Amicus Curiae Brief — Reno v. Kim Ho Ma

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No. 00-38

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

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JANET RENO,

Attorney General of the United States, et al.,

Petitioners,

KIM HO MA,

7 1»

Respondent

——e Je —

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

— o —————

BRIEF OF LAW PROFESSORS AS

AMICI CURIAE, SUPPORTING AFFIRMANCE

———e o ——————

CHaries D. WeisseLBeRc Georce A. CumMMING, JR.

CENTER FOR CLINICAI Counsel of Record

EDUCATION Broseck, PHieGer &

University of California Harrison LLP

School of Law (Boalt Hall) Spear Street Tower

Berkeley, California One Market

94720-7200 San Francisco, California

Telephone: (510) 643-8159 94105

Telephone: (415) 442-1198

Facsimile: (415) 442-1010

Attorneys for Amici Curtae Law Professors

{Names Of Individual Amici Are Listed

At The Conclusion Of The Brief]

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO 0) 225-n4h4

x ALI OLLECT (402) 342-2831

IBEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SRS GS GEG ce vcccescesccscvcccesscatsces 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................0005 1

NE 066.06-05660008bsssecuscdescedcnseenenss 4

I.

Il.

II.

ALIENS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ARE

PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION, EVEN

IN MATTERS RELATING TO THEIR REMOVAL

GE ONE hose ceucddcesctcaceredédees

THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE DERIVES

LARGELY FROM THE EXECUTIVE’S SOVER-

EIGN INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AN

INTEREST THAT IS ABSENT HERE...........

A. The Plenary Power Doctrine Was First

Developed - And Is At Its Zenith — In Cases

Involving “Excludable” Aliens ............

B. The Foreign Affairs Considerations That

Might Support Detention of Excludable

Aliens Are Not Present Here..............

NEITHER MR. MA’S STATUS AS “ORDERED

REMOVED” NOR THE “ENTRY FICTION”

SANCTION THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT

TO TREAT MR. MA AS A FIRST-TIME APPLI-

CANT FOR ADMISSION..................0055

A. This Court Has Applied The Plenary Power

Doctrine To Lawfully Admitted Permanent

Residents To A Lesser Extent Than To Non-

Citizens Seeking Admission...............

B. The Sole Exception to Territorial Standing -

The “Entry Fiction” — Does Not Apply To

Aliens Admitted as Permanent Residents. .

10

13

14

17

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

IV. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE DOES NOT

PRECLUDE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE GOV-

ERNMENT’S REPRESENTATIONS REGARD-

ING THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVAL ........ 21

* CURED SoS ceNededsidecccuediscbietensensise 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) .............. 18

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266

ee ks cceenseeceoesess 6

ee Ge Ge BE Ge BP GRUUED ccccccccccccccceces 21

Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir;

en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976 (1995) ......... 11

The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v.

United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)...... 6, 7, 8, 10, 14

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)........ 22

De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d

Teen og i a eeseseseeeet 22

Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)............. 8

Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) .............2.0005- 10

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) .... 22

Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) ..8, 14

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)............... 18

Gisbert v. U.S. Attorneys General, 988 F.2d 1437 (5th

i dcebcdeesudetesescecetseredeseesocescees 11

Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789

DE Men bnsecedecececcevedcocecccececoeoes 22

INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) ...10, 11, 12

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ..........6.00e ee 13

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) ............... 18

Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478

Sh Me EE ccccncccccosesccencscccocaccocecees 21

Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).............000045. 8

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) aff'd,

et Cs Ce EL cu ddubcddaduduecudemduneekene 11

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)............ 10

Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)

PTT TTTTT TT TTT TTT eonncnsesdesncesseécosce Ub Ee Oe

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)........ 16, 19, 20

Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958)....... 15, 19

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th

GE FIGED Se cccccesconsssnncodcosaseuscosssncesses 22

Paul v. Avril, 901 F.Supp. 330 (S.D.Fla. 1994) ........ 22

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)..........-.222ee eee 5

Fe, SS Bie Ff rrr 16

Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.

GES Qe ee ec ccccsccccoccctscndeissscsansenndcnnesés 6

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).............505. 23

Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.

BD GEG s cc vcccccocccccesscesvecsoeesaveuves passim

Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.

BaP Gee ce csnnccncndceséndcsacecesdesecasneeess 21

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.

BEG GaN oe veccccsccsccecsucccevesesessseseesceses 10

United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1975) ..... 6

United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) .......... 19

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).......... 23

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259

SENSE os ccccccedbcsccsacscuctosecdecnsesebedesnoss 15

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)... .. passim

Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)............. 15, 20

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)....... 2, 4, 5, 14

Unitep States CONSTITUTION

Amendment V........... ebaRennetedecdedescones passim

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“Alien Tort Claims Act”).......... 22

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“Immigration and

PND GRE Donccncscdcvescccscsecesccccoseses 19

Dp es Oe a cicdncccccncecccsdntcccusccocée 19

Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at

note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“Torture Victim

Ss Sr Grr Mr. nceuneeueeeesonnsee ce 22

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, Citizens, Aliens, Member-

ship and the Constitution, 7 Const. COMMENTARY 9

SP cogcaccdwencecesesecesondssceeceseceessoores il

Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, Federal Regulation of

Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am. J. Int’t L. 862

ED co ccccsscceneccacuccucesuceseeseoseceeneceess 7

Henkin, Louis, Foreicn AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-

ccd cccédustenbbecedinebanseebesocde 10

Henkin, Louis, The Constitution and United States

Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and

Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1987) ........ 7, 10

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,

Supp. No. 16 at 168, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) ....

Legomsky, Stephen H., Immigration Law and the

Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984

Page

22

Se al 7, 11, 13

Martin, David A., Due Process and Membership in

the National Community: Political Asylum and

Beyond, 44 U. Prt. L. Rev. 165 (1983)...........

Motomura, Hiroshi, Immigration Law After a Cen-

tury of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional

Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yace L.J.

fe PPrrrrTereToTT Trier TTT TT Tr

Motomura, Hiroshi, The Curious Evolution of Immi-

gration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive

Constitutional Rights, 92 Corum. L. Rev. 1625

rere rrr rrr TT Te Terre TTT Te

Schuck, Peter H., The Transformation of Immigration

Law, 84 Corum. L. Rev. 1 (1984)................

Taylor, Margaret, Detained Aliens Challenging Con-

ditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the

Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 Hastincs Constr.

rr en. et eduuvesencncuceues

This American Life, Immigration, Act Three: Man

Without a Country. (WBEZ Chicago radio

broadcast October 13, 2000) at http://

WIUPORTITIIIGEE occ ccccccccsccccccccescescsecs

Weisselberg, Charles D., The Exclusion and Deten-

tion of. Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen

Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933

EPO cccccceccccuscaccocccesesesesescenessones

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!

Amici Curiae are the immigration and constitutional

law professors whose individual names appear at the

conclusion of this brief. Many of us have written about

the principles that the government invokes in this appeal.

There may be disagreement among us about the scope of

the government's authority to detain people who have

never entered the United States, but all of us conclude

that the immigration authorities may not detain lawfully-

admitted resident aliens except during proceedings to

determine their ability to remain here and for a reason-

able period thereafter to effect removal, so long as

removal remains a realistic possibility.

Amici therefore support affirmance, and write both to

explain the origins and application of the government's

power over non-citizens, and to place this case within the

broader context of constitutional immigration law.

«

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The bedrock guarantees of the Fifth Amendment “are

universal in their application, to all persons within the

territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, “without

' Both Petitioner and Respondent have consented to the

filing of this brief.

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part. The brief was written by counsel for Amici Curiae with the

assistance of Margaret Dundon and Jason Weintraub, students

at the University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall). No

one other than Amici Curiae or their counsel made a monetary

contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.

regard to any differences of . . . nationality.” Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Accordingly, a “final

order of removal” (Pet. Br. 50) does not strip even an

unlawfully admitted alien of the right to be free of uncon-

stitutional detention. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.

228, 236-38 (1896).

Respondent Kim Ho Ma became a permanent resi-

dent of the United States after his lawful admission in

1985 when, at age seven, he fled here as a refugee from

Cambodia. Ten years later, Mr. Ma was convicted of a

crime for which he was sentenced to serve thirty-eight

months, and this felony conviction may permit his depor-

tation - if only some other nation can be persuaded to

accept him. Mr. Ma is therefore one of thousands of “INS

lifers” - lawfully-admitted resident aliens now held in

what Justice Jackson correctly regarded as “executive

imprisonment” because of “fear of future misconduct,

rather than crimes committed.” Shaughnessy v. United

States ex rel. Mezei (“Mezei”), 345 U.S. 206, 218, 225 (1953)

(Jackson, J., dissenting). Although the United States

would now like to deport them because of past acts, it is

unable to do so. Moreover, unlike most removable aliens,

Mr. Ma and other lifers do not hold the keys to the prison

in their own pockets; they simply cannot decide to go

elsewhere.

Although the Constitution protects all those within

our borders, the government also possesses broad power

to determine who may enter the United States ab initio,

and to detain those whom it rejects pending their even-

tual repatriation. Mezei marks the zenith of this power,

but it was decided in a completely different context from

- —_—_

the case at bench and in any event is readily distinguish-

able. Mezei concerned an applicant who had left the

United States for a significant period of time and whose

subsequent entry was denied for national security rea-

sons. In contrast, Mr. Ma entered after having been

screened and admitted by the government as a legal

resident, and he never left the country.

In attempting to justify Mr. Ma’s indefinite incarcera-

tion, the government asks this Court to treat him as if he

were a first-time applicant at our door, thus stripping him

of his constitutional rights. Petitioners put it this way:

“the heightened constitutional status” accorded Mr. Ma

as a resident alien “no longer applies.” Pet. Br. 50. But the

government has the constitutional principle exactly

wrong. All aliens within the United States are “persons”

fully protected by the Fifth Amendment, and none more

so than legally-admitted permanent residents. When the

United States screened and admitted Mr. Ma, it relin-

quished its ability to treat him as someone outside of our

territorial jurisdiction and outside of the protections of

our Constitution.

Amici submit that neither logic nor precedent support

the government's attempt to deny Mr. Ma the protections

of the Fifth Amendment, and thus convert Mezei into a

sweeping authorization of preventive detention. As a

legally admitted permanent resident who has never left

the country, Mr. Ma’s constitutional status is that of a

deportable alien living in the United States, not an inad-

missible alien standing at the border. Indeed, this is per-

haps the most basic, long-standing distinction in all of

this Court’s jurisprudence governing the treatment of

aliens. Moreover, as we will show, the government's

interest in detaining people already screened and admit-

ted to this country differs markedly from its stake in

refusing to admit large numbers of first-time applicants

for admission. The only doctrine that permits the govern-

ment to treat non-citizens physically within our territory

as if they had never been admitted is the “entry fiction,”

an often-criticized rule that has no application here. This

Court should reject the government's invitation to extend

that rule and effectively create a brand-new “exit fiction.”

°

ARGUMENT

I. ALIENS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ARE PRO-

TECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION, EVEN IN MAT-

TERS RELATING TO THEIR REMOVAL AND

DETENTION.

Mr. Ma was admitted into the United States as a

refugee, became a lawfully admitted permanent resident,

and never left. This Court has long held that aliens within

our physical borders are persons within the meaning of

the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Yick Wo, supra, 118 U.S.

at 369; Wong Wing, supra, 163 U.S. at 238. Concurring in

Wong Wing, Justice Field stated the principle clearly:

“The term ‘person,’ used in the Fifth

Amendment, is broad enough to include any

and every human being within the jurisdiction

of the republic . . . This has been decided so

often that the point does not require argumen!.”

(Id. at 242; concurring and dissenting opinion).

—

Agee

ee a

Wong Wing controls here. In that case, the government

defended a statute authorizing executive imprisonment

of unlawful entrants for one year after the entry of a final

order of deportation. This Court rejected this unwar-

ranted assertion of power. Acknowledging the govern-

ment’s broad power over immigration and the

permissibility of “temporary confinement . . . while

arrangements [are] being made for their deportation” (id.,

163 U.S. at 235), the Court struck down the statute. Quot-

ing Yick Wo’s holding that the Fourteenth Amendment is

“universal in [its] application to all persons within the

territorial jurisdiction, without regard to . . . nationality,”

the Court continued:

“[A]ll persons within the territory of the United

States are entitled to the protection guaranteed

by [the Fifth and Sixth] amendments,

and .. . even aliens shall not be held to answer

for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on

a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor

be deprived of life, liberty or property without

due process of law.” (Id., at 238).

Wong Wing, which involved an alien unlawfully in the

United States, makes the instant case a fortiori. If the Due

Process Clause protected Wong Wing against arbitrary

detention, it must protect those like Mr. Ma —- who were

lawfully admitted to the United States - and that protec-

tion continues even after the entry of an order of removal,

so long as Mr. Ma remains in the United States.

The Wong Wing principle informs the Court's juris-

prudence no less today than a century ago. See, e.g., Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, even aliens

whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long

been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of

law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).?

Il. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE DERIVES

LARGELY FROM THE EXECUTIVE’S SOVEREIGN

INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AN INTEREST

THAT IS ABSENT HERE.

The government claims “plenary” power to incarcer-

ate Mr. Ma by invoking the Executive’s control over

foreign affairs, from which the “plenary power doctrine”

is largely derived. This foreign affairs interest, however,

has little relevance in matters involving aliens like Mr.

Ma whom the government has already screened and

admitted to our country. It is difficult to discern any

meaningful connection to foreign affairs in this case. See

post, part II-B.

A. The Plenary Power Doctrine Was First Devel-

oped - And Is At Its Zenith - In Cases Involv-

ing “Excludable” Aliens

The “plenary power doctrine” originated in The Chi-

nese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130

U.S. 581 (1889). As relevant here, the doctrine is short-

hand for the idea that because authority over immigra-

tion into the United States flows from sovereignty itself -

2 See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,

272-74 (1973) (Fourth Amendment: searches and seizures within

the United States); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282

U.S. 481, 490-91 (1931) (Fifth Amendment: takings clause);

United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1975) (Fifth

Amendment: custodial interrogation).

— nanan

—_— ~~

ee A ne

particularly the need for the sovereign to control relations

with other nations — decisions implementing the immi-

gration power may receive deferential judicial review.*

As its name suggests, The Chinese Exclusion Case

involved the Executive’s exclusion of an alien at the

border, treating him as a first-time entrant without consti-

tutional status. The Court rejected the argument that a

new statute violated Chae Chan Ping’s rights as a “per-

son” under the Fifth Amendment, reasoning that the

exclusion of foreigners was an “incident of sovereignty”:

“To preserve its independence, and give security

against foreign aggression and encroachment, is

the highest duty of every nation, and to attain

3 For descriptions of the plenary power doctrine, see T.

Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the

Constitution, 83 Am. J. Int’t L. 862, 864-69 (1989); Louis Henkin,

The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of

Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 854-63

(1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle

of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sur. Cr. Rev. 255, 256-78;

David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National

Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrt. L. Rev. 165,

166-80 (1983); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of

Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive

Constitutional Rights, 92 Coitum. L. Rev. 1625, 1632-50 (1992);

Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary

Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,

100 Yace L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990); Peter H. Schuck, The

Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Corum. L. Rev. 1, 14-18

(1984); Margaret Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of

Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine,

22 Hastincs Constit. L.Q. 1087, 1128-39 (1995); Charles D.

Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from

the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933,

939-951 (1995).

these ends nearly all other considerations are to

be subordinated. It matters not in what form

such aggression and encroachment come,

whether from the foreign nation acting in its

national character, or from vast hordes of its

people crowding in upon us.” (130 U.S. at 606).

See also Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)

(exclusion decisions of the Executive “are due process of

law” as to “foreigners who have never been naturalized,

nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United

States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to

law.” Emphasis added).*

With respect to excludable aliens, the zenith of the

plenary power doctrine came in Mezei, where the Execu-

tive denied entry to a would-be immigrant for national

security reasons, and then detained him because no other

nation would take him off our hands. The Court, citing

The Chinese Exclusion Case, found Mezei’s detention law-

ful. It emphasized foreign affairs and national security

4 The plenary power doctrine has proved controversial,

generating strong dissents throughout the entire history of its

existence. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,

737 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Where are the limits to such

powers to be found, and by whom are they to be pronounced? Is

it within legislative capacity to declare the limits? If so, then the

mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and despotism

exists”); Mezei, supra, 345 U.S at 226 (Jackson, J., dissenting)

(“Does the power to exclude mean that exclusion may be

continued or effectuated by any means which happen to seem

appropriate to the authorities?”); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 874

(1985) (Marshall J., dissenting) (“Only the most perverse

reading of the Constitution would deny detained aliens the

right to bring constitutional challenges to the most basic

conditions of their confinement”).

a

concerns and Mezei’s status as a new applicant for admis-

sion. Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 210-16.

Mezei, however, applies only to first-time applicants

for admission. Although Mezei had lived in the United

States previously, he abandoned his residence and left the

country for what this Court termed “a protracted

absence.” Id. at 214. When Mezei decided to come back,

he presented himself as a new immigrant, “armed with a

quota immigration visa issued by the American consul in

Budapest.” Id. at 208. In short, he viewed himself and was

viewed by the government and the Court as an applicant

for initial entry.

The significance of Mezei’s status as a new entrant is

shown in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953),

decided the same Term, where the Court recognized the

constitutional status of a merchant seaman who sought

entry after a temporary absence at sea. When the govern-

ment likewise sought to exclude him on national security

grounds, things went quite differently. The Court insisted

that his constitutional rights were greater than those of an

unadmitted alien, saying:

“This preservation of petitioner’s right to due

process does not leave an unprotected spot in

the Nation’s armor. Before petitioner’s admis-

sion to permanent residence, he was required to

satisfy the Attorney General and Congress of his

suitab ‘ity for that status.” (Id. at 602).

Kwong Hai Chew was therefore, “from a constitutional

point of view, a person entitled to procedural due process

under the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 600. But writing just a

short while later for the majority in Mezei, Justice Clark

was at pains to distinguish Kwong Hai Chew as a case

10

involving the constitutional rights of “continuously pre-

sent resident aliens.” In contrast, he explained, new

applicants for admission such as Mezei, who are “no

more ours than theirs,” may be excluded and detained

without a hearing. Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 213, 215-16.

Thus, in the case now at bench, the government advo-

cates a “Mezei result,” shorn of all the limiting principles

that informed that decision. See Pet. Br. 43 (citing The

Chinese Exclusion Case). This assertion gives fresh mean-

ing to Justice Jackson’s prophetic warning that

“Such a practice, once established with the best

of intentions, will drift into oppression of the

disadvantaged in this country as surely as it has

elsewhere.” (Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 226; dis-

senting opinion).

B. The Foreign Affairs Considerations That Might

Support Detention of Excludable Aliens Are

Not Present Here.

A constant theme of the Court’s plenary power deci-

sions is the relationship between the political branches’

control over immigration and their ability to conduct

foreign affairs. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.

415, 424-25 (1999); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977);

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972); United

States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542

(1950); The Chinese Exclusion Case, supra, 130 US. at

604-07.° Yet, the foreign policy concerns that animated

° Many commentators have documented this relationship

as well. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, ForeiGN AFFairs AND THE

ConsTITUTION, 23, 289-91 (1972); Louis Henkin, The Constitution

11

Mezei and other cases involving the detention of exclud-

able or inadmissible aliens are absent here. Here the alien

was screened by immigration officials, admitted lawfully

for residence, and he has remained in the United States

and developed substantial ties with and in our society.

Regrettably, Mr. Ma did not live up to our aspirations.

His removal has been ordered in light of the govern-

ment’s proof, in an individualized proceeding, that he

committed a felony. But according Mr. Ma his constitu-

tional rights does not “leave an unprotected spot in the

Nation’s armor.” Kwong Hai Chew, supra, 344 U.S. at 602.

This is not a case where foreign nations threaten our

sovereignty by forcing large numbers of would-be immi-

grants upon us.®

and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and

its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 858-63 (1987); Stephen H.

Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary

Congressional Power, 1984 Sur. Cr. Rev. 255, 261-269; T. Alexander

Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7

Const. COMMENTARY 9, 12 (1990).

6 Post-Mezei decisions upholding the detention of

excludable aliens rest upon the claim — wholly inapplicable here -

that detention is necessary to protect our nation from the influx of

large numbers of unwanted immigrants. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson,

727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)

(asserting that release of excludable aliens “would ultimately

result in our losing control over our borders. A foreign leader

could eventually compel us to grant physical admission via

parole to any aliens he wished by the simple expedient of sending

them here and then refusing to take them back”); Barrera-

Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir; en banc), cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 976 (i995) (quoting Jean); Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney

General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).

Neither is this a case, such as Aguirre-Aguirre, supra, 526

U.S. at 423-32, addressing the substantive ground for

12

Indeed, the government does not seriously advance

any meaningful foreign policy consideration justifying

unlimited detention of Mr. Ma. The only foreign policy

argument the government even mentions in passing is an

assertion that if it cannot keep Mr. Ma under lock-and-

key for howsoever long it wishes, this “could be misin-

terpreted” by other nations “to imply that the United

States believes that removal of the criminal alien is futile,

contrary to the position of the United States, speaking

with one voice through the Executive Branch.” Pet. Br. 44.

Respectfully, the record is bereft of any statement, under

oath, by any Executive officer, suggesting that it is or ever

was a principle of our foreign policy to hold resident

aliens hostage until their countries of birth capitulate to

our repatriation demands. Neither does the record indi-

cate that an inability to detain Mr. Ma interferes with our

nation’s relations with Cambodia. Moreover, this newly-

minted “justification” would seemingly support indefi-

nite incarceration of all removable aliens, not just those

labeled “dangerous,” which appears to be counter to the

government's claim of limited employment of the deten-

tion power.

Unable to present any meaningful foreign affairs evi-

dence, Petitioners offer irrelevant diversion, repeatedly

labeling Mr. Ma a former “gang member,” whose past

activities endanger the public safety, even though he has

withholding deportation, where the question was whether the

non-citizen’s conduct in his home country was political or not.

Here, the only grounds for deportation and detention relate to

Respondent's past conduct wholly within the United States.

Unlike Aguirre-Aguirre, the legal issue in the case at hand does

not involve foreign affairs at all.

ET .

13

served “almost the maximum sentence that could be

ordered based on his criminal record.” Pet. Br. 2-4. But all

this opprobrium only succeeds in demonstrating that this

case has nothing to do with Executive primacy in foreign

affairs, and everything to do with preventive detention

vel non.

Amici submit that this Court marked the proper

bounds of plenary power in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919

(1983). It refused to apply that doctrine where no signifi-

cant connection to foreign affairs had been demonstrated.

While noting the existence of the plenary power doctrine,

the Court struck down a statute permitting a legislative

veto of the Attorney General’s decision to withhold indi-

viduals’ deportations because Congress chose a constitu-

tionally impermissible means to implement its power. See

id. at 940-41, and S. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 299-303

(discussing Chadha).

Ill. NEITHER MR. MA’S STATUS AS “ORDERED

REMOVED” NOR THE “ENTRY FICTION”

SANCTION THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT

TO TREAT MR. MA AS A FIRST-TIME APPLI-

CANT FOR ADMISSION.

We have thus far noted that non-citizens who are

present in the United States are protected by the Consti-

tution, and that the plenary power doctrine applies much

less forcefully to persons admitted to the United States

than to people at the border seeking admission. The only

recognized exception to this territorial distinction — the

“entry fiction” — is a narrow doctrine not relevant here.

This fiction does not permit the government to strip

14

persons like Mr. Ma of many of their protections under

the Constitution and relegate them to the diminished

status of first-time applicants for admission.

A. This Court Has Applied The Plenary Power

Doctrine To Lawfully Admitted Permanent Res-

idents To A Lesser Extent Than To Non-Citi-

zens Seeking Admission.

Even in matters relating to their removal, aliens law-

fully admitted to our country are treated differently than

those at the border seeking first-time admission. The

development of the plenary power doctrine makes this

difference clear.

The Court's first application of the plenary power

doctrine to aliens within our borders came in Fong Yue

Ting v. United States, supra, where the majority said that

the powers both to exclude and deport “rest upon one

foundation, are derived from one source, are supported

by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and

the same power.” 149 U.S. at 713. The dissenting Justices,

however, distinguished between Congress’ power over

admitted and non-admitted aliens, building upon Yick

Wo’s statement of the general principle that constitutional

rights protect all “within the territorial jurisdiction.” Yick

Wo, supra, 118 U.S. at 369. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 US. at

734-37 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 746 (Field, J., dissent-

ing); id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).

Next came Wong Wing, supra, in which both the

majority of the Court and the concurrence of Justice Field

- who authored the opinion of the Court in The Chinese

Exclusion Case — drew a sharp distinction between the

15

constitutional principles relevant to expulsion and to

detention pending expulsion, even though Wong Wing

was subject to a final order of removal. See ante, part I.

These ideas again flowered in Yamataya v. Fisher, 189

U.S. 86 (1903). Yamataya entered the United States, but

was later arrested on the ground that she was a pauper

and thus ineligible to become a permanent resident. The

government insisted in Yamataya that its “plenary

powers” trumped the Fifth Amendment, saying that

deportation “merely enforces the withholding of the priv-

ilege of coming or remaining here[.]”” But writing for the

Court, Justice Harlan rejected this argument, declaring

that the Act sub judice must be interpreted to “bring [it]

into harmony with the Constitution,” and therefore must

afford what we now call “administrative due process” in

deportation proceedings. Id. at 101.

Ever since Yamataya, this Court has steadfastly

enforced its commitment to protecting people who have

developed social ties to this country by consistently

adhering to the sharp distinction between aliens who

have been admitted as permanent residents and those

who have not. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“aliens receive constitutional

protections when they have come within the territory of

the United States and developed substantial connections

with this country”); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,

187 (1958) (“our immigration laws have long made a

distinction between those aliens who have come to our

7 Id. at 93 (reporter's summary of the argument of the

government’s counsel). Much the same argument is now

recycled here, at Pet. Br. 43-44.

16

shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within

the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legal-

ity”).

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), sharply illus-

trates this critical distinction. There, a resident alien

briefly left the United States and was caught smuggling _

aliens upon her return. The government argued that she

should be treated as if she were an “excludable” alien,

much as it now does here. Pet. Br. 49-50. But in an

opinion for eight members of the Court (and with Justice

Marshall «Jncurring), Justice O’Connor disagreed and

held that although Plasencia’s right to return to the

United States could be determined in a process labeled

“exclusion,” she was nevertheless protected by the Due

Process Clause. “[O]nce an alien gains admission to our

country and begins to develop the ties that go with

permanent residence, his constitutional status changes

accordingly.” Id. at 32; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,

306-07 (1993) (detention of aliens during the deportation

process must be measured by the Due Process Clause).

The Court in Plasencia thus determined that a perma-

nent resident has a liberty interest protected by the Con-

stitution even when she stands outside the physical

boundary of our country, making it clear that even in

matters relating to removal — matters in which the gov-

ernment asserts “plenary power” — resident aliens still

enjoy substantial protections under the Fifth Amend-

ment.

——--

17

B. The Sole Exception to Territorial Standing -

The “Entry Fiction” - Does Not Apply To

Aliens Admitted as Permanent Residents.

The cases discussed above stand for the proposition

that once a person has lawfully entered our country, and

has been accepted into our midst, he is not treated in the

same fashion as one arriving at the border for the first

time, hat in hand, seeking admission. The sole exception

to this principle is the “entry fiction,” a peculiarity that

applies only to aliens who have not yet been granted

admission into the United States. In arguing that admit-

ting Mr. Ma gave him some “heightened” status other-

wise unavailable to other aliens (Pet. Br. 50), the

government seemingly ignores the basic principle that all

people, including aliens, are “persons” within the mean-

ing of the Fifth Amendment. Admitting Mr. Ma to this

country as a resident alien did not turn him into a “per-

son;” rather, it terminated any ability to apply the “entry

fiction,” a narrow exception to the doctrine of general

application of the Fifth Amendment.

Mezei makes this plain. There the Court emphasized

that Mezei’s “harborage at Ellis Island [was] not an entry

into the United States.” Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 213.

Distinguishing Kwong Hai Chew, Justice Clark wrote for

the Court that Mezei was merely “on the threshold of

initial entry[.]” Id. at 212. What permitted this Court to

uphold Mezei’s detention was the legal fiction that he

was outside of our country’s territory while sitting at

Ellis Island, and thus not yet entitled to the full protec-

tion of our Constitution.

18

Amici submit that time has not treated Mezei kindly,*

and there are reasons to reconsider its holding, partic-

ularly in light of the last five decades of decisions about

detention and due process.’ It is unlikely that the five

justices who formed the majority in Mezei could have

foreseen the consequences of their ruling; Mezei has been

invoked to uphold long-term detention of non-admitted

aliens under procedures markedly different than those

approved under this Court's later-developed due process

framework. Further, Mezei was decided at a time of par-

ticular concern about national security.'° Even so, this

5 See C. Weisselberg, suy»ra note 3, at 985-86 n.267 (collecting

authorities criticizing Mezei). interestingly, though Mezei was

excluded without a hearing due to claims of national security,

the Attorney General later authorized a hearing. The hearing

officers upheld the grounds for exclusion but recommended

that Mezei nevertheless be released. The Attorney General

followed that recommendation. See id. at 970-84.

9 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (“Due

process requires that the nature of commitment bear some

reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is

committed”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“civil

commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant

deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection”);

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (individual held as

unfit to stand trial cannot be committed for more than a

reasonable period necessary to determine whether he will

become competent in the foreseeable future).

'0 Mezei was denied an exclusion hearing, but this denial

occurred because of the special circumstances of a narrowly-

tailored exception, permitting the Executive to “exclude

without a hearing when the exclusion is based on confidential

information the disclosure of which may be prejudicial to the

public interest.” Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 210-11. Those special

and seldom-occurring concerns are not remotely present here.

19

Court need not overturn Mezei to conclude that Mr. Ma is

entitled to the full protection of our Constitution. Quite

simply, Mezei ought not to be extended to lawfully-admit-

ted resident aliens.!!

As well, the “entry fiction” adumbrated in Mezei

exists solely to accommodate the Executive’s grace in

releasing applicant-aliens on “parole” for “humanitarian

reasons” (8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)) pending their admis-

_ sion or their eventual repatriation. Parole eschews need-

less confinement during the review process. Accordingly,

the entry fiction simply facilitates release on immigration

parole and does not change an unadmitted alien’s status;

he constructively remains at the border seeking admis-

sion.'? But the humanitarian purpose informing the entry

‘| The government suggests that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)

should be applied identically to admitted and unadmitted

aliens. See Pet. Br. 48. But that is not necessarily required. This

Court has previously construed the former exclusion statute to

require different procedures for resident aliens and first-time

applicants for admission. See Plasencia, supra, 459 U.S. at 31-35

(alien’s re-admission to the United States could be determined

in an exclusion proceeding, though she would be entitled to

greater process than owed a prospective new entrant); Kwong

Hai Chew, supra, 344 U.S. at 600 (returning alien “is entitled to

due process without regard to whether or not, for immigration

purposes, he is to be treated as an entrant alien”).

12 See Leng May Ma, supra, 357 U.S. at 190 (immigration

parole reflects “the humane qualities of an enlightened

civilization” and refusal to apply the entry fiction “would be

quite likely to prompt some curtailment of current parole policy

- an intention we are reluctant to impute to the Congress”);

Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 215 (“temporary harborage, an act of

legislative grace, bestows no additional rights”); United States v.

Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (petitioner, although physically

20

fiction would be wholly disserved by accepting the gov-

ernment’s invitation to create a new legal fiction — the

“exit fiction,”!3 perhaps - and using that fiction to estab-

lish a lacuna in the law, a place where the Fifth Amend-

ment somehow does not fully apply.

The entry fiction therefore does not serve the govern-

ment in this case. The Executive may certainly insist that

an immigration parolee gain no legal advantage by virtue

of this generosity, but that is poles apart from allowing

the government to create a new “exit fiction” for resident

aliens, simply because it is frustrated in its ability to

repatriate a person whom it has lawfully admitted but

cannot presently remove. The government's proposal

should be rejected under the principles of Yamataya, Wong

Wing and Plasencia, each holding that a resident alien’s

prospective “deportability” does not strip him of his sub-

stantive and procedural rights as a “person” under the

Fifth Amendment. This Court has never held that an

order of deportation breaks a resident's continued physi-

cal presence within our borders, and the government

cannot change things by the legerdemain it advances

here. Amici submit that the government’s proposed “exit

fiction” is at least one fiction too many.

within our boundaries, is to be regarded as if he had been

stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction, and kept there while his

right to enter was under debate”).

13 See Order and Tentative Ruling, Chea Phoeng v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, No. Civ. S-98-1299 (E.D.

Cal. May 21, 1999), at 10 (applying what the court termed the

“exit fiction”).

21

IV. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE DOES NOT

PRECLUDE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE GOV-

ERNMENT’S REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING

THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVAL.

Amici respectfully submit that resident aliens have a

liberty interest protected by the Constitution, and they

may not be incarcerated indefinitely if removal cannot be

accomplished. In Wong Wing, supra, 163 U.S. at 235, the

Court validated “detention, or temporary confinement, as

part of the means necessary to give effect to the provi-

sions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens[.]”

(Emphasis added). Detention may be justified only as a

means to an end; surely it may not be justified if the end

is beyond timely reach.

The government argues that deference is due when

deportation cannot be effected because “the recalcitrance

of another nation raise[s] the very type of serious ques-

tions affecting international relations and foreign policy

that require such deference.” Pet. Br. 44. As noted, foreign

affairs are rarely if ever implicated in matters relating to

removal of already-admitted resident aliens. See ante,

part II. But even were it otherwise, courts regularly

decide cases that affect international affairs. As this Court

stated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), not every

case that “touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial

cognizance.” Foreign policy considerations did not, for

example, prevent the judiciary from reaching the merits

of claims concerning the Executive’s refusal to impose

trade sanctions (Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean

Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986)), the Executive’s inter-

pretation of the Warsaw Convention (Trans World Airlines

v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 254 n.25 (1984)), or

22

the validity of an Executive agreement ending the Iran

hostage crisis (Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,

669-74 (1981)).

Similarly, under the Alien Tort Claims Act!4 and the

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,!5 courts have care-

fully examined the liability of former foreign officials for

torture and similar violations of international law com-

mitted on foreign soil.!© As well, the right to be free from

prolonged arbitrary detention is found not solely in the

Constitution; this protection is also supported by interna-

tional law. For example, the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, which the United States has

ratified, prohibits arbitrary detention and mandates judi-

cial review.'” Federal courts have recognized this “clear

international prohibition” against prolonged and arbi-

trary detention in cases involving both overseas and

domestic detentions. !8

14 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

1S Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at note

following 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

16 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789,

791-92 (9th Cir. 1996) (suit involving actions of former

Philippine government officials); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d

876, 885-889 (2d Cir. 1980) (Paraguayan military personnel);

Paul v. Avril, 901 F.Supp. 330, 335 (S.D.Fla. 1994) (former Haitian

military ruler).

7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 168, U.N.

Doc. A/6316 (1967) at art. 9, para. 1, 4.

18 Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th

Cir. 1998). See also De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770

F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985).

23

An alien has a clear interest in being free from deten-

tion pending removal when removal may not reasonably

take place. Where, as here, a non-citizen alleges that his

Executive incarceration amounts to impermissible pun-

ishment, courts must ask, at a minimum, whether there is

a rational non-punitive purpose for the detention and

whether it is excessive in relation to that purpose. See

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Schall v.

Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984). To weigh the claim that

detention is necessary for the “non-punitive” purpose of

effecting removal, courts can and must decide whether

the prospects of removal are clear or ephemeral, even if

such review may somehow touch on foreign affairs.

Courts surely ought not be disabled from inquiring into

the factual basis of the government’s claim that removal

may occur in the foreseeable future, as well as whether

the nature of the government’s claim has changed as

detention has continued. These inquiries do not “inter-

fere” with the Executive’s negotiations with foreign

nations. They are not inquiries into, or “second guessing”

of, the bona fides of Executive negotiations with other

nations. Rather, they simply inquire into the fact-bound

question of the progress and prospects of those negotia-

tions.

For this reason, the suggestion of inappropriate judi-

cial second-guessing (Pet. Br. 43-44) is not well-taken. The

actual determinations made by the district court in the

case at bench represent a typical and limited scope of

review. The government says that the processes of nego-

tiating repatriation treaties are often sensitive and diffi-

cult matters. Pet. Br. 44. The courts below neither

24

disagreed with this assessment, nor criticized the Execu-

tive for proceeding at whatever pace of negotiations it

deems appropriate or necessary under these circum-

stances. Per contra, the courts simply determined that the

objective facts placed in evidence by the government

justified the common-sense conclusion that Mr. Ma’‘s

deportation is not likely to occur very soon. This was not

“second guessing” any more than was a Texas prison

guard’s conclusion, broadcast on a national radio pro-

gram, that “everybody’s got a release date here. Except

INS.” 19

Accordingly, judicial review does not invade the

Executive’s turf in any inappropriate way. Indeed, the

district court’s conclusion was consistent with the princi-

ple — first expressed in Wong Wing, supra, and never

doubted since - that so long as he remains within the

territory of the United States, even a deportable alien

remains entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amend-

ment. The farther Mr. Ma stands from permissible “tem-

porary confinement . . . while arrangements [are] being

made for [his] deportation,” (Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235),

the greater is the government's burden to show an appro-

priate justification.

19 This American Life, Immigration, Act Three: Man Without a

Country. (WBEZ Chicago radio broadcast October 13, 2000) at

http:// www.thislife.org.

25

CONCLUSION

The judgment below should be affirmed.

Dated: December 26, 2000

Respectfully submitted,

Georce A. CUMMING, JR.

Counsel of Record

Broseck, PHiecer & Harrison LLP

CuHartes D. WEISSELBERG

CENTER FOR CLINICAL EDUCATION

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

Law Professors

26

LIST OF LAW FACULTY WHO HAVE JOINED

THE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE

(Law schools are listed for identification only)

Professor Carolyn Patty Blum

University of California

School of Law (Boalt Hall)

Berkeley, California

Professor Richard A. Boswell

University of California

Hastings College of the Law

San Francisco, California

Erwin Chemerinsky

Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law,

Legal Ethics and Political Science

University of Southern California Law School

Los Angeles, California

Michael J. Churgin

Raybourne Thompson Centennial Professor

University of Texas

School of Law

Austin, Texas

Professor Sarah H. Cleveland

University of Texas

School of Law

Austin, Texas

Professor Mary L. Dudziak

University of Southern California Law School

Los Angeles, CA

_—

27

Professor Michael G. Heyman

John Marshall Law School

Chicago, Illinois

Professor Kevin R. Johnson

University of California at Davis

School of Law

Davis, California

Professor Daniel Kanstroom

Boston College Law School

Boston, Massachusetts

Stephen H. Legomsky

Charles F. Nagel Professor of International and

Comparative Law

Washington University School of Law

St. Louis, Missouri

Professor M. Isabel Medina

Loyola University

School of Law

New Orleans, Louisiana

Gerald L. Neuman

Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence

Columbia University

School of Law

New York, New York

Protessor Carol Sanger

Columbia University

School of Law

New York, New York

Peter H. Schuck

Simeon E. Baldwin Professor

Yale Law School

New Haven, Connecticut

28

Professor Andrew Silverman

University of Arizona

College of Law

Tucson, Arizona

Professor Peter J. Spiro

Hofstra University

School of Law

Hempstead, New York

Professor Irwin P. Stotzky

University of Miami

School of Law

Miami, Florida

Professor Margaret Taylor

Wake Forest University

School of Law

Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Professor Leti Volpp

American University

Washington College of Law

Washington, D.C.

Professor Charles D. Weisselberg

University of California

School of Law (Boalt Hall)

Berkeley, California

Professor Michael Wishnie

New York University

School of Law

New York, New York

Professor Larry W. Yackle

Boston University

School of Law

Boston, Massachusetts