Amicus Curiae Brief — Medellin v. Dretke

an | Supreme Coun i) €

6) FILED

OCT 20 2004

No. 04-5928 LOFFICE OF THE CLix

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Rnited States

JOSE ERNESTO MEDELLIN,

Petitioner,

Vv.

DouG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Brief of Amici Curiae

Amnesty International, Association of the Bar of the City

of New York, Hispanic National Bar Association, Human

Rights First, Human Rights Watch, League of United Latin

American Citizens, Mexican American Bar Association,

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund,

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, and National

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

In Support of Petitioner

KEVIN R. SULLIVAN

Counsel of Record

KING & SPALDING LLP

1700 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 737-0500

Counsel for Amici Curiae

(Additional counsel listed on inside cover.)

William J. Aceves Clifford S. Anderson

225 Cedar Street Dorsey & Whitney LLP

San Diego, CA 92101 50 South Sixth Street

(619) 515-1589 Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 340-2631

Maniano-Florentino Cuellar

Jenny S. Martinez

Allen S. Weiner

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

(650) 723-2465

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SPRUE GOR CUE CGD bcrccninceensiccreseocessssepvenversosnentetens 1

EEE EGE” RPUPIIIE Dc niscvtecesessisatversvescoenccsonvecsonies 2

TE sncvcltbesiicinniesinnhdstiauiiendinphinadtcsbedadissieniimgepieds ‘as 4

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS A DIRECT

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ICJ AND AN

AMERICAN COURT AND THIS COURT’S

RESOLUTIONM OF THE CONFLICT WILL

IMPACT MANY PENDING CASES ..............:ceceeee 4

Il. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY FAILING TO

FOLLOW THE BINDING RULE OF LAW

ESTABLISHED IN AVENA............ccscsssossssesssssserees os 6

Ill. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS HAVE FAILED

IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO UPHOLD

THE RULE OF LAW IN CASES INVOLVING THE

Fe Ge TTR EIOY cstitctrrecinigsisuniettanennteniesnsinios 8

A. The United States Agreed To Be Legally Bound By

The Vienna Convention And The Optional Protocol.... 8

B. The United States Has A Long History Of Promoting

OSHS FOr TRS Reds OF LAW......ccrcccessceccsccssescosssscesesees 9

C. Federal And State Courts Have Repeatedly Failed To

Provide Meaningful Review and Relief For Vienna

I, Sr cenicccisitiidenntiaeneiineeniitteanapsicemensts 10

1. The Supreme Court’s Breard per curiam opinion. 11

2. The ICJ’s LaGrand and Avena decisions.............. 12

3. Federal and state courts have relied on Breard to

disregard LaGrand and Aven@...............cccsceeeeee000 15

CNY sinncsisisiicstinieseonsciidsieeticicnticeninianissnnetznnpevecsete 19

APPENDIX

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) ................ sees P assim

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 Ee ae i]

Federal Republic of Germany v. United States,

SII iccisih tcctisinnn acnesipeapennetsnocconseneseceneceest 4,13

Gulertekin v. Tinnelman-Cooper, 340 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.

IIIa sas cedinadihdlineenectbabtveneindtatseeseueseseneceveeeeqeees 18

Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) ...............0000. 16

Madej v. Schomig, 223 F.Supp.2d 968 (N.D. Ill. 2002).... 13

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ..........ccccccccccceee 7,9

Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912

rs sccenntensntecnneces 15

Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (Sth Cir. 2004). 2, 5, 7, 18

Teague v. Lane, 498 U.S. 288 (1989) .........ccccccceeneseeeeeeees 15

Torres v. Mullin, 157 L.Ed. 2d 454 (2003), cert. denied,

317 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003)...........ccccccceeeeees 4, 5, 13, 16

Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App.

ES ee nD 6

United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58 (ist Cir.), cert.

| TET 18

iV

United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923) .........00ccccece. 15

United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 992 (2001) ooo coccccccccccceccceee. 18

United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000) ..........cccccccccceeeees 16

United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194 (11th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Arnulfo Zuniga v. United

PRED, Se Tak Cae inti es 18

United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.

United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir.),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002) .0.........ccccccccecccceeeee 17,19

United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 977 (2002)................ 5, 17,19

United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (Sth Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 962 (2001).............. 17, 18, 19

United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.

Gattiad, S54 UB. UGGB CHBGE) nnccccccesccscsssnsecsecenmsestnanns 16, 19

United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956 (2000) ........cccccccccecceceee 17, 18, 19

United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991

GED cxsnicansantecrsessiiiethtitiiginientiilaidamnigbiiabiesilsis ieee 16, 19

Vv

United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.

DIED cctnsantinsiitciittitantinsiasimtuniniveitigensnmaiiuaianaiivnne 16, 18, 19

United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied sub nom. Tello v. United States, 538 U.S. 1042

CD cscctchecgcteenedetiiniannssditiaginaitiacintiiciansadisitncsisnians 5,16,18,19

United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.

Pp & LEO ___ 18

INTERNATIONAL CASES

Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals

(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 L.C.J (Judgment of March 31,

Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of

Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.

eS 3, 8,9, 10

United Nations Charter, opened for signature June 26,

1945, art. 94, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 .........eeseeceeeeees 8-9

Vienna Convention in Case Concerning LaGrand (Ger. v.

U.S.), 2001 LC.J. (Judgment of June 27, 2001)......... passim

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for

signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T 77, 596 U.N.T.S. |

, Rae eye ee passim

vi

STATE CASES

Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002), cert.

denied sub nom. Bell v. Virginia, 537 U.S. 1123

ee ee bak ae 17, 18, 19

Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. App.

Ct. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1144 (2004)... 19

Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied sub

nom. Conde v. Florida, 124 S. Ct. 1885 (2004)........0.0..... 19

State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.2d 267 (N.M. 2001),

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 937 (2002) ...........ccccccccccceseeeeeececeeee 17

State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003),

rev. denied, 661 N.W.2d 101 (Wis. 2003) ..........0.000000.. 5,17

Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)......... 5

Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) :.... 18

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 & art. VI, ch. 2 ....cccccecceeeeeeeee 8

ES, CIID, GUT a iii lala )

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Committee on Capital Punishment, Dying Twice:

Conditions On New York's Death Row, 22 PACE L. REV.

Pe Ge ee csnnviciaticiiincniiaiacbiinisicceticieiitidstncieitik teas A-i

Vii

Committee on Capital Punishment Panel Presentation,

Capital Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 |

aE FR. BG Ge cecttcvtctsncenscishinnectsemninetnsirmnints A-i

Committee on Capital Punishment, The Pataki

Administration's Proposals to Expand the Death Penalty, |

55 RECORD ASSOC. BAR N.Y. 129 (2000)..........ccccceceeeeees A-i

Committee on Civil Rights, Legislative Modification of

Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 RECORD ASSOC. BAR ?

EF. GB cccccecinccnssccevicnsstessestinnbiesdescinsdentstetananstenienaviemnnmat A-i

Committee on Civil Rights, The Death Penalty, 39 RECORD

ABBOC. BAR N.Y. 419.....cccccccecccssccccscssscossvevscessscsssconsesesees A-i

William Howard Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Remarks to

National Association of Attorneys General, at 1, (available

at: http://usinfO.state.gOVv)...........--ceseseeeeereeeeeerseneeneenenenes 10

l

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This Brief of Amici Curiae is respectfully submitted in

support of Petitioner by several bar associations as well as

several human rights and civil rights organizations.' Amici

include Amnesty International, the Association of the Bar

of the City of New York, Hispanic National Bar

Association, Human Rights First, Hunan Rights Watch,

League of United Latin American Ciiizens, Mexican

American Bar Association, Mexican American Legal

Defense and Educational Fund, Minnesota Advocates for

Human Rights and the National Association of Criminal

Defense Lawyers. ”

Each of these bar associations and human rights groups

recognize the importance of U.S. compliance with

international law, as indicated by the issues set forth in this

brief. Amici have observed firsthand the issues that arise

when application and interpretation of the Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature

Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (“Vienna

Convention’) intersects with state and federal criminal law.

Such issues arise on an almost daily basis. Without

appropriate guidance from this Court, however, the state

and federal courts have frequently failed to provide

meaningful review and appropriate relief for Vienna

' Amici Curiae certify that this brief is filed with written consent of all

parties, said consents having been lodged with the Court. Supreme

Court Rule 37.2(a). They also certify that no counsel for either party

authored the brief in whole or in part and that no person or entity, other

than amici curiae, their members, and their counsel, made any

monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

Supreme Court Rule 37.6.

? A complete description of Amici Curiae is located in the Appendix.

Convention violations.

The participation of Amici Curiae will assist this Court

in understanding the profound implications and practical

consequences of these failings, and what is required to

remedy these shortcomings.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Avena, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ’)

definitively interpreted the Vienna Convention as

mandating specific relief in the case of Petitioner Jose

Ernesto Medellin (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Medellin”) and 50

other Mexican death row inmates in U.S. prisons who were

not informed of their right to consular assistance. See Case

Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.

U.S.), 2004 LCJ. (Judgment of March 31, 2004)

(“Avena”);? Vienna Convention, art. 36, para. 1. In

Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (Sth Cir. 2004), however,

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disregarded the Vienna

Convention and the ICJ in denying Mr. Medellin’s

application for post-conviction relief on the grounds that

any violation was procedurally defaulted and was not an

individually enforceable right. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling,

and similar decisions of many other state and federal

courts, are in direct conflict with the ICJ’s ruling in Avena

and the international obligations of the United States under

the Vienna Convention, thereby necessitating this petition

for certiorari.

Long before Petitioner's case arose, the political

branches of the United States government made the policy

choice entrusted to them by the United States Constitution

> The opinions of the International Court of Justice are available at

WWw.icj-cij.org.

3

to ensure reciprocal protection for U.S. citizens abroad by

negotiating and ratifying the Vienna Convention. The

political branches also negotiated and ratified the related

Optional Protocol] to the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of

Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.

325, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (“Optional Protocol”).

Significantly, the Optional Protocol vests the International

Court of Justice with jurisdiction to resolve disputes over

the interpretation and application of the Vienna

Convention.

In recent years, federal and state courts have largely

either ignored or failed to respond to repeated violations of

the Vienna Convention despite their constitutional duty to

uphold the rule of law. These courts have frequently relied

on the Supreme Court’s per curiam denial of relief in

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), as authority for

failing to address Vienna Convention violations. Breard

has also been the basis for these courts to disregard the

ICJ’s 2001 decision interpreting the Vienna Convention in

Case Concerning LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 LCJ.

(Judgment of June 27, 2001) (“LaGrand”’) and the 2004

decision in Avena. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s denial

of certiorari in cases involving Vienna Convention issues

has left the per curiam decision in Breard as its only

significant statement on the Vienna Convention. The lower

courts’ confusion on these issues and conflicting rulings

warrant clarification from this Court.

4

ARGUMENT

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS A DIRECT CONFLICT

BETWEEN THE ICJ AND AN AMERICAN

COURT, AND THIS COURT’S RESOLUTION OF

THE CONFLICT WILL IMPACT MANY

PENDING CASES.

This is the night case and the nght time for the Supreme

Court to address these important issues.*

First, and foremost, Mr. Medellin’s case presents a

direct conflict between the ICJ’s interpretation of what

must happen to Mr. Medellin as a result of the

acknowledged Vienna Convention violations and the Fifth

Circuit’s interpretation thereof. It also presents the broader

* The Avena judgment eliminates any concerns about a premature

certiorari petition based on provisional measures orders from the ICJ.

The instant Petition thus contrasts sharply with the procedural posture

of Torres v. Mullin, 157 L.Ed. 2d 454, 458 (2003) (Breyer, J.,

dissenting) (“Depending on how the ICJ decides Mexico’s related case

against the United States . . . 1 may well vote to grant certiorari in this

case.”). Nor does the case present the problem associated with what,

until 2001, was the uncertain legal status of whether ICJ provisional

measures orders had binding effect. See Federal Republic of Germany

v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting

joined by Stevens, J.) (“*[A)n order of the International Court of Justice

indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a

basis for judicial relief.’ (quoting letter from Solicitor General filed

Mar. 3, 1999, with Clerk of Supreme Court)); id. at 112 (Souter, J.,

concurring joined by Ginsburg, J.) (stating “[we] have taken into

consideration the position of the Solicitor General on behalf of the

United States”). In its final judgment in LaGrand, the ICJ determined,

contrary to the position previously advanced by the United States, that

ICJ provisional measures orders are legally binding. LaGrand,

para. 109, 110.

5

question of whether and how federal and state courts must

adhere to the ICJ’s judgments regarding the Vienna

Convention in other pending cases, including those of the

50 other Mexican nationals addressed in the ICJ’s Avena

decision.

Second, U.S. courts and practitioners need the guidance

that only Supreme Court review would provide. The

uncertain status of the law surrounding the application of

the Vienna Convention in the courts of this country is

evidenced by the substantial number of federal decisions

and state cases that have generated petitions for certiorari,

all without success, over the past six years. Moreover, the

lower courts have issued many calls for Supreme Court

guidance, most notably in Medellin itself. See Medellin,

371 F.3d at 280 (“We are bound to follow the precedent

[i.e., the Supreme Court’s Breard decision] until taught

otherwise by the Supreme Court”) (emphasis added). See

also United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 886 (8th Cir.

2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tello v. United States, 538

U.S. 1042 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has not directly

addressed the issue” of individual rights); United States v.

Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 535 U.S. 977 (2002) (“Confronted in recent years

with numerous claims based upon the Vienna Convention

without the benefit of a definitive statement from the

Supreme Court . . .”); State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487,

493 (Wis. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 661 N.W.2d 101 (Wis.

2003); Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1; 19 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000) (“The effect of a treaty and the consequences of its

violation are ultimately federal questions that only the

United States Supreme Court can finally and definitively

answer.”). Even members of this Court have called for

such review. See Torres v. Mullin, 157 L.Ed. 2d 454, 458

(2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Given the international

implications of the issues raised, I believe further

6

information, analysis, and consideration are necessary.”’).

Finally, further consideration of these Vienna

Convention issues in the lower courts would not be

beneficial. The lower courts have repeatedly staked out

positions contrary to LaGrand and now the Fifth Circuit

has done so as well with respect to Avena.” Thus, little is

likely to change in light of Avena absent action by this

Court. Nor is it likely the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna

Convention will change; indeed, Avena confirms that it will

not.

In sum, judicial review is necessary by the Supreme

Court to address a host of critical issues that have profound

national and international implications — to address whether

the Vienna Convention confers individual nights, to

determine whether and in what circumstances the

procedural default doctrine is ever applicable to Vienna

Convention claims, to establish what an appropriate

prejudice standard is, and to resolve what remedies are

warranted for proven Vienna Convention violations.

II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY FAILING TO

FOLLOW THE BINDING RULE OF LAW

ESTABLISHED IN AVENA.

* In Torres v. Oklahoma, however, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal

Appeals concluded that prior precedent cannot control in the case of a

Mexican national subject to the Avena judgment. See Torres v.

Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)

(attached at Petitioner’s Appendix 142A-163A). The Torres decision

provides a further basis to grant review to resolve the conflict between

the Oklahoma court and the Fifth Circuit over the degree to which

Avena binds U.S. courts faced with violations of Article 36 of the

Vienna Convention.

5

On May 20, 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for a certificate of

appealability that had been previously denied by the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See

Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (Sth Cir. 2004). Both

courts acknowledged a Vienna Convention violation but

declined to provide a remedy. This was error.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision directly contradicts the

Avena final judgment that mandates specific relief in Mr.

Medellin’s case. Among other errors, the Fifth Circuit: (1)

failed to correct the lower court’s use of the procedural

default rule; and (2) failed to acknowledge that the Vienna

Convention creates individually enforceable rights. To be

faithful to Avena, the Fifth Circuit was obligated to order

the lower court to engage in review and reconsideration of

Petitioner’s case that would fully consider whether the

Vienna Convention violations impaired the fairness of his

underlying conviction and sentence. See Avena, para. 138.

The Fifth Circuit’s utter disregard for Avena’s key holdings

warrants granting certiorari so that this Court may correct

these manifest errors of law that have had a fundamental

impact on Mr. Medellin’s case and on the cases of other

foreign nationals on death row in the United States. This

review will also provide the Court with the opportunity to

clarify the appropriate prejudice standard to apply when

considering Vienna Convention violations.

In sum, the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to grant a certificate

of appealability to address the lower court errors

concerning the Vienna Convention violations in Mr.

Medellin’s case merits Supreme Court review. A grant of

certiorari would provide this Court with a needed

opportunity to clarify the status of the law and would

ensure U.S. compliance with its legal obligations. See

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

8

Ill.FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS HAVE FAILED

IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO

UPHOLD THE RULE OF LAW IN CASES

INVOLVING THE VIENNA CONVENTION.

A. The United States Agreed To Be Legally Bound By

The Vienna Convention And The Optional Protocol.

Over 30 years ago, the United States, through the power

granted to its Executive and Legislative branches of

government by the United States Constitution, made the

policy choice to sign and ratify the Vienna Convention,

making it and its attendant provisions the supreme law of

the land. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 & art. VI, cl. 2.

The Vienna Convention provides that foreign nationals

must be informed of their nght to communicate with

consular officials when they are arrested or detained in any

manner. Vienna Convention, art. 36, para. 1. It also

requires that competent authorities notify the appropriate

consulate if the foreign national so requests. Jd. Finally, it

entitles consular officials to visit their nationals, to

communicate with them, and to arrange for their legal

representation. Jd. Thus, the Vienna Convention serves

two broad goals. Through consular assistance, foreign

nationals can gain a greater awareness of the nature and

scope of the legal proceedings that affect them. At the

same time, consular assistance allows foreign governments

to monitor the safety and fair treatment of their nationals in

such proceedings.

Significantly, the United States has also signed and

ratified the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention.

By doing so, it recognized that the ICJ’s “interpretation or

application of the Convention” is authoritative. Optional

Protocol, Preamble; art. I. Moreover, under Article 94 of

the United Nations Charter, the United States also has

9

agreed to comply with ICJ decisions in cases to which it is

a party. United Nations Charter, opened for signature June

26, 1945, art. 94, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.

Under international law, the implications of U.S.

ratification of the Vienna Convention and the Optional

Protocol are significant. Specifically, the United States has

a binding legal obligation to comply with the Vienna

Convention and the ICJ's decision in Avena.

B. The United States Has A Long History Of

Promoting Respect For The Rule Of Law.

Review by this Court is necessary to demonstrate that

the United States continues to take its international legal

obligations seriously. Regardless of how this Court

resolves the merits of Petitioner’s case, it would send a

damaging message Overseas were this Court to decline even

to review a judgment of a federal appellate court that is in

direct conflict with a binding decision of the ICJ. In our

federal system, it is plainly the function of this Court to

interpret federal law, including treaties, and to ensure

compliance by state officials. See U.S. Const. art II, § 2,

cl. 2 (the “judicial Power shall extend to all . . . Treaties

made . . .”); id., art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A}]l Treaties made . . . shall

be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every

State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution

or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”);

Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-

19 (1958).

Throughout its history, the United States has

consistently asserted that violations of international law

have serious consequences for international order. The

United States has also promoted respect for international

law because it reflects important American values. It is

expected, therefore, that the United States will be a leader

10

in complying with the obligations of the Vienna

Convention and the Optional Protocol.

Regrettably, this has not occurred. Review in this case,

therefore, 1s warranted so that the Supreme Court may

uphold the .ule of law and “the supreme Law of the Land.”

In so doing, the Court will also demonstrate to “the [ICJ]

and the world that the United States does indeed take its

international law responsibilities seriously.” William

Howard Taft IV, U.S. Department of State, Legal Adviser,

Remarks to National Association of Attorneys General, at |

(available at: http://usinfo.state.gov).

C. Federal And State Courts Have Repeatedly Failed

To Provide Meaningful Review and Relief For

Vienna Convention Violations.

Despite this country’s deep commitment to the rule of

law, federal and state courts in this country have failed to

provide meaningful review and relief for repeated and

undisputed violations of the Vienna Convention. In doing

so, they have implicitly relied upon, or expressly cited to,

this Court’s 1998 per curiam opinion in Breard.

Conversely, they have all but ignored the ICJ’s subsequent

decision in LaGrand. And, as demonstrated by Petitioner’s

case, Avena is subject to a similar fate absent intervention

by the Court. The failure of U.S. courts to abide by ICJ

decisions has led to substantial conflict between the ICJ

and American courts, leaving uncertain the rule of law

regarding the Vienna Convention in this country. The

Supreme Court’s repeated denial of certiorari in cases

where Vienna Convention issues were raised below has

only contributed to this uncertainty. Review by the Court

is necessary to resolve the conflict and ie answer the

important and recurring legal questions raised by this case.

11

1. The Supreme Court’s Breard per curiam opinion.

More than six years ago, this Court denied the petition

for a wnt of certiorari of Angel Francisco Breard, who was

seeking relief from his death sentence on the grounds of

Article 36 Vienna Convention violations. See Breard, 523

U.S. at 373, 378-379.° Breard, which was rendered before

the ICJ had spoken on the interpretation of the Vienna

Convention, has created confusion in the lower courts.

In stating that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim,

this Court expressed the general view that Article 36(2) of

the Vienna Convention does not bar the application of

procedural default rules to Convention claims. Jd. at 375.

The Court noted that the application of American

procedural default rules was permissible “absent a clear and

express statement to the contrary.” Jd. Moreover, the

Court observed that (at least at that point in time) such

procedural default rules could theoretically be harmonized

with the language of the Vienna Convention itself so long

as they allow “‘full effect to be given to the purposes for

which the rights accorded under’” Article 36 of the

Convention were intended. /d. at 375 (citing Article 36(2),

[1970], 21 U.S.T. at 101).’

* In Breard, the Court also denied Paraguay’s petition for writ of

certiorari that argued its rights under the Vienna Convention were

violated as a result of Breard’s conviction. Additionally, the Court

denied Breard’s petition for an original writ of habeas corpus,

Paraguay’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, and the

accompanying stay applications of both Breard and Paraguay. Breard,

$23 at 378-379.

’ The Court also stated that Breard’s claim was procedurally barred by

observing that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), enacted long after the Vienna Convention became

effective in the United States, precluded federal habeas review of

12

When it rendered its Breard decision, however, the

Supreme Court did not have the benefit of a final ICJ

merits judgment concerning the nature and scope of the

Vienna Convention and its attendant obligations.

2. The ICJ’s LaGrand and Avena decisions.

In 1999, Germany instituted proceedings before the ICJ

against the United States, alleging violations of the Vienna

Convention in the case of two German nationals who had

been sentenced to death in Arizona.® One of the two

German nationals was executed prior to the issuance of the

ICJ’s provisional measures order. While the ICJ

subsequently issued a provisional measures order

requesting that the United States delay the execution of the

second German national pending its final resolution of the

case, it did not rule on the merits of the underlying claim at

that time. ”

Breard’s conviction and sentence. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. The

Fifth Circuit did not rely on the AEDPA in its ruling. In any event, no

AEDPA bar could apply in this case because Petitioner Medellin raised

his Vienna Convention claim in state post-conviction proceedings, filed

a supporting affidavit, and requested an evidentiary hearing, which the

state court denied. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Medellin v.

Dretke, --- U.S. --- (2004) (No. 04-5928).

* Walter and Karl LaGrand were German nationals who, like Mr.

Medellin here, were never informed of their right to communicate with

their country’s consular officials, either when they were arrested and

charged with capital murder or when they were sentenced to death.

LaGrand, para. 15.

* When this provisional measures order was issued, it was unclear

whether such orders were legally binding. The IC) would subsequently

rule on the binding nature of its provisional measures orders in its

merits ruling in LaGrand.

13

Before the ICJ had completed its consideration of the

merits of the underlying claim, the Supreme Court, again in

a per curiam decision, denied Germany’s eleventh hour

motion for leave to file a bill of complaint and motion for

preliminary injunction to delay the execution of Walter

LaGrand. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United

States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999) (per curiam). LaGrand was

executed following this Court’s denial of Germany’s

request for relief.

On June 27, 2001, the ICJ issued its final judgment in

LaGrand. The Court found that the United States had

violated the Vienna Convention. LaGrand, para. 73.

Among its holdings, the ICJ held Article 36(1)(b) creates

and confers individual rights to consular notification for

detained nationals, and does not simply accord rights to the

sending State. /d., para. 77,91. The ICJ also made clear

that a prejudice inquiry is irrelevant for determining the

threshold issue of whether there has been a Vienna

Convention violation. /d., para. 72-74. It further held that

the United States failed to carry out its obligations under

the Vienna Convention when it applied the “procedural

default” doctrine to preclude courts from giving full effect

to the right of consular access. Id., para. 91.

LaGrand establishes that procedural default rules

cannot interfere with the obligation of states to give “full

effect to the purposes” picicdienemonrones se

portion of the ICJ’s ruling “undermin[es] a

of the Court’s per curiam decision in Breard.' See Made}

"© The rationale for the ICJ’s holding is simple: the United States

cannot shift to the foreign national the consequences of its own

violation. See Torres, 157 L.Ed. 2d at 455 (2003) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) (“Applying the procedural default rule in Article 36 claims .

. . is manifestly unfair . . . [because] . . . a foreign national who is

presumptively ignorant of his right to notification should not be

14

v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002); cf

Breard, 523 U.S. at 375. Regarding remedies, the ICJ held

that, for individuals subject to prolonged detentions or

convicted and sentenced to severe penalties, “it would be

incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and

reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking

account of the violation of the rights set forth in the

Convention” and that “an apology is not sufficient.”

LaGrand, para. 123, 125.

Three years later, the ICJ revisited the Vienna

Convention in an action filed by Mexico against the United

States and removed any doubt about the legality of the U.S.

conduct. In Avena, the ICJ held that the United States

violated the Vienna Convention in Mr. Medellin’s case as

well as in the cases of 50 other Mexican nationals. See

Avena, para. 153. To remedy these violations, the ICJ ruled

that the United States must provide “by means of its own

choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions

and sentences of the Mexican nationals” and take into

account the rights set forth in Article 36 as well as relevant

portions of the Avena judgment. Jd., para. 153(9). The ICJ

specified that review and reconsideration must be effective

and provide “a procedure which guarantees that full weight

is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna

Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such

review and reconsideration.” Jd., para. 139. The ICJ also

reaffirmed that the procedural default rule cannot be used

to preclude a defendant from raising a Vienna Convention

violation. Id., para. 134. Application of procedural default

rules would effectively nullify the right to review and

deemed to have waived the Article 36 protections [he does not know

about] simply because he failed to assert that right in a state criminal

proceeding.”’).

15

reconsideration as mandated by the ICJ.

The ICJ stated, moreover, that “the judicial process” is

best suited to undertake review and reconsideration. /d.,

para. 140. The ICJ emphasized that the executive

clemency process is “not sufficient in itself to serve as an

appropniate means of ‘review and reconsideration.’” /d.,

para. 143. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the courts to

ensure meaningful review and reconsideration. Finally, the

ICJ stated that its conclusions not only applied to the cases

of the Mexican nationals before it but also to the cases of

other foreign nationals subject to similar situations in the

United States. Jd., para. 151.

3. Federal and state courts have relied on Breard to

disregard LaGrand and Avena.

Given this Court’s admonition in Breard, that “we

should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of

an international treaty rendered by an international court

with jurisdiction to interpret such,” 523 U.S. at 375, it is

clear that LaGrand and Avena have significantly altered the

legal landscape since this Court last spoke on these issues.

But in the absence of more definitive guidance from this

Court, the lower courts have continued to rely on Breard,

despite its lack of precedential value, as the Fifth Circuit

erroneously has done in Petitioner’s case. See discussion

supra Part Il. As a result, the lower courts remain

uncertain about, or simply ignore, the impact of the ICJ’s

decisions in LaGrand and Avena.

It is well-settled that, to the extent Breard is a decision

denying certiorari, it lacks precedential value. See Teague

v. Lane, 498 U.S. 288, 296 (1989); Maryland v. Baltimore

Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950); United States

v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). Moreover, Breard

was not derived from full briefing, argument, consideration,

16

or deliberation, see Breard, 523 U.S. at 379-81 (Stevens, J.

and Breyer, J., dissenting), and thus is a less than solid

precedent in other respects as well. See Hohn v. United

States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (“We have felt less

constrained to follow precedent where . . . the opinion was

rendered without full briefing or argument.”). Nonetheless,

the lower federal and state courts have consistently relied

on Breard to disregard the ICJ’s opinions in LaGrand and

Avena.

A review of the case law reveals substantial conflict

between U.S. courts and the ICJ on the nature and scope of

the Vienna Convention. See Torres, 157 L.Ed. 2d at 455

(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“There is

obvious tension between the holding in Breard and the

purpose of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention” as

interpreted by the ICJ.). Relying on Breard, several federal

circuits have sidestepped the question of whether the

Vienna Convention § creates judicially enforceable

individual rights, choosing either not to reach the question,

or merely assuming an answer without deciding the issue.

Such courts have rationalized their approach by concluding

that deciding the issue was not necessary to their ultimate

case disposition. See, e.g., Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 886-87;

United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 987-88

(10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045,

1048 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1182 (2001);

United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000); United

States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 884-85 (9th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000).

Several federal circuits and some state courts have

either held, or at least intimated, that the Vienna

Convention does not create individual rights, thus directly

conflicting with the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty.

These courts have relied upon a variety of distinct theories:

17

the presumption against private rights under international

treaties; the contention that the Vienna Convention does not

explicitly create individual rights and is ambiguous on that

question; the assertion that the Convention’s ratification

and legislative history do not support a finding of

individual rights; the historical position of the executive

branch of the United States that the Convention does not

create individual rights; the assertion that other countries do

not recognize such rights or provide a remedy in their

criminal justice systems; and the argument that this Court

has not allowed even signatory nations to the Convention to

pursue actions. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte-Acero,

296 F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (11th Cir.) (suggesting that Vienna

Convention may not create individual rights), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 1038 (2002); United States v. De La Pava, 268

F.3d 157, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Emuegbunam, 268

F.3d at 394 (concluding that Vienna Convention does not

create individual rights); United States v. Jimenez-Nava,

243 F.3d 192, 198 (Sth Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 533 U.S.

962 (2001); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-66 (ist

Cir.) (en banc) (suggesting that Vienna Convention may

not create individual rights), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956

(2000). See also Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695,

706 (Va. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003)

(concluding LaGrand did not hold that Article 36 creates

legally enforceable individual rights); State v. Navarro, 659

N.W.2d 487, 493 (Wis. Ct. App.) (same), rev. denied, 661

N.W.2d 101 (Wis. 2003); State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33

P.3d 267, 274 (N.M. 2001) (concluding that Vienna

Convention does not create individual rights), cert. denied,

535 U.S. 937 (2002).

Stull other U.S. courts have continued to use the

procedural default doctrine to avoid reaching the merits of

Vienna Convention claims, notwithstanding the ICJ’s clear

holdings on this issue after Breard. These courts include

18

the Fifth Circuit in this very case.'’ See Medellin, 371 F.3d

at 279-80. See also Gulertekin v. Tinnelman-Cooper, 340

F.3d 415, 425-26 (6th Cir. 2003); Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d

703, 706-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).

U.S. courts have also relied on Breard to bar

meaningful review and reconsideration — even in cases of

undisputed Vienna Convention violations — by requiring, as

a procedural prerequisite to obtaining such review, a

preliminary demonstration of prejudice, such as proof that

the violations impacted the outcome of a trial or deprived a

defendant of a federal constitutional night. See, e.g., Ortiz,

315 F.3d at 878; Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 987;

United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 992 (2001); United States

v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir.

2000), cert. denied sub nom. Arnulfo Zuniga v. United

States, 531 U.S. 1131 (2001); United States v. Pagan, 196

F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283

(2000); United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 67-68 (ist

Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 887 (1999); Bell, 563 S.E.2d at

'! Indeed, the Petitioner's case also reveals how courts continue to rely

on outdated interpretations of the Vienna Convention. In Medellin, the

Fifth Circuit relied on its decision in United States v. Jimenez-Nava,

243 F.3d 192 (Sth Cir. 2001), to conclude that Article 36 of the Vienna

Convention confers no individually enforceable rights “until either the

Court [i.e., the Fifth Circuit) sitting en banc or the Supreme Court say

otherwise.” Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280. In Jimenez-Nava, the Fifth

Circuit relied on a First Circuit case, United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56

(1st Cir. 2000), as well as the State Department's interpretation of the

Vienna Convention that was submitted in Li. See Jimenez-Nava, 243

F.3d at 197. But the State Department's interpretation of the Vienna

Convention can no longer be viewed as persuasive or even up-to-date

since it was issued prior to the ICJ’s opinions in both LaGrand and

Avena.

19

707. Such ruiings contradict the ICJ, which has held that,

for undisputed Vienna Convention violations, a showing of

prejudice is not a prerequisite to obtaining the threshold

procedural relief of review and reconsideration. See

LaGrand, para. 72-74, 125.

Finally, notwithstanding that this Court left open the

possibility that in certain cases a Vienna Convention

violation could lead to “overturning of a final judgment of

conviction,” Breard, 523 U.S. at 377, lower courts have

routinely held that dismissals of indictments and

suppression of evidence or confessions are not permissible

remedies. See, e.g., Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 886-87; Duarte-

Acero, 296 F.3d at 1281-82; De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 165;

Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 390-91; Minjares-Alvarez, 264

F.3d at 985-87; Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 198-200; Lawal,

231 F.3d at 1048-49; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at

885-88; Li, 206 F.3d at 60; Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930,

953 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, Conde v. Florida, 124 S. Ct.

1885 (2004); Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785 N.E.2d 1237,

1245 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1144

(2004); Bell, 563 S.E.2d at 707. As Avena recently

clarified, while some showing of prejudice may be required

to obtain substantive relief, what is crucial in the review

and reconsideration process is the existence of “a procedure

which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation

of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever

may be the actual outcome of such review and

reconsideration.” Avena, para. 121, 139 (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should

grant Mr. Medellin’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

20

Dated: October 20, 2004

Respectfully submitted,

William J. Aceves Kevin R. Sullivan

225 Cedar Street Counsel of Record

San Diego,CA 92101 King & Spalding LLP

(619) 515-1589 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 737-0500

Clifford S. .\nderson Maniano-Florentino Cuel.ar

Dorsey & Whitney LLP Jenny S. Martinez

50 South Sixth Street Allen S. Weiner

Minneapolis, MN 55402 559 Nathan Abbott Way

(612) 340-2631 Stanford, CA 94305-8610

(650) 723-2465

Counsel for Amici Curiae

APPENDIX

A-i

APPENDIX

List of Amici Curiae

Bar Associations

Association of the Bar of the City of New York

The Association of the Bar of the City of New York

(“the Association”) is a professional association of more

than 22,000 attorneys from nearly every state and more

than 50 countries. Much of the Association’s work is

accomplished through approximately 170 committees. One

of these is dedicated to issues related to capital punishment.

This attention to the death penalty reflects the fact that the

justice system can do nothing more consequential than to

take a life. The Association is committed to the rule of law

on the national and international landscape and to the

principle that if the death penalty is applied, it must be

applied in a fair and impartial manner. Thus, the

Association has long been concerned with capital

punishment and its application. The Association has taken

the lead in the analysis of practical and legal issues relating

to the death penalty. See, e.g., Committee on Capital

Punishment Panel Presentation, Capital Punishment in the

Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH. LAW. 187 (2003); Committee

on Capital Punishment, Dying Twice: Conditions On New

York's Death Row, 22 PACE L. REV. 347 (Spring 2002)

(also at 56 Record Assoc. Bar N.Y. 358); Committee on

Capital Punishment, The Pataki Administration's Proposals

to Expand the Death Penalty, 55 RECORD Assoc. BAR N.Y.

129 (2000); Committee on Civil Rights, Legislative

Modification of Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44

RECORD ASSOC. BAR N.Y. 848 (1989); Committee on Civil

Rights, The Death Penalty, 39 RECORD Assoc. BAR N.Y.

419 (1984).

ate eee eee <2 ee ee

A-il

Hispanic National Bar Association

The Hispanic National Bar Association (“HNBA”) is an

incorporated, non-profit, national association representing

the interest of over 25,000 Hispanic American attorneys,

judges, law professors, and law students in the United

States and Puerto Rico. The HNBA serves Hispanic

attorneys, judges, law professors and law students,

providing a forum for the exchange of ideas, the

administration of justice and the promotion of integration

of Hispanics in the study, practice, instruction and

adjudication of law.

Mexican American Bar Association

The Mexican American Bar Association (“MABA”)

was established in 1959 as a legal organization committed

to helping the Latino community. Its mission is the

advancement of Latinos in the legal profession and the

empowerment of the Latino community through service

and advocacy. Today, MABA is one of the largest and

most prominent legal associations in the nation. -MABA

members include over 700 lawyers, judges, politicians, and

business people of various ethnic backgrounds, serving in

their respective fields of law and holding prominent

positions of leadership in local, state and federal

government. MABA is committed to promoting respect for

the rule of law and the application of the law to all people.

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

(“NACDL”) is a non-profit corporation with more than

11,400 members nationwide and 28,000 affiliate members

in 50 states, including private criminal defense attorneys,

public defenders, and law professors. The American Bar

Association recognizes the NACDL as an affiliate

A-iil

organization and awards it full representation in the ABA’s

House of Delegates. NACDL was founded in 1958 to

promote criminal-law research, to advance and disseminate

knowledge in the area of criminal practice, and to

encourage integrity, independence, and expertise among

criminal-defense counsel. NACDL is _ particularly

dedicated to advancing the proper, efficient, and just

administration of justice, including issues involving the

death penalty. In furtherance of this and other objectives,

the NADCL files approximately 35 amicus curiae briefs

each year, in this Court and others, addressing a wide

variety of criminal-justice issues.

Human Rights and Civil Rights Organizations

Amnesty International

Amnesty International USA is the U.S. section of

Amnesty International, a Nobel Prize-winning organization

with more than 1.8 million members, supporters and

subscribers in over 150 countries and territories throughout

the world. Amnesty International’s mission is to undertake

research and action focused on preventing and ending grave

abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity,

freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from

discrimination, within the context of its work to promote all

human nights. Amnesty International is privately funded

and is independent of any political ideology or economic

interest. In line with the organization’s international focus,

Amnesty International USA joins this brief on matters of

international law.

Human Rights First

Since 1978, Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers

Committee for Human Rights) has worked in the United

States and abroad to create a more secure and humane

A-iv

world by advancing justice, human dignity, and respect for

the rule of law. It protects refugees in flight from

persecution and repression and in seeking legal relief in the

United States; works to ensure that domestic legal systems

incorporate stronger human nghts protections; helps build a

stronger international system of justice and accountability

for the worst human nghts crimes; works with and supports

human rights activists who fight for basic freedoms and

peaceful change at the national level; and promotes fair

economic practices through stronger safeguards for

workers’ rights. Human Rights First has filed numerous

amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court and other

U.S. courts and international bodies, and believes this case

presents compelling issues of justice for victims of human

nights violations.

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) is a _ non-profit

organization established in 1978 that investigates and

reports on violations of fundamental human rights in over

70 countries worldwide with the goal of securing the

respect of these nghts for all persons. It is the largest

international human rights organization based in the United

States. By exposing and calling attention to human rights

abuses committed by state and non-state actors, HRW

seeks to bring international public opinion to bear upon

offending governments and others and thus bring pressure

on them to end abusive practices. HRW has filed amicus

briefs before various bodies, including U.S. courts and

international tribunals.

League of United Latin American Citizens

The League of United Latin American Citizens

(“LULAC’”’) is the largest and oldest Hispanic civil nghts

organization in the United States. With over 115,000

A-vV

members in virtually every state of the nation, LULAC

advances the economic condition, educational attainment,

political influence, health and civil mghts of Hispanic

Americans. For more than 75 years, LULAC’s members

have sought to ensure the civil mnghts of Hispanics

throughout the United States, and foster respect for the rule

of law. We believe in the democratic principal of

individual freedom and are obligated to promote, protect

and assure the constitutional and statutory nghts of all

Hispanics, regardless of immigration status.

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational

Fund

The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational

Fund (“MALDEP’”) is a national civil rights organization

established in 1968. Its principal objective is to secure,

through litigation, advocacy, and education, the civil nghts

of Latinos living in the United States. MALDEF has

litigated numerous cases in the area of immigrants’ nghts

since the organization’s founding. Preserving the

constitutional due process rights of immigrants is a primary

goal of MALDEF’s Immigrants’ Rights program.

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights (“Minnesota

Advocates”) is a volunteer-based non-profit organization

committed to the impartial promotion and protection of

international human rights standards and the rule of law.

Minnesota Advocates conducts a broad range of innovative

programs to promote human rights in the United States and

around the world, including human nghts monitoring and

fact finding, direct legal representation, education and

training, and publications. Minnesota Advocates has

produced more than 50 reports documenting human nghts

practices in more than 25 countries; educated more than

A-VI

10,000 students and community members on human nights

issues; and provided legal representation to thousands of

low-income individuals. Minnesota Advocates’ Death

Penalty Project was organized in 1991 to recruit Minnesota

attorneys to assist death row inmates with their post-

conviction appeals. Minnesota Advocates’ volunteers have

provided pro bono representation to dozens of death row

inmates in 10 states. In addition to working to protect the

rights of capital defendants in death penalty states, the

project provides education on death penalty issues and

actively advocates for the elimination of the death penalty

in the United States. Minnesota Advocates has previously

submitted amicus curiae briefs in numerous cases,

including to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

concerning the request of the government of Mexico for an

advisory opinion related to a Mexican national on death

row in the United States.