Amicus Curiae Brief — Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

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Supreme Court, U.S,

No. 98-963 FILED

—

“BPR 12 1999

IN THE CLERK |

Suprenve Court of the United States 7

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

—>-

JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON, Attorney General of Missouri; RICHARD

ADAMS, PATRICIA FLOOD, ROBERT GARDNER, DONALD GANN,

MICHAEL GREENWELL and ELAINE SPIELBUSCH, members of the

Missouri Ethics Commission; and ROBERT P. MCCULLOCH, St. Louis

County Prosecuting Attorney,

Petitioners,

—_—Vi—

SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC and ZEV DAVID FREDMAN,

—and—

JOAN BRAY,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PAUL ALLEN BECK,

THAD BEYLE, JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER, LEON D.

EPSTEIN, DONALD P. GREEN, RUTH S. JONES, IRA

KATZNELSON, JONATHAN S. KRASNO, DAVID B.

MAGLEBY, MICHAEL J. MALBIN, THOMAS E. MANN,

BURKE MARSHALL, FRANK J. SORAUF AND RAYMOND E.

WOLFINGER IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

EVAN A. DAVIS

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN J. GASS

KIERITH A. JONES

JOEL W.L. MILLAR

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON

Counsel for Amici

One Liberty Plaza

New York, New York 10006

(212) 225-2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE................. l

gp (IBS 4 @ yyy) i |) errr 3

POINT I: THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD HAVE

LATITUDE TO FIX CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS WITHIN A RANGE OF REASON ...... 4

A. Latitude with Respect to the Appearance of

EET cccchadhasspesnsesbidiadeccenseces 5

B. Latitude with Respect to Impact on

ET (1beidbuchbegiwesbdentseeccetedsss 8

POINT II: FUNDRAISING DATA FROM US.

SENATORIAL CAMPAIGNS CONFIRMS

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE

MISSOURI STATEWIDE LIMIT................. 1]

POINT III: CERTAIN PRACTICAL

CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT THE

MISSOURI STATEWIDE LIMIT................. 16

i cticcccceceseusbeneess 16

ie Ee EE ES esa vcceccccccesccsecevces 19

C. The Self-Financed Candidate................ 22

PEEL TTT ETT CT Te eT TTT TUT eT Tee Tee 24

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

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PAGE

48a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ................... 3, 10

Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams,

161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998) ...................... 11-12

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144

Ne cucuccecccccces 22

Other Authorities

Op. N.Y. City Bar Comm. Professional and Judicial

Ethics No. 1994-7 (May 16, 1994) ............... 18

Ceci Connolly, Democrats Leading Dash for Cash

in Some Key House Contests, Wash. Post,

EEE 17

Ceci Connolly, Huge Money Chase Marks 2000 Race;

Some in GOP May Forego Federal Funds,

Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al ................. 22

Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending

in Congressional Elections,72 Am. Pol. Sci.

EEE EES EEE 17

Gary C. Jacobson, The Marginals Never Vanished:

Incumbency and Competition in Elections to

the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-82,

30 Am. J. POl. Sei. 126 (19B7)......... cece ceeee. 13

Paul Kane, Reaction to Lautenberg, States News

ec kccccecccccseccccccss: 14

David R. Mayhew, Congressional Elections: The

Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6 Polity 295

ee asc ccccccccccescescccecccce 14

Tim Nickens, Calling All Contributions,

St. Petersburg Times, June 15, 1998, at ID ...... 17,19

Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress,

1989-1990 (1990)

Elaine S. Povich & Ellen Yan, Can Cash Magnet

Attract Votes’, Newsday, July 3, 1998, at A211... 17

Research and Policy Comm., Committee for Econ.

Dev., Investing in the People’s Business: A

Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform

(1999)

Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths

TERRI NE LE ee 14

Bill Steigerwald, Moral Victory: On The Way To His

Landslide Loss To Congressman Ron Klink.

Mike Turzai Discovered That Even In Politics.

Some Things Are More Important Than

Winning, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 8,

FOC GMT, eccccsvcedenkscddndewincéd. 17

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of

the United States: 1998 (118th ed. 1998)

US. Fed. Election Comm'n, 1998 Congressional

Financial Activity Declines (Dec. 29. 1998) ..... 14

Amy Westfeldt, Lautenberg Won't Seek A Fourth

Term, Associated Press, Feb. 18,1999... 17

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

Amici are political scientists, many of whom have experi-

ence in, and all of whom are students of, the political process.

Amici submit this brief amicus curiae in support of Petition-

ers with the consent of the parties.’ Amici have dedicated all

or a substantial part of their careers to studying, analyzing

and discussing the history of and trends in the political sys-

tem in the United States. As a result, amici have considerable

knowledge of campaign financing practices and the effects of

various practices on the electoral process. Furthermore, the

amici are all well informed about the multitude of other fac-

tors that also affect campaigns and elections. Amici thus have

reasoned opinions on the issues in this case and all share an

interest in bringing their views before this Court.

In particular, the amici are: Paul Allen Beck, Professor,

Ohio State University, former Program Chair of the American

Political Science Association, whose writings include Party

Politics in America (8th ed. 1997); Thad Beyle, Thomas C.

Pearsall Professor of Political Science, University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill, former Chairman of the Board of

the North Carolina Institute of Political Leadership, whose

writings include Governors and Hard Times (1992); Janet M.

Box-Steffensmeier, Associate Professor, Ohio State Univer-

sity, whose writings include A Dynamic Model of Campaign

Spending in Congressional Elections, 6 Pol. Analysis 37

(1997) (co-authored with Tse-Min Lin); Leon D. Epstein,

Hilldale Professor of Political Science Emeritus, University

of Wisconsin-Madison, former President of the American

Political Science Association, whose writings include Polit-

The parties have consented to the submission of this brief. Their

letters are being filed with the Clerk of the Court concurrently with the

filing of this brief. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amuci state that

the brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any of the

partes. No monetary contribution toward the preparation or submission

of this brief was made by any person other than amici curiae and their

counsel

ical Parties in the American Mold (1986): Donald P. Green

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institution

for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, whose writings

include The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in US House

Elections, 56 J. Pol. 459 (1994) (co-authored with Jonathan S.

Krasno and Jonathan A. Cowden); Ruth S. Jones. Professor

Arizona State University, whose writings include A Decade of

U.S. State-Level Campaign Finance Reform, in Comparative

Political Finance Among the Democracies 57 (Herbert E

Alexander & Rei Shiratori eds., 1994); Ira Katznelson Rug-

gles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia

University, whose writings include The Politics of Power: A

Critical Introduction to American Government (rev. 3d ed

1987) (co-authored with Mark Kesselman); Jonathan S.

Krasno, Senior Policy Analyst, Brennan Center for Justice at

New York University School of Law, whose writings include

Challengers, Competition, and Re-Election: Comparing Sen-

ate and House Elections (1994): David B. Magleby, Distin-

guished Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science

Brigham Young University, whose writings include The

Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance and Pro-

posals for Reform (1990) (co-authored with Candice J. Nel-

son); Michael J. Malbin, Professor of Political Science, State

University of New York at Albany, whose writings include

The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons

from the American States (1998) (co-authored with Thomas

L. Gais); Thomas E. Mann, Director. The Brookings Institu-

tion, whose writings include Campaign Finance Reform: A

Sourcebook (1997) (co-edited with A. Corrado, D. Ortiz, T

Potter and Frank J. Sorauf): Burke Marshall, Nicholas D.

Katzenbach Professor Emeritus of Law and George Crawford

Professorial Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. and member

of the Board of Editors of Political Science Quarterly: Frank

J. Sorauf, Regents’ Professor Emeritus of Political Science

University of Minnesota, former President of the Midwest

Political Science Association, whose writings include Inside

Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (1992); and Raymond

E. Wolfinger, Heller Professor of Political Science, Univer-

sity of California, Berkeley, whose writings include The Myth

of the Independent Voter (1992) (co-authored with Bruce E.

Keith, David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth Orr

and Mark C. Westlye).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Rules of ethics are built not only on sanctioning actual

impropriety but also on avoiding the appearance of impro-

priety so as to enhance public confidence in the regulated pro-

cess or profession. Rules of ethics, and in large part this is

what limits on campaign contributions are under Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), are drawn by a judgmental bal-

ancing of those conditions that tend to preserve public con-

fidence against those conditions that allow for the proper

functioning of the process or profession in questicn. As pro-

fessional political scientists, we value both ethical standards

and the ability of candidates to function within them.

We argue below that when fixing rules of ethics for candi-

dates for public office and for the electoral process, state leg-

islatures should be granted latitude to strike the balance

within a range of reason. Because there is good reason to

grant some flexibility to state legislatures when it comes to

fixing contribution limits, this Court need not become a Uni-

versal Ethics Review Commission.

Next we analyze publicly available data from U.S. Sena-

torial races, which indicate that Missouri's contribution lim-

its are high enough to allow for robust campaigns, including

particularly a robust challenge to an incumbent. Finally, we

urge that when reviewing ethical rules for campaign finance,

actual practices in the real world of political fundraising must

be taken into account and that these practices provide further

support for the reasonableness of the limits at issue here.

One key point needs emphasis. This brief should not be

taken as reflecting agreement with the specific limits the Mis-

souri Legislature fixed under the statute at issue in this case.

Were we testifying before a legislative body, some of us

might favor limits that are higher and others of us might favor

limits that are lower. What we all agree on is that the Legis-

lature needs to be able to operate within a range of reason and

that the Missouri Legislature in this instance fixed limits that

fall within that range.

POINT I

THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD HAVE LATITUDE

TO FIX CONTRIBUTION LIMITS WITHIN

A RANGE OF REASON

We are confident that other briefs filed in this case will pro-

vide this Court with a full discussion of the legal analysis to

be applied under the First Amendment to contribution limits

fixed by a State Legislature. We expect they will urge that the

Buckley decision did not apply strict scrutiny, did not insist on

a narrowly tailored regulation and did not require application

of the least restrictive means test in its review of the $1,000

contribution limit at issue there. We are in general agreement

with those views, but the purpose of this brief is not to offer

a strictly legal analysis.

We rather offer this brief to aid this Court with a Statement

of the reasons why, in our judgment, State Legislatures should

be granted considerable latitude when First Amendment

review of contribution limits is undertaken by the judiciary.’

Our discussion assumes a System of campaign financing largely

dependent on nonpublic financing, including individual contributions

Although the issue is not presented here, this Court should not preclude

itself by what it writes here from deciding in a case that does fairly pre-

sent the issue whether a State Legislature may mandate that campaigns

be financed entirely or nearly entirely with public funds and whether

under such a regime the financing of campaigns through individual con-

tributions or the candidate's own resources may be prohibited.

That latitude has two parts: latitude in deciding what level

of contribution creates an appearance of impropriety and lat-

itude in deciding whether the limit so constrains fundraising

as to damage the responsiveness of the electoral process. We

discuss each in turn.’

A. Latitude with Respect to the Appearance of

Impropriety

How big a contribution creates an appearance of impro-

priety? This is a complex question because the question of the

impact of contributions on governmental decision aking Is

itself complex. Many factors influence the conduct of elected

officials and their political appointees, and it is extremely dif-

ficult to reach general conclusions regarding the threshold at

which campaign contributions create a widespread impression

of undue influence. There is no doubt, however, that there is

a strong populist component to the thinking of a significant

part of the populace, and we think a State Legislature should

be able if it chooses to take that thinking into account as it

strives to increase public confidence in government. The

median household income in the United States in 1996 was

$35,492, the income of 20.4% of all households fell below

$15,000 and the income of an additional 15.4% of all house-

holds fell below $25,000. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Sta-

tistical Abstract of the United States: 1998, at 468 tb1.738

(118th ed. 1998). Thus for many Americans $500, let alone

$1,000, is a lot of money. If someone gave them $1,000 to

help them keep their job, or to get a new one, that would be

an important event.

The viewpoint of the person receiving the contribution is

important too. What will a candidate do to get a contribution

of more than $1,000, and how responsive to the contributor’s

concerns will the candidate feel he or she must be 1n order to

For the Court's general reference, Appendix B sets forth a bib-

liography of selected works from the academic literature concerning cam-

paign finance and the electoral process.

expect a like contribution in the next election cycle? Further

we need to keep in mind that it is not merely a $1,000 coa-

tribution at issue, but a $1,000 primary election contribution

a $1,000 general election contribution and often contributions

in each race from two spouses.‘ It can add up to $4,000 for a

single “ask.”

Even limiting the analysis to $1,000, and taking account of

the complexity of the political process, we have no doubt that

many voters believe, and reasonably believe, that a success-

ful candidate will be reluctant not to return the phone call of

a person who contributed more than $1,000, particularly if

that contributor was personally solicited by the candidate. A

typical voter would likely think that a person contributing at

some lesser level, or not contributing at all, is more likely to

have the call returned by a staff person.

We urge that the likely prevalence and plausibility of the

belief that substantial contributions, and certainly those of

over $1,000, bring access should be enough to support a leg-

islative judgment that an appearance of impropriety exists.

The ability to make an argument directly to an officeholder

and to address on the spot the officeholder’s concerns need

not be outcome determinative to be materially influential. The

legislature should have the latitude to conclude that this per-

ception, and indeed reality, of improved access does enough

to impair confidence in government that it should be reduced

by barring contributions of over $1,000.

Even if the perception and reality of improved access for

the over-$1,000 contributor were insufficient to create an

appearance of impropriety, the perception and reality of bias

in favor of the interests of the over-$1,000 contributor would

be sufficient to create such an appearance. Such bias could

reasonably be perceived as potentially outcome determinative

We do not mean to suggest that one spouse can be assumed to

speak for the other, but rather merely observe that many spouses

approach political contributions together in a spirit of partnership

when deciding whom to appoint or whom to sue or whose

organization to favor with a grant or a contract or a favorable

regulatory adjudication.

A State Legislature could also reasonably conclude that the

bias in making an individual- or institution-specific govern-

mental decision is not the only relevant kind of bias. Another

source of bias that arises from contributions of over $1,000 is

the policy choice bias in weighing the interests of the class of

people who can afford to make contributions of over $1,000

and against the interests of the class of people who cannot

afford to contribute even $200. This kind of bias has a poten-

tial to influence such issues of key concern to the mass of vot-

ers as who benefits from tax reductions, what quality of

education will be provided in middle and low income school

districts and how the balance will be struck between com-

petitiveness and job security. A State Legislature should have

the flexibility, if it chooses, to consider the impact of this

kind of bias on public confidence in government.

Not only should a State’s political branches be permitted to

take the foregoing issues into consideration, but the judiciary

should recognize the political branches’ greater institutional

capacity for determining contribution limits that would reduce

public perceptions of impropriety. The Eighth Circuit's deci-

sion below, if affirmed, must inevitably lead to close judicial

scrutiny of the specific limits set by each State that chooses

to adopt campaign finance reform legislation. Yet by what

judicial calculus can a court distinguish between the impact

on promoting public confidence in government of a $1,000

limit and, for example, a $5,000 limit?

The fact-finding methods available to legislators, both

formal and informal, are more appropriate to the task. Leg-

islators have close contact with the very people whose per-

ceptions are at issue, namely constituents and contributors.

B. Latitude with Respect to Impact on Fundraising

How much money is needed to conduct a robust campaign?

Again this is a complex question. For a statewide race it

depends on the size of the state, the attentiveness of the vot-

ers, norms with respect to the availability of so-called “free”

or “earned” media, whether one or more media markets strad-

dle state lines and therefore involve media expenditures that

are in part wasted on persons not entitled to vote, the extent

to which media expenditures are wasted on unregistered vot-

ers, whether the vote turns itself out or requires heavy expen-

ditures to get a good turnout of supporters, the norms with

respect to negative ads which can be expensive to counteract,

the availability of data to target direct mail, the norms with

respect to volunteering to work for a campaign without pay,

prevailing pay rates for political workers, whether there is a

clubhouse structure, norms with respect to the use of phone

banks, the role of unions, the role of independent issue advo-

cacy and a number of other factors.

The effort to study this issue is also made more difficult by

a chicken and egg problem. Is the campaign won because the

candidate has more money or does the candidate have more

money because he or she has the appeal to win the campaign?

There is one group of people who have deep personal

knowledge >i »!. these factors and of their impact on the cost

of a robust campaign within the political jurisdiction in ques-

tion. That group is the Legislators who make the laws for that

jurisdiction and the Governor who signs them. A court could

study the issue in depth, and after lengthy hearings and the

testimony of competing experts, it could only hope to

approach the expertise of the political insiders. Or it could

spend an equal amount of time studying the legislative pro-

cess to assure itself that a “hard look” had been taken at all

the various relevant factors when the limits were set. Yet

there would be little reason to draw comfort from this

approach, since it is nearly impossible to be confident about

what calculus produces a particular legislative conclusion.

The variables are countless.

Under either form of heightened judicial scrutiny, the liti-

gation burden on the State to create and present a detailed

record in support of a precise dollar figure would be consid-

erable; the prospect alone could chill the enactment of cam-

paign finance reform legislation. This Court might therefore

consider whether in-depth judicial study under the adversary

system of the costs of political campaigns 1s necessary to pre-

vent an abridgment of the freedom of speech and political

association guaranteed by the First Amendment? We respect-

fully submit that the answer Is no.

First, the assessment of how much it takes to run a robust

campaign is not an exact science, and a range of judgment

inheres in the very process of analysis. Throughout this brief

we have referred to a $1,000 contribution limit and not the

$1,075 limit that is actually at issue. That is because it would

be misleading to suggest that dollars and tens of dollars are of

scientific significance. To the contrary, the impact on

fundraising revenue of a particular change in a contribution

limit is hard to pin down with any precision. The impact

of local political culture on the cost of a campaign is also dif-

ficult to quantify with accuracy. These uncertainties suggest

the need for a range of reason.

Also, Legislators and Governors have some motivations

that work against setting too low a contribution limit. It has

often been observed that, among the many advantages

enjoyed by incumbents, they are in a better position than are

challengers to raise larger contributions.’ This is because of

, In 1998, U.S. Senate incumbents averaged $1,481,861 in large

contributions ($750 to $1,000) from individuals, whereas challengers did

half as well, averaging $654,667. The pattern was the same in the 1998

U S. House of Representatives campaigns, with incumbents collecting

$123,266 in large donations and challengers collecting $44,053. (Intor-

mation compiled from downloadable databases prepared by the U.S. Fed-

eral Election Commission available at <http://www.fec.gov/finance/

finmenu.htm>.)

the perception that they have the power to give a quicker and

more certain return to the contributors who invest in them.

The fundraising advantage of incumbents means that when an

incumbent votes to reduce a contribution limit, he or she is

almost certainly voting to give up more large contributions

than his or her challengers.

We do not suggest that this circumstance means that no

need exists for scrutiny under the First Amendment. Incum-

bents have many advantages in access to free media, and in

other respects, and, if they secure the enactment of a contri-

bution limit so low that it leaves most challengers without

viable funding, they may be able to hinder the emergence of

effective opposition. Moreover, Legislatures controlled by a

single party might strive to reduce the opposing party's abil-

ity to raise and spend funds. However, such a strategy may be

risky to many incumbents, because if the contribution limit

gets low enough, it may open up a grassroots fundraising

advantage to the challenger. Another and stronger disincen-

tive to this strategy is the self-financed challenger. Here, the

contribution limit cannot under the First Amendment apply to

the large amount of personal resources the self-financed can-

didate may devote to the campaign. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1, 51-54 (1976). Too low a limit will leave the incum-

beni vulnerable.

When deciding how much latitude to give to a State Leg-

islature, we urge the Court to focus on the minimum amount

that a quality challenger needs to mount a campaign that has

a chance of success. As we discuss below, a quarter century

of experience with a $1,000 contribution limit under the Fed-

eral Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) shows no ill effect on

the success of challengers. It is important, in this regard, to

keep in mind that to the extent the contribution limit restricts

the supply of money, it does so for both the incumbent and

the challenger. Accordingly the minimum amount is an

amount needed to get basic exposure and not an amount

needed for competitive exposure. A contribution limit that

makes it reasonably foreseeable that a challenger will be

unable to raise that amount runs afoul of the First Amend-

ment. Above that minimum, the range of judgment in bal-

ancing what is needed to secure public confidence and what

is needed to insure the proper functioning of the system

should rest with the legislative process.®

POINT II

FUNDRAISING DATA FROM U.S. SENATORIAL

CAMPAIGNS CONFIRMS THE CONSTITUTIONAL-

ITY OF THE MISSOURI STATEWIDE LIMIT

We urge above that a campaign contribution limit runs afoul

of the First Amendment when it makes it reasonably fore-

seeable that a challenger will be unable to raise enough to run

a robust campaign. Respondents offered no evidence that Mis-

souri’s $1,075 contribution limit runs afoul of this standard

and accordingly their challenge should have been rejected out

of hand. To the extent this Court considers the position

adopted by one member of the panel in the decision below

that inflation has gradually transformed a $1,000 contribution

limit into an unconstitutional “difference in kind,” see Shrink

® Although we focus in this brief on a $1,000 contribution limit.

and specifically Missouri's $1,075 contribution limit for statewide veces.

the same principles would apply to smaller contribution limits, such “

the $525 and $275 contribution limits enacted by Missouri with respect

to Missouri's smaller, nonstatewide electoral districts. In smaller races,

voters could reasonably believe that candidates may be willing to do

more for a smaller contribution because the supply of potential con-

tributors is smaller. The Legislature should have the latitude to take this

perception into account when fixing limits to preserve public conmience

in the electoral process. Likewise, the Legislature should have the lati-

tude when establishing limits for smaller races to take into account fac-

tors. such as a smaller numbers of voters or the existence of fewer media

markets, that may reduce the costs necessary to run a robust campaign.

Accordingly, if this Court reviews Missouri's lower contribution limits

in addition to the $1,075 limit, we would urge the Court to reverse the

judgment below in all aspects.

Missouri Government PAC vy. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523 (8th

Cir. 1998) (Bowman, C.J., opinion announcing the judgment

of the court), we urge this Court that publicly available

fundraising data for U.S. Senatorial campaigns do not support

such a view and instead confirm that the risk that a $1,000

contribution limit runs afoul of this standard, even in today’s

dollars, is remote.’

Appendix A sets forth by state the amount raised and spent

by each of the major two party candidates in each of the U.S.

Senate races in 1998, 1996, 1994 and 1992. A study of these

tables shows the following about the ability of a challenger to

conduct a robust campaign under a $1,000 contribution limit.

First, challengers for election to the U.S. Senate have been

able to raise substantial sums to finance their campaigns. As

discussed above, identifying just what amount is necessary to

mount a competitive campaign is a complex question, subject

to numerous variables that differ from race to race and which

by their nature defy precise quantification. But one indication

that the $1,000 contribution limit has not prevented chal-

Although we urge that inflation has not rendered challengers

unable to compete under FECA’s $1,000 contribution limits. many of us

do regard the Missouri Legislature's provision for periodic inflation-

adjusted increases in the contribution limit at issue here as a much

needed improvement over FECA. While many of us favor such provi-

sions as a matter of legislative policy, we urge this Court that the inclu-

sion of omission of automatic inflation-adjustment provisions in

campaign finance legislation should not be a matter of constitutional

analysis. A contribution limit that is presently necessary to restore pub-

lic confidence and that permits challengers to run robust campaigns

should not be constitutionally suspect based simply on concern that it

may not anticipate future developments adequately. A court cannot be

certain that the cost of campaigns will increase in accordance with gen-

eral price inflation (however measured) or that the Legislature will not

periodically amend the statute to adjust contribution limits in accordance

with the best available information then known about the costs of cam-

paigns or even to what extent candidates may become more or less

dependent on individual contributions, depending on the future evolution

of campaign finance legislation and fundraising practices.

lengers from raising sufficient funds to mount competitive

campaigns is the fact that many challengers have raised

amounts rivaling or exceeding the amounts raised by Oppos-

ing incumbents.* However much more money candidates

might deem necessary to run the perfect campaign, the fact

that challengers have been able to raise substantial sums on

par with incumbents provides some comfort that the $1 000

contribution limit has not placed challengers at a financial

disadvantage.

This fact provides further comfort in light of available data

showing that some candidates have been able to run winning

campaigns despite being outspent by a substantial margin, as

for example in 1996 when Joseph (Max) Cleland defeated

Guy Millner in an open election for one of Georgia’s Senate

seats, even though he was outspent by more than 3 to | ($9.9

million to $2.9 million). See Appendix A, at |4a. As Cleland’s

campaign illustrates, the minimum amount necessary to run a

competitive campaign is not necessarily an amount that

equals that raised by the candidate's opponent, but rather may

be a lower threshold amount that nonetheless provides a can-

didate the basic exposure necessary to present a viable chal-

lenge. Of course, not all challengers have raised significant

‘Examples from the 1998 Senate elections include races in Cal-

ifornia (challenger Matthew Fong raised $10.8 million compared to

incumbent Barbara Boxer's $12.7 million), Georgia (challenger Michael

Coles raised $5.2 million compared to incumbent Paul Coverdell’s $5.9

million), Nevada (challenger John Ensign raised $3.4 million compared

to incumbent Har™ Reid's $3.9 million), New York (challenger Charles

Schumer raised $16.3 million compared to incumbent Alfonse D’ Amato 's

$17.6 million), Washington (challenger Linda Smith raised $5. ! million

compared to incumbent Patty Murray's $5.3 million) and Wisconsin

(challenger Mark Neumann raised $4.4 million compared to incumbent

Russell Feingold’s $4.1 million). See Appendix A, at 2a, 4a, 7a-Sa, 12a

. Many political scientists have argued that it is more important

for challengers to reach a minimum threshold of expenditures than to

achieve total parity with the incumbent. See, e.g.. Gary c. ven The

Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections, 72 Am. Pol

Sci. Rev. 469 (1978).

amounts of money, but the successful fundraising efforts of so

many other chaiiengers suggests that, of the numerous factors

that ‘may have led to such inadequate financing, the $1,000

contribution limit was not one of them.

A second indication that the $1,000 contribution limit has

not prevented challengers from rura‘rg robust campaigns ts

the fact that since FECA was passed overall campaign spend-

ing for congressional elections has outpaced inflation. Total

congressional campaign expenditures increased more than six-

fold from $99.0 million for the 1975-76 election cycle to

$617.1 million'® for the 1997-98 election cycle, constituting

an increase of 523.3%. See Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign

Finance: Myths and Realities 158 (1992); U.S. Fed. Election

Comm'n, 1998 Congressional Financial Activity Declines

(Dec. 29, 1998) <http://www.fec.gov/press/cn3098tx .htm>.

By contrast, prices increased by less than threefold, rising

182.1% over the same general period, as measured by the

Consumer Price Index (for the period from 1976 to 1997). See

U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra, at 489 tbl.772.

Perhaps most important of all, over more than two decades

of experience with the $1,000 federal limits, there is no evi-

dence that incumbents have become more entrenched. While

incumbents who run for re-election, particularly for House of

Representatives seats, win in a high percentage of races, their

success rate before and after passage of FECA has not mate-

rially changed.'' From 1956 to 1974, 81.3% of incumbent

” The 1997-98 election cycle expenditures are stated as of Novem-

ber 23. 1998, excluding expenditures in special elections and by cand1-

dates who lost in the primaries.

. See generally Gary C. Jacobson, The Marginals Never Vanished.

Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Repre-

sentatives, 1952-82, 31 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 126 (1987). Similarly, although

the average margin of victory remains high for incumbents, this pattern

was established in the 1960s and has not experienced any appreciable

worsening since the enactment of FECA. See generally David R. May-

hew. Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6

Polity 295 (1974), Jacobson, supra.

U.S. Senators and 91.6% of incumbent U.S. Representatives

were re-elected; from 1976 to 1996, 80.7% of incumbent Sen-

ators and 93.7% of incumbent Representatives were re-

elected. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra, at 289 tbl.468:

Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress, 1989-

1990, at 56-57 tbls.2-7 to 2-8 (1990).

The available data placed in the record from several

statewide races held under Missouri's newly enacted contri-

bution limits, although limited in nature, do not reveal a pat-

tern markedly divergent from the federal experience with

$1,000 contribution limits. Of the statewide races for gover-

nor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general

and treasurer, general election campaign expenditures

increased in three of the five races and average expenditures

per candidate (including primaries) increased in four of the

five races in 1996, after the enactment of Missouri's then-

existing $1,000 contribution limit, as compared to the

amounts spent in 1992, when Missouri had no contribution

limits. See State Defs.’ Suggestions Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. Prelim.

Inj. and Supp. State Defs." Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A (Campaign

Finance Data from Recent Elections). Although total cam-

paign expenditures (including primaries) decreased in the

races for governor, treasurer and attorney general in 1996.

those decreases appear likely to be attributable to the fact that

all three races featured contested primaries without any

incumbents in 1992, whereas the same races featured incum-

bents and no primaries in 1996. See id. The limited number of

races constrains the conclusions that can be drawn, but expe-

rience under Missouri's statewide contribution limit has not

manifested an appreciable impediment to candidates’ ability

to maintain adequately financed campaigns.

Our discussion of the campaign fundraising experience

under the federal $1,000 contribution limit should not be

taken as an endorsement of $1,000 contribution limits in par-

ticular. As noted above, many of us might favor higher or

lower limits were we considering the issue as a matter of

legislative policy. What we do urge is that Legislatures should

have latitude when fixing ethical rules governing campaign

finance to determine the appropriate contribution limit so long

as the limit does not become so low as to make it reasonably

foreseeable that a challenger cannot raise sufficient funds to

run a robust campaign. We urge this Court that the likelihood

that a $1,000 contribution limit runs afoul of this standard

appears remote in light of the publicly available fundraising

data. Moreover, we are aware of no systemic evidence to the

contrary, and Respondents have certainly placed none in the

record. Under these circumstances, we urge that the Missouri

Legislature's judgment that a $1,075 contribution limit strikes

the appropriate balance between the needs of preserving pub-

lic confidence and ensuring robust campaigns should be

respected.

POINT III

CERTAIN PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

SUPPORT THE MISSOURI STATEWIDE LIMIT

Ethical rules governing campaign finance that seek to avoid

an appearance of impropriety and promote public confidence

in government and the electoral process should be effective

in real world terms. Therefore they should be evaluated

in the context of how fundraising actually works. Three

prevalent fundraising practices are particularly worthy of con-

sideration. They are dialing for dollars, the impact of con-

tribution limits on the “giving pyramid,” and self-financed

candidates.

A. Dialing for Dollars

Dialing for dollars ts the practice whereby a candidate

directly contacts a potential contributor to get that contribu-

tor to pledge a specific amount on the spot. In urban areas,

runners are often used to pick up the check immediately

following the call. The practice is widespread"? but candidates

do not enjoy doing it.'’ Some have cited dialing for dollars as

a reason not to run for office or not to seek re-election."

Because of the ethical problems with direct solicitation by

the candidate, some favor barring direct solicitation of money

by candidates for certain offices such as judgeships and dis-

12 .

See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Democrats Leading Dash for Cash in

Some Key House Contests, Wash. Post, July 18, 1998, at A6 (quoting the

chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee as

advising candidates that “[y]ou have got to devote an enormous amount

of your personal time . . . on the phone and in person asking for

money”); Elaine S. Povich & Ellen Yan, Can Cash Magnet Attract

Votes ”, Newsday, July 3, 1998, at A21 (reporting the opinion of a polit-

ical consultant who had worked on more than 100 campaigns that the

“successful candidates are the ones who realize they must bow their

heads over the phones for hours each day”); Tim Nickens, Calling All

Contributions, St. Petersburg Times, June 15, 1998, at 1D (describing a

“typical day” for Florida gubernatorial candidate Rick Dantzler during

the Democratic primary campaign as “{dJial for dollars between 9:30 and

noon. . . Hit the phones again from 1:30toSp.m.... . {and return]

to the barren downtown office to make calls from 7:30 to 9 p.m.”).

See, e.g., Paul Kane, Reaction to Lautenberg, States News Ser-

vice, Feb. 17, 1999 (quoting U.S. Representative William Pascrell as stat-

ing that “You've got to sit down and make calls from a private phone for

hours and hours a week. . . It detracts from what you're sent there to

do”), available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Curnws File; Bill Steigerwald.

Moral Victory: On the Way to His Landslide Loss to Congressman Ron

Klink, Mike Turzai Discovered That Even in Politics, Some Thines Are

More Important Than Winning. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 8. 1998.

Lifestyle. at Gl (reporting that U.S. Representative candidate Mike

Turzai spent several hours a day dialing for dollars during his campaign

and hated it, stating that “[i}t's the crass part of it. . . but you can’t have

a winning Campaign without it”).

See, e.g.. Amy Westfeldt. Lautenberg Won't Seek Fourth Term.

Associated Press, Feb. 18, 1999 (reporting U.S. Senator Frank Lauten-

berg’s explanation that he would not run for re-election because “{t}he

compelling factor. . . was the searing reality that | would have had to

spend half of every day between now and the next election fund rais-

ing”), available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library. Curnws File.

trict attorney. See, e.g., Op. N.Y. City Bar Comm. Profes-

sional and Judicial Ethics No. 1994-7 (May 16, 1994) (opin-

ing that candidates for Attorney General, District Attorney

and similar offices, “like candidates for judicial office,

_ . should not personally solicit campaign contributions” but

instead “should establish committees to do so and. . . avoid

learning the names of the contributors and the amount of their

donations”), available in LEXIS, Ethics Library, Nycbar File.

Also, direct solicitation by an incumbent creates a particularly

strong appearance of impropriety. The public can reasonably

believe that specific matters pending before the incumbent are

discussed during such direct solicitation. Of course the

incumbent cannot as a practical matter be barred from direct

solicitation without barring his or her adversaries as well.

Lower contribution limits sharply constrain the ethical

objection to dialing for dollars. Because the favor being asked

is limited, the favor that can be asked in return 1s also limited.

The public can reasonably conclude that the conversation that

surrounds a modest request differs not just in degree but in

order of magnitude from the conversation that accompanies a

large request, even a request for $1,000.

Nor is there reason to believe that a $1,000 limit eliminates

a candidate's ability to raise enough money to conduct a

robust campaign. Some have argued that as the contribution

limit 1s lowered the candidate has to call so many more peo-

ple that dialing for dollars becomes an impossible burden.

This is not the case for several reasons.

First, the lowered “production” from dialing for dollars

affects all the candidates in the race. Time spent on this activ-

ity is influenced by what is required to be competitive and if

the rules are the same for everyone there is no a priori reason

to believe that the amount of time spent on this activity will

increase if, for example, the limit 1s $1,000 as opposed to

$2.000.

Me PRD a ap Aten Se Se —

Second, anecdotal evidence suggests that when contribution

limits are lowered candidates will shift from calling to ask for

a specific contribution pledge to calling to ask for a com-

mitment to raise a specific amount from other donors. For

example in Florida, where the contribution limit is $500, the

St. Petersburg Times recently quoted the executive director of

the Florida Democratic party as saying “It's calling and say-

ing. ‘I need you to raise $ 10,000 for me,’ not that you call

everyone who is contributing the $10,000." Tim Nickens.

Calling all Contributions, St. Petersburg Times, June 15,

1998, at 1D.

Of course it is fair to ask whether this shift benefits public

confidence in government. The answer is that it does. Sur-

rogates in direct conversation with contributors are not in a

position to make a deal to anywhere near the extent that the

candidate is. And as for contact between the candidate and the

fundraiser, gratitude for fundraising effort in the context of

low contribution limits is less likely to impair public confi-

dence in government than is gratitude for the large gift that

the fundraiser could have given directly. To the contrary,

fundraising effort, like other volunteer work, is an important

form of civic participation to be encouraged.

B. The Giving Pyramid

The giving pyramid is a pictoralization of the principle that

as the amount of the contribution goes up the number of con-

tributors giving that amount goes down. A chart of the num-

ber of contributors at various giving levels will look like a

pyramid with the relatively few largest contributors at the top

and a broader base of smaller contributors on the bottom.

The effect of a contribution limit is to cut off the top of the

pyramid so that it looks like the truncated pyramid on the

back of a one dollar bill. The contributors who were at the top

of the pyramid, however, do not all disappear. Some drop out

because the contribution is now a waste of time from the

point of view of buying influence, but those who were con-

tributing because of true support should remain. The number

of the contributors making the maximum, permissible con-

tribution therefore increases as those who would have given

more reduce their contributions to the statutory limit.

Consider, for example, the impact of reducing a $2,000

contribution limit to $1,000. At this level it is reasonable to

assume that few of the $2,000 contributors will drop out.

Even the influence seekers will give $1,000 because this num-

ber is high enough to provoke clear gratitude on the part of

the candidate. Because of the giving pyramid, the number of

these former $1,001 to $2,000 contributors who are now con-

tributing $1,000 (i.e., those who were at the top of the pyra-

mid) is almost certainly fewer than the number who under the

old $2,000 limit were contributing at the $1,000 level or

below (i.e., those who were at the base of the pyramid). For

this reason, a halving of the contribution limit results in

nowhere near a halving of the revenue. To the contrary, as a

matter of mathematics, and assuming no drop outs, the loss of

revenue is equal to the number of contributions between

$1,000 and $2,000 under the old limit multiplied by an

amount equal to the average amount of such contributions

minus $1,000. For example, a campaign which under a $2,000

contribution limit raised a total of $3.4 million, one half of

which came from contributions in excess of $1,000 and where

the average amount of these excess contributions was $1,700,

the loss of revenue from the reduction of the contribution

limit to $1,000 is $700,000 or 21%. If the base is broader

such that one-third of the revenue comes from contributions

in excess of $1,000, the loss of revenue is $466,667 or 14%.

This analysis is not empirical and is therefore only sug-

gestive of sensitivity to the amount raised at levels between

the old and new contribution limits. However, we do know

that in the most recent Senate races approximately one-third

of all contributions were under $500 and in House races

approximately 44% of all contributions were under $500. See

Se ee

Research and Policy Comm., Committee for Econ. Dev

Investing in the People's Business: A Business Proposal lor

Campaign Finance Reform 14 (1999). It is thus highly pos-

sible that in a $2,000 limit regime, more than a majority of

the contributions would be in the amount of $1,000 or below

It is also worth noting that in the race at issue here only 2 per-

cent of the campaign contributions would have been affected

had the $1,075 limit not been enjoined.

Further since it is no longer necessary to spend effort

upgrading $1,000 contributors to $1,500 or $2,000 contrib-

utors, that time can now be devoted either to finding new con-

tributors or to upgrading contributors below $1,000. Thus

without any increase in effort, the revenue loss is mitigated s°

that it falls below the numbers and percentages just men-

tioned.

Also a reduction in the contribution limit may well encour-

age campaigns to spend more effort increasing the number of

contributions lower down in the giving pyramid. This pro-

motes the State's interest in reducing the appearance of

impropriety. A campaign which relies more heavily on $500

or $250 contributions is less likely to be perceived as havin

been bought by the “monied interests.” . .

It is thus apparent that the calibration of specific contri-

bution limits is a complex process. The effect on a candidate's

total revenue of even a 100% difference in contribution lim-

its is difficult to assess, and depends on the structure of the

candidate's giving pyramid, the candidate's change in

fundraising tactics in response to the contribution limit, and

numerous other factors. Any decrease in revenue. moreover

does not translate directly into proportionally decreased

chances for electoral victory. All other candidates must oper-

ate under the same constraints, and in any event, there is no

evidence of a linear relationship between total contributions

and chances of success.

None of these considerations was taken into account by the

court below. The danger of that court’s approach is apparent.

The Legislature, consulting the opinion, would have no guid-

ance as to what limits would be held permissible. If Missouri

nonetheless raised the limit to attempt to comply with the

court's analysis, the Eighth Circuit would have no way of

knowing whether the change made a substantial difference, let

alone one that overcame the constitutional deficiencies it

perceived in the $1,075 limit. Ultimately, there would be no

principled way to divide constitutional limits from uncon-

stitutional ones. In each case, the court would apply a seat-of-

the-pants or “common sense” guess as to the effect of a

specific limit. For the foregoing reasons, common sense Is

likely to overstate the effect of any limit. An accurate

calculus requires a far more complex analysis than that

employed by the court below. It is therefore prudential that

the judiciary confine itself to decide whether the limit falls

below a floor that is necessary to allow a challenger to run a

robust race."

C. The Self-Financed Candidate

Self-financed candidates are an important part of the polit-

ical landscape.'® As noted above, the incumbent's fear of a

self-financed challenger is one reason this Court can have

It is only when contribution limits are so extreme as to hinder

the emergence of effective challengers, or to disadvantage political

minorities, that the judiciary ought to interfere; otherwise, adjustments

to or outright repeal of campaign finance regulation should be left to the

political process. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,

152 n.4 (1938).

‘© See, e.g.. Ceci Connolly, Huge Money Chase Marks 2000 Race;

Some in GOP May Forgo Federal Funds, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1999, at

Al (reporting that Texas Governor George W. Bush may forgo federal

funding and its accompanying spending limits in the 2000 presidential

campaign in order to compete with self-financed candidate Malcolm S.

Forbes, who spent $32 million of his own money in the 1996 presiden-

tial campaign).

Jed, 2 ee ht

confidence that State Legislatures will not fix excessively low

contribution limits. However, since the ability of a candidate

to compete against a self-financed candidate should be a part

of the overall First Amendment analysis, we consider it

briefly here.

We urge that so long as the reduced contribution limit

allows the candidate with plausible voter appeal to raise

enough for a robust campaign, the self-financed candidate

should not be used as a bogey man to strike down a contri-

bution limit fixed by a State Legislature. First, as we have

shown, the drop in fundraising revenue is not proportional to

the drop in the contribution limit and can be mitigated both

through freed up effort and new effort. Second, self-financed

candidates often have access to such awesome resources that

the financial advantage due to wealth overwhelms any

increase in that advantage due to the reduction in the contri-

bution limit. Finally, if a candidate has enough money to get

out the message, opposition by a self-financed candidate can

be a potent ground for an appeal to contribute, to increase

contributions or to devote time as a volunteer to soliciting

contributions within the limit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons advanced in

the Petitioners’ brief herein, it is respectfully submitted that

the question presented in the Petition should be answered in

the affirmative, or in the event that this Court reviews all

aspects of the judgment below, that the judgment should be

reversed and judgment entered in favor of Petitioners grant-

ing Summary Judgment herein.

Respectfully submitted,

EVAN A. DAVIS

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN J. GASS

KIERITH A. JONES

JOEL W.L. MILLAR

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON

Counsel for Amici

One Liberty Plaza

New York, NY 10006

(212) 225-2000

APPENDICES

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48a

APPENDIX B

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.