Amicus Curiae Brief — Miller v. French

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Nos. 99-224 and 99-582 | reo

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHARLES B. MILLER, Superintendent,

Pendleton Correctional Facility, et al., Petitioners,

VS.

RICHARD A. FRENCH, et al., Respondents,

--- AND ---

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

VS.

RICHARD A. FRENCH, et al., Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER

CHARLES L. HOBSON

Attorney of Record

Criminal Justice Legal Fdn.

2131 L Street

Sacramento, CA 95816

Phone: (916) 446-0345

Fax: (916) 446-1194

E-mail: cjlf@cjlf.org

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

Lhe pt

QUESTION PRESENTED

Litigation Reform Act’s automatic stay

18 U.S. C. §3626(e)(2), violate the

powers

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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IES udu tscocecs dé cucncescesecééuc 3

GEE ho cwceccccnsdsteccceccesscncccesecseces 5

The PLRA’s unambiguous language should not be ignored

to avoid a nonexistent constitutional problem ......... 5

The separation-of-powers doctrine does not hermetically

SPP SEED ccc cccccasccccsucccessenecs 6

Ill

The PLRA’s automatic stay provision is a procedural rule

intended to check an excess of the Judiciary ......... 11

Pi PED o Soctackécecccrecacccscesiess 11

Be PMD wweccccccccccccctctecssoceces 18

Congress has neither assumed a judicial function nor

interfered impermissibly with the Judiciary’s

constitutionally assigned function ................. 20

i ee es eo deeseees 21

B. Law and retroactivity ............00ceeeeeee 24

C. Schedules and judicial power................ 28

Ce... cicccceesseebe6eésentaseuedeouneunt 30

Appendix: 18 U. S.C. § 3626 ..... 6.6.6 cece ees A-!

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391,

SUS Ge SOST GOEED bcccvccccestesboscccece 19,

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224,

140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998) ...........

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500,

12 L. Ed. 2d 992, 84 S. Ct. 1659 (1964) .............

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583,

Se as GR. FOES GOED oc cc csensdevccecceccecevece

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659,

Fs GE GER CROTED cc cccccccvcescccecscecseces 7

California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287,

68 L. Ed. 2d 101, 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981) ...........

Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416,

134 L. Ed. 2d 613, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996) ..........

Casey v. Lewis, 43 F. 3d 1261 (CA9 1991)............

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U. S. 300,

131 L. Ed. 2d 403, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995) ..........

Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18,

17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) .............

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,

478 U. S. 833, 92 L. Ed. 2d 675, 106 S. Ct. 3245

EE boskeucdbuadbhabebensoucseetesiesenesees

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast

Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568,

99 L. Ed. 2d 645, 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988) ............

Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative

Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480,

84 L. Ed. 2d 455, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985S) ........... 29

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87,

DE. BE SERED hv cc cevedetecccvccncesvspe 9, 23

French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437

SEdEy DUE nc vnccaddsdcocsensess 2, 3, 5, 6, 20, 26, 28

French v. Owens, 777 F. 2d 1250 (CA7 1985) .......... 2

Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F. 3d 1081 (CA8 1997) ........ 23

Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F. 3d 925 (CA6 1998) ........ 5, 23

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8,

BO, Ge, SERGE oc ccc ccavccecvensésscenaete 10

Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U. S. 870, 79 L. Ed. 2d 878,

BO Ge CEE ov cccccccsnnsnsdscsncecses 30

Hook v. State of Arizona, 120 F. 3d 921

CD PIS. néuveveesdseisecesdeseseesscées 13,14

Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93,

139 L. Ed. 2d 450, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997) ........... 21

In re Blodgett, 502 U. S. 236, 116 L. Ed. 2d 669,

BES EGR GES Gee vnc cecvescocsevesscsedes 18, 19

INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317,

SED B. Ca. THRO GIR cc wccccsccvcccses 7, 8, 9, 10, 20

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750,

90 L. Ed. 1557, 66 S. Ct. 1239 (1946) ...........5.. 22

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606,

SERS. Gh SPO ee ocnedebavanesouccesisdveds 14

Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748,

135 L. Ed. 2d 36, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996) ............ 7

vii

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,

16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) ............ 10

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,

102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) ..... 7, 8, 9, 20

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654,

101 L. Ed. 2d 569, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) ........... 7

NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345,

37 L. Ed. 2d 648, 93 S. Ct. 2591 (1973) ............ 29

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342,

96 L. Ed. 2d 282, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) ........... 17

Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler,

427 U. S. 424, 49 L. Ed. 2d 599, 96 S. Ct. 2697

NEE oa bid ented acuadhbeddeddvacocaiaas bas 19, 25

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,

59 U. S. (18 How.) 421, 15 L. Ed. 435

SE b6abetebkesdvasddsasecvendeececeie 24, 25, 27

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,

131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 115 S. Ct. 1447

SP cviriseybecsatendsuness 9, 10, 11, 20, 22, 24, 28

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475,

36 L. Ed. 2d 439, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973) ............ 17

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396,

40 L. Ed. 2d 224, 94S. Ct. 1800 (1974) ............ 17

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429,

118 L. Ed. 2d 73, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992) ........... 23

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367,

116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) ........ 18, 26

Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Texas 1980) ... 15

Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ... 18

Vili

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 85 L. Ed. 479,

GSB Gh GPE ck svceccccdvcnccecicessecess 10

System Federation v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642,

5 L. Ed. 2d 349, 81 S. Ct. 368 (1961) ........... 26, 28

United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310,

110 L. Ed. 2d 287, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) .......... 29

United States v. Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128,

YS Fee 3, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23

United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84,

85 L. Ed. 2d 64, 105 S. Ct. 1785 (1985) ............ 29

United States v. Padelford, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 531,

PPE. BE, FRG ccccccccvccccvcsscedocsesen 21

United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739,

95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987) ........... 29

United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371,

65 L. Ed. 2d 844, 100 S. Ct. 2716 (1980) ........... 23

United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,

76 L. Ed. 999, 52 S. Ct. 460 (1932) ........ cc eee ees 26

Wright v. Rushen, 642 F. 2d 1129 (CA9 1981)......... 17

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579,

96 L. Ed. 1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952) .............. 7,8

United States Statutes

$0 GL B.C. GRU. cvcccccsecéccbateverineduceseves 28

ins ty) Perrier yr re 29

DO ULG. C. 6 FRBRIEED . ccc cccccccccccsccccvsctenes 29

18 Ui &. C. SPEGIID 0 ccc cldccccccccccccsscvenvee 29

PG UI Nae 2,27

Whe We Ge ID on cvcccccccceccocccesese 15

re ae GE 6 vcccosnedecceesveses 2, 5, 6, 10

Fe es Es cis beceedkdiccsccceeoci 2, 5,6

SE EEE “ab Nuc (ie dds tisunebbe es camacude 27

I a Ns i al 22

IS a Da eS ee 29

Se a 5.0.6 Kecdbeeauceendcbecevecacss 29

Rule of Court

FE RARER Pgh ee nae any arene REE 22

Treatise

R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro,

Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the

Federal System (4th ed. 1996) ...............0000. 21

Miscellaneous

J. Dilulio, No Escape (1991) .........cccceccccceces 1]

Dilulio, The Old Regime and the Ruiz Revolution:

The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Texas Prisons,

in Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution

a wkekesd bchdsbarecdedssiecnceses 16

Feeley & Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the

Modern State (1998) .............0. 11, 12, 14, 16, 17

OO0 CUMS. TAGS. DO SSO CITGO) 2 occ cccccccccccccccces 17

Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding,

FE ee Es CHP CUE ove dcececcciccccccces 15

M. Boot, Out of Order (1998) ......... 0c cece ee eee 12

Chilton & Talarico, Politics and Constitutional

Interpretation in Prison Reform Litigation: The Case

of Guthrie v. Evans, in Courts, Corrections, and the

Constitution (Dilulio ed. 1990) .............45. 13,14

Cripe, Courts, Corrections and the Constitution:

A Practitioner’s View, in Courts, Corrections, and

the Constitution (Dilulio ed. 1990) .......... 12, 16, 19

Decker, Consent Decrees and the Prison Litigation Reform

Act of 1995: Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial

Micro-Management, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 1275 ..... 15, 27

Dilulio, Enhancing Judicial Capacity, in Courts,

Corrections, and the Constitution (Dilulio ed. 1990)... 11

Engel & Rothman, The Paradox of Prison Reform:

Rehabilitation, Prisoner’s Rights, and Violence,

7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 413 (1984) ..........-4.. 17

The Federalist (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) .......... 7, 8,9, 10

Hagedorn, The Consequences of Federal District Court

Intervention into Prisons and Jails: Philadelphia, Texas,

and Arizona (Brookings Institution 1995) ..... 15, 16, 17

Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the

Legislative Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888 (1998) .. 21, 22

Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’

Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein

Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1189..............48. 21

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHARLES B. MILLER, Superintendent,

Pendleton Correctional Facility, et al., Petitioners,

vs.

RICHARD A. FRENCH, et al., Respondents,

--- AND ---

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

VS.

RICHARD A. FRENCH, et al., Respondents.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)!' is a non-

profit California corporation organized to participate in

litigation relating to the criminal justice system as it affects the

public interest. CJLF seeks to bring the constitutional protec-

tions of the accused into balance with the rights of the victim

and of society to rapid, efficient, and reliable determination of

guilt and swift execution of punishment.

Rule 37.6 Statement: This brief was written entirely by counsel for

amicus, as listed on the cover, and not by counsel for any party. No

ree contributions were made to the preparation or submission of

is brief.

All parties have given written consent to the filing of this brief.

The automatic stay component of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act is an important part of Congress’s effort to limit

excessive judicial intrusion in prison management. The cost of

compliance with court orders in these cases threatens the ability

of states to continue the tough sentencing policies that have

dramatically reduced crime and saved many innocent persons

in recent years. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to strike down

the automatic stay is thus contrary to the interests CJLF was

formed to protect.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

This case started over 20 years ago with prisoner-initiated,

class action litigation over the conditions at what is now

Pendleton Correctional Facility in Indiana. French v. Duck-

worth, 178 F. 3d 437, 438 (CA7 1999). The District Court

found that the prison conditions violated both Indiana law and

the United States Constitution. The remedy was a permanent

injunction ordering “detailed changes” in prison conditions.

French v. Owens, 777 F. 2d 1250, 1251 (CA7 1985). The

Seventh Circuit affirmed much of the order. See id., at 1258.

The prison has been operating under this injunction ever since,

subject to periodic modifications. 178 F. 3d, at 438.

The current round of litigation comes from Indiana’s

attempt to modify the injunction to conform to the new stand-

ards of the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See

18 U.S. C. §3626(a)(1). Under 18 U.S. C. § 3626(e)(2), the

decree is automatically stayed if the District Court does not rule

on the motion to modify within 30 days. Subdivision (e)(3)

allows the court to postpone the automatic stay for up to 60

days “for good cause,” other than a congested docket.

On June 5, 1997, Indiana filed a motion to terminate the

decree. French v. Duckworth, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 440. On

June 30, 1997, the prisoners responded with a motion asking

the court to stay the automatic stay provision of § 3626(e)(2).

Id., at 440. The trial court granted the prisoners a Temporary

Restraining Order (“TRO”) on July 3, 1997, suspending the

automatic stay provision. The court converted the TRO to a

preliminary injunction on July 11, 1997. Indiana appealed from

that order.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction.

The panel held that subdivision (e)(2)’s self-executing time

limit was “an unconstitutional intrusion on the power of the

courts to adjudicate cases.” /d., at 446. The Seventh Circuit

further held that the automatic stay imposed a rule of decision

on a pending case contrary to the holding of United States v.

Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). French, supra, 178

F. 3d, at 446-447.

The Seventh Circuit denied Indiana’s motion for a rehearing

en banc, with Judges Easterbrook, Posner, and Manion dissent-

ing. See id., at 448. On December 6, 1999, this Court granted

Indiana’s and the United States’ certiorari petitions.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The PLRA’s automatic stay provision cannot be construed

to give courts the discretion to ignore it. Its language is

unambiguous, and the automatic stay is constitutional as

written. This Court should decline the United States’ invitation

to rewrite the statute.

The separation-of-powers doctrine does not hermetically

seal the three branches from each other. This doctrine, although

designed primarily to protect against the tyrannical aggregation

of power by one branch, also promotes a capable and account-

able government. The founders reconciled these interests by

separating the powers through the Constitution’s system of

checks and balances. The Constitution does not seal off the

three branches, but creates a duty of interdependence between

them.

In the relationship between Congress and the Judiciary,

Congress is the generalist, creating broad rules of general

application, while the Judiciary is the particularist, applying the

given rules to specific cases. This leaves Congress with

considerable power over the operation of the courts. The rules

of evidence and the federal harmless error rule are examples of

congressional authority over a court’s decisionmaking. Because

the automatic stay neither impermissibly interferes with the

Judiciary’s function of deciding cases, nor assumes that

function, it does not violate the separation of powers.

The PLRA is Congress’s attempt to check the excesses of

the federal Judiciary in prison civil rights litigation. Too many

courts have used their equitable powers to remake and manage

prisons in these cases. Judicial authority has been involved in

every aspect of running a prison system, from the type of

cleaner to be used to clean the prison to the design and con-

struction of entire prisons. Every state and the federal govern-

ment have had at least some prisons or jails under judicial

control. The comprehensive usurpation of prison management

by federal district court judges is a direct assault against both

federalism and the separation of powers.

The automatic stay is an important part of Congress’s

solution to this constitutional problem. Federalism and the

separation of powers are continuously violated so long as prison

systems operate under decrees that exceed the constitutional

minimums. The automatic stay places the federal courts on a

schedule in order to promptly relieve penal institutions from the

burden of improper judicial interference with their operations.

Nothing in the Constitution prevents this rule of procedure.

The automatic stay does not violate United States v. Klein.

Klein is an unusual case that has since been limited. This case

now applies only when Congress tells a court how to decide a

pending case without changing the underlying law. The

automatic stay does not come under this holding. Courts still

retain the authority to decide cases. The statute involves the

rights and duties of the parties pending the decision. Further-

more, Congress can and has changed the underlying law,

making the present case even more removed from Klein.

The statute in the present case neither retroactively reopens

a final judgment, nor effects a review of an Article III court. A

long line of cases starting with Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &

Belmont Bridge Co. have held that a court’s exercise of its

injunctive power does not create a final judgment. In Wheeling

Bridge, Congress was allowed to effectively overturn one of

this Court’s decisions because an injunction is a continuing

decree and therefore subject to subsequent changes in the law.

From a separation-of-powers perspective, the PLRA’s auto-

matic stay is comparatively minor compared to what Congress

was allowed to do in Wheeling Bridge. Because Congress can

effectively terminate a continuing injunction, it surely may

suspend one pending a determination of whether it is legal

under current law.

Placing a court on a schedule through the mechanism of an

automatic stay is consistent with the separation of powers. The

Seventh Circuit’s holding would strike down many congres-

sional limits on the Judiciary’s administrative independence,

including the bankruptcy law’s automatic stay. Congress has

often set priorities for courts to rule on cases. The only

difference is that now Congress has set a specific time limit.

This distinction has no constitutional significance.

ARGUMENT

I. The PLRA’s unambiguous language should not be

ignored to avoid a nonexistent constitutional problem.

The United States argues that in order to avoid rendering the

Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) automatic stay provi-

sion unconstitutional, courts must have the discretion to enjoin

it from operating automatically. See French v. Duckworth, 178

F. 3d 437, 442 (CA7 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F. 3d 925,

936-937 (CA6 1998), rev’d on other grounds, Martin v. Hadix,

527 U.S. _, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 119 S. Ct. 1998 (1999). This

is an unacceptable use of a statutory canon in circumstances

where it is unnecessary. The statutory language cannot support

this proposed interpretation. Furthermore, this argument is

unnecessary as the automatic stay provision is constitutional as

it is written. See Part IV, post.

The discussion of any interpretation of the PLRA’s auto-

matic stay begins and ends with the statutory language of 18

U.S. C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3). See Appendix.

The provision’s heart is in one word in its first sentence:

“Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief under

subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period . . . .”

§ 3626(e)(2) (emphasis added). This mandatory language

unambiguously states that the stay is automatic. The only

discretion given to the court is whether to delay the stay for “not

more than 60 days” after finding good cause. The narrowness

of subdivision (e)(3)’s exception undermines any alternative

reading. If “good cause” only justifies a 60-day extension,

Congress could not have meant to allow the court to take the

“normal equitable considerations,” French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at

442, into account before exercising its discretion to issue a

longer stay.

“Shall” means “shall.” It does not mean maybe. Although

it is acceptable to interpret statutes to avoid “serious constitu-

tional problems,” see e.g, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.

Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485

U. S. 568, 575 (1988), this is not a license to rewrite statutes.

See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. §.

833, 841 (1986). The canon of avoiding unconstitutional

construction will not extend “ ‘to the point of perverting the

purpose of a statute’ . . . or judicially rewriting it.” Aptheker vy.

Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting Scales v.

United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)). This canon has two

requirements, a “serious likelihood that the statute will be heid

unconstitutional,” and “the statute must be genuinely suscepii-

ble to two constructions .. . .”. Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U. S. 224, 238 (1998). The United States’ ayument

fails on both grounds.

II. The separation-of-powers doctrine does not

hermetically seal the three branches.

Before deciding whether the PLRA’s automatic stay

violates the doctrine of separatiox of powers, it is necessary to

understand what this doctrine protects and why it does so.

Fortunately, this Court and the founders have cleared a rela-

tively straightforward path through the potentially confusing

thicket of the diverse interests and responsibilities of the three

branches. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit strayed from this

path, jumping into its discussion without a proper analysis of

the rationale behind the separation-of-powers doctrine. Its

opinion lacks the necessary understanding of the permissible

interdependence among the three branches, sacrificing an act of

Congress to an excessive protection of judicial prerogatives.

Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary are separated

primarily to protect against the threat to liberty posed by an

excessive accumulation of power in one branch. Even before

the Constitution’s founding, separation of powers was a known

bulwark against tyranny. See Loving v. United States, 517

U. S. 748, 756 (1996). The founders adopted this perspective.

“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and

judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many

and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly

be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The Federalist

No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). This

principle is found throughout this Court’s separation-of-powers

decisions. See, e.g., Loving, 517 U. S., at 756; Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U. S. 361, 380 (1989); Morrison v. Olson,

487 U.S. 654, 685-696 (1988); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,

950-951 (1983); id. at 960-961 (Powell, J., concurring);

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 721-722 (1986); Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.

v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

Separating the three branches does not only protect liberty;

a lesser, but still important benefit is the enhanced operation of

the government. “By allocating specific powers and responsi-

bilities to a branch fitted to the task, the framers created a

National Government that is both effective and accountable.”

Loving, supra, 517 U. S., at 757. By assigning each branch its

own sphere of responsibilities, greater efficiency is achieved

through the expertise that comes with experience. At the same

time, the public knows which branch is responsible for any

particular policy, ensuring accountability. See id., at 757-758.

The Constitution’s accommodation of liberty, effectiveness,

and accountability is achieved through the means used to

separate the three branches. It does not achieve these goals

through the absolute division of the three branches. “While the

Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also

contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers

into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches

separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”

Youngstown, supra, 343 U. S., at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).

A government that seals the three branches off from each other

cannot function. As the framers understood, a “hermetic

sealing off of the three branches of Government from one

another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable

of governing itself effectively.” Buckley, supra, 424 U. S., at

121. Therefore, any separation-of-powers analysis must take a

“pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power

.... Mistretta, supra, 488 U. S., at 381.

The Constitution maintains a balance of power between

three interdependent branches. Therefore, “the great security

against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the

same department consists in giving to those who administer

each department the necessary constitutional means and

personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” The

Federalist No. 51, pp. 321-322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J.

Madison). Liberty, efficiency, and accountability are thus

simultaneously advanced by a “carefully crafted system of

checked and balanced power within each Branch.” Mistretta,

supra, 488 U. S., at 381; see also Buckley, supra, 424 U. S., at

122 (the framers “built into the tripartite Federal Government

. . . a Sself-executing safeguard against the encroachment or

aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other”);

Chadha, supra, 462 U. S., at 951.

Instead of forbidding any intermixing of powers, separation

of powers actually requires the branches to exert some power in

the others’ spheres of influence.

“Separation of powers, [Madison] wrote, ‘d[oes] not mean

that these [three] departments ought to have no partial

agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but

rather ‘that where the whole power of one department is

exercised by the same hands which possess the whole

power of another department, the fundamenta! principles of

a free constitution, are subverted.’ ” Mistretta, supra, 488

eer pees

U. S., at 380-381 (quoting The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-

326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison)) (emphasis in origi-

nal; some brackets in original).

Therefore, “our constitutional system imposes upon the

Branches a duty of overlapping responsibility, a duty of

interdependence, as well as independence ....” /d., at 381.

It is not enough to simply proclaim a separation-of-powers

violation upon the mere finding that the act of one branch

overlaps with the power of another. Instead, proper analysis

looks to the nature and the extent of the alleged unconstitutional

intrusion, looking to the respective powers, duties, and compe-

tencies of the respective branches. At the same time, the goals

of the separation-of-powers doctrine, preserving liberty, while

maintaining the government’s effectiveness and accountability,

must be kept in mind.

At an abstract level, separation of powers is violated in one

of two ways. “One branch may interfere impermissibly with the

other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function.

Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch

assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to the other.”

Chadha, supra, 462 U. S., at 963 (Powell, J., concurring)

(citations omitted); see Mistretta, supra, 488 U. S., at 382.

Separation-of-powers analysis starts with the relative

functions of the potentially conflicting branches. The spheres

of influence of Congress and the Judiciary are explained in The

Federalist. Congress has the authority to “prescrib(e] the rules

by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regu-

lated” while “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and

peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, pp.

465-467 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see Plaut v.

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.211, 222 (1995). In practice,

Congress is the generalist, prescribing the general rules to

regulate society and the legal system, while the courts are the

particularists, applying these given rules to the specific cases.

“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general

rules for the government of society; the application of those

rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of

other departments.” Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87,

136 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.); see Plaut, 514 U. S., at 241-242

(Breyer, J., concurring).

This still leaves Congress with considerable authority over

the Judiciary. Congress has broad authority to enact procedural

rules. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965);

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,9 (1941). Congressional

authority extends very far into both what a court decides and

how it reaches its decision. For example, this Court has invited

Congress to formulate its own rules to replace its judicially

created Fifth Amendment prophylactic, see Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U. S. 436, 467 (1966), and to provide it with a rule for

defining harmless constitutional error. Chapman v. California,

386 U. S. 18, 21 (1967). So long as Congress does not

“prescribe the rules of decision to the judicial Department of a

case pending before it,” United States v. Klein, 80 U. S. (13

Wall.) 128, 146 (1872), place review of an Article III court’s

decision in officials of another branch, or command the courts

to retroactively reopen final judgments, it is not likely to

unconstitutionally intrude upon the Judiciary. See Plaut, supra,

514 U. S., at 218.

A proper analysis of 18 U. S. C. §3626(e)(2) takes these

principles into account. Amicus submits that the PLRA’s

automatic stay is a rule that neither assumes a judicial function

nor “interfere[s] impermissibly” with the Judiciary. See

Chadha, supra, 462 U. S., at 963 (Powell, J., concurring). This

rule does not decide any specific case, and it does not effect a

review of an Article III court. It is no more than a mechanism

to ensure the expeditious review of some of the longest and

most invasive cases in American jurisprudence after Congress

changed the law underlying the courts’ power to issue injunc-

tive relief in prison cases. Congress has only exerted the partial

authority over the courts that is both its duty and its due. See

The Federalist No. 47, pp. 302-303 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J.

Madison).

SG APE OE

a OR age POS

FPR e eres Se mR ERT

Ill. The PLRA’s automatic stay provision is a procedural

rule intended to check an excess of the Judiciary.

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the automatic stay is 180

degrees off course. This provision advances both federalism

and the separation of powers. Too many prisoner civil rights

cases have degenerated into judicial micromanagement of penal

institutions through continuing injunctions or consent decrees.

These court orders give prisoners far more relief than the

Constitution requires. The automatic stay therefore strikes a

blow for the separation of powers and the equally important

principle of federalism, by freeing federal and state prisons

from the excesses of some Article III courts. Although the

motive behind the policy is not relevant to the separation-of-

powers issues, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S:

211, 228 (1995), a statute’s effect is. Any analysis of the

automatic stay must take into account the fact that it promotes

these important constitutional policies by providing the

necessary check on the courts. See Part II, supra.

A. The Problem.

The PLRA is Congress’s response to one of the greatest

sustained intrusions into federalism and the separation of

powers by the federal Judiciary. Traditionally, courts did not

interfere with the management of prisons. See J. Dilulio, No

Escape 148 (1991) (cited below as “No Escape”). The balance

of power between the federal courts and the prisons changed

dramatically in the mid-60’s and early 70’s, as federal district

courts entertained prisoner-initiated suits over prison condi-

tions. See M. Feeley & E. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and

the Modern State 39-40 (1998); No Escape, supra, at 148.

What began with a trickle soon became a torrent, with a

“dramatic proliferation of prison decisions.” Feeley & Rubin,

supra, at 39. These cases typically involved courts refashioning

prisons or jails after finding that the totality of the conditions

violated the Constitution. See Dilulio, Enhancing Judicial

Capacity, in Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution 4 (J.

Dilulio ed. 1990).

The breadth of federal judicial involvement in the correc-

tional system is startling. Forty-one states have had prisons

under comprehensive court orders. All 50 states have had jails

under court orders and 10 states have had their entire prison

systems under judicial interdiction. See Feeley & Rubin, supra,

at 13 (footnotes omitted).

Not all district courts *~proach prison litigation in this

manner. Some judges d. ot take an activist approach to

prison litigation, keeping their rulings narrow, and often in the

government’s favor. See Cripe, Courts, Corrections, and the

Constitution: A Practitioner’s View, in Courts, Corrections,

and the Constitution, supra, at 270-271. Unfortunately, too

many district court judges were not so restrained. These courts

would render decisions covering entire prisons or even prison

systems. This level of intervention would often be justified by

finding that the conditions of the prison as a whole was a

“shock to the conscience” and thus violated the Eighth Amend-

ment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. See id., at

271-272.

The levei of judicial intervention in these cases is breathtak-

ing, in both its extent and detail. A 52-page consent decree

concerning the New York City jails signed by Mayor Ed Koch

eventually “spawned more than 1,500 pages of court orders

.... M. Boot, Out of Order 138 (1998). The ensuing micro-

management is too typical.

“For starters, the order guaranteed every inmate free

access every day to newspapers, telephones, and television

sets. But it went much further than that. The ‘Sanitation

Order’ prescribed that certain areas of the jails must be

cleaned with a particular type of detergent, Boraxo, in a

specified strength (half a cup per gallon of water). New

York faced fines if it didn’t follow this order’s ‘floor care

procedures’—for instance, if prison janitors failed to stay

six inches away from baseboards and corners when apply-

ing the first two coats of floor finish.” Jbid. (emphasis in

original).

The case of Guthrie v. Evans shows how a suit from a

handful of inmates can turn into a judicially-mandated transfor-

mation of a prison. What started as an in forma pauperis

complaint by 51 black inmates in the Georgia State Prison at

ora

Wet yet or

Reidsville turned into one of the most detailed judicial interven-

tions into the administration of a prison. Chilton & Talarico,

Politics and Constitutional Interpretation in Prison Reform

Litigation: The Case of Guthrie v. Evans, in Courts, Correc-

tions, and the Constitution, supra, at 117. The “extensive

changes . . . covered everything from racial discrimination to

the right to retain up to six issues of monthly magazines for up

to six months.” /bid. The litigation lasted from 1972 to 1985,

involving over two hundred witnesses before a special master

and “nonprocedural orders and consent decrees . . . too numer-

ous to itemize.” See id., at 118-119. A special monitor was

appointed to implement the numerous orders and decrees, and

was given “broad powers beyond mere oversight of decree

implementation and acted as fact-finder, mediator, manager,

and planner.” /d., at 119. His fees exceeded the salary of

Georgia’s gqvernor. The litigation was so long and so grueling

that it drove personnel out of the prison, see id., at 125, and

caused the parties’ positions to change as key personnel entered

and left this seemingly endless case. See id., at 124-125.

Judicial management of prisons is not limited to Eighth

Amendment cases. A 1973 complaint filed by Arizona prison-

ers alleged that prison mail policies violated their First Amend-

ment rights. This right was alleged to include the “constitu-

tional right to subscribe to certain magazines, including

Playboy and Bachelor Beat ....” Hook v. State of Arizona,

120 F. 3d 921, 923 (CA9 1997). In response, the state proposed

a consent decree, accepted by the prisoners and the court, which

promulgated comprehensive mail regulations, including a right

for prisoners “to receive three twenty-five pound packages

between December 10th and 31st of each year.” J/bid. The

Department of Corrections moved to modify the decree in

October 1992. /bid. After settlement negotiations broke down,

Judge Carl A. Muecke denied the motion, while granting the

prisoners’ motion “to change the title of the list of people

authorized to send holiday packages, and to permit inmates to

possess and use hot pots in their cells to heat and cook items.”

Ibid.

Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit reversed in this case. It found

that the considerable expense and security risk posed by the

nearly 25,000 packages a year justified modifying the order.

See id., at 924-925. Unsurprisingly, the court also found that

the Constitution does not confer upon inmates a right to a hot

pot in their cells. /d., at 925. A concurring judge noted that

Judge Muecke “entangled [himself] in the administration of the

Arizona penal institutions,” a role the District Court should

“severely limit.” /d., at 927 (Beezer, J., concurring).

The Ninth Circuit has not always supervised Judge Muecke

adequately. In Casey v. Lewis, 43 F. 3d 1261 (CA9 1991), the

Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the bulk of Judge Muecke’s

detailed reordering of Arizona’s prison library system in the

name of protecting their right of access to the courts. See id.,

at 1266. This

“order specified in minute detail the times that libraries

were to be kept open, the number of hours of library use to

which each inmate was entitled (10 per week), the minimal

educational requirements for prison librarians (a library

science degree, law degree, or paralegal degree), the content

of a videotaped legal-research course for inmates (to be

prepared by persons appointed by the special master but

funded by ADOC), and similar matters.” Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 347 (1996).

This Court struck down the order because the prisoners had

suffered no actual injury to their right of access. /bid.

These are not isolated cases. “Rather, the prison cases

constitute a rapid, inexorable procession of discrete decisions

formulated by federal trial courts throughout the nation and

affirmed repeatedly at the appellate level.” Feeley & Rubin,

supra, at 19. “The Constitution charges federal judges with

deciding cases and controversies, not with running state prisons.

Yet, too frequently federal district courts in the name of the

Constitution effect wholesale takeovers of state correctional

facilities and run them by judicial decree.” Lewis, supra, 518

U. S., at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring). These cases often do not

make it to the appellate level, as the prison authorities decline

to appeal in exchange for concessions from the District Court.

See, e.g., Chilton & Talarico, supra, at 130 (describing pur-

” or

ee ee ee 2

ported negotiations between the Governor of Georgia and the

District Court in the Guthrie case).

Consent decrees pose particular problems in prison litiga-

tion. Although the consent of the prison officials to the final

order would seem to deflect criticism of judicial management

of prisons, the consent is often not what it seems. Prison

officials confronted with a hostile District Court, the threat of

personal liability, and with an uncertain, expensive, and lengthy

appeal as the only alternative, can find a consent decree the

least bad option. See Decker, Consent Decrees and the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Usurping Judicial Power or

Quelling Judicial Micro-Management, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 1275,

1278. Furthermore, consent decrees are a wonderful aid to

bureaucratic empire building. The new facilities, vast increases

in funding, and more staff associated with comprehensive

prison decrees can persuade prison officials to put up with the

indignity of judicial micromanagement of their institutions. See

Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1125,

1156-1158 (1989); Hagedorn, The Consequences of Federal

District Court Intervention into Prisons and Jails: Philadelphia,

Texas, and Arizona 34-35 (Brookings Institution 1995).

Because “[p]rison litigation makes it easier for administrators

to obtain additional funding,” Bleich, 77 Cal. L. Rev., at 1157,

any consent decree that substantially raises prison funding is

suspect. Congress recognized the separation-of-powers

implications of this interference with the state budgeting

process and expressly gave legislators standing to challenge

certain orders. See 18 U.S. C. §3626(a)(3)(F).

A consequence of this immense expansion of federal

judicial power is that many prisons and jails are now subject to

detailed court orders that go beyond the scope of what the

Constitution requires. There is no constitutional mandate for

the type of cleaner to be used in cleaning the prison, see supra,

at 12, or the size, location, and design of prisons. See Ruiz v.

Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1388-1389 (S.D. Tex. 1980).

This is not judicial review, it is judicial management.

“In the process of defining and imposing standards, courts

undertook the management and micromanagement of these

institutions. The appointment of special masters, working

full-time in the prisons and answerable directly to the court,

was only the most dramatic manifestation of this general

trend. Even when courts acted without appointing subordi-

nate officials, they maintained an ongoing, detailed supervi-

sion of the institution that diverges from our traditional

image of judicial action and judicial standard-setting.”

Feeley & Rubin, supra, at 18.

It is unacceptable, both as a matter of public policy and

constitutional law, for courts to involve themselves so deeply

in our penal institutions. Judges lack the training, resources,

and perspective to manage prisons. While judges are generally

quite capable of applying the law to resolve disputes between

the parties, they are often poor managers. See Cripe, in Courts,

Corrections, and the Constitution, supra, at 274. There are

many examples of unintended, but disastrous consequences of

the judicial management of prisons. Inflexible and improperly

designed population caps in Philadelphia created an effective

“get out of jail free card” for many of its criminals, devastating

the city. See Hagedorn, supra, at 2-7. Because certain crimes

could not be punished by imprisonment, these laws were

unenforceable. Thus, drug dealers migrated to Philadelphia

from other cities because “ ‘[t]he town’s wide open.’ ” /d., at

6. Eventually, “there were instances where individuals were

being arrested who had ten or more bench warrants and were

saying things like ‘You can’t hold me, the caps on tonight.’ ”

Id., at 3. 7

The Ruiz litigation provides a particularly infamous and

well-documented example of the dangers of judicial prison

management. This case transformed a controversial, but safe

and well-run system into an expensive nightmare for the

inmates and staff. See Dilulio, The Old Regime and the Ruiz

Revolution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Texas

Prisons, in Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution, supra, at

53-53, 69-70; Hagedorn, supra, at 12-14. Courts do not have

to actively mismanage prisons for their intervention to harm the

institution. In Ruiz, the suit itself, and Judge Justice’s reputa-

tion for sympathy to prisoner claims, led to a breakdown of

discipline as inmates exploited the shift in the balance of power

between themselves and the administration. See id., at 15.

Litigation also intimidates guards, making them wary that

disciplining inmates will lead to personal liability. See Engel

& Rothman, The Paradox of Prison Reform: Rehabilitation,

Prisoner’s Rights, and Violence, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 413,

431 (1984). Continuing judicial management risks an endless

degradation of the administration’s authority.

This is an affront to both federalism and the separation of

powers. “It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a state

has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up

with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the adminis-

tration of its prisons.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

491-492 (1973). Judges should not make prison policy, but

instead must defer to the prison administration’s evaluation of

penological objectives. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482

U. S. 342, 349-350 (1987). Courts, which lack both the

knowledge and resources to administer prisons, are better suited

to safeguarding basic principles; the details of prison life are

better left to the executive and legislative branches. See

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974). Any

remedy must therefore be narrowly tailored to what the Consti-

tution minimally requires. A court “may not use the totality of

all conditions to justify federal intervention requiring remedies

more extensive than are required to correct Eighth Amendment

violations.” Wright v. Rushen, 642 F. 2d 1129, 1133 (CA9

1981). As two proponents of judicial intervention admit, “the

prison reform cases . . . violated nearly every accepted principle

for controlling the judicial branch.” Feeley & Rubin, supra, at

18. The authors did not conclude that the courts were wrong,

however, but rather that “there is something seriously wrong”

with “federalism, separation of powers, and the rule of law

See ©;

This Court knows better, see Part II, supra, as does Con-

gress. The PLRA is Congress’s effort to correct the excesses of

the federal courts in prison litigation. As Senator Abraham said

during the debate over the PLRA, “judicial orders entered under

federal law have effectively turned control of the prison system

away from elected officials accountable to the taxpayer, and

over to the courts.” 141 Cong. Rec. 26,554 (1995). The PLRA

is Congress’s exercise of its constitutional obligation to check

another branch. The automatic stay provision is an important

component of this policy and any analysis of its constitutional-

ity must take this into account.

B. The Solution.

The PLRA seeks to restore the balance between the Judi-

ciary, on one hand, and the States, Congress, and the Executive,

on the other, by placing strict limits on the federal courts’

power to issue injunctive relief in prison cases, and applying

these limits to existing court orders. This later portion is

particularly important since many prisons and jails are still

operating under longstanding judicial decrees. See supra, at 14.

The automatic stay is a necessary component for liberating the

penal system from unnecessarily broad court orders.

If there is one constant in prison litigation, it is the length of

the major cases. Any attempt to remake a prison system is

going to take a long time. The Ruiz case started with a com-

plaint filed in 1972, while the District Court’s decision was not

issued until 1980 after an “epic trial.” Ruiz v. Johnson, 37

F. Supp. 2d 855, 860 (S.D. Tex. 1999). This Court has ad-

dressed a prison reform case that entailed similarly epic

litigation, with numerous court orders and appeals snaking

through the federal courts for over 20 years. See Rufo v.

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 372-378 (1992).

Although it may take time for a court to reorder a prison,

Congress has determined that the courts should not be dilatory

in undoing any excesses. These cases are a source of continu-

ing harm to the extent that the court orders exceed the constitu-

tional minimum. Federalism and the separation of powers are

continually violated, the administration’s authority erodes,

guards are deterred from disciplining inmates, and innovation

is stifled so long as the system operates under the specter of

continued judicial intervention. See supra, at 16-17. Until the

court rules on the continued validity of the stay, justice delayed

will be justice denied. Cf. Jn re Blodgett, 502 U. S. 236, 239

(1992) (delay in ruling on habeas petition in capital case causes

“severe prejudice to the state”).

arin

~ 3 Ee eee aed

Unfortunately, not all district courts can be expected to rule

promptly on these motions. The judge ruling on the motion to

modify under the PLRA will typically be the same judge who

issued the order in the first place. Given the considerable time

and effort that went into these orders, and the high stakes of the

initial litigation, courts may be loath to undo their handiwork.

While district judges are constitutional officers who can and

should be expected to execute their legal duties, they are also

human beings. The power and notoriety that comes with these

cases may be difficult to give up. See Cripe, supra, at 270.

Thus a judge may not wish to see his handiwork undone during

his lifetime. See Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler,

427 U.S. 424, 433 (1976). A judge confronted with a motion

to modify an order that goes well beyond the constitutional

minimum has a strong personal incentive to delay ruling on the

case, thereby keeping in force an order which is now illegal. 18

U.S. C. § 3626(e)(2) is Congress’s device to prevent this from

happening.

Without a specific directive from Congress, it is truly

difficult to compel a federal court to rule on a case. A two-and-

one-half-year stay of execution without any ruling was not

enough to support a writ of mandamus in a habeas corpus attack

on a capital conviction. See Blodgett, supra, 502 U. S., at 240.

Although this Court’s stern warning to the Ninth Circuit, see

id., at 240-241, was warranted, prison authorities should not

have to face the prospect of two rounds of interlocutory appeals,

or a long wait to get the expedited ruling they deserve. Since

the law underlying these injunctions has changed, “it would be

particularly inequitable” to make the taxpayers and prison

authorities labor “under a continuing injunction” that is no

longer valid while the district court “bide[s] [its] time... .”

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997). The automatic

stay places the federal courts on a schedule in order to restore

federalism and the separation of powers. After 30 to 90 days,

it restores the normal state of affairs, in which prisons are run

by prison administrators and not special masters, until a court

actually rules that the order is legal. Nothing in the Constitu-

tion prevents this rule of procedure.

IV. Congress has neither assumed a judicial function nor

interfered impce. missibly with the Judiciary’s

constitutionally assigned function.

There are two ways in which the separation-of-powers

doctrine is violated—either by one branch assuming power that

is “more appropriately diffused among separate branches” or by

undermining another branch’s “authority and ind

....” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 382 (1989);

see INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J.,

concurring). This first prong is not relevant to the present case.

Congress did not purport to decide any specific case when it

passed the PLRA. A legislature assumes a judicial function

when it actually operates as a court, such as the colonial

legislatures which acted as “courts of equity of last resort,

hearing original actions or providing appellate review of

judicial judgments.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,514 U.S.

211, 219 (1995). The PLRA’s automatic stay is merely a

procedural rule, designed to keep courts and litigants on a tight

schedule. See Part III B, supra. Although it can be delegated

to the other branches, rulemaking is ultimately Congress’s

responsibility. See Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 386, n. 14.

The Seventh Circuit based its attack against the automatic

stay provision on the statute’s purported interference with the

judicial function. It found that the time limit set by this rule

was “an unconstitutional intrusion on the power of the courts to

adjudicate cases.” French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437, 446

(CA7 1999). The court further held that 18 U. S. C.

§ 3626(e)(2) was a rule of decision contrary to United States v.

Klein, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). French, 178 F. 3d, at

446-447.

The PLRA’s time limit does not unduly hinder a court from

reaching any necessary decision. Contrary to the panel’s

reasoning, time limits on courts are neither rare nor unconstitu-

tional. Since the automatic stay does not prevent a court from

rendering its decision in any case, it does not violate the

separation-of-powers doctrine.

A. No Rule of Decision.

Klein can be described as a corollary to the maxim “hard

cases make bad law,” see, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522

U. S. 93, 106 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring), namely that

“strange cases make strange law.” The statute struck down in

Klein is without a doubt “exceedingly odd.” See Scheidegger,

Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98

Colum. L. Rev. 888, 922 (1998). Klein involved the seizure

and sale of cotton from Wilson, a Confederate supporter duriny;

the Civil War. Wilson had qualified for a blanket pardon issued

by President Lincoln to all rebel supporters who swore an oath

of loyalty to the Union. Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 131-132. In

an earlier decision, t'sis Court had held that those who qualified

for the pardon were entitled to reimbursement for any pro

seized during the war. United States v. Padelford, 76 U. S. (9

Wall.) 531 (1870). The Court of Claims ruled that in light of

Wilson’s pardon, his estate was entitled to the proceeds of the

sale. See Klein, 80 U. S., at 132.

The statute was Congress’s attempt to overrule Padelford.

See Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’

Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited,

1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1189, 1206-1209. The statute required this

Court to remand any cases like Wilson’s to the Court of Claims,

to treat the pardon as conclusive evidence of disloyalty, and to

dismiss the appeals of those seeking to recover the property of

these persons. See Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 130-134.

This statute’s unconstitutionality is clear. This law was

ant aren Nao part of President Lincoln’s pardon. “Its

controlling purpose is to deny to pardons ted b

the President the effect which this Com has siekedGem “4

have.” Id., at 145. Congress cannot limit the pardon as it is the

exclusive province of the Executive. See id., at 148; see also

R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The

Federal Courts and the Federal System 369, n. 22 (4th ed. 1996)

(viewing Klein as based on an “invasion of executive power’).

This intrusion upon the Executive thus violated the separation

of powers.

The Klein Court’s holding that the act also violated the

Judiciary’s constitutional prerogatives is more complex. This

Court determined that the statute’s use of Congress’s power to

set jurisdiction was a cover for telling the courts how to rule in

these cases. See Klein, supra, 80 U. S., at 146. It next con-

cluded that it “prescribe[d] rules of decision to the judicial

department in cases pending before it” and therefore violated

the separation of powers. See ibid.

This holding is no longer entirely valid. “Whatever the

precise scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made

clear that its prohibition does not hold when Congress

‘amend{s] applicable law.’ ” Plaut, supra, 514 U. S., at 218

(quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 441

(1992)). Plaut’s implicit question about Klein’s scope deserves

an answer. The best answer is that this part of Klein is very

narrow, and unlikely to be repeated.

There is nothing inherently improper about Congress giving

the courts a “rule of decision.” In the broadest sense, Congress

tells the courts how to decide cases each time it enacts a

substantive rule of law. Enacting such rules is the very heart of

the legislative power. See Scheidegger, supra, 98

Colum. L. Rev., at 909-911. Congress’s power to enact

procedural rules also gives this branch considerable influence

over how courts exercise their power. The Rules of Evidence,

subject to other constitutional limitations such as the Confronta-

tion Clause, instructs the courts on what evidence they can and

cannot admit. See, e.g, Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“All relevant

evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the

Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these

rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court

t to statutory authority”). The federal reversible error

rule, enacted by Congress to combat what it saw as the tendency

of the federal appellate courts to be “citadels of technicality,” is

another example of Congress instructing the courts on how to

decide cases. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750,

759 (1946); 28 U.S. C. §2111.

The Klein Court did not proscribe all rules of decision, but

only those affecting pending cases. See Klein, supra, 80 U. S.,

at 146. As noted above, Klein’s retroactivity rule is no longer

all it seems. In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S.

429 (1992), this Court confronted an act of Congress which

stated that a particular plan for wildlife and forest management

is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the

statutory requirements” that were the basis for a named i

case. /d., at 430-431. This Court held this act constitutional,

even though it effectively decided a pending case, because

Congress changed the applicable law. /d., at 441.

Klein’s rule is limited to legislation that does not change the

relevant law, but merely dictates the outcome of a pending case

under the unchanged law. In Klein, Congress could not change

the applicable law, the President’s pardon power. Because the

law could not be changed, the legislation was no more than an

attempt to mandate a result in the case, unconstitutionally

infringing upon the Judiciary’s power to apply the given law to

a particular case. See, e.g, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. (6

Cranch) 87, 136 (1810); supra, at 9-10.

The automatic stay provision does not tell the court how to

decide the specific case before it. This rule changes the

applicable law regarding the extent of injunctive relief. A host

of decrees were issued at a time when the standard was differ-

ent. Many, if not most, of those decrees are now illegal. A

party should not have to continue to obey an order which is now

illegal. The statute gives the issuing court a reasonable oppor-

tunity, up to 90 days, to confirm that the order is legal under

present law. After that, it relieves the enjoined party from

obedience to a probably illegal order unless and until a court

determines it is legal.

The court retains full discretion over the final disposition of

the case, see Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925,940 (CA6 1998),

rev'd in part on other grounds, Martin v. Hadix,527U.S._,

144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 119 S. Ct. 1998 (1999); Gavin v. Branstad,

122 F. 3d 1081, 1089 (CA8 1997) (“The PLRA leaves the

judging to the judges and therefore does not violate the

Klein decision”). Since the court is not kept from giving “the

effect to evidence, which in its own judgment, such evidence

should have,” Klein, supra, 80 U. S.,-at 147, the automatic stay

does not violate K/ein. Under the automatic stay, judges still

have an “adjudicatory function to perform,” United States v.

Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 392 (1980), deciding

whether the decree comports with the PLRA’s new require-

ments. While they can still rule, excessive delay in doing so

results in temporary relief for the state. This is constitutional.

B. Law and Retroactivity.

Klein is not the only limit on congressional regulation of

how the federal courts exercise their Article III power. In Plaut,

supra, this Court identified three types of legislation that violate

this aspect of the separation-of-powers doctrine: the legislation

in Klein, vesting review of Article III courts in the Executive

Branch, and the retroactive reopening of final judgments. See

$14 U. S., at 218-219.

Commanding the courts to retroactively open final judg-

ments violates the separation of powers by undermining a

court’s authority to decide cases. Finality is an essential part of

the authority to decide cases “because ‘a judicial Power’ is one

to render dispositive judgments.” /d., at 219 (quoting Easter-

brook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926

(1990)). Because neither § 3626(e)(2) nor the PLRA reopens a

final judgment, P/aut is not violated.

The automatic stay implements the modification of injunc-

tions and consent decrees in prisoner civil rights cases. Unlike

the litigation reopened by Congress in Plaut, these judgments

are never truly final. P/aut dealt with securities fraud suits that

had been dismissed as untimely under the statute of limitations.

Plaut, supra, 514 U. §S., at 213-214. Congress attempted to

reopen these cases by retroactively extending the statute of

limitations for this class of litigants. See id., at 214-215. The

Plaut Court struck this down as violating the Judiciary’s power

to decide cases. /d., at 218-219.

Plaut must be distinguished from the cases starting with

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18

How.) 421 (1856), which have consistently held that a court’s

exercise of its injunctive power does not create a final judgment

in this sense. In Wheeling Bridge, a prior decision of this Court

had held that a bridge erected across the Ohio River by defen-

dant obstructed the free navigation of the river, and accordingly

ordered its removal or the obstruction’s abatement. See id., at

425. According to this prior decision, the obstruction violated

federal statutes. See id., at 430. After this decision, Congress

enacted a law that this bridge was legal and that the company

could maintain it at its present height. /d., at 425. Wheeling

Bridge confronted the constitutionality of this act.

The Court initially noted that Congress cannot “annul the

judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights determined

thereby in favor of the plaintiff.” /d., at 431. Yet this case was

distinguishable from this proposition, see ibid., due to the

nature of the remedy imposed to protect the right adjudicated in

the prior case.

The right to navigate the river was a “public right” that

could support a private action for damages by a private party

sustaining special damages from the obstruction. /bid. The

private party could also “file a bill in chancery for the purpose

of removing the obstruction.” /bid. Because the right was

“public” it was subject to the regulation of Congress. /bid. A

remedy of damages, being a final judgment, was beyond the

power of Congress to legislate retroactively. Jbid. An equitable

remedy, such as the abatement before the Court, was a different

matter.

“But that part of the decree, directing the abatement of the

obstruction, is executory, a continuing decree, which

requires not only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the

defendants against any reconstruction or continuance. Now,

whether it is a future existing or continuing obstruction

depends upon the question whether or not it interferes with

the right of navigation. If, in the meantime, since the

decree, this right has been modified by the competent

authority, so that the bridge is no longer an unlawful

obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of the court cannot

be enforced. There is no longer any interference with the

enjoyment of the public right inconsistent with law, no

more than there would be where the plaintiff himself had

consented to it, after the rendition of the decree.” /d., at

431-432 (emphasis added).

So long as an injunction is in force, it is subject to modifica-

tion even if it is a final decree. See Pasadena City Bd. of

Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437 (1976). “A continu-

ing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject

always to adaption as events may shape the need.” United

States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932). The injunc-

tion may be continuously modified because the court’s jurisdic-

tion over the injunction does not end unless the injunction is

terminated. “The source of the power to modify is of course the

fact that the injunction often requires continuing supervision by

the court and always a continuing willingness to apply its

powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that

equitable relief.” System Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,

647 (1961). When the law or circumstances sigsificantly

change, the injunction must change with them. See Agostini v.

Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 215 (1997); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk

County Jail, 502 U. S. 367, 384 (1992). Indeed, courts have a

duty to modify injunctions once the law has changed suffi-

ciently. See Agostini, 521 U. S., at 240. Wheeling Bridge

establishes the principle that Congress can change the circum-

stances, and thus the entitlement to injunctive relief, without

violating the separation of powers, even if the injunction is

“final.”

Although it has the most relevance to the constitutionality

of the PLRA’s retroactive changing of the standards governing

prison injunctions, Wheeling Bridge also supports the automatic

stay provision. Since Congress was able to effectively overrule

one of this Court’s decisions in Wheeling Bridge, it can enact

the much lesser intrusion of its temporary stay mechanism. If

Congress did not unconstitutionally review this Court’s

decision in the first Wheeling Bridge case, then the PLRA’s

automatic stay similarly does not review any federal court

ruling. Since the injunction in the present case is not final for

the purpose of the separation of powers, Congress may provide

for its temporary suspension in the context of the changed

circumstances of the PLRA. The Seventh Circw 't’s holding that

the automatic stay unconstitutionally reviews Vuurt decisions,

see French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d 437, 446 (CA7 1999) is

simply incorrect.

It is true that the present case is not identical to Wheeling

Bridge. Unlike that case, Congress does not have total control

over the right underlying the remedy. Whatever the Constitu-

tion requires at minimum Congress cannot limit.’ This does not

change the analysis, however, because the automatic stay

involved does not overturn any prior injunction. Although it

may suspend the operation of the injunction if the District Court

does not rule on its continued validity sufficiently quickly,

ultimately those portions of the injunction that satisfy the

constitutional minimums will be reinstated. Furthermore, many

if not mest prison injunctions go well beyond the constitutional

minimum. See supra, at 14. If Congress can completely

overturn a decision under Wheeling Bridge, then the automatic

stay may relieve prison systems from the burden of excessive

injunctions until the court decides whether and to what extent

the injunction is actually within the legal limit.

This view of Wheeling Bridge is consistent with this Court’s

interpretations of the decision. Some commentators have

distinguished Wheeling Bridge from the PLRA, because prison

civil rights litigation does not rely on the public rights men-

tioned in that case. See, e.g., Decker, Consent Decrees and the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Usurping Judicial

Power or Quelling Judicial Micro-Management, 1997

Wis. L. Rev. 1275, 1290. This misreads the term and its

context. In Wheeling Bridge the “public rights” was used in its

“discussion{] of the law of nuisance” in which “the Court

merely expressed agreement with the proposition that a court of

equity could enjoin a public nuisance in a case brought by a

private person who sustained specific injury.” California v.

Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 296, n. 7 (1981). In the context of

the separation-of-powers analysis, the fact that the injunction

was against a public nuisance was irrelevant. What matters was

that the injunction was necessarily “a continuing decree,”

Wheeling Bridge, supra, 59 U. S., at 431, and therefore subject

to modification when Congress changed the legal circum-

2. And in fact, Congress has not limited injunctive relief below the

constitutionally required minimums. See 18 U. S. C. § 3626(a)(1).

Congress can eliminate federal equity power in an entire area,

relegating aggrieved parties to state remedies, see, e.g., 28 U. S. C.

§ 1341 (Tax Injunction Act), but it has not done so here.

stances. Even between private parties, an injunction is a

“continuing decree” that is always subject to adaptation due to

changes in the facts or the law. See System Federation, supra,

364 U. S., at 647. The character of the right is irrelevant for the

separation-of-powers analysis. The issue here is not the validity

or even the source of the legal rule that produced the Article III

judgments, but rather the immunity from legislative abrogation

of those judgments themselves. Plaut, supra, 514 U. S., at 239.

Because Congress can effectively abrogate a continuing

injunction, it may temporarily suspend one that goes beyond the

constitutional minimum.

C. Schedules and Judicial Power.

The Seventh Circuit also found that the automatic stay

unconstitutionally interfered with the court’s ability to decide

cases by impermissibly placing power over the status quo of the

litigation in the hands of the party moving to terminate the

decree. French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 444. Congress can and

does place courts under automatic rules. It also has the author-

ity to set strict deadlines to the pace of the litigation. The

Seventh Circuit’s decision to strike down Congress’s schedule

betrays a misplaced sense of constitutional priorities.

Judge Easterbrook’s dissent lists the many ways in which

Congress limits the Judiciary’s administrative independence,

and would thus run afoul of the Seventh Circuit’s holding. See

id., at 451-452 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The dissent

correctly notes that § 3626(e)(2) is no different from these valid

exercises of congressional power. As the dissent notes, the

Seventh Circuit operates in a constitutional vacuum. “I am not

aware of any decision by the Supreme Court holding, or even

suggesting, that statutes requiring judges to adjudicate with

dispatch pose constitutional problems.” /d., at 450.

Amicus will add only a few points to Judge Easterbrook’s

dissent. The Seventh Circuit distinguishes the automatic stay

in bankruptcy law, 11 U. S. C. §362, because that statute

preserves “the court’s equitable powers over the entirety of the

bankruptcy estate, not superseding or undermining them.”

French, supra, 178 F. 3d, at 443. While the stay may preserve

the status quo of the case before the bankruptcy court, it

severely disrupts the powers of other courts over the cases

before them. Thus a civil plaintiff could not execute against the

surety on a supersedeas bond when automatically stayed by the

bankruptcy filing. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U. S.

300, 301 (1995). The filing in the Celotex case stayed over

141,000 suits, 100 appeals, and $70 million in supersedeas

bonds. See id., at 302, n. 2. This massive interference with the

proceedings of other courts is triggered by a party filing a

petition without a judicial decision. See 11 U. S. C. § 362(a).

There is nothing unconstitutional about Congress giving the

courts a set of standards they must follow. Section 3626(e)(2)

sets a deadline. Deadlines require hard and fast limits. “But

‘(deadlines are inherently arbitrary’ while fixed dates ‘are often

essential to accomplish necessary results.’ ” United States v.

Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94 (1985) (quoting United States v. Boyle,

469 U. S. 241, 249 (1984)). For every deadline there is always

someone who must be a day late, but courts cannot ignore the

mandate of Congress’s deadline in order to obtain “ ‘optimal’

policy results.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 430

(1996). The federal courts cannot use their inherent rulemaking

power to overcome a specific rule of procedure. See id., at 426.

The fact that a congressional rule leads to a seemingly harsh

result is irrelevant. The courts must follow Congress’s com-

mand. Locke, 471 U. S., at 101.

Congress has often set priorities for courts to rule on cases

by informing the Judiciary to rule quickly or grant expedited

review in various classes of cases. See, e.g., United States v.

Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313, n. 2 (1990) (expedited review for

federal flag burning statute under 18 U. S. C. § 700(d)(2));

United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 742-743 (1987)

(expedited review for pretrial detention orders under the Bail

Reform Act, 18 U. S. C. §3141(b)(c)); Federal Election

Comm'n v. National Conservative Political ActionComm., 470

U. S. 480, 487-488 (1985) (expedited review of constitutional

attacks on the Federal Election Commission Act under 28

U. S. C. § 437(h)(a)); NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 354

(1973) (under 42 U.S. C. § 1971(g), when the Attorney General

sues to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the United States

may request a three-judge court which must “ ‘cause the case to

be in every way expedited’ ”). This Court has never ques-

tioned Congress’s authority to order the Judiciary’s priorities in

deciding litigation. It is the Legislative Branch’s prerogative to

define a category of cases as too important for the courts to

ignore or delay. See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U. S. 870, 881

(1984). The only difference between the automatic stay and the

many expedited review statutes upheld by this Court, is that

§ 3626(e)(2) contains a specific deadline. This distinction has

no constitutional significance.

The automatic stay does not mandate the result in any

specific case. It merely requires the court to act expeditiously

or effectively grant temporary relief to the party injured by the

delay. One may disagree with the place Congress struck the

balance between the states’ and prisoners’ interests, but that is

Congress’s prerogative, to order priorities in federal litigation.

Most importantly, it is Congress’s duty to check the excesses of

the federal Judiciary, by relieving prisons from excessive court

orders.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Seventh Circuit should be reversed.

February, 2000

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES L. HOBSON

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

APPENDIX A

Sec. 3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to prison condi-

tions

“(a) Requirements for Relief.—

“(1) Prospective relief—{A) Prospective relief in any

civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no

further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall

not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court

finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further

than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and is the least intrusive means necéssary to correct the

violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substan-

tial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the

operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

“(B) The court shall not order any prospective relief that

requires or permits a government official to exceed his or

her authority under State or local law or otherwise violates

State or local law, unless—

“(i) Federal law permits such relief to be ordered in

violation of State or local law;

“(ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation

of a Federal right; and

“(iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the

Federal right.

“(C) Nothing in this section shall be construed to

authorize the courts, in exercising their remedial powers, to

order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes, or

to repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations on

the remedial powers of the courts.

“(2) Preliminary injunctive relief.—In any civil action

with respect to prison conditions, to the extent otherwise

authorized by law, the court may enter a temporary restrain-

ing order or an order for preliminary injunctive relief.

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the

- court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least

intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court

shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on

A-1l

public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system

caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the

principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring

any preliminary relief. Preliminary injunctive relief shall

automatically expire on the date that is 90 days after its

entry, unless the court makes the findings required under

subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief and

makes the order final before the expiration of the 90-day

period.

“(3) Prisoner release order—{A) In any civil action

with respect to prison conditions, no prisoner release order

shall be entered unless—

(i) a court has previously entered an order for less

intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the

deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied

through the prisoner release order; and

(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of

time to comply with the previous court orders.

“(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to

prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered

only by a three-judge court in accordance with section 2284

of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E) have

been met.

“(C) A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal

court shall file with any request for such relief, a request for

a three-judge court and materials sufficient to demonstrate

that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have been met.

“(D) If the requirements under subparagraph (A) have

been met, a Federal judge before whom a civil action with

respect to prison conditions is pending who believes that a

prison release order should be considered may sua sponte

request the convening of a three-judge court to determine

whether a prisoner release order should be entered.

“(E) The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release

order only if the court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that—

(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of

a Federal right; and |

A-2

“(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the

Federal right.

“(F) Any State or local official or unit of government

whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of

funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of

program facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons

who may be released from, or not admitted to, a prison as a

result of a prisoner release order shall have standing to

oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such

relief and to seek termination of such relief, and shall have

the right to intervene in any proceeding relating to such

relief.

“(b) Termination of Relief.—

“(1) Termination of prospective relief.—{A) In any civil

action with respect to prison conditions in which prospec-

tive relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon

the motion of any party or intervener—

“(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or

approved the prospective relief;

“(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an

order denying termination of prospective relief under

this paragraph; or

“(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the

date of enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

2 years after such date of enactment.

“(B) Nothing in this section shall prevent the parties

from agreeing to terminate or modify relief before the relief

is terminated under subparagraph (A).

“(2) Immediate termination of prospective relief.—In

any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defen-

dant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate termi-

nation of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or

granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the

relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary

to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least

intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right.

(3) Limitation.—Prospective relief shall not terminate

if the court makes written findings based on the record that

prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or

ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further

than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the

least intrusive means to correct the violation.

“(4) Termination or modification of relief.—Nothing in

this section shall prevent any party or intervener from

seeking modification or termination before the relief is

termirable under paragraph (1) or (2), to the extent that

modification or termination would otherwise be legally

permissible.

“(c) Settlements.—

“(1) Consent decrees.—In any civil action with respect

to prison conditions, the court shall not enter or approve a

consent decree unless it complies with the limitations on

relief set forth in subsection (a).

“(2) Private settlement agreements.—{A) Nothing in

this section shall preclude parties from entering into a

private settlement agreement that does not comply with the

limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a), if the terms

of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement other

than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the

agreement settled.

“(B) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party

claiming that a private settlement agreement has been

breached from seeking in State court any remedy available

under State law.

“(d) State Law Remedies.—The limitations on remedies in

this section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court

based solely upon claims arising under State law.

“(e) Procedure for Motions Affecting Prospective Relief.—

(1) Generally.—The court shall promptly rule on any

motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil

action with respect to prison conditions.

A-4

“(2) Automatic stay.—Any prospective relief subject to

a pending motion shall be automatically stayed during the

period—

“(A)(i). beginning on the 30th day after such motion

is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph

(1) or (2) of subsection (b); or

“(ii) beginning on the 180th day after such motion

is filed, in the case of a motion made under any other

law; and

“(B) ending on the date the court enters a final order

ruling on the motion.

“(f) Special Masters.—

“(1) In general—{A) In any civil action in a Federal

court with respect to prison conditions, the court may

appoint a special master who shall be disinterested and

objective and who will give due regard to the public safety,

to conduct hearings on the record and prepare proposed

findings of fact.

“(B) The court shall appoint a special master under this

subsection during the remedial phase of the action only

upon a finding that the remedial phase will be sufficiently

complex to warrant the appointment.

“(2) Appointment.—{A) If the court determines that the

appointment of a special master is necessary, the court shall

request that the defendant institution and the plaintiff each

submit a list of not more than 5 persons to serve as a special

master.

“(B) Each party shall have the opportunity to remove up

to 3 persons from the opposing party’s list.

“(C) The court shall select the master from the persons

remaining on the list after the operation of subparagraph

(B).

“(3) Interlocutory appeal.—Any party shall have the

right to an interlocutory appeal of the judge’s selection of

the special master under this subsection, on the ground of

partiality.

“(4) Compensation.—The compensation to be allowed

to a special master under this section shall be based on an

hourly rate not greater than the hourly rate established under

section 3006A for payment of court-appointed counsel, plus

costs reasonably incurred by the special master. Such

compensation and costs shall be paid with funds appropri-

ated to the Judiciary.

“(5) Regular review of appointment.—In any civil

action with respect to prison conditions in which a special

master is appointed under this subsection, the court shall

review the appointment of the special master every 6

months to determine whether the services of the special

master continue to be required under paragraph (1). In no

event shall the appointment of a special master extend

beyond the termination of the relief.

“(6) Limitations on powers and duties.—A special

master appointed under this subsection—

“(A) may be authorized by a court to conduct

hearings and prepare proposed findings of fact, which

shall be made on the record;

“(B) shall not make any findings or communications

ex parte;

“(C) may be authorized by a court to assist in the

development of remedial plans; and

“(D) may be removed at any time, but shall be

relieved of the appointment upon the termination of

relief.

“(g) Definitions.—As used in this section—

“(1) the term ‘consent decree’ means any relief entered

by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the

consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include

private settlements;

“(2) the term ‘civil action with respect to prison condi-

tions’ means any civil proceeding arising under Federal law

with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects

of actions by government officials on the lives of persons

confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus

A-6

proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement

in prison;

“(3) the term ‘prisoner’ means any person subject to

incarceration, detention, or admission to any facility who is

accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diver-

sionary program;

“(4) the term ‘prisoner release order’ includes any order,

including a temporary restraining order or preliminary

injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing

or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release

from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison;

“(5) the term ‘prison’ means any Federal, State, or local

facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults

accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated

delinquent for, violations of criminal law;

“(6) the term ‘private settlement agreement’ means an

agreement entered into among the parties that is not subject

to judicial enforcement other than the reinstatement of the

civil proceeding that the agreement settled;

“(7) the term ‘prospective relief’ means all relief other

than compensatory monetary damages;

“(8) the term ‘special master’ means any person ap-

pointed by a Federal court pursuant to Rule 53 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or pursuant to any inherent

power of the court to exercise the powers of a master,

regardless of the title or description given by the court; and

“(9) the term ‘relief means all relief in any form that

may be granted or approved by the court, and includes

consent decrees but does not include private settlement

agreements.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.