Amicus Curiae Brief — Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) (No. 14-915)

Supreme Court, US

FILED

SEP 11 2015

OF FICE OF THE CLERK

No. 14-915

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

REBECCA FRIEDRICHS, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari To

The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF FORMER CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR

PETE WILSON, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

AND BIPARTISAN CALIFORNIA EDUCATORS

AND SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

KEVIN J. RING-DOWELL THEODORE B. OLSON

Gipson, DUNN & CRUTCHERLLP Counsel of Record

555 Mission Street AMIR C. TAYRANI

San Francisco, CA 94105 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

(415) 393-8200 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW

G: DEAN McGrRaTH, JR. aad oo —_

McGraTH & AssocIATEs tolson@gibsondunn.com

‘1025 Thomas Jefferson St., NW

‘Suite 110G

Washington, DC 20007

(202) 295-2304

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ...00......ccccccccseceseseeeeeee 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. ....................cceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 4

IEE, ditiitensinienrtsnianeenienmeitascmmnnnnniememamened 8

I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN’ THE

INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED WITH

ee ve eee 8

A. Collective Bargaining In Public

Education Is Inherently Political ........... 9

B. Agency Shop Arrangements

Violate Nonmembers’ Speech,

Association, And Petition Rights........... 20

Il. THE FREE-RIDER JUSTIFICATION FOR

AGENCY SHOP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE

PUBLIC-SCHOOL SETTING Is

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,

431 U.S. 209 (1977).............ccec000e. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 20, 24

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,

I tate 22, 23

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,

ert trncneatenaeeaanial 21

Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones,

ae ES 22

City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis.

Emp’t Relations Comm’n,

ee OT 23

Harris v. Quinn,

134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014)....................cc000 20, 21, 22, 23

Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union,

Be Oe Gee BO Ci cccnecccccssssccsscensesess 6, 20, 21, 23

McDonald v. Smith,

TE. 22

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,

Eee 27

Riley v. Nat'l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,

gk a 4

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,

ee er 22

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar

PK ee 22

Vergara v. California,

No. BC484642 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014)............

\ihdaiasiiatciiieeiieiainintiniiaiediiiininnninnninesneennninds 11, 13, 14, 26

Wooley v. Maynard,

I is cninnteaiatcniatstanltniiaammnatadii 22

STATUTES

| I near Te 10, 15

a Ls cttsiamiinntimeciinl 10, 15

Cal. Educ. Code § 44944................c.ssscssssscsssesseees 10, 15

Cal. Educ. Code § 44866...........cccccccoccccccoccocsccocccee 13, 15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Agreement between Bd. of Educ. San Diego

Unified School Dist. and San Diego Educ.

| EERE RA Ae rene ane Oe aL aN 12, 15

Agreement between Chaffey Joint Union High

Sch. Dist. and Associated Chaffey Teachers

STITT ict iiinsaiietbsiinstensieiinhieiiinndlididadianinesiaiionenmmpnninsees 19

Agreement between L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Educ. and United Teachers L.A. .....10, 11, 12, 15

Agreement between Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.

Bd. of Educ. and Oakland Educ. Ass’n .....10, 15, 17

Agreement between Sacramento City Unified

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. and Sacramento City

ED ieicciictnrinidniciactintteiitinmnenatnmnpitinaemnsnss 11

Agreement between San Jose Unified School

Dist. Bd. of Educ. and San Jose Teachers

iv

Elaine Allensworth et al., Consortium on Chi.

Sch. Research, The Schools Teachers Leave

acacia teal caine aia etetiliiiniaeemanes 26

Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Collective

Bargaining, Transfer Rights, and

Disadvantaged Schools, 36 Educ. Evaluation

& Pol’y Analysis 83 (2014). ..0.............ccceeeeeseseeeeeeees 16

Joshua Barnett & Gary W. Ritter, When Merit

Pay Is Worth Pursuing, 66(2) Educ.

Leadership (2008), available at

http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-

leadership/oct08/vol66/num02/When-Merit-

Pay-Is-Worth-Pursuing.aspx...............cccccccseees 18, 27

Bhavini Bhakta, Op-Ed., California’s Pink-Slip

Shuffle, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 2012,

http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/16/

opinion/la-oe-bhakta-teaching-20121216.............. 24

Bill & Melinda Gates Found., Ensuring Fair

and Reliable Measures of Effective Teaching

(2013), available at http://www.metproject.

org/downloads/MET_Ensuring Fair_and_

Reliable_Measures_Practitioner_Brief.pdf............. 9

Matthew Blake, Pres., Cal. Fed’n of Teachers,

Teachers Unions Sued over Dues for Political

Activities, Daily Journal (Apr. 8, 2015) ............ 4, 21

Cal. Teachers Ass’n, About CTA, Mission

Statement, http://Awww.cta.org/About-

CTA/Who-We-Are/Mission-Statement.aspx ........... 6

Raj Chetty & Alex Olssen, The Impacts of Last-

In, First-Out vs. Effectiveness-Based Teacher

IIT sicnnrainccanicniecessumbidiniiongnninesans 13

Vv

Raj Chetty et al., Measuring the Impacts of

Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and

Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 104(9) Am.

TT a i)

Contract between S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ. and United Educators of S.F........... 10, 11, 15

Thomas Dee & James Wyckoff, Incentives,

Selection, and Teacher Performance:

Evidence from Impact (Nat’] Bureau of Econ.

Research Working Paper No. 19529, 2013)....18, 19

Dan Goldhaber & Roddy Theobald, Assessing

the Determinants and Implications of Teacher

Layoffs (Nat! Ctr. for Analysis of

Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research,

Working Paper 55, 2010)........................0.. 12, 13, 14

Carrie Hahnel et al., Educ. Trust—W., Victims

of the Churn: The Damaging Impact of

California’s Teacher Layoff Policies on

Schools, Students and Communities in Three

Large School Districts (2011), available at

http://1k9gllyevnfp2lpqldhrqe17.wpengine.

netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/

10/ETW-Victims-of-the-Churn-Report. pdf ........... 14

Eric A. Hanushek, The Single Salary Schedule

and Other Issues of Teacher Pay, 82 Peabody

es ee TE diiirnectninitnpiessncndubnttetisannseinsinesies 17

Eric A. Hanushek, Valuing Teachers: How

Much Is a Good Teacher Worth?, 11(3) Educ.

RIEL eee oR 12,17

Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools

Lose Teachers, 39(2) J. Hum. Resources 326

vi

Lance T. Izumi et al., Pac. Research Inst.,

California Education Report Card (2007),

available at https://Awww.heartland.org/sites/

all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/

eee aretenssssesssnceemmemmnetasinviaaidiniiatinaabeiaaitel 26

Lance T. Izumi et al., Pac. Research Inst., Not

as Good as You Think: Why the Middle Class

Needs School Choice (2007)..................ses0seesee0e+ 3,11

Terry M. Moe, Bottom-Up Structure: Collective

Bargaining, Transfer Rights, and the Plight

of Disadvantaged Schools (Sept. 14, 2006)

(Educ. Working Paper Archive), available at

http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED508944.pdf...3, 24

Umut Ozek, A Closer Look at the Student

Achievement Trends in the District of

Columbia Between 2006-07 and 2012-13

(Nat'l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data

in Educ. Research, Working Paper No. 119,

John P. Papay & Susan Moore Johnson, Js PAR

a Good Investment? Understanding the Costs

and Benefits of Teacher Peer Assistance and

Review Programs (2011)...............cccccccccceceeeeeeeeeeees 12

Michael Podgursky, George W. Bush Inst.,

Reforming Educator Compensation

Vii

Press Release, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner

Research, New University of Southern

California Dornsife College of Letters, Arts

and Sciences/Los Angeles Times Poll (Apr. 10,

2015), available at http://www.gqrr.com/

articles/2015/4/12/new-university-of-

southern-california-dornsife-college-of-letters-

arts-and-scienceslos-angeles-times-poll................ 25

Pamela A. Riley et al., Pac. Research Inst.,

Contract for Failure: The Impact of Teacher

Union Contracts on the Quality of California

Nicole S. Simon & Susan Moore Johnson,

Teacher Turnover in High-Poverty Schools:

What We Know and Can Do (Aug. 2013)

(Working Paper, Project on the Next

Generation of Teachers, Harvard Graduate

Sch. of Educ.), available at http://sites.

harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1231814_files/

Teacher%20Turnover%20in%20High-

Poverty%20Schools. pdf.................-eecccceeeeeeeeees 15, 16

Students Matter, Vergara v. California 2013

California Educators Survey Results (2014),

available at http://studentsmatter.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/03/SM_Research-Now-

Poll-Results_03.05.14. pdf ................:cccccceeeeeeeceeeeees 25

Daniel Weisberg et al., The New Teacher

Project, The Widget Effect (2009) ................0000000+ 26

BRIEF OF FORMER CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR

PETE WILSON, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTI-

TUTE, AND BIPARTISAN CALIFORNIA EDU-

CATORS AND SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!

Amici are a former Republican governor of Cali-

fornia, a non-partisan public-policy organization, and

a bipartisan group of California educators and schol-

ars, all of whom have longsta.iding and deep-rooted

interests in California’s education system. Amici are

bound by a common concern that agency shop ar-

rangements—which compel public-school teachers

who are not union members to finance unions’ collec-

tive bargaining activities—have a profoundly detri-

mental impact on the professional lives of Califor-

nia’s teachers, the well-being of California’s public-

school students, and ultimately the entire public-

education system in the State. In amici’s view,

agency shop arrangements contravene not only

sound education policy but also the First Amend-

ment rights of those nonmember teachers forced to

1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), amici state that peti-

tioners and those respondents who entered an appearance in

the court of appeals (the union respondents and intervenor Cal-

ifornia Attorney General Kamala D. Harris) have filed letters

with the Clerk granting blanket consent to the filing of amicus

briefs. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that no

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and

no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to

fund the brief’s preparation or submission. No person other

than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to

the briefs preparation or submission.

2

fund the collective bargaining that culminates in

these pernicious effects.

Pete Wilson was governor of California from

1991 to 1999, a U.S. Senator from California from

1983 to 1991, and the Mayor of San Diego from 1971

to 1983. Governor Wilson has extensive experience

with matters of education policy affected by collective

Eric Hanushek is the Paul and Jean Hanna Sen-

ior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford Uni-

versity. He studies educational issues from an eco-

nomic perspective, and has promoted the idea that

teacher proficiency should be measured by increased

student achievement.

Peter H. Hanley is Executive Director of the

American Center for School Choice. He has three

times been elected president of the San Mateo Union

High School District Board and is currently board

president of Amethod Public Schools, a charter

school management organization. He has also

served four terms in the California School Boards

Association Delegate Assembly.

Pacific Research Institute (“PRI”) is a non-profit,

non-partisan 501(c\(3) organization that champions

individual freedom, opportunity, and personal re-

sponsibility through the advancement of free-market

policy solutions and private initiative. The PRI Cen-

ter for Education publishes research and promotes

outreach regarding a number of important topics in

the education field, including teacher quality, aca-

demic standards, school finance reform, and parental

choice in education. For example, in March 2002,

PRI published a comprehensive study analyzing the

collective bargaining agreements used in 460 Cali-

3

fornia school districts. See Pamela A. Riley et al.,

Pac. Research Inst., Contract for Failure: The Im-

pact of Teacher Union Contracts on the Quality of

California Schools 1-2 (2002). Based on this analy-

sis, PRI researchers concluded that many of the poli-

cies in collective bargaining agreements “erode[ |] the

authority of the school board and district manage-

ment to make important decisions,” “harm| |] teach-

ers,” and are “detrimental to student achievement.”

Id.; see also Lance T. Izumi et al., Pac. Research

Inst., Not as Good as You Think: Why the Middle

Class Needs School Choice 109 (2007).

A full list of the signatories to this brief is set

forth in the Appendix.

In light of their shared goal of improving public

education in California, all of the amici have a signif-

icant interest in the outcome of this case, which pre-

sents a First Amendment challenge to agency shop

arrangements. Collective bargaining funded by such

arrangements “can cover virtually every aspect of

what happens within schools,” including policies on

teacher discipline, assignment, retention, and com-

pensation that provoke heated debate within the

teaching profession—as well as among politicians,

public-policy experts, taxpayers, and parents—and

that can have substantial adverse effects on student

outcomes. Terry M. Moe, Bottom-Up Structure: Col-

lective Bargaining, Transfer Rights, and the Plight of

Disadvantaged Schools, 8 (Sept. 14, 2006) (Educ.

Working Paper Archive), available at

http-//files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED508944.pdf. By re-

quiring nonmember teachers to subsidize unions’

viewpoints on these public-policy matters—including

positions that many teachers believe to be detri-

mental to their own professional careers and to the

4

success of their students—agency shop arrangements

violate the core First Amendment guarantees that

individuals are free to decide “both what to say and

what not to say,” Riley v. Nat'l Fed’n of the Blind of

N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988); with whom to

associate or not to associate; and whether and how to

petition the government. The Court should strike

down these coercive union-funding obligations, which

infringe upon the First Amendment rights of public-

school teachers and imperil the well-being of the stu-

dents for whom they are responsible.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431

U.S. 209 (1977), this Court held that a State cannot

compel public employees who are not union members

to make financial contributions to unions’ “political”

and “ideological” causes because those mandatory

exactions violate the principle, residing “at the heart

of the First Amendment,” that “one’s beliefs should

be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather

than coerced by the State.” Jd. at 234-35. Because

collective bargaining by unions representing public-

school teachers is necessarily designed to influence

public policy—and is therefore inherently “political”

and “ideological”—this aspect of Abood compels the

conclusion that agency shop arrangements are un-

constitutional in the public-school setting. See Mat-

thew Blake, Pres., Cal. Fed’n of Teachers, Teachers

Unions Sued over Dues for Political Activities, Daily

Journal (Apr. 8, 2015) (“Every element of public edu-

cation is political.”) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). The Court in Abood nevertheless upheld agen-

cy shop arrangements that require nonmember pub-

lic employees to finance unions’ “collective bargain-

5

ing, contract administration, and _ grievance-

adjustment” activities. 431 U.S. at 225-26.

That conclusion is constitutionally insupportable

in any public-employment context, but is especially

problematic in the public-school setting. Abood

failed to recognize the full extent to which teachers’

unions advocate positions during collective bargain-

ing on intensely divisive public-policy issues, some of

which—from the perspective of nonmember teach-

ers—are harmful to both teachers and students. In

addition, the collective bargaining process has direct

and often substantial effects on taxes, budgets, and

other matters of local governance that are inherently

political and ideological in nature. Under Abood,

nonmember teachers have no choice but to bankroll

unions’ support for collectively bargained policies to

which many nonmember teachers strenuously object

as inconsistent with their own beliefs and detri-

mental to their careers and the well-being of their

students.

In particular, school districts and teachers’ un-

ions collectively bargain teacher discipline, layoff,

assignment, and compensation policies, all of which

directly affect teachers’ professional lives and stu-

dents’ classroom performance. Compensation for

teachers also affects the ability of local governments

to provide benefits to other constituencies and sala-

ries to other public employees. Most of these issues

are the subject of extensive disagreement among

members of the teaching profession, the broader edu-

cational community, and the public. For example,

many teachers disagree with teacher discipline,

layoff, assignment, and compensation policies that

operate—either principally or exclusively—on the

basis of seniority, without regard to teachers’ per-

6

formance. These policies, in the minds of many pub-

lic-school teachers, are antithetical to the teaching

profession’s central mission of “enhancling] the qual-

ity of education for students.” Cal. Teachers Ass’n,

About CTA, Mission Statement, http//www.cta.org/

About-CTA/Who-We-Are/Mission-Statement.aspx

(last visited Sept. 8, 2015).

Yet, despite the strong opposition of many non-

member teachers to the educational policies that

teachers’ unions espouse, agency shop arrangements

compel nonmember teachers to subsidize unions’ col-

lective bargaining activities on these matters as a

condition of their public employment. Moreover,

these arrangements effectively designate unions as

the advocates for the interests of both nonmember

and member teachers in negotiations with school dis-

tricts, even though nonmembers may well have very

different views from the unions that they have no

means of airing during the collective bargaining pro-

cess. These intolerable burdens on nonmember

teachers’ speech, association, and petition rights—

countenanced in Abood based on reasoning that has

failed to withstand the test of time—should be re-

jected by this Court.

II. According to Abood, the “primary purpose” of

agency shop arrangements—and the reason that the

burdens they impose on nonmembers’ First Amend-

ment rights can be countenanced—is to prevent

nonmember employees from “free riding” on dues-

paying union members during the collective bargain-

ing process. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 132

S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012) (citation omitted); see also

Abood, 431 U.S. at 224. While it is doubtful that a

“free-rider” rationale could be a constitutionally suf-

ficient justification for coerced speech, association,

7

and petitioning in any setting, that rationale is par-

ticularly flawed in the public-education context. In-

deed, it is far from the case that nonmember public-

school teachers necessarily benefit from the policies

advocated by teachers’ unions during collective bar-

gaining. To the contrary, many teachers—

particularly those who perform at or near the top of

their profession—are, in fact, harmed by the policies

that unions advance during collective bargaining.

For example, teachers who are new to the profes-

sion or to particular school districts often find them-

selves at risk of being laid off or involuntarily trans-

ferred to another school—even when they have

achieved extraordinary success in the classroom—

due to provisions in collective bargaining agreements

that make important employment decisions depend-

ent primarily, if not entirely, on teacher seniority.

Moreover, many union-supported policies make it ex-

ceedingly difficult for school districts to discipline

underperforming or incompetent teachers, which dis-

incentivizes school district administrators from even

initiating disciplinary proceedings. As a result, fail-

ing teachers remain in the classroom year after year,

and the teachers who teach alongside them are

forced to spend valuable classroom time trying to re-

pair the academic damage that these substandard

teachers have inflicted on their students.

In addition, “single salary schedules”—another

product of the collective bargaining process—require

teachers of the same seniority and education levels to

be compensated exactly the same as one another, re-

gardless of the schools to which they are assigned,

the subject matter that they teach, their effective-

ness in the classroom, or their impact on students’

achievement. This lock-step compensation model

8

penalizes teachers in disadvantaged schools and

hard-to-staff teaching fields, as well as the most ef-

fective teachers, all of whom would be better off un-

der a compensation system designed to reward

teacher quality and improve student outcomes.

As a result, the only “free ride” that teachers’ un-

ions can conceivably offer to many nonmember

teachers is one that takes them further from the des-

tination they aspire to reach—a merit-based teach-

ing profession dedicated, first and foremost, to the

well-being and success of its students. Collective

bargaining, after all, is not focused on what is best

for students, but what is best for the unions them-

selves. Thus, it is the unions that are “free-riding”

on the backs of students and non-member teachers—

not the other way around. Coerced financial support

for public unions, and the infringement on teachers’

core First Amendment rights resulting from such co-

ercion, cannot be justified on so flawed a rationale.

Abood should be overruled.

ARGUMENT

I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC-

EDUCATION CONTEXT IS INEXTRICABLY IN-

TERTWINED WITH TEACHERS’ PROFESSION-

AL LIVES, STUDENTS’ ACHIEVEMENT, AND

NONMEMBERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

In Abood, this Court acknowledged that agency

shop arrangements “interfere” with public employ-

ees’ “freedom to associate for the advancement of

ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as [they] see[ ] fit.”

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222

(1977). The Court nevertheless deemed this inter-

ference with core First Amendment rights to be justi-

fied to the extent that nonmembers’ financial contri-

9

butions are used to fund collective bargaining activi-

ties that establish school district policies on “bread

and butter” issues like “wages, hours, vacations, and

pensions.” Id. at 258 (Powell, J., concurring). In so

holding, however, the Court failed to appreciate the

extent to which many of the policies that are estab-

lished during the collective bargaining process—even

those that ostensibly govern the “terms and condi-

tions” of teachers’ employment—involve fundamental

public-policy issues that heavily influence teachers’

professional lives and the achievement of their stu-

dents, and therefore rest at the very core of teachers’

First Amendment interests. Jd. at 220 (majority

opinion).

A. Collective Bargaining In Public Edu-

cation Is Inherently Political.

School district policies that emerge from the col-

lective bargaining process determine which teachers

school districts may hire (or continue to employ) and

the schools to which those teachers are ultimately

assigned. This, in turn, greatly shapes the quality

and equality of students’ educational opportunities.

See Raj Chetty et al., Measuring the Impacts of

Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and Student Out-

comes in Adulthood, 104(9) Am. Econ. Rev. 2633,

2634 (2014) (explaining that teacher effectiveness

“has substantial impacts on a broad range of [stu-

dent] outcomes”); Bill & Melinda Gates Found., En-

suring Fair and Reliable Measures of Effective Teach-

ing 5 (2013), available at http://www.metproject.

org/downloads/MET_Ensuring Fair_and_ Reliable_M

easures_Practitioner_Brief.pdf (concluding that

“more effective teachers not only cause[ ] students to

perform better on state tests, ... they also cause |

students to score higher on other, more cognitively

10

challenging assessments in math and English”).

Agency shop arrangements compel nonmembers to

fund unions’ views on these policies—despite the det-

rimental impact the unions’ negotiating positions

may have on some teachers’ professional lives and

the well-being of their students.

Discipline Policies. For example, unions com-

monly negotiate for provisions in collective bargain-

ing agreements that require school districts to over-

come a gauntlet of procedural obstacles—verbal rep-

rimands, meetings, notices, and teaching improve-

ment plans—before districts can discipline underper-

forming or failing teachers. See, e.g., Agreement be-

tween L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. and Unit-

ed Teachers L.A., art. X, § 11.0 (“L.A. Agreement”)

(requiring school district to provide notifications and

meetings to underperforming teachers before a notice

of unsatisfactory service or act may be issued);

Agreement between Oakland Unified Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Educ. and Oakland Educ. Ass’n (effective July 1,

2005), art. 25.1.1.1 (“Oakland Agreement”) (“Peer as-

sistance ... must be provided to a [teacher] who has

received an overall unsatisfactory evaluation in the

areas of teaching strategies and instruction . .. .”);

Contract between S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.

and United Educators of S.F. (effective July 1, 2012),

art. 28 (“S.F. Agreement”) (requiring school district

to provide verbal reprimands, written reprimands, a

statement of incident or misconduct, and a statement

of discipline before a teacher may be suspended

without pay).

These contractually-mandated steps—which build

upon various statutory requirements governing

teacher dismissals in California, see Cal. Educ. Code

§§ 44934, 44938, 44944—can constitute “tortuous”

11

impediments to an effective disciplinary process,

“caus[ing] districts in many cases to be very reluc-

tant to even commence” the discipline of a failing

teacher. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip

op. at 11, 12 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014), available

at http://goo.g/ThBjNQ. As one California court re-

cently concluded after a ten-week bench trial, the in-

evitable result of procedural barriers to teacher dis-

cipline is that underperforming or incompetent

teachers remain in the classroom year after year,

imposing “a direct, real, appreciable, and negative

impact on a significant number” of students. Id. at 8;

see also id. at 7 (“[A] single year in a classroom with

a grossly ineffective teacher costs students $1.4 mil-

lion in lifetime earnings per classroom.”). Those

poorly performing teachers occupy positions that

would otherwise be available to highly motivated,

entry-level teachers eager to embark on a new career

and to create the optimal classroom environment for

their students.2

2 Collective bargaining agreements also establish and regu-

late district-wide Peer Assistance and Review (“PAR”) pro-

grams, which provide underachieving teachers with individual-

ized goal-setting plans, mentorship meetings with other teach-

ers, periodic reports and evaluations, and additional profes-

sional development activities. See, e.g., L.A. Agreement, art. X-

A; Agreement between Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Educ. and Sacramento City Teachers Ass’n (effective July 1,

2004), Appx. H; S.F. Agreement, art. 39. Although there is

widespread agreement that struggling teachers should receive

some measure of assistance, some PAR programs can operate,

in practice, to delay the discipline or dismissal of failing teach-

ers who are entirely unable or unwilling to meet basic satisfac-

tory performance standards, and many such programs are over-

seen and controlled by union officials or their appointees. See

Lance T. Izumi et al., Pac. Research Inst., Not as Good as You

Think: Why the Middle Class Needs School Choice 118 (2007).

12

Layoff Policies. Teachers’ unions also frequent-

ly advocate, and persuade school boards to adopt,

policies requiring district-wide reductions in force to

be implemented on the basis of teacher seniority.

See, e.g., L.A. Agreement, art. XIII, § 3.6 (“The order

of termination within a teaching or service field .. .

shall be based on seniority within status... .”);

Agreement between Bd. of Educ. San Diego Unified

School Dist. and San Diego Educ. Ass’n (effective Ju-

ly 1, 2013) (“S.D. Agreement”), art. 19.1.3.1 (“The or-

der of layoff within a service field or teaching subject

shall be in reverse order of seniority ... .”); see also

Dan Goldhaber & Roddy Theobald, Assessing the De-

terminants and Implications of Teacher Layoffs 3

(Nat Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ.

Research, Working Paper 55, 2010) (“[IJn the over-

whelming majority of [collective bargaining] agree-

ments, seniority is the determining factor in which

teachers are laid off firat with ‘last hired, first fired’

provisions.”).

These quality-blind reduction-in-force policies—

together with underlying statutory requirements

that can be supplemented during the collective bar-

Thus, in the view of many educators, while PAR programs may

have admirable goals and may achieve some measure of suc-

cess, the time and money that are dedicated to PAR programs

would be better spent enriching the lives of students in other

ways, particularly because “it takes more resources to serve

struggling veterans ... than new teachers, many of whom are

likely to succeed.” John P. Papay & Susan Moore Johnson, /s

PAR a Good Investment? Understanding the Costs and Benefits

of Teacher Peer Assistance and Review Programs 13 (2011); see

also Eric A. Hanushek, Valuing Teachers: How Much Is a Good

Teacher Worth?, 11(3) Educ. Next 41, 44 (2011) (“[T)here is no

substantial evidence that. mentoring programs systematical-

ly make a difference in whether teachers are in fact effective at

driving student achievement.”).

13

gaining process, see Cal. Educ. Code § 44955—result

in the termination of countless highly-effective, well-

liked teachers and the retention of a disproportion-

ately high percentage of below-average teachers. See

Goldhaber & Theobald, supra, at 2 (“[A] very differ-

ent group of teachers would be targeted for layoffs

under an effectiveness-based layoff scenario than

under the seniority-driven system that exists to-

day.”); see also Raj Chetty & Alex Olssen, The Im-

pacts of Last-In, First-Out vs. Effectiveness-Based

Teacher Layoff Policies 1 (2013), Vergara, No.

BC484642, Pls.’ Exhibit 9 (“[TJhe [reverse seniority

layoff] policy ends up laying off many highly effective

teachers who would greatly improve their students’

performance, while retaining ineffective teachers

who would otherwise be laid off under [an effective-

ness]-based policy.”). Indeed, seniority-driven layoff

policies are a barrier to the ability of many newer

teachers—including teachers from diverse back-

grounds with unique viewpoints—to remain in the

public-school teaching profession at all.

It is well-documented that these last-in-first-out

layoff policies impose severe and potentially irrepa-

rable harm on students. In a recent study, research-

ers implemented a hypothetical 5% reduction in the

teaching force of the Los Angeles Unified School Dis-

trict, and compared the effects of a seniority-based

reduction in force (as currently mandated by the Dis-

trict’s collective bargaining agreement) to a reduction

based on teacher effectiveness. See Chetty & Olssen,

supra, at 1. The results are alarming: a seniority-

based reduction in force decreases student test scores

by an average of 11 percentile points relative to an

effectiveness-based reduction in force, and these test-

score decreases translate into a loss in lifetime earn-

ings of $87,000 per student. Id. at 2-3.

14

Worse still, minority and low-income students

“bear the brunt” of these seniority-driven teacher

layoff policies. Vergara, No. BC484642, slip op. at 15

(internal quotation marks omitted). Minority and

low-income students are assigned to junior teachers

at a disproportionately high rate, and are therefore

forced to endure a constant “churning ... of teach-

ers” when district-wide reductions in force become

necessary. Id.; see also Carrie Hahnel et al., Educ.

Trust—W., Victims of the Churn: The Damaging

Impact of California’s Teacher Layoff Policies on

Schools, Students and Communities in Three Large

School Districts 6 (2011), available’ at

http://1k9gllyevnfp2lpq ldhrqe17.wpengine.netdna-

cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ETW-Victims-

of-the-Churn-Report.pdf (“[A] school in the top pov-

erty quartile ... is 65 percent more likely to have a

teacher laid off than a school in the bottom poverty

quartile ....”). This relentless revolving door of

teachers “greatly affects the stability of the learning

process to the detriment of such students.” Vergara,

No. BC484642, slip op. at 15; see also Goldhaber &

Theobald, supra, at 15 (“[T]here are achievement

consequences associated with the churn of teach-

ers.”).

3 In their brief in opposition, the union respondents argued

that teacher discipline, dismissal, and layoff procedures are

“dictated by statute,” and are thus “matters for which the Un-

ions do not and cannot engage in collective bargaining.” CTA

Opp’n at 22-23 & n.13. But respondent California Teachers As-

sociation took the exact opposite position in a recent filing in

the California Court of Appeal, where it claimed that “[n)othing

in [California’s) statutes dictates which teachers are hired or

promoted; whether poor-performing teachers are supported,

asked to resign, or terminated; or which teachers are assigned

to which students.” Opening Br. Intervenors-Appellants CTA &

15

Transfer and Assignment Policies. Teachers’

unions similarly promote and negotiate for teacher

transfer and assignment policies that afford prefer-

ential treatment to teachers on the basis of district

seniority. See, e.8., L.A. Agreement, art. XI, § 6.c

(“[W]hen there is an over-teachered condition, the

teacher with the least District seniority . . . will be

..”); Oakland Agreement, art. 12.4.2

(“[SJeniority . . . Shall be given preference in granting

an assignment.”); S.D. Agreement, art. 12.2.1.1 (“Po-

sitions available immediately following the May post

shall first be offered in seniority order to qualified

unit members ....”). In practice, teachers with sen-

iority tend to invoke this preferential treatment in

order to transfer to or seek assignments at schools

with higher percentages of Caucasian students

and/or more affluent students, environments that are

perceived as having less difficult working conditions

relative to other schools. See Eric A. Hanushek et

al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39(2) J. Hum.

Resources 326, 328 (2004); see also Nicole S. Simon &

Susan Moore Johnson, Teacher Turnover in High-

Poverty Schools: What We Know and Can Do 5-6

Cal. Fed’n Teachers at 48, Vergara v. California, No. B258589

(Cal. Ct. App. May 1, 2015), 2015 WL 4977003. Moreover,

while California law does impose procedural requirements that

school districts must meet before they can dismiss ineffective

teachers, see Cal. Educ. Code §§ 44934, 44938, 44944, and con-

strains the ability of school districts to conduct reductions in

force in the best interests of their students, id. § 44955, in many

of additional policies and procedures that are not found in the

California Education Code. See, eg., L.A. Agreement § 11.0;

S.F. Agreement art. 28. At most, then, the statutes on which

the union respondents rely establish a procedural floor that can

be supplemented and heightened by the discipline, dismissal,

and layoff provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

16

(Aug. 2013) (Working Paper, Project on the Next

Generation of Teachers, Harvard Graduate Sch. of

Educ.), available at http-/Asites.harvard.edu/fs/

docs/icb.topic1231814.files/Teacher®20Turnover%20i

n%20High-Poverty %20Schools.pdf.

Thus, by affording transfer rights to teachers on

the basis of seniority, collective bargaining agree-

ments result in a well-documented trend whereby

the most experienced teachers transfer from low-

income and minority schools to schools that serve

primarily Caucasian and affluent student popula-

tions. See Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Collective

Bargaining, Transfer Rights, and Disadvantaged

Schools, 36 Educ. Evaluation & Pol’y Analysis 83, 93,

97-98 (2014). This, in turn, results in the staffing of

4 disproportionately high percentage of inexperi-

enced teachers in low-income, minority schools. See

id. (concluding that seniority-based transfer provi-

sions in collective bargaining agreements result in a

60% increase in the number of inexperienced teach-

ers at disadvantaged schools in large California

school districts). Furthermore, because junior teach-

ers are most vulnerable to seniority-based reductions

in force, seniority-based teacher transfer policies feed

into and exacerbate the churn that is so devastating

to California’s most disadvantaged schools and stu-

dents.

Teacher Compensation. Finally, collective bar-

gaining sets school district policy on teacher compen-

sation and has resulted in the near-universal adop-

tion of “single salary schedules”—uniform pay

schedules that compensate teachers based almost ex-

clusively on their number of years of teaching expe-

rience and level of education. Michael Podgursky,

George W Bush Inst., Reforming Educator Compen-

17

sation 4-5 (2014); Eric A. Hanushek, The Single Sal-

ary Schedule and Other Issues of Teacher Pay, 82

Peabody J. Educ. 574, 579-82 (2007); see also, e.zg.,

Oakland Agreement, art. 24.2.4 (“All unit members

shall advance one step on the salary schedule for

each year of service in the District . . . .”); Agreement

between San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. and

San Jose Teachers Ass’n, art. 36110 (“San Jose

Agreement”) (stating that teachers’ salaries are

based on “graduate units” and “years of experience”).

Many nonmember teachers, however, profoundly

disagree with this “homogenization of public school

teachers,” which harms teachers and students alike

in several significant ways. Podgursky, supra, at 7.

“Single salary schedules” equalize teacher com-

pensation regardless of how effective ‘eachers are in

the classroom, thereby disincentivizing the very “best

people [from] enter[ing] or remain|[ing] in the profes-

sion” in service of students. Hanushek, Valuing

Teachers, supra, at 44. In contrast, compensation

systems that reward their most effective teachers

have a “selection effect,” and draw “teachers into the

workforce who are relatively more effective at meet-

ing ... performance targets” in the classroom.

Podgursky, supra, at 7. The equalized pay system

that arises out of the collective bargaining process

therefore “tends to lower overall [teacher] effective-

ness” and, as a result, student achievement. /d.

“Single salary schedules” do further harm to stu-

dent outcomes—as well as the ability of school dis-

tricts to staff their schools in a sensible way—by ig-

noring the very real differences that exist in school

environments and teaching fields. Podgursky, supra,

at 7. Because all teachers of equivalent seniority and

education level are compensated exactly the same,

18

regardless of the schools or fields in which they

teach, teachers are less likely to seek employment in

schools with difficult working conditions and in hard-

to-staff teaching fields, such as special education,

high-school mathematics, and high-school science.

Id. at 5-7; see also Joshua Barnett & Gary W. Ritter,

When Merit Pay Is Worth Pursuing, 66(2) Educ.

Leadership (2008), available at http://www.

ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/oct08/

vol66/num02/When-Merit-Pay-Is-Worth-Pursuing.

aspx (“Because the current system includes no mone-

tary rewards directly tied to effectiveness, many ef-

fective teachers seek more ‘compensation’ through

better working conditions, often choosing to leave

schools with a high population of disadvantaged stu-

dents and challenging teaching conditions for schools

serving more advantaged students.”). This, in turn,

leads to unfilled teacher rosters at high-poverty

schools, *acancies in hard-to-staff teaching fields,

and an ineffective practice of assigning teachers “out

of field” or with substandard licenses simply to fill

vacant positions. Podgursky, supra, at 5-7.

Recent educational reforms instituted in school

districts outside California provide concrete evidence

of the damage that “single salary schedules” can do

to student achievement. For example, in the 2009-10

schoolyear, the District of Columbia Public Schools

(“DCPS”) eliminated lock-step teacher salaries and

implemented a teacher evaluation and compensation

policy tied, in large part, to classroom observations of

teachers and student test scores. See Thomas Dee &

James Wyckoff, Incentives, Selection, and Teacher

Performance: Evidence from Impact 2-3 (Nat Bu-

reau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 19529,

2013). Researchers have found that, in the wake of

this reform, low-performing teachers exited the

19

DCPS in droves and highly-effective DCPS teachers

became even more effective. See id. at 23-24 (“[Flor

high-performing teachers, a stronger financial incen-

tive ... meaningfully improve[d] subsequent teacher

performance.”); id. at 26-29 (“[T]he evidence . . . indi-

cates high-powered incentives linked to multiple in-

dicators of teacher performance can substantially

improve the measured performance of the teaching

workforce.”). And, during the same timeframe, stu-

dent achievement in the DCPS soared. See Umut

Ozek, A Closer Look at the Student Achievement

Trends in the District of Columbia Between 2006-07

and 2012-13, at 30 (Nat’] Ctr. for Analysis of Longi-

tudinal Data in Educ. Research, Working Paper No.

119, 2014) (“[E]ven when accounting for changes in

student demographics, test scores in the District

have improved substantially, especially in math.”).

* * *

As these examples make clear, the policies that

are established during the collective bargaining pro-

cess have far-reaching consequences for teachers’

professional lives and the achievement of the stu-

dents for whom they are responsible. Indeed, these

collectively bargained policies shape virtually every

aspect of teachers’ and students’ day-to-day interac-

tions and classroom experiences. See, e.g., Agree-

ment between Chaffey Joint Union High Sch. Dist.

and Associated Chaffey Teachers CTA/NEA,

arts. 10.1, 10.5.6.1.1, 11.1, 11.2 (setting policies with

respect to parent-teacher meetings, class size, and

length of work day). Yet, despite the serious misgiv-

ings that many nonmember teachers have about the

negative effect of these policies on their own careers

and the success of their students, agency shop ar-

rangements compel nonmember teachers to provide

20

financial support for ‘*e unions’ positions on these

intensely personal, and profoundly important, policy

matters.

B. Agency Shop Arrangements Violate

Nonmembers’ Speech, Association,

And Petition Rights.

The “heavy burden” that agency shop arrange-

ments impose on the First Amendment rights of

nonmember public-school teachers, Harris v. Quinn,

134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014)—who are compelled to

fund bargaining in which unions advocate policies

that the teachers may view as detrimental to their

own careers and the success of their students—is in-

compatible with this Court’s First Amendment juris-

prudence.

Abood itself recognized the severity of this bur-

den, declaring that agency shop arrangements inter-

fere with the “moral” and “religious views,” “econom-

ic” and “political” beliefs, and “ideological” viewpoints

of nonmember employees. 431 U.S. at 222-23. In

more recent cases, the Court has repeatedly under-

scored this “significant impingement on [the] First

Amendment rights” of nonmember employees, reit-

erating that it is equally abhorrent to the First

Amendment for the government to “compel the en-

dorsement of ideas” as it is for the government to

“prohibit the dissemination of ideas that it disfa-

vors.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 132 S. Ct.

2277, 2288-89 (2012).

While Abood drew a distinction between union

fees used for “political” and “ideological” causes, on

the one hand, and “collective bargaining activities,”

on the other, subsequent decisions have exposed the

artificiality and unworkability of that distinction. It

21

is no longer open to dispute that a “public-sector un-

ion takes many positions during collective bargaining

that have powerful political and civic consequences.”

Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289; see also Harris, 134 S. Ct.

at 2632 (“In the public sector, core issues such as

wages, pensions, and benefits are important political

issues ....”). In fact, the President of the California

Federation of Teachers recently acknowledged that

“feJvery element of public education is political.”

Matthew Blake, Teachers Unions Sued over Dues for

Political Activities, Daily Journal (Apr. 8, 2015) (em-

phasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to each of the policies discussed above—

teacher discipline, transfers, assignments, layofis,

and compensation—the objections of nonmember

teachers to unions’ collective bargaining positions are

often based on deeply-rooted personal, political, and

ideological concerns, including the impact that such

policies will have on their professional lives, the well-

being of their students, and, ultimately, the success

of the public-education system as a whole. The free-

dom-of-speech considerations that prompted the

Abood Court to condemn compelled subsidies for un-

ions’ lobbying activities therefore apply with equal

force to agency shop arrangements that compel non-

member teachers to fund unions’ collective bargain-

ing activities.

In addition, agency shop arrangements impose

independent, and equally unacceptable, burdens on

nonmember public-school teachers’ associational

rights and their right to petition the government

about matters of public concern. As this Court has

recognized, the freedom of association is “crucial in

preventing the majority from imposing its views on

groups that would rather express other .. . ideas.”

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48

22

(2000). And the right to petition—a right that has

long been recognized as “among the most precious of

the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of

Rights,” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar

Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)—is “integral to the

democratic process” an. ensures that citizens are

free to convey their “special concerns” to the govern-

ment, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct.

2488, 2495 (2011); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472

U.S. 479, 483 (1985) (“[Tlhe values in the right of pe-

tition as an important aspect of self-government are

beyond question ....”). Just as the freedom of

speech “includes both the right to speak freely and

the right to refrain from speaking at all,” Wooley v.

Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977), the right of asso-

ciation and the right to petition carry with them con-

comitant rights to refrain from associating with or-

ganizations with which one disagrees and from sup-

porting their petitioning efforts. See Roberts v. U.S.

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of asso-

ciation ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to as-

sociate.”).

Agency shop arrangements, however, compel

nonmember public-school teachers to “associate with

those who do not share their beliefs” on an array of

matters vital to their careers, the well-being of their

students, and the success of the public-school system

as a whole. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S.

567, 586 (2000). These arrangements likewise coerce

public-school teachers who elect not to join a union to

finance the petitioning activities of unions “with

which they broadly disagree” on matters of great

“public concern” and to cede their petitioning rights

to advocates that are urging different positions from

the ones the nonmembers would take if permitted to

bargain directly with the school district. Harris, 134

23

S. Ct. at 2623, 2640; see also City of Madison Joint

Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429

U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976) (“To permit one side of a de-

batable public question to have a monopoly in ex-

pressing its views to the government is the antithesis

of constitutional guarantees.”). Because individuals

must be permitted to express their own “ideas,

hopes, and concerns to their government and their

elected representatives,” Borough of Duryea, 131 S.

Ct. at 2495, the First Amendment forbids state-

sanctioned measures—such as agency shop ar-

rangements—that compel individuals to associate

with and finance the petitioning activities of groups

that seek to attain goals inconsistent with their own

personal beliefs and professional aspirations.

Il. THE FREE-RIDER JUSTIFICATION FOR

AGENCY SHOP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE

PUBLIC-SCHOOL SETTING IS FUNDAMEN-

TALLY FLAWED.

Abood’s principal justification for upholding

agency shop arrangements—to prevent purported

free-riding by nonmembers on unions’ collective bar-

gaining efforts—is flawed in multiple respects. As

an initial matter, that rationale cannot be reconciled

with this Court’s subsequent precedent. On multiple

occasions, this Court has made clear that the free-

rider justification animating Abood is “something of

an anomaly” and that “free-rider arguments ... are

generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment

objections.” Harris, 134 S.Ct. at 2627; Knox, 132

S. Ct. at 2289, 2290.

The free-rider justification is also impossible to

square with the real-world implications of compelling

nonmember teachers to fund educational policies

with which they may vehemently disagree. In fact,

24

in many settings, the danger that nonmember pub-

lic-school teachers will “free ride” on unions during

the collective bargaining process is wholly illusory

because—contrary to the assumptions underpinning

Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22—many nonmember teach-

ers do not believe that they “obtain[ ] benefits (from]

union representation” during collective bargaining.

In fact, many nonmember teachers are manifestly

harmed by these collective bargaining activities and

are forced to subsidize views contrary to their own

professional, economic, ideological, and personal in-

terests.

For example, new, high-performing teachers

commonly find themselves at risk of losing their

teaching positions, or of being transferred to another

school against their will, due to union-backed policies

that prioritize teacher seniority above performance

in the classroom. See supra Part I.A; Terry M. Moe,

Bottom-Up Structure: Collective Bargaining, Trans-

fer Rights, and the Plight of Disadvantaged Schools

10 (Sept. 14, 2006) (Educ. Working Paper Archive)

(explaining that seniority-based transfer provisions

establish a “hierarchy among teachers” because

“(t]hose with lots of seniority have substantial choice

over where they teach, but those who are newer to

the district (and probably the profession) may have

very little choice indeed, and may find themselves

filling slots that senior teachers do not want.”); see

also Bhavini Bhakta, Op-Ed., California’s Pink-Slip

Shuffle, L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 2012, http://

articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/16/opinion/la-oe-bhakta

-teaching-20121216 (recounting that the author lost

her teaching position four times in eight years due to

her relative lack of seniority, even though she was

named a “Teacher of the Year”). Such policies impair

25

the ability of motivated, student-focused teachers to

progress, or even remain, in their chosen profession.

It should come as no surprise, then, that a signif-

icant proportion of teachers (union members and

nonmembers alike) do not support many of the poli-

cies that are established by their collective bargain-

ing agreements. In fact, a survey of California

public-school teachers released last year shows that

the majority of teachers believe that teacher morale

is negatively affected by reduction-in-force policies

that are based, either primarily or solely, on teacher

seniority. See Students Matter, Vergara v. Califor-

nia 2013 California Educators Survey Results 17-

18 (2014), available at http://studentsmatter.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/03/SM_Research-Now-Poll-Res

ults_03.05.14.pdf. These findings are also consistent

with the attitudes of the U.S. population as a whole,

which overwhelmingly rejects the seniority-based re-

duction-in-force policies advocated by many unions.

See Press Release, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Re-

search, New University of Southern California

Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences/Los

Angeles Times Poll (Apr. 10, 2015), available at

http:?//www.gqrr.com/articles/2015/4/12/new-universit

y-of-southern-california-dornsife-college-of-letters-art

s-and-scienceslos-angeles-times-poll (finding that

92% of respondents in a random survey sample of

California registered voters believed that teacher

seniority should not be the primary factor dictating

teacher layoff order).

Many teachers also oppose teacher discipline pol-

icies contained in collective bargaining agreements

that can lead to the entrenchment of habitually un-

derperforming teachers in the classrooms next door

to them. For many reasons, a significant proportion

26

of “teachers ... do not want grossly ineffective col-

leagues in the classroom.” Vergara, No. BC484642,

slip op. at 12. For example, the continued employ-

ment, and inability or unwillingness to improve, of

these substandard teachers make it difficult for high-

performing teachers to engage in collaborative les-

son-planning and co-teaching. See Elaine Al-

lensworth et al., Consortium on Chi. Sch. Research,

The Schools Teachers Leave 25, 30 (2009) (finding

that teachers are more likely to remain in schools

that have a “shared commitment among the faculty

to improve the school” and are more likely to leave

when colleagues are “uncooperative and resistant to

change”). In addition, students assigned to under-

performing teachers fall far behind their peers,

which requires high-performing teachers to expend

tremendous effort simply trying to bring these stu-

dents back up to grade level.

Moreover, highly-effective teachers routinely find

that their excellence in the classroom is not ade-

quately recognized in the compensation that they re-

ceive. That undercompensation is a product, at least

in part, of the “single salary schedules” that unions

and school districts adopt during the collective bar-

gaining process. See Daniel Weisberg et al., The

New Teacher Project, The Widget Effect 6 (2009)

(“Fifty-nine percent of teachers . . . say their district

is not doing enough to identify, compensate, promote

and retain the most effective teachers.”). Many

teachers desire professional acknowledgment and

compensation commensurate with their achieve-

ments, rather than a system that treats all teachers

as interchangeable parts. See id.; see also Lance T.

Izumi et al., Pac. Research Inst., California Educa-

tion Report Card 92 (2007), available at

https://www.heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/h

27

eartland_migration/files/pdfs/20907.pdf (“A uniform

salary structure with automatic non-performance-

based pay raises does not provide a good basis for re-

cruitment of better teachers, nor does it help in-

crease the achievement of students.”). By failing to

distinguish among teachers, “single salary sched-

ules” deny outstanding teachers the recognition and

compensation that they so justly deserve. See Bar-

nett & Ritter, supra (“[U]nder a merit-based [com-

pensation] scheme, the most effective teachers would

consistently earn large bonuses ... .”).

In short, many nonmember public-school teach-

ers do not want, need, or seek out a “free ride” that

will continue to deliver them the status quo—a sys-

tem that prioritizes the needs of more-senior teach-

ers (regardless of their performance level) at the ex-

pense of newer, higher-performing teachers and the

students for whom they are responsible. Instead,

these nonmember teachers hold the “deeply rooted”

belief that these employment-related decisions

should be based on teachers’ “individual merit or

achievement,” and that an education system founded

on merit-based principles will ultimately benefit all

students. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438

U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).

28

CONCLUSION

This Court should overrule Abood and hold that

agency shop arrangements violate public-school

teachers’ First Amendment speech, association, and

petition rights.

Respectfully submitted.

KEVIN J. RING-DOWELL THEODORE B. OLSON

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP Counsel of Record

555 Mission Street AMIR C. TAYRANI

San Francisco, CA 94105 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

(415) 393-8200 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

C. DEAN MCGRATH, JR. (202) 955-8500

MCGRATH & ASSOCIATES tolson@gibsondunn.com

1025 Thomas Jefferson St., NW

Suite 110G

Washington, DC 20007

(202) 295-2304

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 11, 2015

APPENDIX

APPENDIX OF SIGNATORIES

Gary Beckner is Executive Director of the Associa-

tion of American Educators, an alternative, non-

union professional organization of teachers that pro-

vides liability insurance and other benefits to teach-

ers who do not want to join their union.

Alan Bonsteel is a physician and long-time public

proponent of school choice, who is president and

founder of California Parents for Educational Choice

(“CPEC”). He is author of A Choice for Our Children:

Curing the Crisis in America’s Schools (1997).

Mark Bucher is President of the California Policy

Center and an attorney who has been active in public

policy since 1993, particularly with respect to Propo-

sition 174 (school choice) and Proposition 226 (union

use of dues for political purposes).

Sandra Crandall, twice elected, is a member of the

Fountain Valley School District Board of Trustees in

Orange County, California. Mrs. Crandall was an

elementary teacher for 39 years, a recipient of the

Fountain Valley School District Teacher of the Year

in 2005, and was an agency fee payer.

Lydia Grant is a California parent activist who

helped get the California “Parent Trigger” law off the

ground. She is a member of the board for Parent

Revolution, the Education Chair for the Saving Los

Angeles Project, and a Los Angeles City Commis-

sioner on the Board of Neighborhood Commissioners.

Ms. Grant also served as the Education Representa-

tive for the Sunland-Tujunga Neighborhood Council.

2a

Peter H. Hanley is Executive Director of the Amer-

ican Center for School Choice. With extensive policy

and business experience, he has three times been

elected president of the San Mateo Union High

School District Board and is currently board presi-

dent of Amethod Public Schools, a charter school

management organization. He has also served four

terms in the California School Boards Association

Delegate Assembly, and has pressed for academic re-

form and accountable professional development,

among other initiatives.

Eric Hanushek is the Paul and Jean Hanna Senior

Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford Univer-

sity. He studies educational issues from an economic

perspective, and has promoted the idea that teacher

proficiency should be measured by increased student

achievement. He is a graduate of the Air Force

Academy and has a Ph.D. from MIT.

Victoria Heggem is a teacher in Arcadia, Califor-

nia, and board member of California Teachers Em-

powerment Network (“CTEN”), a non-profit, non-

union information resource for teachers interested in

education reform. She is a “religious objector” pur-

suant to a provision in California law that allows in-

dividuals who object to unions on religious grounds

to have their compulsory union dues paid to an eligi-

ble charity.

Darren Miller is a high school math teacher in sub-

urban Sacramento and a board member of CTEN.

He previously served as a school site union repre-

sentative, but currently rejects union membership

and is an agency fee payer. He has maintained

3a

“Right on the Left Coast,” a successful blog, for over

10 years.

Pacific Research Institute (“PRI”) is a non-profit,

non-partisan 501(c\(3) organization that champions

individual freedom, opportunity, and personal re-

sponsibility through the advancement of free-market

policy solutions and private initiative. PRI believes

that free interaction among consumers, businesses,

and voluntary associations is more effective than

government action in providing good schools, quality

health care, a clean environment, and economic

growth. PRI's activities include publishing books

and studies, giving commentary to media, providing

legislative testimony, hosting public events, and con-

ducting grassroots and community outreach.

Larry Sand is President of CTEN and a well-known

education-reform activist. Mr. Sand is a retired

teacher who began his teaching career in New York

in 1971. Beginning in 1985, he taught elementary

school as well as English, math, history and ESL in

the Los Angeles Unified School District, where he

also served as a Title 1 Coordinator.

Pete Wilson served as the 36th governor of Califor-

nia (1991-1999), a United States Senator (1983-

1991), the Mayor of San Diego (1971-1983), and a

California State Assemblyman (1967-1971). As gov-

ernor, he won—against the opposition of California’s

teachers’ unions—a rigorous upgrade of public-school

curricular standards and legislation enabling the

creation of charter schools, reducing class size to 20

in K-3 grades, and implementing statewide stand-

ardized testing in grades 2-11. He is a Distinguished

4a

Visiting Fellow of the Hoover Institution and spon-

sored three (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to ena-

ble school voucher programs and Propositions 226,

75, and 32 (seeking to repeal extractions of involun-

tary political contributions from teachers’ union dues

and non-member agency fees).