Amicus Curiae Brief — Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams

Supreme Ceut, US

FILED

J UN 24 200: | JUN 29 2001

No. 00-1089 OFFICER OF THE CLHRK |

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

ELLA WILLIAMS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

STUART E. SCHIFFER

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Deputy Solicitor General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

MARLEIGH D. DOVER

CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-22] 7

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether an impairment that limits an individual’s

ability to perform particular job-related manual tasks

can constitute a “disability” under the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A), even if

there has been no finding that the plaintiff has been

excluded from a class of jobs or a sufficiently broad

range of jobs to establish a substantial limitation on the

“major life activity” of “working,” and no finding that

the plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits her

ability to perform manual tasks outside of work.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Interest of the United States .............cscccsssscsessssssseessesesseneeeeneeees l

SEITE -cconsensnenssepiesentecscesieneneensenemnetssnememenssssnsenmesnsenstenssensstbenesees 2

I PNIIIIIIIND cirertecncasenscenescenaseesnsenennesemmnnssemanensesseneessess 9

Argument:

I. The court of appeals’ approach to the major life

activity of “performing manual tasks” would

subvert the established rule that an individual is

substantially limited in the major life activity of

“working” only if his impairment excludes him

from a class or broad range Of jODS ............000sereseee ll

II. By limiting its analysis to the performance of

work-related manual tasks, the court of appeals

failed to undertake an appropriate analysis of

any properly defined “major life activity” ................. 17

III. This case should be remanded to allow the court

of appeals to determine, based on appropriate

legal standards, whether respondent has pre-

sented sufficient evidence that she is substantially

limited in the major life activities of either

“working” or “performing manual tasks” ................. 22

IID cccnerssnnnceceesensessssssnsensnessenessncsnsesensesmenesecssssssssssssensmmanass 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) ......ccccsesssseees 18, 20, 22

Duncan v. WMATA, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001),

petition for cert. pending, No. 00-1776 .......cvsssssseeenees 11-12

Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir.

SR ceerrertrcenncccttestenscennsnenssnasenasescescsemmmengntenieensecessstensesenesenees 8

(IIT)

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., No. 99-6656, 2001 WL

587850 (6th Cir. May 31, 2001) .........cccveseseresesenesereenenenenens 15

Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) .........ccccererneneneneenenes 12

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471

(2GBD) ..2.2.2.cccecceresssssscssesnccccsasesesevosssssensssssesesesesseses 6, 9, 11, 13, 16

Statutes and regulations:

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.

12101 et seq. panssasnnasnnnasuoonsnenemanesnsmsanessassnsses 1

Tit. T (42 U.S.C, 12011-12117) .....cccsecsessesseseeneenseneeneenes 1, 2,19

42 U.S.C. 12102(2) sesaresnsnsssmsensantunase 18

42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A) » £2499

4B UBC. BRRGRGIII) cccecncccsccscnsscssssecssscscssssscsecsesses 4, 8, 22

42 U.S.C. 12102(2(C) .....erereevernerersenenenenennens 4, 8, 22

42 US.C. 12111(8) = 19

42 U.S.C. 12112(a) 2,19

42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A) 2

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ...........000+++ 1

§ 501(d), 29 U.S.C. 791(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ............ 1-2

§ 503, 29 U.S.C. 793 2

§ 504, 29 U.S.C. 794 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) 2

28 C.F.R. 41.31(b)(2) 3

29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630:

Section 1630.2(i) 2, 10, 20

Section 1630.2(j)(1) 3

Section 1630.2(j)(B) .......--cecssesssesesesnenseensnesesnenensnesnsnenssnsees 6

Section 1630.24 (3)\i) ~ 8,11

App. § 1630.2() . - 16,22

41 C.F.R. 60-741.2(p) 2-3

———_—_ s

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 00-1089

TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC.,

PETITIONER

Vv.

ELLA WILLIAMS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

This case concerns the proper understanding of the

term “disability” as that term is used in the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101

et seq. The Department of Justice and the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are

charged with enforcing the ADA, and those agencies

have promulgated regulations and interpretive guid-

ance concerning that statutory term. The Department

of Labor has promulgated comparable regulations for

purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabi-

litation Act), 29 U.S.C. 701 et seg. Moreover, because

the Rehabilitation Act makes the standards of Title I of

the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12111-12117) applicable to the

federal government, see 29 U.S.C. 791(d) (1994 & Supp.

(1)

2

V 1999), the United States has a significant interest in

the principles used to determine whether an individual

has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

STATEMENT

1, Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination by any

covered entity “against a qualified individual with a

disability because of the disability of such individual in

regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-

vancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-

pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and

privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). In

pertinent part, the ADA defines the term “disability”

as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of such

individual.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). The forms of em-

ployment discrimination prohibited by Title I of the

ADA include “not making reasonable accommodations

to the known physical or mental limitations of an other-

wise qualified individual with a disability who is an ap-

plicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demon-

strate that the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C.

12112(b)(5)(A).

EEOC regulations implementing Title I of the ADA

define the term “major life activities” to include “func-

tions such as caring for oneself, performing manual

tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i). A regula-

tion promulgated by the Justice Department contains

the same definition of the term “major life activities”

for purposes of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

see 28 C.F.R. 41.31(b)(2), as does a regulation promul-

gated by the Department of Labor for purposes

of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 41 C.F.R.

3

60-741.2(p). The EEOC’s Title I regulations provide

that an impairment “substantially limits” an individual

if, as a result of the impairment, the person is (i)

“{uJnable to perform a major life activity that the

average person in the general population can perform,”

or (ii) “[s)ignificantly restricted as to the condition,

manner or duration under which [he] can perform a

particular major life activity as compared to the

condition, manner, or duration under which the average

person in the general population can perform that same

major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1). Those regu-

lations contain a special definition of the term “sub-

stantially limits” with respect to the major life activity

of working. In that context,

[t]he term substantially limits means significantly

restricted in the ability to perform either a class of

jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable

training, skills and abilities. The inability to per-

form a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of

working.

29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

2. Beginning in 1990, respondent Ella Williams was

employed as an assembly line worker in an auto manu-

facturing plant operated by petitioner Toyota Motor

Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. Pet. App. 24a. As a

result of her prolonged use of pneumatic tools, respon-

dent developed carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis

in her arms and hands. /d. at 2a, 24a.’ Petitioner

1 Because this case arises out of respondent’s appeal from the

district court’s award of summary judgment to petitioner, the facts

as set forth in the text reflect the record evidence taken in the

light most favorable to respondent. See Pet. App. 2a.

4 o

subsequently placed respondent on a team in the Qual-

ity Control Inspection Operations unit of the assembly

line. Jd. at 25a. Respondent spent approximately three

years inspecting cars on the assembly line for defective

paint and manually wiping down each newly painted car

as it passed on the conveyor. /d. at 2a, 26a. Her duties

were then expanded to include new tasks, which re-

quired her to grip a block of wood and to keep her

hands and arms around shoulder height repetitively

over several hours. Jd. at 2a, 26a-27a. Her ligament

and muscle problems reappeared in a more severe form

as a result of the new job, and she developed tendinitis

in her shoulders and neck as well. Jd. at 2a, 27a. Re-

spondent requested to be assigned back to her former

functions, which she could perform without difficulty.

Ibid. Respondent alleges that petitioner refused to

assign her back to her former job in the paint inspection

section, and that the refusal constituted a failure to

provide reasonable accommodation as required by the

ADA. Id. at 2a, 27a-28a.

8. Respondent filed suit in federal district court, al-

leging that petitioner had violated, inter alia, the ADA.

The district court granted petitioner’s motion for sum-

mary judgment. Pet. App. 23a-54a. With respect to

respondent’s ADA claim, the court held that respon-

dent was not substantially limited in any major life

activity and therefore did not have a “disability” within

the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A).’ Pet. App.

34a-42a.

2 The ADA also defines the term “disability” to include “a re-

cord of such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B), or “being re-

garded as having such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C). The

district court held that respondent could not establish that she had

a “disability” under either of those provisions. Pet. App. 43a-47a.

Those holdings are not at issue in this Court. See note 3, infra.

5

Respondent contended that she was substantially

limited in the major life activities of (1) performing

manual tasks, (2) housework, (3) gardening, (4) playing

with her children, (5) lifting, and (6) working. Pet. App.

34a, 37a. The district court rejected allegations (2)-(4)

on the ground that “[wJhen compared to activities such

as walking, seeing, hearing, speaking and breathing, the

Court cannot find that gardening, housework, playing

with, or otherwise recreating with others, are such

significant activities to warrant their inclusion into the

‘statutory rubric’ of major life activities.” Jd. at 35a.

The court found that allegation (1) was “irretrievably

contradicted by [respondent’s] continual insistence that

she could perform the tasks in assembly and paint

inspection without difficulty,” since those duties re-

quired the performance of manual tasks. /d. at 36a.

The court also stated that “no rational juror could

conclude that [respondent] is substantially limited in

her ability to perform manual tasks” because respon-

dent had “failed to present any evidence regarding the

nature and severity of [her] impairment, the duration

or expected duration of her impairment, or the perma-

nent or long term impact resulting from the impair-

ment.” Jbid. The district court also rejected allegation

(5) because respondent had failed to present evidence

sufficient to persuade a rational juror that her ability to

lift was substantially limited. /d. at 36a-37a.

The district court then addressed respondent’s claim

that she was substantially limited in the major life

activity of “working.” Pet. App. 37a-42a. The court ex-

plained that, to prevail on that theory, respondent was

required to show that her impairment excluded her

from a significant range of jobs. Jd. at 37a-38a. The

court acknowledged that respondent had offered expert

vocational evidence that, as a result of her impairment,

6

“the number of jobs in the economy that [she] can

perform has been reduced by 50% to 55%.” Id. at 38a.

It stated, however, that under the applicable regula-

tions, the “determination of whether one is substan-

tially limited in the major life activity of working

requires an examination, and therefore evidence, of a

claimant’s ability, or inability, to access the job market

in her own geographical area.” Id. at 40a. Based on its

view that the evidence proffered by respondent “offers

no assistance in evaluating her true employability with-

in her own geographical area,” the district court con-

cluded that respondent “cannot show that she is

substantially limited in the major life activity of work-

ing.” Ibid.

4. The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. la-1la.

The court’s analysis focused on respondent’s ability to

perform work-related manual tasks. The court of ap-

peals cited the EEOC regulation that specifically

addresses limitations on the “major life activity” of

“working,” see 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3) (quoted at p. 3,

supra), and this Court’s discussion of that regulation in

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999),

for the proposition that an individual “must be pre-

cluded from * * * a substantial class of jobs” in order

to establish disability based on the major life activity of

“working.” Pet. App. 4a. The court recognized that

réspondent “asserts primarily that her impairments

disable her from performing manual tasks, a different

disability from ‘working.’” Ibid. (footnote omitted).

The court of appeals nevertheless concluded that “in

order to be disabled [respondent] must show that her

manual disability involves a ‘class’ of manual activities

affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.” Ibid.

Applying that standard, the court concluded that

7

taking the evidence in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, * * * [respondent’s] set of impair-

ments to her arms, shoulders and neck are

sufficiently disabling to allow the factfinder to find

she crosses the threshold into the protected class of

individuals under the ADA who must be accorded

reasonable accommodation. Her ailments are analo-

gous to having missing, damaged or deformed limbs

that prevent her from doing the tasks associated

with certain types of manual assembly line jobs,

manual product handling jobs and manual building

trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that

require the gripping of tools and repetitive work

with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder

levels for extended periods of time.

Ibid. The court of appeals acknowledged that respon-

dent could “perform a range of isolated, non-repetitive

manual tasks performed over a short period of time,

such as tending to her personal hygiene or carrying out

personal or household chores.” Jbid. The court con-

cluded, however, that respondent’s ability to perform

those tasks “does not effect [sic] a determination that

her impairment substantially limits her ability to

perform the range of manual tasks associated with an

assembly line job.” Ibid.

3 The court of appeals stated that “[aJlthough [respondent] has

also claimed that she is substantially limited in the major life

activities of lifting and working, in addition to manual tasks, her

counsel conceded during oral argument that [respondent’s]

strongest claim pertained to the major life activity of performing

manual tasks.” Pet. App. 4a n.1. In light of its determination that

respondent had presented sufficient evidence with respect to the

performance of manual tasks, the court declined to determine

whether respondent was also “substantially limited as to the major

life activities of lifting or working.” Jd. at 5a. For similar reasons,

8

Judge Boggs dissented from the court of appeals’

disposition of respondent’s ADA claim. He noted that

although respondent’s physical impairment prevented

her from performing the tasks associated with a

discrete range of jobs, “this inability to perform certain

types of tasks would not likely constitute being disabled

with regard to the major life activity of working. In

particular, this court has held that the inability to per-

form a single, particular job does not constitute a sub-

stantial limitation on working.” Pet. App. 9a (citing

Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir.

1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (collecting cases)).

Judge Boggs concluded that respondent was likewise

unable to demonstrate a substantial limitation on the

“major life activity” of “performing manual tasks.” He

explained that the record demonstrated respondent’s

ability to perform many work-related manual tasks, as

well as “the manual tasks of brushing her teeth, laun-

dering her clothes, and doing some driving.” Pet. App.

9a. In Judge Boggs’s view, the manual tasks that

respondent was demonstrably unable to perform were

almost exclusively tasks connected to a narrow range of

jobs. Jd. at 9a-10a. Judge Boggs concluded that if

respondent’s inability to perform those tasks was an

insufficient basis for finding a substantial limitation on

her ability to work, there was no logical ground for

treating her impairment as a substantial limitation on

her ability to perform manuai tasks. /d. at 10a-11a.

the court found it unnecessary to address respondent’s alternative

claims that she had a “record” of qualifying impairment, see

42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B), or was “regarded as” disabled, see 42 U.S.C.

12102(2)(C). Pet. App. 6a.

_—

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|

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9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Under the pertinent EEOC regulations and this

Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527

U.S. 471 (1999), an ADA plaintiff cannot establish that

he is “substantially limited” in the “major life activity”

of “working” simply through proof that his impairment

precludes him from performing a particular job or a

narrow category of jobs. Rather, an individual is “sub-

stantially limited” in “working” only if his impairment

excludes him from a class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes. Where a plaintiff alleges that he

is substantially limited in the activity of “performing

manual tasks,” and the tasks he identifies are solely

work-related, the plaintiff should likewise be required

to show that as a result of his impairment he is exclud-

ed from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Any

other approach would permit circumvention of the rules

that govern claims based on “working,” because an

inability to perform a particular job can almost always

be recharacterized as an inability to-perform the

manual tasks or functions associated with that job.

The court of appeals decided this case on the appa-

rent assumption that respondent was not substantially

limited in the major life activity of “working.” The

court nevertheless held that respondent could show a

substantial limitation on the activity of “performing

manual tasks,” based solely on her inability to perform

work-related manual tasks. That approach was erro-

neous and would subvert the established rule that a

plaintiff must prove exclusion from a class of jobs or a

broad range of jobs in order to establish disability

based on “working.”

The approach adopted by the court of appeals not

only threatens to circumvent the proper analysis of the

10

major life activity of “working,” but also produces a

truncated and incomplete analysis of the major life

activity of “performing manual tasks.” By focusing only

on manual tasks undertaken in the workplace, the court

of appeals failed to evaluate the full extent of respon-

dent’s limitations with respect to manual tasks gener-

ally. In considering major life activities other than

working, judicial inquiry cannot properly be limited to

effects of the individual’s impairment that are

evidenced in the workplace. Indeed, a principal goal of

the ADA is to ensure that disabilities that do not affect

a person’s actual ability to function in the workplace

will not be used as a basis for irrationally limiting the

employment opportunities of qualified disabled individ-

uals.

For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals em-

ployed an incorrect legal analysis. Accordingly, the

court’s judgment should be vacated and the case should

be remanded for further proceedings. On remand, re-

spondent may be able to demonstrate, under the ap-

propriate legal standards, that the record evidence is

sufficient to preclude summary judgment for petitioner

on the question whether respondent is substantially

limited as to (a) working and/or (b) performing manual

tasks. |

ee ene

11

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APPROACH TO THE

MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY OF “PERFORMING

MANUAL TASKS” WOULD SUBVERT THE ES-

TABLISHED RULE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IS

SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED IN THE MAJOR

LIFE ACTIVITY OF “WORKING” ONLY IF HIS

IMPAIRMENT EXCLUDES HIM FROM A CLASS

OR BROAD RANGE OF JOBS

A. The EEOC’s regulations provide that, in order to

establish a substantial limitation in the major life activ-

ity of working, a plaintiff must show that he is “signifi-

cantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class

of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable

training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2())(3)().

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999),

this Court “[a]ssum[ed] without deciding that working

is a major life activity and that the EEOC regulations

interpreting the term ‘substantially limits’ are reason-

able.” Id. at 492. Applying those regulations, the Court

held that “[wJhen the major life activity under con-

sideration is that of working, the statutory phrase

‘substantially limits’ requires, at a minimum, that plain-

tiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of

jobs.” Jd. at 491. It is therefore clear that a plaintiff

cannvut establish that he is “substantially limit[ed]” in

the “major life activity” of “working” simply through

proof that his impairment precludes him from perform-

ing a particular job or a narrow category of jobs. See,

e.g., Duncan v. WMATA, 240 F.3d 1110, 1115 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (en banc) (testimony that the plaintiff “was not

qualified for the particular kind of job—truck dri-

12

ver—for which he chose to apply” was insufficient to

demonstrate that the plaintiff was substantially limited

in the major life activity of working), petition for cert.

pending, No. 00-1776; cf. Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516,

523 (1999) (“to be regarded as substantially limited in

the major life activity of working, one must be regarded

as precluded from more than a particular job”).

B. An inability to perform a particular job virtually

always can be recharacterized as an inability to perform

the manual tasks or functions associated with that job.

The limiting principle described above would therefore

be wholly undermined if a plaintiff whose impairment

excluded him from an employment category too small to

constitute a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs (and

who therefore could not show a substantial limitation on

the major life activity of “working”) could nevertheless

establish a disability based solely on his inability to per-

form the manual tasks associated with that narrow

category of jobs. Ifa plaintiff claims that he is “sub-

stantially limited” in the activity of “performing manual

tasks,” and if the tasks he identifies are solely work-

related, his inability to perform those tasks should be

regarded as a “disability” only if the category of jobs

from which he is thereby excluded is sufficiently broad

so that he is substantially limited in “working.”

4 The situation described in the text—i.e., where a plaintiff

attempts to prove a substantial limitation on the performance of

manual tasks solely by reference to work-related tasks—may not

arise with great frequency, because a physical impairment that

affects a plaintiff's ability to work will often have effects outside

the workplace as well. That will not always be true, however. For

example, a person whose impairment renders him unable to per-

form a particular task continuously or repetitively for a prolonged

period of time, see Pet. App. 4a (stating that respondent’s impair-

ments “prevent her from doing the tasks associated with certain

a ere

13

C. In granting petitioner’s motion for summary

judgment, the district court found that respondent had

failed to present evidence sufficient to persuade a

reasonable juror that she was substantially limited in

the major life activity of “working.” See Pet. App. 37a-

42a. Although the court of appeals did not specifically

address that conclusion, the court appeared to decide

this case on the assumption that respondent was not

excluded from a class of jobs or a sufficiently broad

range of jobs to allow her to establish a substantial

limitation on her ability to work.°

types of * * * jobs * * * that require the gripping of tools and

repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above

shoulder levels for extended periods of time”), may be excluded

from certain jobs without being significantly restricted in other

areas of his life. An impairment that renders an individual unable

to perform an especially demanding task—e.g., to lift very heavy

objects, or to perform delicate operations requiring an unusual

degree of dexterity—may also disqualify the individual from

particular jobs without restricting him outside the workplace (or in

the workplace for any class or broad range of jobs). Such deter-

minations are to be made on an individualized basis. See Sutton,

527 US. at 483.

5 The precise basis of that assumption is unclear. The court of

appeals stated that “[respondent] asserts primarily that her

impairments disable her from performing manual tasks, a different

_ disability from ‘working,’ the disability at issue in the Sutton case.”

Pet. App. 4a (footnote omitted). The court further observed that

“(although [respondent] has also claimed that she is substantially

limited in the major life activities of lifting and working, in addition

to manual tasks, her counsel conceded during oral argument that

{respondent’s} strongest claim pertained to the major life activity

of performing manual tasks.” Jd. at 4a n.1. Those statements

might suggest that the court understood respondent essentially to

have conceded that she could not establish a substantial limitation

on the “major life activity” of “working.” On the other hand, the

court also stated that “[blecause we conclude that [respondent] is

substantially limited in performing manual tasks, we do not need

14

The court of appeals nevertheless held that respon-

dent could show a substantial limitation on the activity

of “performing manual tasks,” based solely on her in-

ability to perform work-related tasks. Thus, the court

stated that “in order to be disabled [respondent] must

show that her manual disability involves a ‘class’ of

manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks

at work.” Pet. App. 4a. It found that respondent’s

“ailments are analogous to having missing, damaged or

deformed limbs that prevent her from doing the tasks

associated with certain types of * * * jobs * * * that

require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with

hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels

for extended periods of time.” Jbid. The court further

observed that “[t]he fact that [respondent] can perform

a range of isolated, non-repetitive manual tasks per-

formed over a short period of time, such as tending to

her personal hygiene or carrying out personal or house-

hold chores, does not effect [sic] a determination that

her impairment substantially limits her ability to

perform the range of manual tasks associated with an

assembly line job.” Jbid. The court also described re-

spondent’s claim as resting on “the rather simple con-

cept that she is disabled as to performing manual tasks

because she suffers from a severe impairment to her

limbs, shoulders and neck that seriously reduces her

ability to perform the manual tasks that are job-

related.” Jd. at 5a.

to determine whether [respondent] is substantially limited as to

the major life activities of lifting or working.” Jd. at 5a. That for-

mulation suggests that the court simply assumed, arguendo, that

respondent could not resist summary judgment with respect to

“working.”

15

Those statements strongly suggest an exclusive focus

on work-related manual tasks. And a subsequent Sixth

Circuit decision construes the decision below in

precisely that manner. In Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., No.

99-6656, 2001 WL 587850 (May 31, 2001), the court

stated that “[t]o demonstrate a substantial limitation in

the performance of manual tasks, a plaintiff must prove

his ‘manual disability involves a “class” of manual

activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at

work.’” /d. at *8 (quoting Pet. App. 4a). The Kiphart

court’s description of the court of appeals’ opinion in

this case (see ibid.) focused solely on the evidence

suggesting that respondent was unable to perform

various work-related manual tasks. Thus, in Kiphart as

in the instant case, the Sixth Circuit held that the

plaintiff could establish a substantial limitation on the

“major life activity” of “performing manual tasks,”

based solely on work-related manual tasks, without

deciding whether the plaintiff was substantially limited

in the “major life activity” of “working.”” That ap-

proach is erroneous and would subvert the established

rule that a plaintiff must prove exclusion from a class of

6 The court of appeals did state later in its opinion that re-

spondent’s impairments “are sufficiently severe to be like de-

formed limbs and such activities affect manual tasks associated

with working, as well as manual tasks associated with recreation,

household chores and living generally.” Pet. App. 6a (emphasis

added). But that observation appears disconnected from the Sixth

Circuit’s legal analysis.

’ The Kiphart court concluded that “a reasonable jury could

have determined Kiphart’s impairments substantially limited his

ability to perform an entire class of manual activities associated

with assembly-line and product-handling jobs involving the use of

vibrating hand-held power tools and requiring frequent, repetitive

twisting, bending, or flexing of the wrists, elbows, or neck.” 2001

WL 587850, at *9.

16

jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes in order

to establish disability based on “working.” See pp. 11-

12, supra. Limiting the inquiry to the plaintiff's ability

or inability to perform manual tasks in the workplace

leads naturally to a focus on the employee’s ability to

perform the tasks associated with her particular job.

The EEOC regulations, and this Court’s decision in

Sutton, preclude such a job-specific focus and mandate

a broader perspective.

The court of appeals suggested (Pet. App. 5a-6a) that

its mode of analysis was consistent with (or, indeed,

mandated by) the principle that a court should consider

the major life activity of working only “(iJf an individual

is not substantially limited with respect to any other

major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2@);

see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. But that direction as to the

appropriate order of proceeding presupposes a proper

application of tests for major life activities other than

working. The decision below improperly truncated the

analysis of manual tasks, with the effect of circum-

venting the rules governing the analysis of working.

By focusing on manual tasks “in the workplace,” the

court of appeals converted respondent’s manual tasks

claim into a working claim. However, in the process of

conversion, the court of appeals omitted the require-

ment that the employee’s impairment affect her ability

to perform a class or broad range of jobs. The court of

appeals’ approach does not comply with principles of

orderly decisionmaking; it simply enabled the court to

find sufficient evidence of disability, based solely on the

effects of respondent’s impairment on her job

performance (and consequent employability), without

making the requisite determination whether respon-

17

dent was excluded from a broad or narrow category of

jobs.

Il. BY LIMITING ITS ANALYSIS TO THE PER-

FORMANCE OF WORK-RELATED MANUAL

TASKS, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO

UNDERTAKE AN APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS OF

ANY PROPERLY DEFINED “MAJOR LIFE

ACTIVITY”

The court of appeals’ analysis places undue emphasis

on the extent to which a disability is manifested in the

workplace and affects job performance. In articulating

the standard for establishing a substantial limitation on

the ability to perform manual tasks, the court of appeals

stated that “to be disabled the plaintiff must show that

her manual disability involves a ‘class’ of manual activi-

ties affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.” Pet.

App. 4a (emphasis added). The court then concluded

that respondent’s ability to perform “personal or house-

hold chores, does not effect [sic] a determination that

- her impairment substantially limits her ability to

perform the range of manual tasks associated with an

® The petition for certiorari argues that “‘working’ and ‘per-

forming manual tasks’ are indeed distinct inquiries, and that each

must be resolved without reference to the other.” Pet. 21. The

petition further contends that by “evaluat{ing] how an impairment

affects a plaintiff's ability to work in order to determine whether

that impairment limits the major life activity of performing manual

tasks,” the court of appeals “improperly fuse[d] two distinct

analyses into one.” Jbid. In our view, the greater defect in the

court of appeals’ approach is that, in fusing the two inquiries, the

court eliminated an important aspect of the working

inquiry—namely, the determination whether respondent’s impair-

amaretto lance ial

18

assembly line job.” Ibid. (emphasis added), The court

thus (a) held that an ADA plaintiff who alleges a

substantial limitation on the activity of “performing

manual tasks” must prove an adverse effect on job

performance, and (b) improperly truncated its exami-

nation of respondent’s “manual tasks” claim by treating

the performance of work-related manual tasks as

though it were a “major life activity.” Both aspects of

the court’s analysis are erroneous.

A. The statutory definition of “disability” (42 U.S.C.

12102(2)) clearly encompasses impairments that have

no effect on job performance. See, e.g., Bragdon v.

Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding that “[rJepro-

duction falls well within the phrase ‘major life

activity,” and that “[nJothing in the [ADA] definition

(of ‘disability’] suggests that activities without a public,

economic, or daily dimension may somehow be regarded

as so unimportant or insignificant as to fall outside the

meaning of the word ‘major’ ”); id. at 639 (“The inclusion

(in the regulations] of activities such as caring for one’s

self and performing manual tasks belies the suggestion

that a task must have a public or economic character in

order to be a major life activity for purposes of the

ADA.”). With the obvious exception of “working,”

proof that an individual is substantially limited in one of

the major life activities identified in the regulations

does not require a showing that his impairment affects

job performance. In particular, an individual whose

impairment substantially limits his ability to perform

manual tasks has a “disability” within the meaning of

the ADA, even if the tasks that the individual is unable

19

to perform all occur off the job and the impairment does

not affect his “ability to perform tasks at work.”

Title I of the ADA generally prohibits employment

discrimination “against a qualified individual with a dis-

ability because of the disability of such individual.” 42

U.S.C. 12112(a). Title I defines the term “qualified

individual with a disability” to mean “an individual with

a disability who, with or without reasonable accom-

modation, can perform the essential functions of the

employment position that such individual holds or de-

sires.” 42 U.S.C. 12111(8). That the definition of

“qualified individual with a disability” includes a person

who can perform the relevant job “without * * *

accommodation” reinforces the conclusion that proof of

an effect on job performance is not necessary to esta-

blish the existence of a “disability.” It would be per-

verse, moreover, to suggest that an individual who is

substantially limited in some other “major life activity”

could be deprived of Title I’s employment protections

on the ground that her performance of work-related

functions is not impaired. Indeed, a major goal of the

ADA is to ensure that disabilities that do not affect a

person’s actual ability to function in the workplace will

® Respondent’s brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari

reflects the same misunderstanding as the court of appeals’

opinion. Respondent states that “[i]t is appropriate that the im-

pairment claimed always ‘affect’ or be related to employment

because [Title I] of the ADA only relates to employment.” Br. in

Opp. 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. 12112(a)). That is a non sequitur. It is true

that Section 12112(a) applies only to disability-based discrimi-

nation in employment, and that “(t]he ADA does not prohibit

disability discrimination in social settings.” Jbid. But the fact that

the discrimination proscribed by Title I is limited to employment

practices does not mean that the impairment must have workplace

effects in order to constitute a disability.

20

not be used as a basis for irrationally limiting the em-

ployment opportunities of qualified disabled individu-

als.

B. The requirement that an impairment must sub-

stantially limit one or more “major life activities” of an

individual is at the heart of the ADA’s definition of

“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). The term

“major” indicates that only fundamental activities will

qualify, and the activities identified in the applicable

EEOC regulation, see 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (defining

major life activities to include “functions such as caring

for onself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,

hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working”),

reinforce that reading. In holding that reproduction is

a major life activity, this Court noted that “[rJepro-

duction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are

central to the life process itself.” Bragdon, 524 U.S. at

638. Although the pertinent EEOC regulation does not

purport to provide an exhaustive catalogue of “major

life activities,” see id. at 638-639, the fundamental char-

acter of the enumerated activities indicates that courts

should proceed with caution in identifying “major life

activities” other than those listed in the regulation. In

particular, it is inappropriate to define as a “major life

activity” a work-related subset (eg., “hearing” or

“seeing” in the workplace) of one of the activities enu-

merated in the rule.

The performance of work-related manual tasks is a

subset of both “performing manual tasks” and “work-

ing,” but it is not itself defined in the pertinent regula-

tions as a “major life activity.” By framing the question

before it as whether respondent was substantially

limited in performing work-related manual tasks, the

court of appeals essentially declined to consider evi-

dence that would have been directly relevant to analy-

21

sis of a properly defined “major life activity.” A proper

determination whether a plaintiff is substantially

limited in “working” would generally include considera-

tion of his ability (or inability) to carry out jobs that do

not significantly entail the performance of manual

tasks. And a proper determination whether a plaintiff

is substantially limited in “performing manual tasks”

would include an assessment of his ability (or inability)

to perform manual tasks outside the workplace as well

as those on the job.” The court of appeals failed to per-

form either of those analyses.

© The court of appeals’ truncated analysis of manual tasks is

neither pro-employee nor pro-employer; it is simply erroneous.

The effect of truncating the “manual tasks” inquiry by focusing

only on work-related tasks will likely work to the advantage of

some plaintiffs and to the disadvantage of others. On the one hand,

an exclusive focus on work-related tasks may cause workplace

restrictions to appear more “substantial” by reducing the universe

of potential manual tasks, thereby increasing the likelihood that

some plaintiffs (particularly those whose impairments manifest

themselves most severely on the job) will be found to be disabled.

On the other hand, a refusal to consider the individual’s inability

to perform non-work-related tasks may unfairly deny the pro-

tections of the Act to other persons who are fully able to function

in the relevant workplace but who are substantially limited in the

performance of manual tasks generally.

22

Ill. THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO ALLOW

THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DETERMINE,

BASED ON APPROPRIATE LEGAL STANDARDS,

WHETHER RESPONDENT HAS PRESENTED

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS SUB-

STANTIALLY LIMITED IN THE MAJOR LIFE

ACTIVITIES OF EITHER “WORKING” OR “PER-

FORMING MANUAL TASKS”

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate

the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to

permit the courts below to determine, under the correct

legal standards, whether respondent has adduced

evidence sufficient to foreclose summary judgment for

petitioner on the question whether respondent is sub-

stantially limited in the major life activities of either

“working” or “performing manual tasks.”"” The fol-

lowing observations may be relevant to the proceedings

on remand:

A. Although an ADA plaintiff cannot establish a

substantial limitation on “working” based on exclusion

from a particular job or narrow class of jobs, “an in-

dividual does not have to be totally unable to work in

order to be considered substantially limited in the

major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.

§ 1630.2(j); ef. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (“The Act

addresses substantial limitations on major life activi-

ties, not utter inabilities.”). Thus, the fact that respon-

dent can perform some assembly line jobs does not, in

and of itself, preclude her from establishing that she is

oe

11 The courts below can also address on remand respondent’s

alternative claims that she has a “record” of qualifying impairment,

see 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(B), and that she is “regarded as” disabled,

see 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C). See notes 2, 3, supra.

23

substantially limited in the “major life activity” of

“working.”

As we explain above, the court of appeals appeared

to decide this case on the assumption that respondent

_was not excluded from a class of jobs or from a suffi-

ciently broad range of jobs to establish disability based

on “working.” The court did not squarely resolve that

question, however, and it remains open to respondent

on remand to challenge the district court’s adverse

ruling on that point. The government takes no position

on the question whether respondent’s evidence on that

point is sufficient to withstand petitioner’s motion for

summary judgment.

B. A plaintiff may sometimes be able to establish a

“disability” based on an inability to perform, or sub-

stantia! restrictions on the performance of, a combina-

tion of work-related and non-work-related manual

tasks. Thus, even if respondent is unable on remand to

establish a substantial limitation on the activity of

“working,” her inability to perform the manual tasks

associated with a particular job or narrow category of

jobs might still support a claim of disability if respon-

dent can also demonstrate that her impairment sub-

stantially limits her ability to perform manual tasks

outside the workplace.

The court of appeals briefly alluded to respondent’s

contention that her impairments affect her ability to

perform “manual tasks associated with recreation,

household chores and living generally,” Pet. App. 6a,

but it undertook no meaningful analysis of the record

evidence bearing on respondent’s ability to perform

non-work-related manual tasks. (The court’s failure to

perform such an analysis may have resulted from its

misconception that to demonstrate a substantial limita-

tion on the activity of “performing manual tasks,” an

24

ADA “plaintiff must show that her manual disability

involves a ‘class’ of manual activities affecting the

ability to perform tasks at work.” Jd. at 4a; see pp. 18-

20, supra.) Although the court of appeals’ analysis of

the “manual tasks” issue was legally flawed, respondent

may still be able to prevail on remand under the appro-

priate legal standards if she can establish a substantial

limitation on her ability to perform a combination of

work-related and non-work-related manual tasks. The

government takes no position on the question whether

respondent presented sufficient evidence to withstand

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on that

point.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be va-

cated, and the case should be remanded to the court of

appeals for further consideration under the appropriate

legal standards.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

STUART E. SCHIFFER

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Deputy Solicitor General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

MARLEIGH D. DOVER

CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH

Attorneys

JUNE 2001