Amicus Curiae Brief — Samson v. California

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No. 04-9728

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD CURTIS SAMSON,

Petitioner,

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari

ae to the Court of Appeal of California,

First Appellate District ?

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

PAMELA HARRIS CARTER G. PHILLIPS*

NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL JEFFREY T. GREEN

DEFENSE LAWYERS THOMAS A. BURNS

1625 Eye Street, N.W. DEVON A. CORNEAL ;

Washington, DC 20006 SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN &

(202) 383-5300 WOOD LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 28, 2005 * Counsel of Record

‘lh PR cee eT i Te TT

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from

conducting a warrantless search of a person who is subject to

a parole search condition, where there is no suspicion of

criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search is that

the person is on parole?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.........000.00cecascssosseseess l

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....00.... cee eeeeeeeeees l

SETI \tiisshicimceniienpecduniguibehitiiledomnieiiiestiineaninupiinensins 3

I. CALIFORNIA’S STANDARD ~~ DEPARTS

FROM THE PRACTICES OF ITS SISTER

STEEN Taa i eiceileceeiinnieinaseaenceeiteiteiidibetaiecninetinn 3

A. Parole Conditions Generally...................cc0:ceeees 3

B. California’s Suspicionless Searches.................... 5

CALIFORNIA’S COURTS HAVE FAILED TO

OFFER A SATISFACTORY JUSTIFICATION

FOR ITS PAROLE SEARCH DOCTRINE

BECAUSE ONE DOES NOT EXIST................0.... 10

A. California’s Interests In Deterring Crime And

Protecting The Public Do Not Justify Warrant-

less, Suspicionless, Discretionary Searches Of

SII siciatascitetoveniaialenieiisiniadibabuassnininhetianiieeeiesias 10

BD. Tie States OF ParOlees ........cesesesccccossevesicccccsseseees 11

ip. MEDD ceshanieicicciteteianNacaighuaibimemasldniininniesuantineneyisdiie 12

2. Parolees Are Not Prisoners.................:.00000+++ 13

3. The Act-Of-Grace Theory ...............::cccsecceeees 15

C. General Warrants Rejected.............sceeeeeeee: 16

I I i claessnenbamion 18

(iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

Page

Ill. THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD

IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO

PROTECT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

BU Ee CD AAT TRIES ceccscissenisesstitcceninscinaaiaiin 20

IF A eee vvesceveresevemvecesousessesenepeenaniasiselaininahadaiemnnial 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES | Page

Allan v. State, 746 P.2d 138 (Nev. 1987)................ 6

Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) ........... l

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ..... 11

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)... 12

. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)........ ®

Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935) ......ccccccceeeeeees 16

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).............. 16

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)............. 20

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)............... 13, 14

Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).............. l

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)............. l

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) .............. 19

Moreno v. Baca, 400 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005)..... 6,8

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) .. 3, 13, 14, 16

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)............. 8

Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir.

iE ccssisibiiieiitpennibninecapeecinnisenees siiletlabsialidsbaaiad icin 6

Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1990)............. 6

People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251 (Cal. 1986),

overruled on other grounds by People v. Reyes,

ff) lle i eee 11, 12,14

People v. Edwards, 557 P.2d 995 (Cal. 1976)........ 11, 16

People v. Lampitok, 798 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. 2003)....... 7

People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998)........... passim

People v. Samson, 2004 WL 2307111 (Cal. Ct.

App. Oct. 14, 2004), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W.

3199 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-9728)........... 8

People v. Slusher, 844 P.2d 1222 (Colo. Ct. App.

EES en oe eee 6

People v. Woods, 535 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct.

I Uehara edacielatilennintesienidpapeennesieite 6

Riley v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622 (Ky.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218

SU le aiesaiensniisnccenetsiianitinetbiaiibedininstilagitibiaiiiiiiieanies 12 -

State v. Ashley, 459 N.W.2d 828 (S.D. 1990)......... 6

State v. Bonner, 811 So. 2d 1151 (La. Ct. App.

Tie iesiinininitiieedncesiedinipeatiapaaisia dicen idmaiiandids 6

State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379 (Haw. 1984)............ 7

State v. Massey, 913 P.2d 424 (Wash. Ct. App.

TUTTE ctansesccoriintpasnntunsnbianenieeninitonudinindmpbicnistodaiains 6

State v. Maurstad, 647 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 2002) ... 7

State v. Perbix, 331 N.W. 2d 14 (N.D. 1983),

overruled in irrelevant part by State v.

Maurstad, 647 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 2002)............. 7

State v. Smith, 589 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1999).......... 7

State v. West, 517 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. 1994) ........... 6

State ex rel. Corgan v. King, 868 P.2d 743 (Okla.

Se SEIS pee coniteritnitaccineecsicinaectninugeietinguntion 5,6

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ...............ececeeeeeeees 7, 20

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)..... l

United States v. Bennett, 2005 WL 2709572

os ee me Renee 6

United States v. Bradley, 57\ F.2d 787 (4th Cir.

Ee NNN eI Ar a eh 7

United States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700 (9th

Cir.), vacated, 343 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003),

reaching same result on other grounds, 372

A] | s & —_ SET eera enone 13

United States v. Crew, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D.

TE eicclicsicicenceditiinciebisiiisnntanenlaieninsindliaienaiinaies 6,8

United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571 (1st Cir.

ELAS AEES UE nen Nea SILC SNA T NLC 7

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)....... 20

United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358 (10th Cir.

ECE SE CR y Pamir eae mes Fase e- D en nen 6

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543

eee icncineeioimianibncceniiitibteiilaitaiidsitaitadiialiashtdaia ta iaastn eae &

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

United States v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781 (6th Cir.

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

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Idaho Code Ann. § 20-228 .............cccccsesesseesseeseeeeees

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Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.340.0000... eeceeeeeeees

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Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.236 ..........:ccccsccssssseseeeeees

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

ice Mh: iP MITTEE si sssdintenceiseendeininacsomnsesipndeipitonie

eS, Ge Fee ierticcccctereccnstcicttenesiconnian

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-A24 o......cececcceeeeeeeeees

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_ &§ 5 8 > 2 5 SRR nONOEDemeneeanEE

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 753.10 ............cccccccceeseeeseees

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ae i, Gi ie ie et enictnstieiiecleiintibetcnccsctiatiitinsin

a hs SN I ai asisisrienerctmenteigiiettia

S.C. Code Asm. § 24-21-6600 ..........ccccccccscsescccssseseeee

S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15A-24..............ccccceeeeeeees

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-1177 .0.............::ccccceeeeteeees

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.221 .0...........ccccceeeeeees

Se a BB Fe ccrecsneiccsescctesasectncessinnsece

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Wash. Rev. Code § 72.04A.070 .............cccececeeeeeeeees

Si NR i SG icicciehaciiccdienlictdictetaiakencdlieslnnsipainiaiidieidenie

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402 ......0cccccccscccccsssesccessceeees

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 251 1(D)........cceseeeeeeeeees

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ee Be I chitintsciinticcticsinninadicntinniannins

Mid. Code Regs. 12.06.01 21 ......0..ccccccsscsesesessseeseees

120 Mass. Code Regs. 300.07 .0.............cccceseeeeeeeees

ik I ih cil cilasicieitcialettiaddeeatsannaddnns

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N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:71-6.4.0000.........ccccccceeeeeeeee

| TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES Page

William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:

Origins and original meaning, 602-1791

Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original

Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547

icici abies eeaiia hinaaiadinn 16, 17, 18

5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (4th ed.

REESE aor ae reese earns eae ee 12, 13, 14, 15

Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the

Fourth Amendment, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.

RIG RIE ARP eo eoonora core ee eae ORR 18

Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in

the United States, 26 Crime & Just. 479

William R. Rapson, Note, Extending Search-and-

Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22

fee eee 5

Weish S. White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of

Parolees and Probationers, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev.

SEE NE CN tere aah ews otrr ee Le 14, 15

———

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

(“NACDL”) is a non-profit organization with direct national

membership of over 11,500 attorneys, in addition to more

than 28,000 affiliate members from all 50 states. Fo:-nded in

1958, NACDL is the only professional bar association that

represents public defenders and private criminal defense

lawyers at the national level. The American Bar Association

recognizes NACDL as an affiliated organization with full

representation in the ABA House of Delegates.

NACDL’s mission is to ensure justice and due process for

the accused; to foster the integrity, independence, and

expertise of the criminal defense profession; and to promote

.the proper and fair administration of criminal justice,

including issues involving the Bill of Rights. NACDL files

approximately 35 amicus curiae briefs each year on various

issues in this Court and other courts, including many cases

involving the Fourth Amendment. See //linois v. Caballes,

125 S. Ct. 834 (2005); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.

615 (2004); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Bond

v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case presents the question whether the Fourth

Amendment permits law enforcement officers to conduct

warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees at any time

and at any place, regardless of the privacy interests of others

nearby, solely because that person has the status of a parolee.

' Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus states that no counsel for a

party authored this bref in whole or in part and no person, other than

amicus, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the

preparation or submission of this brief. Letters of consent to the filing of

this brief have been lodged with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule

37.3.

Respondent State of California has taken a crabbed and

ahistorical view of Fourth Amendment protections that would

grant unfettered discretion to officers to conduct searches of

the persons, homes and effects of parolees and their families.

According to California, the Fourth Amendment’s

“reasonableness” requirement is fully consistent with a policy

that gives police officers unchecked authority to “search first,

and ask questions later.”

California’s peculiar understanding of what constitutes a

“reasonable” exercise of authority by an officer conflicts with

the practices of many of its sister States, which provide some

meaning to the reasonableness requirement by demanding

that searches of parolees be based at least upon an articulable

suspicion. California’s position also conflicts with numerous

decisions of both State and federal courts. As many of these

courts have recognized, parolees may have a diminished

expectation of privacy in light of the State’s legitimate

interests in the protection of citizens and the deterrence of

further crime. But parolees live among us in our communities

as part of their rehabilitation, and the State’s general interests

cannot justify a unique grant of authority that is anathema to a

free society. .

NACDL’s mission is to defend those accused of crime and

to ensure:that constitutional protections in the criminal justice

system are strictly construed and honored. NACDL and its

members are familiar with the practices in all 50 States and

the District of Columbia with respect to parole and probation.

From this unique perspective, NACDL seeks to call the

Court’s attention to three issues of significant importance:

first, the degree to which California’s proposed practice is at

variance with that of other jurisdictions; second, the absence

of any justification for California’s position; and third, the

need for a reasonable suspicion standard as the only sensible

check on police powers in this context.

ARGUMENT

I, CALIFORNIA’S STANDARD DEPARTS FROM

THE PRACTICES OF ITS SISTER STATES.

No other State has adopted California’s practice of allowing

any officer to conduct a suspicionless search of the person,

home or effects of any parolee at any time and for any reason,

excepting only searches somehow_deemed to be “arbitrary,

capricious or harassing.” Instead, most States impose an

express “reasonable suspicion” standard. Even the courts of

the one State (North Dakota) that has concurred with

California that a broad “reasonableness” standard applies

have nonetheless taken pains to point out that reasonable

suspicion existed for the challenged searches in any event.

And no State has upheld the type of random, intrusive search

that occurred in this instance upon a sidewalk while Petitioner

was walking with his companion and her child.

A. Parole Conditions Generally.

In the United States, parole is a_ well-established

penological tool used to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders

into society. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78

(1972) (discussing the purpose of parole); Joan Petersilia,

Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 Crime

& Just. 479, 487-92 (1999). To achieve these goals, States

have enacted regulatory frameworks governing parole, which,

in part, permit parole boards to impose broad conditions of

release upon parolees.2 The conditions imposed are often

* See Ala. Code § 15-22-29; Alaska Stat. § 33.16.150; Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 31-411; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-206; Cal. Penal Code § 3053; Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 17-2-201; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,

§ 4321; D.C. Code § 1986-14; Fla. Stat. § 947.18; Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-

42, -44; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-66; Idaho Code Ann. § 20-228; 730 IIL.

Comp. Stat. 5/3-3-7; Ind. Code § 11-13-3-4; lowa Code § 45.2(906); Kan.

Stat. Ann. § 22-3717; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 439.340; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 15:574.4; 03-208-001 Me. Code R.; Md. Code Regs. 12.08.01.21; 120

Mass. Code Regs. 300.07; Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.236; Minn. R.

similar from State to State. Thus, significant deviations—

such as the one at issue here—raise sensible concerns about

improper State infringement upon parolees’ constitutional

rights.

California’s general approach to parole and to parole boards

is similar to that in other States. California maintains

extensive supervisory powers over parolees and retains the

right to revoke parole if the conditions imposed are violated.

See Cal. Penal Code § 3056 (“Prisoners on parole shall

remain under the legal custody of the department [of

corrections] and shall be subject at any time to be taken back

within the inclosure of the prison.”). Like other States,

California gives broad discretion to its parole board by

providing that “[t]he Board of Prison Terms upon granting

any parole to any prisoner may also impose on the parole any

conditions that it may deem proper.” /d. § 3053(a).

Generally, parole boards have the authority to apply a set of

universal, mandatory release conditions, in addition to any

special restrictions tailored to an individual parolee’s

particular circumstances.’ Among these restrictions are so-

called “search conditions.”” Most such conditions require a

parolee to submit to searches of his person, his property, or

2940.2000; Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-17; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.690; Mont.

Admin. R. 20.7.1101; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,116; Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 213.12175; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-A:4; NJ. Admin. Code

§ 10A:71-6.4; N.M. Stat. § 31-21-10; N.Y. Penal Law § 70.40; N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 1SA-1374; N.D. Cent. Code § 12-59-07; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 753.10; Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.8; Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.270; 61 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 331.23; R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-16; S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-

660; S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15A-24; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117;

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.221; Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-10; Vt. Stat.

Ann. tit. 18, § 502b; Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-157; Wash. Rev. Code

§ 72.04A.070; W. Va. Code § 62-12-17; Wisc. Stat. § 304.06; Wyo. Stat.

Ann. § 7-13-402.

* The conditions imposed are then set forth in parole forms, the specific

content of which varies from state to state and from parolee to parolee.

Amicus App. la-10a.

both, either without a warrant or expressly upon reasonable

suspicion.” California’s “Notice and Conditions of Parole,”

for example, informs parolees that “You and your residence

and any property under your control may be searched without

a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections or any

law enforcement officer.” Amicus App. la; see also Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2511(b). However, the California Penal

Code also provides that parolees must agree to warrantless

searches “with or without cause.” Cal. Penal Code § 3067(a)

B. California’s Suspicionless Searches.

Based upon this statutory and regulatory framework,

California courts have permitted suspicionless searches of

parolees. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998)

(allowing police and parole officers to search parolees

without individualized suspicion so long as the search is not

“arbitrary, capricious or harassing’’). In so doing, California

goes against the “the vast majority of jurisdictions that have

considered this issue,” and which have held that warrantless

searches are only permissible when supported by reasonable

suspicion. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 453 (Kennard, J., dissenting);

see also State ex rel. Corgan v. King, 868 P.2d 743, 746

(Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that the “majority of states

that have addressed this issue agree that probable cause is not

necessary to justify a warrantless search of a parolee’s home,”

*In broad overview, these restrictions fall into one of four categories.

First, some parole forms do not contain an explicit search condition, but

do contain a catch-all provisicn allowing imposition of “special

conditions” at the court/officer’s discretion. Amicus App. 3a, 10a.

Second, other forms contain a blanket search condition that does not

identify under what terms a search may be conducted. /d. at 4a, 7a.

Third, still other States require parolees to submit to warrantless searches.

/d. at la, 8a. Fourth and finally, several States require parolees to submit

to searches only where the searching officer has reasonable suspicion of a

parole violation. /d. at Sa, 9a.

but that they do “requir[e] reasonable grounds to exist in

order for a warrantless search to be valid’’).°

* The weight of authority on this issue clearly and consistently forbids

suspicionless searches of parolees. See Moreno v. Baca, 400 F.3d 1152,

1163 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 376 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2005) (interpreting Pennsylvania’s parole condition permitting

warrantless searches “’to include an implicit requirement that any search

be based on reasonable suspicion”) (quoting United States v. Baker, 221

F.3d 438, 448 (3d Cir. 2000)); United States v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781, 787

(6th Cir. 1999) (requiring that a parole search be supported by at least

reasonable suspicion); United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 361-62 (10th

Cir. 1995); United States v. Bennett, 2005 WL 2709572, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.

Oct. 21, 2005) (finding that the New York State Division of Parole Policy

& Procedure Manual requires reasonable suspicion for parolee searches);

United States v. Crew, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266 (D. Utah 2004); Riley

v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Ky. 2003); State v. West, 517

N.W.2d 482, 484 n.2 (Wis. 1994) (noting that although Wisconsin

parolees are subject to warrantless searches, those searches are proper if

an officer has “reasonable grounds to believe that the client” is in

possession of contraband); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1357-58 (Wyo.

1990); State v. Ashley, 459 N.W.2d 828, 830 (S.D. 1990) (stating that

although parolees are subject to a warrantless search condition, the

condition limited searches to those supported by “reasonable cause . . .

ascertained by a parole agent”); Allan v. State, 746 P.2d 138, 140 (Nev.

1987) (per curiam) (ruling that a parole search must be founded on

reasonable belief that “a violation of a parole agreement has occurred”);

State v. Bonner, 811 So. 2d 1151, 1153-54 (La. Ct. App. 2002); State v.

Massey, 913 P.2d 424, 425 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Woods, 535

N.W. 2d 259, 261-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); King, 868 P.2d at 745, 746

(ruling that although Oklahoma subjects parolees to searches “‘at any time

or place,”” state regulations require “reasonable grounds to believe that the

offender is keeping contraband” before conducting a search); People v.

Slusher, 844 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a parole

search must be predicated on “reasonable grounds to believe that a parole

violation has occurred”). But see Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1368

(11th Cir. 1982) (permitting probation searches without individualized

suspicion); Reyes, 968 P.2d at 451.

Given that some jurisdictions make no distinction between parolees and

probationers for Fourth Amendment purposes, cases involving probation

searches are relevant here. See, e.g., Williams, 417 F.3d at 376 n.1

(stating “‘there is no constitutional difference between probation and

Even in the rare instance where a court has upheld

suspicionless searches as theoretically permissible, the court

was at pains to point out that the search was, im fact,

supported by reasonable suspicion. See State v. Smith, 589

N.W.2d 546, 549-50 (N.D. 1999) (holding that probationary

searches need not be based on reasonable suspicion, but then

finding that “the reasonable suspicion standard was met

here’). The need for a court to bolster its decision with

alternative findings on reasonable suspicion strongly suggests

that the core holding offering no limitation at all on officer

discretion is constitutionally infirm.®

This Court has consistently demanded cognizable and

meaningful levels of suspicion when granting limited

exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968) (permitting warrantless pat-down

parole for purposes of the [Flourth [A]mendment”’”) (quoting United

States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 909 (3d Cir. 1992)). As such, probation cases

requiring reasonable suspicion help inform the analysis in this case.

United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (ist Cir. 1990) (upholding a

probation search “so long as the decision to search was in fact narrowly

and properly made on the basis of reasonable suspicion”); United States v.

Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (Sth Cir. 1982); United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d

787, 790 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978); People v. Lampitok, 798 N.E.2d 91, 106 (Ill.

2003); State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1390 (Haw. 1984) (requiring, where

a probation condition forced probationers to submit to warrantless

searches, that those searches be “justified by a reasonable suspicion

supportable by specific and articulable facts”).

° Indeed, North Dakota law appears unsettled on this point. Compare

State v. Maurstad, 647 N.W.2d 688, 696 (N.D. 2002) (declining to “apply

our prior case law holding reasonable suspicion or probable cause is

unnecessary for a probationary search to be valid,” because such searches

are valid whenever “a probationary search authorized by a condition of

probation is supported by reasonable suspicion”), with State v. Perbix, 331

N.W. 2d 14, 21-22 (N.D. 1983) (permitting warrantless searches of

probationers without individualized suspicion so long as the searches aré

reasonable), overruled in irrelevant part by State v. Maurstad, 647

N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 2002). As will be discussed below, the justification for

such suspicionless searches is grossly overbroad.

searches for officer safety only where supported by

reasonable suspicion); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,

347 (1985) (permitting warrant-less searches with less than

probable cause only where the state has a special need);

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925)

(permitting warrantless searches of moving vehicles only

where the search is supported by probable cause); see also

Moreno v. Baca, 400 F.3d 1152, 1163 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005)

(noting that “‘special needs’” cases permitting warrantless

searches with less than probable cause “have required

individualized suspicion in order to conduct targeted searches

of individuals”); United States v. Crew, 345 F. Supp. 2d

1264, 1266 (D. Utah 2004) (holding that parole searches were

a “special need[]” and could be conducted without a warrant,

but only if those searches were based on reasonable

suspicion). Thus, “some quantum of individualized suspicion

is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.”

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).

Any “[e]xceptions to the requirement of individualized

suspicion are generally appropriate only Where the privacy

interests implicated by a search are minimal and where ‘other

safeguards’ are available ‘to assure that the individual's

reasonable expectation of privacy”” is protected by more than

an officer’s discretion. 7.L.0., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).

California’s suspicionless parole searches do not provide

those “other safeguards.” :

In its Reyes decision (followed in the decision at issue

here), the California Supreme Court sought to provide some

minimal protection to parolees, in the form of a prohibition on

searches of parolees that are “arbitrary, capricious or

harassing.” Reyes, 968 P.2d at 450; People v. Samson, 2004

WL 2307111, at *2-*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004). This

standard, however, collapses into a _ nullity for two reasons.

First, this prohibition is easily avoided by a simple claim—as

was made here—that the officer conducted the search as part

of his or her more general duties of protecting public safety.

J.A. 38. So long as an officer can provide a “rehabilitative,

reformative, or legitimate law enforcement purpose[]” for the

search, the courts will uphold it. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 450. As

Petitioner notes, this standard “does not significantly limit the

discretion of law enforcement officers to search parolees.”

Pet. Br. 22. Indeed, no California court has ever excluded the

fruit of such searches because they were arbitrary, capricious

or harassing. /d. Second, the standard is patently meaning-

less if the facts as stated here satisfy it. Here, the search

conducted is the definition of arbitrary—Officer Rohleder

admitted that he does not does not “go after [every parolee]

all the time” and offered no explanation for the search other

than that Petitioner was a parolee. J.A. 38-39. A standard

that ratifies searches based upon nothing more than an

officer’s peculiar schedule and whim cannot reasonably be

described as anything other than arbitrary. On its own terms,

then, California’s attempt to satisfy some Fourth Amendment

concerns fails entirely.’

By rejecting this reasonable suspicion standard, California

has veered from the body of case law in the State and federal

courts that recognizes that, despite their lessened expectations

of privacy, parolees are still entitled to Fourth Amendment

protection and should not be subjected to suspicionless

searches at the whim of any law enforcement officer. Given

the importance of Fourth Amendment protections and the

weight of authority opposing California’s decision to relax

those protections, it is particularly important that this Court

invalidate suspicionless searches of parolees and reject

California’s practice.

’ Any additional protection that California might argue it has provided

by requiring that suspicionless searches be “reasonable” is illusory. By

defining reasonableness as being that which is not “arbitrary. capricious or

harassing,” but failing to give real meaning to those terms, California has

eviscerated the protections of the Fourth Amendment for parolees.

Il, CALIFORNIA’S COURTS HAVE FAILED TO

OFFER A_ SATISFACTORY JUSTIFICATION

FOR ITS PAROLE SEARCH DOCTRINE

BECAUSE ONE DOES NOT EXIST.

Warrantless, suspicionless, discretionary parole searches

are not justified by reference to California’s interests in

deterring crime and protecting the public. Neither are such

searches justified by parolees’ express or implied consent or

constructive custody.

A. California’s Interests In Deterring Crime And

Protecting The Public Do Not Justify Warrant-

less, Suspicionless, Discretionary Searches Of

Parolees.

In Reyes, the Supreme Court of California recognized that

parole plays a critical correctional purpose; specifically, it is

“granted for the specific purpose of monitoring [a parolee’s]

transition from inmate to free citizen.” 968 P.2d at 450.

Accordingly, the conditional freedom of parole serves the

dual purpose of rehabilitating convicts and protecting the

public from future crimes. /d. Indeed, California “has a duty

not only to assess the efficacy of its rehabilitative efforts but

to protect the public.” /d. Considering California’s interests

in rehabjlitation and protection, the Reyes court concluded

“the purpose of the search condition is to deter the

commission of crimes and to protect the public.” /d. at 451.

As such, “the importance of the latter interest justifies the

imposition of a warrantless search condition.” /d. at 450.

That was because deterrence and protection are “enhanced by

the potential for random searches.” /d. at 451.

To be sure, a regime of “random searches” of parolees

might “deter the commission of crimes” and “protect the

public,” but that argument proves far too much. Such an

argument might also justify random searches of dwellings in

high crime areas or random searches of corporate boardrooms

whenever earnings are restated. An appeal to such general

interests sweeps so broadly as to justify random, suspicionless

searches in nearly any cognizable context or community

where crime has previously occurred. California steadfastly

refuses to recognize that these are the very same arguments

used to justify a police state. See Brinegar v. United States,

338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)

(“Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most

effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary

government.”). Persons living in a free society enjoy robust

privacy interests that are protected both by ex ante procedures

(valid warrants, probable cause requirements) as well as post

hoc remedial measures (exclusionary remedies, limited civil

actions). These protections necessarily clash with the

interests of public safety and even deterrence. Accordingly,

the question is not whether a regime of suspicionless,

nonconsensual searches would promote deterrence and

protection—as surely it must; instead, the question is whether

such a regime is consonant both with the status of parolees

and the origins and purpose of Fourth Amendment

protections.

B. The Status Of Parolees.

California’s unique posture with respect to its parole search

doctrine is at odds with its own case law recognizing that

parolee status does not extinguish all Fourth Amendment

rights. In particular, California courts have explicitly rejected

the express consent, constructive custody, and act-of-grace

theories. Reyes, 968 P.2d at 448 (rejecting express consent

theory); People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1266-67 (Cal.

1986) (declining to justify suspicionless search by relying on

custody theory to analogize parolees to _ incarcerated

prisoners), overruled on other grounds by People v. Reyes,

968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998); People v. Edwards, 557 P.2d 995,

999 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing that the act-of-grace theory is

now defunct). This Court should likewise reject each theory

as invalid.

1. Consent.

Compulsory parole conditions cannot serve as consent to

engage in otherwise unreasonable searches. Fourth Amend-

ment rights (like other constitutional rights) may be waived,

and a search rendered permissible where an individual gives

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent. See Schneckloth

v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (holding that “a

search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitution-

ally permissible”); see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391

U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (explaining that consent is not

“freely and voluntarily given” without showing “more than

acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”). But

California’s parole form waivers are not voluntary, and thus

cannot be the basis of a “consent” search.

California’s regulatory framework expressly states that

parole conditions cannot be construed as a contract between

parolees and the State. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2512(a)

(“The parole conditions are not a contract but are the specific

rules governing all parolees whether or not the parolee has

signed the form containing the parole conditions.”). That is

because prisoners have no choice in the matter: in California,

parole is mandatory. Reves, 968 P.2d at 448. In other words,

every prisoner in California becomes a parolee upon release

from incarceration; there is no other way in which a prisoner

can leave prison Without choice, there can be no voluntary

consent to inclusion of the search condition.” /d.; see also

Burgener, 714 P.2d at 1266 n.12 {explaining “the parolee’s

acceptance of parole under the determinate sentencing law -is

in no sense pursuant to a voluntary agreement by which he

has waived his right to privacy in exchange for release on

parole”).

Scholarly authority accords with California law in its

criticism of the contractual waiver theory. Professor Wayne

LaFave contends that the “notion that these waivers are

unquestionably voluntary” is “a remarkable one to say the

least.” 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise

on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(b), at 440-41 (4th ed.

2004). Even with respect to probation, Professor LaFave

argues that “to speak of consent ... is to resort to a ‘manifest

fiction,’ for ‘the probationer who purportedly waives his |

rights by accepting such a condition has little genuine option

to refuse, and the waiver cannot be said to be voluntary in any

generally-accepted sense of the term.”” /d. (footnote omit-

ted). In this case, of course, the prisoner has no “option to

refuse,” genuine or otherwise, given that California has made

parole mandatory — with the result that it is impossible to

“speak of consent” in any meaningful way.

The constitutional peril that would attend a rule of law that

treated mandatory parole conditions as contractual waivers is

both obvious and ominous. Under that theory, a State could

attach any requirement it wished to mandatory parole, and

thus to all citizens who had at one time been incarcerated. All

such citizens, in other words, “could be forced to waive all

constitutional rights, including the right to due process in

revocation proceedings, or even the right to trial on any new

offense allegedly committed during the parole period.”

United States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 718 (9th Cir.),

vacated, 343 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003), reaching same result

on other grounds, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

California has pointed to nothing that would justify such an

anomalous and extraordinary result.

2. Parolees Are Not Prisoners.

With respect to the Fourth Amendment, parolees should not

be equated with prisoners. Parolees are unlike prisoners, who

do not have any Fourth Amendment rights. Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984). Instead of leading

highly compartmentalized and rigorously structured lives,

parolees’ daily affairs more closely resemble those of

ordinary free citizens. Even though this Court has held that

parolees have diminished Fourth Amendment rights,

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480 (stating that parolees are deprived

of the “absolute liberty to which ev..y citizen is entitled,” and

can claim only “the conditional liberty properly dependent on

observance of special parole restrictions”), that is a far cry

from holding their Fourth Amendment rights are extinguished

altogether.

This Court has unequivocally rejected the proposition that

the limited Fourth Amendment rights of parolees can be

equated to those extinguished rights of prisoners. Whereas in

the prison context, this Court found that the Fourth

Amendment simply “does not apply within the confines of the

prison cell,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525-26, the Court has long

observed in the parole context that, “[t]hough the State

properly subjects [a parolee] to many restrictions not

applicable to-other citizens, his condition is very different

from that of confinement in a prison,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at

482 (emphasis added). Consistent with Hudson’s analysis,

California has also rejected the constructive custody theory.

Burgener, 714 P.2d at 1266-67. -

Scholars universally criticize the notion that parolees can be

equated with prisoners with respect to their Fourth

Amendment rights. As an initial matter, the first “difficulty

with the constructive custody concept is that it is more a

conclusion than a theory, and thus can be employed to justify

virtually any search of a parolee.” 5 LaFave, supra,

§ 10.10(a), at 435-36. Professor Welsh White has criticized

the custody theory’s premise of equating parolees to

prisoners, and suggested a more appropriate legal lens would

be the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine.” Welsh S.

White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and

Probationers, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 167, 178-81 (1969). Asa

factual matter, parolees bear very little similarity to

prisoners.® While the circumstances of prison necessitate

* The differences between parolees and prisoners include the following:

The parolee is not incarcerated; he is not subjected to a prison

regimen, to the rigors of prison life and the unavoidable company of

sociopaths. He does not live in a society whose violent, though

“severe deprivation of [Fjourth [A]mendment rights” be-

cause, absent frequent suspicionless searches, “the possibility

of riots or attempts to escape might be substantially

increased,” id. at 180, parolees obviously do not live in those

same circumstances. Accordingly, Professor White concludes

“one cannot blithely maintain that for Fourth Amendment

purposes, the two groups of citizens may be treated the

same.” /d.

In short, there is no factual or theoretical basis for treating

parolees like prisoners for Fourth Amendment purposes, or

for using a comparison between the two groups to validate

suspicionless searches of parolees.

3. The Act-Of-Grace Theory.

Finally, the act-of-grace theory does not justify completely

depriving parolees of their Fourth Amendment rights. This

theory is a corollary to the contractual waiver theory.

Whereas the contractual waiver approach might be described

as a kind of express waiver, the act-of-grace theory “might be

described as contemplating an implied waiver of Fourth

Amendment rights arising from acceptance of the ‘privilege’

of probation or parole.” 5 LaFave, supra, § 10.10(b), at 438

(emphasis added).

usually repressed, mores necessitate iron bars and the close watch of

armed guards. Routine searches are necessary in prison to prevent

dangerous riots and internal violence. . .. A parolee, however, lives in

a different environment, one where such problems are absent and

searches and seizures are intrusive. The parolee lives among people

who are free to come and go when and as they wish. Except for the

conditions of parole, he is one of them. His parole represents

supervision, rather than repression; and his parole officer is, ideally,

an advisor, rather than an armed watchman. If the parole officer is to

be the parolee’s personal prison guard, it is only because the court

decides that he is, and such a decision stands on extraordinarily shaky

ground.

William R. Rapson, Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to

Parolees in California, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 129, 133 (1969) (footnote

omitted).

This Court, however, ‘has already discredited the act-of-

grace theory. Compare Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93

(1935) (stating “[p]robation or suspension of sentence comes

as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be

coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as

Congress may impose”), with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.

778, 782 n.4 (1973) (finding that “a probationer can no longer

be denied due process, in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v.

Zerbst, that probation is an ‘act of grace’’’) (citation omitted).

The Court has explained that “[iJt is hardly useful any longer

to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the

parolee’s liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ By whatever

name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the

protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Morrissey, 408

U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court of California has reached the

same result. Edwards, 557 P.2d at 999 (recognizing that “the

traditional view that a grant of probation is a privileged act of

grace or clemency has been discredited in favor of the modern

view that such a grant would be deemed an alternative form

of punishment in those cases when it can be used as a

correctional tool”). As such, any reliance on the “act of

grace” doctrine to justify suspicionless searches is improper.

C. General Warrants Rejected.

California’s parole search doctrine confers a general

warrant upon officers to search the persons, homes and effects

of parolees, subject only to a non-harassment condition. The

Fourth Amendment embodies the Framers’ hostility to

precisely such grants of authority to officers. See Thomas Y.

Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98

Mich. L. Rev. 547, 578 (1999) (explaining that the

“delegation of discretionary authority to ordinary, ‘petty,’ or

‘subordinate’ officers was anathema to _ framing-era

lawyers”). The Framers’ particular concern with the

” A general warrant was “a framing-era term for an unparticularized

warrant (for example, ordering a search of ‘suspected places’), which was

substance of general warrants was much the same as

expressed here—the perceived need to limit the broad

discretion of officers to conduct intrusive searches of homes

and to thereby disrupt the privacy of the residents and the

community’s sense of ordered liberty. See William J.

Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and original

meaning, 602-1791, at 237 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with UMI

Dissertation Services) (“[G]eneral searches and warrants ...

furnished an infinite power of surveillance to searchers that

exposed every Englishman’s dwelling to perpetual, capricious

intrusion.”). :

As here, the general warrant required no showing of cause

and delineated no specific boundaries. Davies, supra, at 558.

It conferred upon common officers essentially unlimited

power to search and arrest at their discretion. The Framers

found this nearly unmitigated authority especially pernicious

given their generai distrust of the judgment of common

officers. As a result, the search restrictions that ultimately

became the Fourth Amendment were a central feature of the

compromise between the Federalists and the Anti-federalists

that made way for the new federal charter. See generally

Davies, supra, at 609-11; see also Cuddihy, supra, at 1365-

79. So strong was the acclamation for such a provision that it

was already a feature of many State constitutions at the time

the Framers drafted our Constitution. See Cuddihy, supra, at

1233-54, 1298-341, 1347-51 (discussing search and seizure in

state constitutions). Accordingly, any conferral of the type of

authority represented by California’s parole search doctrine

warrants careful scrutiny against a backdrop of well over 200

years of unmitigated hostility to such power.

California’s effort to justify its radical approach on the

broad ground of deterrence and public safety likewise

also commonly applied to a warrant lacking a complaint under oath or an

adequate showing of cause.” Davies, supra at 558.

represents a departure from the Framers’ express intent to

strictly limit “unreasonable search and seizures.” While the

Framers held a great distrust for the common officer, they

were unconcerned with passing a congressional standard to

regulate the warrantless officer as “they did not perceive

ordinary officers as possessing any significant discretionary

authority ... to initiate arrests or searches.” Davies, supra at

578. Warrants, and not officers, were the main source of

search and arrest authority. Framing-era common law gave

no more arrest authority to common officers than it did to the

general public, which mandated that a warrantless arrest

could be justified only by “felony in fact,” and nothing so

loose as a general standard of “reasonableness.” /d.

Given the limited power of the warrantless officer, the

Framers intended to “control the officer by controlling the

warrant,” and had little reason to believe that the probable

cause requirement would not effectuate such control. /d. at

552. California, however, not only hands back to the officer

the very sort of general warrant the Framers despised, but also

does so on a ground entirely foreign to them; namely, the

notion that an officer’s warrantless search or seizure can,

without more, be construed as “reasonable” under the Fourth

Amendment. Far from “controlling the warrant,” California

seeks to guarantee “reasonableness through reliance upon the

good will of officers, a “deference” that is decidedly “at odds

with the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is

distrust of discretionary police power.” Tracey Maclin, The

Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 Wm. & Mary

L. Rev. 197, 248 (1993).

D. The Rights Of Others.

California's parole search doctrine contravenes not only the

history of the Fourth Amendment and our nation’s long-held

hostility to the concept of general warrants, but also the

privacy rights and liberty interests of others who may be

impacted by the exercise of such broad authority. The

breadth of authority that California confers upon its officers

to search the persons, homes and effects of state parolees

necessarily threatens the interests of those who are not

parolees and who are imbued by the Constitution with a full

panoply of rights.

The search here is a case in point. Officer Rohleder

stopped Petitioner on the street during an outing with his

companion and her infant child, who was in a stroller at the

time. While not technically a stop of these other two persons,

it was a stop in effect. This Court has given careful

consideration to the rights of others in such a context and

certainly, where such a stop is predicated upon probable cause

or reasonable suspicion, those rights must necessarily yield to

public safety concerns. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.

408, 413-15 (1997).

Here, however, California’s rule makes manifest the

inevitable phenomena of stops and searches that are not

predicated on any specific justification. The co-residents of a

parolee, for example, are subject to a search of their homes

and effects at any time and for any reason short of

harassment. To be sure, it may be said that such “third-

parties” can avoid this vulnerability by avoiding a parolee

altogether. But this is to impose upon those third-parties an

“implied consent” theory that, as described above, is roundly

and sensibly rejected by many courts, even California’s, for

parolees themselves. Further, it contradicts the rehabilitative

purposes of parole to suggest that law-abiding citizens and

family-members should avoid parolees. And, finally, it defies

reality to suggest that the families and friends of parolees

have a real choice in the matter when parolees, like Petitioner,

attempt to resume their lives in the community and their role

in the family unit. Neither the communities in which parolees

live, nor their families should be put to such a Hobson’s

choice.

Ill. THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD IS

THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO PRO-

TECT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERESTS

AT ISSUE.

In allowing parole searches so long as they are not

arbitrary, harassing, or capricious, the Supreme Court of

California has become unmoored from the Fourth

Amendment foundation of its parole system. Its approach is

both unique and reactionary. It is unique because the

overwhelming majority of States require, at a minimum,

reasonable suspicion for parole searches. And it is

reactionary because it is, in essence, an attempt to return to

the general warrant days for which the Fourth Amendment

was initially drafted.

Indeed, California’s approach turns well-established Fourth

Amendment law on its head. It makes no sense to allow

suspicionless searches, on the one hand, and then to add a

caveat that such searches may not be arbitrary or capricious.

All of modern Fourth Amendment law is premised on the

understanding that in the law enforcement context, the best

and only way to ensure that a search is not arbitrary or

capricious, or driven by some impermissible motive, is to

insist that it is based on some articulable suspicion of

wrongdoing. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121

(2001) (“The degree of individualized suspicion required of a

search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high

probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the

intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable.”);

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-

cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); Horton v. California,

496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (explaining “evenhanded law

enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective

standards of conduct”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“[CJourts still

retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police

conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches

upon personal security without the objective evidentiary

justification which the Constitution requires.”). For all

practical purposes, the “reasonable suspicion” requirement is

the logical converse of arbitrary, capricious and harassing

searches. To avoid the latter, we require the former.

For the reasons discussed above, California’s novel

experiment in Fourth Amendment law—cutting loose the

prohibition on arbitrary, capricious and harassing law-

enforcement searches from the reasonable suspicion

requirement—has obvious flaws, and is bound to be entirely

ineffective. That should come as no surprise. If there were a

way to ensure that wholly unconstrained law-enforcement

discretion would not be used in arbitrary or capricious ways,

or to target racial or other mincrities, then there would have

been no need for the reasonable suspicion standard in the first

place.

The reasonable suspicion standard therefore represents the

least restrictive means to accomplish California’s monitoring

and public safety goals while adequately protecting

acknowledged privacy interests. That standard affords

officers tremendous flexibility—allowing them to act on mere

suspicions that need only be articulable and not wholly

irrational. Practically speaking, no standard is less restrictive

and yet short of full officer discretion. California’s proposed

standard does not functionally limit officer discretion in any

meaningful way and cannot, in any event, be applied in any

sort of “bright-line” manner. Whether any particular action is

“arbitrary, capricious or harassing” is patently subjective and

difficult to assess fairly in any context, much less by officers

who are executing their duties in the street. California’s

deviation from the reasonable suspicion standard must

therefore be rejected in favor of the more prevalent and sound

“reasonable suspicion” standard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of

Appeal of California should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

PAMELA HARRIS CARTER G. PHILLIPS*

NAT'L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL JEFFREY T. GREEN

DEFENSE LAWYERS THOMAS A. BURNS

1625 Eye Street, N.W. DEVON A. CORNEAL

Washington, DC 20006 SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN &

(202) 383-5300 WOOD LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 28, 2005 * Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

STATE OF CALIFORMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOTICE AND CONDITIONS OF PAROLE

CDC 1515 GREY 9541)

You will be released on perole effecte fora pened of 3 YEARS This parole

1s subject to the following notice and conditions Should you nolate condinans of this parole. you are subyect to arrest, suspension. andor revocahar of your

parnie

You waive extradition to the State of Calhforma from any state or terntory of the United States or from the District of Columbia You will not contest any effort

to retum you to the State of California

When the Reneé of Pricen Terms determmnen, based upne peyehistic sussens, thet you pase 0 danger t youreelf or ethers, the Hesed may. if necessary for

psychatne treatment, order your placement im a commumty treatment facility or state prson of may revoke your parol apd order your retum lo prison

You and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections o any law

enforcement officer

If another junsdiction has lodged a detamer agains! you. you may be released to the custady of that jurisdiction Should you be released from their custody

pror to the exprrabon of your Cahforma parole, or should the detasner nol be exercised, you are to immechately contact the nearest Department of Corrections

Parole and Community Services Divison Office for ynstructions concerning reporting to a parce agent

You have been informed and have received 1n wrung the procedure for obtaning a Certificate of Rehabthtavon (4852 2! PC)

CONDITIONS OF PAROLE

1. SPECIAL CONDITIONS MUST: a) Relate to the cnme for which you were convicted, b) Relate to conduct which 1s itself crmunal, c) Prohibit conduct

which may he reiated to future crminahty You are subject to the following special conditions

You will participate in antinarcotic testing in accordance with instructions from a parole agent.

You will totally abstain from the use of amy alcoholic beverages or liquor.

You will participate in the psychiatric treatment program approved for you by P&CSD.

You will not have contact with minors without prior approval of P&CSD.

You will not contact , in amy manner without the approval of P&CSD.

You are prohibited from possessing, utilizing or having access to pagers, scanners, police radies or mobile phonc

equipment, unless you can demonstrate that they are related to legitimate employment needs.

You will not wear, possess, have access to or display gang attire, insignias or paraphernalia.

You will not associate with gang members without prior approval from P&CSD.

You are prohibited from residing within one-quarter mile of any school that contains grades Kindergarten through

six.

10. You shall not engage in gang participation as defined in CA. Code of Regulation Title 15, Section 251 Xe).

11. Not to enter the United States legally.

12. You will successfully complete a batterer's program as directed by P&CSD.

13. You will successfully complete a domestic violence/anger management program as directed by P&CSD.

14. You shall participate in a drug treatment program at the direction of your parole agent.

15. You are prohibited from residing in a "single family dwelling" with any person also requircd to register pursuant te

PC Section 290, unless they are legally related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, “single family dwelling” shall

not include a residential facility that serves six or fewer persons.

16. Youarenottouse anyname otherthan

17. Yeu will successfally complete parenting counscts classes.

Reasons for the imposipan of special candiuons of paroie ila Me

1) History of drug use/abuse 2) History of alcoho! abuse 3) Related to commitment offense 4) History of psychiatric

problems 5)Nature of commitment offense 6) Nature of criminal history 7) History of violence or threats of violence 8)

Request of __9) Due to nature of commitment offense 10) Due to gang membership or affiliation 11) BPT imposed

duc to validated gang member 12) IMegal alien status 13) PC 3053.2 14) History of anger management problems 15)

Pursuant to PC 3053.2 16) Prop 6 Mandated.

| acknowledge my special conditions of parole

Pwolees bute SIGNATURE OF UNIT SUPER VISOR DATE SIGNED

2 RELEASE. REPORTING, RESIDENCE, AND TRAVEL: Unless other arrangements are approved in writing, you will report to your parole agent on the

first working dav following your release Any change of residence shall be reported to vour parole agent in advance You wll mform your parole agent within

72 hours of any change of employment locabon, employer, of Lermnzbon of employmen:

3. PAROLE AGENT INSTRUCTIONS: You shail comply with al) mstrucvons of your parole agent and will not travel more than $0 miles from your residence

without hsher pnor approval You wall not be absent trom vour county of remdence for s penod of more thar 48 hours and no! leave the State of Caitorma

without pnor written approval of your parole agent

4 CRIMINA!L. CONDUCT: You shall not engage m conduct prohibvied by law (state. federal. county or munx:pal) You shall ummechately inform your parole

agen! \! vou are arrested for a fclomy or misdemeanor cnme Conduct! protubited by law may vesul! in parok revocaton even though oo cnminal conviction

occurs

S WEAPONS: You shall not own, use, have access to, or have under vour control. (a) amy type of firearm or instrument or device which a reasonable person

would beheve to be capable of being used as a firearm or amy ammunition which could be used in a firearm (b) any weapon dened in state of federal statutes

SY een

ees

or listed w Califorma Pena! Code Secton | 2020 or anv instrument or devicewhich a reasonable person would bebeve to be capable of being used as a weapon

as defined in Penal Code Secuoe | 2020, (c) amyknife with a blade longer than two inches, except kitchen knives which must be kept in your residence and knives

related to your employment which may be used and carned only in connecton with your employment, or (d) a crossbow of any kind

6. You shall gp the parole agreement contmnig the condipons of parole specified in the Board of Prson Terms (BPT) Rules Secton 2512 and any special

condibons imposed as specified in BPT Rules Secton 2513 Penal Code Section 3060 5 provides that the BIT shall revoke any pnsoner/parolee who refuses

to sign the Nouce and Conditions of Parole You have the nght to appeal the special conditons of parole Special conditons imposed by the Parole and

Community Services Dimsson may de appealed pursuant w Califorma Cade of Regulanons (CCR), Secuon 3084 and 408$ Special Conditions of parole imposed

by the BPT may be appealed pursuant to CCR, Secuon 2050.

I have read or have had read to me and understand the conditions of parole as to me.

co (rm Type) ea5 ey SPB te vot

TO BE COMPLETED BY STAFF:

Does the inmate/parolee have s qualifying disabibty requinng effectrve commumcation”? [YES [NO

If yes. cite the source document and or observabons

What type of accommadaton assistance was provided to achieve effect ve communication to the best of the inmate s parolee’s abslity”

STAFF NAME (Punt x Type STAFF SIGNATURE DATE SIGNED

NAME CHS NO. RELEASE ON OR AFTER

Legs. State of Connecticut

Board of Pardons and Paroles

or Statement of Understanding and Agreement

CONDITIONS OF PAROLE

UPON RELEASE, YOU WILL REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED PAROLE OFFICER AS DIRECTED AND FOLLOW THE

PAROLE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL REPORT TO YOUR PAROLE OFFICER IN PERSON, BY TELEPHONE AND IN WRITING WHENEVER

AND WHEREVER THE PAROLE OFFICER DIRECTS

LEVELS OF SUPERVISION YOUR PAROLE OFFICER WILL ASSIGN YOU TO ONE OF SEVERAL LEVELS OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,

DEPENDING UPON YOUR CIRCUMSTANCE THESE LEVELS OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION MAY INCREASE DEPENDING UPON CHANGES IN

CIRCUMSTANCES, AT THE DISCRETION OF THE PAROLE OFFICER, AND MAY INCLUDE RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, ELECTRONIC MONITORING,

CURFEW, AVOIDANCE OF SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS AND AVOIDANCE OF SPECIFIC SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OR INDIVIDUALS.

RESIDENCE, YOU WILL LIVE IN A RESIDENCE APPROVED BY YOUR PAROLE OFFICER AND YOU WILL COORDINATE ANY CHANGES IN YOUR

PLACE OF RESIDENCE THROUGH YOUR PAROLE OFFICER BEFORE MOVING YOUR PAROLE OFFICER HAS THE RIGHT TO VISIT YOUR

RESIDENCE AT ANY REASONABI F TIME

YOU WILL SEEK. OBTAIN AND MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT THROUGHOUT YOUR PAROLE TERM, OR PERFORM COMMUNITY

SERVICE AS DIRECTED BY YOUR PAROLE OFFICER. YOUR PAROLE OFFICER HAS THE RIGHT TO VISIT YOUR PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR

COMM NITY SERVICE AT ANY REASONABLE TIME

MARITAL/,DOMESTIC STATUS YOU WILL KEEP YOUR PAROLE OFFICER INFORMED OF ANY CHANGES IN YOUR MARITAL OR DOMESTIC

STATUS

HIREARMS PROHIBITED YOU WILL NOT USE, OR HAVE IN YOUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL, FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, OR ANY OTHER

WEAPON OR OBJECT THAT CAN RE USED AS A WEAPON

SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT. YOU WILL PARTICIPATE IN AN ADDICTION SERVICES EVALUATION AND TREATMENT AS DEEMED

APPROPRIATE. YOU WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PROGRAM STAFF AND YOUR PAROLE OFFICER AND WILL NOT MAKE ANY

CHANGES WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE PROGRAM STAFF AND YOUR PAROLE OFFICER YOU WILL ALSO SUBMIT TO

RANDOM URINAL YSIS FOR THE BALANCE OF YOUR PAROLE TERM

MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT. YOU MAY BE RFQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN A MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES EVALUATION AND

TREATMENT AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE. YOU WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PROGRAM STAFF AND YOUR PAROLE OFFICER AND

WILL NOT MAKE ANY CHANGES WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE PROGRAM STAFF AND YOUR PAROLE OFFICER

YOU WILL NOT USE, OR HAVE IN YOUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL, ANY ILLEGAL DRUG, NARCOTIC OR DRUG

PARAPHIRI-ALIA.

- TRAVEL, YOU WILL NOT LEAVE THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF YOUR PAROLE OFFICER

OBEY ALL LAWS. REPORT ANY ARREST YOU WILL OBEY ALL LAWS, AND TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY, FULFILL ALL YOUR LEGAL

OBLIGATIONS. INCLUDING PAYMENT OF ALL APPLICABLE CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY ORDERS YOU WILL NOTIFY YOUR PAROLE

OFFICER WITHIN 48 HOURS OF YOUR ARREST FOR ANY OFFF NSF

GANG AFFILIATION, YOU WILL NOT ASSOCIATE OR AFFILIATE WITH ANY STREET GANG. CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION OR WITH ANY

INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS THEREOF

STATUTORY RELEASE CRITERIA YOUR RELEASE ON PAROLE IS BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE

PROBABILITY THAT YOU WILL LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW AND THAT YOUR RELEASE IS NOT

(INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ENGAGE IN CONDUCT IN THE FUTURE WHICH RENDERS THIS

PREMISE NO LONGER VALID, THEN YOUR PAROLE WILL BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS YOU ALSO MUST ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDU AL CONDITIONS

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE CONDITIONS MAY RESULT IN THE REVOCATION OF PAROLE, AND, IF APPLICABLE.

THE LOSS OF GOOD CONDUCT CREDITS EARNED WHILE IN PRISON.

| HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME. IN MY PRIMARY LANGUAGE. THE CONDITIONS OF PAROLE RELEASE | FULLY

UNDERSTAND MY OBLIGATIONS AND AGREE TO COMPLY WITH THESE CONDITIONS OF RELEASE ON PAROLE. IN ADDITION |!

UNDERSTAND THAT THESE CONDITIONS SHALL APPLY TO ANY TERM OF SPECIAL PAROLE FOR WHICH | MAY HAVE BEEN

SENTENCED TO SERVE

For the Board of Pardons and Paroles Dare Heanng Locauon Date

PAROLE CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

| agree to the following and understand that failure to comply with these conditions will subject me to arrest:

12.

13.

On >

raAmmMo

O OoOoOooo ood

1 will report to the parole officer at such times and mlaces as directed. [ wil] comply with the parole officer's instructions and

respond truthfully to all inquéries from the parole officer.

I will comply with al) lawful orders of the court and the parole board, and all instructions of the parole officer, including all court orders

for the payment of fines, restitution, attomey fees, and child support, and the parole supervision fee mandated by RSA 504-A:13.

| will obtain the parole officer's permission before changing residence or employment or traveling out of state.

| will notify the parole officer immediately of any arrest, summons or questioning by a law enforcement officer.

| will diligently seek and maintain iawful employment, aotify my employer of my parolee status, and support my dependents

to the best uf my ability.

I will not receive, possess, control or transport any real or simulated weapon. explosive, or firearm.

I will be of good conduct and obey all |aws.

I wil! submit to breath, blood or urinalysis testing for the presence of any substance, or provide such other sample for testing,

or submit to such other test or procedure, as may be directed by the parole board or my parole officer. <

] will perma the parole officer to visit my residence at any ume for the purpose of examination and inspecuon in the enforcement

of the conditions of parole, and submit to searches of my person, property, and possessions as requested by the parole officer.

1 will not associate with criminal companions or such other individuals as shall be ordered by the court or parole board.

Prohibited contacts include victims. other parolees or probationers, and other persons known to the board or to the parole

officer as having criminal records. :

I will not illegally use, sell, possess, distribute. or be in the presence of controlled drugs, shall notify the parole officer of any

prescribed medications, and shal! not use alcoholic Deverages to excess.

| waive extradition to the State of New Hampshire from any state in the Unrted States or any other place, agree to return to

New Hampshire if directed by the parole officer, and will be responsible for any and all costs, including all Iravel. in connection

with any extradition request or proceeding.

The following specific conditions are imposed by the court or parole board:

] will participate regularly in Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous to the satisfaction of the parole officer.

] will secure written permission from the parole officer prior to purchasing and/or operating a motor vehicle.

1 will participate in and satisfactorily complete the following program:

I will enroll and participate in mental health counseling on a regular basis to (he satisfaction of the parole officer.

| will not be in the unsupervised company of (female/male) minors at any time.

| will not leave the county without permission of the parole officer.

| will refrain totally from the use of alccholic beverages.

I will execute and deliver all necessary documents to release any and al] otherwise privileged reports relating to

medica! or menta! health care, counseling, employment, or income as may be requesicd by the parole officer.

Other:

If you violate any of the conditions of your paro.¢, you are subyect to arrest, revocation of your parole. and return to the NH State Prison

I hereby certify that | have this date recerved a copy of the rules and regulations of parole. I have read or had read to me the conditions,

and | fully understand and agree to comply with them.

Signature of Witness Signacure of Parolee

Tule Dated

STATE OF OHIO

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

Adult Parole Authority

CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

In consideration of having been granted sup

to the instructions | have received and the {

\ i b ; ; , including Chapter 2923. of the Revised Code relating to conduct involv-

ulations of County Common Pleas Court

uct myself as a responsible law abiding citizen. | understand

Control, the Court may impose an additional pnson term

and place of employment. | will obtain permssion from my

‘ . L understand that if | am a re abscond

escape’ nder section 2921.34 of the Revised Code.

permussion of the Adult Parole Authonty.

lien permission of my

son from my supervising

rolled substance or illegal drugs,

including any unstrument, ay jeUggBed to adm meepare them for administration, unless it is

lawfully prescribed for Mased physician. sing Officer promptly of any such prescription

and | agree to submit to i ity.

law enforcement officer to my

or arrangement with any law

ition of my supervision. unless I have

ll iaeltinteeadaes

lich might place me in the position of violating

obtained permussion in wnung from the Adult Parole Authonity, or

9. | agree to a search. without warrant. of my person, my motor vehicle, or my place of residence by a supervising officer or other

authonzed representative of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction a any ime. Notice Pursuant to section 2967.13!

of the Revised Code, Officers of the Adult Parole Authority may conduct warrantless searches of your person. your piace of

residence, your personal property. or any property which you have been given permission to use if they have spesensile aa .

to belveve that you are not ubuding by the law or terms and condinons of your supervision. —

10 | agree 1o signa release of coridential information trot Ley tht pref Necdcd 1 Dida 5 Pe J

offices.

i OE TONE: Wake B12 uni

influence me to enguge in cnmunal activity. without the pnor permission of my supervising officer

12 L agree tw comply with all financial obligations, including chukd support and/or supervision fees as ordered by any court and/or the

Department of Rehadilitauon and Correction

DRC 3019 (Rev 02/03)

(-y

13. | agree to give all information regarding my financial status to assist in determining my ability to pay specific financial

obhgations, to my supervising officer.

14. | agree to follow all rules and regulations of treatment faciliues or programs of any type in which [ am placed or ordered to aticnd

while under the jurisdiction of the Court. and/or Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

15. | agree to fully participate in, and successfully complete, the following indicated Sanctions/Specia! conditions:

ff.

other state or territory of the United States or in Cowen

be deemed to be a waiver of extradition ities will be

of Ohio to bring about my return to this

y the Financial Obligations listed. Failure, wig negayg any eligibility for an early ter-”

it in civil suit by the Atiorney General's

Financial Obligfions

Type Supervision Fees} Fi Resti Court Gosts |Child Support} Other

Amount

Payment Frequency

Completion Date

| understand that | available to ine y a gneva my supervising officer al any time.

However, | also y not grieve Parole Court Ordered SpedigL QOnditid§s and/or Sanctions, being arrested

for supervision vi lure to follow directions/instructions of my supgt¥ cer, the final decision of previous gnevances,

complaints unrelated to supervision, ¢.g. legislauve action, judicial proceed Arcing, or any matter exclusively within the

jurisdiction of the courts or other agencies, ¢.g. Human Services. The gnevatge pr@fedure has been read and/or explained to me and

| am indicating by my signature thal | understand this process.

| have read or had read to me the conditions of my . I fully understand these conditions and | agree to

follow them. | understand that a violation of any of these conditions may result in the revocation of my

which may result in additional imposed sanctions, including imprisonment. ‘peewee: 7

a bi Idec: ma ow es cnc pb of Gee HH my slp ee '

that I have received a copy of these conditions of supervision. | further tand that | may request a meeting Ising

officer or his/her supervisor if | feel any of the conditions (OTs y hin Pid a ete

at all possible.

| further acknowledge I understand that I am under the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority unul I receive a ceruficate of journal

entry terminating my penod of supervision. Be advised, ORC 2967.16 (By establishes the categones for final release trom post release

contol as “favorable” or “unfavorable.” If you receive an unfavorable final release from yous post release control, this could result in

an enhancement of any future felony sentence.

L I

11.

15.

16.

RULES AND CONDITIONS OF PAROLE

I will report to my parole officer and my employer immediately upon arrival at ay

destination.

I will obey all city, state and federal laws. I agree to immediately report any new

arrests to my parole officer.

I agree not to leave the State of Oklahoma without prior written permission by my officer

and not leave the county without permission of my officer or his/her district office.

I agree to report as directed by my officer in person and in writing on the forms provided

by my officer. I agree to allow the officer to visit at home, work or other convenient

laces.

agree to immediately report in person, in writing or by telephone any changes in

residence, employment or marital status.

I agree not to use or possess drugs other than those legally prescribed by a physician. I

agree not to use alcohol nor go onto the premises where alcoholic beverages are served, .

I agree not to lie or misrepresent the truth to any member of the Pardon and Parole Board,

any employee of the Department of Corrections or any official of the government.

I agree not to associate with persons on parole or probation or persons with criminal

records, communicate with inmates of any penal institution, except members of the

immediate family, unless my parole officer gives permission because of work or other good

reason.

I agree to pay parole fees of $40 per month, payable in cashier's check or money order to

the Department of Corrections Restitution and Accounting.

I will comply with all lawful directives issued by my supervising officer or any member of

the Department of Corrections.

I understand that at any time or place, I am subject to search. Im addition, my vehicle

and any property under my control are subject to search.

I agree to submit to urinalysis or any other substance abuse testing procedures as

required by my parole officer.

I agree to pay, during the term of my parole, all fines and court costs impored by the

court at the time of my conviction.

I understand that Oklahoma State Statute 21 § 1283fd) prohibits anyone under the

supervision of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to own or possess a firearm. I

agree not to own, possess or travel in a vehicle with a firearm or explosives.

Sex offenders will abide by special sex offender rules.

I understand that violations may result in the imposition of sanctions including but not

limited to:

Financiel Planning Reintegration Training Blectronic Monitoring Day Reporting

Mental Health Counseling Intensive Supervision Community Service

Temporary Placement in

Attend AA Attend W/A Victim Lmpsect Panel ® community correctional

Attend MRT Curfew Weexend Incarceration facility or jail for up

GED Courses Intensive Parole Nighttime Incarceration to 30 days Supervision

17. I agree to follow the special condition(s) listed below:

I have read these conditions and understand that I must obey them until the

term of my parole expires. I understand that failure to comply with these

rules and conditions may result in the imposition of intermediate sanctions or

revocation of my parole. I also understand that a finding of guilt, or plea

of guilty or nolo contendere will be evidence that I failed to obey the law.

I will be arrested and sent back to prison to serve the remainder of my

sentence plus any new sentences.

WITNESS AND DATE SIGNATURE

WITNESS AND DATE NUMBER

Parole Type «CertNo»

«Parole Type»

STATE OF TENNESSEE

BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE

Division of Board Operations

Parole Certificate

«Paroleei\ame» —- PRISON NUMBER «TomisID»,

is eligible to be paroled from the «InstLine»

and there ts reasonable probability that said pnsoner wiil remai at liberty without violating the law. It further being the opinion of the Tennessee

Board of Probation and Parole that the parole of this prisoner 1s not incompatible with the welfare of socicty.

It ts hereby ordered that said pnsoner be, and hereby ts paroled, subjective to the following conditons, effective: «EffectiveDate»

13.

I will proceed directly to my destination and upon arnval report immediately to my Probation/Parole Officer or in any event no

later than 72 hours after release.

I will obey the laws of the United States or any state, m which | may be, as well as any municipal ordinances.

I will report all arrests, including traffic violanons, immediately, regardless of the outcome, to my Probation/Parole Officer. |

will, when away from my residence, have on my person my parole identification card and present it to the proper authority.

[ will not own, possess, or carry any type of deadly weapon (guns, rifles, knives) or any illegal weapons.

[ will work steadily at a lawful occupation. If 1 become unemployed, | will immediately report this to my Probation/Parole

Officer and then begin to look for another job.

I will get the permission of my Probation/Parole Officer before changing my residence or employment, or before leaving the

county of my residence or the state.

I will allow my Probation/Parole Officer to visit my home, employment site, or elsewhere, and will carry out all lawful

instructions he/she gives and report to my Probation/Parole Officer as instructed, and will carry out all lawful instructions of the

Admimstrative Case Review Committee, and will comply with a referral to Resource Center programs. if available, by

attending, and will submut to clectrome monitoring or community service if required.

| agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or

law enforcement officer, at any ume.

1 will not use imtoxicants (becr, whiskey, wincs, etc) of any kind to excess. | will not usc or have in my possession manjuana or

other illegal drugs. { will submit to drug screens or drug tests as directed by my Probation/Parole Officer

I wil] waive all extradition nghts and processes and agree to return to Tennessee if at any time prior to my release from parole,

the Board of Probation and Parole directs that | do so.

_ | agree to pay all required fees to the Supervision and Crimunal Injures fund.

. | will not engage in any assaultive, abusive, threatening or intimidating behavior. Nor will I participate in any criminal street

gang related activites as defined by TCA 40-35-121. [ wall not behave m a manner that poses a threat to others or myself.

If paroled to a detainer(s), | will report to the office designated if released from that detainer before my Tennessee parole

expiration date.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

1. «<Spect»

2. <Spec2»

3. Spec3»

4. Spec4»

5. SpecS»

Parole Officer: «ParoleOfficerLine» }

Location: «LocationLines a

| fully understand this order of parole, anc | agree to comply with such condsnons during the penod of my parolc, this the day of

.20____s—s Further | hereby wanve all extradition nghts and process and agree to return to Tennessee voluntarily if at any ume

prior to my release the Tennessee Board of Probation and Paroles directs me to do so. Said parole shall expire upon the sentence expiration date.

~~ WITNESS SIGNATURE 2 ~~ PAROLEE SIGNATURE —

GP-0015 (Reward 2-9") RDA WA

Utah Parole Agreement

| agree to be directed and supervised by agents of the Utah State Department of Corrections and

will abide by the following conditions of my parole:

1. Release: On the day of my release from the institution or confinement, | will report to my

assigned Parole Agent, unless othcrwise approved in wnting from the parole office.

2. Absconding: | will not abscond from parole supervision:

a. Reporting: | will report as directed by the Department of Corrections.

b. Residence: } will establish and reside at a residence of record and will not change my

residence without first obtaining permission from my parole agent.

c. Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of residence, even briefly, or any other statz to

which | am released or transferred without prior written permission from my parole agent.

3. Conduct: I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If arrested, cited or questioned by a

peace officer, | will notify my parole agent within 48 hours of the incident.

4. Home Visits: | will permit visits to my place of residence by agents of Adult Probation and

Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my parole. I will not

interfere with requirement; Ic. Having vicious dogs, perimeter secunty doors, refusing to open

the door, cic.

5. Searches: I will permat agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search my person, residence,

vehicle or any other property under my control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night,

upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of my parole.

6. Weapons: | will not own, possess, have under my control or in my custody any explosive,

firearms, or dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-501, as

amended.

7. Employment: Unless otherwise authonzed by my parole agent, | wil] seck, obtain, and

maintain verifiable, lawful full-time employment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by

my parole agent. | will notify my parole agent of any change in employment within 48 hours.

8. Association: | will not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in criminal

activity or whe has been convicted of a felony, without approval from my parole agent.

9. Chemical Analysis: I will submit to tesung of my breath, body fluids or hair to ensure

compliance with my parole agreement.

10. Truthfulness: I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my dealings with Adult

Probation and Parole.

11. Fees: I will pay supervision fees as determined by the Department of Corrections.

12. Special Conditions: I will | 2 3

| have read, understand, and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of these

conditions of this agreement, the Board of pardons and Parole may revoke my parole or the

Department of Corrections may take other appropnate action against me.

Date Signed USP NO. Date as

Witnessed by Authorized By _ aes

Board of Pardons

(COPLED AND PASTED FROM UTAH’S WEBSITE)

® VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Effecuve: 06/01/1998

Conditions of Parole - Virginia inia Parole Board PB 1 (CCOP Chapter 5)

TO: No.

In accordance with law (Title 53,1-136, Chapter IV, Code of Virgima) you have been granted parole, and

if accepted by you, your release from the Department of Corrections is directed on ;

You are placed under the custody and control of the Virgima Parole Board subyect to the parole conditions

hsted below. While you are on parole the Board may revoke your parole, based on a violation of one or

more of the condivons of parole, based on a finchng by the Board that you are otherwise unfit or unsuitable

to remain on parole supervision. Your parole may be extended beyond the estabhshed parole penod for

good cause shown. You are subject to arrest upon cause shown by the Parole Board or the Parole Officer.

Your minimum date of release from supervision ts___, but you will remain under supervision unt! you

receive the final order of discharge from the Parole Board.

age es ne oe we

| will obey all Federal, State and local laws and ordmances.

; | will report any arrest, includmeg traffic hckets, within 3 days to the Parole Officer

3. | will maintain regular employment and | will notfy the Parole Officer promptly of any changes in my

employment.

4. [| will report in person or by telephone to the Probation and Parole office listed below within tree

working days of my release from incarceration, and as otherwise instructed thereafter.

5. | will permt the Parole Officer to visit my home and place of employment.

6. | will follow the Parole Officer's mstructons and will be truthful, cooperative, and report as

mstructed.

7. [will not use alcoholic beverages to the extent that 1 disrupts or interferes with my employment or

orderly conduct.

8 | will not unlawfully use, possess or distribute controlled substances or related paraphernalia.

9. | will not use, own, possess, transport or carry a firearm.

10. [ will not change my residence without the permission of the Parole Officer. I will not leave the State

of Virgumia or travel outside of a designated area without permission of the Parole Officer

Il. [well not abscond from supervision. | understand | will be considered an absconder when my

whereabouts are no longer known to my supervising officer.

The special condizons ordered by the Parole Board arc:

Your release plan is:

By direction of the

Virgwaa Parole Board

COMMUNITY RELEASE MANAGER. DIVISION OF OPE-ATIONS

| have read (had read and explaxned to me) the above and by my signature or mark below acknowledge

recespt of this and understanding of the requirements upon me.

Any person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a feleay offense committed on/or after January

1, 1995, shall pot be eligible for parole for that offense. A maximum of four and one-half days

sentence credit may be earned for eacb thirty days served for that offease. Pursuant to Virginia

Code section 2.1-382, you are hereby notified that the following parolee status information will be

released upos request on/after July 8, 1996: your name, current address, offense. age, gender, race

and the starting and minimum expiration date of your parole. If you have any questions, please

contact your Prebation and Parole Officer. [INITIAL]

Parolee: Date

Witness. Date

lof | Rev. 11/162002

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Order of Release and Conditions of Mandatory Release Effective 6/1998

-Vi Parole Board PB 1A (CCOP)

FO!

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.