Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Foster v. Florida

Oil OF ES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

i a a ee

NO:

CHARLES KENNETH FOSTER,

Petitioner,

a v.

4 i ad § STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To the Supreme Court of the

State of Florida

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOSEPH F. MCDERMOTT, ESQUIRE

MCDERMOTT LAW FIRM

7116-A Gulf Boulevard

St. Petersburg Beach, FL 33706

Ph: (727) 367-1080, Fx: (727) 367-9940

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

CAPITAL CASE

UESTION I:

The Florida Supreme Court erred in upholding a trials court's denial

of Defendant's 3.850 Motion for Post Conviction Relief without a hearing

based upon his alleged violation of his right to an impartial jury. ;

The Trial Court and State Attorney systematically excluded

pregnant women or women with small children from the venire without

Petitioner's knowledge or consent. (Contrary to the V, VI and XIV

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 and

16 to the Constitution of the State of Florida).

CAPITAL CASE

UESTION II:

The Florida Supreme Court engaged in a constitutionally flawed

harmless error analysis in the Defendant's previous Appeal. Foster v. State,

654 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1995). (Appendix A-2) (Contrary to the V and VI

Amendments to the United States Constitution. )

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION III:

The Florida Supreme Court erred in upholding the trial court's denial

of Defendant's 3.850 Motion for post-conviction relief. Claims D., Cruel and

Unusual Punishment - 23 years (now 26 years) on Death Row. (Contrary to

the V, VIII and XIV Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Sections 9 and 17 to the Constitution of the State of Florida.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

QUESTION PRESENTED 2-3 a

OPINIONS BELOW 7

JURISDICTION 8 CASES. PAGE

Alachua County Court Executive v. Anthony, 418 So.2d

STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE 9 Denne ssusubineusicnian 16, 18

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 10-15 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2002),

miu 21

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT - QUESTIONS 16-23

Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 476

|. | THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN US. 79 (1986) 19

be tangent epg i mnneenn

CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT A HEARING BASED | *

. ees os , . .

UPON HIS ALLEGED VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO AN | anene y. Leseeiane, >. Lou 58 US., & 155-196, OS SL. at .

IMPARTIAL JURY (CONTRARY TO THE V, VIAND XIV. | «48 OL 4S Desseseneesseneenetnenetneseenenetnenensentn

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d

CONSTITUTION) | a lt ae a ED 19

2. | THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ENGAGED

os ds So -_ Foster v. State, 614 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1992)...........cc000000- 12

ERROR ANALYSIS IN THE PETITIONER'S PREVIOUS ‘

APPEAL. FOSTER V. STATE, 654 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1995). Foster v. State, 654 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1995)..................44. 2, 12

(CONTRARY TO THE V AND VI AMENDMENTS TO THE

(MheD stares COnStIOO bassin 16US 0,634 LEAL

3. | THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DENYING

pide antipentererin nti nan nie nnn Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2002)............ce.ee0-+- 7,14

mtn A Mh Se ypc Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287-291, 92 S.Ct. 2726

. A : 2751-2753, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)...ccccccceccceeceeesceeesen 23

(CONTRARY TO THE V, VIII AND XIV AMENDMENTS

FO TORS COREE CEASED Corea . Glass v. Louisiana, 105 $.Ct. 2159, 85 L.Ed2d $14, 471

esis | “ U.S. 1080 (1985) ..........ccccceccceccocccessecsscescessceseceees 23

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950,

APPENDIX A 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).............cccccccecccscoescccosececceees 23

Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1999)................0+0 22

Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461, 99 S.Ct. 710, 58 L.Ed.2d

GEE ERE Re AI iS Ree PSPS 19

McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972 (1977) ..........c.000000 18

State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315, 336

ERE ee RR NEA A 22

State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272 (1996)..... 22

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42

I icc tise piiereten etait 17,

Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227, 66 S.Ct.

Se WUE I iccicincthcnesitncnaincenscciinnthieeiie 18

U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.

ea ESN STE IEEE DS, Be PON SE 2, 21

White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5" Cir. 1996)............... 22

STATUTES AND RULES

Is contctcnninincindiaiinabiitiiniinnsanciaiaidlian 9

Florida Statute 40.013(4).........cccccccccssseeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeees 19

Florida Statute 40.013(6)............cccesecccceseeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeees 19

I icienciicinstntnpninddbinnvanidiiiianions 8

I. scccncicsicetinneniniidsnieindtacbiaatiiii 8

TD GR De rccccccnecocctccsccsecascescenessensasassneses 14

6

19

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court that gives rise to this

Petition appears as Charles Kenneth Foster vs. State, 810 So.2d 910 (Fla.

2002). It is submitted in Appendix A-1. The decision was rendered

February 14, 2002.

S ION

Petitioner, Charles Kenneth Foster, filed a direct appeal to the Florida

- STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

Florida Statute 40.01(1) 1975 (Appendix 4):

Supreme Court from denial of his Motion for Post-Conviction Relief (Fla.

Rule 3.850). That Court rejected the appeal by its decision of February 14,

. Grand and petit jurors shall be take from the male and

2002. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1, this Petition has been filed female persons over the age of twenty-one years, who

a 7 are citizens of this state and who have resided in this

within ninety (90) days of the rendition order by the Florida Supreme Court. state for one year and in their respective counties

ee Ss = for six months and who are fully qualified electors of

Jurisdiction of this Court is involved pursuant to Supreme Court Rule their respective counties; provided, however, that

; expectant mothers and mothers with children under

10 (c): eighteen years of age, upon their request, shall be

ted fro and petit jury duty.

(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals — — ie ieee

has decided an important question of federal law

that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court,

or has decided an important federal question in a way that 7

conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

S NT S

A summary of the facts at trial (appears in 369 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1979),

(Appendix A-5) revealed the following:

Anita Rogers, 20 years of age, and Gail Evans, 18 years of age, met

Petitioner and the victim, Julian Lanier at a bar. They knew Petitioner, but

the victim was a stranger.

The girls, after a discussion, agreed to go to the beach or somewhere

else to drink and party with the men. The victim bought whiskey and

cigarettes, after which the four of them left in the victim's Winnebago

camper. The Petitioner and the girls had planned for Gail to have sex with

the victim and make some money. Gail parked the vehicle in a deserted area

and, after some conversation concerning compensation, the victim and Gail

began to disrobe.

Petitioner suddenly began hitting the victim and accusing him of

taking advantage of his sister. (Gail was not his sister). Petitioner then held

a knife to the victim's throat and cut his neck, causing it to bleed profusely.

They dragged the victim from the trailer into the bushes where they laid him

face down and covered him with pine branches and leaves. They could hear

the victim breathing so Petitioner took a knife and cut the victim's spine.

10

The girls and Petitioner then drove off in the Winnebago and (ound

the victim's wallet underneath a mattress. The Petitioner and the girls split

the money found in the wallet and left the vehicle parked in the parking lot

of a motel.

The next morning, Anita Rogers went to the Sheriff's Department and

reported what had happened. She had been committed to a mental

institution when she was 13 years of age and was not charged with any

offense in this case.

Petitioner was charged by an indictment with the offenses of first-

degree murder and robbery.

The Petitioner testified at trial and during his description of the events

of the evening, testified as follows:

"I reckon I'll just cop out. I have done it, killed him

deader than hell. | ain't going to set up here, I am under

oath and I ain't going to tell no fucking lies. I will ask the

Court to excuse my language. | am the one that done it.

They didn't have a damn thing to do with it. I was

premeditated and I intended to kill him. I would have

killed him if he hadn't had no money and I know I never

told you about it, but I killed him."

The jury returned verdicts finding Petitioner guilty of robbery,

premeditated murder in the first degree, and felony murder. After the

sentence hearing, the jury returned an advisory verdict unanimously

recommending that Petitioner receive the death penalty.

11

Thereafter, Petitioner's case was subject to several post-conviction

applications and both State and Federal appeals. (Appendix |). The decision

of Foster v. State, 614 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1992) (Appendix A-6)remanded the

case to enter a new sentencing order.

On August 12, 1993, Petitioner was again sentenced to death, and the

Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on June 16, 1995 and

Rehearing was denied June 19, 1995. See Foster v. State, 654 So.2d 112

(Fla. 1995). (Appendix A-2) Certiorari was denied by the United States

Supreme Court on October 10, 1995. Foster v. Florida, 516 U.S. 920, 116

S.Ct. 314, 133 L.Ed.2d 217 (1995). sat

Petitioner was appointed registry counsel on September 9, 1998, and

an investigator, Michael Glantz, was appointed on December 12, 1998.

An Amended 3.850 Motion for Post-Conviction Relief was filed

September 7, 1999. The State responded July 7, 2000.

Petitioner conceded that his Amended 3.850 Ground D, (Excerpts

Appendix A-7) Petitioner's confinement on Death Row for over 23 years

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and Ground E , Electric Chair -

cruel and unusual punishment had been resolved against Petitioner since the

filing of his 3.850 motion. Ground A, Constitutionally Flawed Harmless

12

Error was raised for Florida Supreme Court reconsideration for possible

Federal review.

However, these issues were preserved for possible Federal review

since they involve death issues as applied to a person with severe mental

deficiencies (Defendant was diagnosed as having “ . . . serious organic

problems secondary to head trauma and poor prenatal care," and“. . .

organic mental disorders."

Through public records disclosure of the prosecutor's files, Petitioner's

investigator, appointed December 12, 1998, obtained a previously

undisclosed document of the original venire in his case. The amended 3.850

motion alleged that this document contained prosecution notes of the venire

pre-selection process in Bay County. The jury list revealed that women

were systematically excluded if they were pregnant or had small children.

It was further alleged that neither Petitioner or his counsel was present

at this pre-selection process, no record of the event was made, except the list

located ". . .through public records disclosure by current counsel's

investigator, Michael Glantz. " Thus, claim was made that there was no

documentation of this issue except the State's venire notes. The Trial Court

denied Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this issue. (Appendix 3)

13

From the Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief, December 27, 2000. (Excerpts Appendix A-9 presented in Petitioner's Brief on

Appeal A-8

Petitioner filed timely Notice of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court on PPS

January 22, 2001. That Court rendered its decision rejecting Petitioner's

appeal and original habeas corpus petition in Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910

(Fla. 2002). (Appendix A-1)

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 14 certiorari, the questions sought to

be reviewed were raised and passed on by the Courts below as follows:

Question I - Violating Right to Impartial Jury. Raised in a

Petitioner's State Motion for Post Conviction Relief, (Appendix

A-7) Ground 14B filed Sestember 3, 1999, Page 12 - 15. Issue

rejected in Trial Courts Order of December 29, 2000.

(Appendix A-3) and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court on

direct appeal. (Appendix A-1) Presented in Petitioner's Brief on

Appeal. (Excerpts Appendix A-8 and Excerpts Appendix A-9)

Question II - Constitutionally Flawed Harmless Error

Analysis. Raised in Petitioner's State 3.850 motion filed

September 3, 1999. Ground 14A,.Constitutionally Flawed

Harmless Error Analysis. Page 10 - 12 of Amended Motion for

Post-Conviction Relief. (Appendix A-7). Trial Court denied

Question in its Order of December 29, 2000. (Appendix A-3),

issue rejected by the Florida Supreme Court. (Appendix A-1)

and (Excerpts Appendix A-9 presented in Petitioner's Brief on

Appeal, Excerpts Appendix A-8)

Question III - Twenty-three (23) years on Death Row -

Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Raised in Petitioner's Motion

for Post-Conviction Relief Ground 14D, Page 16 - 17

(Appendix A-7), issue rejected in Trial Court's Order of

December 29, 2000. (Excerpts Appendix A-3) and rejected by

Florida Supreme Court on direct appeal. (Appendix A-1) and

14 15

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

CAPITAL CASE

UESTION I

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN

DENYING PETITIONER'S 3.850 MOTION FOR POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT A HEARING BASED

UPON HIS ALLEGED VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO

AN IMPARTIAL JURY (CONTRARY TO THE V, VI

AND XIV AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION)

Failure of the Trial Court to permit an evidentiary hearing on this

issue should have been considered reversible error. The amended 3.850

motion sufficiently alleged that the State's jury notes were not available until

the public records review of the State's files by conflict counsel's

investigator. Those notes revealed a systematic exclusion of pregnant

women or women with young children.

The statute in effect at Petitioner Foster's trial was declared

unconstitutional in Alachua County Court Executive v. Anthony, 418

So.2d 264 (Fla. 1982). In denying Petitioner's amended 3.850 motion, Trial

Judge Sirmons concluded that the Alachua _ case addressed "equal

protection" issues and therefore did not ". . .compromise the integrity of the

jury." (Appendix A-3) Alachua very clearly declares the statute under

which Petitioner's female jurors were excluded unconstitutional. Cases cited

by the Trial Court or Supreme Court of Florida do not realistically address

16

the issue presented here. Women were excluded under an unconstitutional

statute, and any gender exclusions of that degree violated constitutional

equal protection standards to an "impartial jury" under the Sixth

Amendment, United States Constitution. Alsc, the Trial Court's "equal

protection distinction" does not find support in the United States Supreme

Court. In Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 476 U.S. 79

(1986) the court held:

By denying a person participation in jury service on

account of his race, the State also unconstitutionally

discriminates against the excluded juror. Moreover,

selection procedures that purposefully exclude black

persons from juries undermine public confidence in

fairness of our system of justice. Pp. 1716-1718.

The same equal protection principles as are applied to

determine whether there is discrimination in selecting the

venire also govern the State's use of peremptory

challenges to strike individual jurors from the petit jury.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 95 S. Ct. 692

(1975) struck Louisiana's jury pool law based upon its exclusion of women

(except those who requested to serve).

The Supreme Court held:

We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as

fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth

**698 Amendment and are convinced that the

requirement has solid foundation. The purpose of a jury

is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power--to make

available the commonsense judgment of the community as

17

a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and

in preference to the professional or perhaps over conditioned

or biased response of a judge. Duncan vy. Louisiana, 391 U.S..,

at 155-156, 88 S. Ct. at 1450-1451. This prophylactic vehicle

is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special

segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are

excluded from the pool. Community participation in the

administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only

consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical

to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice

system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or

excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the

community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept

of jury trial. "Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a

pool broadly representative of the community as well as

impartial in a specific case... (T)he broad representative

character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance

of a diffused impartiality and partly *531 because sharing in the

administration of the justice is a phase of civic responsibility.

" Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227, 66 S.Ct.

984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.

The exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less

representative of the community than would be true if an

economic or racial group were excluded.

unconstitutional based upon its gender-based classification. It is important

to note the Court's language in striking down the statute.

Although section 40.013(4) is not being challenged in this

proceeding on Sixth Amendment grounds, we note that courts

look with disfavor on broadly drawn automatic exemptions

from jury service. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99

S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme

Court declared unconstitutional an exemption available upon

request to all women because of their important role in the

home and family life. In Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461, 99

S.Ct. 710, 58 L.Ed.2d 736 (1979), the Court ordered that the

Duren decision be retroactively applied to all juries sworn

after the 1975 ruling in Taylor vy. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95

S.Ct.692, 42 L.Ed 2d 690 (1975), which set out the basic

constitutional guidelines for jury selection.

Our affirmance of the First District Court of Appeal's decision

holding this automatic exemption unconstitutional does not

mean that individuals, male or female, with child-rearing

responsibilities should not be granted an exemption from jury

service under the discretionary provisions of section 40.013(6).

We expect the trial judges of this state to recognize that one

who has the responsibility of caring for small children has a

legitimate ground for requesting and receiving an exemption

under that section.

The Florida Supreme Court in McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972

(Fla. 1977) held that F.S. 40.01 (1) did not exclude a constitutionally

significant class, in as much as no distinctive quality of parenthood or sex is

lost by the exclusion.

Subsequently, however, the Florida Supreme Court in Alachua

County v. Anthony, 418 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1982) declared F.S. 40.013(4)

18 19

APIT SE

TION

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ENGAGED INA

CONSTITUTIONALLY FLAWED HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS

IN THE PETITIONER'S PREVIOUS APPEAL. FOSTER V. STATE,

654 SO.2D 112 (FLA. 1995). (CONTRARY TO THE V AND VI

AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

This issue included in Petitioner's 3.850 motion was more

appropriately addressed in his Petition for habeas corpus proceeding filed

below. If there was legally no evidence of a robbery or felony-murder, then

the cold, calculated, premeditated aggravator was misapplied under the

harmless error standard and the unconstitutionally applied cold, calculated,

premeditated instruction considered harmless by the Florida Supreme Court.

If Petitioner's case had been submitted to a jury without the robbery

aggravator and with an appropriate cold, calculated, premeditated

instruction, the eight to four death recommendation would likely be

favorably different. Likewise, the sentencing judge would be more apt to

impose a life sentence without the robbery aggravator or unconstitutional

instruction.

Harmless error analysis in a death case essentially means that either

the trial judge or Florida Supreme Court engaged in a fact finding mission,

ie their own version of facts (not necessarily those decided by the jury).

Accordingly, a determination that based on the court's fact, the case warrants

a ne

death although the jury instruction was flawed. Compare U.S. v. Gaudin.

515 U.S. 506 (1995), 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 and Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), 147 L.Ed. 435.

CAPITAL CASE

ESTION Il

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DENYING

PETITIONER'S 3.850 MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION

RELIEF. CLAIMS D. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT -

23 YEARS (NOW 26 YEARS) ON DEATH ROW (CONTRARY TO

THE V, VIII AND XIV AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION)

The Florida Supreme Court has previously ruled against this claim.

The issues were submitted to the Florida Supreme Court for re-consideration

and possible future United States Constitutional review.

In Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1999) the Florida Supreme

Court held:

Finally, Knight claims that to execute him after he has already

endured more than two decades on death row is

unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. He also

argues that Florida has forfeited its right to execute Knight

under binding norms of international law. Although, Knight

makes an interesting argument, we find it lacks merit. As the

State points out, no federal or state courts have accepted

Knight's argument that a prolonged stay on death row

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, especially where

both parties bear responsibility for the long delay. See, e.g.,

White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5" Cir.1996); State v. Smith,

280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272 (1996). We also note that the

Arizona Supreme Court recently rejected this precise claim.

See State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315, 336

(1997) (finding “no evidence that Arizona has set up a scheme

prolonging incarceration in order to torture inmates prior to

their execution"), Cert. Denied, 525 U.S. 862, 119 S.Ct. 149

L.Ed.2d 122 (1998). Second, we also consider that irrespective

—

of the status of this case, Knight has been and will remain

incarcerated on death row for his 1980 murder of Officer Burke

until that case is finalized. We similarly reject Knight's claim

under international law.

Unlike Knight, however, Petitioner Foster's post-conviction relief was

largely successful in obtaining new sentence proceedings due to trial court

errors.

Justices Brennan and Marshall in Glass v. Louisiana, 105 S.Ct. 2159,

85 L.Ed.2d 514, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) in their dissent from denial of

certiorari observed the following:

"I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all

circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited

by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S- 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49

L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and

would therefore grant certiorari and vacate Glass' death

sentence in any event. One of the reasons I adhere to this

view is my belief that the "physical and mental suffering"

inherent in amy method of execution is so "uniquely

degrading to human dignity” that, when combined with

the arbitrariness by which capital punishment is imposed,

the trend of enlightened opinion, and the availability of

less severe penological alternatives, the death penalty is

always unconstitutional. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,

287-291, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2751-2753, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

JOSEPH F. MCDERMOTT, ESQUIRE

MCDERMOTT LAW FIRM

7116-A GULF BOULEVARD

ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, FL 33706

PH? (727)367-1080, FX: (727)367-9940

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO:

CHARLES KENNETH FOSTER,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

| HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and

Appendix have been served by U.S. Mail upon MICHAEL MOORE,

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, 2601 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee,

Florida 32399-2500; the Office of the Attorney General, Attention: RICHARD

MARTELL, ASST ATTORNEY GENERAL, The Florida Capito! Building, Plaza

Level One, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050; and The Office of the State

Attorney, Bay County, Attention: ALTON PAULK, ASA, P O Box 1040, Panama

City, FL 34202 thisthe & “ day of May, 2002. y Cn

JOSEPH F. McDERMOTT, ESQUIRE

Mc LAW FIRM, P.A.

7116-A Gulf Blvd.

Beach, FL 33706

Ph: (727) 367-1080, Fx: (727) 367-9940

~ ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER