Jurisdictional Statement — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

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021674 MAY 2 - RB

No. 02-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 2002

MITCH MCCONNELL et al.,

Appellants,

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et ai.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

District Court For The District of Columbia

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR

SUSAN BUCKLEY Counsel of Record

BRIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN

CAHILL, GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS

80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005

(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000

(additional counsel on signature block)

May 2, 2003

SLL IRE SE EE Ca EAT FED LTE TT EET EE EET ELD EI ELE CLES

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

—

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of

the “soft money” provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81, because it constitutes an invalid exercise

of Congress’ power to regulate elections under Article I,

Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First

Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth

Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague.

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of

the “electioneering communications” provisions (sections

- 201,203, 204, and 311) of BCRA, because they violate the

First Amendment or the equal protection component of the

Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague.

Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable

challenges to, and upholding, portions of the “advance

notice” provisions of BCRA (sections 201 and 212),

because they violate the First Amendment.

Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable

challenges to, and upholding, the “coordination” provisions

of BCRA (sections 202, 211, and 214), because they

violate the First Amendment.

Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable

challenges to, and upholding, the “attack ad” provision of

BCRA (section 305), because it violates the First

Amendment.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The appellants here, who were plaintiffs in two of the eleven

cases consolidated in the district court, are Senator Mitch

McConnell; Southeastern Legal Foundation, _Inc.;

Representative Bob Barr; Center for Individual Freedom;

National Right to Work Committee; 60 Plus Association, Inc.;

U.S. d/b/a Pro English; the National Association of

Broadcasters; and Thomas E. McInerney.

The appellees here, who were defendants or intervenor-

defendants in the district court, are the Federal Election

Commission; the Federal Communications Commission; the

United States of America; Senator John McCain; Senator

Russell Feingold; Representative Christopher Shays;

Representative Martin Meehan; Senator Olympia Snowe; and

Senator James Jeffords.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6

None of the appellants has a parent corporation, and no

publicly held company owns 10% or more of the stock of any of

the appellants.

-———

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Buckley v. Valeo,

EE | ee ssievosiansannisintemmaniiaé passim

California Democratic Party v. Jones,

es Be Ce ices cncreccninnnsennsecneniconnsinnmeniannnnnnnts 11

Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing

v. Berkeley,

ee icinateniniaaieniids 9

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,

Sa a Ge ctectctrctnssencncetnneniminnamennenn 10, 16

Davis v. Bandemer,

Fe es cccicesenttcscnenesascreennsitattnnmemnies 12

Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.,

a as Be icccnretecmcscctesenensccnnionmennnnintvmmans 9

Ex parte Siebold,

es 8 ee ectecnnescctentenesssscsnnsistenenemmannnnn 11

FEC vy. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,

Fa he Se ctctcntinientetnnnennnnniennmmannarene 13

FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,

es I ccsenissetnnneteencicnenenninerinniesenmtunanin 10

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

cccntccesnsnsemasensennssemsnsemimeneenimnnnns 17

Oregon v. Mitchell,

a i Be CR ccreccccncsnenscenscesensecsanenesmnnensssnneninensente 11

Perry v. Sindermann,

es re rcccisccnctaratenncsnsonscesnninensnmennessnneieneanints 17

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley,

le RN eictcristctsnstascnessicnreennentnsnteinnetsoniemvenienanneion 12

Vii

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

8 REESE Ree 17

Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

RE re CN REE 9

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v.

Village of Stratton,

I 15

STATUTES

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,

Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 .......0.cccccccceceeeeeeeees 2, 3,8

Federal Election Campaign Act,

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)........ccccccsscsscsseeseeees 2

Federal Election Campaign Act,

Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) ......cccccccceceeeseee 2

Federal Election Campaign Act,

Pub. L. No. 94-238, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) ........ccccccccssesseeeees 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

The Federalist No. 59 (Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) .. 11

ee Ooms Oe

INTRODUCTION

This case needs no introduction. It is the constitutional

challenge to the “McCain-Feingold” law — known officially, if

somewhat misleadingly, as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform

Act (BCRA). The statute represents the most comprehensive

campaign finance legislation since the Federal Election

Campaign Act (FECA), and this case represents the most

significant constitutional challenge to such legislation since

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

At its core, this is a case about the First Amendment. BCRA

constitutes a frontal assault on First Amendment values, the

likes of which have not been seen since the Republic’s infancy.

But BCRA also offends other constitutional principles —

principles that are no less fundamental. It purports to regulate

the activities of political parties and candidates not just with

respect to federal elections, but also with respect to state

elections, notwithstanding Congress’ lack of power so to

regulate. It subjects a variety of players in the political process,

and a variety of types of political speech, to disparate treatment,

despite the absence of any justification for doing so. And it

contains an abundance of vague provisions, thereby

transforming the Federal Election Commission, the regulatory

body tasked with enforcing those provisions, into a board of

censors that decides which types of political speech are

permitted and which are not. Rarely has Congress acted with

such utter disregard for so many constitutional limitations on its

power.

Appellants urge this Court to no’ probable jurisdiction on

the questions presented herein, and to reverse the district court

on those questions. '

' Other plaintiffs will likely be filing jurisdictional statements of their own,

and it is anticipated that defendants will also do so. Where necessary,

appellants will file prompt responses to those statements. In addition,

appellants shortly intend to file a motion proposing procedures for the

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court’s opinions are not yet reported. See

Appendix (“App.”) 3a. Appellants’ notice of appeal is

reprinted at App. la-2a.

JURISDICTION

The district court entered judgment on May 2, 2003.

Appellants filed their timely notice of appeal on May 2, 2003.

This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to section

403(a)(3) of BCRA.

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub.

L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, is reprinted at App. 7a-68a.

Article I, Section 4, of the United States Constitution is

reprinted at App. 4a.

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution is

reprinted at App. Sa.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is

reprinted at App. 6a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The history of campaign finance regulation in the United

States is relatively brief. In fact, Congress did not attempt

systematically to regulate the financing of campaigns until

1971, when it enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act

(FECA). See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as

amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455). As amended in 1974, see

Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, FECA had three principal

components. First, and most fundamentally, FECA established

limits on the amount of money that could be contributed for the

purpose of influencing federal elections — money that would

come to be known as “hard money.” Individuals could

disposition of this appeal.

contribute up to $1,000 per candidate, and “political

committees” (including political action committees, or PACs)

could contribute up to $5,000.? Second, FECA also imposed

limits on the amount of money that could be spent in federal

elections, restricting expenditures by any person “relative to a

clearly identified candidate” to $1,000. Finally, FECA

established limits on “coordinated expenditures”: that is,

expenditures made on behalf of, and in collaboration with, a

federal candidate for express advocacy and related activities.

FECA treated coordinated expenditures as “contributions”

subject to the applicable limits, and set separate limits for

coordinated expenditures by political party committees.

2. In Buckley, this Court considered challenges to these

and numerous other provisions of FECA. The Court began by

recognizing that both contributions and expenditures on behalf

of political candidates implicate the First Amendment rights of

free speech and free association, although it asserted that

limitations on expenditures constituted “significantly more

severe” restrictions on those rights than limitations on

contributions. See 424 U.S. at 19-23. The Court also

recognized that the government had a compelling interest in

“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of

corruption.” See id. at 25. Although the Court did not define

“corruption,” it repeatedly referred to “quid pro quo”

arrangements in which contributions or expenditures were made

? In 1976, Congress amended FECA to add further limits. See Pub. L. No.

94-238, 90 Stat. 475. Under those amendments, individuals could contribute

up to $5,000 per year to any particular political committee (including PACs

and state political party committees), and up to $20,000 per year to any

national party committee. Poiitical party committees, in turn, could

contribute up to $5,000 to a candidate’s campaign, with national party

committees allowed to contribute up to $17,500 to a senatorial candidate’s

campaign.

The BCRA raises a number of these contribution limits. See BCRA

§§ 102, 307. Appellants are not directly challenging any of the contribution

limits in this appeal.

in order to secure or “influence” a particular action. See id. at

26, 27, 45.

The Court upheld FECA’s contribution limits as

constitutional. See id. at 24-38. However, it struck down

FECA’s limits on independent expenditures. See id. at 39-59.

In order to address both vagueness and overbreadth concerns,

the Court first narrowly construed the expenditure limits to

cover only those funds that were spent for what has come to be

known as “express advocacy”: that is, funds used “in express

terms [to] advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified

candidate.” Jd. at 44. This narrowing construction therefore

excluded from the reach of government regulation political

advocacy that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat

of a clearly identified candidate (so-called “issue advocacy”).

Even after narrowing these provisions, however, the Court

struck them down on the ground that independent expenditures

did not pose a sufficient threat of corruption or the appearance

of corruption. See id. at 45. In so doing, the Court expressed

approval of FECA’s treatment of coordinated expenditures as

contributions. See id. at 47. The Court applied a similar

narrowing construction to a provision of FECA requiring

disclosure of certain expenditures, but ultimately upheld that

provision. See id. at 74-82.

3. In the wake of Buckley, the FECA regime for the

financing of federal election campaigns peacefully coexisted

with the States’ regimes for the financing of their own election

campaigns. Some States allowed virtually unlimited

contributions to, and expenditures by, state candidates and party

committees; others imposed even more stringent limits than

those imposed by FECA on the federal level.

Questions arose, however, regarding the financing of

activities that had effects on both federal and state elections,

such as voter registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-

vote activities. In 1978, the Federal Election Commission

(FEC) declared that state and local party committees could use a

—as

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combination of federally regulated funds (so-called “hard

money”) and state-regulated funds (so-called “soft money’) to

fund those activities. See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10. The

FEC subsequently allowed national party committees to use a

similar “allocation” of federally regulated and state-regulated

funds. See FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17. Over the next two

decades, the FEC extended the allocation regime to cover other

activities by party committees, including administrative

expenses, party-promoting (or “generic”) campaign activities,

and, perhaps most critically, issue advocacy. See FEC Advisory

Op. 1995-25. During the 1990s, the raising and spending of

state-regulated funds for party activities, and the use of issue

advocacy by political parties and other groups, expanded

significantly.

4. It was against this backdrop that BCRA was enacted.

The relevant provisions of BCRA are contained in four titles.

a. Title lof BCRA effectively outlaws the use of so-called

“soft money”: that is, money which has not previously been

subject to federal regulation, but which has been raised by

political parties in full compliance with applicable state law.

Section 101 of BCRA bans national party committees from

receiving or spending state-regulated funds for any purpose —

whether for activities affecting both federal and state elections,

for which an allocation of state-regulated funds could

previously be used, or for activities that affect only state

elections. Section 101 also bans national party committees

from soliciting state-regulated funds for, or transferring state-

regulated funds to, any other entity, including state and local

party committees.

In addition, section 101 bans state and local party committees

from spending state-regulated funds for what BCRA

euphemistically calls “federal election activity” — a broadly

defined phrase that encompasses voter registration, voter

identification, get-out-the-vote activity, and generic campaign

activity whenever there is a federal election on the ballot, and

advertising that contains certain types of references to federal

candidates. Because most States hold their state and local

elections simultaneously with federal elections, the practical

effect of this provision is to ban state and local party

committees from using state-regulated funds for covered

activities even if those activities solely or primarily affect state

and local elections. Although section 101 creates a narrow

subcategory of these activities that can be paid for with a new

category of federally regulated funds (so-called “Levin” funds),

it requires state and local party committees to raise funds for

these activities on their own, without engaging in joint

fundraising or receiving transfers of funds from other party

committees.

Section 101 also severely restricts federal officeholders and

candidates from raising state-regulated funds for state and local

party committees and candidates. Moreover, it bans state and

local candidates from spending state-regulated funds on

advertising that contains certain types of references to federal

candidates.

b. Title II of BCRA contains a number of challenged

provisions. Most notably, sections 201 and 204 ban all

corporations and unions, or other entities using funds donated

by corporations and unions, from making disbursements for

“electioneering communications,” which section 203 defines as

any advertising, carried by a broadcast, satellite, or cable

medium within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general

election, which “refers to a clearly identified candidate for

Federal office.” In the event that this definition is held to be

unconstitutional, section 203 also contains a “fallback”

definition of “electioneering communications,” which covers

any broadcast advertising, at any time, which “promotes,”

“supports,” “attacks,” or “opposes” a federal candidate and “is

suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to

vote for or against a specific candidate.” In addition to banning

corporations and unions from making “electioneering

communications” altogether, section 201 requires all persons

who spend $10,000 on “electioneering communications” to

make disclosures to the FEC regarding those disbursements.

Several other provisions of Title II are also under challenge.

Sections 201 and 212 impose disclosure requirements on

persons who merely enter into a contract to make disbursements

for electioneering communications or other expenditures, even

before those outlays are actually made. Section 202 treats

coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications,

like coordinated expenditures, as contributions to the

“supported” candidates, and -sections 211 and 214 broadly

define the concept of “coordination” and order the FEC to

promulgate new regulations concerning that definition. Finally,

section 213 bans political parties from making both independent

and coordinated expenditures on behalf of any given candidate,

and instead forces them to choose which type of expenditures to

make.

c. Title Ill of BCRA is composed of “miscellaneous”

provisions, several of which are at issue in this litigation.

Section 318 bans minors from contributing federally regulated

money in any amount to a federal candidate, and from

contributing either federally regulated or state-regulated money

to a political party committee. Section 305 requires a federal

candidate who wishes to take advantage of the lowest available

rate for a broadcast advertisement either to certify that he or she

will not refer to another candidate in his or her advertising, or to

include a specified identification or visual statement in the ad.

Sections 304, 316, and 319 raise the generally applicable

limitations on contributions and coordinated expenditures for

candidates who face opponents using specified amounts of

personal funds in their campaigns. And section 311 establishes

detailed identification requirements for the sponsors of

advertising that qualifies as express advocacy or “electioneering

communications.”

d. Title V of BCRA contains one provision under

challenge, section 504, which requires broadcasters to collect

and disclose records of requests to purchase broadcast time for

communications “relating to any political matter of national

importance,” even if those communications are never actually

made.

5. Although noting that BCRA raised “serious

constitutional concerns,” President Bush signed BCRA into law

on March 27, 2002. Eleven complaints were immediately filed

in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the law.

Pursuant to the judicial-review provisions in section 403 of the

BCRA, those cases were consolidated before a single three-

judge panel (Henderson, Circuit Judge, and Kollar-Kotelly and

Leon, District Judges). The court ordered the parties to conduct

expedited discovery and a “paper trial,” in which witnesses

filed written statements and were cross-examined outside court.

On November 6, 2002, BCRA took effect. After a voluminous

record was compiled and expedited briefing completed, the

court heard oral arguments on December 4 and 5, 2002.

On May 2, 2003, the district court issued opinions upholding

some provisions of BCRA, striking down other provisions, and

holding that appellants’ challenges to other provisions were

nonjusticiable. See App. 3a. This appeal follows.

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL

In BCRA, Congress vested this Court with direct appellate

jurisdiction over the district court’s resolution of challenges to

BCRA’s constitutionality, and asked this Court “to expedite to

the greatest possible extent the disposition of the * * * appeal.”

See BCRA § 403(a)(3). The district court’s decision to reject

some of appellants’ constitutional challenges was erroneous,

and this Court should note probable jurisdiction on those issues.

1. The district court largely struck down the “soft money”

provision of BCRA (section 101), but upheld restrictions on the

use of soft money by party committees for certain types of

advertising, and also upheld restrictions on ihe solicitation and

use of soft money by officeholders and candidates. To the

extent the district court held section 101 constitutional, that

decision was erroneous and should be reversed.

a. Most significantly, section 101 violates the First

Amendment. Section 101 imposes burdens on speech and

associational rights that far outweigh those imposed by the

contribution and expenditure limits at issue in Buckley. By

limiting the mere solicitation of state-regulated funds by

various actors, including officeholders and candidates

(provisions upheld by the district court), section 101 directly

restricts the speech of those actors. See, e.g., Schaumberg v.

Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). Section

101 also interferes with the ability of party committees to

associate with other committees of the same party, officeholders

and candidates, and other organizations. See, e.g., Eu v. San

Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,

230-31 (1989). Because of the substantial speech and

associational interests implicated, and because the limits on

donations of state-regulated funds to national party committees

effectively serve as limits on the amounts that national party

committees can spend, section 101 of BCRA should be subject

to strict scrutiny. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition

for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981).

Section .01 cannot survive strict scrutiny because it is not

narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.

Although appellees will suggest that section 101 was justified

to prevent donors of state-regulated funds from securing

“access” to federal officeholders and candidates or to prevent

circumvention of current campaign finance regulations, this

Court has not recognized either of those potentially limitless

justifications for regulation as compelling. Instead, the only

interest that this Court has recognized as compelling in the

campaign finance context is the interest in reducing actual or

apparent corruption. See FEC v. National Conservative

Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).

Asa threshold matter, it is questionable whether restrictions

on the donation of state-regulated funds to, or the spending of

any state-regulated funds by, a political party serve that interest

at all. As this Court has noted, there are no “special dangers of

corruption associated with f dlitical parties.” | Colorado

Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616

(1996) (Colorado I) (plurality opinion).° Moreover, where

funds are being used for activities that do not exclusively serve

to get a candidate elected (such as generic party activity), rather

than for activities that exclusively do so (such as express

advocacy), “the opportunity for corruption * * * is, at best,

attenuated.” Jd.

Even assuming that section 101 does serve the government's

interest in reducing actual or apparent corruption, however, it is

not narrowly tailored to serve that goal. To the extent that

Congress was concerned that the amount of donations of state-

regulated funds gave rise to corruption, it could simply have

capped the amount that could be given. And to the extent that

Congress was worried about the use of state-regulated funds for

certain types of advertising, it could perhaps have banned only

the disbursement of state-regulated funds for that purpose, as

the district court suggests — though, as we will shortly

demonstrate, such advertising is in fact constitutionally

protected speech.

b. Section 101 is constitutionally problematic for three

other reasons. First, appellants intend to argue that Congress

lacked the power to enact section 101, which restricts the

activities of political party committees, officeholders, and

candidates not only with respect to federal elections, but also

3 See also id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(same); id. at 646 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in sat?)

(same).

with respect to state and local elections. The Elections Clause

in Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution — the traditionally

pes ey of authority to regulate campaign financing, see

s > 24 U.S. at 13 — gives Congress the power to regulate

only the Times, Places, and Manner” of holding federal

elections. Both the contemporary understanding and

subsequent case law demonstrate beyond doubt that the

Elections Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate

state elections as well. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 59 z 363

(Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Oregon v. Mitchell 400 US

ak aa (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); Ex parte Siebold,

prone y 7 -4 ~_- : ee ho agro Democratic Party ¥.

S, S. ‘ tev i i

(noting that “[a] State’s power to phair aon

to be elected is a quintessential attribute of sovereignty”).

. Section 101 of BCRA constitutes an improper exercise of

ongress’ Elections Clause power because it fails sufficiently

Oo accommodate the competing state interest in regulatin

activities that affect state elections. Section 101 prohibits nt

committees from raising and spending state-regulated funds for

many activities that have effects on both federal and state

elections (including the use of state-regulated funds for

advertising that refers to both federal and state candidates. the

regulation of which the district court upheld), and other

activities that have effects only on state elections. Similar! in

provisions upheld by the district court, section 101 reeeeea

limits the ability of federal officeholders and candidates to rai :

money for state and local candidates, and Saetens

unprecedented restrictions on th

candidates themselves. ie

Second, section 101 violates basic princi

protection to the extent that it misiiite aman ta ob ae

pe but not identical speech by similarly situated entities.

€ requirement that the government act neutrally among

speakers is embedded not only in the equal protection

component of the Fifth Amendment, but also in the First

Amendment itself. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408

U.S. 92, 96 (1972). At least as originally written, section 101

unquestionably disadvantages political party committees

compared to interest groups: whereas national party committees

are banned outright from raising or spending state-regulated

funds for contributions to state or local candidates, voter

registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity,

generic campaign activity, advocacy relating to ballot measures,

and even administrative expenses, interest groups will be able

to continue to raise and spend non-federally regulated funds for

all of these purposes. The predictable result is that interest

groups will tend to supplant political party committees with

regard to all of these activities, thereby diluting the central role

that political parties traditionally have played in our democratic

process. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986)

(O’Connor, J., concurring).

Third, a number of terms in section 101 are

unconstitutionally vague, including several terms in the

definition of “federal election activity” (such as covered

“communications” that “promote,” “support,” “attack,” or

“oppose” a federal candidate). Crucially, the FEC’s rulemaking

on section 101 has failed to cure the vagueness of many of these

terms, and in some cases has introduced additional vagueness in

the regulatory regime. This vagueness will force party

committees and other actors either to “steer far wider of the

unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas

were clearly marked,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 n.48 (internal

quotation omitted), or to seek prior approval from the FEC

before engaging in political speech.

2. The district court partially upheld and partially struck

down the “electioneering communications” provisions of

BCRA.

As to those provisions, appellants intend to argue that the

regulation of disbursements for political speech other than

express advocacy violates the First Amendment, as this Court

previously held in both Buckley and FEC v. Massachusetts

Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL). In

Buckley, the Court considered a provision of FECA restricting

expenditures by any person “relative to a clearly identified

candidate” to $1,000, and an attendant provision requiring

disclosures of certain expenditures made “for the purpose of

* ** influencing” federal elections. In both instances, the

Court narrowed the statutory provisions to reach only

expenditures made for “communications that in express terms

advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate

for federal office”: that is, “communications containing express

words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’

‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’

‘vote against,” ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.”” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 &

n.52, 80. The Court made clear that it was narrowing these

provisions not merely to cure vagueness in the statutory

language, but also to eliminate constitutional overbreadth. See,

e.g., id. at 80. Notably, the Court drew the constitutional line at

express advocacy while recognizing that the distinction between

express advocacy and other advocacy “may often dissolve in

practical application” because “{c]andidates, especially

incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving

legislative proposals and governmental actions.” Jd. at 42. In

MCFL, the Court similarly narrowed a provision that banned

corporate expenditures “in connection with” federal elections to

cover only expenditures for express advocacy, this time doing

so solely on the basis of overbreadth. See 479 U.S. at 248-49.

Because both of section 203’s definitions of “electioneering

communications” — including the fallback definition, as

modified and then upheld by the district court — extend far

beyond constitutionally regulable express advocacy, the ban on

disbursements for “electioneering communications” by

corporations and unions in sections 201 and 204, and the

attendant disclosure requirements in sections 201 and 311,

should be struck down.

Appellees will likely argue that this Court should overrule

Buckley and MCFL on the theory that many ads run in

proximity to elections are “sham” issue ads, which are

“intended” to influence elections, and therefore should be

treated as the constitutional equivalent of express advocacy. As

the Court recognized in Buckley, it is true that any discussion of

issues and candidates “tend[s] naturally and inexorably to exert

some influence on voting at elections.” 424 U.S. at 42 n.50

(internal quotation omitted). As Buckley itself makes clear,

however, the distinction between express advocacy and other

advocacy was intended precisely to avoid efforts such as

appellees’ to divine the real “purpose” behind an ad. In any

event, the evidentiary record before the district court

demonstrates that BCRA reaches a substantial amount of fully

protected political speech, even under appellees’ redefinition of

express advocacy.

Finally, appellants intend to make further arguments

regarding the constitutionality of BCRA’s “electioneering

communications” provisions. Appellants intend to argue that

the “fallback” definition of “electioneering communications” in

section 203, as modified and then upheld by the district court, is

impermissibly vague because reasonable people can differ as to

whether any given advertisement “promotes,” “supports,”

“attacks,” or “opposes” a federal candidate. Finally, appellants

intend to argue that section 203 violates basic principles of

equal protection because it regulates speech carried by

broadcast media but not by other media, and because it exempts

communications by media corporations themselves.

3. The district court struck down some of the “advance

notice” provisions of BCRA (sections 201 and 212) and held

that challenges to other of those provisions were nonjusticiable.

Appellants intend to argue that all of their challenges are

justiciable and that all of the “advance notice” provisions

violate the First Amendment. Those provisions impose

disclosure requirements on persons who merely enter into a

contract to make disbursements for electioneering

communications or other expenditures, even before those

disbursements or expenditures are actually made, and even if

they are ultimately not made. Sections 201 and 212 therefore

differ in kind from the FECA reporting provisions upheld in

Buckley, which required only after-the-fact disclosure. See

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74-82.

By requiring disclosure of a mere intention to make

disbursements or expenditures, regardless of whether they are

actually made, sections 201 and 212 cannot be said to serve any

governmental interest in preventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption, informing the electorate as to the

source of campaign spending, or assisting in enforcement of

contribution limits — much less to be narrowly tailored to those

interests. These provisions will chill the exercise of free speech

by forcing would-be speakers to disclose their plans in advance,

thereby potentially subjecting them to harassment and giving

their opponents the opportunity either to dissuade media

organizations from running the ads at issue or to counter those

ads with ones of their own. Such a restraint plainly violates the

First Amendment. Cf Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of

N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002)

(striking down ordinance requiring permits for canvassers).

4. The district court upheld some of the “coordination”

provisions of BCRA (section 211 and 214) and held that

challenges to other of those provisions were nonjusticiable.

Appellants intend to argue that all of their challenges are

justiciable and that all of the “coordination” provisions violate

the First Amendment. Sections 211 and 214 give the concept of

“coordination” a new, broader definition, with section 214(c)

expressly stating that “agreement or formal collaboration” are

not required in order to establish coordination, and ordering the

FEC to promulgate new regulations consistent with this

directive. This Court’s prior cases on coordinated expenditures,

however, make clear that some degree of actual agreement is

necessary before an expenditure can be treated as coordinated

and therefore as the legal equivalent of acontribution. See, e.g.,

Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion); Buckley, 424

U.S. at 47 & n.53. Any definition of coordination that lacks

some requirement of actual agreement is_ therefore

unconstitutional.

Moreover, section 202 treats coordinated disbursements for

electioneering communications, like coordinated expenditures

for express advocacy, as contributions to the “supported”

candidates. If this Court strikes down the “electioneering

communications” provisions of BCRA, thereby reaffirming that

Congress may not regulate advocacy that does not constitute

express advocacy, it should also strike down the “coordination”

provisions of BCRA insofar as they reach disbursements for

speech that does not qualify as express advocacy.

5. The district court next held that challenges to the “attack

ad” provision of BCRA (section 305) are nonjusticiable.

Appellants intend to argue that their challenges are justiciable

and that section 305 violates the First Amendment. Section 305

requires a federal candidate who wishes to take advantage of the

statutorily mandated lowest available rate for a broadcast

advertisement either to certify that he or she will not refer to

another candidate in his or her advertising, or to include a

specified identification or visual statement in the ad. There is

no question that this provision was designed to discourage, if

not eradicate, so-called “negative advertising”: the very title of

the provision is “Limitation on Availability of Lowest Unit

Charge for Federal Candidates Attacking Opposition.”

Section 305 violates the First Amendment because it imposes

an unconstitutional condition (namely, the requirement that a

candidate either engage in “positive” advertising or include

certain speech in his or her “negative” advertising) on the

availability of a governmental benefit (namely, the “lowest

unit” rate). See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597

(1972). Indeed, to the extent that section 305 favors “positive”

over “negative” advertising, it constitutes an impermissible

viewpoint-based regulation of speech. See, e.g., Rosenberger v.

Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). It

is beyond question that “negative,” like “positive,” political

speech enjoys the fullest constitutional protection. See, e.g.,

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note probable

jurisdiction.

FLOYD ABRAMS

SUSAN BUCKLEY

BRIAN MARKLEY

CAHILL GORDON &

REINDEL LLP

80 Pine Street

New York, NY 10005

(212) 701-3000

Attorneys for Senator Mitch

McConnell and National

Association of Broadcasters

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 725-9875

Attorney for Senator Mitch

McConnell

G. HUNTER BATES

1215 Cliffwood Drive

Goshen, KY 40026

(502) 473-7557

Attorney for Senator Mitch

McConnell and Thomas E.

Mclnerney

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH W. STARR

Counsel of Record

EDWARD W. WARREN

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

KIRKLAND & ELLIS

655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000

Attorneys for Senator Mitch

McConnell; Southeastern

Legal Foundation, Inc.;

Representative Bob Barr;

Center for Individual

Freedom; National Right to

Work Committee; 60 Plus

Association, Inc.; and U.S.

d/b/a Pro English

JAN WITOLD BARAN

THOMAS W. KIRBY

LEE E. GOODMAN

WILEY, REIN & FIELDING

LLP

1776 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 719-7000

Attorneys for Senator Mitch

McConnell

APPENDIX

Reform Act

107-155,

§ 4

La.

amend

ampaign

L. No

of 2002, Pub.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ey |

U.S. Const. amend

May 2, 2003 ..cccccccccccsssssssssssssseseccessen

Opinion of the District Court

Notice of Appeal to the Supreme

TT cnintniniiinensesemisnenenecccsess OM

Court of the United States,

U.S. Const. art

U.S. Const.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

{

_la

APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF APPEAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA |

SENATOR MITCH

McCONNELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civ. No. 02-0582

V. (CKK, KLH, RKL)

(and related cases)

FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Notice is hereby given that the following plaintiffs hereby

appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from any and

all adverse rulings incorporated in, antecedent to, or ancillary to

the final judgment of the three-judge district court entered in

this action on May 2, 2003: Senator Mitch McConnell;

Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.; Representative Bob Barr;

Center for Individual Freedom; National Right to Work

Committee; 60 Plus Association, Inc.; U.S. d/b/a Pro English;

and Thomas E. McInerney (in No. 02-582, McConnell v. FEC);

and the National Association of Broadcasters (in No. 02-753,

National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FEC).

This appeal is taken pursuant to section 403(a)(3) of the

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81, 114.

Floyd Abrams

Susan Buckley

Brian Markley

Cahill Gordon &

Reindel LLP

80 Pine Street

New York, NY 10005

(212) 701-3000

Attorneys for Senator Mitch

McConnell and National

Association of Broadcasters

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Kenneth W. Starr

Edward W. Warren

Kannon K. Shanmugam

Kirkland & Ellis

655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000 |

Attorneys for Senator Mitch

McConnell; Southeastern

Legal Foundation, Inc.;

Representative Bob Barr;

Center for Individual

Freedom; National Right to

Work Committee; 60 Plus

Association, Inc.; and U.S.

d/b/a Pro English

(additional counsel omitted)

May 2, 2003

APPENDIX B

OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

The district court’s opinions can be found on the Internet at

http://Ismns20.gtwy.uscourts.gov/dced/mcconnell-2002-ruling.

html.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I, SECTION 4

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for

Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State

by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by

Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of

chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and

such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless

they shall by Law appoint a different day.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging —

the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a

Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public

danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.

APPENDIX F

BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002

PUB. L. NO. 107-155, 166 STAT. 81

{March 27, 2002]

An Act To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 to provide bipartisan campaign reform.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE. — This Act may be cited as the

“Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS. — The table of contents of

this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I — REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST

INFLUENCE

Sec. 101. Soft money of political parties.

Sec. 102. Increased contribution limit for State committees of

political parties.

Sec. 103. Reporting requirements.

TITLE If — NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN

EXPENDITURES

Subtitle A — Electioneering Communications

Sec. 201. Disclosure of electioneering communications.

Sec. 202. Coordinated communications as contributions.

Sec. 203. Prohibition of corporate and labor disbursements

for electioneering communications.

a a ee

eee

Sec. 204. Rules relating to certain targeted electioneering

communications.

Subtitle B — Independent and Coordinated Expenditures

Sec. 211. Definition of independent expenditure.

Sec. 212. Reporting requirements for certain independent

expenditures.

Sec. 213. Independent versus coordinated expenditures by

party.

Sec. 214. Coordination with candidates or political parties.

TITLE Il — MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 301. Use of contributed amounts for certain purposes.

Sec. 302. Prohibition of fundraising on Federal property.

Sec. 303. Strengthening foreign money ban.

Sec. 304. Modification of individual contribution limits in

response to expenditures from personal funds.

Sec. 305. Limitation on availability of lowest unit charge for

Federal candidates attacking opposition.

Sec. 306. Software for filing reports and prompt disclosure of

contributions.

Sec. 307. Modification of contribution limits.

Sec. 308. Donations to Presidential inaugural committee.

Sec. 309. Prohibition on fraudulent solicitation of funds.

Sec. 310. Study and report on clean money clean elections

laws.

Sec. 311. Clarity standards for identification of sponsors of

election-related advertising.

Sec. 312. Increase in penalties.

Sec. 313. Statute of limitations.

Sec. 314. Sentencing guidelines.

Sec. 315. Increase in penalties imposed for violations of

conduit contribution ban.

Sec. 316. Restriction on increased contribution limits by

taking into account candidate’s available funds.

Sec. 317. Clarification of right of nationals of the United

States to make political contributions.

Sec. 318. Prohibition of contributions by minors.

Sec. 319. Modification of individual contribution limits for

House candidates in response to expenditures from personal

funds.

TITLE IV — SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 401. Severability.

Sec. 402. Effective dates and regulations.

Sec. 403. Judicial review.

TITLE V — ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS

Sec. 501. Internet access to records.

Sec. 502. Maintenance of website of election reports.

Sec. 503. Additional disclosure reports.

Sec. 504. Public access to broadcasting records.

TITLE I — REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST

INFLUENCE

SEC. 10:. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Title III of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

“(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES. —

“(1) INGENERAL. — A national committee of a political

party (including a national congressional campaign committee

10a

of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another

person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any

other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to

the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this

Act.

“(2) APPLICABILITY. — The prohibition established by

paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any

officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee,

and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed,

maintained, or controlled by such a national committee.

“(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMITTEES. —

“(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in paragraph (2),

an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal election

activity by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party (including an entity that is directly or indirectly

established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State,

district, or local committee of a political party and an officer or

agent acting on behalf of such committee or entity), or by an

association or similar group of candidates for State or local

office or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be

made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and

reporting requirements of this Act.

“(2) APPLICABILITY. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii)

of section 301(20)(A), and subject to subparagraph (B),

paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount expended or

disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party for an activity described in either such clause to the extent

the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are

allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commission)

among amounts —

“(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act

(other than amounts described in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and

lla

“(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act

(other than any requirements of this subsection).

“(B) CONDITIONS. — Subparagraph (A) shall only apply

if —

“(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified

candidate for Federal office;

“(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the

costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication,

other than a communication which refers solely to a clearly

identified candidate for State or local office;

“(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are

described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts which

are donated in accordance with State law and which meet the

requirements of subparagraph (C), except that no person

(including any person established, financed, maintained, or

controlled by such person) may donate more than $10,000 to a

State, district, or local committee of a political party in a

calendar year for such expenditures or disbursements; and

“(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made solely

from funds raised by the State, local, or district committee

which makes such expenditure or disbursement, and do not

include any funds provided to such committee from —

“(I) any other State, local, or district committee of any

State party,

“(II) the national committee of a political party

(including a national congressional campaign committee of a

political party),

“(II]) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any

committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or

“(IV) any entity directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee described

| in subclause (I) or (II).

12a

“(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL

PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND

OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING

JOINTLY. — Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than

subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be spent

under subparagraph (B)(iii) meet the requirements of this

subparagraph only if the amounts —

“(j) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or

spent by or in the name of any person described in subsection

(a) or (e); and

“(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through

fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State,

local, or district committees of any political party or their

agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of 4 political

party on behalf of the State, local, or district committee of a

political party or its agent in one or more other States.

“(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS. — An amount spent by a

person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are

used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements

for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject

to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of

this Act.

“(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS. — A national,

State, district, or local committee of a political party (including

a national congressional campaign committee of a political

party), an entity that is directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, State,

district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent

acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall not

solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to —

“(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation

under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an

application for determination of tax exempt status under such

13a

section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in

connection with an election for Federal office (including

expenditures or disbursements for Federal election activity); or

“(2) an organization described in section 527 of such Code

(other than a political committee, a State, district, or local

committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign

committee of a candidate for State or local office).

“(e¢) FEDERAL CANDIDATES. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — A candidate, individual holding

Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual holding

Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or

more candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall not

“(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in

connection with an election for Federal office, including funds

for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to

the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this

Act; or

“(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in

connection with any election other than an election for Federal

office or disburse funds in connection with such an election

unless the funds —

“(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with respect

to contributions to candidates and political committees under

paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and

(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from

making contributions in connection with an election for Federal

office.

“(2) STATE LAW. — Paragraph (1) does not apply to the

solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an individual

described in such paragraph who is or was also a candidate for a

State or local office solely in connection with such election for

l4a

State or local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending of

funds is permitted under State law and refers only to such State

. or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the State or

local office sought by such candidate, or both.

“(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS. — Notwithstanding

paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an

individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or be a

featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or local

committee of a political party.

“(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS. —

“(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS. — Notwithstanding

any other provision of this subsection, an individual described

in paragraph (1) may make a general solicitation of funds on

behalf of any organization that is described in section 501(c) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation

under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an

application for determination of tax exempt status under such

section) (other than an entity whose principal purpose is to

conduct activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section

301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how the

funds will or should be spent.

“(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS. — In

addition to the general solicitations permitted under

subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph (1) may

make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for carrying out

the activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section

301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal purpose is to

conduct such activities, if —

“(j) the solicitation is made only to individuals; and

“(ii) the amount solicited from any individual during any

calendar year does not exceed $20,000.

“(f) STATE CANDIDATES. —

15a

“(1) INGENERAL. — A candidate for State or local office,

individual holding State or local office, or an agent of such a

candidate or individual may not spend any funds for a

communication described in section 301(20)(A)(iii) unless the

funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting

requirements of this Act.

“(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS.

— Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual described in

such paragraph if the communication involved is in connection

with an election for such State or local office and refers only to

such individual or to any other candidate for the State or local

office held or sought by such individual, or both.”

(b) DEFINITIONS. — Section 301 of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431) is amended by adding at

the end thereof the following:

“(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY. —

“(A) INGENERAL. — The term ‘Federal election activity’

means —

“(i) voter registration activity during the period that begins

on the date that is 120 days before the date a regularly

scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the date of the

election;

“(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or

generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an

election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the

ballot (regardiess of whether a candidate for State or local office

also appears on the ballot);

“(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly

identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a

candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or

identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that

office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office

l6a

(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates

a vote for or against a candidate); or

“(iv) services provided during any month by an employee

of a State, district, or local committee of a political party who

spends more than 25 percent of that individual’s compensated

time during that month on activities in connection with a

Federal election.

“(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY. — The term ‘Federal

election activity’ does not include an amount expended or

disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party for —

“(i) a public communication that refers solely to a clearly

identified candidate for State or local office, if the

communication is not a Federal election activity described in

subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii);

“(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local office,

provided the contribution is not designated to pay for a Federal

election activity described in subparagraph (A);

“(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political

convention; and

“(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, including

buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or depict

only a candidate for State or local office.

“(21) GENERIC CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY. — The term

‘generic campaign activity’ means a campaign activity that

promotes a political party and does not premote a candidate or

non-Federal candidate.

“(22) PUBLIC COMMUNICATION. — The term ‘public

communication’ means a communication by means of any

broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper,

magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or

telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of

general public political advertising.

17a

“(23) MASS MAILING. — The term ‘mass mailing’ means

a mailing by United States mail or facsimile of more than 500

pieces of mail matter of an identical or substantially similar

nature within any 30-day period.

“(24) TELEPHONE BANK. — The term ‘telephone bank’

means more than 500 telephone calls of an identical or

substantially similar nature within any 30-day period.”

SEC. 102. INCREASED CONTRIBUTION LIMIT FOR

STATE COMMITTEES OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) is amended —

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (C) —

(A) by inserting “(other than a committee described in

subparagraph (D))” after “committee”; and

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”;

and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(D) to a political committee established and maintained by

a State committee of a political party in any calendar year

which, in the aggregate, exceed $10,000.”

SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. — Section 304 of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) is

amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) POLITICAL COMMITTEES. —

“(1) NATIONAL AND CONGRESSIONAL POLITICAL

COMMITTEES. —- The national committee of a political party,

any national congressional campaign committee of a political

party, and any subordinate committee of either, shall report all

receipts and disbursements during the reporting period.

18a

“(2) OTHER POLITICAL COMMITTEES TO WHICH

SECTION 323 APPLIES. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — In addition to any other reporting

requirements applicable under this Act, a political committee

(not described in paragraph (1)) to which section 323(b)(1)

applies shall report all receipts and disbursements made for

activities described in section 301(20)(A), unless the aggregate

amount of such receipts and disbursements during the calendar

year is less than $5,000.

“(B) SPECIFIC DISCLOSURE BY STATE AND LOCAL

PARTIES OF CERTAIN NON-FEDERAL AMOUNTS

PERMITTED TO BE SPENT ON FEDERAL ELECTION

ACTIVITY. — Each report by a political committee under

subparagraph (A) of receipts and disbursements made for

activities described in section 301(20)(A) shall include a

disclosure of all receipts and disbursements described in section

323(b)(2)(A) and (B).

“(3) ITEMIZATION. — If a political committee has

receipts or disbursements to which this subsection applies from

or to any person aggregating in excess of $200 for any calendar

year, the political committee shall separately itemize its

reporting for such person in the same manner as required in

paragraphs (3)(A), (5), and (6) of subsection (b).

“(4) REPORTING PERIODS. — Reports required to be

filed under this subsection shall be filed for the same time

periods required for political committees under subsection

(a)(4)(B).”

(b) BUILDING FUND EXCEPTION TO THE

DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTION. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Section 301(8)(B) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(8)(B)) is

amended —

(A) by striking clause (viii); and

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bd (B) by redesignating clauses (ix) through (xv) as clauses

(viii) through (xiv), respectively.

(2) NONPREEMPTION OF STATE LAW. — Section 403

of such Act (2 U.S.C. 453) is amended —

(A) by striking “The provisions of this Act” and inserting:

“(a) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subsection (b), the

provisions of this Act”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(b) STATE AND LOCAL COMMITTEES OF

POLITICAL PARTIES. — Notwithstanding any other

provision of this Act, a State or local committee of a political

party may, subject to State law, use exclusively funds that are

not subject to the prohibitions, limitations, and reporting

requirements of the Act for the purchase or construction of an

office building for such State or local committee.”

TITLE If — NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN

EXPENDITURES

Subtitle A — Electioneering Communications

SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 304 of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434), as amended by section

103, is amended by adding at the end the following new

subsection:

“(f) DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS. —

“(1) STATEMENT REQUIRED. — Every person who

makes a disbursement for the direct costs of producing and

airing electioneering communications in an aggregate amount in

excess of $10,000 during any calendar year shall, within 24

hours of each disclosure date, file with the Commission a

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statement containing the information described in paragraph

(2).

“(2) CONTENTS OF STATEMENT. — Each statement

required to be filed under this subsection shall be made under

penalty of perjury and shall contain the following information:

“(A) The identification of the person making the

disbursement, of any person sharing or exercising direction or

control over the activities of such person, and of the custodian

of the books and accounts of the person making the

disbursement.

“(B) The principal place of business of the person making

the disbursement, if not an individual.

“(C) The amount of each disbursement of more than $200

during the period covered by the statement and the

identification of the person to whom the disbursement was

made.

“(D) The elections to which the electioneering

communications pertain and the names (if known) of the

candidates identified or to be identified.

“(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a segregated

bank account which consists of funds contributed solely by

individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or

lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section

101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1101(a)(20))) directly to this account for electioneering

communications, the names and addresses of all contributors

who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to that

account during the period beginning on the first day of the

preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date.

Nothing in this subparagraph is to be construed as a prohibition

on the use of funds in such a segregated account for a purpose

other than electioneering communications.

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“(F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds not

described in subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of all

contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or

more to the person making the disbursement during the period

beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and

ending on the disclosure date.

“(3) ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION. — For

purposes of this subsection —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — (i) The term ‘electioneering

communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite

communication which —

“(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal

office;

“(ID) is made within —

“(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election

for the office sought by the candidate; or

“(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or

a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to

nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate;

and

“(IID) in the case of a communication which refers to a

candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is

targeted to the relevant electorate.

“(ii) If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally insufficient

by final judicial decision to support the regulation provided

herein, then the term ‘electioneering communication’ means

any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which

promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or

opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the

communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a

candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning

other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific

candidate. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to

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affect the interpretation or application of section 100.22(b) of

title 11, Code of Federal Regulations.

“(B) EXCEPTIONS. — The term ‘electioneering

communication’ does not include —

“(i) a communication appearing in a news story,

commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any

broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or

controlled by any political party, political committee, or

candidate;

“(ii) a communication which constitutes an expenditure or

an independent expenditure under this Act;

“(iii) a communication which constitutes a candidate

debate or forum conducted pursuant to regulations adopted by

the Commission, or which solely promotes such a debate or

forum and is made by or on behalf of the person sponsoring the

debate or forum; or

“(iv) any other communication exempted under such

regulations as the Commission may promulgate (consistent with

the requirements of this paragraph) to ensure the appropriate

implementation of this paragraph, except that under any such

regulation a communication may not be exempted if it meets

the requirements of this paragraph and is described in section

301(20)(A)(iii).

“(C) TARGETING TO RELEVANT ELECTORATE. —

For purposes of this paragraph, a communication which refers

to aclearly identified candidate for Federal office is ‘targeted to

the relevant electorate’ if the communication can be received by

50,000 or more persons —

“(i) in the district the candidate seeks to represent, in the

case of a candidate for Representative in, or Delegate or

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress; or

“(ii) in the State the candidate seeks to represent, in the

case of a candidate for Senator.

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“(4) DISCLOSURE DATE. — For purposes of this

subsection, the term ‘disclosure date’ means —

“(A) the first date during any calendar year by which a

person has made disbursements for the direct costs of producing

or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess

of $10,000; and

“(B) any other date during such calendar year by which a

person has made disbursements for the direct costs of producing

or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess

of $10,000 since the most recent disclosure date for such

calendar year.

“(5) CONTRACTS TO DISBURSE. — For purposes of

this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a

disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the

disbursement.

“(6) COORDINATION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

— Any requirement to report under this subsection shall be in

addition to any other reporting requirement under this Act.

“(7) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE

CODE. — Nothing in this subsection may be construed to

establish, modify, or otherwise affect the definition of political

activities or electioneering activities (including the definition of

participating in, intervening in, or influencing or attempting to

influence a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to

any candidate for public office) for purposes of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1986.”

(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. — The Federal

Communications Commission shall compile and maintain any

information the Federal Election Commission may require to

carry out section 304(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971 (as added by subsection (a)), and shall make such

information available to the public on the Federal

Communication Commission’s website.

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SEC. 202. COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS AS

CONTRIBUTIONS.

Section 315(a)(7) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)) is amended —

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D),

and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:

“(C) if —

“(j) any person makes, or contracts to make, any

disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the

meaning of section 304(f)(3)); and

“(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or

an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or

local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or official

of any such candidate, party, or committee;

such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a

contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering

communication or that candidate’s party and as an expenditure

by that candidate or that candidate’s party; and”.

SEC. 203. PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE AND

LABOR DISBURSEMENTS FOR ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is

amended by inserting “or for any applicable electioneering

communication” before “, but shall not include”.

(b) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATION. — Section 316 of such Act is amended

by adding at the end the following:

“(c) RULES RELATING TO ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS. —

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“(1) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATION. — For purposes of this section, the term

‘applicable electioneering communication’ means an

electioneering communication (within the meaning of section

304(f)(3)) which is made by any entity described in subsection

(a) of this section or by any other person using funds donated by

an entity described in subsection (a) of this section.

“(2) EXCEPTION. — Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the

term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ does not

include a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or

a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986) made under section

304(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this Act if the communication is paid for

exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are

United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for

permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20))). For

purposes of the preceding sentence, the term ‘provided directly

by individuals’ does not include funds the source of which is an

entity described in subsection (a) of this section.

“(3) SPECIAL OPERATING RULES. —

“(A) DEFINITION UNDER PARAGRAPH (1). — An

electioneering communication shall be treated as made by an

entity described in subsection (a) if an entity described in

subsection (a) directly or indirectly disburses any amount for

any of the costs of the communication.

“(B) EXCEPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH (2). — A

section 501(c)(4) organization that derives amounts from

business activities or receives funds from any entity described

in subsection (a) shall be considered to have paid for any

communication out of such amounts unless such organization

paid for the communication out of a segregated account to

which only individuals can contribute, as described in section

304(£)(2)(E).

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“(4) DEFINITIONS AND RULES. — For purposes of this

subsection —

“(A) the term ‘section 501(c)(4) organization’ means —

“(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under

section 501(a) of such Code; or

“(ii) an organization which has submitted an application to

the Internal Revenue Service for determination of its status as

an organization described in clause (i); and

“(B) a person shall be treated as having made a

disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the

disbursement.

“(5) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE

CODE. — Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to

authorize an organization exempt from taxation under section

501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to carry out any

activity which is prohibited under such Code.”

SEC. 204. RULES RELATING TO CERTAIN

TARGETED ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS.

Section 316(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b), as added by section 203, is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“(6) SPECIAL RULES FOR TARGETED

COMMUNICATIONS. —

“(A) EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY. — Paragraph (2)

shall not apply in the case of a targeted communication that is

made by an organization described in such paragraph.

“(B) TARGETED COMMUNICATION. — For purposes

of subparagraph (A), the term ‘targeted communication’ means

an electioneering communication (as defined in section

304(f)(3)) that is distributed from a television or radio broadcast

station or provider of cable or satellite television service and, in

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the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an

office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the

relevant electorate.

“(C) DEFINITION. — For purposes of this paragraph, a

communication is ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ if it meets

the requirements described in section 304(f)(3)(C).”

Subtitle B — Independent and Coordinated Expenditures

SEC. 211. DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT

EXPENDITURE.

Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C.

431) is amended by striking paragraph (17) and inserting the

following:

“(17) INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE. — The term

‘independent expenditure’ means an expenditure by a person —

“(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly

identified candidate; and

“(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at

the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s

authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political

party committee or its agents.”

SEC. 212. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR

CERTAIN INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 304 of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) (as amended by section

201) is amended —

(1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the undesignated matter

after subparagraph (C); and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(g) TIME FOR REPORTING ’~- CERTAIN

EXPENDITURES. —

“(1) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $1,000. —

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“(A) INITIAL REPORT. — A person (including a political

committee) that makes or contracts to make independent

expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but

more than 24 hours, before the date of an election shall file a

report describing the expenditures within 24 hours.

“(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS. — After a person files a

report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an

additional report within 24 hours after each time the person

makes or contracts to make independent expenditures

aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same

election as that to which the initial report relates.

“(2) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $10,000. —

“(A) INITIAL REPORT. — A person (including a political

committee) that makes or contracts to make independent

expenditures aggregating $10,000 or more at any time up to and

including the 20th day before the date of an election shall file a

report describing the expenditures within 48 hours.

“(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS. — After a person files a

report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an

additional report within 48 hours after each time the person

makes or contracts to make independent expenditures

aggregating an additional $10,000 with respect to the same

election as that to which the initial report relates.

“(3) PLACE OF FILING; CONTENTS. — A report under

this subsection —

“(A) shall be filed with the Commission; and

“(B) shall contain the information required by subsection

(b)(6)(B)(iii), including the name of each candidate whom an

expenditure is intended to support or oppose.”

(b) TIME OF FILING OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS. —

(1) INGENERAL. — Section 304(g) of such Act, as added

by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the

following:

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“(4) TIME OF FILING FOR EXPENDITURES

AGGREGATING $1,000. — Notwithstanding subsection

(a)(5), the time at which the statement under paragraph (1) is

received by the Commission or any other recipient to whom the

notification is required to be sent shall be considered the time of

filing of the statement with the recipient.”

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. — (A) Section

304(a)(5) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(5)) is amended by

striking “the second sentence of subsection (c)(2)” and inserting

“subsection (g)(1)”.

(B) Section 304(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(d)(1)) is

amended by inserting “or (g)” after “subsection (c)”.

SEC. 213. INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED

EXPENDITURES BY PARTY.

Section 315(d) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(d)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “and (3)” and inserting “,

(3), and (4)”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(4) INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED

EXPENDITURES BY PARTY. —

| “(A) IN GENERAL. — On or after the date on which a

political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the

political party may make —

“(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection

with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any

time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in

section 301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the

election cycle; or

“(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section

301(1 7) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle

at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under

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this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election

cycle.

“(B) APPLICATION. — For purposes of this paragraph,

all political committees established and maintained by a

national political party (including all congressional campaign

committees) and all political committees established and

maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate

committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a

single political committee.

“(C) TRANSFERS. — A committee of a political party

that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with

respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle,

transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated

expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of

funds from, a commit‘ee of the political party that has made or

intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the

candidate.” .

SEC. 214. COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATES OR

POLITICAL PARTIES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 315(a)(7)(B) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)) is

amended —

(1) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and

(2) by inserting after clause (i) the following new clause:

“(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a

candidate or candidate’s authorized committee) in cooperation,

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of,

a national, State, or local committee of a political party, shall be

considered to be contributions made to such party committee;

and”.

(b) REPEAL OF CURRENT REGULATIONS. — The

regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons

other than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and

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party committees adopted by the Federal Election Commission

and published in the Federal Register at page 76138 of volume

65, Federal Register, on December 6, 2000, are repealed as of

the date by which the Commission is required to promulgate

new regulations under subsection (c) (as described in section

402(c)(1)).

COMMISSION. — The Federal Election Commission shall

promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications

paid for by persons other than candidates, authorized

committees of candidates, and party committees. The

regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration

to establish coordination. In addition to any subject determined

by the Commission, the regulations shall address —

(1) payments for the republication of campaign materials;

(2) payments for the use of a common vendor;

(3) payments for communications directed or made by

persons who previously served as an employee of a candidate or

a political party; and

(4) payments for communications made by a person after

substantial discussion about the communication with a

candidate or a political party.

(d) MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION OR EXPENDITURE

FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 316. — Section

316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by striking “shall include” and

inserting “includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms

are defined in section 301, and also includes”.

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TITLE Il] — MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 301. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR

CERTAIN PURPOSES.

Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by striking section 313 and

inserting the following:

“SEC. 313. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR

CERTAIN PURPOSES.

“(a) PERMITTED USES. — A contribution accepted by a

candidate, and any other donation received by an individual as

support for activities of the individual as a holder of Federal

office, may be used by the candidate or individual —

“(1) for otherwise authorized expenditures in connection

with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate or

individual;

“(2) for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in

connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Federal

office;

“(3) for contributions to an organization described in

section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

“(4) for transfers, without limitation, to a national, State, or

local committee of a political party.

“(b) PROHIBITED USE. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — A contribution or donation

described in subsection (a) shall not be converted by any person

to personal use.

“(2) CONVERSION. — For the purposes of paragraph (1),

a contribution or donation shall be considered to be converted

to personal use if the contribution or amount is used to fulfill

any commitment, obligation, or expense of a person that would

exist irrespective of the candidate’s election campaign or

individual’s duties as a holder of Federal office, including —

33a

“(A) a home mortgage, rent, or utility payment;

“(B) a clothing purchase;

“(C) a noncampaign-related automobile expense;

“(D) a country club membership;

“(E) a vacation or other noncampaign-related trip;

“(F) a household food item;

“(G) a tuition payment;

“(H) admission to a sporting event, concert, theater, or

other form of entertainment not associated with an election

campaign; and

“(I) dues, fees, and other payments to a health club or

recreational facility.”

SEC. 302. PROHIBITION OF FUNDRAISING ON

FEDERAL PROPERTY.

Section 607 of title 18, United States Code, is amended —

(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

“(a) PROHIBITION. —

“(1) INGENERAL. — It shall be unlawful for any person

to solicit or receive a donation of money or other thing of value

in connection with a Federal, State, or local election from a

person who is located in a room or building occupied in the

discharge of official duties by an officer or employee of the

United States. It shall be unlawful for an individual who is an

officer or employee of the Federal Government, including the

President, Vice President, and Members of Congress, to solicit

or receive a donation of money or other thing of value in

connection with a Federal, State, or local election, while in any

room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by

an officer or employee of the United States, from any person.

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“(2) PENALTY. — A person who violates this section shall

be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 3

years, or both.’; and

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “or Executive Office of

the President” after “Congress”.

SEC. 303. STRENGTHENING FOREIGN MONEY BAN.

Section 319 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(2 U.S.C. 441e) is amended —

(1) by striking the heading and inserting the following:

“CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS BY FOREIGN

NATIONALS”; and

(2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

“(a) PROHIBITION. — It shall be unlawful for —

“(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make —

“(A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of

value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a

contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State,

or local election;

“(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a

political party; or

“(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or

disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the

meaning of section 304(f)(3)); or

“(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or

donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1)

from a foreign national.”

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SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO

EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS. — Section

315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441a) is amended —

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person” and

inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), nc person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) INCREASED LIMIT TO ALLOW RESPONSE TO

EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(1) INCREASE. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (2), if the

opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate

for election to the office of Senator exceeds the threshold

amount, the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) (in this subsection

referred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to that

candidate shall be the increased limit.

“(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT. —

“(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND FAIR

CAMPAIGN FORMULA. — In this subsection, the threshold

amount with respect to an election cycle of a candidate

described in subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the sum of

“(I) $150,000; and

“(II) $0.04 multiplied by the voting age population.

“(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION. — In this

subparagraph, the term ‘voting age population’ means in the

case of a candidate for the office of Senator, the voting age

population of the State of the candidate (as certified under

section 315(e)). 4

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“(C) INCREASED LIMIT. — Except as provided in clause

(ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if the opposition personal

funds amount is over —

“(j) 2 times the threshold amount, but not over 4 times that

amount —

“([) the increased limit shall be 3 times the applicable

limit; and

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may

accept such a contribution;

“(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but not over 10 times

that amount —

“(1) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable

limit; and

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may

accept such a contribution; and

“(iii) 10 times the threshold amount —

“(1) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable

limit;

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may

accept such a contribution; and

“(III) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any

expenditure by a State or national committee of a political party

shall not apply.

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“(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS AMOUNT. —

The opposition personal funds amount is an amount equal to the

excess (if any) of —

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from

personal funds (as defined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an

opposing candidate in the same election makes; over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal

funds made by the candidate with respect to the election.

“(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER

INCREASED LIMIT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph (B), a

candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not

accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make

any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1)

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the

opposition personal funds amount under section 304(a)(6)(B);

and

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the

aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and

party expenditures previously made under the increased limits

under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 110 percent

of the opposition personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING

CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s authorized

committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall

not make any expenditure under the increased limit after the

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to

the extent that the amount of such increased limit is attributable

to such an opposing candidate.

“(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s

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authorized committee under the increased limit under paragraph

(1) and not otherwise expended in connection with the election

with respect to which such contributions relate shall, not later

than 50 days after the date of such election, be used in the

manner described in subparagraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or a

candidate’s authorized committee shall return the excess

contribution to the person who made the contribution.

“(j) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL

LOANS. — Any candidate who incurs personal loans made

after the effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

of 2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for

election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the extent

such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any contributions

made to such candidate or any authorized committee of such

candidate after the date of such election.”

(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. — Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is

amended —

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (E),

and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following:

“(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(j) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. — In this subparagraph, the term

‘expenditure from personal funds’ means —

“(I) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal

funds; and

“(II) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the

candidate’s authorized committee.

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“(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than the

date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual

becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the candidate

shall file a declaration stating the total amount of expenditures

from personal funds that the candidate intends to make, or to

obligate to make, with respect to the election that will exceed

the State-by-State competitive and fair campaign formula with

“(I) the Commission; and

“(II) each candidate in the same election.

“(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24 hours

after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes or obligates to

make an aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds

in excess of 2 times the threshold amount in connection with

any election, the candidate shall file a notification with —

“([) the Commission; and

“(II) each candidate in the same election.

“(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a candidate

files an initial notification under clause (iii), the candidate shall

file an additional notification each time expenditures from

personal funds are made or obligated to be made in an

aggregate amount that exceed $10,000 with —

“(I) the Commission; and

“(I]) each candidate in the same election.

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after

the expenditure is made.

“(v) CONTENTS. — A notification under clause (iii) or

(iv) shall include —

“(I) the name of the candidate and the office sought by the

candidate;

“(II) the date and amount of each expenditure; and

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“(III the total amount of expenditures from personal funds

that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with respect

to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is the subject

of the notification.

“(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS

CONTRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report

after the date of the election for which a candidate seeks

nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the

candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall submit

to the Commission a report indicating the source and amount of

any excess contributions (as determined under paragraph (1) of

section 315(i)) and the manner in which the candidate or the

candidate’s authorized committee used such funds.

“(D) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for the

enforcement of the reporting requirements under this paragraph,

see section 309.”

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by section

101(b), is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“(25) ELECTION CYCLE. — For purposes of sections

315(i) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘election cycle’

means the period beginning on the day after the date of the most

recent election for the specific office or seat that a candidate is

seeking and ending on the date of the next election for that

office or seat. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a

primary election and a general election shall be considered to be

separate elections.

“(26) PERSONAL FUNDS. — The term ‘personal funds’

means an amount that is derived from —

“(A) any asset that, under applicable State law, at the time

the individual became a candidate, the candidate had legal right

of access to or control over, and with respect to which the

candidate had —

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“(i) legal and rightful title; or

“(ii) an equitable interest;

“(B) income received during the current election cycle of

the candidate, including —

“(i) a salary and other earned income from bona fide

employment;

“(ii) dividends and proceeds from the sale of the

candidate’s stocks or other investments;

“(iii) bequests to the candidate;

“(iv) income from trusts established before the beginning

of the election cycle;

“(v) income from trusts established by bequest after the

beginning of the election cycle of which the candidate is the

beneficiary;

“(vi) gifts of a personal nature that had been customarily

received by the candidate prior to the beginning of the election

cycle; and

“(vii) proceeds from lotteries and similar legal games of

chance; and

“(C) a portion of assets that are jointly owned by the

candidate and the candidate’s spouse equal to the candidate’s

share of the asset under the instrument of conveyance or

ownership, but if no specific share is indicated by an instrument

of conveyance or ownership, the value of 1/2 of the property.”

SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF

LOWEST UNIT CHARGE FOR’ FEDERAL

CANDIDATES ATTACKING OPPOSITION.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 315(b) of the

Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S. C. 315(b)) is amended

42a

(1) by striking “(b) The charges” and inserting the

following:

“(b) CHARGES. —

“(1) INGENERAL. — The charges”;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as

subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) CONTENT OF BROADCASTS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — In the case of a candidate for

Federal office, such candidate shall not be entitled to receive the

rate under paragraph (1)(A) for the use of any broadcasting

station unless the candidate provides written certification to the

broadcast station that the candidate (and any authorized

committee of the candidate) shall not make any direct reference

to another candidate for the same office, in any broadcast using

the rights and conditions of access under this Act, unless such

reference meets the requirements of subparagraph (C) or (D).

“(B) LIMITATION ON CHARGES. — If a candidate for

Federal office (or any authorized committee of such candidate)

makes a reference described in subparagraph (A) in any

broadcast that does not meet the requirements of subparagraph

rate under paragraph (1)(A) for such broadcast or any other

broadcast during any portion of the 45-day and 60-day periods

described in paragraph (1)(A), that occur on or after the date of

such broadcast, for election to such office.

“(C) TELEVISION BROADCASTS. — A candidate meets

the requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case of a

television broadcast, at the end of such broadcast there appears

simultaneously, for a period no less than 4 seconds —

“(i) a clearly identifiable photographic or similar image of

the candidate; and

43a

“(ii) a clearly readable printed statement, identifying the

candidate and stating that the candidate has approved the

broadcast and that the candidate’s authorized committee paid

for the broadcast.

“(D) RADIO BROADCASTS. — A candidate meets the

requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case of a radio

broadcast, the broadcast includes a personal audio statement

by the candidate that identifies the candidate, the office the

candidate is seeking, and indicates that the candidate has

approved the broadcast.

“(E) CERTIFICATION. — Certifications under this

section shall be provided and certified as accurate by the

candidate (or any authorized committee of the candidate) at the

time of purchase.

“(F) DEFINITIONS. — For purposes of this paragraph, the

terms ‘authorized committee’ and ‘Federal office’ have the

meanings given such terms by section 301 of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431).”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. — Section

315(b)(1 (A) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.

315(b)(1)(A)), as amended by this Act, is amended by inserting

“subject to paragraph (2),” before “during the forty-five days”.

section shall apply to broadcasts made after the effective date of

this Act.

SEC. 306. SOFTWARE FOR FILING REPORTS AND

PROMPT DISCLOSURE OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

Section 304(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“(12) SOFTWARE FOR FILING OF REPORTS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The Commission shall —

44a

“(i) promulgate standards to be used by vendors to develop

software that —

“(1) permits candidates to easily record information

concerning receipts and disbursements required to be reported

under this Act at the time of the receipt or disbursement;

“(II) allows the information recorded under subclause (I)

to be transmitted immediately to the Commission; and

“(IIT) allows the Commission to post the information on

the Internet immediately upon receipt; and

“(ii) make a copy of software that meets the standards

promulgated under clause (i) available to each person required

to file a designation, statement, or report in electronic form

under this Act.

“(B) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. — To the extent

feasible, the Commission shall require vendors to include in the

software developed under the standards under subparagraph (A)

the ability for any person to file any designation, statement, or

report required under this Act in electronic form.

“(C) REQUIRED USE. — Notwithstanding any provision

of this Act relating to times for filing reports, each candidate for

Federal office (or that candidate’s authorized committee) shall

use software that meets the standards promulgated under this

paragraph once such software is made available to such

candidate.

“(D) REQUIRED POSTING. — The Commission shall, as

soon as practicable, post on the Internet any information

received under this paragraph.”

SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS.

(a) INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL LIMITS FOR CERTAIN

CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 44la(a)(1)) is

amended —

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45a

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “$1,000” and inserting

“$2,000”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000” and inserting

“$25,000”.

(b) INCREASE IN ANNUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(a)(3) of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)) is

amended to read as follows:

“(3) During the period which begins on January 1 of an odd-

numbered year and ends on December 31 of the next even-

numbered year, no individual may make contributions

aggregating more than —

“(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to candidates and

the authorized committees of candidates;

“(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of

which not more than $37,500 may be attributable to

contributions to political committees which are not political

committees of national political parties.”

COMMITTEE LIMIT. — Section 315(h) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(h)) is amended

by striking “$17,500” and inserting “$35,000”.

(d) INDEXING OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. — Section

315(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441a(c)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (1) —

(A) by striking the second and third sentences;

(B) by inserting “(A)” before “At the beginning”; and

“(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in any

calendar year after 2002 —

46a

“(i) a limitation established by subsections (a)(1)(A),

(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (b), (d), or (h) shall be increased by the percent

difference determined under subparagraph (A);

“(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in effect for the

calendar year; and

“(iii) if any amount after adjustment under clause (i) is not a

multiple of $100, such amount shall be rounded to the nearest

multiple of $100.

“(C) In the case of limitations under subsections (a)(1)(A),

(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h), increases shall only be made in odd-

numbered years and such increases shall remain in effect for the

2-year period beginning on the first day following the date of

the last general election in the year preceding the year in which

the amount is increased and ending on the date of the next

general election.”; and

(2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking “means the calendar

year 1974” and inserting “means —

“(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d), calendar year

1974; and

“(i1) for purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3),

and (h), calendar year 2001”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendments made by this

section shall apply with respect to contributions made on or

after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 308. DONATIONS TO PRESIDENTIAL

INAUGURAL COMMITTEE.

(a) INGENERAL. — Chapter 5 of title 36, » United States

Code, is amended by —

(1) redesignating section 510 as section 511; and

(2) inserting after section 509 the following:

“§ 510. Disclosure of and prohibition on certain donations

47a

“(a) INGENERAL. — A committee shall not be considered

to be the Inaugural Committee for purposes of this chapter

unless the committee agrees to, and meets, the requirements of

subsections (b) and (c).

“(b) DISCLOSURE. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Not later than the date that is 90

days after the date of the Presidential inaugural ceremony, the

committee shall file a report with the Federal Election

Commission disclosing any donation of money or anything of

value made to the committee in an aggregate amount equal to or

greater than $200.

“(2) CONTENTS OF REPORT. — A report filed under

paragraph (1) shall contain —

“(A) the amount of the donation;

“(B) the date the donation is received; and

“(C) the name and address of the person making the

donation.

“(c) LIMITATION. — The committee shall not accept any

donation from a foreign national (as defined in section 319(b)

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441e(b))).”

(b) REPORTS MADE AVAILABLE BY FEC. — Section

304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

434), as amended by sections 103, 201, and 212 is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“(h) REPORTS FROM INAUGURAL COMMITTEES. —

The Federal Election Commission shall make any report filed

by an Inaugural Committee under section 510 of title 36, United

States Code, accessible to the public at the offices of the

Commission and on the Internet not later than 48 hours after the

report is received by the Commission.”

48a

SEC. 309. PROHIBITION ON FRAUDULENT

SOLICITATION OF FUNDS.

Section 322 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(2 U.S.C. 441h) is amended —

(1) by inserting “(a) IN GENERAL. —” before “No

person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(b) FRAUDULENT SOLICITATION OF FUNDS. — No

person shall —

“(1) fraudulently misrepresent the person as speaking,

writing, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of any candidate or

political party or employee or agent thereof for the purpose of

soliciting contributions or donations; or

“(2) willfully and knowingly participate in or conspire to

participate in any plan, scheme, or design to violate paragraph

( l Ny

SEC. 310. STUDY AND REPORT ON CLEAN MONEY

CLEAN ELECTIONS LAWS.

(a) CLEAN MONEY CLEAN ELECTIONS DEFINED. —

In this section, the term “clean money clean elections” means

funds received under State laws that provide in whole or in part

for the public financing of election campaigns.

(b) STUDY. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — The Comptroller General shall

conduct a study of the clean money clean elections of Arizona

and Maine.

(2) MATTERS STUDIED. —

(A) STATISTICS ON CLEAN MONEY CLEAN

ELECTIONS CANDIDATES. — The Comptroller General

shall determine —

49a

(i) the number of candidates who have chosen to run for

public office with clean money clean elections including —

(I) the office for which they were candidates;

(II) whether the candidate was an incumbent or a

challenger; and

(II) whether the candidate was successful in the

candidate’s bid for public office; and

(ii) the number of races in which at least one candidate ran

an election with clean money clean elections.

(B) EFFECTS OF CLEAN MONEY CLEAN

ELECTIONS. — The Comptroller General of the United States

shall describe the effects of public financing under the clean

money clean elections laws on the 2000 elections in Arizona

and Maine.

enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United

States shall submit a report to the Congress detailing the results

of the study conducted under subsection (b).

SEC. 311. CLARITY STANDARDS FOR

IDENTIFICATION OF SPONSORS OF ELECTION-

RELATED ADVERTISING.

Section 318 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(2 U.S.C. 441d) is amended —

(1) in subsection (a) —

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) —

(i) by striking “Whenever” and inserting “Whenever a

political committee makes a disbursement for the purpose of

financing any communication through any broadcasting station,

newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mailing, or

any other type of general public political advertising, or

whenever”;

50a

(ii) by striking “an expenditure” and inserting “a

disbursement”;

(iii) by striking “direct”; and

(iv) by inserting “or makes a disbursement for an

electioneering communication (as defined in section 304(f)(3))”

after “public political advertising”; and

(B) in paragraph (3), by inserting “and permanent street

address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address” after

“name”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(c) SPECIFICATION. — Any printed communication

described in subsection (a) shall —

“(1) be of sufficient type size to be clearly readable by the

recipient of the communication;

“(2) be contained in a printed box set apart from the other

contents of the communication; and

“(3) be printed with a reasonable degree of color contrast

between the background and the printed statement.

“(d) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS. —

“(1) COMMUNICATIONS BY CANDIDATES OR

AUTHORIZED PERSONS. —

“(A) BY RADIO. — Any communication described in

paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) which is transmitted

through radio shall include, in addition to the requirements of

that paragraph, an audio statement by the candidate that

identifies the candidate and states that the candidate has

approved the communication.

“(B) BY TELEVISION. — Any communication described

in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) which is transmitted

through television shall include, in addition to the requirements

of that paragraph, a statement that identifies the candidate and

Sla

states that the candidate has approved the communication.

Such statement —

“(i) shall be conveyed by —

“(I) an unobscured, full-screen view of the candidate

making the statement, or

“(II) the candidate in voice-over, accompanied by a

clearly identifiable photographic or similar image of the

candidate; and

“(ii) shall also appear in writing at the end of the

communication in a clearly readable manner with a reasonable

degree of color contrast between the background and the printed

statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds.

(2) COMMUNICATIONS BY OTHERS. — Any

communication described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a)

which is transmitted through radio or television shall include, in

addition to the requirements of that paragraph, in a clearly

spoken manner, the following audio statement: ‘ is

responsible for the content of this advertising.’ (with the blank

to be filled in with the name of the political committee or other

person paying for the communication and the name of any

connected organization of the payor). If transmitted through

television, the statement shall be conveyed by an unobscured,

full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or

other person making the statement, or by a representative of

such political committee or other person in voice-over, and

shall also appear in a clearly readable manner with a reasonable

degree of color contrast between the background and the printed

statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds.”

SEC. 312. INCREASE IN PENALTIES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Subparagraph (A) of section

309(d)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:

52a

“(A) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a

violation of any provision of this Act which involves the

making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution, donation, or

expenditure —

“(i) aggregating $25,000 or more during a calendar year

shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned

for not more than 5 years, or both; or

“(ii) aggregating $2,000 or more (but less than $25,000)

during a calendar year shall be fined under such title, or

imprisoned for not more than | year, or both.”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendment made by this

section shall apply to violations occurring on or after the

effective date of this Act.

SEC. 313. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

(a) INGENERAL. — Section 406(a) of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 455(a)) is amended by

striking “3” and inserting “5”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendment made by this

section shall apply to violations occurring on or after the

effective date of this Act.

SEC. 314. SENTENCING GUIDELINES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — The United States Sentencing

Commission shall —

(1) promulgate a guideline, or amend an existing guideline

under section 994 of title 28, United States Code, in accordance

with paragraph (2), for penalties for violations of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related election laws; and

(2) submit to Congress an explanation of any guidelines

promulgated under paragraph (1) and any legislative or

administrative recommendations regarding enforcement of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related election

laws.

53a

(b) CONSIDERATIONS. — The Commission shall provide

guidelines under subsection (a) taking into account the

following considerations:

(1) Ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy

statements reflect the serious nature of such violations and the

need for aggressive and appropriate law enforcement action to

prevent such violations.

(2) Provide a sentencing enhancement for any person

convicted of such violation if such violation involves —

(A) acontribution, donation, or expenditure from a foreign

source;

(B) a large number of illegal transactions;

donations, or expenditures;

(D) the receipt or disbursement of governmental funds; and

(E) an intent to achieve a benefit from the Federal

Government.

(3) Assure reasonable consistency with other relevant

directives and guidelines of the Commission.

(4) Account for aggravating or mitigating circumstances

that might justify exceptions, including circumstances for which

the sentencing guidelines currently provide sentencing

enhancements.

(5) Assure the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of

sentencing under section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States

Code.

PROMULGATE GUIDELINES. —

(1) EFFECTIVE DATE. — Notwithstanding section 402,

the United States Sentencing Commission shall promulgate

guidelines under this section not later than the later of —

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(A) 90 days after the effective date of this Act; or

(B) 90 days after the date on which at least a majority of

the members of the Commission are appointed and holding

office.

(2) EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE

GUIDELINES. — The Commission shall promulgate

guidelines under this section in accordance with the procedures

set forth in section 21(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1987,

as though the authority under such Act has not expired.

SEC. 315. INCREASE IN PENALTIES IMPOSED FOR

VIOLATIONS OF CONDUIT CONTRIBUTION BAN.

(a) INCREASE IN CIVIL MONEY PENALTY FOR

KNOWING AND WILLFUL VIOLATIONS. — Section

309(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

437g(a)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting before the period at the

end the following: “(or, in the case of a violation of section

320, which is not less than 300 percent of the amount involved

in the violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or

1,000 percent of the amount involved in the violation)”; and

(2) in paragraph (6)(C), by inserting before the period at the

end the following: “(or, in the case of a violation of section 320,

which is not less than 300 percent of the amount involved in the

violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or 1,000

percent of the amount involved in the violation)”.

(b) INCREASE IN CRIMINAL PENALTY. — Section

309(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)) is amended by

adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(D) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a

violation of section 320 involving an amount aggregating more

than $10,000 during a calendar year shall be —

5Sa

“(i) imprisoned for not more than 2 years if the amount is

less than $25,000 (and subject to imprisonment under

subparagraph (A) if the amount is $25,000 or more);

“(ii) fined not less than 300 percent of the amount involved

in the violation and not more than the greater of —

“(1) $50,000; or

“(I1) 1,000 percent of the amount involved in the violation,

“(iii) both imprisoned under clause (i) and fined under

clause (ii).”

section shall apply with respect to violations occurring on or

after the effective date of this Act.

SEC. 316. RESTRICTION ON INCREASED

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BY TAKING’ INTO

ACCOUNT CANDIDATE’S AVAILABLE FUNDS.

Section 315(i)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(i)(1)), as added by this Act, is amended by

adding at the end the following:

. “(E)SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN

FUNDS. —

“(i) IN GENERAL. — For purposes of determining the

aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under

subparagraph (D)(ii), such amount shall include the gross

receipts advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee.

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE. — For purposes

of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advantage’ means the

excess, if any, of —

“(1) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts

of a candidate’s authorized committee during any election cycle

(not including contributions from personal funds of the

candidate) that may be expended in connection with the

56a

election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of the year

preceding the year in which a general election is held, over

“(II) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross

receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee

during any election cycle (not including contributions from

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and

December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a general

election is held.”

SEC. 317. CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT OF

NATIONALS OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS.

Section 319(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441e(b)(2)) is amended by inserting after

“United States” the following: “or a national of the United

States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act)”.

SEC. 318. PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY

MINORS.

Title Ill of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 431 et seq.), as amended by section 101, is further

amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY MINORS

“SEC. 324. An individual who is 17 years old or younger

shall not make a contribution to a candidate or a contribution or

donation to a committee of a political party.”

SEC. 319. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES

IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED LIMITS. — Title III of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is

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amended by inserting after section 315 the following new

section:

“MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS FOR HOUSE

CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO

PERSONAL FUND EXPENDITURES OF OPPONENTS

“SEC. 315A. (a) AVAILABILITY OF INCREASED

LIMIT. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (3), if the

opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate

for election to the office of Representative in, or Delegate or

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress exceeds $350,000 —

“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to

the candidate shall be tripled;

“(B) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with

respect to any contribution made with respect to the candidate if

the contribution is made under the increased limit allowed

under subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate

may accept such a contribution; and

“(C) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any

expenditure by a State or national committee of a political party

on behalf of the candidate shall not apply.

“(2) DETERMINATION OF OPPOSITION PERSONAL

FUNDS AMOUNT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The opposition personal funds

amount is an amount equal to the excess (if any) of —

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from

personal funds (as defined in subsection (b)(1)) that an

opposing candidate in the same election makes; over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal

funds made by the candidate with respect to the election.

_ “(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN

FUNDS. —

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“(i) IN GENERAL. — For purposes of determining the

aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under

subparagraph (A), such amount shall include the gross receipts

advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee.

“(i1) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVAl TAGE. — For purposes

of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advantage’ means the

excess, if any, of —

“(1) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts

of a candidate’s authorized committee during any election cycle

- (not including contributions from personal funds of the

candidate) that may be expended in connection with the

election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of the year

preceding the year in which a general election is held, over

“(I]) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross

receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee

during any election cycle (not including contributions from

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and

December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a general

election is held.

“(3) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER

INCREASED LIMIT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph (B), a

candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not

accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make

any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1)

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the

Opposition personal funds amount under subsection (b)(1); and

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the

aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and

party expenditures previously made under the increased limits

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under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 100 percent

of the opposition personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING

CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s authorized

committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall

not make any expenditure under the increased limit after the

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to

the extent that the amount of such increased limit is attnbutable

to such an opposing candidate.

“(4) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s

authorized committee under the increased limit under paragraph

(1) and not otherwise expended in connection with the election

with respect to which such contributions relate shall, not later

than 50 days after the date of such election, be used in the

manner described in subparagraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or a

candidate’s authorized committee shall return the excess

contribution to the person who made the contribution.

“(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. —

“(A) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. — In this paragraph, the term

‘expenditure from personal funds’ means —

“(i) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal

funds; and

“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the

candidate’s authorized committee.

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“(B) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than the

date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual

becomes a candidate for the office of Representative in, or

Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, the

candidate shall file a declaration stating the total amount of

expenditures from personal funds that the candidate intends to

make, or to obligate to make, with respect to the election that

will exceed $350,000.

“(C) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24 hours

after a candidate described in subparagraph (B) makes or

obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from

personal funds in excess of $350,000 in connection with any

election, the candidate shall file a notification.

“(D) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a

candidate files an initial notification under subparagraph (C),

the candidate shall file an additional notification each time

expenditures from personal funds are made or obligated to be

made in an aggregate amount that exceeds $10,000. Such

notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after the

expenditure is made.

“(E) CONTENTS. — A notification under subparagraph

“(i) the name of the candidate and the office sought by the

candidate;

“(ii) the date and amount of each expenditure; and

“(iii) the total amount of expenditures from personal funds

that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with respect

to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is the subject

of the notification. :

“(F) PLACE OF FILING. — Each declaration or

notification required to be filed by a candidate under

subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be filed with —

“(i) the Commission; and

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“(ii) each candidate in the same election and the national

party of each such candidate.

“(2) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS

CONTRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report

after the date of the election for which a candidate seeks

nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the

candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall submit

to the Commission a report indicating the source and amount of

any excess contributions (as determined under subsection (a))

and the manner in which the candidate or the candidate’s

authorized committee used such funds.

“(3) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for the

enforcement of the reporting requirements under this

subsection, see section 309.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. — Section 315(a)(1)

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a),

as amended by section 304(a), is amended by striking

“subsection (i’,” and inserting “subsection (i) and section

315A,”.

TITLE IV — SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act,

or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or

circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of

this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the application

of the provisions and amendment to any person or

circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.

SEC. 402. EFFECTIVE DATES AND REGULATIONS.

(a) GENERAL EFFECTIVE DATE. —

(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in the succeeding

provisions of this section, the effective date of this Act, and the

amendments made by this Act, is November 6, 2002.

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(2) MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. —

The amendments made by —

(A) section 102 shall apply with respect to contributions

made on or after January 1, 2003; and

(B) section 307 shall take effect as provided in subsection

(e) of such section.

(3) SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATES AND

REGULATIONS; JUDICIAL REVIEW. — Title IV shall take

effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

(4) PROVISIONS NOT TO APPLY TO RUNOFF

ELECTIONS. — Section 323(b) of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by section 101(a)), section

103(a), title II, sections 304 (including section 315(j) of Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971, as added by section 304(a)(2)),

305 (notwithstanding subsection (c) of such section), 311, 316,

318, and 319, and title V (and the amendments made by such

sections and titles) shall take effect on November 6, 2002, but

shall not apply with respect to runoff elections, recounts, or

election contests resulting from elections held prior to such

date.

(b) SOFT MONEY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL

PARTIES. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Except for subsection (b) of such

section, section 323 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (as added by section 101(a)) shall take effect on

November 6, 2002.

(2) TRANSITION, L RULES FOR THE SPENDING OF

SOFT MONEY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES. —

(A) IN GENERAL. — Notwithstanding section 323(a) of

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by

section 101(a)), if a national committee of a political party

described in such section (including any person who is subject

to such section under paragraph (2) of such section), has

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received funds described in such section prior to November 6,

2002, the rules described in subparagraph (B) shall apply with

respect to the spending of the amount of such funds in the

possession of such committee as of such date.

(B) USE OF EXCESS SOFT MONEY FUNDS. —

(i) INGENERAL. — Subject to clauses (11) and (iii), the

national committee of a political party may use the amount

described in subparagraph (A) prior to January 1, 2003, solely

for the purpose of —

(I) retiring outstanding debts or obligations that were

incurred solely in connection with an election held prior to

November 6, 2002; or

(II) paying expenses or retiring outstanding debts or

paying for obligations that were incurred solely in connection

with any runoff election, recount, or election contest resulting

from an election held prior to November 6, 2002.

(ii) PROHIBITION ON USING SOFT MONEY FOR

HARD MONEY EXPENSES, DEBTS, AND OBLIGATIONS.

— A national committee of a political party may not use the

amount described in subparagraph (A) for any expenditure (as

defined in section 301(9) of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(9))) or for retiring outstanding debts or

obligations that were incurred for such an expenditure.

(iii) PROHIBITION OF BUILDING FUND USES. — A

national committee of a political party may not use the amount

described in subparagraph (A) for activities to defray the costs

of the construction or purchase of any office building or facility.

(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in paragraph (2),

the Federal Election Commission shall promulgate regulations

to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act that

are under the Commission’s jurisdiction not later than 270 days

after the date of enactment of this Act.

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(2) SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. — Not

later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the

Federal Election Commission shall promulgate regulations to

carry out title I of this Act and the amendments made by such

title.

SEC. 403. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) SPECIAL RULES FOR ACTIONS BROUGHT ON

CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS. — If any action is brought

for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the

constitutionality of any provision of this Act or any amendment

made by this Act, the following rules shall apply:

(1) The action shall be filed in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia and shall be heard by a 3-

judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 28,

United States Code.

(2) A copy of the complaint shall be delivered promptly to

the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of

the Senate.

(3) A final decision in the action shall be reviewable only

by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Such appeal shall be taken by the filing of a notice of appeal

within 10 days, and the filing of a jurisdictional statement

within 30 days, of the entry of the final decision.

(4) It shall be the duty of the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the

United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the

greatest possible extent the disposition of the action and appeal.

(b) INTERVENTION BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. —

In any action in which the constitutionality of any provision of

this Act or any amendment made by this Act is raised

(including but not limited to an action described in subsection

- (a)), any member of the House of Representatives (including a

Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress) or Senate

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shall have the right to intervene either in support of or

opposition to the position of a party to the case regarding the

constitutionality of the provision or amendment. To avoid

duplication of efforts and reduce the burdens placed on the

parties to the action, the court in any such action may make

such orders as it considers necessary, including orders to require

intervenors taking similar positions to file joint papers or to be

represented by a single attorney at oral argument.

Any Member of Congress may bring an action, subject to the

special rules described in subsection (a), for declaratory or

injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any

provision of this Act or any amendment made by this Act.

(d) APPLICABILITY. —

(1) INITIAL CLAIMS. — With respect to any action

initially filed on or before December 31, 2006, the provisions of

subsection (a) shall apply with respect to each action described

in such section.

(2) SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS. — With respect to any

action initially filed after December 31, 2006, the provisions of

subsection (a) shall not apply to any action described in such

section unless the person filing such action elects such

provisions to apply to the action.

TITLE V — ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. INTERNET ACCESS TO RECORDS.

Section 304(a)(11)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(11)(B)) is amended to read as follows:

“(B) The Commission shall make a designation, statement,

report, or notification that is filed with the Commission under

this Act available for inspection by the public in the offices of

the Commission and accessible to the public on the Internet not

later than 48 hours (or not later than 24 hours in the case of a

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designation, statement, report, or notification filed

electronically) after receipt by the Commission.”

SEC. 502. MAINTENANCE OF WEBSITE OF

ELECTION REPORTS.

(a) IN GENERAL. — The Federal Election Commission

shall maintain a central site on the Internet to make accessible

to the public all publicly available election-related reports and

information.

(b) ELECTION-RELATED REPORT. — In this section, the

term “election-related report” means any report, designation, or

statement required to be filed under the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971.

Federal executive agency receiving election-related information

which that agency is required by law to publicly disclose shall

cooperate and coordinate with the Federal Election Commission

to make such report available through, or for posting on, the site

of the Federal Election Commission in a timely manner.

SEC, 503. ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS.

(a) PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES. — Section

304(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 is

amended by striking “the following reports” and all that follows

through the period and inserting “the treasurer shall file

quarterly reports, which shall be filed not later than the 15th day

after the last day of each calendar quarter, and which shall be

complete as of the last day of each calendar quarter, except that

the report for the quarter ending December 31 shall be filed not

later than January 31 of the following calendar year.”

(b) NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF A POLITICAL PARTY.

— Section 304(a)(4) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(4)) is

amended by adding at the end the following flush sentence:

“Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a national committee

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of a political party shall file the reports required under

subparagraph (B).”

SEC. 504. PUBLIC ACCESS TO BROADCASTING

RECORDS.

Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.

315), as amended by this Act, is amended by redesignating

subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively,

and inserting after subsection (d) the following:

“(e) POLITICAL RECORD. —

“(1) INGENERAL. — A licensee shall maintain, and make

available for public inspection, a complete record of a request to

purchase broadcast time that —

“(A) is made by or on behalf of-a legally qualified

candidate for public office; or

“(B) communicates a message relating to any political

matter of national importance, including —

“(i) a legally qualified candidate;

“(ii) any election to Federal office; or

“(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance.

“(2) CONTENTS OF RECORD. — A record maintained

under paragraph (1) shall contain information regarding —

“(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time is

accepted or rejected by the licensee;

“(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time;

“(C) the date and time on which the communication is

aired;

“(D) the class of time that is purchased;

“(E) the name of the candidate to which the communication

refers and the office to which the candidate is seeking election,

the election to which the communication refers, or the issue to

which the communication refers (as applicable);

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“(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a

candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized committee

of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee; and

- “(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the

person purchasing the time, the name, address, and phone

number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the

chief executive officers or members of the executive committee

or of the board of directors of such person.

“(3) TIME TO MAINTAIN FILE. — The information

required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file

as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a

period of not less than 2 years.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.