the tax credits to turn on

the establishment of state-run Exchanges. Indeed,

the States considered many factors in deciding

whether to set up Exchanges in the period immedi-

ately following the law’s enactment, but the possibil-

ity that the failure to set up a state-run Exchange

would preclude that State’s citizens from enjoying the

tax credits and subsidies was never one of them.

For example, California, in response to a query

from HHS about “[w]hat factors [the States would]

consider in determining whether they will elect to of-

fer an Exchange by January 1, 2014,” 75 Fed. Reg.

45,584, 45,586 (Aug. 3, 2010), noted that “the primary

consideration for states is whether policy makers

view the Exchange as an effective tool for improving

access, quality, and affordability of health insurance

coverage and view state administration of the Ex-

change as the best way to achieve these goals.”*' It

did not mention the tax credits. In response to the

same prompt, Texas noted that it would consider

“cost containment, cost effectiveness, maintaining

state flexibility, and how a state-run Exchange vs. a

federally-run Exchange would interact with the Tex-

31 Cal. HHS, Public Comments to HHS on the Planning and Es-

tablishment of State-Level Exchanges 2 (Oct. 4, 2010), available

at https://www.statereforum.org/sites/default/files/california-1.

pdf.

as insurance market and Texas’ existing health cov-

erage programs, including Medicaid and CHIP.” It,

too, failed to mention the tax credits. Strikingly,

Ohio, in a working group report, listed five pros and

four cons to establishing a State Exchange, but the

availability (or not) of the tax credits did not appear

on either list.*3 Indeed, so far as amici are aware, no

State ever suggested that the lack of subsidies on a

federally-facilitated Exchange was a factor in its de-

cision.** Surely, if the States had recognized that

% Tex. Dep’t of Ins. & HHS Comm'n, Public Comments to HHS

on the Planning and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges 1

(Oct. 4, 2010), available at https://www.statereforum.org/sites/

default/files/texas. pdf.

%3 Ohio Health Care Coverage & Quality Council, Report of

Health Benefits Exchange Task Force, available at

https://www.statereforum.org/sites/default/files/hbe_pros_cons_1

0_2_10_-_final_2.pdf (listing pros and cons of Ohio setting up its

own Exchange).

*% Amici’s conclusion is consistent with research performed as

part of a comprehensive Georgetown University Health Policy

Institute study of state decisions implementing ACA Exchange

provisions. As summarized by a co-author of this study, States

were motivated by a mix of policy considerations, such as flexi-

bility and control, and “strategic” calculations by ACA oppo-

nents, not the availability of tax credits. See Christine Mo-

nahan, Halbig v. Sebelius and State Motivations To Opt for Fed-

erally Run Exchanges, CHIRblog (Feb. 11, 2014),

http://chirblog.org/halbig-v-sebelius-and-state-motivations-to-

opt-for-federally-run-exchanges/. Monahan notes that two ami-

cus briefs filed in parallel litigation on behalf of States con-

trolled by ACA opponents “imply [without actually asserting]

that these states decided not to pursue state-based exchanges

because they did not want premium tax credits to be available in

their states,” but the Georgetown researchers’ extensive review

of contemporaneous “official public statements,” press accounts,

and interviews shows this post hoc claim seeking to block pre-

mium assistance for their residents “was, at best, little more

than an afterthought.” Id.

their citizens would lose access to the premium tax

credits and subsidies if they failed to set up their own

Exchanges, that would have been at least one factor,

if not a key factor, in their decisionmaking.*5

The National Governors Association (“NGA”), too,

identified numerous issues associated with imple-

menting the Exchanges, but (again) the prospect that

a State’s citizens might be denied the tax credits if

the State failed to set up its own Exchange was never

one of them. For example, within days of the ACA’s

passage, the NGA circulated an eight page, single-

spaced document identifying key implementation is-

sues for its members.** Nowhere in this lengthy doc-

ument was there any suggestion that the tax credits

would not be available if States did not set up their

own Exchanges. Similarly, on September 16, 2011,

the NGA published an Issue Brief on “State Perspec-

tives on Insurance Exchanges.”*’ It, too, enumerated

state concerns regarding implementation of the Ex-

3° Tellingly, when State ACA opponents were filing their brief

in the Supreme Court objecting to ACA’s Medicaid expansion

provisions, they did not think the tax credit provisions were

intended to pressure them into setting up their own Exchang-

es. In fact, they repeatedly contrasted the Medicaid expan-

sion, which they challenged as coercive, with the Exchange

provisions, which they viewed as non-coercive. See Brief of

State Petitioners on Medicaid, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health

and Human Servs., No. 11-400 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012), 2012

WL 105551, at *12; see id. at *22, 25, 51.

36 See Nat'l Governors Ass'n, Implementation Timeline for Fed-

eral Health Reform Legislation (2010), available at

http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1003HEALTHS

UMMITIMPLEMENTATIONTIMELINE.PDF.

37 See Nat'l Governors Ass’n, State Perspectives on Insurance

Exchanges: Implementing Health Reform In An Uncertain Envi-

ronment (2011), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live

/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1 1|O9NGAEXCHANGESSUMMARY.PDF.

change provisions, and it, too, did nothing to indicate

that the NGA had even contemplated the possibility

that the tax credits would not be available to individ-

uals who purchased insurance on federally-facilitated

Exchanges. Given the important role that the tax

credits were to play in making health insurance af-

fordable—again, the core purpose of the ACA— it

makes no sense to think that issue would have been

omitted as the NGA helped States decide whether

and how they would participate in implementing the

statute.

Two of Petitioners’ amici suggest that the States

did understand that the availability of tax credits

turned on whether an Exchange was State or federal-

ly-facilitated, pointing primarily to a handful of

statements made during and after 2012 that they

claim made States aware that the credits would not

be available if they did not set up their own Exchang-

es. Missouri Liberty Project et al. Amici Br. 13-21;

see also Galen Institute et al. Amici Br. 13-14.

The problem with this argument is that the rele-

vant time period for determining what States under-

stood based on the text of the law and the actual leg-

islative record is the period immediately following the

law’s enactment, that is, before the individuals be-

hind the current litigation published their argument

that the credit would not be available on federally-

facilitated Exchanges,** and before one of them exe-

cuted a nationwide campaign to attempt to persuade

sympathetic state officials to, as he put it, ““block[]

the state exchanges” in order to force Congress to

“set ridof . this very bad law,” Steve Mistler, Out-

% Jonathan H. Adier & Michael F. Cannon, Another ObamaCare

Glitch, Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.wsj. com/articles/

SB100014240529702036875045 7700632243 1330662.

spoken Critic of Obamacare Helped To Turn LePage

Against State Exchange, Portland Press Herald, Nov.

23, 2014, http://www.pressherald.com/2014/11/23/out

spoken-critic-of-obamacare-helped-to-turn-lepage-

against-state-exchange/ (quoting Michael F. Cannon)

(cited in Missouri Liberty Project et al. Amici Br. 17).

By that point, it is unsurprising that some individu-

als might claim that the tax credits would not be

available on federally-facilitated Exchanges, notwith-

standing the plain text of the law and the universal

understanding at the time it was enacted.

But Petitioners’ amici cite no evidence from the pe-

riod immediately following the law’s enactment that

suggests that States believed that the availability of

tax credits turned on whether they set up their own

Exchange.*? To the contrary, the only pre-2012 evi-

dence amici cite confirms that other factors—such as

lack of regulatory control—caused States not to set

up their own Exchanges. See Missouri Liberty Pro-

iect et al. Amici Br. 13 (legislation to establish a State

Exchange in Missouri “stalled [because opposing

Senators] believed that the bill gave the federal gov-

ernment too much control over the exchange”). Amici

provide no evidence—as opposed to conjecture—that

the States understood the premium tax assistance to

be limited to state-run Exchanges based on the text of

the law and the legislative record.

Petitioners’ amici do provide “evidence” that some

individuals questioned the availability of tax credits

on federally-facilitated Exchanges after 2011, but

39 Six states submitted an amici curiae brief supporting Peti-

tioners that baldly asserts that “the States were well aware’

that tax credits were available only on state-run exchanges, Ok-

lahoma et al. Amici Br. 15, but strikingly, the brief cites no evi-

dence—none—in support of that assertion.

none of this putative “evidence” detracts from the

contemporaneous, universal understanding shared by

officials in the States in the period immediately after

the law’s enactment that the provisions at issue in

this case prescribed tax credits and subsidies to make

insurance affordable on all Exchanges in all States,

regardless of who operated them.*® Moreover, almost

40 Moreover, there is significant evidence from this period that

confirms that States continued to understand that tax credits

would be available in States with federally-facilitated Exchang-

es and made their decisions about whether to set up Exchanges

based on that understanding. See Virginia et al. Amici Br. 15-

27; see also Marilyn Ralat-Albernas, R.N., et al. Amici Br. 29-30.

Indeed, even after the law’s opponents put forward their inter-

pretation in late 2011, some prominent leaders in States with

federally-facilitated Exchanges remained unpersuaded. Wiscon-

sin Governor Scott Walker, for example, “spent nearly two

years looking at” whether to set up a state Exchange and saw

“no real substantive difference” in the ACA between a state-run

Exchange and the federally-facilitated option which he and his

legislature chose. WSJ Live Presents: Gov. Scott Walker Inter-

viewed, Wall St. J. Video (Mar. 27, 2013),

http://www.wsj.com/video/wsj-live-presents-gov-scott-walker-

interviewed/1 BC 163BF-68C2-4351-9DFF-CC FO3AE5FC6E. htm!

(relevant remarks at 1:52, 2:37-44). Significantly, Governor

Walker's conclusion was essential to his solution to the problem

of how to increase insurance coverage in Wisconsin given his

decision to reject the expansion of Medicaid. See Erin Toner,

Scott Walker's Medicaid Maneuver, Kaiser Health News (Nov.

19, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/wisconsin-governor-

scott-walker-embraces-parts-of-obamacare/ (explaining that

Wisconsin would shift 83,000 persons formerly covered by the

State's Medicaid program to subsidized coverage via the State’s

federally-facilitated Exchange). Governor Walker publicly speci-

fied that this solution would work because “the Exchanges un-

der the Affordable Care Act provide a subsidy to make the

health care Exchange affordable.” Governor Walker Addresses

WMC Business Day in Madison, WI, Wisconsin Eye (Feb. 13,

2013), http://www.wiseye.org/videoplayer/vp.html?sid=9595 (rel-

evant remarks at 22:00).

none of this “evidence” actually suggests, let alone

proves, that state legislators and other state officials

believed that tax credits would not be available on

federally-facilitated Exchanges; rather, amici largely

point to statements made in op-eds and by advocates

without even trying to tie those statements to actual

deliberations by State officials.4! In short, Petition-

ers’ amici point to nothing that undermines amici

state legislators’ belief that the States never under-

stood the tax credits to be limited to state-run Ex-

changes based on the text of the law and the legisla-

tive record.

Indeed, if amici state legislators thought there was

a real possibility that their constituents would lose

access to these valuable tax credits unless their

States established their own Exchanges, they would

have vigorously advocated for state-run Exchanges

citing this potential consequence. But this was not

part of the debate because everyone at the time un-

derstood that the tax credits were an essential com-

ponent of the ACA that were to be available to all

Americans regardless of whether they purchased in-

surance on a state-run or federally-facilitated Ex-

change.

2292

In conclusion, as amici know from their own expe-

rience, Petitioners’ argument that the tax credits

were intended to induce States to set up their own

Exchanges makes no sense in light of the text, histo-

4! For example, Petitioners’ amici note that Maine’s governor

elected to have the federal government operate that State’s Ex-

change (Missouri Liberty Project et al. Amici Br. 17), but Maine

has joined a brief supporting the Government in this case. See

Virginia et al. Amici Br.

ry, and purpose of the statute, all of which make clear

that Congress never sent—and state officials never

received—any message indicating that States needed

to set up their own Exchanges if they wanted their

citizens to have access to the tax credits and subsi-

dies. Indeed, Congress never sent any such message

for the simple reason that it did not intend the stat-

ute to operate in the way Petitioners argue. Rather,

the tax credits and subsidies were supposed to be

available to all Americans to help realize the statute’s

goal of making insurance affordable for all Ameri-

cans.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-

firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

DOUGLAS T. KENDALL

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA*

SIMON LAZARUS

BRIANNE J. GOROD

CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

1200 18th Street NW

Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-6889

elizabeth@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

January 28, 2015 * Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A:

LIST OF CONGRESSIONAL AMICI

APPENDIX B:

eee eee eee eeee

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICT .........

APPENDIX A:

LIST OF CONGRESSIONAL AMICI*

Becerra, Xavier

Representative of California

Clyburn, James E.

Representative of South Carolina

Conyers, John, Jr.

Representative of Michigan

Crowley, Joseph

Representative of New York

Durbin, Dick

Senator of Illinois

Harkin, Tom

Former Senator of Iowa

Hoyer, Steny

Representative of Maryland

Levin, Sander M.

Representative of Michigan

Miller, George

Former Representative of California

Murray, Patty

Senator of Washington

Pallone, Frank

Representative of New Jersey

Pelosi, Nancy

Representative of California

LIST OF CONGRESSIONAL AMICL-cont'd.

Reid, Harry

Senator of Nevada

Schumer, Charles E.

Senator of New York

Scott, Bobby

Representative of Virginia

Waxman, Henry

Former Representative of California

Wyden, Ron

Senator of Oregon

* Amici who no longer serve in Congress join solely

in their individual capacities as former members of

Congress.

APPENDIX B:

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI*

Ajello, Edith

Representative of Rhode Island

Albis, James

Representative of Connecticut

Alexander, Kelly

Representative of North Carolina

Antonio, Nickie

Representative of Ohio

Barrett, Dick

Senator of Montana

Beavers, Roberta

Representative of Maine

Bennett, David

Representative of Rhode Island

Bolkcom, Joe

Senator of Iowa

Briggs, Sheryl

Former Representative of Maine

Briscoe, Joel

Representative of Utah

Bronson, Harry

Assemblymember of New York

Bullard, Dwight

Senator of Florida

Cafaro, Capri

Senator of Ohio

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Carey, Michael

Former Representative of Maine

Chase, Cynthia

Representative of New Hampshire

Chenette, Justin

Representative of Maine

Cody, Eileen

Representative of Washington

Coleman, Garnet

Representative of Texas

Cooper, Janice

Representative of Maine

Cunningham, Carla

Representative of North Carolina

Daley, Mary Jo

Representative of Pennsylvania

Daughtry, Matthea

Representative of Maine

Dicks, Steph

Assemblymember of Pennsylvania

Dorney, Ann

Representative of Maine

Fahy, Patricia

Assemblymember of New York

Falk, Andrew

Former Representative of Minnesota

Farnsworth, Richard

Representative of Maine

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Ferri, Frank

Former Representative of Rhode Island

Fisher, Susan

Representative of North Carolina

Fitzgibbon, Joe

Representative of Washington

Fludd, Virgil

Representative of Georgia

Fraser, Karen

Senator of Washington

Gardner, Pat

Representative of Georgia

Gattine, Drew

Representative of Maine

Gibson, Audrey

Representative of Florida

Gilbert, Paul

Representative of Maine

Gill, Rosa

Representative of North Carolina

Glassheim, Eliot

Representative of North Dakota

Glazier, Rick

Representative of North Carolina

Goode, Adam

Representative of Maine

Gottfried, Richard N.

Chair, Assembly of New York

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Gratwick, Geoff

Senator of Maine

Hamann, Scott

Representative of Maine

Harlow, Denise

Representative of Maine

Harrison, Pricey

Representative of North Carolina

Hatch, Jack

Senator of Iowa

Hunt, Sam

Representative of Washington

Insko, Verla

Representative of North Carolina

Johnson, Burt

Senator of Michigan

Johnson, Connie

Former Senator of Oklahoma

Jones, Brian

Former Representative of Maine

Jones, Mia L.

Representative of Florida

Karrick, David

Representative of New Hampshire

Kaufmann, Christine

Senator of Montana

Keiser, Karen

Senator of Washington

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI - cont'd.

King, Phylis

Representative of Idaho

Kline, Adam

Former Senator of Washington

Kloucek, Frank

Former Representative of South Dakota

Kohl-Welles, Jeanne

Senator of Washington

Kruger, Chuck

Representative of Maine

Kumiega, Walter

Representative of Maine

Kusiak, Karen

Former Representative of Maine

Lemar, Roland

Representative of Connecticut

Lesser, Matthew

Representative of Connecticut

Lewis, Jason

Senator of Massachusetts

Liebling, Tina

Representative of Minnesota

Liias, Marko

Senator of Washington

Longstaff, Thomas '

Representative of Maine

Luedtke, Eric

Delegate of Maryland

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

MacDonald, Bruce

Former Representative of Maine

Madaleno, Jr., Richard

Senator of Maryland

Markey, Margaret

Assemblywoman of New York

Marzian, Mary Lou

Representative of Kentucky

Mason, Andrew

Former Representative of Maine

Mastraccio, Anne-Marie

Representative of Maine

Mathern, Tim

Senator of North Dakota

Mcgowan, Paul

Former Representative of Maine

McLean, Andrew

Representative of Maine

McNamar, Jay

Representative of Minnesota

McSorley, Cisco

Senator of New Mexico

Molchany, Erin C.

Representative of Pennsylvania

Moody, Marcia

Representative of New Hampshire

Moonen, Matthew

Representative of Maine

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Morrison, Terry

Representative of Maine

Mundy, Phyllis

Former Representative of Pennsylvania

Nelson, Mary Pennell

Former Representative of Maine

Newman, Stacey

Representative of Missouri

Noon, Bill

Representative of Maine

Nordquist, Jeremy

Senator of Nebraska

O’Brien, Michael

Representative of Pennsylvania

Orrock, Nan

Senator of Georgia

Ortiz, Felix

Assembly Member of New York

Ortiz y Pino, Gerald

Senator of New Mexico

Parker, Cherelle L.

Representative of Pennsylvania

Patterson, Daniel

Former Representative of Arizona

Paulin, Amy

Assemblymember of New York

Phillips, Mike

Senator of Montana

10A

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Porter, Marjorie

Representative of New Hampshire

Pringle, Jane

Former Representative of Maine

Richardson, Bobbie

Representative of North Carolina

Ringo, Shirley

Former Representative of Idaho

Rivera, Gustavo

Senator of New York

Rochelo, Megan

Former Representative of Maine

Rosenbaum, Diane

Senator of Oregon

Rosenwald, Cindy

Representative of New Hampshire

Rusche, John

Representative of Idaho

Ryan, Kevin

Representative of Connecticut

Rykerson, Deane

Representative of Maine

Ryu, Cindy

Representative of Washington

Sanborn, Linda

Representative of Maine

Saucier, Robert

Representative of Maine

11A

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Schlossberg, Michael

Representative of Pennsylvania

Schneck, John

Representative of Maine

Sells, Mike

Representative of Washington

Sepulveda, Luis

Assemblyman of New York

Sheran, Kathleen

Senator of Minnesota

Sims, Brian

Representative of Pennsylvania

Skindell, Michael

Senator of Ohio

Slocum, Linda

Representative of Minnesota

Stanford, Derek

Representative of Washington

Talabi, Alberta

Representative of Michigan

Tavares, Charleta B.

Senator of Ohio

Till, George

Representative of Vermont

Tipping-Spitz, Ryan

Representative of Maine

Townsend, Charles

Representative of New Hampshire

12A

LIST OF STATE LEGISLATOR AMICI — cont'd.

Treat, Sharon

Former Representative of Maine

Vuckovich, Gene

Senator of Montana

Wanzenried, David E.

Former Senator of Montana

Ward, JoAnn

Representative of Minnesota

Witt, Brad

Representative of Oregon

Yantachka, Michael

Representative of Vermont

* Amici who no longer serve in a state legislature

join solely in their individual capacities as former

state legislators.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.