Amicus Curiae Brief — California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.
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Supreme Court, Ug.
F lelvE D
(\)
No. 96-1400 _/
In The
Supreme Court of the United
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATE LANDS COMMISSION,
Petitioners,
v.
DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC..,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FoR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNDERWATER
ARCHAEOLOGY, COUNCIL OF AMERICAN MARITIME
MUSEUMS, INSTITUTE OF NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE HISTORIC
PRESERVATION OFFICERS, NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
OCEANIC HISTORY, SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN
ARCHAEOLOGY, SOCIETY FOR CALIFORNIA ARCHAEOLOGY,
SOCIETY FOR HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, AND SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONAL ARCHEOLOGISTS
AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
Paul W. Edmondson
Elizabeth S. Merritt
Thompson M. Mayes
Edith M. Shine
Laura S. Nelson
NATIONAL TRUST FOR
HISTORIC PRESERVATION
1785 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 588-6035
August 1997
Robert A. Long, Jr.*
James A. Goold
Craig W. Canetti
COVINGTON & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 7566
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 662-6000
Counsel for Amici Curiae
* Counsel of Record
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether, in an in rem admiralty action seeking title
or salvage rights to a shipwreck lying on the submerged lands
of a State, a State is entitled to immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment only if it can prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it owns the shipwreck.
2. Whether the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2106 ("ASA"), preempts state laws governing title to
historic shipwrecks that are not protected by the ASA.
3. Whether a long-lost historic shipwreck should be
deemed not abandoned, and therefore not protected by the
ASA, because an insurance company may have paid a claim
on a portion of the ship’s cargo.
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................. V
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE............... i
ee ewe ee 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................ 6
Ne debe o es 9
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS
FEDERAL COURTS FROM ADJUDICATING AN
UNCONSENTING STATE’S INTEREST IN
HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS LOCATED ON THE
STATE’S SUBMERGED LANDS ........... 9
Il. THE ASA DOES NOT PREEMPT CALIFORNIA’S
LAW GOVERNING ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES
LOCATED IN OR ON THE _ STATE’S
SUBMERGED LANDS ................. 13
Ill. LONG-LOST HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS SHOULD
BE PRESUMED TO BE ABANDONED ...... 17
A. Abandonment May Be Implied From
Inaction Over A Period Of Time ......... 18
B. Whether Technology Needed To Salvage A
Vessel Was Developed Only Recently Should
Not Preclude A Determination That A Long-Lost
Historic Shipwreck Is Abandoned ........ 20
(iii)
iv
C. There Is No General Rule That A Vessel
And Its Cargo Must Be Treated As A
“Unified Mes” ow we eee eer eeeees
D. The Possibility Of Litigation In Two Courts
Defeats The Purpose Of The ASA .......--
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Dredging Co. v. Miller,
a ee
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A.
v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996) ......
Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 1042
(E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd without op..,
99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996) .........
Bunge Corp. v. Agri-Trans Corp.,
542 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Miss. 1982),
aff'd in part and vacated in part
on other grounds, 721 F.2d 1005
a ee een a as
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found
and Salvaged from the Nashville,
A/K/A, The Rattlesnake, 606 F. Supp.
801 (S.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd mem..,
775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985) ......
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
I a A eee ee a
Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
525 F: Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981) ......
Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ......
(v)
vi
Columbus-America Discovery Group
v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,
974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993) ........... 20, 24
Compania Galeana, S.A. v. Motor Vessel
Caribbean Mara, 565 F.2d 358
Le a ee 24
English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72
5 es ok 6k Ma AGS O0m)) 60.0 OP 8 15
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) .........-. 11
Fairport International Exploration, Inc.
v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the
Cuneta Lawrence, 105 F.3d 1078
(6th Cir. 1997) .. 2... eee eee ee eee eee 22
Fitzgerald v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Vessel, 866 F.2d 16 (ist Cir.
SS ire PS yore ie 11, 12, 13
Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) ..... 10, 11, 13
Georgia Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 50 F.2d 901
(W.D. Wash. 1930) .......---- eee eeee 24
Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ... 0.22 ee eee eee eee 24
ITSI TV Products, Inc. v. Agricultural Ass’ns,
3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) ........--0ee 12
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028
EEE bes bdccmneenderdsde.*e spe he 12
In re New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) .......----- Q
In re New York, 256 U.S. 503 (1921) ........-+--- 9
Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F. Supp. 1377
(S.D. Fla. 1988) ....----- eee eee eee 4, 6
vii
Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.
MP ASW MECERL ee dle me. 17
Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954) . . 15. 25
Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 717 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1983)... 4, 6, 11,
Martha’s Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. ra
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abanduned Steam
Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059 (1st Cir. 1987) ...... 19, 20
Marx v. Government of Guam, 866 F.2d 294 ,
PT RS re 12
Moyer v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,
Known as the Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp.
I ee ee gor Oo.- 5, 20
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) .... . 12
Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co, SOUS SS6 CD ow ci ccc se 15
Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co.,
ge 10
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) .......... 4
Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked &
Abandoned Vessel, Known As "The Sindia",
895 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1990) ............. 13
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. |
ee i) at, ee oe ee 17
Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4 Se ee 24
Subaqueous Exploration & Archaeology, Lid.
v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,
577 F. Supp. 597 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd
without op., 765 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1985) .... 4,6
The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 125 (1815) ...... 9, 23
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866) .... 10
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569
F.2d 330 (Sth Cir. 1978) .. 1... 6 ee ee ees 20
United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212 (3d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984
|. ne rs i. Se. i ee 2
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,
482 U.S. 193 (1987)... 2 2. ees 11
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance,
$48 U.S. 310 (1935S) 2. ww cw eee wee 14
Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, Believed to be the SB "Lady Elgin",
755 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1991), rev'd,
960 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 985 (1992)... 2 6 ee ee eee 2, 23
Zych v. Wrecked Vessel Believed To Be The
"Lady Elgin”, 960 F.2d 665 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992) . 8, 10, 11, 12, 13
Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, Believed to be the SB "Seabird",
746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd,
941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand,
811 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd,
19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
$13 U.S. 961 (1994)... 2 ee ees
ix
Constitution, Statutes, and Rule
U.S. Const. amend. XI........ ji
Mimmanhs........... 0 core
. ' Leone adeedeas
43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 .......... 1,4, 5
ee CU we 15 16
eS 15
Pe 19
Mee 5, 18
Seana. | 15
ee a ana 14
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health ==«-s—i—™
Education Act of 1986,
15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994)... ... 14
Rivers and Harbors Act .............
Gee is
Submerged Lands Act of 1953,43U.S.C _
I a ae eta t ele os 6
SS le ee ane 14
WE i ee
I re Se ee
1 SERRE Obata ;
Cal. Pub. Res. Code §6313.............7 15, 17
RE ut 13
I ey |
&-% & ) es enter ek Rca ay l
Miscellaneous
H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(1) (1988) ........ 17, 18, 22
H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(II) (1988) ........... 6, 18
x
S. Rep. No. 100-241 (1987) .......--- 5, 17, 19, 22
134 Cong. Rec. 5336-5337 (1988) .....- +--+: 22
134 Cong. Rec. 6613 (1988) ....-- +--+ sees: 16
134 Cong. Rec. 6615 (1988) ....--- +e eee eees 25
55 Fed. Reg. 50,115 (1990) ....----- seer eee 19
70 Am. Jur. 2d Shipping (1987) ....--- +++ 55> 20
A. Crothall, Wealth From The Sea (1993) ..-.--.---> 3
G. Bass, Archaeology Under Water CD We bce ewes 3
Thompson M. Mayes, Current Legal Issues in the
Law of Historic Shipwrecks, 5 Preservation
L. Rep. 2027 (1986) .....- +--+ e seer rr rees 2
29 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 703.06[2] (3d ed. 1997)... -- eee eee i)
3A Martin J. Norris, Benedict on Admiralty
§ 207 (7th ed. 1997) ....---- +++ paces 24
2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime
Law § 16.7, at 341 (2d ed. 1994) .......--- 17, 19
W.F. Searle, Jr., Advanced Deep Salvage
Operations, Oceanology International,
ee eer ere ee 3
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States ("National Trust") was chartered by Congress in 1949
aS a private nonprofit corporation to facilitate public
participation in historic preservation and to further the historic
preservation policies of the United States. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 468 (1994). Additional information describing the National
Trust, the Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, the
Council of American Maritime Museums, the Institute of
Nautical Archaeology, the National Conference of State
Historic Preservation Officers, the North American Society for
Oceanic History, the Society for American Archaeology, the
Society for California Archaeology, the Society for Historical
Archaeology, and the Society of Professional Archeologists is
included in the Appendix.'
Recognizing that the United States’ irreplaceable maritime
legacy of historic shipwrecks was being damaged or destroyed
through unregulated commercial exploitation, the amici
organizations actively supported passage of the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act of 1987 ("ASA" or "the Act"), 43 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2106 (1994), in order to clarify the States’ authority
to protect historic shipwrecks. The National Trust and many
of the other amici have participated in lower court cases
involving historic shipwrecks and the ASA in an attempt to
prevent the deterioration or destruction of these valuable
' Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.3(a), the amici have obtained from all
parties their written consent to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to Sup. Ct.
R. 37.6, counsel for the amici certify that this brief was not authored in
whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity
other than the amici, its members, or its counsel has made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
(1)
2
historic resources.* Additionally, the National Trust has
monitored litigation concerning historic shipwrecks both
before and after the passage of the ASA and its judicial
interpretation throughout the country.’ Thus, the amici have
a substantial interest in the validity and effectiveness of the
ASA and other federal and state historic preservation laws.
INTRODUCTION
1. Historic Value of Shipwrecks. Historic shipwrecks
are time capsules of our heritage. Because a shipwreck lies
undisturbed until discovery, the site contains a cross-section
of the past — a tableau that tells us about a ship, its cargo,
and the lives of its crew and passengers. Study of these par
provides invaluable information about maritime history :
technology, international and regional trade, and the seafaring
life.
purred b worldwide losses of ships bearing valuable
ae during World War I, technology was developed by the
1920s that enabled salvors to recover objects from 250 feet or
more below the surface, largely using smash-and-grab
2 See Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Paes
be the SB “Seabird,” 746 F.Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd, 941 F. ;
§25 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand, 811 F.Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd,
19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961 (1994); Zych v.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the aan
Elgin,” 755 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1991), rev d, 960 F.2d 665 ( a
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992); United States v. Steinmetz,
F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).
3 See 15 Preservation L. Rep. 1159 (1996) ("PLR"); 14 PLR 1096,
1192 (1995); 13 PLR 1081, 1157 (1994); 12 PLR 1001 nage bho
1109 (1992); 10 PLR 1155 (1991); 8 PLR 3044, 3046, 3048, ( +
7 PLR 1001 (1988); Thompson M. Mayes, Current Legal Issues in
Law of Historic Shipwrecks, 5 PLR 2027 (1986).
3
techniques such as clam-shell buckets guided by divers.‘
Beginning in the early 1960’s, innovations in technology made
it possible to treat shipwrecks as archaeological sites that
could be studied systematically and preserved with the same
degree of precision and care as sites on land. Archaeologists
and historians since have excavated a rapidly growing number
of shipwreck sites in accordance with scientific standards,
producing major breakthroughs in our knowledge of maritime
history and culture, and making this information available for
study and museum display.° However, the same advances in
scuba and other underwater technology have placed these sites
within the reach of salvors and looters who are motivated
primarily by the possibility of reaping pecuniary gain from the
artifacts located at the shipwreck sites.
Commercial exploitation of historic shipwrecks can easily
result in the loss or destruction of this priceless legacy.
Where recovery techniques fail to preserve and document a
vessel's contents, crucial elements of the story of a vessel and
its times are forever lost. Where proper conservation
techniques are not applied, the rapid deterioration of ancient
materials exposed to surface conditions makes it impossible to
glean accurate scientific and historical information from the
remains, or to make them available for public display.
Too often, historic shipwrecks are exploited for their
monetary value, and are either intentionally looted or
inadvertently destroyed without regard for their irreplaceable
historic and cultural value. The primary goal of even the
best-intentioned commercial salvors is financial return, not
* See generally A. Crothall, Wealth From The Sea (1993). As early
as 1915, the United States submarine F-4 was raised from 330 feet. See
W.F. Searle, Jr., Advanced Deep Salvage Operations, Oceanolog’.
International, March 1969.
* See generally G. Bass, Archaeology Under Water (1966).
4
documentation and preservation of historically significant
artifacts.
2. The Brother Jonathan. The Brother Jonathan
illustrates the value of historic pe eee te eb 1850, the
ip represents a significant departure ier ocean-
A designs, and 0 the transition from sailing-ship-
inspired hulls to the straight-stemmed hull common to later
steamships. The Brother Jonathan played a significant role in
the development of Pacific coast ports, beginning with the
discovery of gold in British Columbia in 1858. The vessel
appears to have sunk more or less intact, leaving many
artifacts in their original places. The site also marks the final
resting place of the 225 people who perished in what is still
regarded as the greatest maritime disaster in California waters.
Because of its unique design, its role in the Gold Rush, and
the integrity of its well-preserved remains, the Brother
Jonathan has been determined eligible for listing on the
National Register of Historic Places, and is a California
Registered Landmark. See J.A. 566-72.
3. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act. Congress enacted the
ASA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106, *. 1987 in response to
increasing confusion and conflict over :he appropriate judicial
forum and legal principles for resolving ownership of these
irreplaceable cultural resources.° Congress determined that
° itime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified,
er, pa. Fevscs Sailing Vessel, 717 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1983); Jupiter
Wreck, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F.
Supp. 1377 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found =
Salvaged from the Nashville, A/K/A, The Rattlesnake, 606 F. Supp.
(S.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd mem., 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985); Subaqueous
Exploration & Archaeology, Lid. v. Unidentified ones enero
Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd without op., 765 F.2d |
(4th Cir. 1985). Contra, Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Cobb Coin
5
historic abandoned shipwrecks located in or on the State’s
submerged lands are most appropriately owned and managed
by the States, which have expertise and established programs
for the management of these resources. Congress’ intent was
to clarify the States’ ability to exercise stewardship over these
sites, so that the States no longer would be required to litigate
Claims to historic shipwrecks in protracted cases involving
unsettled law in federal admiralty courts. See S. Rep. No.
100-241, at 3 (1987).
Under the ASA, the federal government asserted title to
certain historic shipwrecks and transferred title to the States.
43 U.S.C. § 2105.’ The States typically protect historic
shipwreck sites through permits that require scholars and
Salvors to excavate the sites in accordance with professional
archaeological standards, which would not necessarily be
required by admiralty courts. See Moyer v. Wrecked &
Abandoned Vessel, Known as the Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp.
1099, 1107 (D. N.J. 1993).®
Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F.
Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
” Under the ASA, the United States asserted title
to any abandoned shipwreck that is—
(1) embedded in submerged lands of a State:
(2) embedded in coralline formations protected by a State on
submerged lands of a State; or
(3) on submerged lands of a State and is included in or
determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register.
43 U.S.C. § 2105(a). The United States then transferred its title in these
shipwrecks to the States. See id. § 2105(c).
. All 50 States have programs of cultural resource management, and
at least 28 States had specific laws relating to the treatment of underwater
archaeological resources when the ASA was enacted. See H.R. Rep. No.
6
Prior to the ASA, States argued that the Eleventh
Amendment barred in rem admiralty actions in federal court
in which treasure salvors sought to adjudicate the State’s
interest in historic shipwrecks located on the State’s
submerged lands. See, e.g., Maritime Underwater Surveys,
Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
717 F.2d 6 (ist Cir. 1983); Jupiter Wreck, Inc. Vv.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F.
Supp. 1377 (S.D. Fla. 1988). States typically asserted title to
the shipwrecks under state preservation statutes and the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315
(1994). See, e.g., Subaqueous Exploration, 577 F. Supp. at
608 (D. Md. 1983). Following enactment of the ASA, the
Eleventh Amendment continues to provide States with
immunity from suit in federal court over these claims, as
Congress intended. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-5141), at 2-3
(1988).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals incorrectly held that the State is not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity unless a federal
court determines that the State has a "colorable claim" to the
Brother Jonathan. The Court defined a "“colorable claim" to
require proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a
shipwreck satisfies all the criteria of the ASA. That holding
is contrary to established Eleventh Amendment principles.
First, the Eleventh Amendment applies to admiralty
proceedings, including in rem proceedings. Second, the
Eleventh Amendment applies if the State is a “party in fact,”
whether or not it is a named party to the action. Third, the
Eleventh Amendment provides an immunity from suit, which
protects States from being subjected to the indignity of the
100-514(11), at 1. Forty States now have established programs for the
protection of historically significant shipwrecks. See Pet. 15 n.5.
:
coercive process of a judicial tribunal at the instance of private
parties. Consequently, it is the existence of the State’
Sk Mese Iad Ges Oe Gent of Go Oun’s dn on
Oe Co ant Amenteneet imasenity. Theve is 20 doubt
ornia has asserted a claim to the Brother Jonathan
and that is sufficient to establish Eleventh Amendment
immunity. California's entitlement to Eleventh Amendment
immunity is reinforced by respondent's stipulation that the
shipwreck is located on the State’s sovereign lands.
In the course of ruling that California is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case, the court of
> ay made nena rulings co pea seriously damage
ie ley framework , Congress established to protect
First, the court of appeals held that the ASA reempts
California statute that provides additional ataaien .
archaeological sites and historic resources located on the
State's submerged lands.” The court of appeals’ preemption
ruling is not supported by the text or purpose of the ASA
which Congress enacted to confirm the States’ title to and
authority over historic shipwrecks. The California statute
does not conflict with the objectives of the ASA: indeed. it
The court of appeals also erred in ruling that
the Brother Jonathan had been abandoned. * 8 wth
obtained an assignment of interests in a fraction of the Brother
Jonathan's cargo from successors of the insurance companies
tot reportedly had paid claims on thet portion of the cargo at
time of the sinking. Respondent then argued that the
* Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 6313(a) (West Supp. 1997) provides, i
“ Supp. ) ,
that [t]he title to all abandoned shipwrecks and all archaeological sites and
pce ay me oe in the tide and submerged lands of California is
assignors had not abandoned their interests.'° The Ninth
Circuit incorrectly agreed.
The court concluded that no inference of abandonment
arises where salvage has become possible only recently due to
advances in salvage technology, which the court assumed to
be true in the case of the Brother Jonathan. Prior to the
ASA, it was generally understood that abandonment of a
vessel may be implied from the owner’s inaction over a period
of time. This understanding, which is reflected in the
legislative history of the ASA and guidelines promulgated
pursuant to the Act, is consistent with the congressional
purpose. The court of appeals’ contrary holding would
frustrate the purpose of the ASA by judging past intentions in
the light of present-day capabilities.
, contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion, there
is no general admiralty principle that a vessel and its cargo
must be treated as a “unified res." Nor does the possibility
that a salvor will be required to litigate in both federal and
state court justify a rule that effectively would deny the
protection of the ASA to countless historic shipwrecks.
© Since the enactment of the ASA, commercial salvors have used this
tactic to revive dormant insurance claims. See, e.g., Zych v. Wrecked
Vessel Believed To Be The “Lady Elgin,” 960 F.2d 665, 668 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992). In this case, newspaper reports at the
time of the sinking indicated that about two thirds of the Brother
Jonathan's cargo was not insured. Pet. App. A4, A31 n.9. There is no
evidence that the vessel itself was insured. Ja.
" Because of the importance of the court of appeals’ rulings on
preemption and abandonment, this Court may wish to consider providing
guidance to lower courts on those issues even if it holds that California is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In the alternative, the Court
may wish to state explicitly that it expresses no opinion as to the
correctness of the lower court's rulings on those issues.
9
ARGUMENT
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS FEDERAL
COURTS FROM ADJUDICATING AN
UNCONSENTING STATE’S INTEREST IN
HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS LOCATED ON THE
STATE’S SUBMERGED LANDS.
The Eleventh Amendment applies to admiralty
proceedings, including in rem proceedings. See In re New
York, 256 U.S 490 (1921) (New York I); In re New York, 256
U.S. 503 (1921) (New York IN). Even though respondent did
not name the State as a party to this action,
[ijt is well established that the [Eleventh] Amendment
bars suits not only against the State when it is the named
party but also when it is the party in fact. Its
applicability "is to be determined not by the mere names
of the titular parties but by the essential nature and effect
of the proceeding, as it appears from the entire record.”
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) (quoting New
York I, 256 U.S. at 500) (citations omitted)).
The effect of a judgment in an in rem admiralty action is
to establish the plaintiff's right to title in the defendant res
against all of the world, i.e., "the whole world is bound by
the decision." The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 125, 143 (1815)
(Marshall, C.J.)."" Consequently, a judgment in rem that
" See also Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co.. 237 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1915) (“By virtue of dominion over the thing all persons
interested in it are deemed to be parties to the [in rem] suit: the decree
binds all the world and under it the property itself passes and not merely
the title or interest of a personal defendant."); The Moses Taylor, 71 US.
(4 Wall.) 411, 427 (1866) (“It is this dominion of the suit in admiralty over
the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title made under its decrees
validity against all the world."). See generally 29 James W. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice § 703.06[2] (3d ed. 1997).
10
determines a State’s claim to the res is a judgment "against
one of the United States" for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Zych v. Wrecked Vessel Believed To Be The "Lady Elgin , 960
F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 985 (1992). In Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), eight members of this
Court agreed that the Eleventh Amendment deprives a federa)
court of the power to determine a State's interest in property
that is the subject of an in rem admiralty action. See id. at
682 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ.) ("The (district) court did not have
power . . . to adjudicate the State’s interest in the property
without the State’s consent"); id. at 706 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment, joined by Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor,
JJ.) ("A suit of this type [to determine a State’s title to
artifacts} is at the heart of the Eleventh Amendment
immunity .”").
of appeals’ conclusion that Eleventh
paasadtaaass temmenian ons oh <hiatien te Sista oxn ouhinel
a “colorable claim" of ownership, see Pet. App. Al0-A14,
rests on a misreading of the plurality opinion in 7reasure
Salvors. The question presented in Treasure Salvors was
whether the Eleventh Amendment immunized property held by
state officials from a federal court’s process. See id. at 673,
by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In applying the Ex
parte Young doctrine, the plurality looked to whether the state
officials had acted ultra vires. It was in the course of this
to the State ’s assertion of a claim to ownership of the property
at issue. See Zych, 960 F.2d at 670 ("The strength of the
11
state’s legal position is irrelevant."); Fitzgerald v.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 866 F.2d 16, 18
(Ist Cir. 1989) (action is barred "irrespective of the actual
merit of the [State’s) claim to the salvaged wreck . or,
Maritime Underwater Surveys, 717 F.2d at 8 ("[BJecause of
the Eleventh Amendment’s flat prohibition of suits against
States regardless of their merit, we need not reach the
colorability of (se [State’s] claim. . . .").
Of course, "[t]o know whether a general all-the-wor
injunction runs against a state, the court must determine
whether the state has some interest." Zych, 960 F.2d at 670.
"In this sense, some view of the merits is inevitable." Jd.
But “it is the existence, and not the strength, of the [State’s]
claim that activates the eleventh amendment." /d.
In this case, there is no doubt that California has claimed
ownership of the Brother Jonathan under both the ASA and
state law. It is undisputed that respondent seeks title to the
wreck of the Brother Jonathan. See Pet. App. A3, A22.
Moreover, respondent has stipulated that the wreck is located
on the submerged lands of the State of California. See Pet.
App. A6é, A24n.4. This Court recently reaffirmed that "lands
underlying navigable waters have historically been considered
‘sovereign lands," and that “[s]tate ownership of them has
been ‘considered an essential attribute of sovereignty." Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2041 (1997)
(quoting Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S.
193, 195-98 (1987))."° Because the State is asserting title to
the wreck, it is a party in fact and is entitled to Eleventh
Courts of appeals that have dismissed in rem admiralty actions
against historic shipwrecks on Eleventh Amendment grounds have noted
the presence of the wreck on the State’s submerged lands. See Zych, 960
F.2d at 667, 670; Fitzgerald, 866 F.2d at 17; Maritime Underwater
Surveys, 717 F.2d at 8. Cf. Marx v. Government of Guam, 866 F.2d 294,
300-01 (9th Cir. 1989).
12
Amendment immunity. Further evaluation of the merits of the
State’s claim, particularly after the location of the wreck on
the State’s sovereign lands has been established, would
conflict with the “role of the [Eleventh] Amendment in our
system of federalism,” which is "to prevent the indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals
at the instance of priv... parties." Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) ("PRASA") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Ninth Circuit subjected the State of California to just
such an indignity by requiring the State to prove that it was
entitled to prevail on the merits as a prerequisite to receiving
Eleventh Amendment immunity The court of appeals’
reasons for imposing such a requirement conflict with
decisions of this Court. The Ninth Circuit’s view that
Eleventh Amendment immunity is a mere “affirmative
defense," see Pet. App. Al2-A13, was rejected by this Court
in PRASA. See 506 U.S. at 145-46. Even if the State bears
the burden of asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity, "a
motion by a State or its agents to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds . . . generally will have no bearing on
the merits of the underlying action." Jd. at 145 (citation
omitted).'* Treasure Salvors, moreover, contradicts the
Ninth Circuit's holding that the preponderance of the evidence
standard merely enables the district court to determine its
The court of appeals relied on JTS] TV Prods., Inc. v. Agricultural
Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). See Pet. App. Al2-A13. In /TSI,
however, the court required an entity asserting Eleventh Amendment
immunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was an arm
of the State and therefore entitled to immunity. The /TS/ court did not
require the State to make any showing on the merits, let alone prove its
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
13
jurisdiction. See Pet. App. All-Al2. In Treasure Salvors,
the lower courts had treated the State’s ownership of the res
as a "jurisdictional fact" that had to be resolved in order to
determine "whether the Eleventh Amendment in fact barred an
exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court." 458 U.S. at 681
n.14, 682. Eight iustices agreed, however, that the Eleventh
Amendment bars a federal court from adjudicating the State’s
interest in the property, thus removing proof of ownership
from the jurisdictional analysis. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Amendment bars a federal district court from adjudicating
California’s claim to the Brother Jonathan.“
Il. THE ASA DOES NOT PREEMPT CALIFORNIA’S
LAW GOVERNING ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES
LOCATED IN OR ON THE STATE’S SUBMERGED
LANDS.
Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2,
Congress may expressly preempt state law. See Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). In the
absence of an express statement of preemption, “courts must
consider whether the federal statute’s structure and purpose,
or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear,
but implicit, preemptive intent." Barnett Bank of Marion
County, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (1996)
(citation omitted). In either case, "(t]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis." See
'S Respondent is free to bring a quiet title action in California state
court to test the validity of the State’s claim. The Eleventh Amendment
would not preclude a federal court from adjudicating the claims of parties
other than the State in an in rem action. See Zych, 960 F.2d at 670; Sindia
Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known As "The Sindia”,
895 F.2d 116, 121-23 (3d Cir. 1990). If the State is found to be an
indispensable party to the in rem action, however, the entire action must
be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. See Fitzgerald, 866 F.2d at 18-
19; Maritime Underwater Surveys, 717 F.2d at 8 & n.3.
14
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (internal quotation marks and
Citations omitted).
The ASA contains no provision expressly preempting state
law. The district court erroneously viewed section 7(b) of the
ASA, 43 U.S.C. § 2106(b), as an express preemption clause.
See Pet. App. A46. Section 7(b) provides that "[t)his chapter
shall not change the laws of the United States relating to
shipwrecks, other than those to which this chapter applies."
By its plain terms, section 7(b) simply confirms that the ASA
does not affect the law applicable to shipwrecks that are
outside its scope. That provision falls well short of the
affirmative preemptive statement required to expressly
preempt state law.'°
Nor does the ASA implicitly preempt state laws governing
title to historic shipwrecks. Congress has not "so thoroughly
occupie[d] [the] legislative field as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the states to
supplement it." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has recognized
repeatedly that admiralty is not an exclusively federal
domain.'’ Rather than occupying the field of historic
‘© Congress knows how to preempt state law expressly when it wants
to do so. For example, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health
Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994), contains two
express preemption clauses, as well as a saving clause providing that
"[nJjothing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common
law or under State statutory law to any other person.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 4406(c).
'" See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447
(1994) (state forum non conveniens rule applies in admiralty); Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-75 (1959)
(listing additional state law provisions valid in admiralty cases); Wilburn
Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (state law governs
maritime insurance contracts); Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556,
a ee ee
15
shipwreck preservation, Congress has recognized in the ASA
that the States have the primary role in managing historic
shipwrecks located on the State’s sovereign submerged lands.
There is also no conflict between the ASA and Cal. Pub.
Res. Code § 6313. It is not "impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements." English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citations omitted).
And the state law is not "an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Jd. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
To the contrary, section 6313 furthers the stated purpose of
the ASA, which is to ensure State control over historic
shipwrecks located in or on state submerged lands. Congress
found that "States have the responsibility for management of
a broad range of living and nonliving resources in State waters
and submerged lands," 43 U.S.C. § 2101(a), and declared as
a matter of federal policy that States should
develop appropriate and consistent policies so as to —
(A) protect natural resources and habitat areas;
(B) guarantee recreational exploration of shipwreck
sites; and
(C) allow for appropriate public and private sector
recovery of shipwrecks consistent with the protection
of historical values and environmental integrity of the
shipwrecks and the sites.
Id. § 2103(a). Congress expressly provided that "[tjhe
[federal] law of salvage and the law of finds shall not apply to
abandoned shipwrecks" covered by the ASA. Id. § 2106(a).
The ASA was enacted in direct response to burdensome
litigation faced by state preservation programs in the federal
561 (1954) (actions to resolve title questions between individuals, and not
against the entire world, may be brought in state court).
16
courts. See supra note 6. Representative Vento, a primary
sponsor of the ASA, explained the problem that the Act
sought to redress:
Currently, some 27 States have laws concerning the
protection of historic shipwrecks. These States spend a
disproportionate amount of effort and expense in
admiralty court arguing for jurisdiction over the
shipwrecks on their State submerged lands.
134 Cong. Rec. 6613 (1988). After describing the conflict
between state cultural resource management programs and
federal admiralty court rulings, Representative Vento
expressed the view that "the States can do a better job of
making sure that these few abandoned shipwrecks are
available to all the appropriate interests and not just to the
salvors." Jd. (statement of Rep. Vento).
The court of appeals’ preemption ruling appears to have
been based largely on an incorrect assumption that, apart from
the ASA, States have no authority to legislate concerning
historic shipwrecks located on the their submerged lands. See
Pet. App. A7-A9. Although this Court has never drawn a
bright line establishing "just how far the general maritime law
may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation,"
it has recognized "[t}hat this may be done to some extent
cannot be denied." American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 451
(quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216
(1917)). California’s law governing historic sites located on
its sovereign submerged lands falls well within the realm of
permissible state legislation. Preservation of historic
shipwrecks on state lands is far from the core concerns of
admiralty law. See S. Rep. No. 100-241, at 6 ("The
Committee recognizes that the management of long submerged
and abandoned shipwrecks now presents concerns far removed
from the traditional admiralty interests in safety and in
returning goods to the streams of commerce."); H.R. Rep.
17
10J-514(1) at 2 (1988) ("Admiralty law . . . developed to
encourage the salvage of commercial goods. Its focus is
commercial, mot cultural resource management or
recreation. ").
California’s section 6313 supplements the ASA by
extending protection to additional sites of historic and
archaeological value located in or on the State’s submerged
lands. In so doing, section 6313 does not impinge on
admiralty’s core concern with maritime commerce, but rather
is entirely in accord with the overriding purpose of the ASA
to confirm the States’ title to and authority over historic
shipwrecks located in or on their submerged lands.
Accordingly, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 6313 is not expressly or
implicitly preempted by the ASA."
Il. LONG-LOST HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS
SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO BE ABANDONED.
The court of appeals’ decision effectively eviscerates the
ASA by defining the concept of “abandonment” so narrowly
that very few historic shipwrecks will continue to be protected
by the ASA. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a). This Court should
correct the court of appeals’ erroneous definition of
abandonment, and reinstate the definition of abandonment that
‘8 Even if section 6313 and the ASA did not exist, the State might
have a claim to the Brother Jonathan under admiralty’s law of finds. The
American law of finds generally assigns ownership to the person who
discovers lost or abandoned property and reduces it to possession, but there
are two exceptions to this rule: "(1) when the property is embedded in the
soil, it belongs to the owner of the soil; and (2) when the owner of the
land where the property is found (whether on or embedded in the soil) has
asserted constructive possession of the property, it belongs to the owner of
the land.” 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 16.7,
at 341 (2d ed. 1994). See also Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985).
18
Congress intended to apply under the ASA — namely, that
abandonment can be inferred from the passage of time.
A. Abandonment May Be Implied From Inaction
Over A Period Of Time.
Although the ASA does not expressly define
“abandonment,” Congress clearly understood the term and
used it to ensure that the ASA would apply to long-lost
historic shipwrecks." The legislative reports that
accompanied the ASA expressly state that abandonment can
arise from inaction over a period of time:
The Committee notes that the term "abandoned" does not
require the original owner to actively disclaim title or
ownership. The abandonment or relinquishment of
ownership rights may be implied or otherwise inferred, as
by an owner never asserting any control over or otherwise
indicating his claim of possession of the shipwreck.
H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(1), at 2. See also H.R. Rep. No.
100-514(II), at 5; S. Rep. No. 100-241, at 5 (1987).”
' Congress structured the ASA to apply to “abandoned” shipwrecks,
but excluded more recent shipwrecks by requiring that protected
shipwrecks must also possess other characteristics common to historic
shipwrecks. For example, it was known that shipwrecks become
embedded in the seabed and in coral over time. Congress also included
shipwrecks lying on submerged lands and that are eligible for inclusion in
the National Register of Historic Places. This category includes
shipwrecks that are lying on rock (or that are not embedded for some other
reason) but are nevertheless historic. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a).
© National Park Service Guidelines, issued pursuant to 43 U.S.C.
§ 2104, further clarify the meaning of abandonment:
By not taking any action after a wreck incident either to mark and
subsequently remove the wrecked vessel and its cargo or to provide
legal notice of abandonment to the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S.
19
These statements are consistent with the traditional
maritime rule that abandonment "may be accomplished by
either an express or implied act of leaving or deserting
property without hope of recovering it and without the
intention of returning to it." Bunge Corp. v. Agri-Trans
Corp., 542 F. Supp. 961, 969 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (citing 3A
Benedict on Admiralty § 134 (7th ed. 1980)), aff'd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 721 F.2d 1005 (Sth Cir.
1983). In the absence of express statements or acts,
abandonment is determined from all the circumstances.
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged from the
Nashville, A/K/A, The Rattlesnake, 606 F. Supp. 801, 804
(S.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd without op., 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.
1985).*!
Applying these principles to historic shipwrecks, most
courts have held that abandonment may be inferred from the
passage of time, absent affirmative acts showing non-
Army Corps of Engineers, as is required under provisions in the
Rivers and Harbors Act (33 U.S.C. 409), an owner shows intent to
give up title. Such shipwrecks ordinarily are treated as being
abandoned after the expiration of 30 days from the sinking.
55 Fed. Reg. 50,115, 50,120 (1990).
| The traditional maritime definition of abandonment is applied to
determine whether a salvor receives title under the law of finds or a
salvage award under the law of salvage. The law of finds is predicated on
the assumption that the property is abandoned, and that the finder of lost
or abandoned property is entitled © ownership. See, e.g., Martha’s
Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (ist Cir. 1987). The law of salvage
is predicated on the assumption that the owner has not abandoned the
property. 2 Schoenbaum, supra, § 16-7, at 338.
20
abandonment.” In @ leading case, the Fifth Circuit observed
that "[d]isposition of a wrecked vessel whose very location has
been lost for centuries as though its owner were still in
existence stretches a fiction to absurd lengths." Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (Sth Cir. 1978).
B. Whether Technology Needed To Salvage A Vessel
Was Developed Only Recently Should Not
Preclude A Determination That A Long-Lost
Historic Shipwreck Is Abandoned.
The court of appeals erroneously concluded that "[w]hen
the technology to conduct salvage operations has been
developed recently, failure on the part of an owner to attempt
” This rule is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of animus
revertendi (the owner has no intention of returning). Chance, 606 F. Supp.
at 804.
® See also Martha's Vineyard, 833 F.2d at 1065 ("{I]n cases where
- . . articles have been presumptively abandoned, i.e., . . . so long lost
that time can be presumed to have eroded any realistic claim of original
title . . . the better-reasoned authorities agree that the law of finds may
appropriately be utilized."); Moyer, 836 F. Supp. at 1105 (holding that
insurance company’s lack of effort to salvage wreck from 1956 to present
constituted abandonment); 2 Schoenbaum, supra, § 16.7, at 339-40 ("In the
treasure salvage cases, often involving wrecks hundreds of years old, the
inference of abandonment may arise from lapse of time and non-use of
property. ... In virtually all of the treasure salvage cases involving
wrecks of great antiquity, the law of finds, not salvage, is appropriate
...."); 70 Am. Jur. 2d Shipping § 974, at 1076 (1987) ("The most
significar’ factor indicating abandonment appears to be the passage of a
considerable length of time without effort on the part of the owners to
secure repossession of their property.”). But cf. Columbus-America
Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 464-65 (4th Cir.
1992) (inference of abandonment of long-lost shipwreck improper if a
previous Owner appears and asserts his ownership interest), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 1000 (1993).
21
to salvage the wreck does not give rise to an inference that the
owner has abandoned title to the vessel." Pet. App. Al7.
Although pre-ASA cases do not appear to have discussed this
issue, those cases analyzed abandonment by looking to the
owner’s intent at the time the vessel was lost. See, ¢.g.,
Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059 (1st Cir.
1987); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged, 606 F.
Supp. 801 (S.D. Ga. 1984). If salvage was not
technologically feasible at the time of the wreck, that fact
supports the inference that the owner intended to abandon the
wreck, because there was no realistic hope of recovering the
vessel or its cargo. The court of appeals departed from these
decisions by assessing an owner's past intentions in light of
present-day expectations and capabilities.”
The court of appeals’ ruling is fundamentally inconsistent
with the principle that abandonment can be inferred from the
passage of time. Indeed, to the extent that the court of
appeals was relying on recently-developed technology, it
effectively adopted a reverse presumption that long-lost ships
are not abandoned. When combined with commercial salvors'’
tactic of obtaining assignments of interests from insurers of
long-lost vessels and cargo, the Ninth Circuit’s holding
permits the revival of many dormant claims that traditionally
would have been deemed to have been abandoned, thereby
severely limiting the scope of the ASA.”
™ As discussed above, see supra pp. 2-3, technology for salvaging
shipwrecks and cargo from depths of more than 250 feet has been in
existence since early this century. This casts considerable doubt on the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that the Brother Jonathan was not previously
salvageable and thus not abandoned.
= Because marine insurance for vessels and cargo has been in
within the geographical scope of the ASA would be subject to salvors
22
The court of appeals’ ruling ignores the origins of the
ASA, which Congress enacted to protect historic shipwrecks
from depredations made possible by the wider availability of
deep sea technology.“ Although other courts have
considered the availability of technology as a factor in
determining whether there was intent to abandon, no other
court has gone so far as to hold that the non-existence of
technology could be dispositive on the issue of
abandonment.”’
attempts to obtain assignments of interests from insurers of vessels and
cargo or their successors in interest.
As the Senate Report explained:
As new technologies have allowed the recovery of wrecks that have
been lost for long periods of time, a new concern has been developed
for the historic and recreational interests in shipwrecks. Shipwrecks
are no longer viewed as only lost commercial resources that should
be salvaged so that the goods can be returned to commerce. Rather,
many shipwrecks are now used as recreational resources for sport
divers and fishermen and are viewed as invaluable and irreplaceable
archaeological resources.
S. Rep. No. 100-241 at 6. See also H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(1) at 1; 134
Cong. Rec. 5336-5337 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Vento).
*” Compare Zych, 755 F Supp. at 216 (the owners had left explicit and
express instructions that the shipwreck not be abandoned despite its depth),
and Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 464-65 (owners had
initiated salvage efforts shortly after vessel sank and continued to negotiate
with salvors during the intervening 130 years) with Fairport Int'l
Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence,
105 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1997) (court held that adequate salvage technology
did exist under the facts of that case, therefore supporting its finding that
the shipwreck was abandoned).
23
C. There Is No General Rule That A Vessel And Its
Cargo Must Be Treated As A "Unified Res."
The court of appeals applied what it took to be a “general
rule in maritime law of treating wrecks as a legally unified
res." Pet. App. Al8.% The court of appeals cited no
authority for this “general rule,” and in fact there is no such
rule.
This Court recognized as early as 1815 that property
interests in a vessel and its cargo may be treated separately.
See The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 142-43 (holding in prize
case that although the vessel properly was condemned where
the vessel’s owner defaulted, that judgment could have no
effect against the vessel’s cargo because "[t}he owners of the
cargo had no control over the owner of the vessel"). This
principle has been reaffirmed in various factual settings. See
Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4, 6, 10-11 (1834) (salved
vessel and its cargo are not jointly liable for the whole salvage
award, where the cargo consisted of multiple parcels owned
by multiple parties); Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974
F.2d at 468 (although the vessel itself was abandoned, the
insured portions of the cargo were not); Compania Galeana,
S.A. v. Motor Vessel Caribbean Mara, 565 F.2d 358, 359 (Sth
Cir. 1978) (affirming separate settlement agreements between
the plaintiff and the vessel as well as the plaintiff and the
cargo); Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (salvor secured title to the hull of the ship from the
insurance company but was denied title to the cargo and
** This element of the court’s holding disposed of the State’s argument
that although the insured portion of the wreck might not be considered to
be abandoned, the uninsured portions should be considered abandoned.
However, the court “reserve[d] the question of whether there is some point
at which the portion of the wreck that is insured becomes so negligible that
the wreck might be considered abandoned for the purposes of the ASA.“
Pet. App. Al9.
24
personal belongings because the insurer never had a legal
interest in them), aff'd without op., 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir.
1996); Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (two competing groups of salvors were
entitled to attempt a salvage of cargo that belonged to a single
owner); Georgia Co. v. Richfield Oil Co., 50 F.2d 901, 902
(W.D. Wash. 1930) (The Kekoskee) (salvaged vessel and its
cargo are not considered a unified res, even if owned by the
same person or entity). See also 3A Martin J. Norris,
Benedict on Admiralty § 207, at 16-5 (7th ed. 1997) ("the
mo Ng age tgregpandiartnnntiges hag y dines wn
liable, each for its proportionate share of the salvage
remuneration").
In short, admiralty law recognizes independent claims
against a vessel and its cargo — and even against distinct
portions of its cargo — regardless of whether vessel and cargo
are owned by a single party or multiple parties. The ASA
does not dictate a different result.”
D. The Possibility Of Litigation In Two Courts
Cannot Justify A Rule That Effectively Defeats
The Purpose Of The ASA.
The court of appeals also concluded that if the wreck
were divided into abandoned and unabandoned portions, "we
would have to dismiss the action in federal court with respect
to the abandoned part of the wreck and retain jurisdiction over
the part on which insurance claims were paid." Pet. App.
* If a “unified res” principle were .o be applied, it should operate in
the other direction: a partially abandoned shipwreck should be treated as
completely abandoned for purposes of the ASA, especially where, as here,
only a portion of the cargo is alleged to have been unabandoned and the
historic vessel itself is unclaimed. Such an approach would further the
purposes of the ASA.
25
Al18. The court thought it "unlikely that Congress intended
such a confusing and inefficient approach." /d.
Declining to treat a shipwreck as a unified res will not
necessarily lead to litigation in more than one forum. In some
cases, the State is the only competing claimant. If the State
asserts a claim to the entire wreck in such a case, the entire
action must be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. In
addition, the entire action may be dismissed for other reasons
(e.g., if the State is determined to be an indispensable party).
A salvor may elect to litigate claims of parties other than
the State in state court. See Madruga, 346 U.S. at 560-61
(state courts may adjudicate maritime causes of action in
proceedings brought in personam). In enacting the ASA,
Congress plainly regarded state courts as a suitable forum for
adjudicating rights to shipwrecks located on the State’s
submerged lands. See 134 Cong. Rec. 6615 (1988) (remarks
of Rep. Jones) ("We can depend on State courts to apply State
and Federal policies fairly to all affected parties.")
Although a salvor seeking a judgment “against all the
world" may be required to bring a separate in rem action in
federal court as to the unabandoned portion of a wreck,
parallel litigation in federal and state court is hardly a rarity.
The mere possibility of such a situation cannot justify a rule
that effectively denies the protection of the ASA to many
historic shipwrecks. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred
in holding that the Brother Jonathan should be treated as a
“unified res.”
26
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
Paul W. Edmondson
Elizabeth S. Merritt
Thompson M. Mayes
Edith M. Shine
Laura S. Nelson
NATIONAL TRUST FOR
HISTORIC PRESERVATION
1785 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
(202) 588-6035
August 1997
20036
Respectfully submitted,
Robert A. Long, Jr.*
James A. Goold
Craig W. Canetti
COVINGTON & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 7566
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 662-6000
Counsel for Amici Curiae
* Counsel of Record
APPENDIX
Interests of Amici Curiae Organizations
National Trust for Historic Preservation
The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States ("National Trust") was chartered by Congress in 1949
as a private charitable, educational, and nonprofit organization
to “facilitate public participation in the preservation of sites,
sealian cad atic Malan te, Seaeien, temas ont
culture," and to further the purposes of federal historic
preservation laws. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461, 468. The National
Trust has grown to include more than 265,000 individual
members and approximately 3,500 member organizations, as
well as operating seven regional and field offices.
Through its Legal Defense Fund, the National Trust
advocates to secure judicial, administrative, and legislative
decisions that uphold the validity and effectiveness of
regulatory protections for historic resources throughout the
United States. The National Trust has a particular interest in
the protection of historic shipwrecks. The National Trust
actively supported the passage of the Abandoned Shipwreck
Act of 1987 and has participated as amicus in cases
challenging and upholding its legality and effectiveness. The
National Trust has participated in more than 100 federal and
state court cases over the past quarter century and has
participated as an amicus in 14 cases before this Court.
Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology
The Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology
("ACUA") is an elected body of leaders in the field of
underwater archaeology and is associated with the Society for
Historical Archaeology. The purposes for which the ACUA
is organized are to preserve and protect underwater
(la)
2a
archaeological sites, to encourage maintenance of the highest
ethical and research standards in underwater archaeology, and
to educate the general public and sport diving community
about the need for conservation of underwater archaeological
resources. The ACUA encourages the publication of
underwater archaeological research and the distribution and
dissemination of information concerning archaeological
matters. The organization also sponsors and publishes the
proceedings of an annual Conference on Underwater
Archaeology.
Council of American Maritime Museums
The Council of American Maritime Museums ("CAMM")
exists to uphold, promote and further the welfare, programs
and activities of maritime museums in the Western
hemisphere. To these ends, CAMM works to insure that high
professional standards are adhered to in the preservation and
interpretation of maritime history, collections, sites and
vessels. _CAMM also encourages cooperation between
member museums in research and loan exhibits, jointly
sponsors publications, and promotes public awareness of itself
and the interests of its members. In addition, CAMM lobbies
on legislation and government actions affecting its members.
Institute of Nautical Archaeology
The Institute for Nautical Archaeology is an academic and
scientific institution dedicated to the excavation, study and
preservation of shipwrecks of historic and pre-historic
significance. The Institute faculty is comprised of practicing
archaeologists engaged in projects involving shipwrecks in
United States waters, the Caribbean Sea, the Mediterranean
Ocean, the Azores Islands, Kenya, Eritrea and elsewhere. In
the United States, the Institute has participated in projects
involving shipwrecks in the James River, the Gulf of Mexico
and the Great Lakes. The Institute has a vital interest in the
3a
preservation of ships subject to the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
for academic study, recovery and museum display.
National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers
The National Conference of State Historic Preservation
Officers ("NCSHPO") is a non-profit, professional
organization representing the State Historic Preservation
Officers in the 59 States, territories and the District of
Columbia. The role of NCSHPO in the administration of the
national historic preservation program was recognized in the
1980 amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act.
16 U.S.C. § 470. NCSHPO encourages research and
development concerning historic preservation programs, as
well as legislative proposals for the implementation of
programs at the state and federal levels. NCSHPO actively
supported the passage of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of
1987.
North American Society for Oceanic History
The North American Society for Oceanic History
("NASOH"), incorporated in 1974, is a_ not-for-profit
organization whose members include curators of maritime
museums and history professors across the U.S. and in
Canada. The goals of the organization include the research
and promotion of maritime history. NASOH sponsors a
annual conference at which members present scholarly papers
and the organization rewards outstanding publications on
maritime history and nautical archaeology. For several years,
NASOH has also worked on behalf of the preservation of
historic shipwrecks.
Society for American Archaeology
The Society for American Archaeology ("SAA") is a
scholarly organization of professionals whose objective is to
encourage mew research and interpretation of the
archaeological record in the Americas. Other goals of the
4a
organization include education, public communication, and the
protection of resources. To disseminate information, SAA
holds annual meetings and publishes American Antiquity, a
journal of papers on the archaeology of the Western
Hemisphere and closely related subjects. SAA is also
involved in legislative action and government relations
affecting the discipline of archaeology.
Society for California Archaeology
The Society for California Archaeology ("SCA") is a
non-profit organization founded in 1966 and dedicated to the
research, understanding, conservation, interpretation and
protection of California’s archaeological heritage. Today,
SCA has approximately 800 members, including professional
archaeologists employed by universities and colleges,
government agencies, museums and research institutions,
utility companies, and private consulting firms. SCA
members also include student and avocational archaeologists,
Native American scholars, historians, environmental planners,
and members of the general public. SCA holds an annual
conference and two annual data-sharing meetings in both
northern and southern California, as well sponsoring the
annual California Archaeology Week. The organization
publishes a quarterly newsletter on annual proceedings, and
produces an occasional publication series.
Society for Historical Archaeology
The Society for Historical Archaeology ("SHA") is the
largest professional organization of scholars concerned with
the archaeology of the modern world (from A.D. 1400 to the
present). SHA is concerned with the identification,
excavation, interpretation and preservation of sites and
artifacts from both the land and underwater. The organization
annually sponsors the international Conference on Historical
and Underwater Archaeology and publishes the proceedings
entitled Underwater Archaeology each year with the assistance
5a
of the Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology. The
great significance of historic shipwrecks lead SHA to strongly
support Congress’s enactment of the Abandoned Shipwreck
Act of 1987.
Society of Professional Archeologists
The Society of Professional Archeologists ("SOPA") is a
national non-profit association of more than 700 professional
archeologists. SOPA seeks to define professionalism in the
field, to establish national standards for archeological
practices, research and performance, and to identify those
individuals who possess the ability and willingness to meet
those standards. The organization maintains standards for
various archeological specialities including underwater
archeology. Also, SOPA serves to represent the profession
working with other professional organizations, governmental
agencies and private enterprises to further the goals of
archeology. SOPA strongly supported Congress’ enactment
of the Abandoned Shipwrzck Act of 1987, as an important and
needed measure for ensuring that these fragile and
irreplaceable resources are appropriately preserved and
managed as cultural and archeological sites.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.