Amicus Curiae Brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

Supreme Court brief2010

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What actually matters in this document.

Text

10-238 and 10-239

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN MCCOMISH, NANCY MCLAIN, and TONY

BOUIE,

Petitioners,

-against-

KEN BENNETT, in his official capacity as Secretary of

the State of Arizona, and GARY SCARAMAZZO,

ROYANN J. PARKER, JEFFREY L. FAIRMAN,

LOUIS HOFFMAN and LORI DANIELS, in their

official capacities as members of the ARIZONA

CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

MUNICIPAL BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO,

Corporation Counsel of the

City of New York,

100 Church Street,

New York, New York 10007.

(212) 799-1043 or 1010

LEONARD J. KOERNER,"

EDWARD F.X. HART,

JANE L. GORDON,

of Counsel. (Additional counsel listed

*Counsel of Record on inside page)

THERESE M STEWART,

Chief Deputy City Attorney

JONATHAN GIVNER,

ANDREW SHEN,

CHRISTINE VAN AKEN,

City Attorney's Office

1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place

City Hall, Room 234

San Francisco, Califorma 94102

(419) SO4-4700

Counsel for the City and

County of San Francisco

CHARLES W) THOMPSON,

IR.

Executive Director, General

Counsel

International Municipal

Lawyers Association

7910 Woodmont Ave... Ste laa

Bethesda, Maryland 2OS814

(LOL) 742-1016

Counsel for International

Municipal Lawvers

Association

QUESTION PRESENTED

Given that long term) practical expenence

with tiered pubhe funds inp pubhe campaign

financing demonstrates they do not deter the

exercise of free speech by non participants, did the

Ninth Cireuit correctly apply an intermediate level

of scrutiny to Arnvzona’s Clean Elections Act, and

under that analysis, find those payments are

justified by the compelling and umportant state

interest mm reducing actual or perceived corruption,

encouraging participation oi public financing

Programs, and promoting robust and competitive

“

elections

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURLAF

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The New York City Expenence

The San Francisco Experience

ARGUMENT

NON- PARTICIPATING CANDIDATES AND

THIRD PARTIES DO NOT CURTAIL

THEIR SPEECH TO AVOID BONUS OR

TRIGGER PAYMENTS ro

PARTICIPATING CANDIDATES THEY

OPPOSE, AND THOSE PAYMENTS

THEREFORE POSE NO MORE THAN A

MINIMAL BURDEN ON FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS. THE PROGRAMS

ALSO ADVANCE THE IMPORTANT

STATE INTERESTS IN) COMBATING

CORRUPTION ENCOURAGING

PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC FINANCING

PROGRAMS, AND FOSTERING ROBUST

COMPETITION AND DEBATE IN) THE

POLITICAL PROCESS

A Based on the expenence of San Francisco

and New York City, there is no evidence that

bonus payments deter campaign spending

Page

B Matching fund provisions also advance

important and compelling government

interests

C Trigger mechanisms are substantially

related to those mmportant and compelling

government interests

CONCLUSION

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pages

CASES

Buckley Vv Valeo.

424US 197) Passum

CBS, Inc. ve FEC.

493 US BOF (19st) 28

MecComuish v. Bennett.

611 F 3d 510 (th Cir ZOO) 26

New York Times Co vo Sullivan,

376 US 2Wh4 (1964) 7, 26

Nivon vy Shrink Missour: Government PAC,

SYS US 377 (2000) 15, 28, 29

Ognibene vo Parkes, OS8-ev- 1335

(SDNY Swain, J) ll

Randall v Sorrell,

S48 US. 230 (2000) | | Js

Rosenstiel vy Rodmgue?.

101 F 3d 1544 (8 Cir 1996) ma)

Vote Choice, Inc. v_DiStefano,

4 F 3d 26 (1" Cir 1993) 26

LOCAL LAWS

Laval Law of the City of New York No 881

(1888) ]

Pages

NYC. Admin. Code § 3-703) 9

NYC Admin Code §3 (03q1 a) 9

NYC. Admin. Code § 3-706(3) 11

SF Bd. of Sups Resolution 1018 989) File

No 81881 (Novo 1 1999) 16

SF Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code &§

1. 10-4,w) le

SF. Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code §

1 140(b) = 16

SF. Campaign & Goev'tal Conduct Code §

1 14aqa) Ll

SF. Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code §

1 144¢b)(4) 17

SF Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code §

] l4dic) l;

SF. Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code §

1 1L44co)3) l7

SF Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code &§

1 1L44(ce)(4) lL?

SF Campaign & Gov tal Conduct Code §

1 144(ad)(¢3) Wy

Pages

MISCELLANEOUS

A Citizen's Guide to the New York City

Campaign Finance Board (danuary 201))

http (www nvecfh info PDF press agency:

brochure pdf’smepress Zldthe 2006

Angela Migally & Susan Lass, Small Donor

Matching Funds The NYC Election

Experience, 13 (2010),

htp brennan Jedn net SL lobe ldo 7s4ecs

Y3taiambbenvw pdt

Bob Porterfield and A. Clay Thompson,

Zoning for Sale? S Fo Bay Guardian,

January 5, 2000

Editorial, A Hard Act to Follou , N Y Times.

June 4, 2006, 814. at 15

The Impact of High Spending Non-

Participants on the Campaign Finance

Program, (LOO)

http www nyeetd info PDF issue_reports

High-Spending-White- Paper pdf

Lance Wilhams and Chuck Finme, Brou

Nets ‘Soft Money’ Windfall, S F

Examiner, Sept 7, 1999

Lance Wilkhams and Chuck Finnie. Gusher of

‘Soft Money’ a Bonanza for San Francisco

)

Mayor, S Fo Examiner, May 2. 2001]

Pages

Lance Wilhams, Chuck Finnie, and Jenny

Strasburg, ‘/utce Polities’ at Crty Ehall,

SF. Examiner, July 29, 2001 Lo

New Yorkers Make Their Voices Heard:

Report on the 2009 Elections (2010)

http. ‘www nveefh info PDF per 2009] PE

RZ009Post ElectionReport pdt 10

Testimony of Virginia Vida, S F. Ethies

Commission Executive Director, before

S_F. Board of Supervisors Finance

Committee, February 16, 2000

http. www sfethics org files vida _2 16 00

pdf .. : 14

Testimony of Virgima Vida, S FL Ethics

Commission Executive Director, before

SF. Board of Supervisors Finance

Committee, April 5, 2000

http www sfethics org files vida_45 00 p

dt Sieeaus 1G

Testimony of Virgima Vida, S F. Ethics

Commission Executive Director, before

SF. Board of Supervisors April 12, 2000

http (www sfethics org files vida 4 12 00

pdf. | 16

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The New York Citv Amicus

In 1988S, the New York City Council

responded to widely reported local “pay to plav’

scandals by creating an imnovative system of pubhe

financing for campaigns. In its legislative findings,

the Council determined that ‘both the possibilty of

privilege and favoritism and the appearance of

impropriety harm the eflective functioning of

government and that corruption “has a deleterious

effect upon government in that at creates the

appearance of such abuses and thereby gives rise to

citizen apathy and evmicism |!

The authors of the City’s Campaign Finance

Act (CFA) resolved to address that) publ

perception, as well as improve governmental ethics

and popular understanding of local issues, increase

participation in elections by voters and candidates

and enhance pubhe confidence in government. Thev

did this by creating a program built on the premise

that competitive, corruption free campaigns that

actively engaged citizens could be financed wath a

combination of small private donations and public

funds When the Act was signed into law by then.

Mavor Ed Koch, New York City became the largest

mumeipality ino the nation to adopt publicly

financed elections Today, New York Citw's s public

financing program us considered one of the most

' Laxnal Law of the City of New York No S§ 1 (1988)

No counsel for a party authored this brie wud on

wwunse. or party made a monetary contribution

intended to fund this brief

successful in the country and “a model for

campaign reformers nationwide"?

An essential element of the City’s program

are “bonus” provisions, which come into play when

a program participant faces a high-spending non

participant. In 1989, businessman Ronald Lauder

spent $13 millon (the vast majority of it his own

money) in his failed bid for the Repubhean

nomination for mayor His spending in that race

triggered the program's first bonus payment: his

opponent in that race was aisformer federal

prosecutor named Rudolph Giuhan: Since that

time, bonus payments have been pand in 58 more

City elections

Perhaps no other pubhe financing program,

at any level of government, has had more practical

experience with how bonus provisions actually

work And after more than two decades of

experience, there is simply no empimeal data to

support the notion, on which petitioners rest their

First Amendment claim, that bonus payments

somehow inhibit a non-participant’s speech

The City’s extensive experience with bonus

provisions also confirms the critical role they play

in advancing genuine and meaningful campaign

finance reform and the important and compelling

government interest ino combating actual and

perceived corruption

‘ Editomal. A Mard Act to Follow, NY Times. dune 4 2006

Sl4 ats

The San Francisco Articus

In November 2000, San Francisco voters

adopted a pubhe financing program for candidates

for the Citws Board of Supervisors In 2006. San

Francisco expanded its pubhe financing program to

include candidates for Mayor San Francisco's

pubhe financing scheme is a “partial public

financing program: it requires participants to raise

contributions from private sources before receiving

any matching public funds Like Arzona’s system,

a central element of San Francisco's program 1s tts

“trigger” mechanism After a participating

candidate quahfes, the candidate as imitially

subject to a spending hmat, but spending by other

candidates and third-parties over a certain level

“triggers” an incremental increase in the spending

caps for participating candidates) When San

Francisco raises a participating = candidate's

spending limit, the candidate becomes eligible for

additional public funds, but only if the candidate

first raises) additional contmbutions from private

SOUTERS

Since the inception of its public financing

program, San Francisco has balanced = two

competing concerns encouraging viable candidates

to participate in the program by offering sufficient

funds to make them competitive against privately

funded political opponents, and ensuring that

public funds are not expended needlessly The

programs trigger mechanism, because it makes

matching public funds available only when

necessary, is the best — and perhaps the only

pohey response that appropriately balances those

competing concerns Like many local and. state

governments San Francisco Is facing

unprecedented budget shortfalls and wall continue

to Wrestle with fiscal challenges for the foreseeable

future. And bevond its near-term fiscal difficulties.

San Francisco must be a responsible steward of

public funds and allocate its taxpaver dollars as

efeiently as possible. Without the ability to use

trigger mechanisms, local governments hke San

Francisco would be forced to choose between two

equally unpalatable options: a pubhe financing

program that viable candidates would refuse to join

or a program that unnecessarily consumes hmuited

public funds. Either option could ultimately lead to

the end of pubhe financing in many jurisdictions,

including San Francisco.

Moreover, ten vears of experience in San

Francisco indicate that trigger mechanisms do not

deter fund-raising or poltical spending bv

candidates or third parties In fact, the levels of

spending im San Francisco” elections have

significantly increased since the voters adopted

pubhe financing in 2000.

The IMLA Amicus

The International Munmieipal Lawyers

Assocation (IMLA’) is a non-profit, professional

organization of over 3500 local government entities,

including cities, counties, and special district

entities, as represented by their chief legal officers,

state municipal leagues. and individual attorneys.

Since 1935, IMLA has served as a national, and

now international, clearmmghouse = of — legal

information and cooperation on municipal legal

matters IMLA’s mission ts to advance the

responsible development of municipal law through

education and advocacy by providing the collective

viewpoint of local governments around the countrys

on legal issues before the United States Supreme

Court, in the Umited States Courts of Appeals, and

In state supreme and appellate courts.

IMLA beheves that with the ever-increasing

cost of political campaigns and the concomitant

governmental interest in assuring free and open

elections, state and local governments must create

methods by which campaigns can be financed

through publhe dollars, thereby allowing all

candidates to express their political message. IMLA

beheves that because these programs depend on

public finances, they must be carefully constructed

to prevent lmitless spending while making

sufficient funds available to draw the participation

of a wide-range of candidates. IMLA beheves that

the trigger mechanism used in Arizona provides

one of the few method to reach these goals and that

without this mechanism, — state and local

governments would lose a vital tool necessary to

protect the democratic nature of the electoral

process.

Thus, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.4,

the City of New York, Mayor Michael R.

Bloomberg, the New York City Council, Public

Advocate Ball de Blasio, the New York City

Campaign Finance Board, the City and County of

San Francisco, and the International Mumeipal

Lawyers Association submit this bref amicus

curiae in support of the respondents.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Pubhe financing of campaigns serves well-

recognized governmental interests: it reduces

corruption and the appearance of corruption by

eliminating the improper influence of large private

contributions and reheving candidates from the

)

rigors of soliciting private contributions. As this

Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,

92-93 (1976), public financing enhances the First

Amendment because it 1s the use of public money

“to facihtate and enlarge public discussion and

participation in the electoral process... .”

Buckley also recognizes that publhe financing

programs may condition the receipt of public funds

on a voluntary agreement to hmit expenditures.

424 U.S. at 57, n.65. As a practical matter,

however, few candidates would voluntarily

participate in a public financing program involving

voluntary spending hmits if those limits effectively

precluded their ability to mount a competitive

campaign against a high-spending oppon ent who

has no spending limit. Bonus payments make these

races competitive in a fiscally prudent and targeted

way. And more importantly, they encourage

candidates to join a public financing program that

does not penalize them when an opponent refuses

to join. Without these mechanisms, public financing

programs that advance a municipality's substantial

and compelling interest in eliminating actual or

perceived corruption in its political process will be

unable to accomplish that goal, because no viable

candidates will participate.

Bonus provisions also produce more speech

that helps to build a _ robust representative

democracy. They increase debate about issues of

public concern, and they therefore necessarily

promote exactly the kind of free and open debate

the First Amendment fosters and protects. Indeed,

because democracy demands that kind of informed

debate, this Court has long recognized that the

First Amendment embraces government funding of

particular speakers, such as “aid to public

broadcasting and other forms of educational media,

and preferential postal rates and antitrust

exemptions for newspapers” Buckley, 424 US. at

93, n.127

At the same time, there is no evidence that

non-participants intentionally limit their own

spending so as not to trigger additional payments

to candidates they oppose. To the contrary, data

trom two decades of New York City elections, as

well as the experience of San Francisco, establish

exactly the opposite conclusion

As this Court has also recognized. “the

central purpose” of the First Amendment is “to

assure a society in which ‘uninhibited, robust, and

wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of

publhe interest would thrive, for only in such a

society can a healthy representative democracy

flourish” Buckley, 424 U.S) 93, n.127, Quoting Neu

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 270

(1964). Our electoral svstem works best when two

or More strong candidates compete for the support

of their fellow citizens That is what makes the

exercise of the franchise meaningtul

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The New York Crtv Experience

The New York Citv. Campaign Finance

Program (‘the Program’) is the voluntary

government reform program estabhshed by the

New York City Campayrn Finance Act. The

independent, non-partisan) Campaign Finance

Board administers the Program through which ut

provides public matching funds to participating

candidates running for Maver, Comptroller, Pubhe

‘

Advocate, Borough President, and City Council

member. In return, participating candidates agree

to abide by strtly enforced spending hmits and

other hmaits on self-financing and contrmbutions

The law also imposes certain requirements on non

participants regarding complete and timely

disclosure of their financial transactions, and all

campaigns are subject to mgorous auditing by the

Campaign Finance Board *

The overarching goals of the Program are to

encourage grassroots support for candidates by

average New Yorkers, require full disclosure of

campaign fundraising practices, and combat the

public perception of corruption in the political

process by decreasing a candidate's dependence on

large contribubions The Program helps credible

candidates run competitive campaigns whether or

not they have access to “big money.” giving New

Yorkers greater chotwces at the voting booth

Pubhe funds are only a portion of the moneys

spent by candidates. and thev are capped at 55

pereent of the spending limit for the office the

candidate aus) seeking. The Program) encourages

participants to seek small! contributions, and reach

out to ao greater number of their prospective

constituents That, in- turn, increases citizen

interest and participation in) elections Only

contmbutions from New York City residents are

matched with pubhe funds Contmbutions from

pohtical action committees, umions, lobbyists. or

persons domg business with the Citv are not

‘These facts are taken from 4 Cruzen's Guide fo the New York

City Camomnen Binance Roord | (January 2011),

http wew nveefd info PDP press agency

brochure pdf’sm <presas_2ldthe 2006

matchable. The match is hmoted to the first $175 of

an oehywble contmbution Because the — basic

matching funds rate as S$6-to-$l. that $175

contribution can be matched with $1,050 in pubhe

dollars, resulting ino a total of $1,225 ter the

campaign. *

In the last 22 vears, the Citys voluntary

pubhe financing program has disbursed more than

$101.2 millon in matching funds to 543 candidates

The distinguishing feature of the Program its

system of matching individual donations in a way

that supercharges small donations is in large

measure the reason for the Program's success

Under the Program. a New York City candidate can

finance ao viable campaign based on small

donations, and the City’s expenence shows that an

increasing number of them now do just that. In

2009, 95 percent of all candidates who were elected

were Program participants

The Program has also had a profound effect

in encouraging broader participation in the political

process) Small Donor Matching BPunds) The NYC

Flection Experience, a 2010 report by the Brennan

Center for dustice, found that the Program has not

just increased donor participation. at has also

expanded the pool of donors to encompass what the

Contributions to all city candidates are subject to the

following Limits $4950 for Mayor, Pubhe Advocate and

Comptroller, $3,850 for Borough President. and $2.750 for

City Council NYC Adoun Code § 3-703(1)0 There are

additional contributions lmits mmposed on persons doing

business with the City dg at 83-703.) a)

report describes as “a more diverse and inclusive

political culture *

Competition alse mereased Even with a

limited number of open seats. five City Council

incumbents were unseated by challengers Other

incumbents won by shimmer margins, and more

faced primaries, and the average margins of victory

were closer than in previous elections More than

half of all participants in 2009 — 101 candidates

were seeking city office for the first time ®

Additionally, candidates, motivated by the

Program's matching formula, are now placing a

greater emphasis on soheiting smaller

contributions In 2OOs, 689 percent of all

individual contributors gave $175 or less. to

candidates, up from 565 percent in 2005 Most

significantly, im 20028 more than half of all

contributors — 30.000 New Yorkers — contributed to

Citv elections for the first time This proves how

effective the matching of small donations is as a

campaign financing model, and how dramatically

candidates are expanding their fundraising base

bevond a core of relrable large donors

In short. more New Yorkers are investing in

the political process for the first tune as

contmbuters, as candidates. and as) successful

* Angela Migally & Susan Liss. Seals Donor Marching Suna

lhe NYC Biecthon Parerictce 1a (LOTTO

hip Drennan dodo new SE lebe 236 7S4oc82 Gf rambhenww pat

* These facts are from New Yor®ers Make TReir Veices Heara

Revor! Or the S009 Mleciiors (2010)

biup wee nvoefh info PDP per 20098 PER 2009Post Flectionk

eport pdt

elected offerals) And the City’s pubhe financing

program is giving a Voice to manv who otherwise

would be unable to run a competitive campaign

To assure candidates in competitive races

that they wall have sufficrent funds to run a viable

campaign, the Program has also provided for

“bonus payments (NYC. Admin Code §§3

TORS] [a] and [bP They come into play when an

otherwise competitive candidate faces off against a

high-spending candidate who is not a Program

participant. Under a Tier Ll bonus situation (when

the nonparticipating opponent raises or spends

more than 50 percent of the spending hmuat for the

participant) the $1,050 in funds for ai $175

contribution rises to $1,250, and the spending hat

is increased to 150 percent of the regular spending

limit. Under Tier 2 (when the nonparticipating

Opponent raises or spends three times the spending

limat), $1,500 in pubhe funds is available for a $175

contmbution, and the spending hmit is removed

New York City participants must gather private

support from New Yorkers ty maximize their access

to additional publie funds ~

Funds attributable to bonus payments are a

very small percentage of the total funds distributed

through the Program As of 2006. those publhe

funds accounted for only four percent of the total

The City’s bonus provisions are being challenged in

Ownidene > Parkes OS-ev-1335 (8S DN Y \Swain J)

public funds distributed since 1997 5

In the most recent City election (2008),

almost all primary candidates Y3 percent

financed their elections Chrough the City’s program,

while 66 percent of all general election candidates

participated > In 2OONs contest, the Pubhe

Advocate, the Comptroller, all) five Borough

Presidents, and all but two of the 51 Citv Council

candidates who were elected to office partioapated

In the sin’ elections that) vear pitting

paruhioapating candidates against high-spending

non participants, a participant won in three of the

races and finshed as close runners-up im the

remaining three races All of those races were

competitive, and ne winner finished more than 10

percentage points ahead of the runner up

An analysis of the Programs bonus

provisions, performed in January 2YOTL, is annexed

as Appendix A Certain important trends are

evident from the vears covered (1989 9 2008) Most

relevantly, this experience shows that high-

spending non-participants are simply not forgoing

speech opportumties ino order to curb a

participating opponents bonus payments As with

Anvzona’s pubhe financing system, actual campaign

Corunna Finan Pogram (2000) 8

http wee nye info PDP issue reports High Spending

White Paper pdt

* That 66 percent figure reflects certain anomalies including

the fact that 26 of Silo non-participants are candidates who

had little or me campaign activity and failed to register with

the CEB If that group is excluded from the equation the

partiipation rate in the general election rises to SO percent

behavior estabhshes = that non-partiaipating

candidates do not make decisions about their

spending based upon the possibility of tmggering

bonus payments If they were refrainmag from

speaking, the data would show candidates spending

up to. but not im excess of the trigger amounts

However, the data reveals no such pattern

non-partiapants who have triggered

bonus payments They spent, on

average, 55 tumes the bonus amount

More than half of them (33 of 36)

spent more than double the trigger

amount, one-fourth (14 of 56) spent

more than six times the trigger

who never triggered a bonus payment,

the average non-participating

candidate spent only 17.8 percent of

the bonus trigger amount) Practically

all of them (44 of 59) spent less than

halt the trigger amount

reported expenditures that) brought

them within five percent of the trigger

amount. and both were candidates in

the same race for Citv Council in 1997

before the 2005 elections to provide

additional bonus funds to candidates

facing extremely high spending

candidates (the Ther 2 trigger is) six

times the oryonal Ther 1) bonus

trigger) Since then, seven candidates

rave triggered a Tier 1 bonus, none of

those candidates even approached

)

spending enough to trigger the Tier 2

bonus

Tier 2 bonus. since YOOS One

candidate triggered the bonus wath

contributions (rather than

expenditures). the other three

exceeded the bonus level — by

substantial amounts

Thus, non-participating candidates tend to

spend far above, or far below, the bonus trigger,

which strongly indicates their speech is not affected

by bonus payments at all There is. therefore, no

evidence that the City’s bonus provisions are

inhibiting speech or otherwise affecting the First

Amendment rights of non-participants

The San Francisco Experience

In November 2000, San) Francisco voters

adopted aio pubhe financing program for their

elected oMeials via a ballot measure The measure.

Proposition O, was placed on the ballot by San

Franciscos independent Ethics Commission (the

“Commission’) in dune 2000) following several

months of hearings and consideration of numerous

poheyv proposals to address the appearance of

corruption in local government

The iummediate catalyst for Proposition O

was the Citys 1999 mavoral election. which

featured an unprecedented amount of political

contmbutions and spending. raising concerns about

the appearance of corruption Before, during. and

after the 1999 election. the pubhe was readily

aware that the mayoral race drew unusually Ingh

levels of campaign spending The top four

candidates received and spent over $7 milhon in

private contributions, and independent committees

spent approximately $2.6 milhon '® Press reports

painted oa pieture oof apparent corruption

highhghting speafhle examples of — perceived

corruption arising out of campaign spending in the

race, including contmbutions and independent

spending bv several entities that) won major

contracts or legislative victomes shortly before or

after the campaign |

Shortly after the election, the Commussion

launched a semes of public hearings on San

Francisco's campaign finance laws and the laws of

other mumempalities As the Commissions

Executive Director testified before the Board in

April 2000. these hearings indicated that) ‘the

campaign finance system in San Francisco [was] in

a state of crisis. in large part because of concern

' See Testimony of Virginia Vida SFO Ethies Commission

Executive Director before S Fo Board of Supervisors Finance

Committee February ie 2000

ttp ‘www sfethies org files vida 2 16 00 pdf

'! See, eg. Lance Wilhams and Chuck Finme, Broun Nets

Soft Money’ Windfall, SF.) Examiner, Sept 7. 1999. Bob

Porterfield and A Clav Thompson, Zoning for Save! SF Bay

Guardian, January § 2O0Q0) Lance Wilhams and Chuck

Finme Guster of ‘Soft Monev a Bonanza for San Francisco

Mayor SFO Examiner. May 2. 2001, Lance Willams Chack

Finme. and Jenny Strasburg Uuice Poutes at City Mol SF

Examiner, July 29) 2001 Cr Niawwn cv SArink Missour

Government PAC S28 US 377 393. 395 (LOOM (citing

newspaper accounts to suggest that concerns about oorruption

and appearance of corruption supported state contribution

lamits)

about the appearance or perception of corruption in

San Francisco polities” and “the perception that big

money and big) spending may influence the

pohevmaking of those who are elected’ As the

hearings drew to a close, the Commussion favored

the estabhshment of a pubhe financing program

because the “pubhe financing of campaigns actually

enhances the democratic process” by encouraging

more candidates to seek office. meluding their

points of view in the pubhe dialogue, and allowing

candidates to spend their time and energy debating

pubhe pohey instead of raising campaign donations

And the Commission concluded that public

financing would “limit the aintluence, or the

appearance of intluence, of private contributions on

polevmaking “+

In crafting a pubhe financing svstem. the

Commission balanced the important goal of

encouraging candidates to partiapate wath the

need to operate within San Francisco's financial

constraints. From the outset, the Commussion

focused on whether using trigger mechanisms

would accomplish that balance After extensive

debate, the Commission and its statf concluded that

a trigger mechanism was critical to the success of

the program because candidates were unhkely to

participate unless the program allowed them to

raise and spend money in response to opposition

spending Finally, on dune 26. 2000, the

Commission decided to submit the measure to the

voters. Voters adopted the measure. and San

' Testimony of Virguma Vida SF Ethics Commission

Bxecutive Director before S Fo Board of Supervisors (April 12

LOO0), hitp. www sfethics org files vida 412 00 pdf and

before SF Board of Supervisors Finance Comamuttee (April 5

L000) http www sfethies org files vida 4500 pdf

Francisco implemented us pubhe financing svstem

for the first time in November 2002

San Francisco's puble financing program

currently provides public funds to ehgible

candidates for Mavor and eleven-seat Board of

Supervisors. To quahfv for pubhe financing, a

candidate must raise a certain amount of money

from a minimum number of San Francisco

residents. SF. Campaign & Gov'tal Conduct Code

8§ 1. 1040w), 1 1400) (0) Once othev qualify,

participating candidates receive an imtial grant of

public funds. Jad § 1 144qc)-(d)

Thereafter, to receive additional pubhe

funds, a participating candidate must first solicit

campaign contributions from private sources Once

a participating candidate has raised private

contnbutions, the City matches those contributions

with pubhe funds in predetermined ratios, initially

on a four-to-one basis and then on a one-to-one

basis Jd § 1.144(¢)(3), (d)(3). Thus, after the initial

grant, for every additional dollar that participating

candidates raise from private sources, the City

matches those contmbutions with public funds.

As noted above, San Francisco's system also

incorporates ao “trigger’ mechanism Publicly

financed candidates fundraising efforts are

initially subject to an upper hmit, a spending cap

referred to as an “mdividual expenditure ceiling ”

ld. §& 1.140(b)(4)40)4) During the course of a

campaign, a candidate's spending cap may increase

bused upon the level of spending in the race. The

Citvy must raise a candidate's spending hmit when

the sum of (1) third-party spending opposing the

candidate, (2) contmbuthons to one of the

candidate's opponents, and (3) third-party spending

supporting the opponent exceed the publicly

financed candidate's spending cap 7d. § 1.143(a)-

(b) Once the Citv raises a candidate’s spending

cap, the candidate becomes eligible to collect

additional private contmbutions and receive

additional matching funds from the City on a

dollar-for-dollar basis.

Since its adoption, San Francisco's public

financing program has successfully attracted the

participation of many credible candidates for local

office. For example, in the November 2010 elections

for members of the Board of Supervisors, 22 of the

46 candidates participated in the City’s’ public

financing program. And many of the participants

won their races for open seats — three of the five

were publicly financed. In the November 2008

Board of Supervisor elections, 19 of the 42

candidates for seven open seats qualified for public

financing. Of the seven winning candidates, five

had participated in the City’s puble financing

program.

San Francisco's pubhe financing system 1s

supported entirely by taxpayer dollars. Both in the

current climate of budget challenges and beyond,

San Francisco must act as a responsible steward of

pubhe funds, using every available pohcy option

that conserves money without compromising public

programs. A trigger mechanism its a critical policy

tool to achieve both goals. By providing publicly

financed candidates with access to public funds in

hmited circumstances, 1.e., only when they are in

danger of being outspent by competing, non-

participating candidates and third parties, and only

when they are able to show continuing support

from local donors, San Francisco provides only

what is needed but no more. An alternative public

financing system that did not feature-a trigger

mechanism would risk either setting funding levels

so low that no viable candidate would be interested

In participating or spend public funds

unnecessarily by over funding publicly financed

candidates who face no challenge from credible

vpponents. In short, a challenge to. trigger

mechanisms is a challenge to the viability of public

financing itself.

The City's first ten years of public financing

indicate that trigger mechanisms neither chill

political speech nor deter political spending in San

Francisco. The relative levels of spending in San

Francisco's Board of Supervisors elections have

dramatically increased since the voters instituted

public financing in 2000.'3 The growth in spending

is demonstrated by a comparison of campaigns in

November 2000 with recent campaigns in 2008 and

2010.14 Over that decade, despite the public

financing program’s trigger mechanism, the

aggregate amount of spending in Board elections

has increased at a steady pace. In November 2000,

when San Francisco held its last set of

'3 Even though candidates for both the Board of Supervisors

and Mayor may currently participate in the city’s public

financing system, the first election in which mayoral

candidates could be eligible was held in 2007. In 2007, then-

Mayor Gavin Newsom ran largely unopposed, and no

candidate in the race qualified for public financing.

'4 Elections between 2002 and 2006 are not good comparators

because during those election cycles, a local campaign

provision unrelated to public financing Limited contributions

that could be made to third-party committees, thus lowering

the amount of third-party spending generally. During the

2008 and 2009 elections, the Commission has not enforced

that provision.

supervisorial elections prior to the advent of public

financing, all eleven seats on the Board of

Supervisors were up for election. Candidates in

those eleven races raised approximately $4 million

in campaign contributions and spent approximately

$3.1 million of those funds. A vanety of third-party

groups spent approximately $1.5 million to support

or oppose those candidates. On average, spending

per open seat was approximately $420,000.

In 2008, with seven open Board seats, the

candidates raised approximately $2.4 million in

contributions and spent approximately $3.9 million,

and third-parties spent $1.3 million. In that

election, spending totaled an average of $740,000

per open seat.'5 And in 2010, with five open Board

seats, candidates collected approximately $2.3

million 1n contributions and spent approximately

$3.6 million, and third parties again spent $1.3

million. The average spending per open seat in that

election was almost $1 million. In other words, the

average spending per seat on the Board of

Supervisors has risen dramatically in the years

since San Francisco instituted public financing. The

City’s public financing system, and its trigger

mechanism, has simply not deterred spending in

local elections.

As these figures reflect, San Francisco's

public financing system has not deterred non-

participants from spending even though such

activity results in a publicly financed candidate’s

eligibility for additional public funds. For example,

'S The expenditures in the 2008 and 2010 election cycles

exceeded contributions because the City's public financing

program increased the total amount of money available.

average per-race third-party expenditures leaped

from approximately $136,000 in 2000 to $186,000

mn ZOOS to $260,000 in 2010. Every pohtical

committee spending money on these races

understood that its spending could impheate the

trigger mechanism and potentially increase the

amount of public funds available to candidates

whom the committee opposed Indeed, the Ethics

Commission regularly updates a pubhe webpage

with information about each pubhely financed

candidate's spending cap. Armed with” that

information, non-participants can determine

whether their additional spending will result in an

increased spending cap for their publicly financed

pohtical opponents. Yet there is no evidence that

spending has been chilled at all To the contrary,

spending has increased significantly.

Apart from aggregate and average spending

figures, discrete decisions in-s individual races

further demonstrate that the City’s pubhe

financing program and its trigger provisions do not

deter political spending by non-participants.

Candidates and third parties continue to spend

freely despite the implications of their spending on

their publicly financed opponents’ spending caps.

Two recent examples bear this out concretely

In 2008, Supervisor David Chiu was a

publicly financed candidate pursuing election to the

Board of Supervisors. He was opposed bv well-

funded candidates who dechned to participate in

the City’s pubhe financing program. Applying the

City’s trigger mechanism, the Commission first

raised his cap a month and a half before election

day, making Chiu eligible for additional private

fund-raising and matching public funds. Over the

next six weeks. one competing candidate

nonetheless spent approximately $170,000 in favor

of his candidacy even though wt had the direct effect

of further raising Chiuws ceiling. By election day,

Supervisor Chiu’s spending cap had been adjusted

up trom its initial level of $143,000 to $360,000 in

response to this type of spending by his opponents

The City’s trigger provision had no apparent effect

on their campaign activity

More recently, in) 201Q, Supervisor Scott

Wiener, then a publicly financed candidate tor the

Ihstrict S seat on the Board, faced a significant

amount of independent spending opposing his

eandidacy. The Commussion raised his spending

cap from the iitial $143,000 on September 28.

2010. Over the next month, third parties spent

approximately $100,000 against him, even theugh

wo owas evident that the spending would result in

Wiener becoming elble for additional matching

pubhe funds. Due to that spending. and other

contributions and expenditures made opposing his

candidacy, the Commission eventually raised

Wiener'’s ceiling to $493,000

Finally, San Francisco's pubhe financing

system has not faced anv apparent “gaming” bv its

participants (Pet. Br. at 71-75) There have been

no reported instances in Which candidates seeking

the same elective office were actively cooperating mn

order to trigger increases 1n the spending caps. Nor

is there anv evidence that third-parties have

engaged in “reverse targeting’ to benefit

participating candidates

Practical expermwence from both New York

City and San Francisco therefore demonstrates

that there is no empirtcal evidence to support the

contention that) non-participants restrain” their

ved

spending ino order to averd bonus payments to

program participants they disagree with or seek to

defeat

ARGUMENT

NON-PARTICIPATING CANDIDATES AND

THIRD PARTIES DO NOT CURTAIL THEIR

SPEECH TO AVOID BONUS OR TRIGGER

PAYMENTS TO PARTICIPATING

CANDIDATES THEY OPPOSE, AND THOSE

PAYMENTS THEREFORE POSE NO MORE

THAN A MINIMAL BURDEN ON) FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS. THE PROGRAMS

ALSO ADVANCE THE IMPORTANT STATE

INTERESTS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION,

ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATION IN

PUBLIC FINANCING PROGRAMS, AND

FOSTERING ROBUST COMPETITION AND

DEBATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

A. Based on the experience of San Francisco

and New York City, there is no evidence that

bonus payments deter campaign spending.

Petitioners ask this Court to accept, on faith

alone, the premise that no “rational person” would

want to raise and spend monev if it means it would

trigger additional publi funds for his or her

opponent, and that “anvone who takes ideas

seriously” wall be chilled by that prospect (Pet) Br.

at 41). Many vears of practical experience, however,

demonstrate that trigger funds have no impact on

the campaign spending of non-participants and

third parties, as Arizona, New York City, San

Francisco, and others can attest. That expernence.

moreover, confirms the propnmety of applying an

intermediate level of scrutiny to Arizona's program,

as the Ninth Cireuat correctly determined

In Anvona’s experience, non-paruopating

candidates either regularly spent bevond = the

matching-funds trigger. or spent so far below it

that) spending by non participants was evidently

unaffected by triggers and matching funds (Resp

Br. at 5. 15-16) Not surprisingly, the municipal

experience further supports the conclusion that

trigger mechanisms are unhkelv, if ever, to deter

protected First Amendment activity

In the 59 New York Citv races where bonus

payments were never reached, the non

participating candidates spent, on average, 17.8

percent of the bonus trigger amount. The vast

miayority fell more than 75 percent short of the

trigger, There have been S6 high-spending non.

participants who have triggered bonus payments

They spent, on average, 35 times the bonus

amount. Four candidates have triggered a Tier 2

bonus since 2O0S

San Francisco has also found that, mn the

first ten vears of pubhe financing, trigger

mechanisms have neither chilled political speech

nor deterred political spending Indeed, the relative

levels of spending in local races have significantly

increased since the City’s public financing program

went into effect. Accounting for the number of open

seats in each election evele, political spending has

skv-rocketed from $420,000 per race im 2OOQO, the

last election held pror to pubhe financing. to

$740,000 per race in 2008 and nearly $1 milhon per

race in ZOLQ) Moreover, an examination of spending

deqsions in the context ef individual races

demonstrates that non participants continue te

spend freely, regardless of the effect that spending

has on a publely financed candidate's ehyibilty for

additional pubhe funds

The Ninth Cireurt’s conclusion that Arizona s

program poses, at most. a minimal burden on First

Amendment rights, is thus supported not just by

the facts in this Record, but. as explained above, by

the expenence of San Francisco and New York City

as well The many elections conducted under these

independent mumeipal = tinancing — programs

demonstrate that bonus payments do not influence

a non-participant’s spending or impact his First

Amendment mghts. because they have no apparent

impact whatsvever on the quantity. of a non.

participants speech Non-participants are simply

not reducing their speech in order to avoid

triggering an Opponents opportunity to receive

additional publre funding

B. Matching fund provisions also advance

important and compelling government

interests.

Pubhe financing programs. and the bonus

and trigger provisions found in New York City’s

and San Francisco's programs, advance several

important and compelling interests

The first as the government interest in

combating actual corruption and the appearance of

corruption created by campaign-related

faundransing, A kev component ano all public

financing programs aus the requirement that

participating candidates, in exchange for pubhe

financing, either relinquish or limit their right to

raise campaign contributions from private donors,

and also agree to spending hmits) That alone

reduces opportunities and incentives “fo trade

legislative tavors for financial favors.’ as the Ninth

Cireuit cerrect!]y found MecComish oo Bennett, 611

PiSd 510, S26 (th Cir, 2O1O. And as this Court

recognized ino Buckley, that furthers a sigmificant

governmental interest 424 US at %) Tellingly.

since its pubhe financing program began, New York

City has not) expermeneed the “pay to plaw

corruption scandals that led the City Council to

enact the program in the first place And im San

Francisco, participants have confirmed that the

Catws public financing program has reduced the

pressure to spend all of their time on fundraising

activities

In addition, as acknowledged bv several

appellate decisions, encouraging participation an

pubhe financing programs ms itself an important

and compelling government interest. See eg.

MeComish, O11 FOd at 526: Rosenstiel ¢

Rodriguez, 101 F 3d 1944, 1553 (Sth Cir 1996),

Vote Choice, Inc. & DiStefane, 4 F.3d 26, 39-40 cst

Cir, 1993) Tf mumeipal pubhe financing programs

did not incorporate ao tnogger mechamsm that

assured particupants that they could mount a

competitive campaign ono. credible candidates

would participate. In other words, without triggers,

pubhe financing programs would simply fail due to

a lack of interest

Lastly, pubhe financing programs create

more speech and a more robust civic dialogue by

fostering competition Enhancing involvement in

the pohtical process is an important government

interest because it honors “a profound national

commitment that debate on publi issues should

be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” New York

Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 270 (1964)

More speech and discussion among candidates on

issues of pubhe importance is a matter of utmost

civic importance and those conversations make (a

healthy representative democracy — flourtsh ”

Buckley, 424 US. at 83. nl2?. Citizens in New

York City and San Francisco have gained more

confidence in the integrity of their elections. as

shown by their willingness to participate in the

political process. either as small donors or as

candidates

C. Trigger mechanisms are = substantially

related to those important and compelling

government interests.

There sis moreover, ample — practical

expermence showing oa “substantial relation”

between ao omatching tunds program and the

suffloiently important and compelling

governmental interests discussed above To draw

the participation of strong candidates. pubhe

financing programs must ensure that those

candidates wall be able fo mount competitive

campaigns If additional matching funds were not

available, no fiscally responsible pubhe financing

plan could attract participants, because it would

pose an enormous risk to participate in such a

system

In times of fiseal austerity, trigger

mechanisms are the most prudent, reasonable, and

narrowly tailored approach to an increasingly

expensive and vexing problem for mumeipalties

These programs are obligated to allocate limited

pubhe funds ino a non-partisan and equitable,

content-neutral way) Targeting matching funds for

the most competitive races accomplishes that goal

most efficiently

Pe ee

~ /

Moreover, the Constitution “does not require

Congress to treat all declared candidates the same

for public inancing purposes Buckley, 424 US at

97 That as because legislative iniatives that

enhance core First Amendment values by financing

particular speakers “is the rule, not the exception

Our statute books are replete with laws providing

financial assistance to the exereise of free speech,

such as aid to pubhe broadcasting and other forms

of educational media, and preferential postal rates

and antitrust exemptions for newspapers la. at

93. n.127

In the concededly different vet nevertheless

apt context of contribution hmits. this Court has

recognmived that ensuring competitiveness is) an

important constitutional consideration. See. eg.

Ruckley, 424 US at 21 (noting the “severe impact

on politeal dialogue” that occurs when candidates

are prevented from ‘amassing the resources

necessary for effective advocacy’), Randall:

Sorrell, 548 US 230, BAS 249 (L006) Ccontmbution

limits that are too low can also harm the electoral

process by preventing challengers from mounting

effective campaigns against incumbent

oMeeholders, thereby reducing = democratic

accountability’) That is because “enhancing the

ability of candidates to present, and the pubhe to

receive, information necessary for the effective

operation of the democratic process’ contributes to

freedom of expression CBS, Ime ov FCC, 453 US

367, 396 (1981) The “silencing of a candidate has

consequences for political debate and competition

overall.” Shrink Mo., S28 US at 420 (Thomas, d.

dissenting)

Arivonas program does not restrict anvone's

speech But even af this Court) found that it

‘ve

somehow was a restriction, the Constitution “often

permits restrictions on the speech of some in order

to prevent a few from drowning out the many -- in

Congress, for example. where constitutionally

protected debate, Art. 1 § 6) as Limited to provide

every Member an equal opportunity to express his

or her views Shrink Mo 528 US. at 402 (Brever

and Ginsburg, Jd. concurring) Effective electoral

competition is the critical civic value here, because

polatical discourse and democracy suffer when only

one candidate has the resources to mount a

competitive campaign

That does not mean that the tngger

provisions of these campaign finance programs are

impermissibly egalitarian or intended to “level the

Playing field” Rather. they are oa necessary

building block for pubhe financing They are

effective in bringing more candidates into the

program, and that advances the legitimate,

compelling and long-accepted government interest

m campaigns that are free of corruption

That as the intent and effect of Arizona's

matching fund programs. as the Ninth Cireuit

correctly understood Its order should be affirmed

CONCLUSION

THE NINTH CIRCUITS JUDGMENT

SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL A CARDOZO,

Corporation Counsel of the

Citv of New York,

100 Church Street,

New York, New York 10007

(212) 788-1043 or O835

wordoneélaw nve gov

LEONARD J KOERNER.*

EDWARD FX. HART,

JANE L. GORDON,

of Counsel

*Counse! of Record

NON-PARTICTPATING CANDIDATES AND THE BONUS PROVISIONS IN

NEW YORK CITY'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM

New York City Campaign Finance Board, February 2011

Spending by High Spending Non Parte:pating Candidates Who T

Bonus

New York City Elections, 1989 2010

Year Elector Canrdetate

XW Gene ae | Baorterg Mote’

ORs eres) «=6Baomterg Metac”

OW! Prevoet | Boonte Metac

WW" Gere a Ensto® Antes’

1983 Gee aE asto® Anten’

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tN Parry ee ™* ane 71

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——EEE

Nr a

eth

151 OY

11991 Praeay Fata Jo City Cour ! $50 OO $38 895 129 7%

1991 Prarey Cruz Lucy City Cour 18 $HOOL0 $38 149 127 2%

1997 Porray | Perer, Frevienco” Oty Cour: 7 $59 CC0 $SMSIS 115

199° Para ~ Masar Vero City Cour ? $HON $34 158 13H,

199° Pomav Sagrer Ache’ On Cour 2 $A COO $3205 1097

99' Pamay Coeman ens Cty Coure ‘8 $30 XC $32 B22 198.7%

ONT Pema Provenzano, Magee’ Oty Couns 13 $88 NO 5°'sM ‘MSM

} 1987 Genera Pyun Chur Sao City Cour 20 $32 XO $3° 1X8 103 8%:

1993 Genera’ MeCafrey Walte*t City Coure 26 $AAY $256.8 85 4,

1997 Generate Golden, Foward’f Boro Pres os $232 SW $390 4468 T3 Fe

1991 Pamay — Wibams Eaach’t City Coune 4° $3) WW $21 229 TO TS

* Incumbent

t+ - Bonus was triggered by non-participant’s contributions only

Note: Includes high-spending non-participating candidates who faced

partierpating candidates m races where the Board declared a bonus High

spending non-particpants who were unopposed, faved only other non-

partiapating candidates. or who faced participating candidates who did not

quahty for public funds, are not included Candidates who triggered a bonus

payment for opponents in both a primary and general election are counted once

for each election

Spending by Non Participating Candidates Who Triggered Tier 1 Bonus

Payments

New York City Elections, 2005-2010

-- ’ Expend asa

Year Elector Candidate Office a pial Net Expend "2 ad 2

2Ws Povay Kew Aen City Courw ‘3 $4830)" $303 234 OH 2*>

20S Paewy Chou Yen City Coun Pot $283.0)" $205 349 63 1°>

203 Porwy Chair Hed City Cou 23 $483.0)" $246 136 51 0%

2S Spepal Tatvcno Johe City Couna “3 $583 OD $°89 953 39 3%:

2098 Speaal — Cro@tey, Saadeh City Cour » $482 AYO $179,912 372

20S Porwy = Sanders Jr James* City Cove ce $450 OD $147 7S3 32 8s

2008 Pamay _ Aavthara Stanley eity Cove 2D S452 00! SING 27 7%

Spending by Non-Participating Candidates Who Triggered Tier 2 Bonus

Payments,

New York City Elections, 2005-2010:

Tes » Expend. as a

Year Election Candidate Office i Trigger NetExpend. ‘of Tier2

tst Amount Tri

ngger

2008 Gereral Sloomberg, Michael’ Mayor $18 474.001 $108.371.588 586 6%

2008 Gereral Shoomberg, Michae!* Mayor . $17 184.000 $84,587 319 492 2°»

208 Gereral Aim, Kevin City Counal 19 $483,001 $648 603 15M *®:

5 Prmary Katz, Melinda‘t City Counal 29 $450, 000 $331 204 73 6°

*. Incumbent

fT - Bonus was triggered by non-participant’s comTibutions only

¥ Ter 2 established by Local Law $8 of 1005

Spending by Non-Participating Candidates Failing to Trigger Bonus

New York City Elections, 1989-2010

Te - Expend.

Year Election Candidate Office rae Fond eume S % ~

1997 Prmary inard, Stanley City Counal 4° $30,000 $29.45 982%

1997 =Prmary Boyand Tracy City Counal 4) $30,000 $28 626 96.4%

1997 General Solano. Reylando City Counal 13 $39,000 $22,241 74 1%

1993 Gereral Golden, Howard" Boro Pres Sk $450,000 $298946 664%

1993 Pnm’Gen Rosado, David City Counal 7 $30,000 $19.669 656°»

1983 General Harnson, Juha* City Counall 20 $30,000 $14,401 48.0%

2005 =Pomary Jennings, J, A’an* City Council 28 $75,000 $32,191 42 9%

1997 =Prhmary —- Borzelher, Frank City Counal 30 $30,000 $12,742 42 5%

1993 PrmGen Kloberdanz, Barbara City Counal 5 $30,000 $11,569 38.6%

1991 Pnmary Dorsa, Joseph City Counal *9 $30,000 $10,922 36 4%

1997 General Scala Frark City Counal { $30,000 $10514 350%

1991 Prmary Krongok, Martin City Couna’ 38 $30,000 $9,797 = 32.7%

2005 Prmary Ampry-Samre.Abcsa — City Couna' 41 $75,000 $22.97 26%

2001 = General Strougo. Robert City Counci 5 $68.500 $20 564 30.5%

2010 «Special Caller. Carl City Couna 44 $84 000 24 061 28 6%

2009 Prmary Facundo, Luss City Counc: 10 $80,501 $18 267 22 7%

2001 General Karako. Jak City Counc: 4 $68 500 $14 483 21 1%

2010 = Special «= Jennings, Jr , Alan City Council 2 $84,000 $17335 206%

2007 Special «= Eugene. Mathieu City Council 40 $75,000 $15,170 202%

1993 General Mangano, Rosemare City Council $1 $30,000 $6,060 202%

1991 Pamary Marvarello, Fred City Counci 19 $30,000 $5,860 18 9°,

2005 Prm'Gen Flores Rodolfo City Courcil 25 $75,000 $11672 156%

1993 General Martin, George Mayor $2,000,000 $270924 13 5%

1991 =Pnmay Eatmon Jr, Andeew City Courcil 17 $30,000 $4034 13.4%

2009 Pramary = Jennings, Jr, Alar City Courcil 28 $80.50" $70,003 12 4%

2001 General Chwat, Norbert City Courcil 29 $68 500 $7,649 11 2%

1997 «General Salazar, Rod City Coural 6 $30 000 $2,934 9 8%,

1991 Pnomay Dechter, Hyman City Courcil 2 $30 000 2,602 7%

2001 General Mercado, Julho City Coural Re $68 500 $4,927 7 2%

2001 General Vazquez, Jome City Courcil 34 $68 500 $4,927 7 2%

2009. General §=Golaberg Joshua City Courcil 6 $80 50° $5,646 70%

2002. Specal = Martinez. George City Courci 38 $75 000 $5,000 7%

A->

2001 Generali Grupico, Sa! City Counal 45 $68 500 $3,793 5 5%

2001 General Herschafi, Aken City Counal 48 $68,500 $3,611 5 3%

1997 General Shanahan, Mary Lov City Counal §1 $30,000 $1,329 4.4%

1993 General Brown, Mantyn City Counail 24 $30,000 $1,227 41%

2003 PnnvGen Park, Terence City Coural 22 $75,000 $2,977 40%

1993 General Reiss, Elaine 30’0 Pres. Mn $450,000 $17,345 39%

2001 Pnmary Pope, Sandra City Counall 27 $68,500 $2,534 3.7%

1997 General Piker, Joan Boro Pres Mn $532,500 $18,350 34%

1997 Prmary Ceretti, Anthony City Couna! 43 $30,000 $1,000 33%

2001 General Jereski, Robert City Counal 4 $68,500 $1,919 2.8%

1997 General McAvoy, Annemane Comptrolier . $1,479,000 $18,203 1.2%

1991 Primary Cavaco Jr, Manuel City Council 1 $30,000 $346 12%

2005 General Gonzalez, Miguel City Council 37 $75,000 $624 08%

1993 General Richman, Martin Boro Pres. Bx $450,000 $3,589 0.8%

2001 General Rexach, Nida Luz City Council 10 $68,500 $485 07%

2009 Primary Grays, Lou City Council 3 $80,501 $509 06%

2009 Genera! Villar, Francisca Mayor . $3,079,001 $°0,527 0 3%

1997 Pnmary Green, Roger Pub. Advo $1,479,000 $3,186 02%

1897 Pnmary Rogers, Roland Mayor - $2,366,000 $4,635 02%

1993 Pnmary Braggs, Monica Boro Pres Bx $450,000 $595 01%

2009 General Horvath, Irene City Counal 1 $80,501 $56 01%

1993 General Falk, Bob Pub. Advo . $1,250,000 $568 00%

2009 Primary Rogers, Roland Mayor . $3,079,001 $205 00%

2001 General Agosto, Jonathan City Counal 16 $68,500 $0 00%

1993 General Augustin, Owen City Counal 40 $30,000 $0 00%

2001 General McManus, Patrick City Council 17 $68 500 $0 0.0%

2001 General Perez, Aida City Counc! 17 $68 500 $0 00%

* . Incumbent

Note: Includes only non-participating candidates who were opposed by

participants and reported itemized financial activity to the city or state Board of

Elections or the Campaign Finance Board. During the same period, there were

an additional 267 non-participating candidates opposed by participants who

reported no itemized contributions or expenditures.

Spending by Non-Participating Candidates as a Percentage of the Bonus

Trigger, New York City Elections, 1989-2010

100°,

rS%

90%,

‘

re - S

o 8 8 p :

1080 qo08 1907 2001 OOS POO M93

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.