Amicus Curiae Brief — Mayle v. Felix
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No. 04-563
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DENEICE A. MAYLE, WARDEN, PETITIONER
L.
JACOBY LEE FELIX
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL R. DREEBEN
Deputy Solicitor General
LISA S. BLATT
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
RICHARD A. FRIEDMAN
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c)(2), an amended habeas petition that is filed after
the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C.
2244(d)(1) relates back to the date of an original timely
filed habeas petition, simply because the amended
petition asserts claims arising from the same trial an
conviction that the prisoner attacked in the original
petition.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Interest of the United States
Relevant statutory provisions
Statement
Summary of argument
Argument:
An amended post-conviction pleading relates back
to an original pleading when the amended pleading
arises from the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
that is the basis for relief set forth in th > original
pleading 10
A. Federal Rule 15(c)(2) permits relation back
in post-conviction proceedings when an
amended claim arises from the grounds for
relief and supporting facts that are required
to be set forth in the original pleading 11
B. The court of appeals interpretation of Rule
1516 ) conflicts with the purposes of AEDPA's
one-year time limit 16
C. The court of appeals’ holding conflicts with
the notice principle of Rule 15(c)(2) 2
Conclusion 27
Appendix la
mee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F 3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001) 24
Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 US.
| 147 (1984) 9, 22, 25
t Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347 (2004) 22
| Brannigan v. United States, 249 F 3d 584 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 874 (2001) 26
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2000) 15
(IIT)
IV
*
Cases—Continued: Page
Cases—Continued:
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1988) 21 -
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) 22 United States v. Hicks, 283 F 3d 380 (D.C. Cir.
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) 15 2002) 7, 15, 17, 24
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) 22,25 United States v. Pittman, 209 F 3d 314 (4th Cir.
Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341 (11th 2000) 7, 11, 17, 18
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 52 U.S. 907 (2001) 7, 18 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) 16
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) 16, 18 Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). 12. 16,22
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002) .......... 15 Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir.
Ellzey v. United States, 324 F 3d 521 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 973 (2002) 2
2003) 6, 20, 21, 25 Statutes and rules:
Engle v. Isaac, 456 US. 107 (1982) 21,22
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) 26 Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334... 13
Fama v. Commissioner of Corr. Servs.,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, Tit. 1, 110 Stat. 1214:
235 F Ad 804 (2d Cir. 2000) 2
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) 12, 21 — — L
Johnson v. United States, 196 F 3d 802 (7th Cir. 28 U.S.C. 2244(b\(1) 27
1999) 20 2244(b
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) 15 — — — 5 9
Missouri, Kan. & Ter Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570 | 28 U.S.C. 2244(dX1) 1, 2,3, 10
(1913) 23 244
New York Cent. & HR. R. v. Kinney, — — — — —
260 U S. 340 (1922) 23 28 U.S.C. 2242 : 11,14
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 28 U.S.C. 2254 14
(1979) 26
Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) a ey yy paint
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) 21 Rule 15. 2.21
Scarborough v. Principi, 124 S. Ct. 1856 (2004). 22.23 Rule 15) 11. 12, 20, 21
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) 25 Rule 15(e) 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 20, 25
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) 22 Rule 15(¢2) passim
Smith v. Murray, 477 US. 527 (1986) 21 Rule 60(b) 13
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574 Rule 81(aX2) 12
(1945) 23 Crim. P. ANN
United States v. Duffus, 173 F 3d 333 (3d Cir.), — —— 0
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 866 (1999) 7, 17, 18, 21 Rule 2 2
United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F 3d 501 Rule Ae) 13
(10th Cir. 2000) 7. 18
VI
- Rules—Continued: Page
Rule Ae) 8,14
Rule Ac 2) 8,14
Rule 2(d) 14
Rule Ae) 17
Rule 11 12
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings:
Rule Abu) 8,14
Rule Ab) 8,14
Rule Ac) 14
Rule 2(d) 17
Rule 12 12
Miscellaneous:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review (1995) 19
6A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d (1990) 23,24
H.R. Rep. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976 13
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 04-563
DENEICE A. MAYLE, WARDEN, PETITIONER
v.
JACOBY LEE FELIX
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The court of appeals held that a state prisoner’s
amended habeas petition that is filed after the one-year
limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1) relates
back to the filing of an original timely filed habeas
petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15002),
simply because the amended petition was based on
claims arising from the same trial and conviction under
attack in the original petition. A similar one-year
limitation period applies to collateral challenges to
federal convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 J 6, and the
lower courts have held that the doctrine of relation
back applies equally to proceedings under Section 2254
and under Section 2255. E.g., Pet. App. A4 n.1;
(1)
2
Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 973 (2002); Fama v. Com-
missioner of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 816 (2d Cir.
2000). Because the Court’s ruling will apply o col-
lateral attacks on federal criminal judgments, the
United States has a substantial interest in the outcome
of this case.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2244, Rule 2 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, and Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in an
appendix to the brief. App., infra, la-5a.
STATEMENT
Following a jury trial in California state court,
respondent was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. The California Court of Appeal affirmed and
the California Supreme Court denied review. Respon-
dent subsequently brought a timely petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
Eastern District of California. He later amended the
petition to add new claims after the expiration of the
one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1).
The district court dismissed the new claims as time-
barred. The United States Court of Appeals for the
winth Circuit reversed that dismissal, ruling that the
amended petition related back for statute of limitation
purposes to the date of respondent’s initial habeas
petition.
1. In 1995, respondent was convicted in California
state court of first degree murder and second degree
robbery of Richard Harper, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The
focus of the prosecution’s case at trial was a videotaped
3
interview given by Kenneth Williams in which Williams
reported to police the following events. On September
21, 1993, just before the robbery and murder of Harper,
Williams overheard respondent, who had an automatic
weapon, speaking with two other individuals, Lawson
and Curtis, about a plan to rob Harper to steal mari-
juana from him. Williams saw the three men go around
the corner. Two minutes later he heard six or seven
shots. Williams then observed respondent and Curtis
getting into and driving Harper’s vehicle. Williams
again saw the trio a short time later going through
Harper’s car. When Williams asked respondent
whether he shot Harper, respondent replied, “I think
so.” Pet. App. C5. Williams testified at trial but denied
having any memory of his interview with the police,
despite being shown videotaped excerpts of that
interview in front of the jury. Id. at C4.
Another witness also testified at trial that he over-
heard respondent state that a woman might have seen
respondent on the night of the robbery and that respon-
dent was “going back to smoke [shoot] her.” Pet. App.
C4. The State also introduced pre-trial statements to
police that were made by respondent and Lawson, who
each gave false or contradictery statements about their
activities during the evening of the robbery and
murder.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed respondent’s
conviction. The California Supreme Court declined
further review. Respondent’s conviction became final
on August 12, 1997. Pet. App. A5.
2. On May 8, 1998, within the one-year limitation
period for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), respondent
filed in federal district court a pro se petition for a writ
1
of habeas corpus. The petition raised three elaims that
respondent had exhausted on direct appeal: that the
admission into evidence of Williams's videotaped testi-
mony violated respondent’s rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment; that the judge
had erred in instructing the jury; and that there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Pet.
App. A5, G1-G7.
On May 29, 1998, a magistrate judge ordered the ap-
pointment of counsel. Pet. App. C6, H2. On August 11,
1998, the AEDPA one-year limitation period expired.
Id. at A5.
On January 28, 1999, five months after the expiration
of AEDPA’s time limit, respondent's counsel filed an
amended petition that reiterated his Confrontation
Clause claim but deleted the instructional error and
insufficient evidence claims. The amended petition also
contained two new claims: that the police used coercive
tactics during his pre-trial interrogation such that the
admission at trial of his pre-trial statements violated his
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment, and that respondent’s counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to raise that coerced confession claim on
direct appeal. Pet. App. A5, C6, 14-119. The State
moved to dismiss the new claims for failure to exhaust,
but that motion was vacated at the request of the State
after respondent had exhausted the claims in state
court. Id. at C6-C7.
In February 2001, the magistrate judge issued find-
ings and recommendations concluding that the coerced
confession and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
should be dismissed as time-barred, because the
amended petition raising those claims was not filed
until after the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year
5
limitation period. The magistrate judge observed that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which governs the
amendment of pleadings, applies to habeas corpus
actions, but that Rule 15(c)(2) does not permit an
amended pleading to relate back to the date of the
original pleading unless “the claim or defense asserted
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading.” Pet. App. C14. The
magistrate judge further explained that relation back
was not warranted in this case on the theory that the
original and amended claims “are based on the same
criminal conviction.” Id. at C16. Rather, the magis-
trate judge concluded, “(t]he claims * * * which
concern [respondent’s] allegedly involuntary state-
ments to police do not arise out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as the videotaped interroga-
tion of Kenneth Williams.” Jbid. Addressing respon-
dent’s timely Confrontation Clause on the merits, the
magistrate judge recommended that it be dismissed.
Id. at C18- C45.
In June 2002, the district court dismissed respon-
dent’s amended claims as time-barred and dismissed
respondent’s Confrontation Clause claim on the merits,
relying on the magistrate judge’s findings and recom-
mendations. Pet. App. B1-B3. The district court
subsequently issued a certificate of appealability for
both the Confrontation Clause and the amended claims.
Id. at A6.
3. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of respondent’s Confrontation
Clause claim but reversed the dismissal of his coerced
confession claim and remanded that claim to the district
court for further proceedings. Pet. App. Al-Al9. The
court of appeals recognized that the timeliness of the
6
coerced confession claim, which was raised in an
amended petition after the expiration of AEDPA’s one-
year time limit, turned on whether that claim arose
from the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” set forth
in respondent’s original petition within the meaning of
Rule 15(c)(2)’s relation back rule. Pet. App. A4.
Holding that “the transaction or occurrence” raised in
respondent’s original habeas petition was the “trial and
conviction” under attack, the court of appeals concluded
that the amended petition related back to the filing of
the original petition. Id. at A4, A6, A7. In so holding,
the court of appeals expressed its agreement (id. at A7)
with the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Ellzey v.
United States, 324 F.3d 521, 526 (2003).
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that its holding was
supported by a “literal application” of Rule 15(c). Pet.
App. A6. The court also opined that respondent’s
original petition “brought his trial and conviction to the
attention of the State,” and thus had fairly put the
State on notice that respondent might amend his
petition to challenge other “allegedly unconstitutional
rulings at trial.” Id. at Al0. The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed (id. at A8) with the majority of courts of appeals
that have concluded that construing “conduct, transac-
tion, or occurrence” to refer to a prisoner’s conviction
would impermissibly undermine AEDPA’s one-year
limit by invariably permitting expired claims to relate
The court of appeals did not explicitly rule on the timeliness of
respondent’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal,
but the decision appears to have treated that claim as part
of respondent’s coerced confession claim because respondent’s
amended habeas petition combined the two theories as one ground
for relief from his conviction. Pet. App. 14-119.
t
F
4
*
+
7
back to a timely filed post-conviction pleading.’ The
court of appeals reasoned that “AEDPA * Still
requires the original petition to be filed within the one-
year period.” Ibid.
Judge Tallman dissented. Pet. App. Al3-A19. He
explained that to define “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” under Rule 15(c)(2) “so broadly that any
claim stemming from pre-trial motions, the trial, or
sentencing relates back to a timely-filed habeas peti-
tion” would “obliterate[] AEDPA’s one year statute of
limitation.” Pet. App. Al3. In Judge Tallman’s view,
“(while an amendment offered to clarify or amplify the
facts already alleged in support of a timely claim may
relate back, an amendment that introduces a new legal
theory based on facts different from those underlying
the timely claim may not.” Id. at A18.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A prisoner cannot rely on the doctrine of relation
back, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2), to
render timely under the AEDPA’s limitation period an
otherwise untimely amendment to an original habeas
petition, when the amendment articulates new grounds
for relief and supporting facts that differ from those
alleged in the original petition.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) permits
relation back of an otherwise untimely pleading when
“the claim * * * asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
2 See United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 505 (10th Cir.
2000); Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001); United States v. Pittman,
209 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d
333, 337-338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 866 (1999).
8
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading.” In the post-conviction setting, the “conduct,
transaction, or occurrence” set forth in an original post-
conviction pleading refers to the conduct or event that
is the basis for the prisoner’s collateral attack, i. e., the
specific grounds for collateral relief and supporting
facts that are set forth in the original pleading. The
Rules governing post-conviction proceedings require an
original post-conviction pleading to set forth all grounds
for relief and supporting facts available to the prisoner.
Rule 2(c)(1) and (2) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases (Section 2254 Rules); Rule 2(b)(1) and (2) of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (Section
2255 Rules). Because relation back under Rule 15(c)(2)
requires that any claim asserted in an amended
pleading must arise from the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” that is set forth in the original pleading, the
phrase “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” logically
refers to the grounds for relief and supporting facts
that the prisoner was required to set forth in his
original pleading.
Under that approach to Rule 15(c) in the post-con-
viction setting, relation back principles allow a prisoner
to cure technical deficiencies of form in the original
pleading; to add legal theories based on a set of facts
previously identified in the original pleading; and to
clarify or amplify facts set forth in the original pleading.
The prisoner cannot, however, rely on relation back
to save an otherwise untimely pleading if the amended
pleading asserts both new grounds for relief and a
different set of facts than those set forth in the
prisoner’s original pleading.
Applying that analysis, respondent’s claims of
coerced confession and ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal are time barred because they do not arise out
9
of any conduct, transaction, or occurrence that is speci-
fied in respondent’s original petition. Those claims rely
on new legal theories and different events and conduct
than those identified in respondent’s original petition,
which concerned the admission of extra-judicial
testimony of a government witness, instructional error,
and insufficient evidence. The amended petition
accordingly does not relate back under Rule 15(c)(2).
B. The Ninth Circuit’s view that the relevant “con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence” is the prisoner’s trial
and conviction conflicts with the central purpose of the
AEDPA’s one-year time limit: to promote the finality
of criminal convictions. Because an original petition
will almost always be based on a prisoner’s underlying
conviction, the rule embraced by the Ninth Circuit
would invariably permit relation back of untimely
claims no matter how disparate the amended claims
were in both time and type from the claims set forth in
the original petition. That rule of virtually automatic
relation back would substantially extend the time in
which to raise new collateral attacks well beyond
AEDPA’s one-year limit and would undermine the
principles of finality, federalism, and comity that
animated the passage of the AEDPA.
C. The conclusion that Rule 15(c)(2) permits relation
back only when the amended pleading arises from the
grounds for relief and supporting facts set forth in the
prisoner’s original post-conviction pleading is confirmed
by the notice principle that serves as the foundation for
the relation-back doctrine. When an amended pleading
asserts a claim of which the original pleading gave fair
notice, there is no cause to assert a limitation period as
a bar to relief. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984). Thus, when an
amended post-conviction pleading arises from the
10
grounds for relief and supporting facts stated in a
timely pleading, permitting the amended pleading to
relate back is consistent with principles of fair notice.
By contrast, the rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit
would permit an amended pleading to relate back even
in cases such as the present one, where the original
pleading provided no notice of the newly asserted basis
for relief.
ARGUMENT
AN AMENDED POST-CONVICTION PLEADING
RELATES BACK TO AN ORIGINAL PLEADING
WHEN THE AMENDED PLEADING ARISES FROM
THE CONDUCT, TRANSACTION, OR OCCURRENCE
THAT IS THE BASIS FOR RELIEF SET FORTH IN
THE ORIGINAL PLEADING
Following the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year
limitation period, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), respondent filed
an amended habeas corpus petition that claimed that
the admission at trial of respondent’s pre-trial con-
fession violated his due process rights because his
confession was coerced by police and that counsel was
ineffective on appeal in failing to press the coerced
confession claim. It is undisputed that those claims are
time-barred unless they relate back to respundent’s
timely filed original petition that raised Confrontation
Clause, instructional error, and evidence insufficiency
claims.
According to the rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit,
respondent’s amended claims relate back to the date of
his original petition because the “conduct, transaction,
or occurrence” contemplated by Rule 15(c)(2) in this
context is respondent’s conviction, and because the
original and amended claims arise from the same
criminal conviction. As illustrated by this csae, such a
11
rule would permit relation back of untimely claims that
would include any pre-trial, trial, or post- trial error
that would provide a basis for challenging the
conviction. That approach “views ‘occurrence’ at too
high a level of generality,” United States v. Pittman,
209 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2000), and is inconsistent
with the rules governing post-conviction proceedings,
the policies of finality, comity, and federalism under-
lying the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, and the
requirement of fair notice that is embodied in Rule
15(c). Properly construed, the Rule 15(c)(2) “conduct,
transaction, or occurrence” out of which the amended
petition must arise refers to the specific conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence that is the basis for a prisoner’s
legal challenge as set forth in his original habeas peti-
tion. Because respondent’s original petition gave the
State no notice that respondent was challenging the
introduction of his pre-trial confession, much less his
counsel's effectiveness of assistance on appeal, respon-
dent’s amended claims do not relate back to his original
A. Federal Rule 15(c)(2) Permits Relation Back In Post-
Conviction Proceedings When An Amended Claim
Arises From The Grounds For Relief And Supporting
Facts That Are Required To Be Set Forth In The
Original Pleading _—
1. An Jalpplication for a writ of habeas corpus”
“may be amended or supplemented as provided in the
rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C.
2242. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that a party may amend a pleading
after the opposing party has filed a responsive pleading
“only by leave of court” or by consent of the adverse
party, but “leave shall be freely given when justice so
12
requires.” Rule 15(a) addresses when an amendment
should be permitted, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962), but subsection (a) does not address whether
an amended pleading that raises a new claim is none-
theless barred by an applicable sti ute of limitation.
That issue is addressed by Rule 15,<', which provides in
pertinent part that “[ajn amendment of a pleading
relates back to the date of the original pleading when
* * * the claim * * * asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
Rule 15(c)(2), however, cannot be applied to post-
conviction pleadings in a manner that conflicts with the
statutes and rules governing post-conviction pro-
ceedings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(2)
states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
to “proceedings for * * * habeas corpus * to the
extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set
forth in * * * the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255 Pro-
ceedings.” Similarly, Rule 11 of the Section 2254 Rules
and Rule 12 of the Section 2255 Rules provide that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions
or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under
these rules. See also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.
202, 208 (2003) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply in the context of habeas suits to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus
Rules.”); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 489 (1975) (per
All citations to the Section 2254 Rules and Section 2255 Rules
refer to the version that became effective on December 1, 2004.
http//www.uscourts.gov/rules/index.html#congressional 120104.
MEY of Foon
13
curiam) (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
does not trump exhaustion requirement under Section
2254).
2. As stated, Rule 15(c)(2) permits relation back of
an amended pleading when the claim asserted in the
amended pleading “arose out of the conduct, transac-
tion, or occurrence set forth * * * in the original
pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). In the context of an
original pleading that collaterally attacks a criminal
conviction, the phrase “conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence” refers to whatever conduct, event, or occurrence
is alleged as the basis for the initial pleading’s attack on
the conviction, ie, the specific grounds for relief and
supporting facts that are set forth in the original
pleading. That conclusion best comports with the
Section 2254 Rules and the Section 2255 Rules, which
govern the content and form for post-conviction plead-
ings. Those rules reflect Congress’s unambiguous in-
tent that the original post-conviction pleading (i e., a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254
or a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence
under Section 2255) particularize the specific grounds
for relief and supporting facts for the collateral chal-
lenge to the prisoner’s conviction.‘
Rule 2 requires that a prisoner’s petition or motion
must “specify all the grounds for relief available” to the
prisoner and “state the facts supporting each ground.”
* Rule 2’s specificity requirement was contained in the original
Rules that were drafted by the Advisory Committee in 1976, were
transmitted to Congress by this Court by Order of April 26, 1976,
and were approved by Congress after “careful study.” H.R. Rep.
No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976); see also Pub. L. No. 94-426,
90 Stat. 1334; Advisory Committee Notes to Section 2254 Rule 2,
1976 Adoption (Rule 2(c) “requires that all available grounds for
relief be presented in the petition.”).
14
Section 2254 Rule 2(c)(1) and (2); Section 2255 Rule
2(b)\(1) and (2). The Model Form accompanying the
Rules contains similar instructions as well as a caution-
ary statement that if you fail to set forth all the
grounds” in the original pleading, “you may be barred
from presenting additional grounds at a later date.”
Appendix of Forms for Petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2254
and Motions under Section 2255 (Instructions § 9,
Model Form J 12); see also Section 2254 Rule 2(d) and
Section 2255 Rule 2(c) (requiring that original pleading
“must substantially follow either the form appended to
these rules” or form prescribed by local district-court
rules).
For those reasons, the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading” in a Section 2254 or Section 2255
proceeding is not a prisoner’s “trial and conviction,” as
held by the court of appeals. Pet. App. A4, A6, A7.
Rather, the phrase, in this context, refers to the
particular conduct, event, or occurrence that serves as
the ground for relief and supporting facts that the post-
conviction Rules require the prisoner to specify in his
original pleading. Accordingly, an amended post-con-
viction pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading under Rule 15(c)(2) only if the amended claim
arises from the grounds and set of facts identified in the
prisoner's original pleading.
That conclusion does not render Rule 15(c)’s relation-
back principle “meaningless in the habeas context,” as
suggested by the Ninth Circuit. Pet. App. A7-A8, 49.
For instance, relation back is appropriate when the
amended pleading cures a technical or form deficiency
in an original pleading, such as a missing signature. See
Advisory Committee Notes to 2004 Amendments to
Rules 2 and 3 of the Section 2254 Rules and Section
15
2255 Rules (explaining amendments that require clerks
to accept defective motions so that prisoner can later
file corrected motion); cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll.,
535 U.S. 106 (2002) (permitting relation back of
verification requirement under Title VII); Becker v.
Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001) (permitting relation
back of signature requirement for notice of appeal).
Relation back also is appropriate if the amended
pleading adds a new legal theory that is based on the
same set of facts that were specified in the original
post-conviction pleading, i.e. the particular occurrences
or conduct challenged in the original pleading. Cf.
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (rejecting self-
incrimination clause challenge but remanding for sub-
stantive due process analysis of same conduct); McNeil
v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-179 (1991) (reviewing
validity of admission of confession under Fifth and
Sixth Amendments). Relation back is also appropriate
if an amended pleading clarifies or amplifies facts to
support the specific grounds that were raised in the
original pleading. As Judge Edwards has explained in
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hicks,
283 F.3d 380, 388 (2002), “an amendment offered for the
purpose of adding [to] or amplifying the facts already
alleged in support of a particular claim may relate
back.” Conversely, an amendment “that attempts to
introduce a new legal theory based on facts different
from those underlying the timely claims may not.” Id.
at 389; accord Pet. App. ot nena
3. Under the above principles, respondent’s amend-
ed petition does not arise out of any “conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence” that was raised in respondent’s
original petition. Respondent’s timely original petition
raised three grounds for relief from his state court
conviction: the admission of Williams’ out-of-court
16
statement, instructional error, and insufficiency of the
evidence. Pet. App. G6. The new claims raised in the
amended petition, filed after the AEDPA’s one-year
limitation period, abandoned the latter two claims and
raised entirely new grounds for relief based on a com-
pletely different set of facts: the admission of respon-
dent’s allegedly coerced confession and counsel’s al-
leged ineffective assistance on appeal for failure to raise
the coerced confession claim. “Here, it simply cannot
be said that [the original and amended] claims arise
from the same set of facts; rather, they arise from dis-
tinctly separate occurrences of both time and type.” /d.
at Als (Tallman, J., dissenting); accord id. at D9
(magistrate judge’s recommended findings) (“Obvi-
ously, the theories and facts of the claims are distinct.”).
Respondent’s untimely amended petition therefore
should have been dismissed as time-barred under the
AEDPA’s one-year time limit.
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Interpretation Of Rule 15(c)(2)
Conflicts With The Purposes Of AEDPA’s One-Year
Time Limit
1. “Congress enacted AEDPA to reduce delays in
the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
particularly capital cases,” and “to further the prin-
ciples of comity, finality, and federalism.” Woodford v.
Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (quoting Willams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386, 436 (2000)). In particular, the
AEDPA’s one-year limitation period “quite plainly
serves the well-recognized interest in the finality” of
criminal judgments by “restricting the time that a
prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which to
seek federal habeas review.” Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 179 (2001). Those purposes are best served by
permitting relation back of an amendment that is filed
17
beyond AEDPA’s one-year limitation period only when
the amendment arises out of the grounds and set of
facts set forth in an original timely filed pleading. That
rule is “faithful * * * to the concerns about drawn-out
and unlimited collateral attacks on federal criminal
judgments evinced by the passage of AEDPA.” Hicks,
283 F.3d at 389; accord United States v. Duffus, 174
F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir.) (“A prisoner should not be able
to assert a claim otherwise barred by the statute of
limitations merely because he asserted a separate claim
within the limitations period.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
866 (1999).
By contrast, a rule that the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” is the prisoner’s trial and conviction “would
be difficult to square with Congress’ decision to ex-
pedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time
restrictions” on Section 2254 petitions and Section 2255
motions. Hicks, 283 F.3d at 388. The Ninth Circuit’s
rule would mean that amendments “would almost
invariably be allowed even after the statute of limita-
tions has expired, because most [collateral] claims arise
from a criminal defendant’s underlying conviction and
sentence.” Pittman, 209 F. 3d at 318; Hicks, 283 F. ad at
388 (“In most cases, a prisoner’s claims for relief will
arise out of the same criminal conviction; if the de-
fendant’s trial and sentencing are construed to be the
‘occurrence,’ virtually any purported amendment will
relate back.”); see also Section 2254 Rule 2(e) and
Section 2255 Rule 2(d) (requiring separate petitions or
motions for separate judgments under attack).
Because a judgment of conviction generally embodies
the jury verdict or plea and the sentence, see, e. g., Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1), the rule embraced by the Ninth
Circuit would significantly extend the one-year limita-
tion period with respect to any new grounds for relief
18
or supporting set of facts that arise out of the conviction
at issue, even though the new grounds and facts were
not set forth in the original petition. “By defining
‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence’ so broadly that any
claim stemming from pre-trial motions, the trial, or
sentencing relates back to a timely-filed habeas
petition,” the Ninth Circuit’s rule would permit “the
‘relation-back’ doctrine to swallow AEDPA’s statute of
limitation, rendering it a virtual nullity through which
an unlimited number of amendments must be liberally
permitted so long as the original collateral attack
was timely filed.“ Pet. App. A13, A1l6 (Tallman, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also United States v.
Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“(Tjo allow amendment under that broad umbrella
would be tantamount to judicial rescission of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations period.”); accord Davenport v.
United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 907 (2001); Pittman, 209 F.3d at 318;
Duffus, 174 F.3d at 337-338.
In Duncan, this Court refused to adopt an inter-
pretation of the AED PA that would permit a state
prisoner's filing of a federal habeas petition to count as
a post-conviction filing that tolls the one-year limitation
period under Section 2244(d)(2) because that inter-
pretation would hold greater potential to hinder
finality.” 533 U.S. at 178. The Ninth Cireuit's inter-
pretation similarly should be rejected because it would
hold greater potential to hinder finality.” bid. The
Ninth Circuit’s holding would permit indefinite relation
back for untimely claims arising out of the prisoner’s
conviction so long as the case remains pending. That
time period in many instances would last well beyond
the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year limit.
19
For instance, in a sample of habeas actions disposed
of during 1992, the average (mean) number of days to
resolve the case on the merits in district court was 477
days, and that number was 925 days for multiple-issue
habeas petitions involving a sentence of death. Bureau
of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal
Habeas Corpus Review 23-25 (1995). Even the median
case processing time for all habeas cases, including
those not addressed on the merits, was about 6 months, ~
with 10% taking more than 761 days to resolve. Id. at
19-20; see also Pet. App. Al6 n.2 (Tallman, J., dis-
senting) (observing that respondent’s case was pending
for four years before the district court resolved
respondent’s Confrontation Clause claim on the merits).
Thus, by embracing a rule that would invariably lead to
relation back of untimely claims as long as they arose
out of the prisoner’s conviction, the net effect of the
Ninth Circuit’s rule would be to extend the limitations
period for filing collateral challenges substantially
beyond the time period specified by Congress.
2. The Ninth Circuit believed that its holding was
tempered by the fact that a prisoner who delays the
filing of an amended petition runs the risk that the
district court will have already entered judgment on
the merits with respect to the original petition and the
prisoner therefore will have to meet the more stringent
requirements for bringing a second or successive
petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). Pet. App. A8-A9
n.2. As discussed, however, a considerable amount of
time may pass before a court resolves a prisoner’s
original claim or claims. Moreover, because the amount
of time to resolve any given collateral attack will vary
in light of the complexity of the case and docket of the
district court, the Ninth Circuit’s approach would
create anomalies and inequities that could not have
20
been intended by Congress. A prisoner seeking relief
from a conviction before a district court that promptly
enters final judgment with respect to the original
petition not only will have to raise any additional chal-
lenges to his conviction under the strict requirements
for second and successive petitions, ibid., but he also
will have to comply with the one-year limitation period
with respect to any additional claims. By contrast, a
similarly-situated prisoner whose case is pending be-
fore a court that takes a longer time to act on an
original petition is free to mount additional and effec-
tively consecutive attacks on the conviction without
regard to AEDPA’s one-year time limit or the Act’s
provisions on second or successive petitions. There is
no basis for reading Rule 15(c) to create such disparate
treatment.’
The court of appeals in Ellzey, 324 F.3d at 526, stated that,
under the government’s view of Rule 15(c), post-conviction “plead-
ings could not be amended at all.“ even if filed within the one-year
limit, “for a successive collateral attack requires prior appellate
approval” under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A) and 2255 1 8. That sug-
gestion is unfounded. As long s a post-conviction proceeding is
pending, all timely amendments may be filed under Rule 15(a)
without becoming a second or successive filing under AEDPA.
Johnson v. United States, 196 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A
prisoner receives one complete round of litigation, which as in
other civil suits includes the opportunity to amend a pleading be-
fore judgment.”). That conclusion holds true even where the
amended petition raises claims based on different grounds and
facts from the original petition, so long as the amendment is filed
within the limitations period. Rule 15(a) does not require any
“conduct, transaction, or occurrence” connection between the
original and amended claims, and Rule 15(c)(2) is relevant only
when the amended petition is filed after the expiration of the
limitations period.
21
The Ninth Circuit also attempted to justify its
holding on the theory that “abuses of [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 15 can be controlled by the district
court under subsection (a), which requires leave of
court to file an amendment after a responsive pleading
has been filed.” Pet. App. Ag; see also Ellzey, 324 F.3d
at 527. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, Pet. App. A9
n.3, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) re-
quires leave to be “freely given,” and will be typically
given absent prejudice to the opposing party or other
similar circumstances. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. at
182. More importantly, permitting relation back of an
otherwise proper amendment under Rule 15(a) (i.e.,
because there is no prejudice to the government) would
nonetheless substantially extend AEDPA’s one-year
limit and therefore would “thwart[] the basic objective
of repose underlying the very notion of a limitations
period.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 (2000);
Duffus, 174 F.3d at 338 (recognizing principle “that
usually statutes of limitations operate without taking
prejudice from delay into account”).
The harm to the principle of repose is particularly
acute in the post-conviction setting where a prisoner
attacks an otherwise final criminal conviction. By inter-
fering with the finality of criminal judgments, collateral
review of criminal convictions entails “profound societal
costs.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998)
(quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)).
Such review “extends the ordeal of trial for both society
and the accused,” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-127
(1982), and undermines the government’s ability to
exact retribution for crimes because it prevents the
government from executing the moral judgments re-
flected in criminal convictions, Thompson, 523 U.S. at
556. The absence of finality also frustrates deterrence
22
and rehabilitation. Effective deterrence depends on the
expectation that punishment will be swift and sure, and
successful rehabilitation requires the defendant to
accept that he is justly subject to sanction and that he
needs to be rehabilitated. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 127-128
n.32.
Collateral review of state convictions also threatens
the other purposes for Congress’s enactment of
AEDPA—the promotion of comity and federalism.
Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. at 206; Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995). Review of state court judg-
ments by lower federal courts “frustrate[s] both the
States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their
good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”
Isaac, 456 U.S. at 128. The costs to comity and federal-
ism are magnified in cases like the present one in which
the prisoner’s untimely claims had not been exhausted
in state court. Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351
(2004); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002).
C. The Court Of Appeal’s Holding Conflicts With The
Notice Principle Of Rule 15(c)(2)
1. Rule 15(c)(2) is premised on the principle that
once an original pleading “‘give[s] the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests,’” the defendant “has been given all
the notice that statutes of limitations were intended to
provide.” Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466
U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1984) (per curiam) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, (1957)). Thus, the relation back
principle, which was “a well-recognized doctrine” that
pre-dated the Federal Rules, Scarborough v. Principi,
124 S. Ct. 1856, 1867 (2004) (quoting Advisory Com-
mittee’s 1937 note on Subd. (c) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15),
recognizes that “[w]hen a defendant has had notice
23
from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is
trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified
conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do
not exist.” New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v.
Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922); see, e.g., Scarborough,
124 S. Ct. at 1867 (permitting relation back of the “not
substantially justified” allegation required by the Equal
Access to Justice Act because “the allegation does not
serve an essential notice-giving function”).
The notice principle that undergirds Rule 15(c)(2)
fully supports viewing the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” as the specific grounds for relief and sup-
porting facts identified by the prisoner in his original
pleading. In the ordinary civil context, “amendments
that do no more than restate the original claim with
greater particularity or amplify the details of the
transaction alleged in the preceding pleading fall within
Rule 15(c)” because the opposing party has been noti-
fied by the original pleading of the gist of the plaintiff's
claim. 6A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1497, at 76 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
Under similar principles, an amendment that “changes
the legal theory on which the action initially was
brought” relates back to an original filing “if the factual
situation upon which the action depends remains the
same and has been brought to defendant’s attention by
the original pleading.” Jd. at 95 (footnote omitted); See,
e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574
(1945) (amended Federal Boiler Inspection Act claim
related back to timely filed Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act claim based on same train accident that
injured the plaintiff).
By contrast, relation back is not appropriate where
“the amended petition set([s] up not only a different
state of facts, but a different rule of law as the ground
24
of the action.” Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Wulf, 226
U.S. 570, 577 (1913). Yet the Ninth Circuit’s conception
of “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” as the convic-
tion under collateral attack would permit relation back
in such instances by allowing a prisoner to raise expired
claims arising from different pre-trial, trial, or post-trial
events of which the original pleading gave the govern-
ment no notice. As Judge Edwards has cogently ex-
plained, where an amended post-conviction pleading
raises “an entirely new legal theory that arises from an
entirely different set of facts and type of conduct,” “the
Government would be deprived of ‘sufficient notice of
the facts and claims giving rise to the proposed amend-
ment,’ thus subverting the central policy of the relation
back doctrine.” Hicks, 283 F.3d at 388, 389 (quoting
Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001)).
This case well illustrates the point. There is nothing
in respondent’s original petition that notified the State
that respondent was seeking relief from his conviction
based on the court’s refusal to suppress incriminating
pre-trial statements that respondent made to police,
much less counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness on appeal.
To permit relation back in that instance would impro-
perly require the State “to prepare the case a second
time.” Charles Alan Wright et al., supra, at 85.°
It would also be incorrect to conclude, as suggested
by the Ninth Circuit, that an original petition brings an
® Respondent was aware of the events giving rise to his coerced
confession and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims before he
filed his original petition. Br. in Opp. 2 n.2 (noting that respon-
dent’s counsel objected before trial to the introduction of respon-
dent’s pre-trial statements); cf. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D), 2255
1 6(2)-(3) (providing separate limitations period for certain claims
such as newly discovered evidence).
25
entire “trial and conviction to the attention of the
State.” Pet. App. Al0. As discussed, pp. 13-14, supra,
the Rules governing collateral challenges require the
original pleading to set forth a specific ground for relief
and supporting facts. Similarly, a pleading that seeks
relief from a conviction based on a mere general
allegation of an invalid trial or conviction, without any
supporting grounds or facts, would provide the govern-
ment with no “notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests” and therefore would
“not be an original pleading that could be rehabilitated
by invoking Rule 15(c).” Baldwin County Welcome
Ctr., 466 U.S. at 150 n.4 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. at 47). Accordingly, the government may be pro-
perly charged with notice of only those grounds for
relief and set of supporting facts that were identified in
a prisoner’s timely-filed pleading. Cf. Schiavone v.
Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (observing that under
the 1990 version of Rule 15(c), which permitted relation
back of an amendment that changes party-defendant,
“(t]he linchpin is notice, and notice within the limita-
tions period”). Moreover, the notion that the govern-
ment is entitled to notice of no more than the bare fact
that a habeas petition has been filed is inconsistent with
the limitation in Rule 15(c)(2) that relation back not
extend beyond the “conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence” addressed in the original pleading.
3. The Ninth Circuit also expressed the view that its
interpretation of Rule 15(c) conformed to principles of
res judicata in the civil context such that “anything that
would be barred, if not brought now, may be added and
litigated” under Rule 15(c)(2). Pet. App. A7 (quoting
Ellzey, 324 F.3d at 526). The text of Rule 15(c), how-
ever, does not mention res judicata, and the two doc-
trines serve different purposes. Whereas Rule 15(c) is
26
concerned with fair notice, res judicata furthers prin-
ciples of judicial economy and the protection of parties
from the burdens of repetitious litigation. Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).
Moreover, principles of res judicata governing
civil cases do not govern post-conviction proceedings.
Rather, Congress in AEDPA has enacted a “modified
res judicata rule” in AEDPA’s provisions dealing with
second or successive petitions or motions. Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), 2255
18. Under AEDPA, any “claim” presented in a suc-
cessive petition or motion that “was presented” in a
prior petition or motion must be dismissed, whereas
any “claim” that “was not presented” previously will
not be dismissed if the claim meets certain gatekeeping
requirements. 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) and (2). Those pro-
visions reflect a conception of “claim” that refers to “a
challenge to a particular step in the case, such as the
introduction of a given piece of evidence, the text of a
given jury instruction, or the performance of counsel.”
Brannigan v. United States, 249 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir.)
(Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 874 (2001). The
contrary view—that a “claim” refers to the entire trial
and conviction—“would imply that every successive
collateral attack on a single conviction and sentence
must be dismissed.” /bid.
AEDPA’s second and successive provisions, like the
Rules governing post-conviction proceedings generally,
thus focus on the particular grounds and supporting
facts that are the basis for the prisoner’s collateral
challenge. Those provisions, like AEDPA’s one-year
limitation period, all reflect Congress’s overarching
concern for finality of criminal convictions. The court of
appeals’ conception of relation back in the post-con-
viction setting undermines that fundamental concern as
27
well as the requirement of fair notice that forms the
justification for the relation back doctrine under Rule
15(¢)(2).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
PAUL D. CLEMENT
CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL R. DREEBEN
Deputy Solicitor General
LISA S. BLATT
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
RICHARD A. FRIEDMAN
Attorney
FEBRUARY 2005
1. Section 2244 of Title 18 U.S.C., provides in rele-
vant part:
Finality of determination
* * * * *
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was
not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless—
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not
have been discovered previously through the exer-
cise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that, but for constitutional error, no reason-
able factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.
(3A) Before a second or successive application per-
mitted by this section is filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider
the application.
(la)
2a
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a second or
successive application shall be determined by a
three-judge panel of the court of appeals.
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing
of a second or successive application only if it deter-
mines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the require-
ments of this subsection.
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the
authorization to file a second or successive applica-
tion not later than 30 days after the filing of the
motion.
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a
court of appeals to file a second or successive appli-
cation shall not be appealable and shall not be the
subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of
certiorari.
(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim pre-
sented in a second or successive application that the
court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the
applicant shows that the claim satisfies the require-
ments of this section.
* * * * *
(d; (I) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final
~by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review;
3a
B) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in vio’ation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the
claim or claims presented could have been dis-
covered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed appli-
cation for State post-conviction or other collateral re-
view with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.
2. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
provides in relevant part:
The Petition
* * * * *
(e) Form. The petition must:
(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to
the petitioner;
(2) state the facts supporting each ground;
(3) state the relief requested;
4a
(4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly hand-
written; and
(5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the
petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for
petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.
(d) Standard Form. The petition must substantially
follow either the form appended to these rules or a form
prescribed by a local district-court rule. The clerk must
make forms available to petitioners without charge.
(e) Separate Petitions for Judgments of Separate
Courts. A petitioner who seeks relief from judgments
of more than one state court must file a separate peti-
tion covering the judgment of judgments of each court.
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides in
relevant part:
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
(a) Amendments. A party may amend the party’s
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the
party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.
* * * * *
(e) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment
of a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when
(2) the elaim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading * * *.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.