Amicus Curiae Brief — Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education
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Supreme Court of the Anited States
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PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,
Petitioner,
v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1; ET AL.,
Respondents.
®
CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, Custodial Parent and
Next Friend of Joshua Ryan McDonald,
Petitioner,
Vv.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL..,
Respondents.
¢
On Writs Of Certiorari To The
United States Courts Of Appeals
For The Ninth And Sixth Circuits
S
BRIEF OF INTERESTED HUMAN RIGHTS CLINICS
AND ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
¢
CYNTHIA J. LARSEN (Counsel of Record)
CLIFFORD R. MICHEL
MARLENE A. ZARFES
E. ANNE HAWKINS
SUSAN COLLIER
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
400 Capitol Mall, Suite 3000
Sacramento, CA 95814-4497
(916) 447-9200
{Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Cover]
——_—_ i _ _ SEE
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
. Of counsel:
MARTHA F. Davis 7
Professor of Law
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
400 Huntington Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02115
(617) 373-8921
CYNTHIA SOOHOO
CAROLINE BETTINGER-LOPEZ
Supervising Attorneys
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTs CLINIC
435 W. 116th Street, Box-28
New York, NY 10027
(212) 854-4291
CATHERINE ALBISA
Executive Director
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
90 John Street, Suite 308
New York, NY 10038
(212) 253-1710
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Interested Human Rights Clinics and Organizations
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIA .........ccccccscsessensseceeeees 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............cccccesesesseeseeeseseees 4
ITT secennecdasionncsniisenediinsinibnataninnnalienananniamueniats 5
I. COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
II.
Il.
ARE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE
WEED GIGI, sscceicccsocsmessssnesnsenmionienennmnsavinneeitenn
OTHER NATIONS HAVE UPHELD RACE-
CONSCIOUS AND GENDER-CONSCIOUS
MEASURES UNDER COMPARABLE CIR-
FOU cnchosnsntmosnenensnseesimenesnseeescstvetsseeen
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES SUPPORT
CONSIDERATION OF RACE AS A FACTOR
IN SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT...........c:ccccsseeeseeerees
A. The ICCPR and CERD Make Clear that
Race-Conscious Policies Designed to Cre-
ate Diversity Are Not Discriminatory.........
B. The Managed-Choice Programs Are Con-
sistent with the Obligations of the United
States Under the ICCPR and CERD...........
C. Self-Execution Is Not an Issue Where, as
Here, the Treaty Provisions Are Cited as
Aids to Interpretation...............::ccceseeseeeesens
ea cccnirstanssntnentiniesmntniaicuinnaarneedesenenicinenintinn
11
19
20
23
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERAL CASES
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ........ cc ceeesesseeees 7,8
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294
uae ee er iidpnccssnsniivterhnitingtenertinsinnsinigediauniatanetiemndiiiniadieenineidepewin 10
Grutter v. Bollinger, 589 U.S. 306 (2003) .......c.essse000 7, 22
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999).........ccccesceseseeeeees 9
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) .......:.csssssseeseseee 7,8
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US. (2
ne tl usitinsisinicntnicatneuicidinnitinnsnseninapisinesiniidinuasite 6
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ...........ccccceeeeecenee 7
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377
seal iccrscncuatianicuniassdiasenttaaoanniidianiganinsddinaiatimpeniitinaiquiits 9
Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002)...........:ccccceeeeeeeeseees 8
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)..............008 8,9
Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
SEPP thdcsdiletbanentinisincigiiniabenerinandinbbdipeinignididiitbingabinessibiuitabidannils 12
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) .............04. 6, 7, 8, 18
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801)...................4. 6
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)........:ccccccceeeerees 6
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) .........:cceseee 9
Trop uv. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) .........cccssccesseessseereseesees 7
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995).............. 7
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)..........:000008 7
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~ Continued
Page
INTERNATIONAL CASES
Balaji v. State of Mysore, A.LR. (S.C.) 649 (1963)..........0. 17
Canada (Attorney General) v. Moore, 55 C.R.R. (2d)
B54; 1968 C.BR. LIBRIS FBZ ...cecccccessescesseccsccsecosovssvecssees 11
Canadian Nat Ry. Co. v. Canada, {1987} 1 S.C.R.
1114, 1987 S.C.R. LEXIS 1136 (Can.)........ eee 14, 15
Case C-158/97 Badeck & Others, 2000 E.C.R. I-
1875, [2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 6, 2000 All ER (EC) 289
Fils Gai e ccecinscensnsccerseevsenssnsseoemnsenagennsonsensnies 11, 12, 13
Case C-409/95 Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. I-6363, 1997 All ER (EC)
I 11,12
Case C-476/99 Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw
Natuurbeheer en Visserij, {2002} IRLR 430
TIRES at toto oe 219 AO 13
Case E-1/02 EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The
Kingdom of Norway, |2003] IRLR 318 (E.F.T.A.
i dsiaistitanshelsaniashiguianinpindinineeasieiinbinnnimaelaentiatiemnesiete 13
Devadasan v. Union of India, A.I.R. (S.C.) 179
IIE harsniehciiehiciinsstcnadnedabelcindainiebabiteniintdeatiiiediniannniiosiinciubedirianias 17
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.1.R. (S.C.) 477
anal kacistiinititaiidnneianncsnentetsileiunaintinanaitaiiieieitienudinbeiannianeienie 17
Gerhardy v. Brown (1985) 159 C.L.R. 70 (Austl.) ............ 17
Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2000 Can.
a Tees Se a MI Deicccoctssccccnsnennsintenstntosienssenaniens 14
Motala & Another v. Univ. of Natal, 1995 (3) BCLR
374 (Durban Sup. Ct.), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256
Es SEREEV SERRE one CODE TE FMC Te oT nL mt Sen Oe 15
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~ Continued
Re Parsons: Application for Judicial Review, [2003]
NICA 20; [2004] NI 38 (N.Ir.)......ccccccccceceececseseeeceseeee
State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, A.1.R.
CAG.) TP CRIB) ceevccnvsccecsnecseossconvennsncescnesanienneideniantiin
Summayyah Mohammed v. Moraine & Another
(1996), 3 L.R.C. 475 (Trinidad & Tobago)................
Te Runanga O Muriwhenua Inc. v. Attorney-
General [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 641, 1990° N.Z.L.R.
Seca OOD CO.A.) GZ.) cccoreceveosecenssesnscotessnemnansenetes
CONSTITUTIONS
Canada Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) Schedule B,
Pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
GUE), G TBGED .0ccceccccesereceeoselenvenssessonasunnmensunetbensnnnns
Indian Const. arts.
South Africa Const. pmbl.; ch. 2, § 9(2) ....... eee eeceeeeeee
iF fo 0 U8 § ee
STATUTES
Canadian Human Rights Act of 1985 (R.S.C. 1985,
Or» FE, ©. WD ovrccnresesccsesoccscnsniscipscioseneenniseaanammamanas
Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998) sections
GER Man) amd BOB) ...cccccoccccrecnessovesssocconsostnnageniennnsvesetans
Page
pevee 18
seeewe 11
. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Employment Insurance Act of 1996, Part I] Em-
ployment Benefits and National Employment
Service (S.C. 1996, ¢. 23, 8. GO) ..........ccccceceseseeceeeeeseeeeees 14
Human Rights Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 82 §§ 58,
ni cetaaaielaaastaedanennapeseatnente 17
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 19, 1990
TTR enE eee nee E TE 17
Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, ¢.32, § 46(1)............. 17
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act, 2000 (4 of 2000), Section 25.......... 15
Racial Discrimination Act 1975, § 8(1) (Austl.) 0.0.0.0... 17
Schools Act 84 of 1996 (No. 27 of 1996), Section
cies cca ncteicemmenmenneneneesensentenens 15
OTHER AUTHORITIES” -
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation: Addendum by Israel, at J 485, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/471/Add. 2 (2005).........:cccccccsessssrereccessssererereees 18
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, Gen. Rec. No. 19, Racial
segregation and apartheid, paras, 2-4, U.N.
CERD Comm., 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50/18
STE TTT cinta taintiebinabdncnneieagensonsetonasecneseensoowencees 20
Martha F. Davis, Jnternational Human Rights and
United States Law: Predictions of a Court-
watcher, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 417 (2000)...............ccccceeeeeeeeees 10
Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s:
New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U.
TR 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Preemptive and Interpretive
Force of International Human Rights Law in State
Courts, 90 Am. Soc’y Int'l L. Proc. 259 (1996)............-+..
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme
Court of the United States, “A Decent Respect to
the Opinions of [HumanJkind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adju-
dication, Keynote Address to the American Soci-
ety of International Law (Apr. 1, 2005) .................ccceee
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt,
Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial Lecture - Affirma-
tive Action: An International Human Rights Dia-
logue, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253 (1999) ..........:cccccccceeeeeeees
Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 784-86 (1999)...........
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by the States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant, 87th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
i iiiceciteiachiaisinaaileehtinaaiaanciadaiidmialatinldiiciaidiaill
ICCPR, General Comment Adopted Under Article
40 on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the
Optional Protocols, or in Relation to Declarations
Under Article 41 of the Covenant (Adopted, No-
vember 2, 1994), 34 I.L.M. 839 (1995) (General
SI Bi encncesscoscssnictnbnnimentapinusnicnmmnnaaidnenainnataien
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted and opened for signature December 16,
1966
et ff A. See eeeremeeene 19
et, SE, Ba Ces CO cecccetensenectcvernenncnesmsctnatiiciannas
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Page
Bh, Se Be I Se cccrecencctnnenmnetccntitmnnennneatiinis 20
RE SF 21
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and
opened for signature December 21, 1965
OR, Be ee i irctiennentntcntnncvenmntneensnnineasl 20, 22
ast. 3-5, 660 U.NN.TG. BIG-BB .....cccccccccocesocsscccccsesesccsseeee 20
EG eS i iireeitetrsncentepntinsseunenemnssenncentinnnins 24
a a ee i ictrtitnsnscccmnncsnenemnscnnnineen 20
Rt ee 20
Herbert M. Jauch, Affirmative Action in Namibia
te htrincsisicbiansideensanineinbicninniinssiinnensainidanaaditisnndntitis 18
Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue:
Globalization and the International Impact of the
Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L.J. 15 (1998) ........0. eee 10
Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons:
Why American Lawyers Must Learn About For-
eign Law, 45 Fed. Lawyer 20 (1998).............ccccccceseeseeeeees 7
Sandra Day O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations,
reprinted in International Law Decisions in Na-
tional Courts 13 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory
I i, SI sincicencerncatiniaeeannethcehlandigebabei cantante 6
Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International
Law, 88 Am. J. Int’] L. 721, 722 (1994)................eeeees ace
Jordan J. Paust, International Law as Law of the
United States 62-64, 68, 97-98, 134-35, 370, 377-
es CU TUE oerritinstinaiinssiieidincciicpieenigibeniiiieatimceigntaitainddsisigte 26
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Compara-
tive Remarks (1989), reprinted in Germany and
its Basic Law: Past, Present and Future - A Ger-
man-American Symposium 411 (Paul Kirchhof &
Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) ..........ccccccececeeeeeeeeees
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 115(b) Reporter’s Note (1987).........ccccscsessseesseeess
U.S. Reservations, Understandings, Declarations,
and Proviso, ICCPR, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01
(daily ed. April 2, 1992), I1(5)...........ccssssessesseerseeeees
U.S. Reservations, Understanding, Declarations,
and Proviso, CERD, 140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02
(daily ed. Jume 24, 1994), I] 0... ceseeeseseeesseeeeeeeenes
United Nations, Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Hu-
man Rights Treaty Bodies, General Comment 18,
mame. 1S ab BB CIGD) .cccccccccnccecssvececescesisccssssenenesssnsens
Page
1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE'
Amicus Curiae Columbia Law School Human Rights
Clinic (Columbia Clinic), to bridge theory and practice,
provides students with hands-on experience working on
active human rights cases and projects. Working in part-
nership with experienced attorneys and institutions
engaged in human rights activism, both in the United
States and abroad, students contribute to effecting posi-
tive change locally and globally. In recent years, the
Columbia Clinic has worked on several matters concerning
human rights issues in the United States.
Amicus Curiae the Allard K. Lowenstein International
Human Rights Clinic (Yale Clinic) is a Yale Law School
program that gives students first-hand experience in
human rights advocacy. The Yale Clinic undertakes litiga-
tion and research projects on behalf of human rights
organizations and individual victims of human rights
abuses. The clinic’s work is based on the human rights
standards contained in international customary and
conventional law, at the core of which is the prohibition
against discrimination. Since the clinic began more than
ten years ago, its students have worked on a number of
lawsuits and other projects designed to combat racial,
gender, ethnic and other kinds of discrimination. In recent
years, the Yale Clinic has focused increasing attention on
efforts to ensure respect for international human rights
standards in the United States.
' The parties’ letters consenting to the filing of amici curiae briefs
have been filed with the Clerk of the Court. No counsel for any party
has authored this brief in whole or part. No person or entity, other than
amici, their members, or their counsel, have made a monetary contribu-
tion to the preparation or submission of the bref.
2
Amicus Curiae the International Human Rights Clinic
at George Washington Law School (GW Clinic) is dedi-
cated primarily to litigating human rights cases before
United States and international tribunals. The GW Clinic
seeks first to promote the progressive integration of
international human rights standards into United States
legal practice, and second, to assist victims of injustice in
utilizing domestic and international legal regimes to
protect their human rights or vindicate violations of those
rights. Accordingly, its docket consists largely of cases
either in United States courts under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA) and other federal statutes, or before interna-
tiona: tribunals, such as those in the Inter-American
Human Rights System.
Amicus Curiae the International Human Rights Law
Clinic at the University of Virginia School of Law (U.Va.
Clinic) gives students first-hand experience in human
rights advocacy under the supervision of international
human rights lawyers. Projects are designed to help
students build the knowledge and skills necessary to be
effective human rights lawyers and to integrate the theory
and practice of human rights. The U.Va. Clinic collabo-
rates with non-governmental organizations and individual
advocates on a wide range of human rights issues through
various means, including litigation. The U.Va. Clinic’s
work regularly involves comparative legal analyses and
international law analyses of alleged human rights viola-
tions or domestic legislation.
Amicus Curiae Global Rights —- Partners for Justice
(“Global Rights”) is a non-profit organization of human
rights and legal professionals engaged in human rights
advocacy, litigation, and training around the world.
Founded in the District of Columbia in 1978, Global
3
Rights (formerly the International Human Rights Law
Group) works to empower advocates to expand the scope of
human rights protection for men and women and to
promote broad participation in creating more effective
human rights standards and procedures at the national,
regional, and international level. Global Rights has repre-
sented individuals and organizations before United States
and international tribunals and has appeared as amicus
curiae in a number of United States cases. Beginning in
the 1990s, a central focus of Global Rights’ work has been
to promote the use of international human rights law and
standards in efforts to promote women’s rights and to
combat racial discrimination. Global Rights joins this brief
to emphasize the obligation of the United States to provide
remedies for racial and gender discrimination consistent
with its obligations under international treaty law, par-
ticularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as
international customary law.
Amicus Curiae the National Economic and Social
Rights Initiative (NESRI) promotes a human rights vision
for the United States that ensures dignity and access to
the basic resources needed for human development and
civic participation. The Human Right to Education Pro-
gram at NESRI works with education advocates and
organizers to promote policy change in public education
using human rights standards and strategies. NESRI
believes that human rights offer a framework for how to
transform our public schools based on internationally
recognized standards of equality, accountability, dignity, -
and community participation. The program initiatives
work in collaboration with community partners to
4
generate human rights documentation, analysis, advocacy,
public education materials and workshops.
Amicus Curiae the US Human Rights Network was
formed to promote United States accountability to univer-
sal human rights standards by building linkages between
organizations, as well as individuals, working on human
rights issues in the United States. The Network strives
towards building a human rights culture in the United
States that puts those directly affected by human rights
violations, with a special emphasis on grassroots organiza-
tions and social movements, in a central leadership role.
The Network also works towards connecting the United
States human rights movement with the broader United
States social justice movement and human rights move-
ments around the world. The Network joins this brief to
emphasize the United States’ obligation to remedy dis-
crimination and promote equality and in recognition of the
important role that integrated schools play in realizing the
right to education.
¢
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Comparative and international law are relevant to the
Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of the
managed-choice plans adopted by Jefferson County Board
of Education and Seattle School District No. 1, and sup-
port upholding both plans. The legal tradition of the
United States has long embraced looking to foreign and
international precedent for guidance on domestic legal
questions. The Court's intellectual leadership in the field
of international human rights is strengthened by consid-
eration of the human rights jurisprudence of foreign
jurisdictions and the law of nations.
5
The courts of other nations as diverse as Canada,
South Africa, and India and international entities such as
the European Union have all confronted challenges to
race-conscious and gender-conscious policies. These bodies
repeatedly have upheld the use of such policies to benefit
underrepresented minorities, and in many cases have
permitted affirmative action programs that go far beyond
the managed-choice programs at issue here. As members
of this Court have previously recognized, opinions such as
these by colleagues in foreign jurisdictions can assist this
Court in reaching sound conclusions under domestic law.
International treaties to which the United States is a
party are also sources of guidance in consideration of the
validity of the Jefferson County and Seattle plans. These
international] treaties not only permit but endorse the type
of race-conscious programs voluntarily adopted by the
Jefferson County and Seattle school districts.
¢
ARGUMENT
I. COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
ARE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE
THE COURT
Respondents argue that the managed-choice plans
adopted by Jefferson County and Seattle constitutionally
use race as one of several factors in assigning students to
public schools. The record amply supports these argu-
ments.
In considering the constitutionality of the Jefferson
County and Seattle plans, amici curiae urge this Court to
look to foreign and international law to inform its decision
6
regarding the Jefferson County and Seattle managed-
choice plans.
The Court has long recognized that the laws of the
United States should be construed to be consistent with
international law whenever possible. See, e.g., Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(“an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801)
(“the laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoid-
able, so to be construed as to infract the common princi-
ples and usages of nations”); see generally Sandra Day
O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, reprinted in Inter-
national Law Decisions in National Courts 13, 15-16
(Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
In addition, the Court has recognized that customary
international law is a part of American law and should be
looked to for guidance in determining issues that fall
within its scope. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900). This recognition of the importance of international
law in guiding American jurisprudence is especially true
in the area of human rights. The fundamental rights that
are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
have found iterations in the laws of other nations as well
as in international treaties and covenants. In Roper v.
Simmons, Justice Kennedy observed that “[iJt does not
lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom.” 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005). The Court has expressly looked to the laws and
_ opinions of other nations in determining issues pertaining
to the rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. at 575-78; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21
(2002); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16
(1997); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958), as well
as issues pertaining to the fundamental rights of freedom
and privacy, see, eg., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
There are practical as well as historic reasons to look
to international law for guidance in resolving domestic
legal issues. Experience has a longstanding role in the
development and evolution of legal jurisprudence — as
Justice Holmes wrote, “the life of the law has not been
logic, it has been experience,” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Common Law 1 (1881). Looking to the experience of
other legal systems for ideas and guidance is particularly
practical when those other systems “have struggled with
the same basic constitutional questions as we have: equal
protection, due process, the rule of law in constituticnal
democracies.” Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our
Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About
Foreign Law, 45 Fed. Lawyer 20 (1998); see also New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 672-74 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (supporting the application of other nations’
relevant experiences to determine scope of Fifth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule); United States v. Then, 56 F.3d
464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(noting that other countries draw from American constitu-
tional theory and practice and that, as a result, the ways
in which those countries have dealt with problems analo-
gous to issues arising in American jurisprudence can be
8
very useful in analyzing and interpreting difficult Ameri-
can constitutional issues).
International and foreign law rulings on constitu-
tional issues such as those facing the Court can also
illustrate the ramifications of different solutions to similar
legal problems, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting), shedding light on potential
consequences of a given constitut nal interpretation or
ruling.
Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly exhorted the value of
legal decision-making processes that take into account the
decisions and opinions of international law and foreign
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, “A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]Jkind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,
Keynote Address to the American Society of International
Law (Apr. 1, 2005). Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Stevens
have also demonstrated a belief that both comparative and
international law materials are valuable aids to constitu-
tional interpretation. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575
(Kennedy, J.) (noting that the Court’s determination that
the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for
juvenile offenders “finds confirmation” in the fact that the
United States was the only country in the world that
officially sanctioned the practice), Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
576 (Kennedy, J.) (noting that the European Court of
Human Rights and other nations “have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual con-
duct.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (Stevens, J.); Patterson
v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (citing an apparent international
9
consensus against the execution of a capital sentence
imposed upon a juvenile to urge the Court to revisit the
issue of the constitutionality of the sentence); Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that other nations’ ap-
proaches to campaign finance are consistent with Supreme
Court majority’s approach); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990, 995-96 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (considering the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee, and the case law of other countries in determining if a
lengthy delay in administering the lawful death penalty
may be unusually and impermissibly cruel); Printz uv.
United States, 521 U.S. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing experiences of federal systems in Switzerland,
Germany, and the European Union as aids to deciding
question of United States federalism); Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (Stevens, J.) (looking to
opinions of “other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage” and “leading members of the Western European
community” as aids to deciding questions arising under
the Eighth Amendment). See also William Rehnquist,
Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks (1989),
reprinted in Germany and its Basic Law: Past, Present and
Future — A German-American Symposium 411, 412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (noting “it is
time that the United States courts begin looking to the
decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own.
deliberative process”).
Furthermore, recognizing the validity of interpreta-
tions from foreign and international courts ensures the
Court’s continued presence and leadership in the interna-
tional arena of human rights issues. See Martha F. Davis,
10
International Human Rights and United States Law:
Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 417, 421-28
(2000) (arguing that in the twenty-first century, judicial
legitimacy requires that courts acknowledge international
context of decisions). Decisions rendered by this Court
have long served as a model for countries around the
world; high courts in other countries have historically
looked to the jurisprudence of this Court for guidance, and
the United States government has been an international
leader in proclaiming the importance of international law
and the promotion of human rights. See Claire LHeureux-
Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L.J.
15, 16-17 (1998). Increased engagement with the constitu-
tional courts of other countries can help to ensure a
leading position in international human rights for Ameri-
can courts and for the United States more generally.
The practical and historic rationales for taking inter-
national and comparative perspectives into consideration
in resolving domestic legal issues are directly relevant to
determining the constitutionality of the Jefferson County
and Seattle plans. The United States is not alone among
nations in imstituting programs promoting diversity and
remedying lingering effects of discrimination against
certain social groups, nor has the United States been alone
in requiring that such programs be reconciled with guar-
antees of equality under existing law. Indeed, the legal
systems in other countries have been profoundly influ-
enced by the legacy of this Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See
L’Heureux-Dubé, 34 Tulsa L.J. at 20 (noting that Brown
has “had a large impact on the spirit and development of
human rights protections worldwide”). Brown has been
11
widely cited by courts all over the world. See, e.g., Canada
(Attorney General) v. Moore, 55 C.R.R. (2d) 254; 1988
C.R.R. LEXIS 287; Summayyah Mohammed v. Moraine &
Another (1996), 3 L.R.C. 475 (Trinidad & Tobago); Te
Runanga O Muriwhenua Inc. v. Attorney-General [1990] 2
N.Z.L.R. 641, 1990 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 845 (C.A.) (New
Zealand). Taking into account other nations’ interpreta-
tions of human rights issues will only enhance the Court’s
reasoning, prestige and influence in the areas of interna-
tional human rights law and constitutional law.
II. OTHER NATIONS HAVE UPHELD RACE-
CONSCIOUS AND GENDER-CONSCIOUS MEAS-
URES UNDER COMPARABLE CIRCUMSTANCES
Numerous countries have upheld the use of “special
measures” — both race-conscious and gender-conscious
factors — in programs to benefit underrepresented popula-
tions. In many countries, permissible programs to promote
integration and remedy past discrimination are much
more aggressive than the narrowly-tailored managed-
choice programs at issue here, and even jurisdictions that
have set limits on affirmative action have upheld race-
conscious or gender-conscious measures.
Most notably, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities has endorsed programs that use gender as a
factor in employment decisions in order to remedy gender
discrimination in employment. In two recent cases, the
Court of Justice upheld national measures giving priority
to women for promotion to public service positions in
which women were underrepresented. See Case C-158/97,
Badeck & Others, 2000 E.C.R. I-1875, [2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 6,
2000 All ER (EC) 289 (E.C.J. 2000) (available on Westlaw);
Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
12
1997 E.C.R. 1-6363, 1997 All ER (EC) 865 (E.C.J. 1997)
(available on Westlaw).
Significantly, in the Hessen, Germany plan under
review in Badeck and the German national rule considered
in Marschall, gender was used as a “plus” factor for
promotion. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 318 (1978); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg &
Deborah Jones Merritt, Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial
Lecture - Affirmative Action: An International Human
Rights Dialogue, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 279 (1999)
(acknowledging that race and gender may be plus factors
in employment, promotion, or educational admissions).
The plans under review in Badeck and Marschall did not
give automatic or unconditional priority to women over
men. Similarly, the Jefferson County and the Seattle
school integration plans under review in the case at bar do
not give automatic or unconditional priority in school
assignment to students of any race. Rather, in the Jeffer-
son County program, students are initially assigned to
schools in their “resides” area, the boundaries of which are
drawn taking race into account, but that assignment may
be superseded by student choice and other factors. In the
Seattle program, race is but one of several factors that
may be utilized, after consideration of the student’s pref-
erence among schools to attend. Thus, student choice is
the primary selection criteria under both plans.
Although in Badeck and Marschall the European
Court of Justice did not explicitly adopt the concept of
“narrow tailoring” from United States jurisprudence, it
engaged in analysis similar to that invoked by American
courts reviewing government action with regard to race-
conscious programs. Thus, in Badeck, for example, the
European Court investigated whether the priority given to
13
females in appointments and promotions pursued a
legitimate social objective and used means that were
proportionate “in relation to the real needs of the disad-
vantaged group.” Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. at 1889. Applying
this standard, the court concluded that the program
passed muster under Community law. Jd. at 1919.
Since Badeck, the European Court of Justice and the
European Free Trade Association (“E.F.T.A.”) Court have
upheld affirmative measures to promote employment of
underrepresented groups. In Case E-1/02, EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority v. The Kingdom of Norway, {2003} IRLR
318 (E.F.T.A. 2003), the E.F.T.A. Court affirmed that states
may adopt measures providing specific advantages for
women in employment sectors in which they were previ-
ously underrepresented, so long as such measures take
into account the principle of proportionality, “which
requires that derogations remain within the limits of what
is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in
view and that the principle of equal treatment be recon-
ciled as far as possible with the requirements of the aim
pursued.” Jd. at paras. 43, 56. Similarly, in Case C-476/99
Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw Natuurbeheer en
Visserij, |2002) IRLR 430 (E.C.J. 2002), the European
Court of Justice found that the Dutch Ministry’s program
reserving a limited number of subsidized places for female
officials was proportional and compatible with the Euro-
pean Community Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 since
it did “not totally exclude male officials from its scope” and
promoted the employment of a previously underrepre-
sented group.
Other countries also permit race-conscious and
gender-conscious programs to correct systemic under-
representation of minority populations.
14
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
permits governmental programs to redress past discrimi-
nation, and its equal protection provision specifies that the
Charter “does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that
are disadvantaged because of race.” Can. Const. (Constitu-
tion Act, 1982) Schedule B, Pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 15(2); see generally Lovelace v.
Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2000 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS
33, at *87-*100 (Can.) (discussing relationship between
§ 15(2) and Charter’s equal protection provision).
In addition, the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1985
(R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 16) and Employment Insurance Act
of 1996, Part II Employment Benefits and National Em-
ployment Service (S.C. 1996, c. 23, s. 60) both exclude from
the definition of prohibited discrimination special pro-
grams “designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely
to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages
that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those
disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohib-
ited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities
respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or
employment in relation to that group.”
In interpreting the Canadian Human Rights Act, the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld an affirmative action
measure imposed on the Canadian National Railway to
combat systemic discrimination in the hiring and promo-
tion of women. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co. v. Canada, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1114, 1143-45, 1987 S.C.R. LEXIS 1136, at *48-*52
(Can.). The special, temporary measure — far more inter-
ventionist than the voluntary school integration programs
at issue here — required hiring at least one woman for
15
every four positions traditionally filled by men until
women had achieved greater representation. Jd. at 1125-
27, 1141, 1987 S.C.R. LEXIS at *17-"21, *44-*45.
Similarly, the South African Constitution adopted in
1996 specifically acknowledges the injustices of the past
and promotes affirmative action policies to assist groups
that have been disadvantaged under prior laws. S. Afr.
Const. pmbl.; ch. 2, § 9(2). Indeed, the lack of quality
education available to African students in South Africa led
the dean of a medical school to create an affirmative action
program targeted to benefit African students. Motala &
Another v. Univ. of Natal, 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (Durban
Sup. Ct.), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256 at *16-*17 (S. Afr.). An
Indian woman who was denied admission challenged the
school’s program. Jd. at *13-*14. In rejecting her claim, the
court observed that, although Indians also suffered dis-
crimination under apartheid, the experience for Africans
was significantly worse, and compensating for this long-
standing mistreatment of African applicants to the medi-
cal school did not represent unfair discrimination against
Indian students under the constitution. Jd. at *28.
South African legislation also reflects a commitment
to the adoption of polices to redress past educational
discrimination and promote equality. In South Africa, the
Schools Act 84 of 1996 (No. 27 of 1996), Section 34(1),
requires ejuitable funding of public schools in order to
ensure the “proper exercise” of the right to education and
to redress past inequalities; the Promotion of Equality and
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (4 of 2000),
Section 25, requires the state to take measures and
implement programs to promote equality and where
necessary or appropriate develop action plans to address
unfair discrimination; and the Employment Equity Act
16
(No. 55 of 1998), Sections 6(2)(a) and 15(3), states that it is
not unfair discrimination to “take affirmative action
measures consistent with the purposes of this Act” if such
measures “include preferential treatment and numerical
goals, but exclude quotas.”
In India, the Indian Constitution of 1950 and its
subsequent amendments set forth a comprehensive equal-
ity doctrine that has laid the foundation for extensive
affirmative action measures through a system of quotas
(referred to as “reservations”) in the areas of higher
education and participation in government employment to
remedy past injustices against members of the lower levels
of India’s caste system as well as other historically-
disadvantaged groups. The Constitution reserves seats for
members of India’s most disadvantaged social castes and
tribes (known in Ugal parlance as “scheduled castes” and
“scheduled tribes”) in the House of the People, state
legislative assemblies, and local governmental units
(Indian Const. Arts. 243D, 243T, 330, 332) and permits the
government to “reserve” civic “appointments or posts” for
members of “any backward class of citizens which, in the
opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
services under the State” (Indian Const. Art. 16(4)) and
make “promotion(s], with consequential seniority,” of
members of historically underrepresented castes and
tribes to governmental positions. (Indian Const. Art.
16(4A)).
In response to a legal challenge to affirmative action
over a half century ago in State of Madras v. Champakam
Dorairajan, A.1.R. (S.C.) 226 (1951), India amended
its Constitution in 1951 to affirm its commitment to
affirmative action. “Nothing in [the constitution’s anti-
discrimination provisions] shall prevent the State from
17
making any special provision for the advancement of any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the [lowest castes and tribes].” (Indian Const. Art.
15(4); see also Indian Const. Art. 29).
Since 1963, the Indian Supreme Court has consis-
tently upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs in the higher education and governmental
employment contexts, including the endorsement of a
quota system that allows up to fifty percent of positions to
be reserved for members of historically disadvantaged
groups, going far beyond the ameliorative measures
voluntarily adopted by Jefferson County and Seattle. (See
Balaji v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. (S.C.) 649 (1963); see also
Devadasan v. Union of India, A.I.R. (S.C.) 179 (1964)
(affirming Balaji fifty percent ceiling in context of carrying
forward unfilled reserved positions in government em-
ployment); Jndra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.LR. (S.C.)
477 (1993)).
In addition to the countries discussed above, many
other nations also take into account the need to redress
the effects of past discriminatory laws and practices. In
New Zealand and Australia, for example, affirmative
action programs are permitted by statute. See New Zea-
land Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 19, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109;
Human Rights Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 82 §§ 58, 73(1)
(New Zealand); Racial Discrimination Act 1975, § 8(1)
(Austl.); see also Gerhardy v. Brown (1985) 159 C.L.R. 70
(Austl.). In Northern Ireland, past religious discrimination
is addressed through legislation that requires taking
religion into account in order to promote a more integrated
police force. Specifically, the Police (Northern Ireland)
Act 2000, ¢.32, § 46/1) requires that in recruitment or
appointment of trainees, appointments shall be made from
18
a pool of qualified applicants of whom “one half shall be
persons who are treated as Roman Catholic.” Re Parsons:
Application for Judicial Review, [2003] NICA 20; [2004] NI
38 (N. Ir.) (affirmative action in police recruitment did not
violate applicant’s right to freedom of religion). See also
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
Addendum by Israel, at 99485, 486 U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/47V/Add. 2 (2005) (describing recent Israeli
educational programs to redress past marginalization of
Arabs and to “lower[] the walls that separate [Arab and
Jewish] societies,” so that Arabs can “achieve success in
higher educational institutions and reach full integration
in the public daily life and economy of the country”);
Herbert M. Jauch, Affirmative Action in Namibia 53-148
(1998) (detailing history of affirmative action in Namibia).
This Court has recently reaffirmed the relevance of
international legal norms to its proceedings: “The opinion
of the world, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)
(Kennedy, J.). Accordingly, the legal analyses applied by
other countries to uphold successful affirmative action and
other race- and gender-conscious policies for groups, like
racial minorities in the United States, that have suffered
past discrimination should inform this Court as it ad-
dresses similar issues, including the voluntary efforts
made by public school districts in the United States to
promote the racial integration of their schools for articu-
lated benefits to all students and their communities.
19
Ill. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES SUPPORT CON-
SIDERATION OF RACE AS A FACTOR IN
SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT
Widely ratified international human rights treaties
also represent the cumulative wisdom and experience of
nations across the globe. Two treaties are of particular
relevance here — the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights’ (hereinafter “ICCPR,” which has been
ratified by 157 nations) and the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’
(hereinafter “CERD,” which has been fratified by 170
nations). Together these treaties, both of which have been
ratified by the United States, and are the supreme law of
the land, represent the international consensus on what
constitutes racial discrimination. As such, they provide
guidance as courts examine local authorities’ remedial
efforts to provide equal access to our nation’s education
system."
* Adopted and opened for signature December 16, 1966, 999
U.N.TS. 171.
* Adopted and opened for signature December 21, 1965, 660
U.N.TS. 195.
* As stated in the Supremacy Clause, “all Treaties made... under
the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.” U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law § 115(b) Reporter’s Note (1987) (“That a rule of interna-
tional law or a provision of an international] agreement is superseded as
domestic law-does not relieve the United States of its international
obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.”).
20
A. The ICCPR and CERD Make Clear that
Race-Conscious Policies Designed to Create
Diversity Are Not Discriminatory
Both the ICCPR and CERD require parties to the
covenants to abstain from engaging in “racial discrimina-
tion.” The ICCPR guarantees rights without distinction
based on race, ICCPR art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 173, and
CERD prohibits conduct that would have the “purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life,” CERD, art. 1, 660
U.N.T.S. at 216. See ICCPR, art. 26, 999 U.N.T:S. at 179.
The CERD also states that parties to the treaty, “condemn
racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to pre-
vent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in
territories under their jurisdiction,” CERD art. 3, 660
U.N.T.S. at 218, and “undertake . . . to guarantee the right
of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law ... in
the enjoyment of... [the] right to education and training”
CERD art. 5(e)(5), 660 U.N.T:S. at 222. See Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Gen. Rec. No. 19, Racial segregation and apartheid, paras.
2-4, U.N. CERD Comm., 47th Sess., UN. Doc. A/50/18
(Aug. 8, 1995). Finally, the CERD’s general provisions
prohibit all forms of racial discrimination, see CERD, arts.
2-5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216-22. Thus, the treaties provide
comprehensive protection against discrimination.
Yet, the Human Rights Committee, which is the
formal monitoring body for the ICGPR,° has noted that
* As a means for regulating compliance with the treaty, the terms
of the ICCPR set up a Human Rights Committee (the “Committee”).
(Continued on following page)
21
“not every differentiation of treatment will constitute
discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a
purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant.”
[emphasis added] United Nations, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General Comment 18, para.
13, at 28 (1994) (hereinafter “General Comment 18”).
According to the Human Rights Committee:
[T]he principle of equality sometimes requires
States parties to take affirmative action in order
to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause
or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited
by the Covenant. ... Such action may involve
granting for a time ... certain preferential
treatment in specific matters... .
General Comment 18, para. 10.
Similarly, the CERD specifically states that:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of
securing adequate advancement of certain racial
or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such
protection as may be necessary in order to ensure
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental free-
doms shall not be deemed racial discrimination,
provided, however, that such measures do not, as
a consequence, lead to the maintenance of sepa-
rate rights for different racial groups and that
Parties to the ICCPR submit reports to the Committee on the measures
adopted pursuant to the treaty. ICCPR, art. 40, 999 U_N.TS. at 181-82.
Following a review of the reports, the Committee issues concluding
observations that often include recommendations for addressing
concerns raised by the Committee.
22
they shall not be continued after the objectives
for which they were taken have been achieved.
CERD, art. 1(4), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216; see also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the CERD endorses “special and con-
crete measures” to ensure the rights outlined in the
CERD, until such objectives have been achieved).
When the Senate ratified the CERD, it recognized
that race may be taken into account when necessary to
secure equality. In his formal statement to Chairman
Claiborne Pell of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
concerning ratification of the treaty, Conrad Harper, the
Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, noted: “Article 1(4)
explicitly exempts ‘special measures’ taken for the sole
purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such
protection.” Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 721, 722 (1994).
The managed-choice programs at issue here are
clearly both reasonable and objective; they are carefully
designed to limit the use of race in school assignment to
the extent necessary to achieve the goal of school integra-
tion, and they do not permit exercise of informal discretion
that might mask discriminatory bias. More importantly,
the programs are well designed to achieve the central
purpose of the covenants, which is to prevent discrimina-
tion. They do not in any way lead to the “maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups.” See CERD, art.
1(4), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216. They represent the most modest
of race conscious’ remedies, and they stop far short of
providing special preferences or benefits to one racial
23
group. The program benefits all students and, indeed, the
entire community, by creating non-discriminatory and
diverse school environments. Indeed, the Jefferson County
and Seattle school districts have continually and repeat-
edly determined that integrated educational environments
lead to people of all racial backgrounds leading richer
lives. The Jefferson County Board of Education has
explained that one of its educational goals is to ensure
that all students in the district are, “safe, supported,
respected and confident in racially integrated schools,
classrooms and student activities.” Joint Appendix 22.
B. The Managed-Choice Programs Are Consis-
tent with the Obligations of the United
States Under the ICCPR and CERD
Upon ratification of the ICCPR and CERD, the Senate
acknowledged that it is the responsibility of both our state
and local governments to ensure the principles set forth in
these treaties.* It is also the expectation of the interna-
tional community. For example, parties to the ICCPR are
obligated to undertake the “necessary steps ... to adopt
such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized” in the treaty. ICCPR, art.
2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. Likewise, Article 2(1)(a) of the
CERD provides that “[eJach State Party undertakes... to
ensure that all public authorities and public institutions,
national and local, shall act in conformity” with their
* U.S. Reservations, Understandings, Declarations, and Proviso,
ICCPR, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed. April 2, 1992), 11(5); see also
U.S. Reservations, Understanding, Declarations, and Proviso, CERD,
140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994), II.
24
obligations under the treaty. CERD, art. 2, 660 U.N.T.S. at
218. The programs at issue in the instant case, which do
not even involve preferential treatment, are appropriate
local measures to realize the principle of non-
discrimination.
Indeed, the Human Rights Committee recently ad-
dressed the issue of de facto racial segregation in United
States public schools.” The Committee noted that de facto
racial segregation had resulted from housing patterns and
the manner in which school Cistricts are created, funded
and regulated. It expressed concern that the United States
“had not succeeded in eliminating racial discrimination
such as regarding the wide disparities in the quality of
education across school districts in metropolitan areas, to
the detriment of minority students.” Jd. at 923. The
Committee reminded the United States “of its obligation
under articles 2 and 26 of the {[ICCPR] to respect and
ensure that all individuals are guaranteed effective
protection against practices that have either the purpose
or the effect of discrimination on a racial basis.” Finally,
the Committee recommended that “(t]he [United States]
should conduct in-depth investigations into the de facto
segregation described above, and take remedial steps, in
consultation with the affected communities.” Jd. The steps
taken by the Seattle and Jefferson County school districts
are precisely the type of measured remedial actions called
for by the Committee, and by the ICCPR, in response to de
facto segregation.
” Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by the States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 87th Sess., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (2006).
25
Carefully crafted managed-cheice programs tailored to
ensure equal enjoyment of rights by all racial groups are
thus permissible and even endorsed under the ICCPR and
CERD.
C. Self-Execution Is Not an Issue Where, as
Here, the Treaty Provisions Are Cited as
Aids to Interpretation
When the United States ratified the ICCPR and
CERD, it included reservations that many, but not all, of
the articles are “non-self-executing.” Louis Henkin et al.,
Human Rights 784-86, 1043-44 (1999). A non-self-
executing treaty requires additional legislation in order for
it to be enforceable by a litigant in Court. While the
Human Rights Committee has questioned the validity of
such reservations in connection with a human rights
treaty (see ICCPR, General Comment Adopted Under
Article 40 on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41
of the Covenant (Adopted, November 2, 1994), 34 1.L.M.
839 (1995) (General Comment 24)), the propriety of such
reservations need not be resolved here. The amici cite the
provisions of the ICCPR and CERD not as the foundation
for their legal claims, but rather as interpretive support
for their position that the school districts’ managed-choice
programs do not violate the United States Constitution.
As explained in detail above, this Court has looked to
international law to provide guidance in various areas of
jurisprudence. Even where treaties are viewed as “non-
self-executing,” they may be used indirectly as aids for
interpretation of other laws, defensively in civil or crimi-
nal contexts, or — as here — to support race-conscious
26
managed-choice school integration policies. See, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, Jnternational Law as Law of the United
States 62-64, 68, 97-98, 134-35, 370, 377-78 n.4, 384
(1996); Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s:
New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev.
423, 456 n.206, 460, 467-68, 470 (1997); Joan Fitzpatrick,
The Preemptive dnd Interpretive Force of International
Human Rights Law in State Courts, 90 Am. Soc’y Int'l L.
Proc. 259, 262, 264 (1996). In an effort to best understand
the need for these programs, their benefits to our commu-
nities, and their narrow limits in application, the Court
may appropriately consider these treaties here.
+
27
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, as well as those set
forth in the briefs of Respondents, the decisions of the
courts below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CYNTHIA J. LARSEN
(Counsel of Record)
CLIFFORD R. MICHEL
MARLENE A. ZARFES
E. ANNE HAWKINS
SUSAN COLLIER
ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Interested Human Rights
Clinics and Organizations
Of counsel
MARTHA F. Davis
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
CYNTHIA SOOHOO
CAROLINE BETTINGER-LOPEZ
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL HUMAN
RIGHTS CLINIC
CATHERINE ALBISA
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTs INITIATIVE
Dated: October 10, 2006
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