Amicus Curiae Brief — Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.
Supreme Court brief2006
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
———___
upreme Court. S
FiLeEp
IN THE | nae
FEOF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the Binited inte
JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, ANDREW SCHOLBERG, TIMOTHY MURPHY,
and THE PRO-LIFE ACTION LEAGUE, INC.,
Petitioners,
Vv
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., ef ai.,
Respondents.
OPERATION RESCUE,
Petitioners,
Vv
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., ef al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF CONSISTENT LIFE,
THE CATHOLIC-LABOR NETWORK, CITIZENS UNITED
FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY,
THE CONFERENCE OF MAJOR SUPERIORS OF MEN,
INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE, THE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE OF WOMEN RELIGIOUS, PEOPLE
FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS,
SOJOURNERS, DANIEL BERRIGIAN, WILL DAVIS
CAMPBELL, CAROL CROSSED, THOMAS GUMBLETON,
KATHY KELLY, RACHEL MACNAIR, HELEN PREJEAN,
MARTIN SHEEN, HOWARD ZINN, STEPHEN ZUNES ET AL
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.
Counsel of Record
Valparaiso University School
of Law
656 S. Greenwich Street
Valparaiso, IN 46383
(219) 465-7860
[Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover]
WiLSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WasHiNGTON, D. C. 20001
oa ~
JOSEPH MATHIAS COSGROVE
Counsel for Martin Sheen
1460 Wyoming Avenue
Forty Fort, PA 18704
(570) 823-9078
JEFFREY S. KERR
General Counsel
People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc.
501 Font Street
Norfolk VA 23510
(757) 622-7382
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..............c:cccccsscceeseeeeeeeeeeees ill
INTEREST OF THE AMICT CURIAE ........ccccceceeeeeeeees |
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..........ccccccceesseeeeeeeeseeenees
PATIENT sccccccrssesccsesersscescesensentesseninsseti seheneindaneiindé 4
1. The Hobbs Act and RICO should not be
- misused against civil rights protesters by their
Political AdVETSATIES ............:eeceeeceeeeeeeeeneeeneenees 4
A. “Uninhibited, robust, and wide open”
speech on public issues leads frequently to
many forms of protected communicative
activity, including leafleting, picketing,
demonstrations, sit-downs, sit-ins, and
BODIES ..cccccccccessconcssscsnosescosscossososoosesovooosooes 4
B. First Amendment concerns about the
demonstrations at issue in this case require
the “precision of regulation” mandated in
Claiborne Hardware (1982), not the
sweeping national injunction authorized
under Milk Wagon Drivers (1941)........:2++++ 9
C. The practical effect of the interpretation of
the Hobbs Act by the court of appeals is to
sideline or trivialize the very crimes—
robbery and extortion—that Congress
deliberately inserted into the statute, and to
federalize the very crime—coercion—that
Congress deliberately excluded from the
CRI cccccctccensiscctqnenndecenccsncensceseniampattnnreeeaneces 16
D. Congress never intended RICO to apply to
CiVE] PFOLESIETS.........00..ccccscccscrereresersesesverseees 19
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
The interpretation of the Hobbs Act by the
court of appeals is irreconcilable with the
structure of the United States Constitution and
with Arwen can constitutional history ................
A. We, the People, retain the right to engage
in vigorous protest against governmental
ee ee ee
B. The lower court’s view of the Hobbs Act
and RICO is irreconcilable with the long
history of social protest in this country .......
The court of appeals improperly perpetuated a
nationwide injunction against unpopular civil
protesters for a full two years after this Court
had ordered the injunction vacated....................
A. “The injunction must necessarily be
vacated.”
ehhh
Page
21
21
24
26
$3 &
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).......ccccceeeeeeeeees 11
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,
TE 17
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S.
Be 30
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(| 27
Cafeteria Employees Union Local 302 v.
Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943) ......ccc-ecereeseeeeeees 11
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) . 11, 12, 27
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)............ 12
Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ............ 27, 30
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) .......cccceeeeeeees 6
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) .....-.-.cceceereeee 15
Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
CO EE 11,12, 13
Missouri v. National Organization for Women,
620 F.2d 1301 (C.A. 8 1980), cert. denied, 449
I ________ 6, 12
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886
( 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
OS EES———————— 28
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)......... 6
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 832
OS ——————————————E 22
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)...... 6
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ........cccccceeereereee 7, 22-23
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247
(| a 30
Scheidler v. NOW, 537 US. 393
A 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 28
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S.
Be Cee crrsssstanssemapeimeneneinibbgaiinasbianenes 12
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
SF Ge ccnressematnennscesscsirertnmntientdanibieininantie 6, 12
Teamsters Local 796 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341
(REIT xiensssnerasnssiintiennnansemnnstuscssiiiiintnabauindaneatinaiaietes 11
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US. |
GEE coneninaresemnnicnecseneneniemmasaptinnsaiiiipasnindienen 6
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).. 15
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
IDE ansasnecnsibiniindscnninpuuentnniaainuiieianmmasivinge 11
STATUTES
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18
ise OF GUID connnnensnencnenennemntneneatemnentinssenens 28
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(a)...0.......ccceceeeeeeeees passim
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 0.0. passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the National Organization
for Women, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (Dec. 24, 1981)
O.T. 1981, No. 81-202.................. 4, 7-8, 12, 13, 14, 16
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters (1988)............ 26
Brian Murray, “Protesters, Extortion, and
Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling
First Amendment Freedoms,” 75 NOTRE DAME
Ben es Ge Ga conemensnnenstnsemutidbiiammnne 20
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country:
The American Experience of Religious
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF CONSISTENT LIFE, et al.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici' are civil rights organizations, environmentalists,
animal protection advocates, political groups, groups support-
ing organized labor, voluntary associations or persons who
(1) are committed to principles of nonviolent direct action on
a wide range of social issues, (2) do not condone the use of
violence as a legitimate form of social protest, and (3) do not
necessarily agree with the substantive views of the petitioners
about abortion (some do, some don’t, and some take no
position).
Each of these aspects about the amici merits further elabo-
ration. On the first and second points, we repeat that we do
not engage in violence or encourage others to do so. Although
amici are aware that allegations of violence of varying de-
grees have arisen in this litigation, we do not condone such
violence in any way, but participate in this brief due to our
deep concerns over the legal issues that have arisen.
The lead organization—Consistent Life—is a network that
promotes a consistent life ethic, focusing on connections
among many issues concerning human life, including war,
abortion, poverty, racism, the death penalty and euthanasia,
and repudiates all forms of violence. Some of the amici
organizations focus their energies on one or another issue
without taking a stand on all other issues. For example,
Citizens United for Alternatives to the Death Penalty focuses
on capital punishment and does not have an official policy on
animal rights. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
focuses on the view that “animals are not ours to eat, wear,
experiment on, or use for entertainment,” but does not es-
pouse a view about the death penalty.
' Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, emici state that no
counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part and that no
person or entity, other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, has
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
On the third point it is enough to say that although some of
us disagree strongly with the substantive views of the peti-
tioners about abortion or with the methods they employed in
the 1980s to demonstrate their opposition to abortion, all of
us disagree with the respondents’ litigation strategy of reli-
ance upon civil RICO against civil protesters. Amici are
interested in a prompt disposition of this case because the
misapplication of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act [RICO]-exposes us to enterprise
liability with staggering penalties (treble damages, attorney
fees, nationwide injunctions of long duration) whenever two
of more supporters of any of the organizational amici (who
need not be members of the sponsoring body or community)
act in a manner deemed by a federal judge to constitute “acts
or threats of physical violence to any person or property.” Pet.
App. 28a.
The lower court’s misreading of the Hobbs Act places all
social protesters in grave financial jeopardy if any of their
supporters engage in conduct vaguely defined as a “threat to
property affecting interstate commerce.” Judicial imposition
of vicarious liability because of the acts of loosely connected
supporters of various causes is at odds with the text of both
the Hobbs Act and RICO, the history surrounding the adop-
tion of these statutes, and the broader social history of unin-
hibited protest in this country.
The novel reading of the Hobbs Act offered by the court of
appeals—that the statute does not require any proof of either
robbery or extortion, the two crimes specified in the Hobbs
Act—tepreseits a profound threat to Americans who love this
country enough to want to change social policies they deem
to fall short of the capacity of our society for human compas-
sion and social justice.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judicial imposition of vicarious liability because of the acts
of loosely connected supporters of various causes is at odds
with the text of both the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and
3
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and the legislative history
surrounding the adoption of these statutes. Neither statute
should be misused against political and labor protesters.
The misreading of the Hobbs Act by the court of appeals—
effectively rewriting the statute to delete the two crimes
specified in the text, robbery and extortion—places all social
protesters in grave financial jeopardy if any of their support-
ers engage in conduct vaguely defined as a “threat to property
affecting interstate commerce.” This unfounded interpretation
is wrong for another reason: it leaves the statute sounding like
the federalization of the crime of coercion, which is precisely
what Congress chose not to do when it enacted the Hobbs
Act.
In addition to being wrong in its reading of the Hobbs Act,
the court of appeals was also wrong in applying RICO to civil
protesters, a result never intended by Congress. The Court
need not review the entire legislative history of RICO to
search for isolated sentences in a committee report or a floor
debate. It is enough to look carefully at the text of the statute,
and compare it with the preexisting bill to recognize that the
law signed by President Nixon by no means sought to sweep
civil protesters within its scope.
The broader social history of uninhibited protest in this
country confirms this view of the Hobbs Act and RICO as
well. This history confirms that the People retain the right to
engage in vigorous protest against a wide variety of govern-
mental policies, and in a variety of forms of direct action,
including leafleting, demonstrations, picketing, sit-downs, sit-
ins, and boycotts. Real struggles in our past could have had a
very different outcome if the novel interpretation of the
Hobbs Act and RICO had been around when these events
occurred.
The reading of the eran fective grace Sn carve ed
appeals represents a profound threat to Americans e
this country well enough to confront social policies they
4
deem to fall far short of the capacity of our society for human
compassion and social justice.
ARGUMENT
I. The Hobbs Act and RICO should not be misused
against civil rights protesters by their political
adversaries.
A. “Uninhibited, robust and wide open” speech on
public issues leads frequently to many forms of
protected communicative activity, including
leafleting, picketing, demonstrations, sit-downs,
sit-ins, and boycotts.
After nearly two decades of litigation related to one of the
most contentious issues in our society, the parties before the
Court might be imagined to share little common ground. But
the truth is that they share much in common. The abortion
issue that divides them is a profound disagreement, one
that both sides take with great seriousness. The three points
we discuss below are all profound truths, and we think it
signi. cant that petitioners and respondents agree about these
truths. Hence, before turning to matters in contention, we
emphasize at the outset the things that unite the petitioners
and respondents.
First, both parties believe that the life of the mind cannot be
stifled or controlled by politicians. For example, NOW ar-
gued in a brief amicus curiae filed in this Court in NAACP vy.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982): “Protection of
Political Speech and Association Is Central to the First
Amendment.” O.T. 1981, No. 81-202, Brief Amici Curiae of
the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Organization for Women, (hereafter: “NOW Amicus Brief in
Claiborne Hardware”), 1981 WL 390220. We offer two ex-
amples from American history of the illusory character of any
system of attempted thought control. First, King George III
and his Parliament could not satisfy the yearning of the
American colonists for self-governance by telling them that
they should be content with the idea of “virtual representa-
5
tion,” or that they should put all thought of rebellion out of
their mind. From the period of the Stamp Act to the founding
of the republic, our colonial forebears understood that taxa-
tion without representation is tyranny, and when the time
came to declare their independence from the mother country,
they stated candid reasons that impelled them to the separa-
tion, producing the most famous list of grievances in the
eighteenth century, the Declaration of Independence. | Stat. |
(1776). Second, the men who governed this country from the
dawn of the republic were equally unpersuasive when they
told women that they should be satisfied with the political
arrangements in this country at the outset because the men
provided “virtual representation” for the women. If women
were content with this way of thinking, they would still not be
voting or serving in public office or on this Court or on juries
throughout the land. The reality is that from the founding
period to the present, women have known that virtual repre-
sentation” of women by men is as illegitimate as virtual
representation of the colonists by their imperial superiors in
Westminster. And when in 1848 American women organized
collectively to share their convictions about their experience
as a colonized people, they articulated the most famous
nineteenth-century list of women’s grievances known as the
Deciaration of Sentiments of Seneca Falls. Both of these
examples illustrate that thought cannot be controlled. The life
of the mind cannot be contained. Freedom of speech matters.
Both petitioners and respondents subscribe to these funda-
mental propositions about civil liberty.
Second, both sides agree that it is not enough to protect
only the life of the mind, or only “pure speech.” \deas have
consequences. They can trouble people’s consciences, awaken
an awareness, and become a clarion call to action. Hence it is
not enough in a free republic that ideas alone or “pure
speech” alone must be protected. It is also necessary to
protect communicative action. The text of the First Amend-
ment itself acknowledges this by expressly securing the
6
natural right of the people not only to freedom of speech, but
also freedom to assemble peaceably. The same amendment
protects the free exercise of religion, which James Madison
understood to be profoundly different from mere toleration of
the theological ideas of dissenters. See, e.g., John T. Noonan,
Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of
Religious Freedom (1998). Just as this Court has overcome
the false start in earlier free exercise cases that divided reli-
gious belief and action too categorically, compare e.g., Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), with Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), so too it has clarified in a host
of cases that the Free Speech Clause protects not only utter-
ance itself, but also a wide variety of communicative acts,
such as leafleting, picketing, demonstrations, sit-downs, sit-
ins, and boycotts. See, e.g., Hague v. ClO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
Third, both sides not only agree with these ideas. They
both put these ideas into practice regularly. For example,
NOW testifies regularly before Congress and State legisla-
tures On issues important to its constituents, and has for dec-
ades engaged in a variety of public expressive acts such as
marches, demonstrations, and boycotts. While the Equal Rights
Amendment was pending, NOW organized a nationwide
boycott involving several hundred church groups, profes-
sional associations, women’s organizations, and civil rights
groups that agreed not to hold their meetings or conventions
in states that had not ratified the proposed amendment. Two
State attorneys general sued NOW, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the organization for its role in
promoting the “ERA boycott.” NOW successfully defended
the right to engage in such activity. Missouri v. National
Organization for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (C.A. 8 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). Similarly, the petitioners are not
content to leave their ideas about abortion at a purely theoreti-
7
cal level, but take their convictions to the public through
participating in an annual march and demonstration on Janu-
ary 22, the anniversary of this Court’s decision in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). And in the early 1980s they
formed the “Pro-Life Action Network” (PLAN), a loosely
organized coalition of persons, many of whom participated in
the demonstrations in front of abortion clinics that are the
underlying subject of this litigation.
Like petitioners and respondents, amici are divided over
the abortion issue. Like them, we are in complete agreement
with one another and with the parties about the three points
discussed above. We could find no better way to underscore
this accord than by stating our agreement with the following
propositions articulated by NOW as the headings in the
amicus brief that it submitted to this Court in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware; 458 U.S. 886 (1982):
I. A Civil Rights Boycott Is At the Core of First
Amendment Protection.
A. A Civil Rights Boycott Is A Form of Political
Speech and Association. .
B. Protection of Political Speech and Association Is
Central to the First Amendment.
ll. Civil Rights Boycotts Should Not Be Judged as
Common Law Conspiracies.
A. Imposing Liability On An Individual Solely Because
of Political Association With Others Violates the First
Amendment.
B. An Injunction That Prohibits Advocacy and
Picketing Is An Impermissible Prior Restraint and An
Unconstitutionally Overbroad, Content-Based Restric-
tion on Speech.
C. The Meadowmoor Case No Longer Expresses a
Constitutionally Viable Principle.
Ill. Illegal Conduct By Boycott Participants Can Be
Controlled Under Traditional Common-Law Principles
of Personal Responsibility Without Employing The
Conspiracy Doctrine.
8
IV. Limiting the Power of A State To Suppress Civil
Rights Boycotts Is Not Inconsistent With the Principle
That Federal Civil Rights Laws and Remedies Should
Be Broadly Construed.
NOW Amicus Brief in Claiborne Hardware, 1981 WL
390220.
From our perspective as activists on a host of contentious
issues in America, these principles articulated by NOW in
1981 seem preferable to the strategies later adopted by the
respondents in this litigation with the petitioners.
Finally, we are acutely aware that this case involves allega-
tions of violence. We have already indicated our views on
this matter in the statement of interest, and several amici do
so with greater specificity in their statements in Appendix A.
But it bears repetition that amici are united in our commit-
ment to principles of nonviolent direct action on a wide range
of social issues and in our resolve not to encourage or
condone the use of violence as a legitimate form of social
protest.
We take this moral stand for two reasons. First, we realize
that direct action is often necessary to awaken the conscience
of the nation to injustice within our society. For example, the
abolitionists did so for three decades prior io the Civil War.
Women were a prominent part of that movement, and had to
sustain their own movement of direct action to awaken our
country to the injustice of excluding women from voice or
vote. Even though emancipated, African Americans endured
a brutal pattern of systematic discrimination in housing,
employment, schooling, and the franchise; and they under-
took a massive campaign of direct action to overcome these
injustices. Even enfranchised, women were still subjected to
unequal treatment in the laws and policies of the nation; and
they undertook a massive campaign of direct action to
overcome these injustices.
Second, we have been shaped by the commitment to
Gandhian nonviolence preached and practiced by Dr. Martin
9
Luther King, Jr., the principal leader of the movement to end
legalized apartheid in this country. Some of the amici are
civil rights activists from that era. For example, Will Davis
Campbell was a founding member of Dr. King’s Southern
Christian Leadership Conference; Dr. Campbell served as the
Executive Director of the Committee for Southern Church-
men, now known as Witnesses for Reconciliation. Others
bore the brunt of the violence of arch-segregationists like Bull
Connor and Governors George Corey Wallace and Orval
Faubus. These heroes of the civil rights movement sang “We
shall overcome,” and they did overcome the violence of
racism by nonviolence.
B. First Amendment concerns about the demon-
strations at issue in this case require the
“precision of regulation” mandated in
Claiborne Hardware (1982), not the sweeping
national injunction authorized under Milk
Wagon Drivers (1941).
The general commitment to nonviolence referred to above
in Part I.A did not guarantee there never were any instances
in which civil rights protesters threatened violence or resorted
to it. On the contrary, that very fact pattern was the subject of
a ruling by this Court that is highly relevant to this case,
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). These
were the facts. In 1966, a branch of the NAACP in Claiborne
County, Mississippi, launched a boycott of local white mer-
chants “to secure compliance by both civic and business leaders
with a lengthy list of demands for equality and racial justice.”
Id. at 907. The record in this case contains abundant evidence
of pure speech (“encouraging nonparticipants to join the com-
mon cause”) and clearly protected activity (“nonviolent picket-
ing”). The complexity of the case is reflected in clear evidence
that fear of reprisals caused some black citizens to withhold
their patronage from the boycotted businesses. This led the state
supreme court to rule that the entire boycott was unlawful and
10
that each of the named defendants was liable for all of its
economic consequences. /d. at 888.
This Court was persuaded that the critical factors in the
boycott’s success were “persuasive rhetoric, determination to
remedy past injustices, and a host of voluntary decisions by free
citizens.” /d. As to the violence in the record, Justice Stevens
noted: “Although the extent and significance of the violence in
this case are vigorously disputed by the parties, there is no
question that acts of violence occurred. No federal rule of law
restricts a State from imposing tort liability for business
losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence.”
Id. at 916.
Thus, Claiborne Hardware states clearly that violence is
not constitutionally protected. None of the amici claims that
violence in protesting abortion or any other issue on which
we sometimes take to the street in protest is constitutionally
protected. On the contrary, we go further than the constitu-
tional distinctions and declare unambiguously that violence
against women seeking an abortion or those providing them
is itself morally repugnant to us, an offense we do not
condone. But the principal focus of our concern in this
litigation is that the legal tool selected by respondents—civil
RICO (conspiracy theory writ large)}—is problematic for all
protesters of all stripes on issues of all sorts, especially as this
statute has been construed by the court of appeals to lack any
requirement of proof of either robbery or extortion.
Hence we return to Claiborne Hardware, noting important
factual parallels between that precedent and the instant case.
First, although the parties in both cases disputed the extent and
significance of the violence, there is no question in either case
that acts of violence occurred. /d. at 916. Second, in both
cases, the record does not reflect a pervasive pattern of
violent acts, but relatively few instances of violence amidst a
pattern of predominantly nonviolent protected activity. /d. at
923. Third, precisely because in both cases sporadic acts of
violence were situated within a broader context of pure
speech and clearly protected activity, both cases require rigor-
ous “precision of regulation.” As Justice Stevens clarified:
“the presence of activity protected by the First Amendment
imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to dam-
ages liability and on the persons who may be held account-
able for those damages.” /d. at 916-917; see also Carroll v.
President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 \S.
175, 184 (1968). Hence the Court set clear limits on the im-
position of derivative or enterprise liability upon an entire
group for the conduct of some members who might have
engaged in illegal tactics unauthorized by the organization,
while most of the membership remained truly innocent of any
illegal acts committed by the organization. /d. at 930-932.
At the urging of the respondents, the district court rejected
Claiborne Hardware as the precedent to follow, and relied
instead on an earlier precedent, Milk Wagon Drivers v. Mead-
owmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941). No. 04-1244, 127a-
128a. The court of appeals considered Claiborne Hardware
in passing, see No. 04-1444, Pet. App. 48a-49, but the logic
of its holding is contrary to this precedent.
The very styling of the 1941 case suffices as a clue that
something curious was happening in the selection of which
precedent to honor. Milk has not been delivered to homes by
wagon drivers in a very long while. It was only after 1941]
that this Court clarified in a host of important decisions that
concerted activity such as picketing, sit-downs, and boycotts
are protected activity not subject to state injunctions. See,
e.g., AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (state court injunc-
tion against picketing reversed; Milk Wagon Drivers distin-
guished); Cafeteria Employees Union Local 302 v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293 (1943) (state court injunction against picketing
reversed; Milk Wagon Drivers distinguished); Teamsters Local
796 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (state court injunction
against picketing and boycotts issued in reliance upon Milk
Wagon Drivers reversed per curiam), Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state court injunction against pick-
12
eting reversed; Milk Wagon Drivers distinguished); Carroll v.
Princess Anne, supra (state court injunction against rallies
issued in reliance upon Milk Wagon Drivers reversed). By the
simple device of electing to “follow” Milk Wagon Drivers,
the lower courts could proceed apace to ignore all of this
Court's teaching in the four decades between the precedents,
including cases at the height of the civil rights movement,
see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969), and 382 U.S. 87 (1965), and cases involving trespass
by sit-down protesters at segregated lunch counters, Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185, 201-207 (1961) (Harlan, J.
concurring). See NOW Amicus Brief in Claiborne Hardware,
1981 WL 390220, at 19-21.
The most significant reason to distinguish Milk Wagon
Drivers and Claiborne Hardware is not the year in which the
Court decided these cases, or even the many subsequent cases
in which this Court declined to follow Milk Wagon Drivers. It
is the profoundly different circumstances or facts in each
record. Thus, in Claiborne Hardware Justice Stevens distin-
guished Milk Wagon Drivers by citing the following facts
from the record in the 1941 case:
Witnesses testified to more than fifty instances of win-
dowsmashing; explosive bombs caused substantial injury
to the plants of Meadowmoor and another dairy using the
vendor system and to five stores; stench bombs were
dropped in five stores; three trucks of vendors were
wrecked, seriously injuring one driver, and another was
driven into a river; a store was set on fire and in large
measure ruined; two trucks of vendors were burned; a
storekeeper and a truck driver were severely beaten;
workers at a dairy which, like Meadowmoor, used the
vendor system were held with guns and severely beaten
about the head while being told ‘to join the union’;
carloads of men followed vendors’ trucks, threatening the
drivers, and in one instance shot at the truck and driver.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 923, citing Milk
Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S., at 291-292.
——
13
Nothing of the magnitude of this level of violent crime can be
found in the record of Claiborne Hardware or the Scheidler
case. We repeat, the fact that there is any violence at all in the
context of an abortion protest is something that amici find
morally abhorrent. But, to return to constitutional analysis,
we examine the record in this case soberly and find nothing
remotely approximating the level of pervasive violence in
Milk Wagon Drivers.
A corollary of this point is that “insubstantial findings of
fact” will not suffice to defeat any constitutional freedom, let
alone “the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.” Milk Wagon Driv-
ers, 312 U.S. at 292. In both Claiborne Hardware and the
instant case the only evidence of violence refers to a few
isolated acts of violence during a limited period in the long
years under review. In Milk Wagon Drivers, by contrast, there
was overwhelming testimony of a much more serious pattern
of criminal activity.
In the light of these considerations, can one seriously claim
in 2005 that Milk Wagon Dairies continues to express a con-
stitutionally viable principle after Claiborne Hardware? It is
instructive that NOW argued persuasively to the contrary in
the amicus brief that it filed in this Court in Claiborne
Hardware “The [Milk Wagon Drivers v.| Meadowmoor Case
No Longer Expresses a Constitutionally Viable Principle.”
NOW Amicus Brief in Claiborne Hardware, 1981 WL 390220
at 19. The Court, of course, has ready access to this brief,
both in the Library of the Court and on line, 1981 WL
390220. But we include a few samples of its solid reasoning
here. For example, NOW argued in its brief: “[Milk Wagon
Drivers] was decided before the Court had developed the
First Amendment principles on which we and the petitioners
rely. The Court’s holding is, as we urge here, inconsistent
with fundamental constitutional principles.” /d. at 20. “[Milk
Wagon Drivers v.| Meadowmoor no longer reflects current
interpretation of the protection to be afforded First Amend-
ment rights, and we urge that it be overruled.” /d. at 22. We
14
agree. NOW correctly grasped the complexity of hybrid cases
in which protected and unprotected activity coincide in a
single record. The principle that NOW articulated in its
amicus brief in Claiborne Hardware is no less valid today,
and no less valid in this very case.
At this stage of the lengthy proceedings, the court of ap-
peals has suggested a remand to the district court to ponder
four free-floating acts of violence that the court of appeals
thinks merit further reflection—though not further fact-
finding—by the district court. Pet. App. 2a-6a. This conclu-
sion flies in the face of the clear mandate of this Court in
Scheidler v. NOW, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Scheidler I): “Be-
cause all of the predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of
a RICO violation must be reversed, the judgment that peti-
tioners violated RICO must also be reversed. Without an
underlying RICO violation, the injunction issued by the
District Court must necessarily be vacated.” 537 U.S. at 411.
Since the court of appeals acknowledged that Claiborne
Hardware is the more fitting precedent to follow in the
Scheidler case, Pet. App. 48a, amici focus only on whether
the lower court actually achieved the “precision of regula-
tion” that Claiborne Hardware requires. Claiborne Hardware
repeatedly states that it is not permissible to identify a few
acts or threats of violence, and then assign liability for these -
acts to people who did not commit them. See e.g., 458 U.S. at
916-917 (presence of protected activity imposes restraints on
the grounds that may give rise to liability for damages and on
the persons who may be held accountable for those damages);
id. at 924 (attendance and participation at meetings of civil
nights organizations an insufficient basis upon which to impose
liability for certain violent acts engaged in by some persons
participating in the boycott where no illegal conduct was
authorized, ratified, or discussed at any of those meetings); id.
at 925 (guilt by association is impermissible basis for assigning
liability); id. at 930-932 (limits on the imposition of derivative
or enterprise liability upon an entire group for conduct of
15
some members who might have engaged in illegal tactics
unauthorized by the organization, while most of the member-
ship remained truly innocent of any illegal acts committed by
the organization).
The lower courts did not come close to “precision of
regulation.” For example, the court of appeals sustained the
decision of the district court allowing plaintiffs-respondents
to introduce before the jury evidence about the conduct of
persons never identified in the trial. Whoever these parties
were, their acts against various abortion providers, Tr. 685,
687, 723, 1148, 1486, 2147-50, over the fourteen years from
1984 to trial were most emphatically not the acts of any of the
named petitioners. Once one tries to achieve “precision of
regulation,” serious questions present themselves. Is there any
evidence in this vast record linking any of the named petition-
ers to any act of coercion or violence? If there is no reliable
factual basis for determining precisely who committed those
acts of violence or threats of violence that the court of appeals
wants the district to think about, how can a court fashion an
equitable remedy?
The answer to these questions surely cannot be that the
petitioners hung out with one another, for this Court has
repeatedly rejected the idea of guilt by association. See, e.g.,
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185-186 (1972) the Court (state
university may not deny recognition to local student group
merely because of affiliation with national organization asso-
ciated with disruptive and violent campus activity).
In Claiborne Hardware, Justice Stevens cited both Healy,
408 U.S. at 186, and United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
265 (1967) for the proposition that “guilt by association alone,
without [establishing] that an individual’s association poses
the threat feared by the Government,’ is an impermissible
basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights. The gov-
ernment has the burden of establishing a knowing affiliation
with an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and —
a specific intent to further those illegal aims.” 458 U.S. at
16
919-920. Analogously, the plaintiff in a civil RICO case has a
similar burden. In this litigation respondents did not even
attempt to establish specific intent by any specific person to
further illegal aims. Contrast this litigation behavior with the
convictions of NOW set forth in its amicus brief in Claiborne
Hardware: “Imposing Liability On An Individual Solely Be-
cause of Political Association With Others Violates the First
Amendment.” NOW Amicus Brief in Claiborne Hardware,
1981 WL 390220, at 12-15.
For these reasons alone, the court of appeals should be
reversed. But there are other reasons for reversing the court of
appeals that arise from its misreading of both the Hobbs Act
and of RICO itself.
C. The practical effect of the interpretation of the
Hobbs Act by the court of appeals is to sideline
or trivialize the very crimes—robbery and
extortion—that Congress deliberately inserted
into the statute, and to federalize the very
crime—coercion—that Congress deliberately
_ excluded from the statute.
At the conclusion of the trial in this case in 1999, the
district court entered judgment for the respondents and
Shortly thereafter entered a nationwide permanent injunction
regulating petitioners’ future protest activities at abortion
clinics. No 04-1244, Pet. App., 14la-174a. The court of
appeals affirmed “in all respects.” /d. at 61a.
This Court reversed, concluding its opinion on February
26, 2003 with three clear commands: (1) “all of the predicate
acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation must be
reversed,” (2) “the judgment that petitioners violated RICO
must also be reversed,” and (3)-“[w]ithout an underlying
RICO violation, the injunction issued by the District Court
must necessarily be vacated.” /d. at 411. Those three com-
mands are, of course inter-related. Without any predicate acts,
the RICO judgment had to fall. And without a final judgment
favoring the respondents, the injunction had to be vacated.
17
See e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 546, n. 12 (1987).
For these reasons amici imagined that the case was over,
but we underestimated the capacity of lawyers and judges to
extend the life of a case. After pondering the case for a full
year, the court of appeals issued an unpublished order re-
manding the case to the district court to determine whether
four unspecified “acts or threats of physical violence to any
person or property” are sufficient to support the nationwide
injunction it imposed in 1999. No. 04-1244, Pet. App. 25a-
29a.
In defending this result, the court of appeals not only
ignored this Court’s clear mandate, but also indulged more in
statutory amendment than in statutory interpretation. The text
of the Hobbs Act adopted in 1946 clearly links the federal
violation with the common law crimes of robbery and extor-
tion. Section 2 provides: “Whoever in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extor-
tion, shall be guilty of a felony.” Section 5 provides: “Who-
ever commits or threatens physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of section 2 shall be guilty of a felony.” Pub. L. No.
486, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (emphasis added).
This case has never involved any allegation of robbery, for
none of the anti-abortion protesters ever stole any property
from any of the clinics at which they engaged in sit-ins. And
the law of the case determined by this Court in Scheidler v.
NOW, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (Scheidler 11), is that this case no
longer involves any contention about extortion, for none of
the anti-abortion protesters ever obtained by force or violence
any property from any of the clinics at which they staged
protests. Since the two crimes expressly mentioned in the
Hobbs Act have no relevance to this case, the Court’s con-
cluding paragraph was ineluctable: “Because all of the predi-
cate acts supporting the jury's finding of a RICO violation
18
must be reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO
must also be reversed.” Scheidler II, 537 U.S., at 411 (empha-
sis added), No. 04-1352, Pet App. 48a.
Nevertheless, on remand the court of appeals held the case
for a full year—a long time to ponder a clear mandate—and
then took another full year to rule on the petition for
rehearing. What emerged from all this judicial deliberation
was not the birth of a new legal vision of the relationship of
federal and state crimes, nor even a bold statement of how the
Hobbs Act must be sensibly construed, but only a meek, iffy
supposition that “it is not beyond the realm of possibility that
the revisers may have made certain substantive changes, ei-
ther advertently or inadvertently.” ? No. 04-1244, Pet. App. | Sa.
After all this waiting, the court of appeals directed the
district court to consider a novel view of the Hobbs Act that
had been rejected by all other circuits that have considered it.
See No. 04-1244, Pet. 18-22. Judge Wood wrote: “it would be
imprudent to resolve this problem of statutory interpretation
at this stage” and she elected instead to follow “for reasons of
judicial economy and restraint . . . a wait-and-see approach.”
No. 04-1244, Pet. App., 6a-7a, 15a-16a. “Imprudent’”? It is
not imprudent; it is impertinent for a lower court to ignore the
mandate of this Court. “Judicial economy”? The court of
appeals wasted judicial resources by prolonging a case that
this Court ended over two years ago. “Restraint”? The court
of appeals was unrestrained in page after page attacking the
sensible view of the Hobbs Act offered by the petitioners in
their briefs below. “Wait-and-see”? This is not a case about
the rule against perpetuities; it is a case that misapplies RICO
to social protesters.
At the end of the day the court of appeals offered a view of
the Hobbs Act that is a mirror image of what Congress en-
* In the Ars Poetica, the ancient Roman poet Horace wrote: “Parturient
montes, et nascitur ridiculus mus.” (“The mountains are in labor, and a
ridiculous mouse is born.”)
Te a
19
acted. First, Congress expressly excluded the crime of coer-
cion from the Hobbs Act in 1946, and the court of appeals has
effectively read that crime back into the Hobbs Act by sug-
gesting that the statute punishes a free-floating crime of
threatening a person engaged in interstate commerce, which
sounds pretty much like the crime of coercion. Second, Con-
gress expressly included robbery and extortion in the Hobbs
Acts, and the court of appeals rewrote the statute by effec-
tively striking from the statute’s “violence provision” any
connection to the two crimes that Congress decided to punish
as a federal offense. To achieve this remarkable feat of statu-
tory interpretation, the court of appeals simply ignored this
Court’s clear teaching on this very matter in Scheidler I], 537
U.S. at 405. Even more boldly, the court of appeals ignored
the clear mandate of this Court in Scheidler Il, id. at 411,
as well as the concerns of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
about the expansive use of RICO, id. at 411-12 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
D. Congress never intended RICO to apply to civil
protesters.
In addition to being wrong in its reading of the Hobbs Act,
the court of appeals was wrong in applying RICO to civil
protesters, a result never intended by Congress. T:.. “ourt
need not review the entire legislative history of RICO to
search for isolated sentences in a committee report or a floor
debate. It is enough to look carefully at the text of the statute,
and compare it with the preexisting bill to recognize that the
law signed by President Nixon by no means sought to sweep
civil protesters within its scope. In 1969 the bill that would
eventually become RICO defined “racketeering activity” very
broadly to include “any act involving the danger of violence
to life, limb or property, indictable under State or Federal law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”
S. 1861, 91st Cong., Section 2(a) (1969). see also 115 Cong.
Rec. 9569 (1969). Several objected to this language. Note that
20
this language is very close to the crime of coercion, which
Congress had not federalized from the Hobbs Act in 1946.
Several Members of Congress, including Senators Laward
Kennedy and Philip Hart complained that the bill reached
beyond “organized crime.” S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 215 (1969).
The American Civil Liberties Union also opposed the bill,
expressing the concern that social and political protesters
might fall within the bill’s ambit. The ACLU found the
breadth of the original definition of racketeering activity
“particularly troublesome,” citing the anti-war demonstrations
at the Pentagon and at Columbia University. Measures Relat-
ing to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30 and Related Meas-
ures Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Proc. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 475-76 (1969).
The ACLU feared that this version of the bill would be used
by the Nixon Administration to suppress anti-Vietnam war
dissent. The Department oi Justice also objected to the sweep-
ing definition of “racketeering activity” in the bill, arguing
that it was “too broad and would result in a large number of
unintended applications.” S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 121-22.
Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst suggested
an amendment to narrow the definition to a list of specific
offenses “customarily invoked against organized crime.” /d.
at 158.
In response to these misgivings, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee eliminated the broad language defining “racketeering
activity” as “danger of violence to life, limb or property,” and
replaced it with a list of specifically designated federal and
state offenses, such as the Hobbs Act. The new language was
virtually identical to that recommended by the Justice Depart-
ment. The Senate adopted the revised bill by a vote of
seventy-three to one. 116 Cong. Rec. 972 (1970). The House
then made minor amendments with which the Senate con-
curred. /d. at 36,296. President Nixon signed the bill into law
on October 15, 1970. See Brian Murray, “Protesters, Extor-
tion, and Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling First
—— 2
21
Amendment Freedoms,” 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 697 &
n.21 (1999).
As noted above with respect to the Hobbs Act, one of the
objectionable features of the opinions of the court of appeals
on remand is that three unelected judges have, in effect,
assumed functions better left for Congress to undertake. The
court of appeals on remand effectively reinstated the arguably
unconstitutional broader version of the RICO bill that the
Senate expressly rejected. Congress emphatically did not in-
tend RICO to be used as a bludgeon against social protesters,
as the lower courts have done not only in this case, but also in
other cases directly affecting some of the amici. The Court
should reinstate a sensible construction of RICO.
II. The interpretation of the Hobbs Act by the court of
appeals is irreconcilable with the structure of the
United States Constitution and with American
constitutional history.
A. We, the People, retain the right to engage in
vigorous protest against governmental policies.
The structure of our constitutional order is highly relevant
to the proceedings in this case. We, the People ordain and
establish the Constitution of the United States. The First
Amendment is a mirror image of Article I, §8. In Article I the
People confer legislative power upon Congress. In Amend-
ment I the People deny to Congress (and by implication to the
Executive and the Judiciary) any power or jurisdiction to
establish religion or prohibit its free exercise, or abridge the
People’s freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the
People peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.
In times of crisis, the People rather than governmental offi-
cials (arresting officers, angry mayors or governors or legisla-
ters, even judges who have from time to time yielded to the
passion of the day), have often been the moral compass of
society. Law has not always been an instrument of establish-
ing justice, but has also become a means of coerced injustice.
22
Slavery is the most obvious example that was overcome not
by the political branches nor by the decisions of this Court,
but by a massive popular upheaval sustained for nearly three
decades (1830-1860) before the political branches began to
respond to the demands of the People to end this inequity.
And it took another century after the eradication of slavery to
put an end to Jim Crow segregation that made a mockery of
this country’s commitment to “equal protection of the laws.”
Again massive popular civil protest—led by African Ameri-
cans—against the injustice of these laws was the vehicle for
the Civil Rights Laws of the 1960s that were the direct fruit
of the civil rights movements.
The original Constitution excluded women from full citi-
zenship by denying them the franchise as well as public
obligations such as service on juries; and by virtue of laws
enacted by all-male legislatures and enforced by all-male
courts, the subjugation of women to men lasted throughout
the majority of this country’s history. As with the civil rights
movements, it took two massive popular movements—both
led by women—in both the nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries to overcome these inequalities. Amici note- with
gratitude the role that respondent National Organization for
Women played in helping, prodding when necessary, our
society to move in the direction of equal dignity for men and
women.
Abortion still divides our country decades after Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). So is this Court divided, even as
it attempts to shore up its Cwn major precedent. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 832 (1992) (reaffirming Roe).
Indeed, some members of this Court have dared to suggest
that a significant cause for popular unrest over this issue is
the Court's withdrawal of the issue from the political forum
where common ground might be sought among contending
parties. For example, Justice White wrote: “The upshot is that
the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are constitu-
tionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the
23
continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one
hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother,
on the other hand.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 221 (1973)
(White J., dissenting). See also Comments of [then Circuit
Judge] Ruth Bader Ginsburg, New York University Law
School, 1992.
Amici cannot in this brief suggest a simple way out of the
country’s anguish over abortion, for we are divided on
this issue ourselves. It is equally true that all the amici are
united in rejecting the solution to this issue represented by
this litigation as it has meandered through numerous legal
theories—including the view that anti-abortion demonstrators
represented a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation
of the Sherman Act, or that petitioners could be linked
with deeply disturbing crimes such as intentional murder of
doctors who provide abortions or with arson perpetrated at
abortion clinics, even though there was no evidence linking
any of the defendants (petitioners here) to these crimes, which
amici repudiate with unanimity and full vigor. In its latter
stage, the case has rested upon the federal racketeering law,
the application of which to social protesters is a result that
Congress never intended when it enacted RICO, and that is
nowhere to be found in the statute signed by President Nixon
in 1970. See Part I.D, above.
This Court has attempted to shed light on RICO twice
already. We had thought the second time was the denouement
of this litigation, since the Court concluded its 8-1 opinion
- with such a clear mandate: “Because all of the predicate acts
supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation must be
reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO must
also be reversed. Without an underlying RICO violation, the
injunction issued by the District Court must necessarily be
vacated.” Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 411.
We hope that this case has now come to its final act. But
we are compelled to state that after all these years the case
has taken a turn for the worse, when it was difficult for us to
24
imagine that it was possible after this Court's resolution of
the issue of reversing the judgment and vacating the injunc-
tion in Scheidler II.
That this case has gone on so long is another indicator that
something has gone wrong with RICO. As we noted above in
Part 1.D, Congress did not have people like the petitioners in
mind when it enacted RICO. Not to put too fine a point on the
matter, we imagine that Congress was taking aim at, well,
“racketeer influenced” and highly organized, if thoroughly
“corrupt organizations.” But to amici, most of whom engage
regularly in civil protest on a wide variety of issues, and
who—like the petitioners—do so in a fairly unorganized and
spontaneous way, we think the application of RICO to social
protesters is a profound mistake.
Why is the mistake a profound one? We return to the most
fundamental truth about our constitutional order stated above:
that that People retain the natural rights articulated in the First
Amendment, and efforts to stifle these differing points of
view—sometimes radically differing—are in the long run
fruitless. Worse yet, the involvement of the judiciary in one
legal theory after another to wear down the meager resources
of civil protesters is itself problematical.
B. The lower court’s view of the Hobbs Act and
RICO is irreconcilable with the long history of
social protest in this country.
People have frequently protested the moral flaws of the
law, whether enacted by the people’s representatives or pro-
nounced by the judiciary. For this principle of democracy to
thrive at a time we are trying to urge greater openness to
democracy in other cultures, this society needs to grant
breathing space for vigorous social protest. RICO chokes off
such protest activity. Freedom cannot flourish with a case that
imposes on protesters severe penalties under the federal rack-
eteering laws.
What drives our basic intuition that our view is correct is as
much a sense of American history from the underside as a
25
refined appreciation of this Court’s precedents. So we turn to
an account of how incompatible this litigation is with our
nation’s history. Real struggles in our past could have had a
very different outcome if the new interpretation of the Hobbs
Act and RICO had been around when these events occurred.
For example, the participants in the Boston Tea Party not
only threatened property, but actually pitched taxed tea into
Boston harbor. But it was not the crime of robbery or extor-
tion. So we don’t recall it as a RICO offense, but as a political
act of rebellion against taxation without representation.
The picket line and the economic boycott are tools used by
organized labor to persuade owners or managers of corpora-
tions to raise wages or provide better benefits. Both picketing
and boycott activity intentionally cause economic injury by
diminishing the profits of the targeted company. For example,
the Reuther brothers led United Auto Workers in a sit-down
strike at the Ford plant in 1937. Ford called the strikers “tres-
passers” and had them arrested on that charge. Whatever
offense may have been committed at the Ford plant, it was
not the crime of robbery or extortion. So we don’t recall it as
a RICO offense, but as a famous effort to protect the rights of
workers.
If RICO had been on the books back in the 1960s and if the
lower court’s reading of RICO is right, then Dr. King and the
SCLC would have been vulnerable to losing their assets to
their arch-segregationist racial-supremacist adversaries. All it
would have taken to reach that bizarre result is for a federal
judge to have viewed the “trespass” by sit-in protesters at
racially segregated lunch counters as a “threat of physical
violence” to the property of the Woolworth company by de-
priving the drugstore of revenues they otherwise would have
made. But it was not the crime of robbery or extortion. So we
don’t recall it as a RICO offense, but as a courageous protest
against Apartheid.
Rosa Parks’ famous refusal to sit in the back of the bus
triggered a year-long, city-wide boycott of the Montgomery
26
buses led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., which inflicted
economic injury on the city by depriving the city of revenues
from their segregated buses. But it was not the crime of
robbery or extortion. So we don’t recail it as a RICO offense,
but as one of the great instances that the People shall over-
come. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward
Freedom (1963); Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters (1988);
Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States:
1492—Present 440-450 (1995).
None of these great Americans should have been forced to
endure the expense of protracted litigation as defendants in a
RICO action, even if it were eventually dismissed on the
ground that the there was no “physical violence,” whatever
that might mean with respect to property (arson? malicious
destruction? ).
As a practical matter, moreover, the lower court’s reading
of the Hobbs Act is impossible for a leader of a protest
movement to enforce. It is bound to happen sooner or later
that a member of a loosely defined movement may do things
that are not authorized by the leadership, especially in the
heat of the moment, when tempers and emotions run high.
Ill. The court of appeals improperly perpetuated a
nationwide injunction against unpopular civil
protesters for a full two years after this Court had
ordered the injunction vacated.
A. “The injunction must necessarily be vacated.”
This Court reversed the court of appeals in 2003, noting
with respect to the injunction: “Without an underlying RICO
violation, the injunction issued by the District Court must
necessarily be vacated.” /d. at 411. On remand the court of
appeals considered the case for a full year, and then issued an
unpublished order remanding the case to the district court to
determine whether four unspecified “acts or threats of physi-
cal violence to any person or property” are sufficient to
support the nationwide injunction it had imposed in 1999. No.
04-1244, Pet. App. 25a-29a.
27
Since the parties are briefing the question of whether RICO
authorizes private parties to obtain injunctive relief, we offer
the Court a perspective on injunctions that comes from the
considerable cumulative experience of the amici as social
activists engaged in civil protest on many contentious and
difficult issues.
First, amici note the duration of the injunction. More than
two years after this Court ordered the injunction to be
vacated, the injunction in this case is still ongoing. This
injunction was ordered against protest activity that happened
nearly twenty years ago. It has been in force for nearly six
years, and if the lower court is right, it could go on until 2011,
another six years. See No. 04-1244, Pet. App. 14la-142a. See
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (reversing an
ex parte temporary restraining order of ten days’ duration).
This Court used the adverb “necessarily” in its order to vacate
the injunction, but did not add a specific chronological
dimension to its order, such as “with all deliberate speed” or
“instanter” or “now.” It had no cause to do so in 2003, for the
normal assumption would be that compliance with a mandate
would be done promptly.
When the Court used the phrase “with all deliberate speed,”
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), it
intuited that the subject of its order—tracial desegregation of
public schools—would take time to achieve, and it intention-
ally left to the district courts the task of devising desegrega-
tion plans in their region of the country. The order in the
instant case, however, was not to begin to devise plans for
“the dismantling of well-entrenched dual [school] systems
tempered by an awareness that complex and multifaceted
problems would arise which would require time and
flexibility for a successful resolution.” Green v. School Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). It was simply to dissolve an
injunction that no longer had any legal basis. To vacate the
injunction in this case does not take much time. It only takes
the humility to follow a direct order from this Court. After a
28
decade of foot-dragging by local officials in Virginia, this
Court amended the ambiguous term “with all deliberate speed”
to the direct and simple term “now.” Green, id. Now is the
moment for the Court to use the same adverb in this case. The
injunction should be vacated now.
When First Amendment rights are implicated, this Court
has given explicit directions for the speed with which it
expects its mandates to be complied with. See, e.g., New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (“The
judgments shall issue forthwith.”); id. at 715 (Black, J., con-
curring) (“every moment's continuance of the injunctions
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible,
and continuing violation of the First Amendment.”).
Second, even if this Court had not ruled with clarity about
the nationwide injunction in this case, protest activity in front
of abortion clinics is now governed by the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248. See also Scheidler
II, 537 U.S., at 411, (Ginsburg, J., concurring), No. 04-1352,
Pet App. 48a. This statute was enacted because Attorney
General Reno and the Attorneys General of several states
took the view that no federal law—including the Hobbs Act
and RICO—afforded any protection to abortion clinics under
the circumstances of protests in front of clinics at the time.
Third, amici have considerable experience with public
demonstrations of popular dissent from controversial policies.
For example, Fort Benning, Georgia, houses a program called
the School of the Americas, a training center for foreign
military and security officials. The program has included
training in the use of torture. Prominent alumni of this pro-
gram have been engaged in death squads for decades. They
include assassins of Archbishop Oscar Romero and of six
Jesuit priests and their housekeepers in El Salvador. Each
year in November a large group of Americans, including sev-
eral of the amici, protest against this program. If demonstra-
tors cross onto the base, they are apprehended by federal
authorities, and are punished for trespassing on federal prop-
29
erty, with prison sentences up to six months, and fines of up
to $5,000. For example, in November of 2004 Sister Lil
Mattingly, an elderly nun, was among those who crossed onto
the base; despite her age, she received the maximum sentence
of six months incarceration for daring to demonstrate against
a policy hard to reconcile with fundamental decency and with
this country’s commitment to international humanitarian law
specified in treaties and covenants to which this nation is a
high contracting party. During the past fourteen years in which
this demonstration has been occurring, over 180 people have
been sentenced to prison, totaling 81 years in prison. These
sentences seem excessive when compared with typical sen-
tences for trespassing under state law. Imagine the impact of
the decision below, if the Government could add to its arsenal
against nonviolent demonstrators the full range of criminal
penalties under the Hobbs Act (up to 20 years in prison), with
no duty upon the Government to show that a “threat of physi-
cal violence to . . . property” was achieved by robbery or
extortion.
Finally, the decision by the court of appeals to ignore the
order of this Court to vacate the injunction in this case could
embolden judges who are so minded to issue excessive in-
junctive relief when they should be thinking instead of pre-
serving the fragile ability of the People to bring their govern-
ment back to decency and sanity.
B. Enough is enough.
As a practical matter, there must be some finality to
litigation. Amici are activists who may not be able to define
with precision the point when finality is or should be reached.
But two decades of litigation seems more than enough time
for parties to be wrangling in court over the application of
RICO to civil protest.
In its most recent order, the court of appeals assures the
parties that it does not mean to “open Pandora’s Box,” but
“merely resolves the final loose ends in this long-running
litigation.” No. 04-1244, Pet. App. 16a. But this Court al-
30
ready resolved all the “loose ends” of this litigation in 2003.
The court of appeals has needlessly prolonged the case for
two years, and has proposed a recipe for further delay by
remanding to the district court to decide among various
competing views on how to read the Hobbs Act. And it did so
after strongly suggesting that a Hobbs Act violation can occur
without robbery or extortion, a view plainly at odds with
other circuits that have considered this question. See No. 04-
1244, Pet. 18-22.
Most of the amici who join this brief also joined the briefs
filed in the October 2001 Term. Few of the amici are lawyers
familiar with the intricacies of distinguishing precedents and
construing statutes. But all of us marveled at the ingenuity
with which a lower court could, in effect, reverse this Court.
See, e.g., In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255
(1895); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S.
781, 785 (1929). When asked to consider joining another
brief this Term on the same matter in the same case, most of
the amici spontaneously observed that endless litigation eats
up the meager resources of people who espouse unpopular
views.
We now say respectfully to the Court, “Enough is enough.”
Reaffirm the mandate announced by the Chief Justice at the
end of Scheidler II: “Because all of the predicate acts sup-
porting the jury's finding of a RICO violation must be
reversed, the judgment that petitioners violated RICO must
also be reversed. Without an underlying RICO violation, the
injunction issued by the District Court must necessarily be
vacated.” 537 U.S., at 411 (emphasis added), No. 04-1352,
Pet App. 48a.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.
Counsel of Record
Valparaiso University School
of Law
656 S. Greenwich Street
Valparaiso, IN 46383
(219) 465-7860
JOSEPH MATHIAS COSGROVE
Counsel for Martin Sheen
1460 Wyoming Ave.
Forty Fort, PA 18704
(570) 823-9078
JEFFREY S. KERR
General Counsel
People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc.
501 Font Street
Norfolk VA 23510
(757) 622-7382
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A
Particular Statements of Interest of Amici Curiae
Communities and Voluntary Associations
Amici are voluntary associations and individuals who
engage in protest activity on a wide variety of issues. Because
Consistent Life organized the participation of these amici in
this brief, it is listed first.
Consistent Life (CL) is a coalition of groups and indi-
viduals committed to nonviolence and respect for life. The
network promotes the consistent life ethic, focusing on the
connections among issues concerning human life, including
war, abortion, poverty, racism, the death penalty and
euthanasia. CL supports all means of nonviolent change
including, but not limited to, nonviolent direct action,
political and legislative action, and direct service to those
suffering under these attacks on life. Carol Crossed (former
executive director of CL), Mary S. Rider (former executive
director), and Ruth Enero (former president of the Board of
Directors) have frequently engaged in nonviolent civil dis-
obedience relating to the issues listed above. All five are
married women and mothers of many children. If their
political opponents were to use civil RICO against them, the
loss of their homes, cars, and other valuable things they own
would wreak havoc upon them and their families. Ms. Rider
offered a declaration before the district court in this case at
the stage when it was considering the issuance of the
Life Abortion Network (PLAN). This declaration challenged
the enormous breadth of the nationwide injunction.
Agape is a community of faith in Franklin, Louisiana, that
witnesses for peace and justice through nonviolence. It en-
gages in education of its members and the public, especially
on the death penalty, through publishing booklets, brochures,
and treatises on how to effect change through raising public
2a
awareness and consciousness about issues of justice and
peace.
Carolina Interfaith Task Force on Central America
(CITCA) is a voluntary association of persons who believe in
nonviolent direct action on issues relating to peace and justice
in Central America. CITCA notes that all citizens of the
United States have the right to express their views on con-
troversial matters in a nonviolent fashion. This right is
jeopardized when federal courts penalize citizens for
exercising rights that are fundamental parts of the Bill of
Rights.
The Catholic-Labor Network is a place for Catholics who
are active in their churches and unions to learn about their
Church's teachings regarding labor issues, to pray for those
who are working for economic justice, and to share infor-
mation about events and struggles taking place in their area.
Catholic Peace Fellowship (CPF) is a nationwide organi-
zation of Catholics committed to peacemaking in the name of
Christ. CPF engages in educational projects about peace and
nonviolence, and it supports those who stand for peace by
virtue of conscience. For example, some of the members of
CPF have engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience of laws
and policies inimical to peace in today’s world.
The Catholic Worker (CW) is a lay Catholic community
founded by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin to bear witness to
the Gospel that identifies service to the hungry, the thirsty,
the homeless, and the imprisoned as a way of recognizing the
presence of God in categories of human need. The com-
munity provides hospitality to homeless families while work-
ing to address the root causes of homelessness. Committed to
following the teachings of Christ on nonviolence, each CW
house or center engages in acts of hospitality and witness to
Gospel values in a variety of ways, including demonstrations
against war and militarism, poverty, and abortion. The CW
3a
houses that join this brief are: the Casa Juan Diego (Houston,
Texas); Dorothy Day Catholic Worker House (Washington,
D.C.); the Day House (Detroit, Michigan); Ithaca, New York
Catholic Worker; the Los Angeles Catholic Worker; Mary’s
House (Birmingham, Alabama); Redwood City (California)
Catholic Worker; St. Francis Catholic Worker Community
(Columbia, Missouri); and the St. Francis and Therese
Catholic Worker House (Worcester, Massachusetts).
Center for Action and Contemplation is a Christian center
forwarding the integration of social action and contemplative
prayer. The members of this community regularly engage in
transforming society around the issues of poverty, war, and
other kinds of violence.
Citizens United for Alternatives to the Death Penalty
(CUADP) is a national organization that works to end the
death penalty in the United States through aggressive
campaigns of public education and the promotion of tactical
grassroots activism. CUADP takes no position on the
abortion issue. It does not endorse or support the stand of
these defendants on that issue, nor does it necessarily approve
of their tactics or actions. It supports the petitioners strictly as
a legal matter, urging the Justices that peaceable, nonviolent
direct action—that is, peaceful civil resistance which “crosses
the line” and may involve sit-ins or blocking access in a
manner that might be regarded as a “threat” to property rights
should not be held to constitute the federal felony punished
by the Hobbs Act, without any proof of robbery or extortion.
Nor should a “pattern” of such “direct action” be penalized
under the federal racketeering laws.
The Conference of Major Superiors of Men serves the
leadership of Catholic orders of over 25,000 vowed religious
priests and brothers in the United States. The Justice and
Peace Division provides a voice for these communities
throughout society in witnessing against capital punishment,
war, poverty, and any issue that threatens life. The civil rights
da
of free speech and assembly are crucial to effective action
against oppression. These civil rights are threatened by the
use of the federal racketeering statute against political and
religious dissenters.
The Eighth Day Center for Justice is a community
composed of Catholic sisters, priests, and laity who believe
that nonviolent direct action is the backbone of our
democracy and the core of the Christian message. For
example, some of the healing actions of Jesus on the Sabbath
were viewed as a violation of the Torah. Religiously moti-
vated opposition to unjust laws has a long and admirable
history, culminating in the Civil Rights Movement and the
Movement for Gender Equality in this country, and in the
opposition to the assault upon human life in the Nazi regime.
Embrace a Consistent Ethic participates in ongoing peace-
ful public witness against all forms of taking human life,
including opposition to war, capital punishment, euthanasia,
abortion, racism and poverty. The members of this commu-
nity believe that the NOW vs. Scheidler litigation interferes
with the ability to carry out group/individual conscientious
objection, even those actions which would normally be con-
sidered within the limits of free speech.
Every Church a Peace Church (ECPC) is an association of
churches that adopt nonviolent struggle as their way to pursue
justice. For this reason ECPC agrees with the brief filed in
this case by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in
the court of appeals that the power to impose treble damage
awards upon the petitioners and to enter a nationwide
injunction under RICO represents “clear and present danger
to future prospects for the lawful exercise of our liberties,
namely, the free exercise of religion, speech, press, or assem-
bly and petition for redress of grievances.”
The Faith Community of St. Sabina’s in Chicago is a
Word-based, Bible teaching church that believes in the power
“ a e———e
Sa
of praise and worship—a spiritual hospital where all are
welcome and invited to “taste and see the goodness of the
Lord.” The members of the Faith Community of St. Sabina’s
believe that the church is called to be the immune system of
the world—fighting off the attacks of Satan, by both prayer
and peaceable nonviolent direct action. St. Sabina’s has
crusaded against a host of social evils.
Franciscan Office of Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of
Creation, Santa Barbara Province, practices outreach, advo-
cacy, and education with and on behalf of the friars and those
with whom they minister.
Interfaith Worker Justice (IWJ), a national nonprofit or-
ganization founded in 1996, educates, organizes and mobi-
lizes the U. S. religious community on issues and campaigns
to improve wages, benefits and working conditions for work-
ers, especially low-wage workers. For these reasons, [WJ is
concerned about the possible misuse of the federal racketeer-
ing statute (RICO) against workers in a ~©Sor organizing
context.
The Leadership Conference of Women Religious (LCWR)
is an association of leaders of congregations of Catholic
women religious in the United States. LCWR has approxi-
mately 1000 members, who represent about 95 percent of the
75,000 women religious in the United States. Founded in
1956, the conference assists its members to collaboratively
carry out their service of leadership to further the mission of
the Gospel in today’s world. Social justice is an integral part
of LCWR’s focus. LCWR members work together to create a
corporate voice that amplifies the efforts of local religious
congregations. Rather than solutions that temporarily assuage
injustice, LCWR members strive to think strategically about
systemic change.The scope of the LCWR conference con-
cerns is broad and includes collaborating with the Catholic
church and other socictal efforts that influence systemic
change, studying significant trends and issues within the
6a
church and society, utilizing our corporate voice in solidarity
with people who experience any form of violence or oppres-
sion, and creating and offering resource materials on
leadership skills.
Nevada Desert Experience has since 1983 organized non-
violent civil disobedience at the U.S. nuclear test site in Mer-
cury, Nevada, where tens of thousands of people—including
the actor Martin Sheen—have been arrested for trespass in
their public protest against weapons of mass destruction.
The Orthodox Peace Fellowship in North America is a
community of Eastern Orthodox Christians committed to wit-
nessing for peace in our world: Eastern Orthodox Christianity
has for 2000 years affirmed the Sacredness of human life
from conception to death. This, we understand, is the faith of
Christ, the apostles, the councils, and the fathers and mothers
of the Church. This we must proclaim.
Pax Christi USA is the national Catholic peace movement
of 14,000 members who are committed to the gospel impera-
tive of seeking peace through nonviolence. The members of
this association promote peace through personal and social
transformation. They frequently engage in nonviolent protest
of policies that undermine peace and justice.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), with
more than 850,000 members, is the largest animal rights
Organization in the world. Founded in 1980, PETA is
dedicated to establishing and protecting the rights of all
animals. PETA operates under the simple principle that
animals are not ours to eat, wear, experiment on, or use for
entertainment. PETA focuses its attention on the four areas in
which the largest numbers of animals suffer the most
intensely for the longest periods of time: on factory farms, in
laboratories, in the clothing trade, and in the entertainment
industry. We also work on a variety of other issues, including
the cruel killing of beavers, birds and other “pests,” and the
7a
abuse of backyard dogs. PETA works through public edu-
cation, cruelty investigations, research, animal rescue, legisla-
tion, special events, celebrity involvement, and protest cam-
paigns.
The Peter Maurin Center in Washington, D.C., was
established in 1997. In the words of Peter Maurin, the center
seeks to contribute to creating a “society where it is easier to
be good.” The Center does so in three ways: (1) evange-
lization in the Catholic Worker tradition through operating
the Catholic Worker Bookstore; (2) — et wt works om
mercy through operating a furniture
cathion m othr people who have more than they need
give it to the Center, which distributes se ape = a
3 izing for and justice wi
ree nge Sek ag vty their effort to de-colonize, and
specifically to rid themselves of the Navy at Vieques; and (4)
through work for the abolition of the death penalty,
specifically focusing on the case of Mumia Abu-Jamal. The
Center is concerned with the broad and elastic application of
the RICO act to dissent and nonviolent protest. The mis-
application of the law in this way permits the government to
virtually at will. Affording the government power of this
essentially disempowers the People in i process.
To protect popular, and especially unpopular, political
expression, these effects of the RICO law need to be nullified.
Plowshares is a coalition of religious believers who seek to
enflesh the words of the prophet Isaiah 2:4, “They shall beat
hooks. Nation shall not take up sword against nation and
neither shall they study war anymore.” The founders of this
movement, Fr. Daniel Berrigan, S.J., and his deceased brother
Philip Berrigan were leaders in the opposition to the Vietnam
War. From burning draft files to organizing larger civil
8a
disobedience actions, they provided the peace movement with
a sharp focus. Fr. Berrigan offered a declaration before the
district court in this case at the stage when the court was
considering the issuance of the nationwide injunction against
anyone associated with the Pro-Life Abortion Network
(PLAN). This declaration addresses the severe impact on
nonviolent social protest that flows from treating loose
associations of antiwar protesters as though they were racket-
eer-influenced corrupt organizations. Fr. Berrigan joins this
brief in his individual capacity, as do the following Plow-
shares Activists: Bruce Friedrich, Art Laffin, Paul Magno,
Patrick O'Neill, and Kathy Boylan Shields. All of these
activists have spent many years imprisoned for their non-
violent protest against war.
Sojourners is a Christian ministry whose mission is to
proclaim and practice the biblical call to integrate spiritual
renewal and social justice. In response to this call, the
members of this community offer a vision for faith in public
life by: publishing Sojourners magazine, and other resources
that address issues of faith, politics, and culture from a
biblical perspective; preaching, teaching, organizing, and
public witness; nurturing community by people from the vari-
ous traditions and streams of the church; hosting an annual
program of voluntary service for education, ministry, and dis-
cipleship. Members of Sojourners seek to be guided in their
lives and work by the biblical principles of justice, mercy,
and humility.
Witnesses for Reconciliation (WFR) was formerly the
Committee of Southern Churchmen that was founded in the
1960's to promote the work and vision of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and to advance his cause of nonviolence. The Com-
mittee promoted, participated in, and led marches, sit-ins,
boycotts, and the freedom rides. WFR continues to advance
the cause of civil and political rights for minorities.
eee LO LLL LLL! LLL LL! AA ay
-_ ——
9a
Individuals
David Atwood is the director of the Texas Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty. This group regularly organizes
demonstrations against the death penalty in Texas.
Donald Bauer is a Catholic priest who served as a member
of the New York State Labor and Religion Coalition since its
inception, and who worked tirelessly for farmworker wage
equity and other issues on behalf of the poor. He also was
appointed to the Congress on Racial Equality and in both of
these capacities used public witness to educate and challenge
the public.
Michael Baxter, C.S.C. is a theology professor at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, and the national president of the
Catholic Peace Fellowship.
Wendell Berry is an American poet, novelist, essayist,
philosopher and farmer. He has published several collection
of poems, and essays about his commitment to the pre-
servation of ecological diversity and integrity, and the re-
newal, on sound cultural and ecological principles, of local
economies and local communities.
Abe Bonowitz is the director of Citizens United for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty (CUADP), a national
organization that works to end the death penalty in the United
States through aggressive campaigns of public education and
the promotion of tactical grassroots activism. On occasion he
has engaged in peaceful acts of civil resistance. While
CUADP takes no position on the abortion issue, Bonowitz is
pro-choice and, therefore, he is in profound disagreement
with the petitioners on that issue and deplores the violent
tactics that abortion opponents have been known to employ.
He does not know these petitioners and has no personal
knowledge of their tactics. He is informed, though, that jurors
at the trial of this case found petitioners or unidentified
persons “associated with” them responsible for four acts or
10a
threats against persons or property. He supports this appeal
only because, as a legal matter, political protest involving sit-
ins or blocking access should not be condemned as “ex-
tortion” or “racketeering.”
Roy Bourgeois, M.M., is a Maryknoll priest who, after
years as a foreign missionary in Central America, founded the
School of the Americas Watch (SOAW), a loose coalition of
citizens concerned about the widespread abuse of human
rights—including torture and murder of religious leaders and
labor leaders throughout Central and South America—by
foreign military officers who study at the U.S. Army School
of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia. Eric LeCompte is
the director of programming of SOAW. Each November—on
the anniversary of the assassination of six Jesuit priests and
their domestic workers in San Salvador by graduates of the
School of the Americas—SOAW organizes a major demon-
stration against the negative effects of this program upon
peace and justice in our hemisphere.
Bernard Broussard is the founder of the Human Relations
Council of Louisiana, a group that played a leading role in
community organization on behalf of the civil rights of
African Americans in Louisiana in the mid 1960s. From that
time to the present, he continues to challenge through
marches, demonstrations, holding prayer meetings on behalf
of the oppressed in the South. He is a founder of Starthrow-
ers, a human rights organization based in Louisiana.
Will Davis Campbell is a writer, lecturer, and long time
supporter of the Civil Rights Movement who helped escort
African-American children when they tried to integrate a
Little Rock, Arkansas high school back in 1957. A founding
member of Dr. King’s Southern Christian Leadership Con-
ference, he became the Executive Director of the Committee
for Southern Churchmen, which is now known as Witnesses
for Reconciliation.
a 7 -
Thomas Cornell is the founder of the Catholic Peace
Fellowship and an ordained deacon in the Catholic Church.
He is the editor of The Catholic Worker, a newspaper of
national circulation founded by Dorothy Day, and he lives at
the Catholic Worker farm in Marlboro, New York.
John Dear, S.J., has written over 100 articles on peace and
nonviolent action Fr. Dear’s writings focus on nonviolence
and peacemaking. One of his books, Peacemaking Behind
Bars, is an account of his time spent in jail for a 1993 action
at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, N.C. He
has participated in many other actions of nonviolent civil
disobedience for justice and peace.
Stephen Dear is the executive director of People of Faith
Against the Death Penalty, a national organization with
headquarters in Carrboro, North Carolina.
Heather DeMaim is a founding member of Not Dead Yet
and ADAPT, a disability rights organizations in Missouri.
Jim and Shelley Douglass are co-founders of Mary House,
Catholic Workers, in Birmingham, Alabama, peace activists,
co-founders of Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action,
and co-organizers of a national campaign to stop the “White
Trains” transporting nuclear weapons across the U.S. and to
stop the Trident nuclear submarine and missile system. The
Douglasses believe that every nonviolent movement in U.S.
history could have been squelched by the way in which RICO
has been applied in NOW v. Scheidler.
Thomas Gumbleton is a Catholic bishop in the Archdiocese
of Detroit, Michigan, and a founder of Pax Christi, USA. He
was a leading voice urging the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops to issue its statement in 1971 collectively
opposing the Vietnam War on the ground that the war could
no longer be justified under the principles of the just war
tradition. Bishop Gumbleton has worked and visited in poor
and war-torn countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
l2a
and is deeply concerned with human rights violations around
the world. He holds a deep belief in the power of nonviolence
to effect social change.
Lana Jacobs has been arrested numerous times at the
Strategic Air Command base in Omaha, Nebraska, and
Whiteman AFB protesting the stealth bomber; has trial in
September 2005 for opposing ROTC in the schools in
Missouri; In March, 2005, Lana was arrested for taking water
to Terri Schiavo. She is the recipient of the Martin Luther
King Jr. Award and the Shalom Peace Award.
Kathy Kelly is a co-founder of Voices in the Wilderness, a
group that has sought to end the economic sanctions against
the people of Iraq, by sending delegations to Iraq to break the
siege and to bring desperately needed medical supplies to
children and families, and by sponsoring demonstrations
against these sanctions, including week-long fasting outside
the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. Voices
in the Wilderness has also protested against the current war in
Iraq. The American Friends Service Committee nominated
Ms. Kelly for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Andy Lipscomb is a member of Witnesses for Reconcilia-
tion, a board member of Consistent Life, and a long-time ac-
tivist for civil rights.
Deborah McEvoy is a member of Feminists for Life of
America and of the Detroit Peace Community. In her role as a
health professional, she supports the needs of women and
their children through petitions, public advocacy and demon-
strations.
Rachel MacNair, a Quaker, is the founder and director of
the Feminism and Nonviolence Studies Association. She has
written a seminal book on peace psychology, and has been
arrested frequently for participation in nonviolent direct
actions at nuclear weapons facilities and abortion clinics.
l3a
John W. Oliver is the coordinator of the Orthodox Peace
Fellowship in North America. He is professor emeritus of
history at Malone College.
Gail Phares is a founder of Witness for Peace (WFP) a
national organization working to affect U.S. policy in Latin
America. Ms. Phares is also the founder and director of the
Carolina Interfaith Task Force on Central America. She has
led many delegations to war-torn areas in Latin America and
frequently joins nonviolent peace and justice actions at home.
The members of WFP believe that organizing for justice—
including the right to nonviolent protest of official policies of
our government—is a fundamental right secured under the
Constitution.
Rev. Michael Pfleger is Pastor of the Faith Community of
St. Sabina’s on Chicago’s South Side, a “Pastor, Preacher,
Parent, Lecturer, Activist, and ‘Errand Boy for Jesus,’ “ who
has mobilized his parish and community in a series of protest
crusades, sometimes involving peaceable nonviolent direct
action, including campaigns against drug paraphernalia
(which precipitated statewide legislation), “Standing Up—
Talking Back,” a social action crusade, an anti-Alcohol &
Tobacco Billboard campaign which reduced the number of
such billboards from 118 to 40 in the cama Sarg and
stin tions to identify vendors selling liquor to minors.
On ‘April 27, 1998, citing the verdict in NOW vs. Scheidler,
the Chicago Sun-Times editorialized that, if RICO weren't
curtailed, that statute might even be invoked to deter or
punish Fr. Pfleger’s and St. Sabina’s community-based pro-
test against the trivialization of violence on the Jerry Springer
TV show.
Sister Helen Prejean, CSJ, is internationally known for her
opposition to the death penalty and her work with both death
row inmates and the families of murder victims. She is the
founder of Survive, a New Orleans victim’s advocacy group,
and the author of Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account
14a
of the Death Penalty in the United States, which became both
a national and international bestseller and a major motion
picture. Sister Helen does not believe that peaceful, non-
violent protesters should be condemned as “extortionists” or
protest leaders prosecuted as “racketeers.”
Scott and Claire Schaeffer-Duffy are co-founders of the
Saints Francis and Therese Catholic Worker in Worcester,
MA, a lay Catholic pacifist community which offers hospital-
ity to homeless men and women. They also publish The
Catholic Radical, a bi-monthly journal of opinion. Scott has
engaged in civil disobedience at weapons facilities and
abortion clinics, and has lectured extensively at colleges and
universities throughout New England on the value of
nonviolent direct action. The Schaeffer-Duffys state their
interest in this case as follows: “Nonviolent civil disobedi-
ence is an American tradition, one that has brought much
good to our country. We advocate its use when laws ccn-
tradict the needs of the common good and the greater law of
wod’s love for all.”
Martin Sheen is an actor who has participated for nearly
two decades in protests against weapons of mass destruction
and in demonstrations pertaining to homelessness and other
issues of social justice.
John Stoner is a member of Mennonite Central Committee,
a traditional peace church. He is the founder of Every Church
a Peace Church, a movement to share the convictions of the
Anabaptist community with all other Christian churches.
Brian Terrell is a leader of the Catholic Peace Ministry in
Ces Moines, lowa and is a participant with members of the
Des Moines Catholic Worker community in nonviolent
Gandhian activism at Offutt Air Force Base.
Howard Zinn is a professor of history at Boston University.
He has served as a professor of history at Spelman College in
Atlanta, and as a visiting professor at the University of Paris
ee ee ae
es weer he ee
1Sa
and the University of Bologna. He has written over a dozen
books which deal in some way with protest movements in
American history. Two of these books most closely related to
the theme of this brief are Disobedience and Democracy
(1968), and A People’s History of the United States (3d ed.
1999).
Stephen Zunes is Professor of Politics at the University of
San Francisco. He is the principal editor of Nonviolent Social
Movements (Blackwell, 1999). His research interests have
included the impact of grassroots political movements on
policy and government. Prior to his academic career, he
engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns against
nuclear power, nuclear weapons and apartheid and served as a
staff member and nonviolence trainer for organizations sup-
porting nonviolent civil disobedience.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.