Amicus Curiae Brief — United States v. United States Shoe Corp.
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No. 97-372
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES SHOE CORPORATION,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
UNITED STATES SHOE CORPORATION
Robert E. Burke
Counsel of Record
Christopher E. Pey
BARNES, RICHARDSON & COLBURN
200 East Randolph Dr.
Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 565-2000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Amoco Chemical Company
January 14, 1998
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTION:
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 5 .. 2... 6.6... 005. passim
CASES:
Fairbank v. United States,
EE Nat an, po ccceeceecctbiccs 7
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
ole ie acc codbcctcecscce 6
Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876) ............. 12
STATUTES:
P.L. 99-662, Water Resources Development Act of 1986
(Nov. 17, 1986), 100 Stat. 4082 .............. 10, 11
P.L.101-508, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
es ae ES PI, OED... co ccccccdccecece 11
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:
H.R. Rep. No. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017 ........... 1
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C_AN. 2374 ............. T
iii
OTHER:
Annual Report to Congress on the Status of the Harbor
Maintenance Trust Fund for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996
(Dally 16, 1DDT) 2. cccccccccccccccccccces 5, 12-19
141 Cong. Rec. E519 (extension of remarks, March 6,
1995\Rep. McDermott) ........ 6.66 e eee eeeee 10
“Ports Try Tax Breaks To Reel In Business,” Journal of
Commerce, April 6, 1995, at 1A, 8A. ............ 10
Part One, The Debate on the Constitution (Library of
America, New York, 1993) ..........600 cee eeees 7)
The Federalist Papers, (B. Wright, ed. 1961) ....... 6
The Federalist Papers, Penguin Books,
IED gn gb Eco meee cece. 6
Records of the Federal Convention
(M. Farrand, ed. 1934) .... 6.6... cc cece eee 7-9
L. Abramson, State Taxation of Exports: The Stream of
Constitutionality, 54 N.C.L.Rev. 59 (1976) ....... 6
No. 97-372
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES SHOE CORPORATION,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
UNITED STATES SHOE CORPORATION
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
OF AMICUS CURIAE '
The Amoco Corporation, having its principal place of
business in Chicago, Illinois, is a manufacturer of a wide
This brief was drafted entirely by counsel for amicus
curiae Amoco Chemical Company without assistance, monetary or
2
variety of hydrocarbon based products including motor
fuel and other fuels, refined petrochemical and natural gas
products and semi-finished chemical products. Among its
activities, Amoco Corporation, including its subsidiary
Amoco Chemical Company (hereinafter “Amoco”),
(plaintiff in a related refund case currently stayed before
the United States Court of International Trade), exports,
imports and ships in coastal traffic substantial quantities of
materials subject to the Harbor Maintenance Tax
(“HMT”). Amoco exports large quantities of such
products as styrene, which is a basic building block
chemical for the production of polystyrene plastic resins,
and purified terephtalic acid “PTA”, a major raw material
for the production of polyester resins. Amoco utilizes
intercoastal shipping in the United States for shipping
intermediate and finished goods to and from its various
refineries and distribution points located throughout the
country. In addition, Amoco imports substantial quantities
of crude oil which is subject to the HMT. To date, Amoco
has paid millions of dollars in HMT on exports, imports
and coastwise traffic.
Amoco has reviewed in depth and fully supports the
basic arguments on constitutionality offered to this
Honorable Court in the brief filed by Respondent, United
States Shoe Corporation. In the interests of judicial
economy, Amoco will not repeat those arguments in this
brief. At the same time, Amoco believes that this brief
may offer an insight to the Court relative to how the
economic concerns of the Framers supporting the
prohibition of a tax on exports are as dynamic and
significant in international commerce today, as they were
at the time the Constitution was being drafted.
3
As a major United States exporter, Amoco is sensitive
to the importance of maintaining a strong industrial base
in this country. Amoco also understands the nature of
competitive conditions in world markets. It is
fundamentally inconsistent with the economic interests of
the United States for any tax to be assessed on exported
merchandise. This, we believe, was fully recognized in
1789 when the Founding Fathers debated, and finally
approved, a Constitution that expressly prohibits the
establishment of such a pernicious tax.
In practical terms, Amoco is competitively
disadvantaged by the harbor maintenance tax. The present
amount of the tax, when aggregated, is a significant
factor affecting the profitability of many export
businesses. Indeed, the tax could easily affect whether a
company would enter into an export transaction, given the
extremely competitive world wide market conditions
under which commodity chemical products are sold at
historically low profit margins. In the case of Amoco, the
assessment of the HMT is another factor facing Amoco in
fulfilling its export marketing strategies. No exporter
should have to contend with government-established
disincentives to export business.
Amoco is convinced that the Drafters of the
Constitution envisioned that a tax, such as the Harbor
Maintenance Tax, should not be instituted by the Federal
Government. Clearly, the assessment is by its own
definition and character a tax, and not merely a fee, as
argued by the Government. The history of the Framers’
debates on the Export Clause demonstrate that they
intended to enact the Clause because of its sound
economic underpinnings. Because the tax impinges
4
directly on Amoco’s ability to compete in the critical
export markets of the world, the constitutionality of the tax
is of great importance to it.
STATEMENT OF CONSENT
Amicus Curiae Amoco Chemical Company has
obtained the consent of both parties to the filing of this
brief in support of respondent United States Shoe
Corporation, as indicated in the enclosed letters.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A primary intent of the Framers in enacting the Export
Clause was clearly to avoid a factional conflict between
the exporting Southern states and the majority Northern
states. Concerns were also expressed in the
Constitutional Convention that the power to tax exports
would be exercised improperly if granted to the national
government. In addition to those primary concerns, the
Framers clearly considered and understood the advanced
(for the day) economic rationale that eliminating taxes on
exports would operate to the greater benefit of the country
as a whole. Those concerns remain valid today, especially
in view of the highly integrated nature of the international
and domestic economies.
As one of the few restraints on the Congressional
power to tax, the Export Clause should be staunchly
defended against surreptitious incursions such as the tax
before the Court. The Harbor Maintenance Tax (“HMT”)
is an ad valorem tax laid upon the value of exported cargo.
A more clear example of a tax on exports is difficult to
5
envision. Congress should not be permitted to make such
an obvious encroachment upon the clear terms of the
Constitution.
Practically speaking, if the HMT is allowed to stand as
written, atid if the Government’s arguments are taken to
their necessary conclusions, Congress would be essentially
unimpeded from taxing exports for any other purpose it
can devise, either by inventing a “connection” between
exports and the “service” being provided, or by increasing
the tax rate to a level even more disproportionate in
relation to the service provided than is currently the case.
If the Court should approve the HMT in its current form as
the Government argues, there would be essentially no
upper limit on how high Congress could tax exports,
because the current rate of taxation bears no relation to the
costs of the purported benefits being provided. Indeed, the
tax each year raises approximately 133% of the cost of the
purported benefits, and that ratio is growing each year.
Projections from the Annual Report to Congress on the
Status of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund for Fiscal
Years 1995 and 1996 (“Annual Report”) show that, at
average levels of increase, the HMTF will have an
accumulated surplus of $6.5 billion in 2005, $14.5 billion
in 2010, and over $57 billion in 2020. This shows that the
Framers were correct to be wary of taxes on exports,
however small. Once a tax has been established, it
inevitably grows, as will the progressively accumulating
surplus in the HMTF.
6
ARGUMENT
I. The Framers Intended That The Federal
Government Be Prohibited From Establishing
Taxes or Similar Burdens on Export for Sound
Economic Reasons that Remain Valid Today
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution
provides that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State.” This clause formed an
essential part of the political compromise necessary for
ratification of the Constitution. After the Declaration of
Independence, the states joined together under the
Articles of Confederation. But because the Articles
lacked a strong central authority, states with seaports
discriminated against other non-port states by charging
duties on goods shipped out of state.? Many states
passed tariff laws to benefit themselves at the expense of
neighboring states.’
The Export C).:..e compromise was essential to the
adoption of the Constitution, for it removed a power
from the states which they had abused, and prevented
the Federal Government from exercising a power that
had a great danger of abuse. See, L. Abramson, State
Taxation of Exports: The Stream of Constitutionality, 54
N.C.L.Rev. 59, 60-63 (1976). The Southern states
. See, The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 42, at 305
(B. Wright, ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also, Michelin Tire Corp.
v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283-5 (1976).
, Editor’s Introduction to The Federalist Papers,
Penguin Books, (I. Kramnick, ed 1987), at 20.
7
were concerned that if the Northern states had control
over the Federal Government they would tax exported
products, which were the South’s main source of
revenue. In addition, concerns were expressed that the
power to tax exports would be exercised improperly if
granted to the national government. Both policies must
be vindicated in any review under the Export Clause.
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 292 (1901)
(prohibition applies not only to prevent discrimination
among the states, but also to prevent the Federal
Government from imposing an ad valorem tax on all
exports).
A principal concern was that the Northern states
would impose duties on exported goods, which were a
major source of income for the Southern states. This
concern was equal in importance for the Southern states
to their fears that the new Constitution would outlaw
slavery. At the Constitutional Convention, Gen.
Pickney, delegate of South Carolina, issued a warning
just before the convention delegates were to turn over
their agreed-upon resolutions to the Committee of Detail
that “If the committee should fail to insert some security
to the Southern states against an emancipation of slaves
and taxes on exports, I shall be bound by my duty to my
State to vote against their report.” 2 Records of the
Federal Convention 95 (M. Farrand ed. 1934). The
Committee on Detail returned a draft text that included
a prohibition on taxes on exports, which was approved
after extended debate. /d., at 183.
Several attempts to change the text of the Clause
demonstrate the true intent of the Framers. During the
debate of the clause one delegate attempted to insert the
words “for purposes of revenue,” after the word “duty”
in the text of the Export Clause, but his motion was
voted down. 2 Records of the Federal Convention at
363. By rejecting that restriction the Framers showed
that export taxes or duties were intended to be
prohibited for whatever reason, whether for purposes of
revenue or not. The Framers did not care if the tax was
a “fee for service” or an ad valorem duty: both were
prohibited.
The restriction on taxing exports was arguably even
meant to avoid paying for expenses associated with
exports. James Madison noted that the exporting states
wished to retain the power to lay duties on exports “to
enable them to pay the expenses incurred.” 3 Records
of the Federal Convention at 328-29. This proposal was
rejected following agreement to the Import-Export
Clause, which, as discussed in Respondent’s Brief,
allows duties or taxes in very limited circumstances.
Therefore, taxes on exports, even to pay for expenses
incurred by states on behalf of exporters were intended
to be prohibited by the Framers, except as provided in
the Import-Export Clause.
In addition to the political reasons for the Export
Clause, the Framers understood that taxing exports was
a dangerous though attractive power that should be
curbed, because many states had imposed such taxes
under the Articles of Confederation. Some delegates
were concerned that the power to tax exports would be
exercised improperly if granted to the national
government. 2 Records of the Federal Convention at
9
308 (Statement of Mr. Sherman). Oliver Ellsworth,
delegate from Connecticut, argued that,
There are solid reasons agst. Congs taxing
exports. 1. it will discourage industry, as taxes
on imports discourage luxury. 2. The produce
of different States is such as to prevent
uniformity in such taxes. there are indeed but a
few articles that could be taxed at all; as
[tobacco] rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone
would be partial & unjust. 3. The taxing of
exports would engender incurable jealousies.
2 Records of the Federal Convention, at 360. In
broadsheets covering and discussing the Constitutional
Convention, taxing exports was condemned as “the
acme of impolicy.”*
We believe that if the Framers had been presented with
the HMT, they would have condemned it as vehemently as
they condemned state taxes on exports while drafting the
Constitution. It has all the pernicious aspects of those
earlier taxes on exports. The Framers inserted the
Export Clause in the Constitution to prevent the types of
rivalries that are now developing due to a loss of business
by certain U.S. ports to Canadian and Mexican ports, in
? “Reply to Mason’s ‘Objections’: Civis Rusticus,”
Virginia Indep. Chronicle, Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in, Part One, The
Debate on the Constitution, (Library of America, New York, 1993)
at 361; see also, “Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New
Constitution,” “Marcus” (James Iredell), Norfolk and Portsmouth
Journal, March 19, 1788, reprinted in, Part One, The Debate on the
Constitution, at 394-95.
10
order to pay for improvements made in ports farther away
from our neighbors. See, 141 Cong. Rec. E519 (extension
of remarks, March 6, 1995)(Rep. McDermott); “Ports Try
Tax Breaks To Reel In Business,” Journal of Commerce,
April 6, 1995, at 1A, 8A. Because the HMT so closely
matches the Framers’ concerns, the Court must reject the
Government’s arguments and find that the HMT, as
applied to exports, is an unlawful “tax or duty”.
II. Establishment of the HMT and Increasing the
HMT Rate, was Precisely What the Framers
Intended to Prevent With the Export Clause
Congress passed the bill containing the Harbor
Maintenance Tax as part of a larger political compromise
on one of the largest water project authorization bills ever:
the Water Resources Development Act of 1986
(“WRDA”), P.L. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (November 17,
1986). The WRDA authorized funds for hundreds of
water projects that had been bottled up in Congress for
almost ten years, including mostly non-harbor dredging
projects. See, P.L. 99-662, Titles II-VI, 100 Stat. at 4089-
4149, for a list of over two hundred water projects
authorized by the WRDA. But aside from imposing the
HMT on shippers, the WRDA imposed no new regulations
on vessels or shippers.
When no one objected strenuously to the new tax
(because it was very low and the Government did not
enforce the tax on exports), the Administration and
Congress took the opportunity to more than triple the tax,
while at the same time assuring a tidy surplus, which could
be counted as an effort toward reducing the federal budget
deficit. The HMT was increased from 0.04 percent of
11
cargo value to 0.125 percent by the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1990, which was included in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (“OBRA”),
P.L.101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (Nov. 5, 1990). Unlike the
original HMT in the WRDA, the three-fold increase in the
tax rate was not necessary in order to obtain agreement of
the Administration for authorizing new water projects; the
increase was a simple money grab. Like the WRDA, the
Revenue Reconciliation Act and OBRA included no
regulation of shippers. None of the congressional reports
give any substantive reason for the need to increase the
tax, other than increasing revenues or lowering the deficit.
See, H.R. Rep. No. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 288
(1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2290; H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1055 (1990),
reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2760. Note that in
the OBRA, the clause providing for the increase in the
HMT was included in Title XI, “Revenue Provisions,” and
not in Title X, “Miscellaneous User Fees and Other
Provisions.” P.L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-385, -400,
-436. The HMT rate increase was passed along with other
deficit reduction items, an indication of the effect that
Congress intended the rate increase to have.
The increase in the HMT tax rate validates the
Framers’ suspicions of government taxation of exports.
Once such taxes are allowed, they will inevitably increase.
The Export Clause is meant to protect against such taxes,
no matter how small. Despite the Government’s
arguments and some of the statements in the legislative
history to the WRDA, the HMT was meant as a “revenue
enhancer” from the very beginning. The legislative
history of the OBRA shows that the trebling of the HMT
rate was clearly intended to provide “revenue
12
reconciliation” as a “user-related tax”, thereby providing
meaningful deficit reduction. However, while deficit
reduction is a laudable goal, the Export Clause prohibits
revenue-raising taxes from being placed on exported
goods.
That the HMT is a revenue measure, and not a fee-for-
service, can also be seen by review of the collections and
expenditures made from the Harbor Maintenance Trust
Fund (“HMTF”). As shown in the following charts, the
trust fund operates at a significant annual surplus.
Revenues increased (or are projected to increase)° in the
years 1991-2001 at the rate of 11 percent, while
expenditures will increase by only 4.05 percent. The
Annual Report information is found on the charts entitled
“HMTF Balance Sheet 1991-2001” and “HMTF Annual
Accumulated Surplus 1991-2001”. Following those charts
are two similar charts showing projected increases in the
trust fund at the historical (11% and 4.05%) rates of
, In Pace v. Burgess, 181 U.S. 372, 375-76 (1876), the
Court stated:
. . . We cannot say that the charge imposed is
excessive, or that it amounts to an infringement of
the constitutional provision referred to.
The HMT should be differentiated from the Pace charge
because that charge was not imposed on an ad valorem basis. It
should also be clear from the points raised by Respondent as well as
the information portrayed in the charts found infra, that the HMT is
in fact an excessive revenue-raising charge, and does amount to an
infringement of the Export Clause.
e All 1991-2001 HMTF information is taken from the
Annual Report, at 7-8.
13
increase. These charts demonstrate that the trust fund is
seriously out of balance, and is heavily skewed toward
increasing revenues, in the absence of any anticipated
increases in future harbor maintenance expenditures.
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HMTF Annual Accumulated Surplus 1991-2020 (in thousands)
Source: Annual Report to Congress on the Status of the HMTF for
Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996, at 7-8, plus projections based upon average revenue increases
from 1991-2001 (11%), and expenditures (4.05%).
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Balance Sheet 2001-2020 (in thousands)
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Source: Projections from average increases for revenues (11%) and expenditures (4.05%)
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of the Status of the HMTF for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996, at 7-8.
20
CONCLUSION
Because the HMT is an ad valorem tax imposed upon
exported cargo, it falls squarely within the prohibition of
the Export Clause. The Framers understood that
imposition of any such tax would lead to inevitable
pressure for an increase in the tax rate. They also
understood that exports should be promoted by
government, not discouraged by taxation. We believe that
the Framers would reject the HMT as soundly as they
rejected the then-current export taxes imposed by many
states before the enactment of the Constitution, and that
this Honorable Court should do the same.
Respectfully submitted,
BARNES, RICHARDSON & COLBURN
200 East Randolph Drive
Suite 7920
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Tel. (312) 565-2000
Robert E. Burke
Counsel of Record
Christopher E. Pey
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Amoco Chemical Company
Dated: January 14, 1998
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