Amicus Curiae Brief — Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western NY

5 afeig No. 95-1065 ai. -

Supreme Court, U.S.

IN THE FILED

Supreme Court of the United States 995

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

CLERK

> a =

REVEREND PAUL SCHENCK and DWIGHT SAUNDERS,

Petitioners,

-——V,—

PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN’S ASSO-

CIATION, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION,

CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, CONNECTICUT

WOMEN’S EDUCATION AND LEGAL FUND, INC., FAMILY

PLANNING ADVOCATES OF NEW YORK STATE, INC.,

JEWISH WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, LAMBDA LEGAL

DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, NATIONAL CENTER

FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

FOR WOMEN, NORTHWEST WOMEN’S LAW CENTER,

WOMEN’S LAW CENTER OF MARYLAND, WOMEN’S

LAW PROJECT, AND YWCA OF THE U.S.A. AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

EVE C. GARTNER

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL E. ERDOS

CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE

LAW & POLICY

120 Wall Street

New York, New York 10021

(212) 514-5534

Dated: July 1, 1996 Counsel for Amici Curiae

7

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. The Buffer Zone And The Cease And Desist

Provision Are Constitutional Because They

Protect A Captive Audience Exercising The

Right To Reproductive Privacy .................... 3

A. The Captive Audience Doctrine Applies

Here Where Patients Are Seeking Access

To Reproductive Health Care Facilities ........... 4

1. The Injunction Appropriately Protects

Patients’ Substantial Privacy Interests ........ 7

2. Absent The Injunction, Patients Would

Be At Risk Of Substantial Harm ........... 10

3. The Patients Here Are Truly “Captive”

To Petitioners’ Invasive Tactics............ 15

B. The Injunction Protects This Captive Audience

And Burdens No More Speech Than Necessary .... 18

Il. The Cease And Desist Provision Also Is Constitutic

Because It Is Only Triggered By The Targeted Patient

Communicating Her Unwillingness To Hear Additional

“Counseling” ......--ssscceccececssescerecees

[Il. Injunctions Have Consistently Been Granted In Other

Contexts Where The Right Of The Listener To Be Left

Alone Outweighs The Interests Of The Speaker .....-.

CONCLUSION... ccc cece cece rcrrccccresseccsees

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) ................. 2

American College of Obstetricians &

Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656

EE LE 12

Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986) ............ 19

Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) ......... 8

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,

I ee cc ccc ccc cc ccccccccce 6, 17

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp.

EE ETT . 6,17

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) .... 2... 2 eee, 20

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191

DUES eG eee ebcecesccccccccc: 5, 15, 20, 21

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ............ passim

Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,

EE ee ccc cc ccc cecccccs 6, 17, 23, 24

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ................. 5

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) .............. 5, 20

Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852

EEE SEIT 29

E.E.0.C. v. Sage Realty Corp.,

507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) .........0.0...... 29

iv

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,

422 U.S. 205 (197S) 2... cece cece eee eecenes 6,7, 17

FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726

GED occcccdcdeccesecsdatedcucess 6, 14, 17, 25

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474

OD vc cccckececccstecesececcdcccececs passim

Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318

(D. Minn. 1995) ... 0... cece cece eee e ee eeeee 18

Frye v. District 1199, 996 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993) .......-. 8

Gilbert v. State of Oklahoma,

765 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ......... 27, 28

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) .......-. 5

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) ......-. 28

Heffron v. International Soc. For Krishna Consciousness,

452 US. GOD (IGRI) 2. i ccc cece cece c ce eecescces 3

Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670

(Colo. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied,

No. 95$C593, 1996 Colo. LEXIS 136 (Feb. 26, 1996) 9, 20

Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. 1991) ....... 20

Jew v. University of lowa, 749 F. Supp. 946

(S.D. lowa 1990) .. 2... cece ee eee eens 29

Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942),

adopted on rehearing as opinion of Court,

pte 7... eer 25

Vv

Jordan v. Wilson, 662 F. Supp. 528

(MLD. Alle. 1987) ... 2. ccc ccc cece eee, 29

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ............ 6, 22, 24

Lee v. International Soc'y For Krishna

Consciousness, 50S U.S. 672 (1992) ............... 1]

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. $77 Rea wa eer rs 6

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,

418 U.S. 298 (1974)

(1994)

PPOUUOROKEKOESEU CEES OeSObe60666 0: passim

Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) .........__. . 23

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 ( SEE wéneons 29

Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (NJ. 1994),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995) ............_.. 21

NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773 RE re x

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. $75 a ea 11

NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958) ........ 28

Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center

. . Inc,

626 So.2d 664 (Fla 1993) .................... 4,8

People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742

PE asc cccbhsadoneeccsdcwace. 27

vi

Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo County v.

Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617

SL es SE oc cd aewnecacesedecveseseesees« 13

Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates

for Life, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) ........... 12, 21

Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue Western New York,

799 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) ............ passim

Pro-Choice Network v. Walker, 994 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1993) . 16

Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Schenck,

GP FG Bre GRO Ge GRU cc ccc ssccccseccess passim

Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) ........ 9

RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, SOS U.S. 377 (1992) .......... 29

Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383

Ps ds eckeekeacta se beestneescoens 28

Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486

PO ME c Sb eb cb be dhe cede crtsoed sees ss 28

Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577

(E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990) .... 13

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ........ 2... 2.2.2 eee ues 4

Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, .

oe! SL PTT TTT weenes passim

Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d 1169

ESS GSES a ee 23, 24

vii

Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d 501

Se SU ch ebownededdaees ce ceeds 26, 27

State v. Baumann, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 261,

532 N.W.2d 144 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1995) .......... 20, 21

State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173 (S.D. 1996) ......... 26, 27

Taylor v. United States, 358 F Supp. 384

Se eh deneneweekadedbaeseeb ce cacwe 15

United States v. Allen, 317 F.2d 777 (2d. Cir. 1963) ....... 15

United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977 (D. Kan. 1992) ... 14

United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) ........... 2,4

United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325 (Sth Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975) ................. 15

United States v. Omirly, 488 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1973) ...... 15

United States v. Rutherford, 332 F.2d 444 (2d. Cir.),

cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964) ................. 15

United States v. Silver, 196 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.Pa. 1961) .... 15

STATUTES

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

A ny 28

ns i a il ee a 26

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior:

Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding

SUED bce cseddeckacncdesedsdheseesssoudes« 12

Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Anti-Abortion Leader Draws

‘Battle Plan,’ Orlando Sentinel Tribune,

fh PPPPPPTTTISTIIT LITT eee 14

G. Burrow & T. Ferris, Medical Complications During

Pregnancy (3d ed. 1988) ... 2... cece cence ennees 10

Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects

of Anti-Abortion Demonstrators and Pro-Choice

Escorts on Women’s Psychological Responses to

Abortion, 13 Journal of Social & Clinical

Popshaiony 406 (IDRS) on ccccccccccccvccsccees 12

D. Danforth and J. Scott, Obstetrics & Gynecology

i Cs c.et tndversunnd deebahe weees re

Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right

Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 153 (1972) .. 24

Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (1966) ........... 12

Warren M. Hern, Proxemics: The Application of Theory to

Conflict Arising from Antiabortion Demonstrations,

12 Population and Environment 379 (1991) .......... 12

Catherine F. Klein & Lesley E. Orloff, Providing Legal

Protection for Battered Women: an Analysis of State

Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (1993) 25, 26

National Abortion Federation, Incidents of Violence and

Distruption Against Abortion Providers, 1995 (Jan. 1996) 14

Rovinsky and Guttmacher's Medical, Surgical &

Gynecological Complications of Pregnancy

512 (S. Cherry et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985)

iouomeee ee os 10

Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine,

19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 85 (1991) .............. 9,17

Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace,

25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1990) ............... 28

Robert Sommer, Personal Space: The Behavioral

Basis of Design (1969) ........................ 12

Williams Obstetrics (F. Gary Cunningham

et al. eds., 19h ed. 1993).............. 10

l

This amicus curiae brief is submitted in support of

Respondents Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, et al.

By letters already filed with the Clerk of the Court, Petitioners

and Respondents have consented to the filing of this brief.

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The American Medical Women’s Association, American Public

Health Association, Catholics for a Free Choice, Connecticut

Women’s Education and Legal Fund, Inc., Family Planning

Advocates of New York State, Inc., Jewish Women International,

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Center for

Lesbian Rights, Northwest Women’s Law Center, National

Organization for Women, Women’s Law Center of Maryland,

Women’s Law Project, and YWCA of the U.S.A. are advocacy

and/or educational organizations that seek to ensure women’s

equal rights and to protect women’s access to safe reproductive

health care. Amici curiae have a particular interest in halting the

concerted violence, harassment and intimidation being directed

against women seeking abortions and against clinics, physicians

and staff providing abortion services. Amici seek to ameliorate

the current public health and public safety crisis resulting from

the violence and climate of fear created by anti-choice militants

and the resultant shortage of physicians and clinics willing to

provide abortion services. Individual statements of interest of

each amici are attached hereto as Appendix A.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici curiae respectfully urge this Court to uphold the

decision of the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit (hereinafter "Court of Appeals”). This Court has

“regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish ‘to

propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so

whenever and however and wherever they please.’" United States

v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983) (citing Adderley v.

Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966)). The district court fulfilled

this need to take accouni of the context in which expressive

activity occurs by issuing a measured response to a persistent

campaign of obstructive, coercive, and harassing conduct by

Petitioners and their co-defendants (hereinafter “Petitioners” or

“defendants”) targeted at women who seek abortions and the

clinics, physicians and staff who provide these essential services

in the Western District of New York. While the constitutionality

of the limited restrictions on Petitioners’ intimidating and

disruptive activities is amply supported by the State’s interests in

protecting women’s reproductive rights and public safety (see

Brief of Respondents), amici focus on additional grounds of

support recognized by this Court: The permeable buffer zone and

the cease and desist provision are constitutional under this Court's

well-established privacy doctrines regarding captive audiences and

notice remedies.

Because the injunction protects from serious harm a

captive audience exercising the constitutional right to reproductive

choice, and because it does not preclude many forms of

communication that could reach the targeted audience, it must be

upheld as constitutional. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,

114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994). This Court has firmly established the

constitutionality of restrictions on harassment and coezcion

targeted at a captive audience. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474

(1988). Here, patients seeking time-sensitive health services in

order to exercise their right to reproductive privacy cannot avoid

the invasive and offensive maneuvering of the protesters and so-

called "sidewalk counselors,” subjecting them to serious physical

and psychological harm. These patients thus comprise a “captive

3

audience” entitled to the protection of the limited restrictions the

district court ordered to afford them access to medical facilities.

These narrowly drawn provisions burden no more speech than

necessary because they ensure that Petitioners have alternative

avenues of communicating their message. They therefore pass

muster under Madsen and reflect a proper balance between the

privacy rights and health needs of patients and the rights of those

who seek to deter them from exercising their constitutionally

protected choice.

Further support for the cease and desist provision’s

constitutionality is found in the fact that it is appropriately

conditioned on notice of unwelcomeness given by the listener.

This Court has squarely held that it is constitutional to restrict

speech based on notice communicated by a listener that further

communication is unwanted. Rowan v. United States Post Office

Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

The constitutionality of the challenged restrictions is also

supported by analogous decisions in the contexts of domestic

violence and sexual harassment. In these settings, courts have

protected unwilling listeners’ privacy rights by limiting harassing

and intimidating speech and activities that cause harm to the

recipients. In light of well-established jurisprudence upholding

against First Amendment challenge protective orders to remedy

domestic violence, and injunctions to prevent continuing sexual

harassment in the workplace, this Court similarly should find that

the challenge to the instant injunction is without merit.

ARGUMENT

I. The Buffer Zone And The Cease And Desist Provision

Are Constitutional Because They Protect A Captive

Audience Exercising The Right To Reproductive Privacy.

This Court repeatedly has emphasized that the “First

Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s

views at all times and places or in any manner that may be

desired." Heffron v. International Soc’y For Krishna

4

Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (citations omitted); see

also Grace, 461 U.S. at 177-78. In particular, "the right of every

person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the scales with the nght

of others to communicate.” Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736. Courts

protect this important privacy right through application of the

captive audience doctrine.

Through this doctrine, courts account for the difference

between generalized speech and speech or expressive conduct

directed at an individual by protesters who “do not seek to

disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon

the targeted [individual], and to do so in an especially offensive

way.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486. Accordingly, government can

limit discourse where "substantial privacy interests are being

invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). This principle carries even

greater force in the reproductive health care context. The

injunction at issue responds to an intolerable invasion of the

privacy rights of individuals seeking to enter women’s medical

facilities. The buffer zone and the cease and desist provision

ensure that those “held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance,”

Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (quoting Operation Rescue v.

Women’s Health Center, Inc, 626 So.2d 664, 673 (Fla. 1993)),

can freely exercise their constitutional right to reproductive

privacy and can avoid having their health endangered through

badgering and intimidation by abortion opponents.

A. The Captive Audience Doctrine Applies Here Where

Patients Are Seeking Access To Reproductive Health

Care Facilities.

This Court has recognized that government may regulate

speech in order to protect an unwilling listener or viewer when

that listener or viewer is a “captive audience." Frisby, 487 U.S.

at 487. Given that the invasive anti-choice activities at issue here

target and “capture” an audience at a medical facility attempting

to exercise the right to reproductive privacy, the captive audience

doctrine clearly applies here.

5

In Frisby, this Court upheld a town ordinance banning

targeted picketing on the public streets' in front of private

residences. The Court found “the target[s] of the focused

picketing” to be "captive" because they had “no ready means of

avoiding the unwanted speech." 487 U.S. at 487. Although

“complete bans" on expressive activity in residential

neighborhoods are unconstitutional, see id. at 486, the Court

recognized that anti-choice picketing of the homes of doctors who

perform abortion is an “activity [that] inherently and offensively

intrudes on residential privacy,” id. at 486, and noted that the

Town Board justified the ban because targeted residential

picketing "causes emotional disturbance and distress to the

occupants . . . [and] has as its object the harassing of such

occupants.” /d. at 477 (alteration in original).

While "we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the

home and subject to objectionable speech," Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21

(citation omitted), this Court has responded with equal force to

In its amicus brief, the AFL-CIO misleadingly describes a "spectrum"

of cases: on one end are cases, such as Frisby, “that recognize a

heightened privacy interest in the home;" on the other end are cases

“involving speech on the ordinary public street." Brief of AFL-CIO at

28. This mistaken analysis is highlighted by Frisby itself, where the

speech at issue took place on public streets and sidewalks. In fact, the

Court regularly protects targeted audiences from speech oceurring in

public spaces that are unsuited for unfettered expression; there is no

right to “address a group at any public place and at any time.” Cox v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("Cox I”) (Black, J., concurring in

part, dissenting in part). See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191

(1992) (upholding prohibition of solicitation of votes and display or

distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place);

Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding ban on picketing

near school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) ("Cox IT")

(upholding prohibition of certain picketing near courthouse). As Frisby

makes clear, what is dispositive in a “captive audience” analysis is not

whether the speech occurs in public, but rather whether it intolerably

intrudes on the privacy of its target either because of special privacy

interests implicated or because of the degree of captivity.

6

the need to protect certain captive audiences outside the home.

For example, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298

(1974), a plurality of the Court upheld a prohibition on political

advertisements in public streetcars in part because the passengers

were a captive audience. See also Lehman, 418 U.S. at 305-08

(Douglas, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,

730 (1978) (prohibiting daytime broadcast of indecent radio show

heard in the car while father was driving with young son). The

Court likewise has found that children at assemblies or graduation

ceremonies in school are captive audiences. See Bethel School

District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986); Lee v.

Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).

Moreover, even where a citizen is on a public street, the Court

has applied captive audience principles to protect her from

unavoidable speech. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949),

the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting vehicles from emitting

loud broadcast noises while on city streets. The Court stated that

"{iJn his home or on the street [the unwilling listener] is

practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy . .

. except through the protection of the municipality." Jd. at 87

(emphasis added).’

2 That the home has not been the determinative factor in captive

audience cases is further supported by cases in which a captive audience

argument was rejected. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp.,

463 U.S. 60 (1983) (recipient of objectionable mailing can easily avert

eyes and discard mail); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (same). Rather than being dispositive,

presence in the home has lightened the burden on the listener to avoid

unwanted speech because of the substantial privacy interests involved.

See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 ("the home is different” because it is not

one of the "many locations [where] we expect individuals simply to

avoid speech they do not want to hear"); FCC, 438 U.S. at 749 n.27

("Outside the home, the balance between the offensive speaker and the

unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the speaker, requiring

the offended listener to turn away."); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.

205, 210-11 (1975) ("burden normally falls upon the viewer" to avoid

speech); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. Thus, the Court in these cases did not

(continued...)

7

In short, “rights of ‘captive audiences’ to be free . . . of

unwanted speech ... [exist] even in traditional fora . . . when

circumstances indicate a heightened need to protect the right of

the [viewer or] listener to be left alone." Pro-Choice Network of

Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 392 (2d Cir. 1995).

Such a heightened need to protect captive audiences exists where

“substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially

intolerable manner,” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, or where “the degree

of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or

auditor to avoid exposure." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209. The

present context provides a classic example of a captive audience

entitled to protection because the privacy interests, the potential

harm, and the degree of captivity are great.

1. The Injunction Appropriately Protects Patients’

Substantial Privacy Interests.

The privacy interests involved here are substantial; in fact,

they are even stronger than the residential privacy protected in

Frisby.’ First, this case involves patients entering medical

* (...continued)

dismiss the captive audience argument out of hand if the home was not

implicated, but, instead, found that the viewer or listener could avoid the

Given the substantial privacy interests at stake here, as in Frisby,

the patients should not bear a heavy burden to avoid the intimidating

and offensive speech. In other words, patients at a reproductive health

care should not be forced to “escape” unwanted speech. However, even

if the burden did fall upon them, the patients here cannot avoid the

speech. See infra.

5

As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Madsen:

The [Frisby] reasoning applies with even greater force where

the object of targeted picketing is the medical

dweller. While targeted picketing of the home

threatens the psychological well-being of the

(continued...)

facilities, not “the rough-and-tumble world of politics.” Brief of

Family Research Council at 25. As this Court has recognized,

medical settings demand tranquility:

Hospitals, after all are not factories or mines or

assembly plants. They are hospitals, where human

ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike

often are under emotional strain and worry, where

pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of

the day’s activity, and where the patient and [her]

family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and

helpful atmosphere.

Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (alteration in original) (citations

omitted);* see also NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, 442 U.S. 773

(1979) (recognizing right to ban solicitation in hospitals where

such activity interferes with patient care); Beth Israel Hospital v.

NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (same); Frye v. District 1199, 996

F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993) (in response to disruption caused by

striking nursing home workers outside facility, court upholds

injunction limiting number of picketers to three and prohibiting

picketing within twenty-five feet of nursing home driveway).

Privacy is thus critical to patients seeking care at medical

facilities, who are no more “free to come and go”, Brief for

Petitioners at 42, than are residents of a home. See Pro-Choice

* (...continued)

“captive” resident, targeted picketing of the hospital

or clinic threatens not only the psychological but

the physical well-being of the patient held “captive”

by medical circumstance.

Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 673.

* See also Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 389 (quoting Pro-Choice

Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New York, 799

F. Supp. 1417, 1433-34 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)) ("Here, in the context of

health care facilities treating women who are already undergoing the

stress normally associated with having an abortion, there is an attendant

need for a calm, quiet, stress-free atmosphere.”).

9

Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1434 (defendants’ “noisy, disruptive,

invasive, threatening and intimidating activities are clearly

inappropriate in such a setting”).

Privacy in this context also implicates autonomy. “The right

to make our own choices is essential to our conception of

ourselves as free thinking, independent, autonomous individuals.”

Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19

Hastings Const. L.Q. 85, 108 (1991); see Pro-Choice Network,

799 F. Supp. at 1435 ("To think as one chooses, to believe as one

wishes, are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let

alone.") (quoting Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,

468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Integral to this autonomy is

“the ability to choose for ourselves what ideas and thoughts we

want to be exposed to.” Strauss, supra, at 110. This Court has

long recognized that this right to privacy encompasses not only

personal decisions generally, but particularly decisions involving

abortion and procreation. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54

(1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)

(“[t}hese matters[] involv[e] the most intimate and personal

choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to

personal dignity and autonomy”). Accordingly, women who

seek access to medical facilities in order to exercise their

constitutionally-protected right to reproductive privacy are entitled

to protection from the invasive activities of the defendants, which

infringe upon this right by impeding their ability both to make

reproductive choices free from unwanted intrusions and to

effectuate these choices.°

* See also Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 675 (Colo. Ct. App.

1995) (impermissible to “limit{] . . . the right of a private citizen to

determine whether to permit others to confront [her] concerning medical

care or treatment”), cert. denied, No. 95SC593, 1996 Colo. LEXIS 136

(Feb. 26, 1996).

* In addition, the constitutional right of “informational privacy,”

protecting the confidentiality of women seeking abortions, see Casey,

505 U.S. at 898, 901 also supports an application of the captive

(continued...)

10

2. Absent The Injunction, Patients Would Be At

Risk Of Substantial Harm.

The need to protect a captive audience seeking reproductive

health care is highlighted by the severe harms caused by

defendants’ tactics.’ The hostile and intimidating confrontational

tactics employed by anti-choice individuals severely endanger

women’s health: “This harassment and intimidation causes stress

and sometimes even physical injury to the patients . . . and

generally disrupts the atmosphere necessary for rendering safe and

efficacious health care." Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 383.

As exemplified by the experiences in the instant case, these

harassing and charged encounters impede women’s access to

necessary health care at crucial moments, and in some cases

produce traumatic physical and psychological effects.*

*( vontinued)

by videotaping women seeking access to the clinics, as well as their

vehicles and license plates, in order to create the legitimate “fear that

their identities might be revealed.” Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp.

at 1426.

’ These harms are greater than those relied on by this Court in Frisby,

where the Court did not rely on any showing that the picketing caused

harm to the targeted abortion provider or his family. At a minimum, to

intrude upon the privacy of the patients here in such a harmful way is as

“especially offensive” as was the targeted residential picketing in Frisby.

487 U.S. at 486.

* These effects are particularly detrimental for women who need an

abortion to protect their health, such as when they suffer from

congenital heart disease and advanced coronary artery disease, and

cancer. See Williams Obstetrics 790-92 (F. Gary Cunningham et al.

eds., 19th ed. 1993); D. Danforth and J. Scott, Obstetrics & Gynecology

433, 441-42, 494-97 (Sth ed. 1986); G. Burrow & T. Ferris, Medical

Complications During Pregnancy 41 (3d ed. 1988); C. Pauerstein,

Clinical Obstetrics 630, 647 (1987); Rovinsky and Guttmacher's

(continued...)

11

Patients are targeted for harassment immediately prior to,

during, and after a surgical procedure.’ As detailed by the

health risk for women. “Women who have been the target of

‘sidewalk counseling’ or other ‘rescue’ demonstrations usually

enter the medical facilities visibly shaken and severely distressed."

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427. Stress and anxiety

cause hypertension and elevated blood pressure, and often require

sedation or special counseling; "[p)atients may become so agitated

that they are unable to lie still in the operating room thereby

increasing the risks associated with surgery." Pro-Choice

* (...continued)

Medical, Surgical & Gynecological Complications of Pregnancy 512-15

(S. Cherry et al eds., 3d ed. 1985). Women who are compelled to

terminate their pregnancies due to severe fetal anomalies, because their

pregnancies result from rape or incest, or for many other personal and

moral reasons also are at risk of significant harm as a result of

* Here, as in Madsen, “the picketing is directed primarily at patients

and staff of the clinic.” 114 S. Ct. at 2527. Certain women visiting the

target younger-looking women because they are the ones most likely to

be seeking an abortion. They also target cars that arrive at the facilities

with out-of-state license plates. . . ." Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp.

at 1425. .

Whether it be intimidating a woman by crowding her or hounding

her after she requests no further face-to-face “counseling,” “the

temptation and opportunity for coercion or obstruction are at their

greatest." Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 396 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S.

at 486). Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)

(upholding content-based statutory restriction on employer speech

because risk of nonpersuasive coercion great in labor relations setting);

Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672,

684 (1992) (upholding ban on solicitation at airport because “face-to-

face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of

vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering

physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation.”).

12

Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427."° These conditions, in turn,

will force physicians to anesthetize their patients with higher

doses of sedatives or, if the hypertension is severe, to turn the

patient away altogether. /d. In some instances, these conditions

“lead{] to incomplete or inaccurate health history reports which

the client completes soon after entry to the [clinic]." Portland

Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, 859 F.2d

681, 683 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the stress from anti-abortion

demonstration tactics can prolong a patient’s recovery time, see,

e.g., American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.

Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1985), and often

adversely affect a patient’s post-operative psychological health,

see Catherine Cozzarelli & Brenda Major, The Effects of Anti-

Abortion Demonstrators and Pro-Choice Escorts on Women's

Psychological Responses to Abortion, 13 Journal of Social &

‘© Among the plethora of tactics used by the protesters to stress

patients is the invasion of their personal space. Dr. Alice Hoagland, an

expert in behavioral medicine and “social impact theory,” testified that

invasions by a large number of people can be a significant adverse stress

factor from as far away as 25 feet; from five feet or less — even by only

a few demonstrators -- could cause a stress reaction that is extreme.

Preliminary Injunction Transcript at 742-53. Her testimony is in accord

with accepted “social impact” theory, see, e.g., Irwin Altman, The

Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory,

Crowding 54, 62 (1975) ("{C}lose contact with strangers . . . is aversive

and leads to discomfort .. . . [W)hen someone crosses a personal-space

boundary, anxiety or stress often results."); Edward T. Hall, The Hidden

Dimension 122 (1966) ("When stress increases, sensitivity to crowding

rises -- people get more on edge - so that more and more space is

required as less and less is available"). and particularly as that theory

relates to anti-choice activity at abortion clinics, see Warren M. Hern,

Proxemics: The Application of Theory to Conflict Arising from

Antiabortion Demonstrations, 12 Population and Environment 379, 386

(1991) ("The strategy of antiabortion activists is to make the targets of

their protests acutely uncomfortable by purposefully violating accepted

cultural norms for the use of space, and to use social distances in

deliberately inappropriate ways."). See generally Robert Sommer,

Personal Space: The Behavioral Basis of Design 26-57 (1969); Hall,

supra, at 107-122.

13

Clinical Psychology 404 (1994) (impact study of anti-abortion

demonstrations conducted at plaintiff Buffalo Gyn Womenservices

during summer of 1990 revealed that such demonstrations

increased post-abortion depression).

Additionally, patients who are prevented or intimidated from

gaining access to a clinic, or sent home because of their anxiety,

delay obtaining their abortions.

This delay can increase the risks associated with an abortion.

For example, the delay may move ths »r-gnancy from the

first trimester to the second trimester curing which the risks

associated with the procedure increase. Other women who

are seeking a post-abortion check-up might delay their

appointment or simply cancel it altogether, thereby enhancing

the possibility of complications. For some women who elect

to undergo an abortion, clinic medical personnel prescribe

and insert a device known as a pre-abortion laminaria to

achieve cervical dilation. In these instances, timely removal

of the laminaria is necessary to avoid infection, bleeding and

other potentially serious complications. If a woman

returning to have the laminaria removed finds that her access

to the clinic entrance is blocked or impeded . . .

complications may result.

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1427."'

The stress caused by defendants’ tactics -- and the hesitancy

to enter the clinics -- is aggravated by patients’ reasonable fear of

violence. Patients and staff are well aware of the extreme

measures abortion opponents have taken against patients seeking

See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo County v. Holy

Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 620 (N.D. Cal. 1991)

(women are often so upset by protesters that they reschedule

procedures); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D. Pa.

1989) (woman denied necessary medical services in Pennsylvania as a

result of blockade), aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).

14

reproductive health care and their health care providers. Since

1977 there have been more than 1,800 acts of violence towards

abortion providers, staff, and patients. These include 5 murders,

12 attempted murders, 41 bombings, 106 arsons, 266 death

threats, 97 assaults, 2 kidnappings, and 351 clinic invasions.

National Abortion Federation, Incidents Of Violence and

Disruption Against Abortion Providers, 1995 | (Jan. 1996).

These events are seldom isolated, local events; they are part of a

campaign coordinated and planned strategically on a national

level. For example, the "success" of a massive clinic assault and

blockade mission headed by Operation Rescue in Wichita, Kansas

in 1991, see United States v. Cooley, 787 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D.

Kan. 1992), led it to launch similar campaigns. Only two months

after the district court issued a preliminary injunction in this case,

Operation Rescue conducted the massive "Spring of Life"

blockade campaign in Buffalo, in which over 600 arrests were

made and five defendants in the instant case pleaded guilty to

criminal contempt for violating the preliminary injunction.’

This Court must consider the national climate of fear created by

anti-choice violence when analyzing the privacy interests of the

patients at the clinics and the impact of harassment on those

patients who come to clinics already fearing potentially deadly

violence."

'2 Shortly thereafter, Petitioner Schenck conducted a nationwide

“twelve-week Operation Rescue training program designed to teach

leaders in the anti-abortion movement the most effective techniques to

further their cause." Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Anti-Abortion Leader

Draws ‘Battle Plan,’ Orlando Sentinel Tribune, February 21, 1993, at

B3. He urged anti-abortion activists, inter alia, to become

“subversives,” and to blockade and gain control of medical facilities. /d.

'' Indeed, the context of fear and intimidation surrounding reproductive

health care clinics is similar to other contexts where the government's

interest in public health and safety justify restrictions on speech.

Recognizing that context can alter the meaning of speech, i.e., a

“message” in one context can become a “threat” in another, the federal

courts have upheld even content-based restrictions on speech in order to

(continued...)

15

3. The Patients Here Are Truly "Captive" To

Petitioners’ Invasive Tactics.

In addition to the substantial privacy interests at stake, as

well as the severe harm caused by infringement of these interests,

application of the captive audience doctrine is compelled by the

degree of captivity of the patients needing to enter the medical

facilities. As the district court found, these patients “cannot, as a

practical matter, escape” defendants’ expressive activity. Pro-

Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1436.

The court’s factual findings illustrate an arsenal of extreme

tactics employed by the defendants which render patients unable

to avoid them. On a regular basis -- both before and after the

court’s initial injunction -- patients, Respondent clinics and

physicians, and their staff have been confronted with harassment,

intimidation, and physical abuse by the defendants. See id. at

'? (continued)

protect public health and safety. For example, although a statute

prohibiting comments or jokes about a "bomb" or “hijacking” might be

unconstitutional in some contexts, the courts have upheld statutes

criminalizing even offhand remarks about bombs or hijacking if made in

airports or airplanes. See United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975); United States v. Omirly, 488

F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rutherford, 332 F.2d 444 (2d.

Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964); United States v. Allen, 317 F.2d

777 (2d. Cir. 1963); Taylor v. United States, 358 F.Supp. 384 (S.D. Fla.

1973); United States v. Silver, 196 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.Pa. 1961). In

doing so, courts not only recognized the heightened interests in security

and public safety inherent in airline travel, but also looked to the history

of aviation terrorism and the consequences of terrorist threats -- whether

real or pranks -- that led Congress to enact laws banning such speech.

Accordingly, Petitioners’ exhortation for the Court to “address the

present petition independent of the national controversy out of which it

arises,” Brief for Petitioners at 18, is in direct conflict with constitutional

jurisprudence. See also Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-06 (100-foot polling

buffer zone was necessary to ensure the right to vote in light of this

country’s history of voter intimidation and election fraud).

16

1423-27. Defendants physically blockaded clinic entrances, often

by chaining themselves together. /d. at 1424. They formed

“constructive blockades” by congregating around the entrances

and in the driveways, making loud and disruptive noises, and

harassing patients and staff. Jd. They further forced themselves

upon and intimidated patients and staff by surrounding, pushing,

grabbing, shoving, and yelling at them. Jd. They also engaged in

so-called "sidewalk counseling,” where anti-choice “counselors”

yell at, badger, and harass patients while invading their personal

space. Id. at 1424-25. "[E]ven when women seeking access to

the clinics signal their desire to be left alone, defendants continue

to follow right alongside them and persist in communicating their

message.” Id. at 1436."

These pitched activities "force women seeking access to [the

medical facilities] to run a gauntlet of demonstrators, picketers

and ‘sidewalk counselors." Jd. They cannot avoid the throngs

of protesters who complicate access to the clinic in order to deter

them from receiving health care; nor can they evade the persistent

badgering of “sidewalk counselors. They are crowded and

pursued, their personal space is invaded, their eyes and ears are

bombarded. As in Lehman, where they go, so goes the

message."

These patients cannot “simply . . . avoid speech they do not

want to hear.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. "Defendants’ aggressive

conduct makes it impossible for women entering the clinics

simply to avert their eyes or cover their ears in order to avoid

— o—

'* See also Pro-Choice Network v. Walker, 994 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir.

1993) (involving contempt judgments in case at bar) (one of the

defendants pursued and harassed patients for an entire city block, even

after repeatedly being asked to leave them alone).

'S However, unlike the commuter in Lehman, or the driver in FCC,

patients cannot escape the protesters’ harassment by simply looking

away or turning the channel. Thus, the degree of captivity is even

greater here than in cases relying on that factor to support application of

the captive audience doctrine.

17

receiving defendants’ message." Pro-Choice Network, 799 F.

Supp. at 1436. Unlike the drive-in movie passersby in Erznoznik

and the courtroom visitors in Cohen, women targeted and

pursued while seeking access to reproductive health clinics for

medical care cannot avoid offensive and relentless "sidewalk

counseling” by looking in a different direction; nor should they

have to “stop up [their] ears.""© Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529; cf.

FCC; Bethel School District. Unlike the recipients of

objectionable mail in Bolger and Consolidated Edison, patients

here cannot simply take the defendants’ "messages" and toss them

in the trash.

In sum, as this Court recognized in Madsen, patients seeking

access to reproductive health clinics are a captive audience

entitled to protection: "[T]argeted picketing of a hospital or clinic

threatens not only the psychological, but the physical well-being

of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance.” 114 S. Ct.

at 2526 (citation omitted).'’ Thus, "[t]he First Amendment does

not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean

efforts to escape the [invasiveness] of political protests.” Jd. at

2528. Ultimately, "[t}he only choice women have if they want to

avoid the message is to forego their constitutional right to have an

abortion.” Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1436. This

'© To do so would directly infringe on the patient's autonomy: “by

closing off one’s ears, one cannot listen to those sounds one wishes to

hear.” Strauss, supra, at 118.

It is no answer to suggest that women seeking access to the

medical facilities are not a captive audience because they are exposed to

objectionable speech for a limited time. See Brief of AFL-CIO at 27.

Even brief exposure to the harassment and intimidation by defendants

can adversely effect the patients’ health. Thus, as this Court found in

dismissing a similar argument in FCC, “(this) is like saying that the

remedy for assault is to run away after the first blow.” 438 U.S. at 748-

49.

" See also id. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part) (The First Amendment "does not encompass attempts to abuse an

unreceptive or captive audience") (emphasis added).

18

burden is too great. Accordingly, the district court properly

recognized that the state has a significant interest here in

protecting a captive audience through the limited restrictions

against the defendants’ invasive tactics.

B. The Injunction Protects This Captive Audience And

Burdens No More Speech Than Necessary.

The narrow injunctive provisions protect women attempting

to exercise their constitutional right to reproductive choice from

the harms caused by aggressive and hostile abortion opponents.

See Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 391-92 (provisions “provide

a vulnerable group of medical patients with some relief from the

duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an extremely

vocal group of demonstrators"). Moreover, they allow ample

opportunity for these demonstrators to convey their message.

Thus, because these provisions burden no more speech than

necessary to serve an important governmental interest, they pass

constitutional muster under Madsen. 114 S. Ct. at 2525-28.

As in Madsen, the buffer zone is necessary to ensure access

to the clinics and to soften the blow of the myriad anti-choice

confrontational tactics which "[take] their toll on the clinic’s

patients."'* Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 388 (quoting

Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521). The buffer curtails the harassment

that begins the moment the woman approaches the facility and

continues even as she is leaving, and prevents the "constructive

blockades" which frequently result in delayed medical care. See

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424. It alleviates the

crowding, yelling, pushing, and grabbing which "cause(] stress

and sometimes even physical injury,” id., and prevents the

invasions of patients’ personal space, id., which can have

significant adverse physical and psychological effects.

'§ See Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1329 (D. Minn.

1995) (upholding “buffer zone . . . adopted as a practical device used by

the police to protect those actively exercising their rights from those

who would prevent its exercise”).

eee

19

Although the radius of the buffer is only fifteen feet, this

distance is sufficient to give patients critical personal space to

avoid the most disturbing "in your face" tactics, and helps create

the “atmosphere necessary for rendering safe and efficacious

health care." Jd. Yet, at the same time, the district court’s

“carefully drawn restriction{]," id. at 1434, is limited to allow

ample opportunity for the speech of those seeking to stop women

from receiving that care. In assessing the burden to speech in

Madsen, this Court found significant that "the buffer zone was

narrow enough to place petitioners at a distance of no greater than

10 to 12 feet from cars approaching and leaving the clinic. . . .

Protesters standing across . . . from the clinic can still be seen and

heard...." 114 S. Ct. at 2527. So too here, a buffer with "a

very short radius [of] fifteen feet," Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d

at 389, will ensure that the protesters’ "message will still be

conveyed.” Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1437.

Defendants “can still picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in

full view of people going into the clinics or just passing by."

Id.” Cf. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84 (upholding restriction on

focused picketing of residences which left ample alternatives for

generalized communications within neighborhood).

In fact, the term “buffer zone" is a misnomer. Because the

zone has such a short radius, most non-verbal means of

communication, such as placards, will not be affected. Moreover,

the injunction here -- unlike the one approved in Madsen -

allows a significant amount of verbal expression, both because of

19

See also Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2 ("petitioners are not

prevented from expressing their message in any one of several different

ways, they are simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot

buffer zone"); Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 931 (Wash. 1986)

(injunction’s speech-free zone in front of reproductive health care clinic

provides ample opportunity for speech since for anyone desirous of

counseling, "it is a very short walk to the end of the block where

picketers are free to ‘counsel’). Obviously, Petitioners need not relocate

"to a meeting hall or a town park elsewhere.” See Brief of The

Rutherford Institute at 11.

20

its radius and because counseling is permitted without geographic

restriction if not rebuffed by a patient. Thus, as the Court of

Appeals deemed it, “permeable buffer" better describes the

restriction on speech communicated towards women inside the

zone. Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 387.

The injunction’s mandate that the permeable buffer zone

float with the patient or her vehicle as they approach or leave the

clinic also is necessary. Given a buffer of only fifteen feet

around the clinic entrance, the district court employed a float to

ensure that patients can get between their cars and the clinics

without having anti-choice extremists approach them at close

range unless they want it. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 674 (eight-foot

personal zone within 100-foot radius from clinic entrance

“depriv(es} protesters of the opportunity to intimidate or make

other physical contact with the patients or staff"); State v.

Baumann, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 261, at *21, 532 N.W.2d 144

(Wisc. Ct. App. 1995) (injunction’s “ten-foot bubble [surrounding

any person entering or exiting the clinic] . . . ensures freedom of

movement, free of intimidation, for those who do not wish to

engage in conversation"); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 401 S.E.2d

530, 534 (Ga. 1991) (injunction’s 5- foot cease and desist bubble

that extends 50 feet from clinic "affords a clinic patient,

physician, or employee the ability to exit a vehicle and approach

the site of medical care without being swarmed, jostled, and

yelled at from close range by protestors”).

Indeed, the district court’s approach was quite conservative.

It refused to employ a larger, non-moving buffer -- even one, as

in Madsen, that imposes an absolute ban on speech -- which

would have moved demonstrators even further away from their

targets, despite the fact that these more restrictive zones have

consistently withstood judicial scrutiny in this Court. Cf, e.g.,

Madsen (36-foot no-speech zone); Burson (100-foot zone around

polling entrances); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)

(prohibition on congregating within 500 feet of foreign embassy);

Cox II (ban on picketing near courthouse applied to prohibit

protesters from coming within 100 feet of state courthouse in

ee ee eee oe ae ee

21

Baton Rouge).”

Burson is particularly instructive because, in the face of

countervailing fundamental rights and an analogous need to gain

access to a physical facility in order to exercise that right, the

Court upheld under strict scrutiny a content-based restriction more

burdensome than the content-neutral restriction at issue here.

Burson upheld a Tennessee statute that -- in order to combat voter

intimidation and election fraud -- imposed a 100-foot buffer zone

around polling entrances in which votes could not be solicited and

campaign materials could not be displayed or distributed. The

intimidation of women exercising their fundamental right to

reproductive choice in this case is at least as compelling as the

historical voter intimidation and election fraud recognized in

Burson. \n Burson, the Court noted that "labor men" were afraid

to vote and stayed away from the polls, 504 U.S. at 201 n.7, and

that agitators engaged in heated competition involving “sham

battles” aimed at keeping away elderly and timid voters. /d. at

202. Similarly, the district court below discussed the often

“charged encounters" at the clinics during which the “sidewalk

counselors” invaded the women’s personal space and persisted to

harass, badger, intimidate and yell “even after the patients

signal[ed] their desire to be left alone." Pro-Choice Network, 799

F. Supp. at 1425. Just as the campaign agitators in Burson

targeted elderly and timid voters, the "sidewalk counselors” here

target young women and those who occupy cars with out-of-state

license plates. Jd. The need for safe, unfettered access to

medical facilities here is at least as compelling as the need for

safe access to polling places. Given Burson’s holding that the

100-foot buffer zone met strict scrutiny, it would defy reason for

* See also, e.g., Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (NJ. 1994)

(upholding injunction’s 100-foot buffer around home of abortion

provider), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2264 (1995); Baumann (affirming

twenty-five foot buffer zone around reproductive health care clinic,

noting it is even less restrictive than the zone in Madsen); Portland

Feminist Women's Health Center, 859 F.2d at 685-87 (affirming

injunction’s twenty-five foot clear zone around the entrance to

reproductive health care facility).

22

this Court not to find that the narrower bubble zone here meets

the more relaxed Madsen standard.

Like the buffer zone, the cease and desist provision “ensures

that the injunction does not hamper Project Rescue’s message,

only its intimidating method of demonstration.” Pro-Choice

Network, 67 F.3d at 389. It prohibits only harmful tactics --

intimidation, harassment, the invasion of personal space, and

badgering -- foisted upon a captive, unwilling audience in need of

medical care. See id. at 391. This Court must recognize that, in

the context of reproductive health clinics, persistent “counseling”

in the face of a request to withdraw is not “peaceful.” Madsen,

114 S. Ct. at 2529. Thus, “the ‘cease and desist’ provision is

necessary in order to protect the right of people approaching and

entering the facilities to be left alone." Pro-Choice Network, 799

F. Supp. at 1435. Moreover, because this provision protects

patients only from unwanted communication, it allows more

speech than have the restrictions in other captive audience cases:

In this case, the “cease and desist" provision shields only

unwilling listeners from defendants’ message. In

Lehman and Kovacs, however, both willing and

unwilling listeners were prevented from hearing the

speakers’ message. Thus, the Court’s “cease and desist”

provision advances the values of the marketplace of

ideas by permitting listeners to exercise their autonomy

to make their own determinations among competing

ideas. Once a woman seeking access to one of the

clinics has made a determination not to listen to

defendants’ message, defendants must respect her

choice.

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1436.

23

Il. The Cease And Desist Provision Also Is Constitutional

Because It Is Only Triggered By The Targeted Patient

Communicating Her Unwillingness To Hear Additional

“Counseling.”

This Court has held that a “notice remedy"-- by which a

restriction on expression is triggered when a targeted recipient

gives notice that further communication is not desired -- is a

constitutional means of protecting one’s right to be let alone.

Rowan, see also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943)

(householders have right to indicate that they are unwilling to be

disturbed by door-to-door distribution of literature). “The First

Amendment protects the right of a prospective recipient of

[speech] to refuse the communication as well as the right of the

prospective communicant to offer it." Sabelko v. City of Phoenix,

68 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding cease and desist

ordinance governing abortion clinics) (citing Martin; Schneider v.

State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).

In Rowan, this Court unanimously upheld a federal statute

that allows a recipient of unwanted mail to give notice to the

sender that she wishes no further mailings and requires the sender

both to remove the recipient’s name from its mailing lists and to

stop all further mailings to that person. In upholding the statute,

the Court relied on the fact that it called for a notice remedy, as

well as the fact that the mailings were offensive and intrusive.

The Court noted that under the statute, “the mailer’s right to

communicate is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the

addressee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from

that mailer.” 397 U.S. at 737. Although the statute “impede[{s]}

the flow of even valid ideas, . . . no one has a right to press even

‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient." /d. at 738. See also

Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 n.11 (state could achieve

goal of "protecting consumers against overly intrusive bill inserts

. . . by requiring [company] to stop sending bill inserts to the

homes of objecting customers”).

The cease and desist provision operates virtually identically

to the notice remedy in Rowan, in that a “sidewalk counselor”

24

need not cease communicating face-to-face until the targeted

patient gives notice that she does not wish further “counseling.”

The provision here, however, is on even stronger constitutional

footing than that in Rowan. While the inconvenienced

householder in Rowan merely had to throw out unwanted mail,

see also Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542, the patients trying

to enter reproductive health care facilities have no choice, absent

an injunction, but to listen to persistent anti-choice badgering and

harassment. Moreover, as a result of the anti-choice “counselor's”

unwillingness to take “no” for an answer, the potential physical

and psychological harm caused by his communication is more

severe than that of the merely offensive unwanted advertisements

in Rowan. See Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424-26.

Unlike the cease and desist provision here, the “no approach"

provision that the Supreme Court invalidated in Madsen did not

contain a notice remedy. Rather, that provision barred

demonstrators from “proffer[ing] their advice at an intimate range

unless the counselees ‘indicate[d] a desire to communicate by

approaching or by inquiring of the [counselors]."" Pro-Choice

Network, 67 F.3d at 390 (quoting Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522).

Thus, the Madsen remedy, which disallowed speech unless the

prospective listener invites it, is very different than the remedy

here, where speech is allowed until the listener says “stop.” As

the Court of Appeals in this case and the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals have found, this distinction is dispositive. Pro-Choice

Network, 67 F.3d at 390; Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, 68 F.3d at

1173.

The cease and desist provision is consistent with the

proposition that the First Amendment protects the right of every

citizen to “reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there

must be opportunity to win their attention.” Kovacs v. Cooper,

336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949); see also Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v.

Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L.

Rev. 153, 193 (1972) (a “notice remedy” “preservies} for those

wishing to speak an opportunity to get at least ‘one shot’ at all

potential audiences"). Like the statute in Rowan, but unlike the

"no approach” provision in Madsen, the cease and desist provision

25

does not prevent "sidewalk counselors” from reaching willing

listeners. Cf. FCC, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting)

(distinguishing FCC on this basis because the FCC ban prohibited

willing listeners form hearing the broadcast); Lehman (curtailing

speech even to willing viewers).”’ Because the notice remedy is

invoked only when the listener indicates that no further

communication is desired, this tips the “scales” in favor of “the

night of every person to be let alone.” Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736;

see Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2533 (Stevens, J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part) (although the speaker has the “right to offer

‘sidewalk counseling’,” this right "does not encompass attempts to

abuse an unreceptive or captive audience”) (emphasis added).

Ifl. Injunctions Have Consistently Been Granted In Other

Contexts Where The Right Of The Listener To Be Left

Alone Outweighs The Interests Of The Speaker.

The correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision becomes

even more apparent when it is viewed in light of other areas of

law where courts have adopted context-sensitive First Amendment

analyses and allowed listener-protective relief to prevent unique

harms. Of especial relevance are decisions rejecting First

Amendment challenges to comparable restrictions in the domestic

violence and sexual harassment contexts.

Orders of protection -- like the injunctive provisions at issue

-- restrict speech based, in part, on injury and harm tq the

recipient. Cognizant of this harm, courts have consistently

rejected First Amendment challenges to orders of protection and

domestic violence statutes. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E.

* Petitioners’ use of Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)

(Stone, C.J., dissenting), adopted on rehearing as opinion of Court, 319

U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam), is inapposite. See Brief for Petitioners at

37. That case dealt with a publisher who, no matter whether he

“withheld” or “withdrew” the privilege to publish, prevented the

audience from receiving the restricted message. In the instant case, it is

the audience itself -- the patient -- who decides. Thus, the fact that she

first hears the message is meaningful.

26

Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An

Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801,

905, 907 (1993). For example, in Schramek v. Bohren, 429

N.W.2d 501 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), the Wisconsin Court of

Appeals rejected a First Amendment challenge raised by a woman

who had been ordered, pursuant to the state spousal abuse statute,

to stay away from her husband’s residence, to avoid contacting

her husband unless he consented in writing, and to arrange

visitation with their child through a third party. Schramek, 429

N.W.2d at 503.” The court noted that the statute was “not

directed at free speech but at the suppression of physical abuse or

the threat thereof,” and that "[e]ven if the sanctions of the statute

indirectly prohibit speech, the state can ban speech directed

primarily at those who are unwilling to receive it." Jd. at 506

(citing Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2504).

Similarly, in State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173 (S.D. 1996),

the South Dakota Supreme Court responded to a campaign of

physical and verbal abuse of the defendant against his ex-wife by

issuing a protective order directing defendant to “not verbally

contact Plaintiff in any manner, which includes phone contact or

contact through third parties, and . . . not verbally abuse or

threaten Plaintiff." /d. at 174. In rejecting a First Amendment

challenge, the court held that the protective order satisfied the

2 The plaintiff in Schramek challenged the state spousal abuse statute

itself rather than the protective order. Domestic violence and spousal

abuse statutes are directly analogous to the injunctive provisions here

because those statutes specifically authorize broad injunctive relief based

on “reasonable grounds” that an individual already has or might in the

future engage in domestic abuse. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 813.12 (1994),

cited in Schramek, 429 N.W.2d at 504; Klein & Orloff, supra, at 901

(“Most state statutes recognize the relevance of a past abusive act to

provide a context to evaluate present fear and danger."). Moreover, the

proposition that “there must be a long history of repeated wrongful or

threatening behavior of a specific defendant against a specific plaintiff”

in order to justify a buffer zone, Brief of Family Research Council at 12

n.7, if true, precisely describes the conduct of the defendants towards the

health care providers and their patients in this case.

27

Madsen standard for injunctions. The court found that the

interests in preserving residential privacy and "the mental and

emotional health of the vulnerable" were compelling, and that

"[tJo shield victims of domestic violence from threats and

intimidation, court must sometimes prohibt all contact between

the abused and the abuser." /d. at 176. See also Gilbert v. State,

765 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (upholding state

Protection from Domestic Abuse Act and "reject[ing] any notion

that the First Amendment . . . ever covered threatening or abusive

communications to persons who have demonstrated a need for

protection from an immediate and present danger of domestic

abuse");” People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct.

1985).

The reasonable apprehension of violence and both physical

and psychological harm, particularly in light of past misconduct,

is common to both the clinic disruption and domestic violence

contexts. As with domestic violence, "sidewalk counseling” and

focused picketing by the defendants involves communications that

frequently are threatening or abusive. And like survivors of

domestic abuse, the women trying to obtain medical care here

suffer the same reasonable apprehension of serious harm. This is

reflected in the abusive practices previously employed by the

defendants, and is exacerbated by the extensive history and

escalating level of violence associated with anti-choice protests.

Thus, just as domestic violence statutes authorize injunctive relief

based on reasonable grounds of past or likely violent conduct in

order to safeguard the victims of such violence, the injunction

here provides patients with a means of getting into and out of a

clinic without risking severe physical and psychological

hardship.”

*® The husband in Gilbert was ordered, among other things, "not to

visit with . . . or otherwise interfere with his wife . . . and to remain

away from her residence.” 765 P.2d at 1209.

** These provisions are far less restrictive of expression than the "stay

away” orders and other broad restrictions in Hauge, Schramek and

(continued...)

28

Sexual harassment provides another analogous context. Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996),

prohibits conduct and speech which constitute “quid pro quo"

harassment or which create a “hostile environment." See Harris

v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In Robinson v.

Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991),

the court enjoined sexually harassing speech that created a hostile

environment, specifically rejecting a First Amendment challenge

to the hostile environment sexual harassment doctrine.” The

court reasoned that an injunction could restrict the speech at issue

because, inter alia, the interest in eliminating discrimination in

the workplace justified the infringement on speech, that the

female workers were a captive audience,” and that the

* (..continued)

Gilbert. Rather than imposing a blanket prohibition of a wide range of

conduct with no geographic limit, the buffer zone and cease and desist

provisions only restrict demonstrating within a fifteen foot radius of the

clinic or woman, and only restrict "sidewalk counseling” within this

radius after a targeted woman communicates her unwillingness to be

“counseled.”

*S The plaintiff alleged hostile environment sexual harassment based on

the prominent posting of pictures of nude women throughout the

workplace and the constant barrage of insulting and derogatory

comments she received form male co-workers. Id. at 1494-99. The

court enjoined the defendant company from maintaining the hostile

environment. /d at 1541. Prohibited conduct included sexual comments

made in the presence of an employee who had indicated that such

conduct was unwelcome. /d. at 1542.

%® —"{W]Jomen employees . . . may be forced to endure unwanted

messages by virtue of being unable to leave the workplace. If a woman

really wants to avoid the offensive speech, she may be forced to leave

her job." Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv.

C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1990). See also NLRB v. United Steelworkers,

357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part) ("{e}mployees during working hours are the classic captive

audience"); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 401-02

(continued...)

29

injunction was narrowly tailored to remedy this discrimination.

Id. at 1535-36. Other courts have similarly concluded that the

First Amendment does not protect hostile environment sexual

harassment liability under Title VII. See, e.g., Jew v. University

of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 961 (S.D. lowa 1990); Jordan v.

Wilson, 662 F. Supp. 528, 533-34 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Doe v.

University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 1989);

E.E.0.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610 (S.D.N.Y.

1981).

Recognizing the serious harm that results from "[rJequir{ing]

a man or woman [to] run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for

the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living,”

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), this

Court has signalled that the First Amendment does not prohibit

remedies that restrict sexually harassing speech in the confines of

the workplace. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,

389-90 (1992). For similar reasons, the First Amendment does

not prohibit the narrowly drawn injunction issued here, which

ensures that women needing reproductive health care can avoid "a

gauntlet of harassment and intimidation"”’ in order to exercise

their constitutionally protected right to choice.

* (...continued)

(E.D. Pa. 1980) (workers at jobsite were captive to harassing messages

delivered over loudspeakers; only way to avoid speech was to quit jobs).

Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1424.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully urge this

Court to affirm the decision of the en banc Court of Appeals.

Eve C. Gartner

(Counsel of Record)

Michael E. Erdos

Center for Reproductive

Law & Policy

120 Wall St., 18th FI.

New York, New York 10005

Counsel for Amici Curiae

EO

APPENDIX

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

ae

The American Medical Women’s Association (""AMWA"),

founded in 1915, is a non-profit organization of 12,000

women physicians and medical students. AMWA

unequivocally supports the right of the pregnant patient, in

consultation with her physician, to make a personal,

. ' medically-informed decision whether or not to continue a

Bx pregnancy.

The American Public Health Association ("“APHA"), founded

in 1872, and with a membership of 55,000, is the oldest and

3 largest multi-disciplinary society of public health

rf. professionals in the world. Throughout its history, the

4 | APHA has been in the forefront of countless efforts to

a | protect and promote personal and public health. The

im: ) APHA's membership includes physicians, nurses, social

% child health specialists who are experts in both prenatal care,

neonatology, women’s health issues and drug abuse

prevention and treatment.

Catholics for a Free Choice ("“CFFC"), founded in 1973, shapes

and advances sexual and reproductive ethics that are based

on justice, reflect a commitment to women’s well-being, and

respect and affirm the moral capacity of women and men to

ei | . Through discourse, education, and advocacy, CFFC works in

; | the United States and internationally to infuse these values

catholic social thinking and teaching. CFFC has offices in

Washington, DC, Mexico City, Mexico, Montevideo,

Uruguay and Sao Paolo, Brazil. Individuals in forty US

states operate as affiliated independent activists.

Connecticut Women’s Education And Legal Fund, Inc. is a

non-profit women’s rights organization incorporated in 1973,

with over 1,400 members. Its mission is to work through

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to end sex discrimination and to empower all women to be

full and equal participants in society. The Connecticut

Women’s Education and Legal Fund, Inc. seeks to join this

brief as amicus curiae because it is committed to protecting

women’s reproductive rights and because it believes in the

underlying premise that unwelcome behavior can tigger

restrictions on a person's right to free expression.

Family Planning Advocates Of New York State, Inc. ("FPA")

is the only statewide voluntary organization in New York

dedicated to promoting access to the full range of quality,

confidential reproductive health services for all women,

regardless of age, income, geographical location or other

circumstances. Its members include more than 140

organizations spanning a wide range of health, welfare and

religious groups, including a substantial number of abortion

providers, in addition to thousands of individual members.

FPA believes that every woman in New York has a

fundamental right, under the federal and New York State

Constitutions, to privacy in determining whether or not to

bear a child and that access to providers of abortion services

is an integral component of this night.

Jewish Women International is an organization of 75,000

Jewish women in the United States and Canada) Among its

aims is to help women in improving the quality of life for

themselves, their families, and society. In line with this goal,

Jewish Women International has worked for more than 20

years to assure a woman’s right to choose in matters of

reproductive rights. Jewish Women International believes

that abortion clinic violence is pointless, destructive behavior,

and it has pressed for stiff penalties to be imposed on

perpetrators of these crimes.

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund ("Lambda") is a

national public interest law organization that advocates for

the rights of lesbians, gay men, and those with HIV/AIDS

through impact litigation and education. The constitutional

questions implicated in the struggle of women to control

A-2

their bodies are similar to those faced by lesbians and gay

men who have a deep interest in the right of individuals to

engage in intimate association without government

interference. Lambda is specifically interested in the issue

raised by this case because the right to be free from

harassment and violence is of importance to lesbians and gay

men, who have themselves been targets of such campaigns;

at the same time, Lambda has a vital interest in assuring that,

while curbing violence, the law protects legitimate protest.

Lambda represents a community with a deep need and

respect for the First Amendment, inasmuch as the full civil

nghts of lesbians and gay men have not yet been recognized.

Lambda is keenly interested in striking the appropriate

balance between permitting expression and curbing violence.

The National Center for Lesbian Rights ("NCLR"), formerly

the Lesbian Rights Project, is a non-profit public interest law

firm, founded in 1977, and devoted to the legal concerns of

women who encounter discrimination on the basis of their

sexual orientation. NCLR is particularly well-suited to offer

amicus assistance to this court in this matter, as NCLR

attorneys regularly litigate the constitutional issues implicated

here. Specifically, NCLR is concerned about the right to be

free from harassing conduct and expression, as well as the

right to reproductive choice. NCLR has participated in

several reproductive rights cases.

The National Organization for Women ("Now") is the nation’s

largest feminist organization devoted to the advancement of

women’s nights, with over 280,000 members and more than

600 chapters in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

NOW has, since its inception, worked for reproductive

freedom for all women. In addition to bringing the cases

National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.

798 (1994), and Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,

113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), it is also the plaintiff in several cases

with existing injunctions similar to the ones at issue here,

including New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 41

F.3d 794 (2d Cir. 1994), and Nat'l Org. for Women v.

Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The Northwest Women’s Law Center, based in Seattle,

Washington, is a non-profit public interest legal organization

that works to advance the legal rights of women through

litigation, education, legislative advocacy and the provision

of a free information and referral phone service for women

with legal problems. Since its founding in 1978, the Law

Center has been dedicated to representing the interests and

rights of women seeking abortions. The Law Center has a

long history of litigation and participation as amicus curiae

in cases locally and throughout the country on behalf of

women seeking safe and legal abortions. The Law Center

has also been instrumental in the passage of legislation that

provides safe access to abortion services.

The Women’s Law Center of Maryland is an advocacy

organization whose membership consists of attorneys and

judges in the State of Maryland. In existence since 1971, the

goal of the Women’s Law Center is to promote the legal

rights of women through litigation, legislation and education.

The Women’s Law Center has worked to protect

reproductive nights for all women, including participation as

amicus curiae in cases dealing with the issue. The Women’s

Law Center believes that the issues involved in this case are

critical to the legal rights of women.

The Women’s Law Project is a nonprofit feminist law firm

based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania devoted to winning

equality and justice for women. A primary focus of the Law

Project’s mission is to secure reproductive freedom for all

women. Since it’s founding in 1974, the Law Project has

challenged generations of restrictive abortion statutes on

behalf of women’s health care providers and the patients they

serve. The Law Project served as co-counsel for plaintiffs in

ACOG v. Thornburgh, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,

Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center v. Knoll, challenging the

provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. The

A

medical providers from anti-choice violence, harassment and

intimidation. In Roe v. Operation Rescue, the Law Project

won a federal injunction that continues to protect women’s

health care providers in southeastern Pennsylvania from mass

blockades and other concerted acts of interference with

patients and clinic staff. Since the tragic slayings of clinic

workers in Massachusetts in December 1994, Law Project

attorneys have redoubled their advocacy efforts with federal

and local law enforcement officials to protect reproductive

health care providers and to enforce the criminal laws

vigorously against anti-choice offenders.

The YWCA of the U.S.A. was founded in 1858 and is one of the

oldest women’s organization in the country. Its mission is

the empowerment of women and girls and the elimination of

racism. It serves 1,004,000 women and their families

through 374 community and student YWCAs at 4,000 sites.

The YWCA of the U.S.A. is a member of the World

YWCA. The YWCA supports the right of a woman to make

her own decisions related to her reproductive health. The

YWCA also supports measures that will assure the protection

of persons from violence.