Amicus Curiae Brief — Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014) (No. 14-15)

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No. 14-15 OFFICE OF THE Chere

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Supreme Court of the Anited States

RICHARD ARMSTRONG, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

EXCEPTIONAL CHILD CENTER, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER AS AMICUS

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

DOUGLAS T. KENDALL

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA*

DAVID H. GANS

BRIANNE J. GOROD

CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

1200 18 Street NW

Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-6889

elizabeth@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

December 23, 2014 * Counsel of Record

nn ne

WiLSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

Library of Congress

_~ Law Library

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ND OE I ccerercespnteniciepncninennerersnitniatien ii

Interest of Amicus Curiae ....................sssssesseesses 1

Introduction and Summary of Argument........... l

IEE ccctincncesrassttnimennnininninmniniemnn 5

I. The Text and History of the Supremacy

Clause Give Federal Courts the Power of

Judicial Review to Maintain the Suprema-

er FE cteseceiccessrcnarnsenntnmmeeeniain 5

Il. The Text and History of the Constitution

Support the Availability of Equitable Relief

to Prohibit Unconstitutional State Action

Even in the Absence of a Statutory Cause

OF I cciencntenniddctestonsenesextnetenteceeneignimedions 13

III. Spending Clause Legislation is Entitled to

the Same Preemptive Force as Other Exer-

cises of Congress’ Enumerated Powers. ...... 22

a aesahaaeniaainenen 26

(i)

os

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Alden v. Maine,

gs eer 20

Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.,

4 SERRE SSS eee ene 20

Baring v. Erdman,

2 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1834) (No.

SIRES ESE scenes meee ioe eNO 19

Belknap v. Belknap,

2 Johns. Ch. 463 (N.Y. Ch. 1817)............. 19

Bennett v. Arkansas,

EE ee 24

Boyle v. Zacharie,

31 U.S. G Pet.) 648 (1832)....................020. 18

Carroll v. Safford,

44 U.S. (3 How.) 441 (1845)..........0...00...... 19

Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning

Servs.,

FO ER eee eee 24

Dodge v. Woolsey,

59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).................... 7

Ex Parte Young,

ee 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

FERC v. Mississippi,

ns 9

Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting

Oversight Bd.,

I 13

Frewin v. Lewis,

4 Mylne & Craig 249 (Ch. 1838)............... 19

Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).................. 4,13

Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los

Angeles,

| EE Ee Fa 4,13

Green v. Mansour,

Lt EERE ESMnReE ere sn ar 20

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alli-

ance Bond Fund, Inc.,

Os i 18

Hughes v. Trs. of Morden College,

BD DP BP Gee Be icccscinsestiniccctececcssees 19

King v. Smith,

Ge SN CN ienincciinienscnetnoninicnnnsiien 24

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Lane Cnty. v. Oregon,

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868).........00000000000.. 11

M’Culloch v. Maryland,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).........0000...... 3

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ........00.00000.... 2

Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

gg a | ee 24, 25

Osborn v. Bank of United States,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).............. 4, 19, 20

Pennoyer v. McConnaughey,

ee a fe ee cilatcenissstenscbetioticgntucdcienpinintinn 20

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont-

Bridge Co.,

54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851)................... 17, 18

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names

of Jesus and Mary,

ee eis Ce CI ccteccnesncccninecieneisinssescees 21

Rosado v. Wyman,

es Se I ccctnacinteiinncnesoniinitetsasennes 24

Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,

Se es Oe Ci irthcticticnescnvinssesicccscassesoce 13

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,

SE A FIED: intsdscssiestassndstmetnnaiusiensenie 3

United States v. Lopez,

De GP UP TIED cesssccnsesconcensonssonenecssenee 3

Verizon Md., Inc v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of

596'US. 685 0 amie seth by de 13

Wos v. E.M.A.,

ee Os Gas Be Ge evencccccncucnsescsssecseconee 24

ORY LEGI :

TIVE PROVISIONS

42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A) ..............:ccceceeeeeeee 5, 25

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat.

a EE ciienicieisinietiind onlbenentensushtnnseiclincnscadsanthiesins 17

rey Moms OE, RB vccnevicicctnscrnsanerencios 23

U.S. Const. art. ITT, § 2, cl. 1..........0000000.. 5, 14, 17

es EI, CR, WEA MEE, 1 ceccccesnantesissnonssédnathocoons 2, 5

H YA

Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution:

Ae I GE dccrecencccecnsnneviccnsounssevees 11, 22

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Fed-

eraliem,

96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987) ..000.. eee. 11

Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As

a Safeguard of Federalism,

79 Tex. L. Rev. 1821 (2001) ...................... 5

Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An

Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,

1988 Duke L.J. 879 (1988)... 16

James E. Pfander, Rethinking The Su-

preme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in

State-Party Cases,

82 Calif. L. Rev. 555 (1994) 0.0000. 14

James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan,

“Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity

and Quality of Decisionmaking Required

of Article HT Courts,

98 Colum. L. Rev. 696 (1998).........0.0000000.. 6, 11

John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunc-

tion Relief in Constitutional Cases,

22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1 (2013). 14, 15, 16

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Lit-

igation in the Roberts Court,

58 Duke L.J. 345 (2008)..........000000cccccccee. 24

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise of Eq-

uity Jurisprudence as Administered in

the United States of America (1881)......... 16

1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity

Jurisprudence as Administered in Eng-

land and America (14th ed. 1918)..... 16, 18

1 The Records of the Federal Convention of

1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).................. 8

2 The Debates in the Several Siate Conven-

tions on the Adoption of the Federal Con-

stitution (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836)......... 23

2 The Records of the Federal Convention of

1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).................. 9, 10, 11

3 The Debates in the Several State

Conventions on the Adoption of the Fed-

eral Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed.,

ERDAS ERS ESTEE ER SS so eee ooee 2, 8, 10, 23

4 The Debates in the Several State

Conventions on the Adoption of the Fed-

eral Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed.,

aR enb aR SEN Bite RRR GC EP aL bee SUR eee 6, 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufac-

tures (Dec. 5, 1791), in 10 The Papers of

Alexander Hamilton 252 (Harold C. Sy-

rett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1966)............. 24

Circular to State Governments (Oct. 18,

1780), in Washington: Writings 393 (John

Rhodehame!l ed., 1997) ..............0ccccccecceceee 22

F. W. Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of

Action at Common Law: Two Courses of

Lectures (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whit-

Rs, CE cecstinsiccsminnsiocestcinccitinieniisantenenines 15

The Federalist No. 21 (Alexander Hamil-

ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)............... 7

The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamil-

ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)............... 7

The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamil-

ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)............... 3, 23

The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison)

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) .........000..00000... 6

The Federalist No. 44 (James Madison)

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) .........00...0000002. 7

The Federalist No. 80 (Alexander Hamil-

ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)............... 14

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

James Madison, Vices of the Political Sya-

tem of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9

The Papers of James Madison 345 (Rob-

ert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal

John Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings

in Suits in the Court of Chancery (2d ed.

BR Ae EE eae 15, 16, 19

Letter from George Washington to Joseph

Jones (May 31, 1780), in 18 The Writings

of George Washington 452 (John C. Fitz-

NE is Sete icccttcciceninascsnenmeietarpnateven’ 22

Letter from George Washington to Lund

Washington (March 19, 1783), in Wash-

ington Writings 502 (John Rhodehamel

Bis SIO caciccacc nial abdianianenites dndieeeecamanason canis 23

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jef-

ferson (June 27, 1823), in 9 The Writings

of James Madison 137 (Gaillard Hunt

a ME picctescreetecs acinseisaraescecoscenmmameennncedae ake 6

Letters from the Federal Farmer to the

Republican [II (Oct. 10, 1787),

http:/Awww.constitution.org/afp/fedfar03.

a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in

the American Colonies, in 2 Select Essays

in Anglo-American Legal History 779

(Neng tne Paseo OI RAPS ot een ee LSP 15

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE!

Amicus Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC)

is a think tank, public interest law firm, and action

center dedicated to fulfilling the progressive promise

of our Constitution’s text and history. CAC works in

our courts, through our government, and with legal

scholars to improve understanding of the Constitu-

tion and preserve the rights and freedoms it guaran-

tees. CAC has a strong interest in constitutional fed-

eralism and in preserving the federal powers granted

by the Constitution.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Where, as here, a state law conflicts with federal

law, the Supremacy Clause requires federal courts to

step in to prevent unlawful state action. Armstrong

asks the Court to abandon this clear constitutional

command, urging this Court to view the Supremacy

Clause as simply a “choice-of-law rule,” Pet’rs Br. at

17, that gives no authority to the federal courts to

prevent states from enforcing preempted state laws.

That argument cannot be squared with the text and

history of the Constitution nor with more than two

centuries of this Court’s precedent recognizing the

! The parties have consented to the filing of this brief and their

letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Under Rule

37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amicus states that no counsel for

a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or

party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prepa-

ration or submission of this brief. No person other than amicus

or its counsel made a monetary contribution to ita preparation

or submission.

2

vital responsibility of the federal judiciary to main-

tain the federal-state balance.

From the very beginning of our Constitution’s his-

tory, federal courts were designed to be the frontline

against unlawful acts committed by state govern-

ments. When the Framers wrote our founding char-

ter more than two centuries ago, they were particu-

larly concerned about unlawful actions by state gov-

ernments, which had gone unchecked under the dys-

functional government of the Articles of Confedera-

tion. They included in the Supremacy Clause a man-

date for the judicial branch to void “any Thing” in

state law to the “Contrary” of federal law. U.S.

Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Judicial review is hard-wired in

the text of the Supremacy Clause. As the debates in

Philadelphia show, the Framers consciously chose ju-

dicial review of state laws as the means for enforcing

constitutional limits and ensuring the supremacy of

federal law. As James Madison explained, “[t]hat

causes of a federal nature will arise, will be obvious

to every gentleman who will recollect that the states

are laid under restrictions, and that the rights of the

Union are secured by these restrictions.” 3 The De-

bates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-

tion of the Federal Constitution 532 (Jonathan Elliot

ed., 1836) (hereinafter Elliot’s Debates].

Armstrong's argument that, as a matter of separa-

tion of powers and federalism, the courthouse doors

must be closed to the plaintiffs in this case, Pet’rs Br.

at 14, turns fundamental constitutional principles on

their head. It is “emphatically the province and duty

of the judicial department to say what the law is,”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177

(1803), and enforce the “great principle” that “the

3

constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof

are supreme; that they control the constitution and

laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled

by them.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

316, 426 (1819). In establishing our Constitution, the

Framers “split the atom of sovereignty,” U.S. Term

Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)

(Kennedy, J., concurring), creating a vibrant federal-

ism that gave broad powers to the states while ensur-

ing that they respected constitutional limits and the

supremacy of federal law. Armstrong and his amici

would improperly deny the courts their historic role

in maintaining this constitutional balance of federal-

state power.

It makes no difference to this analysis that the

state law at issue here is preempted by a federal law

enacted pursuant to congressional Spending Clause

authority. Ensuring principles of federal supremacy

is as fundamentally important when Congress exer-

cises its authority under the Spending Clause as

when it exercises other enumerated powers. The

Framere recognized that the power to spend for the

general welfare was an “indispensable ingredient in

every constitution,” observing that “[m]Joney is

considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as

that which sustain its life and motion and enables it

to perform its most essential functions.” The Federal-

ist No. 30, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-

siter ed., 1961). In the Spending Clause context, as

elsewhere, it is imperative that the Supremacy

Clause be applied properly. “[T]he whole jurispru-

dence of preemption” is of vital importance to “main-

taining the federal balance.” United States v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

4

For more than 200 years, the judicial branch has

permitted suits, including those brought by private

parties, to challenge state laws that allegedly violate

federal law and requirements. As Chief Justice John

Marshall explained, the Framers expected that some

state laws would conflict with federal statutes and in

“every such case” the law of the state “must yield” to

federal law. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,

211 (1824). Where state action violates federal law,

injunctive relief has long been viewed as the appro-

priate remedy “to arrest the injury” and “prevent the

wrong.” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9

Wheat.) 738, 845 (1824). An unbroken line of cases

reflects that “plaintiffs may vindicate pre-emption

claims by seeking declaratory and equitable relief in

the federal district courts through their powers under

federal jurisdictional statutes.” Golden State Transit

Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 119 (1989)

(Kennedy, J., dissenting). These cases accord preemp-

tive authority to federal laws passed pursuant to the

Spending Clause as well as other exercises of Con-

gress’s enumerated powers.

Armstrong and his amici concede that federal

courts may invoke equitable power to vindicate the

supremacy of federal law in certain circumstances,

but urge this Court to radically revise its precedents

here to close the courthouse doors to plaintiffs in this

case. These arguments, however, devalue fundanien-

tal principles of constitutional supremacy enshrined

in the Supremacy Clause, ignore the role of the courts

in our constitutional scheme as envisioned by the

Framers, and misstate equity's historic role in pre-

venting constitutional wrongs. The court of appeals

properly held that plaintiffs could invoke the Su-

premacy Clause to prevent Idaho from contravening

5

the Medicaid statute's requirement that reimburse-

ment rates be “consistent with efficiency, economy,

and quality of care,” 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A), and

that judgment should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

lL THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE SU-

PREMACY CLAUSE GIVE FEDERAL

COURTS THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RE-

VIEW TO MAINTAIN THE SUPREMACY OF

FEDERAL LAW.

The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Consti-

tution, and the Laws of the United States which shall

be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,

or which shall be made, under the Authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to

the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI,

cl. 2. By including in the Constitution a sweeping

declaration of constitutional supremacy and giving to

courts the power to declare preempted state law null

and void, the Framers provided that “conflicts be-

tween state and federal law” would be “resolved by

principled adjudication, rather than political will or

force.” Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As a

Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1348

(2001).

1. The Supremacy Clause, together with Article II,

which provides for an independent federal judiciary

with the power to hear all cases arising under “this

Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Trea-

ties made under their Authority,” U.S. Const. art.

6

ITI, § 2, cl. 1, ensures that states respect the suprem-

acy of federal law. As James Madison observed, “the

General Convention regarded a provision within the

Constitution for deciding in a peaceable & regular

mode all cases arising in the course of its operation,

as essential to an adequate System of Govt. that

this intention is expressed by the articles declaring

that the federal Constitution & laws shall be the su-

preme law of the land, and that the Judicial Power of

the U.S. shall extend to all cases arising under them.”

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson

(June 27, 1823), in 9 The Writings of James Madison

137, 142 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also The Fed-

eralist No. 39, supra, at 213 (James Madison) (ex-

plaining that “in controversies relating to the bound-

ary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which

is ultimately to decide is to be established under the

general government’).

The “parallel language of the ‘Arising Under’ and

Supremacy Clauses was intentional and structurally

crucial,” James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan,

“Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of

Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98

Colum. L. Rev. 696, 708 (1998), ensuring that private

parties who suffered injury at the hands of state au-

thorities could invoke the power of judicial review to

challenge state laws that conflicted with federal law.

“Otherwise, any one state might repeal the laws of

the Union at large.” 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra, at 187-

88. “To permit the local laws of any state to control

the laws of the Union would be to give the general

government no powers at all. If the judges are not to

be bound by it, the powers of Congress will be nuga-

tory.” Id. at 181. Without judges enforcing the prom-

ise of federal supremacy, our system of government

7

“would have seen the authority of the whole society

everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts;

it would have seen a monster, in which the head was

under the direction of the members.” The Federalist

No. 44, supra, at 255 (James Madison); see Dodge v.

Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 355 (1855) (“Without

the supreme court . . . neither the constitution nor the

laws of congress passed in pursuance of it, nor trea-

ties, would be in practice or in fact the supreme law

of the land, and the injunction that the judges in eve-

ry State should be bound thereby would be use-

less. .”).

2. The Framers crafted the Supremacy Clause

against the backdrop of numerous abuses of state au-

thority under the Articles of Confederation, which es-

tablished a single branch of the federal government,

but contained no mechanism for ensuring federal su-

premacy. Under the dysfunctional government of the

Articles, the federal government could not enforce its

laws, prompting Alexander Hamilton to observe that

a “most palpable defect of the existing Confederation

is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws.” The

Federalist No. 21, supra, at 106 (Alexander Hamil-

ton); see id. No. 22, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (ex-

plaining that “[l]Jaws are a dead letter without courts

to expound and define their true meaning and opera-

tion”). The result, Madison lamented, is that “acts of

Congs. depend{] for their execution on the will of

the state legislatures,” making federal laws “nominal-

ly authoritative, [but] in fect recommendatory only.”

James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the

United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 The Papers of James

Madison 345, 352 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.

E. Rachal eds., 1975).

8

The Framers gathered together in Philadelphia in

1787 to correct these “vices” resulting from the lack of

“effectual control in the whole over its parts.” 1 The

Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 167

(Max Farrand ed., 1911) {hereinafter Farrand’s Rec-

ords]. At the Convention, they extensively debated

different possible means to ensure the supremacy of

federal law, including use of force by the executive, a

congressional veto on state laws, as well as judicial

review.

Early in the Convention, Governor Edmund Ran-

dolph of Virginia proposed an initial mechanism to

ensure the supremacy of federal law, recommending

that the “National Legislature” be given the power “to

negative all laws passed by the several States,” as

well as the power “to call forth the force of the Union”

against a state “failing to fulfill its duty.” 1 Farrand’s

Records, supra, at 21. While James Madison sup-

ported the legislative “negative,” he strongly disa-

greed with reliance upon military force to resolve con-

flicts between federal and state law. “The use of force

agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of

war, than an infliction of punishment, and would

probably be considered by the party attacked as a

dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might

be bound.” Jd. at 54. Randolph was persuaded to

change his position, agreeing that the use of force

would be “impracticable, expensive, [and] cruel to in-

dividuals.” Jd. at 256 (emphasis omitted). The

Framers overwhelmingly preferred a “coer{clion of

laws” to a “coer[c]lion of arms.” Id. at 284 (Alexander

Hamilton); see 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra, at 554 (John

Marshall) (“What is the service or purpose of a judici-

ary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable, orderly

9

manner, without shedding blood, or creating a con-

test, or availing yourselves of force?”’).

While Madison convinced his colleagues to relin-

quish the military option, he could not persuade them

to embrace the use of congressional power to invali-

date state laws. His reasoning in support of the con-

gressional negation of state law met with fierce re-

sistance, precisely because a majority of delegates

preferred to rely on judicial review for this important

task. As Governor Morris argued, “[a] law that ought

to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary de-

partment. and if that security should fail; may be re-

pealed by a Nationl. law.” 2 Farrand’s Records, supra,

at 28. The proposal for Congress to nullify state laws

was defeated by a vote of three states in favor to sev-

en states against. Jd. In rejecting the congressional

negative, “the Framers substituted judicial review of

state laws for congressional control of state legisla-

tures.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 795 (1982)

(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

Immediately after the defeat of the negative, Lu-

ther Martin of Maryland proposed an initial version

of the Supremacy Clause, which provided that “the

Legislative acts of the [United States] shall be the

supreme law of the respective States [and] that

the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound

thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective

laws of the individual States to the contrary notwith-

standing.” 2 Farrand’s Records, supra, at 28-29. The

Convention unanimously adopted this supremacy

provision.

10

The Framers’ decision to vest the federal courts

with the responsibility to ensure the supremacy of

federal law through the exercise of judicial review in

law suits brought by injured private parties reflected

the Framers’ belief that the judiciary was the “quar-

ter [to] look for protection from an infringement

on the Constitution,” 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra, at 554

(John Marshall), and that review by an independent

judge was the only “natural and effectual method of

enforcing laws.” 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra, at 14

(James Iredell); see also id. at 158 (William Davie)

(“[T]he judicial power ought to be coéxtensive with

the legislative. The federal government ought to pos-

sess the means of carrying the laws into execution

. If laws are not to be carried into execution by the

interposition of the judiciary, how is it to be done?”).

Access to the courts was essential to protect individu-

al liberty, prevent government abuse, and ensure the

supremacy of federal law.

Over the course of the rest of the Convention, the

Framers strengthened the requirement of federal su-

premacy. First, the Committee on Detail subjected

state constitutions as well as state laws to the re-

quirement of federal supremacy and changed the

phrase “the Judiciaries of the several States” to “the

judges in the several States,” imposing a personal

mandate on judges to uphold federal law. 2 Far-

rand’s Records, supra, at 183. Second, the Conven-

tion unanimously agreed to add that the United

States Constitution is supreme to state laws. Id. at

389.

Third, the Convention broadened the language of

Article III's “Arising Under” Clause to conform with

the now-expanded Supremacy Clause, id. at 431,

11

“self-consciously and irrevocably forg[ing] the consti-

tutional structural link between the front-line deci-

sionmaking of ‘the Judges in every State’ under the

Supremacy Clause and the supervisory decisionmak-

ing of the federal judiciary when called upon to exer-

cise the ‘arising under’ jurisdiction permitted by the

judiciary article.” Liebman & Ryan, supra, at 747.

This ensured that federal as well as state courts

would have the authority to vindicate the supremacy

of federal law in cases brought by aggrieved individu.

als.

Fourth, and finally, the Committee on Style Revi-

sion replaced the words “the supreme law of the

states” with the phrase “the supreme law of the

land.” 2 Farrand’s Records, supra, at 603. As Profes-

sor Amar explains, “the implication was continental:

one Constitution, one land, one People.” Akhil Reed

Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ.

1425, 1458 (1987). This change in wording left no

doubt “[t]he people of the United States constitute

one nation, under one government, and this govern-

ment, within the scope of the powers with which it is

invested, is supreme.” Lane Cnty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S.

(7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868). The Founding generation be-

lieved that federal laws “would embody the judgment

of America as a whole, as distinct from the more pa-

rochial view of any particular local part,” and there-

fore federal statutes have “priority over any incon-

sistent state-law norm.” Akhil Reed Amar, America’s

Constitution: A Biography 300 (2005). The Suprema-

cy Clause establishes federal law as embodying the

will of the nation’s people, who are empowered to

turn to the judiciary for enforcement.

12

In sum, the Constitution’s text and history estab-

lish that providing for judicial review in cases of con-

flict between federal and state law was at the core of

the Supremacy Clause. Armstrong and his amici are

simply incorrect when they state that the Supremacy

Clause is a “choice-of-law” or “rule of decision” provi-

sion, Pet’rs Br. at 15, 17; Texas et al. Br. at 6-7, that

has nothing to do with judicial review. On the con-

trary, “the Convention resolved the debate over how

to enforce the supremacy of federal law by reliance on

the judicial duty to apply federal law in cases of con-

flict.” See NGA et al. Br. at 19.?

3. Consistent with this text and history, Supreme

Court precedent dating back to the Marshall Court

establishes that courts have a constitutional obliga-

tion to maintain the federal-state balance by declar-

ing null and void state laws that conflict with federal

law.

As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons v.

Ogden, the Constitution specifically “declar[es] the

supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in

2 Amici NGA and vUouncil of State Governments suggest that

“authorizing private lawsuits in ali cases of arguable federal

pre-emption would replicate much of the intrusion the oppo-

nents of the negative found troubling,” NGA et al. Br. at 24.

That argument ignores the fundamental difference between the

congressional negative the Framers rejected, which would have

given Congress an unfettered power to void state laws, and the

system of judicial review they wrote into the Constitution, which

gave the courts the power to strike down state laws that trans-

gressed the Constitution, duly-enacted federal laws, and treaties

in cases brought by aggrieved persons. As the Constitution’s text

and history discussed above show, the Framers gave courts the

duty to police the federal-state balance and invalidate state laws

in conflict with federal law.

13

pursuance of it.” Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 210. Thus, “fijn

every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is

supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in

the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to

it.” Id. at 211. Accordingly, “[a] plaintiff who seeks

injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground

that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal stat-

ute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the

Constitution, must prevail, . presents a federal

question which the federal courts have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.” Shaw v. Delia

Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983); see also

Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535

U.S. 635, 642 (2002). Even absent a private cause of

action under a federal statute or 42 U.S.C. 1983,

plaintiffs may bring “pre-emption claims by seeking

declaratory and equitable relief in the federal district

courts through their powers under federal jurisdic-

tional statutes.” Golden Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at

119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). An aggrieved individu-

al need not rely on those other sources of law “to vest

in him a right to assert that an attempted exercise of

jurisdiction or control violates the proper distribution

of powers within the federal system.” Jd. at 114

(Kennedy, J., dissenting).

li. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE CON-

STITUTION SUPPORT THE AVAILABILITY

OF EQUITABLE RELIEF TO PROHIBIT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATE ACTION

EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A STATUTO-

RY CAUSE OF ACTION.

Equitable relief “has long been recognized as the

proper means for preventing entities from acting un-

constitutionally.” Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Ac-

14

counting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010)

(quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,

74 (2001)). The power of Article [II courts to issue

such relief is anchored directly in the text of the Con-

stitution and flows from equity's historic mission of

preventing illegal action for which there is no ade-

quate remedy at law. When the Framers designed

our system of government, they made sure to give the

federal courts the “judicial power” to enforce the Con-

stitution and maintain the supremacy of federal law

in “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this

Constitution[ and] the Laws of the United States.”

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. By granting courts the

power to award equitable as well as legal remedies,

the Framers ensured that courts would possess the

“effectual power” to “restrain or correct the infrac-

tions” of the Constitution by the states. The Federal-

ist No. 80, supra, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton); see

also James E. Pfander, Rethinking The Supreme

Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82

Calif. L. Rev. 555, 601 (1994) (“[FJederal courts, by

virtue of their authority to hear ‘cases’ in law and eq-

uity, would enjoy the power to ‘restrain’ or enjoin

state infractions of the Constitution ky

By extending the “judicial Power” to “all Cases, in

Law and Equity,” the Framers incorporated a well-

established understanding about the scope of judicial

authority and the types of relief the courts could pro-

vide. Pursuant to that understanding, “[clourts of

equity had the authority to, and did in fact, create

causes of action in cases where courts of law would

not issue damages.” John F. Preis, In Defense of Im-

plied Injunction Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22

Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 7 (2013). Thus, regardless

whether individuals may seek damages for injuries

15

caused by constitutional violations in the absence of a

statute creating a specific “cause of action,” they can

surely seek the sort of equitable relief to prevent im-

plementation of unconstitutional state laws that Re-

spondents seek here.

1. Dating back to the fourteenth century, England

recognized two distinct types of courts: common-law

courts that issued a “variety of standardized writs,”

each of which specified a “complete set of substan-

tive, procedural, and evidentiary law” that applied to

the case, and equitable courts that both “enforcfed]

. Claims created anew by equity” and provided “new

and distinct remedies for the violation of preexisting

legal rights.” Preis, supra, at 11-12 (quoting H. Brent

McKnight, How then Shall We Reason, The Historical

Setting of Equity, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 919, 929 (1994)).

By the time of the Framing, these two distinct courts

were well-established on both sides of the Atlantic.

Cf. Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the

American Colonies, in 2 Select Essays in Anglo-

American Legal History 779, 779 (1907) (“Prior to the

Revolution, courts of chancery had existed in some

shape or other in every one of the thirteen colonies.”).

Although common law courts would only hear cases

where there was a recognized form of action, F. W.

Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of Action at Com-

mon Law: Two Courses of Lectures 296-300 (A. H.

Chaytor & W. J. Whitaker eds., 1920), equity courts

did not require that the cases they heard adhere to

the set forms that were cognizable at common law,

John Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in

the Court of Chancery 7-9 (2d ed. 1787). As Joseph

Story explained, equity jurisdiction existed where “a

wrong [wa]s done, for which there [wa]s no plain, ad-

16

equate, and complete remedy in the Courts of Com-

mon Law.” 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity

Jurisprudence as Administered in England and

America § 49 (14th ed. 1918).

Because equity courts were concerned principally

with whether a wrong had been committed, a plaintiff

bringing a claim in equity did not have to show that

he would be able to bring a claim at common law, or

that a statut. provided a “right” that would be recog-

nized by common law courts. Rather, all a plaintiff

had to show was “that the subject of the suit is such

upon which a court of equity will assume jurisdic-

tion.” Mitford, supra, at 120-21. As Story and others

explained, equity jurisdiction was quite broad, ex-

tending to cases where “the principles of law by

which the ordinary courts are guided give no right,”

id. at 103-04 (emphasis added); see Story, supra, at

§ 29; 1 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise of Equity

Jurisprudence as Administered in the United States

of America § 424 (1881). Thus, for example, in 1491,

the Archbishop of Canterbury readily disposed of an

argument that he was without jurisdiction to consider

a case because there would have been no right violat-

ed at common law. As he explained, “It is so in all

cases where there is no remedy at the common law

and no right, and yet a good remedy in equity.” Jd. at

§ 50 n.1 (quoting Year Book of Henry VII, folio 12);

see id. at § 423.

In short, “{a]t the time of the American Founding, it

was not uncommon for Chancery to enforce the com-

mon law through equitable remedies even where the

common law might not itself make damages availa-

ble.” Preis, supra, at 15; cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Be-

yond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,

17

1988 Duke L.J. 879, 880 (1988) (“Equity granted re-

lief—and common law courts did not—in numerous

situations involving one person’s abuse of confidence

reposed in him by another.”).

2 When the Framers defined the “judicial Power”

to include “all Cases, in Law and Equity,” U.S. Const.

art. II, § 2, cl. 1, they were incorporating into the

Constitution this well-established understanding

about the power of equitable courts to provide reme-

dies in the absence of a common law right. Indeed,

although there was little discussion about the precise

meaning of those terms at the Convention, during the

debates about whether to ratify the Constitution,

some anti-Federalists expressed concern about giving

federal judges equitable powers because of the signif-

icant power that would afford them. Letters from the

Federal Farmer to the Republican III (Oct. 10, 1787),

http /iwww.constitution.org/afp/fedfar03.htm.

The first Congress subsequently identified the ini-

tial set of cases in which the courts could exercise this

power by giving the courts diversity jurisdiction over

suits “in equity” in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Ever since this initial grant of

power, federal courts exercising their equitable pow-

ers have applied the same principles and provided

the same remedies available in the High Court of

Chancery in England. As this Court has explained it,

“since the organization of the government,” “[t}]he us-

ages of the High Court of Chancery in England,

whenever the jurisdiction is exercised, govern the

proceedings” in equity cases, and other than where

statutes defining federal jurisdiction generally im-

pose limits, “there is no other limitation to the exer-

cise of a chancery jurisdiction by these courts.” Penn-

18

sylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont-Bridge Co., 54 U.S.

(13 How.) 518, 563 (1851); see Grupo Mexicano de De-

sarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.

308, 318 (1999) (“[E]quity jurisdiction of the federal

courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the

High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the

adoption of the Constitution ”); Boyle v. Zacharie,

31 US. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832); see also Story, supra,

at § 57.

Consistent with these basic equity principles, more

than 150 years ago, this Court specifically recognized

the power of federal courts to fashion equitable reme-

dies to ensure the supremacy of federal law, including

in cases where Congress had not provided any statu-

tory right of action. See Wheeling & Belmont-Bridge

Co., 54 U.S. at 566 (“This compact, by the sanction of

Congress, has become a law of the Union. What fur-

ther legislation can be desired for judicial action?

No State law can hinder or obstruct the free use of a

license granted under an act of Congress. Nor can

any State violate the compact by obstructing the

navigation of the river. More than this is not neces-

sary to give a civil remedy for an injury done by an

obstruction.”). As Wheeling Bridge reflects, so long as

a federal court had a basis for subject matter jurisdic-

tion, it could issue equitable remedies to maintain the

supremacy of federal law in cases in which there was

no adequate remedy at law. It did not matter wheth-

er Congress had provided a private right of action.

3. The relief Respondents seek here—an injunction

prohibiting State officials from implementing state

law that conflicts with the federal Medicaid statute—

is precisely the type of relief that would have been

available in equity courts at the Framing.

19

When equity courts had jurisdiction over a case, the

question they addressed was whether the plaintiff

suffered an “injury” as a result of the defendant’s un-

lawful acts. Mitford, supra, at 32-33. If he did, the

court could issue an injunction “to restrain the de-

fendant from . doing any injurious act.” Jd. at 46.

Applying this basic principle, courts of equity regular-

ly issued relief to prevent injury caused by public off-

cieis engaging in ultra vires action, see, e.g., Hughes

v. Trs. of Morden College, 1 Vesey 188 (Ch. 1748), and

courts in the early nineteenth century concluded that

“relief may be given in a court of equity to prevent

an injurious act by a public officer, for which the law

might give no adequate redress.” Carroll v. Safford,

44 U.S. (3 How.) 441, 463 (1845); see, e.g., Belknap v.

Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. 463, 473 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (based

on “well settled” “jurisdiction of chancery,” “chancery

would restrain [commissioners] by injunction” if they

“exceeded their powers”); Baring v. Erdman, 2 F. Cas.

784, 786 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 981) (where acts of

public officials “transcend the authority conferred on

them by law,” they are subject to control by injunc-

tion to prevent “irreparable injury”); Frewin v. Lewis,

4 Mylne & Craig 249, 254-55 (Ch. 1838) (equity court

will prevent injury by enjoining public officials from

acting “beyond the line of their authority”).

Ever since this Court's decision in Osborn v. Bank

of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), it

has been well settled that federal courts have the au-

thority to maintain the federal-state balance and is-

sue injunctive relief in cases in which a state law is

“repugnant to the constitution, or to a law of the

United States made in pursuance thereof.” Osborn,

22 U.S. at 859. As Chief Justice Marshall explained,

20

“it is the province of a Court of equity to arrest

the injury, and prevent the wrong.” Jd. at 845. The

exercise of that remedy “is to vindicate the suprema-

cy of the constitution, and to maintain the integrity of

the powers and rights which it confers.” Allen v. Bal-

timore & O. R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 316 (1885).

Osborn’s holding that “circuit courts of the United

States will restrain a state officer from executing an

unconstitutional statute of the state has never

been departed from,” Pennoyer v. McConnaughey, 140

U.S. 1, 12 (1891) and, together with Ex Parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908), reflects that “certain suits for

declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers

must therefore be permitted if the Constitution is to

remain the supreme law of the land.” Alden uv.

Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999). As the Court has

long recognized, “the availability of prospective relief

gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies de-

signed to end a continuing violation of federal law are

necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring

the supremacy of that law.” Green v. Mansour, 474

U.S. 64, 68 (1985).

Armstrong and his amici concede, as they must,

that there is a long history of federal courts granting

equitable relief in preemption cases to vindicate the

guarantee of the Supremacy Clause that federal law

is superior in force te state law, see Pet’rs Br. at 40-

41, 43-44; U.S. Br. at 20 (recognizing that “the ability

of private parties to obtain protection in the face of

state compulsion that violates federal law has consid-

erable historical grounding”), but they argue that

private parties should not be able to obtain this type

of protection in this case. According to Armstrong

and the Solicitor General, the federal courts’ equita-

21

ble powers should be viewed as limited to suits

brought as “an anticipatory defense to state enforce-

ment proceedings,” Pet’rs Br. at 40; U.S. Br. at 20.

But neither Armstrong nor the Solicitor General of-

fers either Framing-era evidence or court precedents

to support the suggestion that the historical power of

equitable courts was so limited and, as discussed

above, it was not.3 Armstrong’s arguments would

leave courts powerless to enforce the supremacy of

federal law in this and other cases, effectively making

state law supreme over federal. That cannot be what

the Supremacy Clause means.

The Supremacy Clause makes all federal laws en-

acted pursuant to Congress’s enumerated powers the

supreme law of the land, not simply a fraction of

them. There is no basis in constitutional text and

history, this Court’s precedent from Osborn on, or eq-

uity’s historic mission of “[p]revention of impending

injury by unlawful action,” Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of

the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536

(1925), for carving out an exception to the courts’ con-

stitutional responsibility to enforce the Supremacy

Clause and maintain the federal-state balance.

Plaintiffs, no less than others challenging state action

8 Amici NGA and Council of State Governments also concede

that equity can provide private parties a right to seek redress

for unconstitutional action, see NGA et al. Br. at 26, but argues

that “under equity, only negative injunctive relief was permit-

ted,” id. at 29. This argument either misunderstands the nature

of “negative injunctive relief’ or the relief Respondents seek

here. All Respondents seek is an injunction prohibiting the

State from violating the Medicaid statute. Such equitable relief

is clearly of the type that would have been available at the

Framing. See supra at 18-19.

22

as contrary to federal law, are entitled to their day in

court to present their claims.

Iti. SPENDING CLAUSE LEGISLATION IS EN-

TITLED TO THE SAME PREEMPTIVE

FORCE AS OTHER EXERCISES OF CON-

GRESS’ ENUMERATED POWERS.

Fundamental constitutional principles of federal

supremacy apply witk full force to legislation, such as

the Medicaid Act involved in this case, enacted pur-

suant to Congress’s powers under the Spending

Clause. Spending Clause enactments, like statutes

passed to effectuate other enumerated powers, are

the supreme law of the land.

1. Providing Congress the power to tax and spend

was of central importance to the drafters of our Con-

stitution: they had witnessed the disastrous conse-

quences of the Articles of Confederation’s failure to

provide for such a power. Under the Articles of Con-

federation, Congress could raise money only by mak-

ing requests to the States, but “State governments

had often failed to provide the funds that the Confed-

eration demanded of them. Without a strong rev-

enue stream, vital federal functions were withering.”

Amar, America’s Constitution, supra, at 106. Indeed,

this created such an ineffectual central government

that, according to George Washington, it nearly cost

Americans victory in the Revolutionary War, and he

lamented the dire situation in which the soldiers had

been placed as a result of Congress’s inability to levy

taxes to support the Army. See Letter from George

Washington to Joseph Jones (May 31, 1780), in 18

The Writings of George Washington 452, 453 (John C.

Fitzpatrick ed., 1937); see also Circular to State Gov-

23

ernments (Oct. 18, 1780), in Washington: Writings

393, 393 (John Rhodehamc! -1., 1997); Letter from

George Washington to Lund Washington (March 19,

1783), in Washington: Writings 502, 502-03 (John

Rhodehame!l ed., 1997).

This historical foundation explains why the Spend-

ing Clause is the first and one of the most sweeping

powers the Constitution confers upon Congress,

providing the power “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Du-

ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and pro-

vide for the common Defense and general Welfare of

the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The

power to tax and spend for the common defense and

general welfare is “an indispensible ingredient in

every constitution,” The Federalist No. 30, supra, at

156 (Alexander Hamilton), and it was essential for

the Constitution to “embrace a provision for the sup-

port of the national civic list; for the payment of the

national debts contracted, or that may be contracted;

and, in general, for all those matters which will call

for disbursements out of the national treasury.” Jd.

The Framers recognized that “government should

be able to command all the resources of the country;

because no man can tell what our exigencies may

be. Government must therefore be able to com-

mand the whole power of the purse ” 2 Elliot's

Debates, supra, at 191. Recognizing that “money is

the nerve — the life and soul of a government,” 3 El-

liot’s Debates, supra, at 115, and that which “enables

it to perform its most essential functions,” The Fed-

eralist 30, supra, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton), the

Convention wrote the Spending Clause in the broad-

est terms possible, empowering the government to

spend money to provide for the general welfare of the

24

United States. As Alexander Hamilton observed,

“The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could

have been used [T}his necessarily embraces a

vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible nei-

ther of specification nor of definition.” Alexander

Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in

10 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 252, 252-56

(Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1966).

2. Consistent with this text and history, this Court

has held that Congress may use its Spending Clause

authority “to grant federal funds to the States” and

may impose legally enforceable conditions on the

States to “ensure that the funds are used by the

States to ‘provide for the general Welfare’ in the

manner Congress intended.” Nat? Fed’n of Indep.

Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601, 2602 (2012).

In a long line of cases, this Court has repeatedly ap-

plied the Supremacy Clause to give preemptive force

to congressional legislation under the Spending

Clause imposing conditions on states’ receipt of fed-

eral funding, ensuring that states do not act in con-

flict with federal law. See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S.

Ct. 1391, 1398-99 (2013); Dalton v. Little Rock Family

Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1996); Bennett

v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1988); Rosado v.

Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-23 (1970); King v. Smith,

392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968). As this string of rul-

ings reflects, “[c]onditional spending statutes are no

less ‘law’ than any other kind of federal legislation,”

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in

the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 391 (2008).

There is no “Spending Clause” exception to the Su-

premacy Clause.

25

Thus, while Spending Clause legislation is “much

in the nature of a contract,” Natl Fed’n of Indep.

Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman,

536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (emphasis omitted)), this

Court fulfills its obligation to maintain the federal-

state balance by holding states to their bargain.

Here, Idaho agreed to abide by the federal require-

ment to ensure that Medicaid “payments are con-

sistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care,”

42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A), but chose to set artificially

low reimbursement rates for purely budgetary rea-

sons. Indeed, despite cost studies establishing that

rates were too low, the Idaho legislature refused to

increase rates to bring them into compliance with

federal law. In these circumstances, the court of ap-

peals properly exercised its historic role in maintain-

ing the federal-state balance by holding the state’s

action contrary to the supremacy of federal law.

26

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-

firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

DOUGLAS T. KENDALL

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA*

DAVID H. GANS

BRIANNE J. GOROD

CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

1200 18* Street NW

Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-6889

elizabeth@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

December 23, 2014 * Counsel of Record