Amicus Curiae Brief — Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius

_ JAN 27 2014

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., et al.,

se Respondents.

CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORP., et ail.,

Petitioners,

v.

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al., .

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States

Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Third Circuits

BRIEF OF AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF HOBBY LOBBY

AND CONESTOGA, ET AL.

RoBert JOSEPH MUISE

Counsel of Record

AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER

P.O. Box 131098

ANN Arsor, MI 48113

(734) 635-3756

rmuise@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

DAvip ELIEZER YERUSHALMI

AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER

1901 PEeNNsyYLvaAniA AVE. N.W., Surre 201

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

(646) 262-0500

dyerushalmi@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae American Freedom Law Center

Becker Gallacher + Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. - 800.890.5001

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Bupreme Coun, US. |

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The question presented in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby

Stores, Inc., was framed by the government as follows:

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. [§§] 2000bb et seqg., provides

that the government “shall not substantially

burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the

burden is the least restrictive means to further

a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C.

[$$] 2000bb-1(a) and (b). The question presented

is whether RFRA allows a for-profit corporation

to deny its employees the health coverage of

contraceptives to which the employees are

otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the

religious objections of the corporation’s owners.

In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, the

petitioners framed the question presented as follows:

Whether the religious owners of a family

business, or their closely-held business

corporation, have free exercise rights that are

violated by the application of the contraceptive

coverage Mandate of the Patient Protection and

Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”).

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

SABLA OF ALTTRIAFEEEMD 06 ccc cess ce eeesnes

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTERESTS

OF AMICUS CURIAE

INTRODUCTION .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...

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I.

II.

III.

The Church’s Universal and Consistent

Moral Teaching on the Immorality of

Contraceptive Services Is Binding on the

Consciences of the Faithful ..............

The Government’s “Substantial Burden”

Argument Invites the Court to Determine the

Validity of the Challengers’ Religious

Objection to the Mandate ................

Thomas Compels a Finding that the

Contraceptive Services Mandate Imposes a

Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise in

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of

Hialeah,

se et ee re 4

Gulardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ... .... 3,14, 15

Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv.,

490 US. GEO CIGGS) ......-..4-.. aes 10

Johnson Welded Products, Inc. v. Sebelius,

No. 1:13-cv-00609-ESH, Minute Order, (D.D.C.

CS ae ere errr oy ower ee 2

Jolly v. Coughlin,

TO P.2G S60 Gia Cir. IGGG) . cae eees 10

Korte v. Sebelius,

735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) . .... ..... 13, 14

Patrick v. Lefevre,

145 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984) .............. . 10

Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ.,

707 F.20 476 (2d Cir. 1966) .... 2... cee eees 10

Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs.,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177951 (D.D.C. Dec. 19,

a rena ee ae ee ea ve 2

Sample v. Lappin,

424 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006) .... ... . 10

1V

Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.,

ee ah ae, Pe CD eS ae ee eee passim

United States v. Seeger,

Se Se, RE bcs ecb eeraeuebueeen 10

STATUTES

aie Lem ee ee re ere i

as Sees NE aoe ae Gk ee ses web ee i

ee ee eS eee Tee eee ee eer rere i

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (1968) ....... passim

Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons (1960) ........ 3

1

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTERESTS

OF AMICUS CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, Amicus Curiae

American Freedom Law Center (hereinafter referred to

as “AFLC”) respectfully submits this brief in support of

the respondents in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and the

petitioners in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., urging

the Court to protect the fundamental right to religious

exercise that is violated by the contraceptive services

mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care

Act of 2010 (hereinafter “Affordable Care Act” or

“Act”).’

AFLC is a national, public interest law firm that

advances and defends America’s Judeo-Christian

heritage and mora! values, including religious freedom

and the sanctity of human life. AFLC accomplishes its

mission through litigation, education, and public policy

initiatives.

To further its public interest mission of

safeguarding religious freedom, AFLC is lead counsel

for two legal challenges to the contraceptive services

mandate. The first legal challenge was filed on behalf

of Johnson Welded Products, Inc., an Ohio-based

company, and its owner, Ms. Lilli Johnson, a devout

' All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Letters

evidencing such consent have been filed with the Clerk of the

Court.

AFLC further states that no counsel for any party authored

this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. No person other than AFLC, its members,

or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or

submission.

2

Catholic who wants to operate her family business

according to the precepts of her faith. This case, in

which the government consented to a preliminary

injunction, is currently pending in the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia. See Johnson

Welded Products, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00609-

ESH, Minute Order, (D.D.C. May 24, 2013) (granting

unopposed motion for preliminary injunction).

The second legal challenge was filed on behalf of

Priests for Life, a nonprofit Catholic organization;

Father Frank Pavone, the National Director of Priests

for Life; Dr. Alveda King, the niece of civil rights leader

Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Pastoral Associate and

Director of African-American Outreach for Priests for

Life; and Janet Morana, the Executive Director of

Priests for Life. This case is currently pending in the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit. On December 31, 2013, the court of appeals

granted Priests for Life’s emergency motion for an

injunction, enjoining the enforcement of the

contraceptive services mandate pending appeal. See

Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Seruvs.,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177951 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2013),

injunction granted, No. 13-5368, Order at 2, (D.C. Cir.

Dec. 31, 2013), petition for cert. filed, (Jan. 23, 2014).

In both cases and similar to the situation confronted

by the challengers here, private citizens seek to operate

their company or organization in accord with the tenets

of their faith. Permitting the government to impose

this unconscionabie mandate on businesses and

nonprofit organizations will effectively exclude faith-

conscious owners and directors from participating in

3

business affairs and public life — a result squarely at

odds with the First Amendment and RFRA.

INTRODUCTION

Sir Thomas More: “And when we stand before

God, and you are sent to Paradise for doing

according to your conscience, and I am damned

for not doing according to mine, will you come

with me, for fellowship?”

Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons 132 (1960)

For people of faith, matters of morality and

conscience are not insubstantial — they are serious

concerns that directly and materially affect a person’s

soul and thus eternal salvation, which is far more

important than a person’s physical health and thus

exponentially more important than increasing the use

of contraceptive services — services the government

promotes under the guise of healthcare. And one’s

religious beliefs are not simply persona! beliefs that are

checked in and out at the cathedral door. Rather, for

the faithful, their religious beliefs transcend all that

they do. Indeed, for Catholics such as Ms. Johnson and

Father Pavone, their faith is their guide for how they

conduct their lives, both private and public. See, e.g.,

Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733

F.3d 1208, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Equally

uncontroverted is the nature of the Gilardis’ religious

exercise: they operate their corporate enterprises in

accordance with the tenets of their Catholic faith.”).

And their religious beliefs and practices are beyond the

reach of government compulsion and thus beyond the

government’s purview of what is or is not a burden

upon those beliefs and practices. Otherwise, the First

4

Amendment loses its meaning and force as a restriction

on the power of government. Church of the Lukumi

Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523

(1993) (“The principle that government may not enact

laws that suppress religious belief or practice is...

well understood.”).

Through its defense of the challenged mandate, the

government urges this Court to accept what it, the

government, believes is an acceptable burden upon

religious beliefs and practices. Indeed, the government

urges the Court to accept the position that “a proffered

burden” upon one’s religious beliefs is “not substantial

in cases where the nature of applicable legal regimes

and societal expectations necessarily impose objective

outer limits on when an individual can insist on

modification of, or heightened justification for,

governmental programs that may offend his beliefs.”

Pet’r Sebelius Br. in Hobby Lobby at 33. But by whose

measure, then, are we to determine what is an

“objective outer limit”: the measure of the government

agency that is empowered to enforce the program or the

man whose conscience is burdened in the process? The

answer to that fundamental question rests, as it

should, with the latter. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind.

Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“Thomas

drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he

drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not

undertake to dissect religious beliefs.”). Indeed, moral

teachings that guide the consciences of the faithful do

not change with — nor can they be changed by — “legal

regimes” or “societal expectations,” and that is

certainly the case with the Church’s universal and

consistent moral teaching on contraception — a

teaching that has been in place for over 2,000 years.

5

And despite the best efforts of man and the federal

government, this teaching will not, because it cannot,

change. As Pope Paul VI made clear in Humanae

Vitae, which confirmed the Church’s universal teaching

regarding the immorality of contraceptive practices:

It is to be anticipated that perhaps not everyone

will easily accept this particular teaching. There

is too much clamorous outcry against the voice of

the Church, and this is intensified by modern

means of communication. But it comes as no

surprise to the Church that she, no less than her

divine Founder, is destined to be a “sign of

contradiction.” She does not, because of this,

evade the duty imposed on her of proclaiming

humbly but firmly the entire moral law, both

natura! and evangelical.

Since the Church did not make either of these

laws, she cannot be their arbiter — only their

guardian and interpreter. /t could never be right

for her to declare lawful what is in fact unlawful,

since that, by its very nature, ts always opposed

to the true good of man.

In preserving intact the whole moral law of

marriage, the Church is convinced that she is

contributing to the creation of a truly human

civilization. She urges man not to betray his

personal responsibilities by putting all his faith

in technical expedients. In this way she defends

the dignity of husband and wife. This course of

action shows that the Church, loyal to the

example and teaching of the divine Savior, is

sincere and unselfish in her regard for men

whom she strives to help even now during this

6

earthly pilgrimage “to share God’s life as sons of

the living God, the Father of all men.”

Humanae Vitae 418 (1968) (emphasis added).

Similarly, it could never be right for civil authorities —

whether the federal government or this Court — to

declare moral what is in fact immoral for a person of

faith, “since that, by its very nature, is always opposed

to the true good of man.”

In the final analysis, religious beliefs and rights of

conscience that flow from those beliefs are not subject

to popular vote, majoritarian preferences, “societal

expectations,” “legal regimes,” the predilections of the

Executive Branch, or the predilections of this Court.

The Bill of Rights ensures us of that outcome.

Consequently, it should ensure us that this Court will

uphold this fundamental freedom against the

government’s unconscionable and unlawful mandate —

an outcome similarly compelled by RFRA.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The ultimate question for this Court is not whether

compliance with the contraceptive services mandate

can be reconciled with the religious beliefs of the

challengers. That’s a question of religious conscience

that no civil authority, including this Court, can decide.

Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid that the judiciary is

singularly ill-equipped to sit in judgment on the verity

of an adherent’s religious beliefs. Here, the challengers

have concluded that their legal obligations under the

mandate and their religious obligations compelled by

their consciences are incompatible. Thus, by presenting

challengers with a Hobson’s choice of either violating

their religious beliefs or suffering crippling financial

7

penalties, the mandate imposes a substantial burden

on religious exercise, properly understood, in direct

violation of RFRA.

ARGUMENT

I. The Church’s Universal and Consistent

Moral Teaching on the Immorality of

Contraceptive Services Is Binding on the

Consciences of the Faithful.

The Church “teaches that each and every marital

act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to

the procreation of human life.” Humanae Vitae {11.

“This particular doctrine, often expounded by the

magisterium of the Church, is based on the inseparable

connection, established by God, which man on his own

initiative may not break, between the _ unitive

significance and the procreative significance which are

both inherent to the marriage act.” Humanae Vitae

412. Thus, “an act of mutual love which impairs the

capacity to transmit life which God the Creator,

through specific laws, has built into it, frustrates His

design which constitutes the norm of marriage, and

contradicts the will of the Author of life. Hence to use

this divine gift while depriving it, even if only partially,

of its meaning and purpose, is equally repugnant to the

nature of man and of woman, and is consequently in

opposition to the plan of God and His holy will.”

Humanae Vitae 413. Therefore, based “on the first

principles of a human and Christian doctrine of

marriage,” the Church is “obliged once more to declare

that the direct interruption of the generative process

already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even

for therapeutic reasons, are to be absolutely excluded

as lawful means of regulating the number of children.

8

Equally to be condemned, as the magisterium of the

Church has affirmed on many occasions, is direct

sterilization, whether of the man or of the woman,

whether permanent or temporary. Similarly excluded

is any action which either before, at the moment of, or

after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to

prevent procreation — whether as an end or as a

means.” Humanae Vitae { 14.

As Pope Paul VI prophetically observed in Humanae

Vitae:

Responsible men can become more deeply

convinced of the truth of the doctrine laid down

by the Church on this issue if they reflect on the

consequences of methods and plans for artificial

birth control. Let them first consider how easily

this course of action could open wide the way for

marital infidelity and a general lowering of

moral standards. Not much experience is

needed to be fully aware of human weakness

and to understand that human beings — and

especially the young, who are so exposed to

temptation — need incentives to keep the moral

law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for

them to break that law. Another effect that gives

cause for alarm is that a man who grows

accustomed to the use of contraceptive methods

may forget the reverence due to a woman, and,

disregarding her physical and emotional

equilibrium, reduce her to being a mere

instrument for the satisfaction of his own

desires, no longer considering her as his partner

9

whom he should surround with care and

affection.

Humanae Vitae J 17 (emphasis added).

Thus, it has come to pass that the widespread use

of contraceptives has indeed harmed women physically,

emotionally, morally, and spiritually — and has, in

many respects, reduced her to the “mere instrument for

the satisfaction of [man’s] own desires.” Consequently,

the promotion of contraceptive services — the very goal

of the challenged mandate — harms not only women,

but it harms society in general by “open(ing]| wide the

way for marital infidelity and a general lowering of

moral standards.” Responsible men and women cannot

deny this truth.

In sum, for adherents to Church teaching,

contraceptive services are not properly understood to

constitute medicine, healthcare, or a means of

providing for the well-being of persons. Rather, these

procedures involve gravely immoral practices, and

compelling people of faith to promote or facilitate their

use imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of

religion, properly understood.

II. The Government’s “Substantial Burden”

Argument Invites the Court to Determine

the Validity of the Challengers’ Religious

Objection to the Mandate.

It is well established that “[cJourts are not arbiters

of scriptural interpretation.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.

And while the government gives a nod to this

longstanding principle of free exercise jurisprudence,

see Pet’r Sebelius Br. in Hobby Lobby at 32, it

nonetheless invites this Court to assume that role. The

10

Court should reject this invitation, which will

essentially subject religious beliefs (and religious

objections to government programs based on those

beliefs) to those to which the government deems valid.

See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv.,

490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial

ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or

practices to a faith, or the validity of a particular

litigant’s interpretation of those creeds.”); United

States vu. Seeger, 380 US. 1638, 185 (1965)

(acknowledging that the court’s limited competence in

this area extends to determining “whether the beliefs

professed by [the challengers] are sincerely held and

whether they are, in [their] own scheme of things,

religious”); see also Patrick v. Lefevre, 745 F.2d 153,

157 (2d Cir. 1984) (“It cannot be gainsaid that the

judiciary is singularly ill-equipped to sit in judgment on

the verity of an adherent’s religious beliefs.”); Philbrook

v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir.

1985) (noting that courts must be vigilant to “avoid any

test that might turn on the factfinder’s own idea of

what a religion should resemble”) (internal quotations

and citation omitted); Sample v. Lappin, 424 F. Supp.

2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The Court’s inquiry is limited to

‘whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief

and whether the belief is religious in nature.”) (quoting

Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2d Cir. 1996)

(upholding the granting of a preliminary injunction

under RFRA in a case in which the plaintiff refused to

submit to a PPD test, claiming that accepting artificial

substances into the body is a sin under the tenets of

Rastafarianism)).

11

Ill. Thomas Compels a Finding that the

Contraceptive Services Mandate Imposes a

Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise

in Violation of RFRA.

In defense of its claim that the challenged mandate

and the onerous penalties associated with failing to

comply with it do not substantially burden religious

exercise, the government attempts to distinguish

Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S.

707 (1981). See Pet’r Sebelius Br. in Hobby Lobby at

35-37 (characterizing the argument as _ follows:

“Respondents rely on Thomas for the proposition that

the Court must accept not only their definition of their

sincerely held religious belief but also their position

that their religious exercise would be substantially

burdened by the provision they challenge”). However,

that attempt is unavailing.

In Thomas, this Court held that the State’s denial

of unemployment compensation benefits because the

employee voluntarily terminated his employment with

a factory that produced armaments, claiming that the

production of items that could be used for war was

contrary to his religious beliefs, placed a substantial

burden on the employee’s right to the free exercise of

religion. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (“While the

compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free

exercise is nonetheless substantial.”). Indeed, Thomas

specifically stated that he did not object to the physical

work required of him. Jd. at 711 (“When asked at the

hearing to explain what kind of work his religious

convictions would permit, Thomas said that he would

have no difficulty doing the type of work that he had

done at the roll foundry. He testified that he could, in

12

good conscience, engage indirectly in the production of

materials that might be used ultimately to fabricate

arms — for example, as an employee of a raw material

supplier or of a roll foundry.”).

In fact, Thomas made it clear that it was not the

physical act of the work that violated his religious

beliefs, but the purposes and effects of what someone

else would do with the result of his “work” at some

later point in time (i.e., use the tanks he worked on for

war). See id. at 714 (quoting Thomas at his hearing).

So it is that Thomas did object to doing the exact same

unobjectionable work when that work resulted in a

thing (7.e., a tank) that would be used subsequently by

a third-party (i.e., the military) to do that which was

objectionable: to wage war. That is, not only is waging

war objectionable to Thomas, but any act, the purpose

and effect of which is to facilitate the waging of war by

a third party at some later time, was proscribed by

Thomas’ religious beliefs and thus a substantial burden

was found. Consequently, Thomas provides an a

fortiori argument for a RFRA violation here. Thomas

stated expressly that he had no religious objection to

working in a roll foundry, the product of which might

be used later to build a tank. But doing that same

work in a factory that more directly violated his

religious objection to war was too direct pursuant to his

religious beliefs. In other words, this Court credited

Thomas’ religious beliefs for determining how direct or

indirect an enabler or facilitator Thomas could be

before he violated his religious beliefs (and thus a

substantial burden found). Neither a federal court nor

a government agency may decide how direct an enabler

or facilitator Thomas could be for war waging. Id. at

715 (“Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say

13

that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.”). And

the same is true here with regard to the contraceptive

services mandate. Indeed, the burden here is more

substantial in that the Hobson’s choice presented by

the challenged mandate is not simply between violating

one’s religious beliefs or forfeiting benefits, as in

Thomas. Rather, the challengers must choose between

violating their religious beliefs or being subject to

substantial penalties that will financially ruin them

and their family-run business that they spent a lifetime

building.

The Seventh Circuit in Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d

654 (7th Cir. 2013), reaffirmed this principle in a case

challenging the contraceptive services mandate by

expressly rejecting the argument the government

presents here:

The government’s “attenuation” argument posits

that the mandate is too loosely connected to the

use of contraception to be a substantial burden

on religious exercise. Because _ several

independent decisions separate the employer's

act of providing the mandated coverage from an

employee’s eventual use of contraception, any

complicity problem is insignificant or

nonexistent. This argument purports to resolve

the religious question underlying these cases:

Does providing this coverage impermissibly

assist the commission of a wrongful act in

violation of the moral doctrines of the Catholic

Church? No civil authority can decide that

question.

To repeat, the judicial duty to decide

substantial-burden questions under RFRA does

14

not permit the court to resolve religious

questions or decide whether the claimant’s

understanding of his faith is mistaken. .. The

question for us is not whether compliance with

the contraception mandate can be reconciled

with the teachings of the Catholic Church.

That’s a question of religious conscience for the

Kortes and the Grotes to decide. They have

concluded that their legal and religious

obligations are incompatible: The contraception

mandate forces them to do what their religion

tells them they must not do. That qualifies as a

substantial burden on _ religious’ exercise,

properly understood.

Id. at 685.

The D.C. Circuit similarly rejected the government’s

argument in Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human

Serus., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), stating, in

relevant part:

The contraceptive mandate demands that

owners like the [challengers] meaningfully

approve and endorse the inclusion of

contraceptive coverage in their companies’

employer-provided plans, over whatever

objections they may have. Such an endorsement

— procured exclusively by regulatory ukase — is

a “compel [led] affirmation of a repugnant belief.”

See id. That, standing alone, is a cognizable

burden on free exercise. And the burden

becomes substantial because the government

commands compliance by _ giving the

[challengers] a Hobson’s choice. They can either

abide by the sacred tenets of their faith, pay a

15

penalty of over $14 million, and cripple the

companies they have spent a lifetime building,

or they become complicit in a grave moral

wrong. If that is not “substantial pressure on an

adherent to modify his behavior and to violate

his beliefs,” we fail to see how the standard

could be met. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.

Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1218

In the final analysis, the ultimate question for this

Court is not whether compliance with the challenged

mandate can be reconciled with the religious beliefs of

the challengers. That’s a question of religious

conscience that no civil authority can decide. The

challengers have concluded that their legal obligations

under the mandate and their religious obligations are

incompatible. Thus, by presenting challengers with a

Hobson’s choice, the mandate imposes a substantial

burden on religious exercise, properly understood, in

direct violation of RFRA.

16

CONCLUSION

The Court should hold that the contraceptive

services mandate of the Affordable Care Act

substantially burdens the challengers’ exercise of

religion in violation of RFRA.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT JOSEPH MUISE

Counsel of Record

American Freedom Law Center

P.O. Box 131098

Ann Arbor, MI 48113

(734) 635-3756

rmuise@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

DAVID YERUSHALMI

American Freedom Law Center

1901 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Suite 201

Washington, D.C. 20006

(646) 262-0500

dyerushalmi@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

American Freedom Law Center