Joint Appendix — Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
Supreme Court brief1997
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m “FILED
No. bode JUL 19 1996
SSE Orne Cn
In THE
Supreme Court of the United State
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., et al.,
Appellants,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
JOINT APPENDIX
Volume III
H. BARTOW FArg, III *
RICHARD G. TARANTO
FARR & TARANTO
2445 M Street, NW
Suite 225
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 775-0184
Counsel for National Cable
Television Association, Inc.
ROBERT D. JOFFE
STUART W. GOLD
ROWAN D. WILSON
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
Worldwide Plaza
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
(212) 474-1000
Counsel for Time Warner
Entertainment Company, L.P.
(Additional Counsel for
Parties Listed on Inside
Cover)
* Counsel of Record
Drew S. Days, III *
Solicitor General
FRANK W. HUNGER
Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
DOUGLAS N. LETTER
BRUCE G. FORREST
JOHN R. TYLER
JAMES J. GILLIGAN
Attorneys
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 514-2217
WILLIAM E. KENNARD
General Counsel
CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT
Deputy General Counsel
Federal Communications
Commission
Washington, DC 20544
nn =e
APPEAL DOCKETED DECEMBER 21, 1995
PROBABLE JURISDICTION NOTED FEBRUARY 20, 1996
a
BRIAN CONBOY
THEODORE CASE WHITEHOUSE
WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER
Three Lafayette Center
1155 21st Street, NW
Suite 6000
Washington, DC 20036-3384
(202) 328-8000
Counsel for Time Warner
Entertainment Company, L.P.
Bruce D. SOKLER
CHRISTOPHER A. HOLT
TARA M. Corvo
MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
GLOVSKY AND PopeEo, P.C.
701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004-2608
(202) 434-7300
Counsel for Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc., et al.
ALBERT G. LAUBER
PETER VAN N. LocKWooD
CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHTD.
One Thomas Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 862-5000
Counsel for Discovery
Communications, Inc. and The
Learning Channel
BRUCE J. ENNIS, JR.
Kit A. PIERSON
DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
THOMAS J. PERRELLI
JENNER & BLOCK
601 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 639-6000
Counsel for National ,
Association of Broadcasters
and Association of Local
Television Stations
CAROLYN F.. CORWIN
MARK H. LYNCH
CAROLINE M. BROWN
COVINGTON & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
P.O. Box 7566
Washington, DC 20044
(202) 662-6000
Counsel for the Association of
America’s Public Television
Stations, Public Broadcasting
Service, and Corporation for
Public Broadcasting
li
EDITOR'S NOTE
THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY
AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A
BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE
WILL BE ISSUED.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
Order, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, Civ.
Docket No. 92-2247 (and consolidated cases) (D.D.C.
Mar. 6, 1996) (amending judgment of Dec. 20, 1995) ....
Memorandum Of Discovery Communications, Inc. In
Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment,
App. A (May 26, 1995) (ELRA Group, Inc., Outdoor
Antennas, Reception of Local Television Signals and
Cable Television (Jan. 28, 1986) ) ............cccc00cccc0cccceecceem
Defendants’ Joint Submission Of Congressional Record
In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment
(“DCR”), Vol. I.CC, Exh. 170 (May 26, 1995) (Com-
ments of the NAB in FCC Docket No. 85-349 (Apr. 25,
ETE a ae
DCR, Vol. IL.DD, Exh. 183 (Joint Petition For Reconsid-
eration of National Cable Television Association, Inc.
in FCC Docket No. 85-849 (Dec. 17, 1986)) ....000000000....
Exhibits Cited In Time Warner Entertainment Com-
pany, L.P.’s Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To
Defendants’ And Intervenors’ Summary Judgment
Motions And In Further Support Of Its Summary
Judgment Motion (“TWE Opp. Exhs.”), Vol. I, Exh.
4 (June 16, 1995) (Memorandum from John Abel to
Dick Hollands (Feb. 12, 1987) ) ...0...........0000000000000000....
DCR, Vol. I.P, Exh. 52 (FCC Cable Carriage Survey
Report (Sept. 1, 1988) ) 2... cccccccccccececccceeeeenseneeeneeeeenes
Exhibits To Affidavit Of Gregory M. Loss In Support Of
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P.’s Motion
For Summary Judgment (“LAX”), Vol. I, Exh. 11
(May 26, 1995) (NAB, Advertising Revenues Per Tele-
vision Household: A Market By Market Analysis
LAX, Vol. I, Exh. 6 (Research and Planning Memo-
randum From Rick Ducey To Jeff Baumann, attaching
Television In Transition: The Values of Broadcast
Television In A Changing Marketplace (Jan. 30,
1990) ) .. LES
17
19
36
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
TWE Opp. Exhs., Vol. I, Exh. 20 (Memorandum from
Rick Ducey to Jeff Baumann, et al. Re: Cable Drops
And Repositions Survey (Jan. 30, 1990)) -........------------.
LAX, Vol. I, Exh. 12 (NAB, Advertising Revenues Per
Television Household: A Market by Market Analysis
(10B1) ) ----.2-----0-.-.c--cenennenrapsonenssnsnneneees -_
LAX, Vol. I, Exh. 13 (TV Digest (Jan. 7, 1991)) -......
Defendants’ Joint Submission Of Additional Evidence In
Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment (“DAE”),
Vol. VII.M. Exh. 288 (May 26, 1995) (OPP Working
Paper Series: Broadcast Television In A Multichannel
Marketplace (June 1991) ) ......-------------------ese-seennennnnennnees
LAX, Vol. I, Exh. 14 (Research & Planning Memoran-
dum From Mark Fratrik To Jim May Re: Results From
Television Financial Survey (July 19, 1991)) -............-..
TWE . Exhs., Vol. III, Exh. 42 (APTS, Harm To
PTV pa a From Cable System Shifts and Drops
(Ag. 1901) ) -...---...----ce-n-neerensnennenseneneseneseensecees pe ee es
DCR, Vol. I.Q. Exh. 71 (Comments of the NAB, attach-
ing A/B Switch Availability And Use (Sept. 25, 1991) ..
DAE, Vol. VII.K, Exh. 239 (Larry Zipin, Local Cable
Advertising Sales: 1992 and Beyond (Nov. 20, 1991) )..
LAX, Vol. II, Exh. 18 (FTC Staff Study, Carriage of
Television Broadcast Signals By Cable Television Sys-
tems (Nov. 26, 1991) ) ......-----------------cseeenennnnrennennnnnnnees ~
LAX, Vol. II, Exh. 18 (NAB, Advertising Revenues er
Television Household: A Market By Market Analysis
| ) anne One
Affidavits In Must Carry Proceedings (Feb. 12, 1993)
(Affidavit of Edward J. Weiss, Exh. 2 (Paul Kagan
Assocs., Cable TV Investor (June 23, 1992))) -.............
Page
116
120
126
134
192
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
LAX, Vol. II, Exh. 19 (CPB, Viewer and Listener Mem-
bership Income for Public Television and Radio Grant-
ees: Fiscal Year 1991 (Sept. 1992))
DAE, Vol. VII.G, Exh. 157 (Time Warner, Memoran-
dum from T. Bigelow to E. Hamowy (Oct. 20, 1992) ) .
LAX, Vol. II, Exh. 21 (1998 NAB Cable System Elec-
tion Survey Charts (1998)) ...
LAX, Vol. II, Exh. 22 (TV & Cable Fact Book (1993) ) .
Affidavits In Must Carry Proceedings (Feb. 12, 1993)
(Affidavit of Joseph J. Collins (Feb. 11, 1998) _.....
DAE, Vol. VII.K, Exh. 282 (The Cable Television In-
dustry: New Technologies, New Opportunities And New
Competition (Mar. 8, 1998))
DAE, Vol. VILK, Exh. 247 (Paul Kagan Assocs., Cable
TV Advertising (June 22, 1998) )
DAE, Vol. VII.M, Exh. 292 (Memorandum from Ww.
Ciciora to L. Yaeger, et al. Re: A/B Switches (June 25,
OA) Eee
LAX, Vol. II, Exh. 25 (NAB, TV Today (July 19,
SIDUTEY ) <csussissnsthocbesesesseniommmnmnistesmectonsnemmssetessasiemeancitasens ccs,
DAE, Vol. VII.K, Exh. 246 (Paul Kagan Assocs., Cable
TV Advertising (July 28,1998)) ee sts—S
DAE, Vol. VILI, Exh. 200 (Memorandum From D. Orr
To P. Beckham and B. Grumbles Re: TCNS 1994 Mar-
keting Overview (Sept. 17,1998)) ss s—
DAE, Vol. VIL.G, Exh. 161 (The History Channel: 1994
Business Plan & Financial Forecast (Nov. 1998))..
DAE, Vol. VIIL.I, Exh. 198 (Memorandum From D. Orr
to P. Beckham Re: KNWS/TV (Dec. 6, 1993))
DAE, Vol. VILE, Exh. 91 (Horowitz Assocs., Inc.,
State of Cable 1994 (1994) )
POP OO SOS SSDO SS SSS S0S8SSS SSS SSSSS0 oS eseseceoceces
247
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P.’s Corrected
Appendix To Brief In Support Of Its Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment (“TWE App.”), Exh. 16 (May 26,
1995) (NAB, The Television Industry: 1994 Market-
By-Market Review (1994) ) ......-----------------e-eeeseesenneenens
TWE Opp. Exhs., Vol. II, Exh. 33 (Broadcasting and
Cable (May 28, 1994) ) .........----------cc-ecsesens-nesensensnesnnnnnnnene
DAE, Vol. VII.K, Exh. 244 (Paul Kagan Assocs., Cable
TV Advertising (June 15, 1994) ) -......-------------.-c-eee0e
Plaintiffs’ Exhibits In Support Of Their Motion For
Summary Judgment, Vol. II, Exh. V (May 26, 1995)
(Letter from NAB to FCC General Counsel (June 21,
BODE) ) nnnnn--eccececceceeennneeso--encessccnseserssnssnssnnnsenanesenscesoenesssosoenese
DAE, Vol. VILK, Exh. 243 (Paul Kagan Assocs., Cable
TV Advertising (Sept. 30, 1994)) ~.......-------------...-
DAE, Vol. VILK, Exh. 266 (Turner Broadcasting, Top
I EM EES
DAE, Vol. VII.K, Exh. 242 (Paul Kagan Assocs., Cable
TV Advertising (Oct. 26, 1994) ) ......-------.--ccceceeeeeeeneees
TWE Opp. Exhs., Vol. II, Exh. 25 (CPB, Public Broad-
casting Income: Fiscal Year 1993 (Dec. 1994)) ............
LAX, Vol. III, Exh. 35 (Paul Kagan Assocs., The Kagan
Media Index (Feb. 24, 1995) ) -.........--------ce------eneeeeneees
Defendants’ Rebuttal Declarations And Exhibits, Vol.
VIII (“Def. Reb. Decis.”), Exh. K (June 16, 1995)
(Stipulation and Supplemental Protective Order Con-
cerning Pre-Trial Use of A.C. Nielsen Data in Turner
| 2 » |)
Deposition of David Brugger (Apr. 7, 1995) .................
Deposition of James Mooney (Apr. 18, 1995) —................
Deposition of Brendan Clouston (Apr. 14, 1995) ..........
Deposition of John Huddy (Apr. 14, 1995) —....................
Deposition of Jack N. Goodman (Apr. 17, 1995) ............
Page
275
281
Vv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Deposition of M. Peter Downey (Apr. 18, 1995, May 18, _
1995) a ee eee 341
Deposition of John C. Siegel (Apr. 18, 1995) 345
Deposition of James J. Popham (Apr. 20, 1995) _....... 346
Expert Report of Stanley M. Besen On Behalf Of Plain-
tiffs Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. (Apr. 21,
ase ca I LESSEE Ab ei 349
Expert Report of Eldon J. Haakinson (Apr. 21,1995). 352
Expert Report of Tom Meek (Apr. 21, 1995) 357
Deposition of Bernadette McGuire (Apr. 21, 1995)... 360
Deposition of Joseph L. Stern (May 3, 1995) 362
Deposition of James N. Dertouzos (May 4, 1995) 380
Deposition of Eldon J. Haakinson (May 4, 1995) _.__. 385
Deposition of Linda McLaughlin (May 8, 1995) 441
Deposition of Tom Meek (May 8, 1995, May 9,1995)... 442
Deposition of Roger G. Noll (May 10, 1995) 446
Deposition of Richard Feldman (May 11, 1995) 460
Deposition of John Haring (May 12,1995) ... 461
Deposition of Charles L. Jackson (May 12, 1995) _.... 469
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.’s Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment, Exh. I (May 26, 1995) (Cable Takes
Fresh Angle On Services, Electronic Media (May 15,
EEE Enea ee 471
Deposition of Harry M. Shooshan III (May 15,1995)... 477
Deposition of David J. Large (May 16,1995)... 480
Deposition of Jonathan C. Abbott (May 18, 1995). 510
Deposition of Lucie Salhany (May 18, 1995) .... 512
Def. Reb. Decls., Exh. H (Transcript of Telephone
Conference on Discovery Issues (May 18, 1995)) _...... 515
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
VOLUME II
Appendix To Public Broadcaster Defendant-Inter-
venors’ Motion For Summary Judgment (“Publ.
App.”), Vol. 2 (May 26, 1995) (Declaration of Dr.
Charles Anderson (May 18, 1995) ) ...........-----.--sseeeee
Publ. App., Vol. 2 (Declaration of John L. Beabout
(May 18, 1995) )..............---c-c-cecsnssssesesnenssnnnensnsnnsnensnanstnnnas
DAE, Vol. IIIA (Declaration of Douglas Johnson
(May 18, 1995) ) .............-.0-ccecesesesesesseseenenssnsnanensnsnsnnnnnnnnnes
Publ. App., Vol. 2 (Declaration of David Dial (May 19,
1QDB) ) .-nceeneenceernceccecconccrensssnsrenseneesnossonssnsccssonsennnsensssnatensennees
Publ. App., Vol. 8 (Declaration of Carolyn Bailey
Lewis (May 19, 1995) ) ..............---e-essessenenesnnnnnnnnnnnnnens
Publ. App., Vol. 3 (Declaration of Denins Malloy (May
1D, 2005) ) ----crccccccceseessecersenssssecrecscneesoswonsepenssseceneneneeenstonnesoacs
Publ. App., Vol. 8 (Declaration of Steven K. Meuche
(Bag 18, 1006) ) ....-c.cceccecscoserecsesssoccernsesecsensnsenssnsesessserenensees
Publ. App., Vol. 3 (Declaration of Virgle Smith (May
BD, BBB) ) ..anccorecccocecsscescscesensscsnsecnintereseruianecnstsbostatensbocssenesnens
Publ. App., Vol 2 (Declaration of Daniel Alpert (May
DAE, Vol. ILB (Declaration of Eldon J. Haakinson
(2 § |) ee
DAE, Vol. I1.A (Declaration of Tom Meek (May 23,
)
SB BRBB) ) cccecccovnccesanesnssticcssessacsecnseonenecsosestonqnsssonsassssssassoenstecse
Memorandum Of National Cable Television Associa-
tion, Inc. In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment (“NCTA Br.”), Exh. B (May 26,
1995) (Declaration of Peter D. Shapiro (May 23,
| __ a
Page
521
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
DAE, Vol. II1.A (Declaration of Harry M. Shooshan III
I a cedamunerenes
Discovery Communications, Inc., Statement Of Material
Facts Not In Dispute (May 26, 1995) (Affidavit of
Joseph L. Stern (May 28, 1995) ) ..........cccccccccececcceceeeeeees
Declaration of Stani«y M. Besen on Behalf of Plaintiffs
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. (May 24,
A a A ee ROD A CCC ELE i ac ae
DAE, Vol. I1.B (Declaration of James N. Dertouzos
I
Publ. App., Vol. 4 (Declaration of Richard Feldman
I ee
Discovery Communications, Inc., Statement Of Material
Facts Not In Dispute (May 26, 1995) (Declaration of
William Goodwyn (May 24, 1995)) 0.0.00
DAE, Vol. II.B (Declaration of Roger G. Noll (May 24,
a BS TE yt lt ai a Sl cl
Publ. App., Vol. 4 (Declaration of Jonathon C. Abbott
(May 26, 1995) )
ehhh ee Te ee ee eee ee ee eee
VOLUME IIl
Affidavits In Support Of Time Warner Entertainment
Company, L.P.’s Motion For Summary Judgment
(“TWE Affs.”) (May 26, 1995) (Affidavit of E. Thayer
Bigelow (May 25, 1995)) 0...
TWE Affs. (Affidavit of Brendan Clouston (May 25,
1995) )
POSSESSES ESSE EEE EA SSEES ESS SSOEESESESESE SESE SSE SESS SESE S ESE SHEE SESE SORE HO eee eeeeee
ke ROPE EIN a iD I i
TWE Affs. (Affidavit of Fred Dressler (May 25,
SP Pecks inchaclttthentbtdiseamhesischsbierchdesbaniictsnsiesndedansochtsssmsncesasns
TWE Affs. (Affidavit of John F. Gault wad 25,
1995) )
ieee terre eee
Page
1032
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
DAE, Vol. ILA (Declaration of John Haring (May 25,
1995) )
tat teiieiettee e eee ee eeeeet
BID Poctesceseenseerenscemassnastnaiiinhreesisemnctisthiiitatendibistiiiiiinshoadsinciintinn
DAE, Vol. I1.B (Declaration of Charles L. Jackson
0} SR SE Leer ee ee
TWE Affs. (Affidavit of David Kinley (May 25,
1995) )
| EE eee Mee mS le ee NN Oe ae
Declaration of John L. Peterman (May 25, 1995) ........
DAE, Vol. II.B (Declaration of Jeffrey H. Rohlfs (May
elite ete ee eee eee eee eee ee)
STUB icieviesnenacesctestenpneepipechiaidimnitadeaninatieteatatiaaastteiatinatbtesienaen
Publ. App., Vol. 1 (Declaration of David J. Brugger
ee te iii ee
Discovery Communications, Inc., Statement Of Material
Facts Not In Dispute (May 26, 1995) (Affidavit of
David J. Large (May 26, 1995) ) 0.0
All Parties’ Joint Statement Of Undisputed Facts (May
a Rg Ie ee pln AP ye a
DAE, Vol. VII.K, Exh. 249 (Cable Advertising Over-
ey Ge ies SE tterrtertrrrrntenitie Ale i
Defendants’ Joint Statement Of Evidence Before Con-
gress, Parts 1 and 2 (May 26, 1995)
eee eee eee eee eee ee
VOLUME IV
Defendants’ Joint Statement Of Evidence Before Con-
gress, Parts 1 and 2 (May 26, 1995) (continued)...
Public Broadcaster Defendant-Intervenors’ Supple-
mental Statement of Evidence Before Congress (May
IN I ES Oats eT
DAE, Vol. VII.J, Exh. 217 (February Industry Issues
(May 26, 1995) )
Page
1098
1109
1111
1128
1134
1151
1155
1170
1180
1213
1245
1247
1249
1567
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P.’s Affi-
davits In Opposition To Defendants’ And Intervenors’
Summary Judgment Motions And In Further Support
Of Its Summary Judgment Motion (“TWE Opp.
Affs.”) (June 16, 1995) (Supplemental Affidavit of
Charles W. Ellis (June 18, 1995) ) -................-.----------------
Memorandum Of Discovery Communications, Inc. In
Opposition To Defendants’ Motions For Summary Judg-
ment (“Discovery Opp. Br.”) (June 16, 1995) —-
mental Affidavit of David J. Large (June 13, 1995) ) ...
TWE Opp. Affs. (Supplemental Affidavit of Sista
Clouston (June 14, 1995) ) -......--..--..-------e---c-eceeseeeeneeees
Def. Reb. Decls. (Rebuttal Declaration of Roger G.
Bell (Femme: BA, BODE) P ccacccrecccenccnccnscenccesecscsccncorecccsnwrcocescoscese
TWE Opp. Affs. (Supplemental Affidavit of Laurence
Zipin (June 14, 1996) ) ..................------cceecseneereseneenesnenneeees
Second Declaration of Stanley M. Besen On Behalf of
Plaintiffs Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al.
SD TI Te icine setihicinciiacinnsttesncinseninecensienevesensncscenssontes
Def. Reb. Decls. (Second Declaration of Tom Meek
IID ii HI Piscine scanners cintinctnlinhedasatanneaniandniatntnensine
Def. Reb. Decls. (Rebuttal Declaration of Jeffrey H.
ss speisemeineccneminneeneann
Def. Reb. Decls. (Rebuttal Declaration of David E.
ee Se 0 eauipinnsnaeaneneumnanemsnanenne
Def. Reb. Decls. (Rebuttal Declaration of James N.
STE aee
Discovery Opp. Br. (Supplemental Affidavit of Joseph
rt mnenmennnssnnn
Memorandum Of Turner Plaintiffs In Opposition To
Defendants’ Motions For Summary Judgment, App. A
(June 16, 1995) (Carriage Chart (June 16, 1995)) ....
Defendants’ Supplemental Appendix In Opposition To
Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary we (June 16,
tine wR rere te a al at atone NG «ai lt eA TR
Page
1764
1769
1784
1788
1808
1811
1925
x
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Defendants’ Reply Declarations And Exhibits, Vol. IX
“Det. Reply Decls.”) (June 30, 1995) (Reply Declara-
tion of Roger G. Noll (June 22, 1995) ) ...........-----------------
Def. Reply Decls. (Reply Declaration of James N.
Dertouzos (June 28, 1995) ) ........--------------eeseeeenennennnenonees
Def. Reply Decls. (Supplemental Declaration of Eldon
J. Haakinson (June 28, 1995) ) ...........-----------ecceeeseeneennees
Third Declaration of Stanley M. Besen On Behalf of
Plaintiffs Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al.
(Fume BO, 19DB) ...-..0.-0csenrseecereeveccnecnseonsscsensensersssrnsenesnsssnssoes
Def. Reply Decl. (Third Declaration of Tom Meek
CFeme BD, 1GBB) ) -~<na..enceecceenevcestsccvospcsnvoncnssesesoresnosessoecsosse
Appendix To Public Broadcaster Defendant-Intervenors’
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment (June 30, 1995) (Declaration of
Edward J. Coltman (June 30, 1995)) ~..............----...-.--
Federal Defendants’ Statement In Response To The
Court’s Order of September 7, 1995 (Sept. 18, 1995) ....
Plaintiffs’ Joint Objections To Federal Defendants’
Statement (Sept. 29, 1995) -........--....-.---c--ecseeeeseennneennnnenne
VOLUME V (Under Seal)
TWE Opp. Exhs., Vol. II, Exh. 22 (APTS, Public Tele-
vision Service and Structure Analysis (May 1991) ) -...
TWE Opp. Exhs., Vol. II, Exh. 26 (APTS, Critical
System Objectives for Public Television (1992 Status
ON ,) ———————————
DAE, Vol. VILL, Exh. 284 (Memorandum From F.
Lopez to T. Baxter, et al. Re: Adlink’s Presentations
on Retransmission Consent (June 14, 1993) ) -................
DAE, Vol. VILK, Exh. 228 (Tele-Communications,
Inc., Cable Advertising Executive Summary (Mar.
TWE Opp. Exhs., Vol. II, Exh. 23 (APTS, Public Tele-
vision in the Information Age (July 1994) ) -..................
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
DAE, Vol. IILA (Declaration of Edward Lau (May 18,
) PATE ES AES TREE
DAE, Vol. ILA (Declaration of Harry M. Shooshan
III, Attach. J (May 28, 1995) ) 00.0.0.
DAE, Vol. I1.A (Declaration of John Haring, Exh. B
gh, EERE RES SE RS SE ee” * Fe
DAE, Vol. VII.M, Exh. 291 (Tele-Communications,
Inc., Corpus Christi Retransmission-consent Research
Highlights (May 26, 1995) ) 2.000.000 ce eee eee eee
TWE Affs. (Affidavit of Linda McLaughlin vated 25,
Ce en ee ee ae ae es ae a
TWE Opp. Affs. (Rebuttal Affidavit of Linda Mc-
Laughlin (June 15, 1995) ) 0.0.00 eee eeeeeeeeee ee
Surrebuttal Affidavit of Linda McLaughlin (June 29,
EEE a en ee ae ae ya
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P.’s Memo-
randum Of Law In Opposition To Defendants’ And In-
tervenors’ Summary Judgment Motions And 'n Further
Support Of Its Summary Judgment Motion, 8-17 (June
ARISE AE SES Le ne ee
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P.’s Reply
Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Its Motion For
Summary Judgment, Exhs. A and B (June 30, 1995)...
Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P.’s Broad-
cast Station Rebuttal (June 16, 1995)
These documents do not appear in the Joint Appen-
dix. They can be found in the Jurisdictional Statement
on the following pages:
Memorandym and Order, Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, Civ. Docket No. 92-2247 (and consolidated
| kT | Rn
Judgment, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, Civ.
Docket No. 92-2247 (and consolidated cases) (D.D.C.
Dec. 20, 1995)
eee tL LEE EEE EEE TTT
Page
2136
2139
2143
2159
2169
2190
2221
2234
2242
2264
1051
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
May 25, 1995
1052
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVIT OF E. THAYER BIGELOW
STATE OF New York )
) ss:
COUNTY OF New York )
E. THAYER BIGELOW, being duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1. I am President and Chief Executive Officer of
Time Warner Cable Programming (“TWCP”), a division
of Time Warner Cable ( “TWC”), which itself is an un-
incorporated division of Time Warner Entertainment
Company, L.P. (“TWE”). I have previously submitted
an affidavit for this case, dated February 12, 1993, and
I incorporate the contents of that affidavit by reference
herein.
2. TWC has still not invested in any new conven-
tional cable programming services since the passage of
the 1992 Cable Act because it lacks confidence in the
ability of any new programming service to obtain dis-
tribution under the 1992 Cable Act's regulatory scheme.
At least 50-60 programmers have approached TWC to
ask for investment in new programming. TWC has re-
fused all of them. Some examples of potential program-
mers include the Career and Opportunity Network, the
Scholastic Network, C-Net, the American Health Net-
work and Ovation. Although we believed that these and
other program services would have been well received by
subscribers and had great potential to expand the variety
and depth of speech offered on cable television, the effect
1053
of the Cable Act convinced us that these vendors would
not be sound investments.
‘ cable systems are channel constrained. Only
a handful of services such as ESPN, USA Network, CNN
and MTV have fully penetrated the cable universe. Be-
yond those are several services with significant coverage
that are hoping to reach more subscribers. An even
larger number of program services have reached fewer
than 30 million subscribers and are trying to obtain more
significant distribution. This group includes services such
as E! Entertainment TV, Court TV and the Cartoon Net-
work. New ideas must compete not only against each
other but also against the established services for scarce
channel space. This makes investment in programming
services an extremely high risk. Even with substantial in-
vestment in a promising idea, prospects of carriage are
grim. : . : :
5. Although a number of cable systems have plans
to upgrade and rebuild, channel capacity will always be
scarce. Significant rebuilds will take time to accomplish
and even when they are complete, there will still be
capacity constraints limiting programming options. In
my experience, the development of cable programming
networks has always outpaced channel expansion. Back
when 20 channels seemed like a lot of space people
wondered how it could all possibly be used. Filling chan-
nels has never been a . Currently, a system with
77 analog channels has well over 100 cable networks (let
alone pay-per-view, premium services, locally originated
and distant broadcast stations) competing for whatever
space is available after must-carry, leased access and PEG
requirements are fulfilled.
. t deal of channel space which cable pro-
oiniaatamne compete for in a free market is occupied
by must-carry and retransmission consent stations. An es-
timated 30,025 are occupied by must-carry stations. An-
other 44,725 channels are vulnerable to must-carry de-
1054
mands." The Cable Act has thus effectively removed
pve fie -mypimiowmncdbanngdreedprieneteg, by on ah
which cable programmers may compete. is space is
eliminated from the pool of available channels regardless
of capacity expansion, and could readily support 30-40
new cable program services.
*” * *” ~
May 25, 1996
/s/ E. Thayer Bigelow
E. THAYER BIGELOW
[Jurat Omitted]
' Arthur D. Little Report to NCTA, April, 1995.
1055
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
™* * * *
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
* us * *
May 26, 1995
1056
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENDAN CLOUSTON
STATE OF New YORK )
”
CounTYy OF New YORK )
I, Brendan Clouston, on behalf of Tele-CCommunications,
Inc. (“TCT”), state the following based on my personal
knowledge:
1. I am President of TC! Communications, Inc., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of TCI that operates its cable
systems, as well as its satellite-delivered programming
operations.
2. TCI currently has approximately 11.5 million cus-
tomers to the cable systems that it owns and operates,
although that number fluctuates greatly.
3. In addition to its cable and satellite delivery sys-
tem operations, TCI operates or holds an interest in a
number of video programming services.
4. TCI’s cable systems have very little unused chan-
nel capacity. Although TCI intends to use digital com-
pression technology to increase the number of program-
ming options offered to subscribers, its early expectations
regarding the timing for delivery of that technology have
proven to be overly optimistic. Implementation of the
technology for any significant number of subscribers will
be phased in over a period of time, for several reasons.
First, television set top digital compression convert-
ers, which are required for a subscriber to enjoy the
1057
benefits of compression, will cost hundreds of dollars per
household. Obviously, some critical mass of subscribers
must be willing to bear at least some portion of this cost.
Second, because TCI currently does not have blocks
of unused channels for a significant number of subscrib-
ers, digital compression will require TCI to drop pro-
gramming from existing channels in order to provide the
channels needed for compression. Although this will ben-
efit subscribers that have acquired the digital compres-
sion converters, it also will result in the loss of those
channels for a majority of subscribers who would not be
directly utilizing the compression services.
Third, although TCI believes that technology has ad-
vanced to the point at which compression is possible, the
necessary technology has yet to be delivered. In addi-
tion, companies that manufacture converter boxes have
not yet proven their ability to produce the boxes, let
alone to meet the production requirements for a significant
roll-out. Finally, the perceived impact and actual result
of cable rate regulation, as set forth in the 1992 Cable
Act, has impeded TCI's ability to raise capital. This, in
turn, has slowed increases in channel capacity. In short.
TCI anticipates that constraints on channel capacity will
continue to affect programming carriage decisions even
after the implementation of digital compression technol-
ogy has begun.
5. Although TCI currently is rebuilding most cable
systems using fiber, those rebuilds as currently being con-
structed will not increase channel capacity in all cases.
At this time, the fiber is being constructed from the cable
system headend to the neighborhood, but the coaxial cable
that runs to the home is not being upgraded. Conse-
quently, these fiber rebuilds will improve picture quality
and reliability but, standing alone, will not increase chan-
nel capacity.
6. The “must carry” provisions of the 1992 Cable Act,
together with the implementing regulations, have injured
1058
TCI in a number of significant ways. First, because un-
used channel capacity is scarce, “must carry” requirements
have forced TCI to drop, reposition, or refuse to carry a
significant amount of programming that it would have
preferred to carry or at least carry on a different channel
position.
To cite but three of the many example, TCI's s Redlands
and Colton, California systems were forced to drop The
Weather Channel, VH1, CNBC, Trinity Broadcasting
Network, and Sneak Preview, in order to add five broad-
cast stations each pursuant to the “must carry” rules.
In Allen, Texas, a TCI system likewise was forced to
drop MTV, Lifetime, American Movie Classics, CNBC,
QVC and Request 2 to accommodate six “must carry”
broadcast stations.
7. Second, dropping and rearranging channels to ac-
commodate “must carry” demands have resulted in cus-
tomer confusion and complaints. Because we carry serv-
ices that our subscribers want, and because consequently
dropping those services makes our subscribers unhappy,
TCI did everything it could to avoid dropping services
while still complying with the 1992 Cable Act. The prob-
lem has been magnified by the fact that often the broad-
cast stations that TCI has been forced to carry are un-
popular or even duplicative. Not only are these stations
unable to attract new subscribers, they also cause dis-
satisfaction among existing subscribers. The bandwidth
that the channel occupies could be better used to offer pro-
gramming that subscribers want.
8. Third, as a matter of policy, TCI prefers to launch
a particular programming service on all or a significant
number of its systems at the same time. As mentioned
previously, TCI’s cable systems have very little unused
channel capacity. By using up channel space, “must
carry” constraints have made it difficult, if not impossible,
to operate within this policy.
1059
9. Fourth, “must carry” rules have harmed TCI by
denying it control over its own property. Indeed, even
in instances in which broadcast stations would have been
carried in the absence of the “must carry” rules, the rules
have given TCI’s systems less flexibility in the positioning
of those stations. The rules also have removed the possi-
bility that TCI itself could decide whether to continue
carrying a station in the event of a format or quality
change, even if subscribers express their preference for
other programming over a “must carry” broadcast station.
10. Finally, the “must carry” rules have increased cap-
ital and administrative costs and caused a tremendous ad-
ministrative burden for TCI and its individual systems.
11. The most important source of revenue for TCI is
subscription revenue. Revenues from advertising com-
prise a small part—less than 5% in 1994—of TCI’s total
revenue. TCI currently is incapable of delivering na-
tional advertising on all of its systems. And digital inser-
tion technology, which will improve TCI’s advertising
delivery capabilities, will not have a significant impact on
TCI’s cable advertising revenues for a number of years.
Thus, TCI favors programming lineups that are popular
with subscribers over lineups that may increase advertising
revenues but are less popular with subscribers.
12. TCI’s programming interests also have been in-
jured by “must carry” requirements. Broadcast stations
that TCI and other cable operators are forced to carry
deprive cable programmers of channel space for which
they could otherwise compete on the merits. This makes
it harder for TCI and others to launch new programming
services, regardless of subscriber demand for such serv-
ices, and ultimately harms subscribers and cable operators
through its effect of decreasing programming choices.
13. TCI continues to have its editorial discretion im-
peded by “must carry” requests up to the present day.
Under the 1992 Cable Act, there were broadcast stations
1060
that elected “must carry,” but chose not to perfect their
“must carry” rights because of the copyright liability they
would incur. However, in 1994, Congress changed the
copyright status of these stations pursuant to the Home
Satellite Act. This has resulted in these stations perfect-
ing their rights and forcing carriage on the cable systems.
These new actions have further constrained channel ca-
pacity and further limit TCI’s freedom of speech and
editorial discretion in making programming carriage
decisions.
14. It is important to TCI to carry broadcast stations
that our subscribers value. In the absence of “must carry,”
“we carried, and would continue to carry, broadcast sta-
tions that our subscribers desire. TCI’s business will not
change in that regard. Furthermore, the advent of com- —
peting technologies, such as DBS, will make it more at-
tractive to TCI to continue to provide local broadcast
stations that these new technologies do not provide.
May 25, 1995
/s/ Brendan Clouston .
BRENDAN CLOUSTON
{[Jurat Omitted]
1061
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
APPENDIX TO
PUBLIC BROADCASTER DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
VOLUME 4
(EXPERT WITNESS DECLARATIONS)
Dated: May 26, 1995
1062
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
DECLARATION OF M. PETER DOWNEY
1. I am M. Peter Downey, and I hold the position of
Senior Vice President of Program Business Affairs for the
Public Broadcasting Service (“PBS”). In that position,
I supervise PBS’s contracting process with program pro-
ducers and the monitoring of producers’ compliance with
PBS’s administrative policies. I have held the position
of Senior Vice President with responsibility for Program
Business Affairs since 1980.
Background and Expert Qualifications
2. Prior to joining PBS, I spent 13 years in a variety
of production-related positions at WGBH, a public broad-
casting organization in Boston, Massachusetts. This in-
cluded five years as a television producer-director, fol-
lowed by eight years as Opeartions Manager for all of
WGBH’s film, television and radio production, and en-
gineering operations.
3. I joined PBS in 1977 as Director of Operations and
was responsible for managing the operational aspects of
PBS’s transition from terrestrial to satellite distribution
of public television programming. In mid-1978, I was
elected Senior Vice President for Corporate Affairs and
served as principal management liaison to the PBS Board
of Directors. In 1980, I was given responsibility for a
variety of program support activities, including program
scheduling, management of PBS’s program purchasing
mechanism (the Siation Program Cooperative), contract-
1063
ing with program providers, and managing various ad-
ministrative policies related to the acceptance and dis-
tribution of programming.
4. Since 1980, I have, from time to time, supervised
a number of additional PBS departments and activities,
including advertising, promotion, corporate information,
development, computer services, audience research, cor-
porate administration, conference services, personnel, pro-
gram data and analysis, and PBS Enterprises (PBS's for-
profit subsidiary). Over the past seventeen years, I have
played a significant role in numerous PBS policy and
business initiatives, including: supervision of two different
PBS cable program service initiatives (1980 and 1990);
design and introduction of a new PBS corporate logo and
corporate identification system (1984); several proposals
for a PBS national advertising effort (1984-1986); de-
velopment of new Nationa! Program Funding Standards
and Practices (1987); development of new On-Air Offers
Policies (1989); development of a new program manage-
ment structure and pricing system (1988-1990); new pro-
ducer contracting policies (1994); and numerous other
corporate strategic plans and initiatives. In the course of
my thirty-plus years of service in the public television in-
dustry, I have gained extensive knowledge of most aspects
of public television, including programming, station and
PBS operations, cable relations, viewership and member-
ship patterns, and systemwide economic and strategic is-
sues. In addition, I have become familiar with the objec-
tives of public television and the ways in which public
television’s performance and achievements are ordinarily
measured.
5. In my seventeen-plus years at PBS, I have au-
thored dozens of intra-system white papers intended to de-
scribe and advance particular PBS policy and operational
initiatives. I also collaborated in the writing of, and am
the subject of, a Harvard Business School Case Study that
examines “The PBS National Advertising Plan” that I
1064
advanced in the mid-1980’s.' In 1986, I authored a
“Public Television Financial Abstract” for the PBS Board
of Directors that detailed the macroeconomics of public
television and laid the foundation for a transition four
years later to a more centralized form of programming for
public television. In 1988, I was the principal author of
“PBS's Strategic Plan for the 1990's.”
6. In my current capacities, I am called upon fre-
quently as PBS’s spokesperson on a variety of subjects
including system finances, relations with cable, relations
with corporate and foundation underwriters, PBS’s con-
tracting practices, PBS’s poliices with respect to ancillary
income from program-related activities, and similar mat-
ters. In August 1993, I submitted testimony to the U.S.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Docket 92-1-90CD); in De-
cember 1989, I testified before the Copyright Board of
Canada in the Matter of Royalties for Retransmission of
Distant Radio and Television Signals to become effective
January 1, 1990.
7. The opinions expressed below are based primarily
on the knowledge and experience I have gained in con-
nection with the many positions I have held at PBS and
WGBH. In addition, I have consulted certain data and
various studies, as indicated below. Where appropriate,
I have cited the source of my information. I am also
aware of the expert opinions that Jonathan C. Abbott and
Dr. Roger Noll intend to express concerning public tele-
vision stations in this case, and I believe my opinions are
consistent with, and supportive of, their views.
Public Television Objectives:
Public Service, Universal Access, and Diversity
8. Public television is a not-for-profit business whose
objective is public service, not private gain. The mission
1 The PBS National Advertising Plan; Harvard Business School
Case Study #0-587-152; Teopaca, John L. and Greyser, Stephen A.;
© 1987, President & Fellows of Harvard College.
1065
of public television is to provide quality programming and
services to all Americans. The value of public television,
therefore, cannot be measured in commercial marketplace
terms. For public television, every viewer is important.
9. Local public television stations strive to fulfill the
mission of public tglevision by serving the diverse needs
within their communities. For example, in addition to
all those who benefit from public television’s general serv-
ices for audiences, an estimated 29.5 million school chil-
dren attending approximately 70,000 schools now have
daily access to public television’s instructional program-
ming services. Public television is the number one
resource for classroom programming in the country, and
these instructional services are used by nearly 2 million
teachers. Public television also provides college tele-
courses for more than 325,000 degree-candidates each
year. See Exhibit A to this Declaration.
10. Given public television’s mission, the use of Niel-
sen ratings, for example, to measure the “worth” of public
television would be wholly inappropriate. To illustrate,
if all 325,000 degree-candidates were to view the same
episode of a telecourse at the same time * * *. Judged
by commercial standards, such a program would not sur-
vive. However, in public television, such a program
would continue to be aired in order to serve the needs
of the 325,000 degree-candidates.
11. Universal access is central to public television’s
mission. As Congress declared in The Public Broadcast-
ing Act of 1967, public television services should be
“available to all citizens of the United States.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 396(a)(7). To help make its programming and serv-
ices universally accessible, public television has been the
leader in providing closed captioning for the hearing im-
paired, descriptive video service for the visually impaired,
and foreign language programming, for example.
12. Consistent with the congressional policy of univer-
sal access, the Federal Communications Commission
1066
(“FCC”) has allocated a portion of the broadcast spec-
trum to noncommercial educational television stations
(commonly referred to as “public television stations”) and
required that those stations furnish a “non-profit and non-
commercial broadcast service.” 47 C.F.R. § 73.621.
This has enabled the establishment of approximately 350
community-based stations that provide public broadcast-
ing service to their respective communities.
13. Public television is also founded on the principle
of diversity. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5). Each public tele-
vision station endeavors to provide programming that will
serve diverse needs of viewers within the community to
which it is licensed, particularly those who are unserved
or underserved, such as minorities and children. Public
television stations are operated and controlled by local
institutions, and each station’s programming choices and
scheduling decisions are made entirely by that station.
Where two or more public television stations serve the
same community, they have been established to serve dif-
ferent community needs and they offer services that are
not duplicative of one another. It is therefore untrue that
“PBS” stations are all alike; rather, there are vast dif-
ferences between and among the programming and other
services provided by overlapping public television stations
—perhaps more so than between and among commercial
network affiliates. Attached as Exhibit B to this Declara-
tion is a list of all of the second, third, and f PBS
pro-
member stations in major markets and the special
gram niches they fill.
14. Even in the Washington, D.C. area, a unique
market reached by five public television stations. each
Station targets its service to different audiences and seeks
to provide a unique service to meet the needs of its
tive audiences: (i) WETA, the largest of the five, offers
mainstream PBS programming to a general audience; (ii)
WHMM, licensed to Howard University, offers program-
ming oriented to African-American audiences; (iii)
1067
WNVC offers an “international” service with a broad
variety of foreign language programming for international
expatriates; (iv) WNTV, the sister station of WNVC,
offers primarily instructional television services; and (v)
WMPT/ Annapolis, one of several transmitters owned and
operated by Maryland Public Television, provides many
programs with a focus on Maryland.
15. Furthermore, to the extent the same PBS programs
are available to these stations, PBS’s membership and finan-
cial policies strongly encourage public television stations
in the same market to schedule the same programs at dif-
ferent times (“time-shift”). To illustrate, in the greater
Los Angeles area, there are four public television stations:
KCET, a community institution, provides a general au-
dience service; KLCS, operated by the Los Angeles Uni-
programming to Los Angeles County public schools; and
KVCR/San Bernardino and KOCE/Huntington Beach,
both licensed to community colleges, distribute college
telecourses for degree-seeking students. In addition to
having differentiated services, these stations’ program
schedules are very different from one another and avoid
the simultaneous broadcast of duplicative programming.
16. It is my expert opinion that any action that
diminishes a local public television station’s access to its
intended audience would frustrate clear congressional
policies of universal access and diversity, and would in-
hibit the public television station’s ability to fulfill its
public service misison. The loss of any station in a market
diminishes the accessibility and diversity of public tele-
vision programming available to all viewers in that market.
Thus, wholly apart from any financial consequences, the
diminution or denial of access harms public television
stations and the public they are licensed to serve.
1068
The Importance of Cable in Meeting Public
Television's Objectives
17. Public television has long been dependent on cable
carriage to achieve its objectives and, in particular, uni-
versal access. This is because cable carriage overcomes
the signal reception problems that handicap viewers’ ac-
cess to public television stations. Approximately two-
thirds of public television stations operate in the UHF
experience and observations as head of engineering opera-
tions for WGBH, WGBX and WGBY in Massachusetts
(channels 2, 44 and 57, respectively), I can affirm that
UHF stations are at a significant disadvantage relative to
VHF stations, and that this phenomenon particularly dis-
advantages public television.
18. Other things being equal, the quality of the UHF
signal that is receivable in a community is inferior to that
of the VHF signals. While, to some extent, these UHF/
VHF differences could be mitigated by operating UHF
stations at the highest permissible power level (500,000
watts of Effective Radiated Power), relatively few public
broadcasters operate at this ERP level because it is diffi-
cult for a non-profit, noncommercial institution to justify
the benefit of the additional reach the extremely high
energy costs.
19. Cable also enables public television to overcome
problems with poor signal quality. In particular, public
television stations suffer from the fact that their trans-
mission towers are often situated well away from the
commercial towers serving the same community. This is
sometimes the result of unaffordable land costs, or because
able to them.
1069
Loss of Cable Carriage Results
In Loss of Viewers of Public Television
20. Based on discussions with a ae a
personnel over the years, | am aware a sys-
tem’s failure to carry a local public television station
results in loss of viewership for that station. If a cable
system drops a public television station, by definition, the
system's subscribers can no longer receive the station's
signal thronugh the cable. Depending on the strength of
the station's signal, local terrain features, the existence of
ty
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:
1070
because of the lack of proximity to popular commercial
network stations.
22. The problem of shifts is further exacerbated if the
shift is to a channel that is so high that a cable subscriber
cannot receive that channel without a “converter box.”
Many subscribers will be reluctant to purchase or lease
this additional equipment and some may be unfamiliar
with it or unaware of its availability. Even if cable com-
panies provide their customers with the necessary physical
equipment, these companies may not necessarily install it.
23. Thus, the subscriber may need to overcome a num-
ber of obstacles in order to receive a public television
signal on its new channel assuming the cable subscriber
even knows where to find the public television station.
The station may be required to spend time and consider-
able resources on a promotion campaign to publicize its
new channel location (or to obtain a reversal of the chan-
nel switch). Even when such campaigns are successful,
the station is still likely to experience an extended loss of
viewership until subscribers resolve their confusion and
adjust to the new (or restored) channel location.
Loss of Cable Carriage Results in Harm to Public
Television's National and Local Programming
24. As the Declaration of Jonathan C. Abbott ex-
plains, a station’s loss of access to viewers due to cable
drops and shifts will result in a loss of membership reve-
nue and other forms of financial support for the public
television station’s service. This would have a direct ad-
verse effect on the public television station’s program-
ming or other services.
operating
mix of funding on which a particular public television sta-
tion relies, any substantial loss of funds from any source
from a cable drop, for example—will most likely translate
to a dollar-for-dollar reduction in programming budgets,
and thus a direct diminution in the volume (and/or
quality) of the programming provided by the station.
programming distribted nationally by PBS to all public
television stations is likely to be reduced, and this results
in barm to all stations and their respective viewers.
27. Specifically, the programs made available by PBS
through the NPS are a significant part of the program-
ming that most public television stations offer. These
1072
its possible for PBS to obtain programming, and the sta-
tions’ contributions are leveraged so that, currently, an
annual station investment of approximately $90 million
yields $250 million to $300 million worth of NPS pro-
gramming. PBS’s ability to acquire high-quality produc-
tions for the NPS depends on the amount of money
that public television stations are collectively able to
aggregate for national programming, which in turn de-
pends on their individual station revenues. Accordingly,
the quality and quantity of NPS programming is related
directly to the ability of each public television station to
pay for it. 4
28. A reduction in revenues will also injure a station’s
ability to acquire programming from sources other than
PBS. Most stations produce some amount of local pro-
gramming, and they also acquire programming from
regional public television networks and from commercial
sources. The decision as to what programming to pro-
duce and/or acquire (including what amount of PBS
programming to acquire) rests with the local station.
Almost all public television stations subscribe to the NPS,
1073
The Need for Must Carry Regulation
30. During the 1985 to 1992 period, I did not have
responsibility for collecting information on adverse (or
beneficial) cable actions involving public television sta-
tions and therefore did not personally maintain a sys-
tematic count of the numbers of cable drops and shifts.
However, in the course of my conversations with public
television station managers during this period, I became
aware that there was considerable concern about the fact
that cable systems had dropped some stations or shifted
the channel of others. Particularly during the period
from 1985 to 1988, it seemed that I was learning on a
daily basis, about new drops and shifts and the detrimental
effects resulting therefore. The apparent mounting num-
bers of such drops and shifts stations were creating con-
siderable turmoil in the public television industry.
31. Moreover, based on my conversations with station
manager, it appeared that there was a pattern of drops
and shifts, and this was alarming. Specifically, during the
1985 to 1988 period, I became aware of instances where,
over a relatively short period of time, several stations on
cable systems owned by some of the nation’s largest
multiple system operators (“MSOs”) had experienced un-
announced drops. This posed a serious threat to any
station carried by that MSO. Thus, even though a station
that was being carried by that MSO was not ultimately
dropped, the constant threat of a drop was disturbing to
that station.
32. Further, it was a widely-held belief in the public
television industry that the cable industry may have
been on its “best behavior” during the late 1980s and
early 1990s when Congress and the FCC were actively
total number of drops and shifts may have been during
this period, I believe that considerably more drops and
shifts would have occurred absent the prospect of must
carry legislation. Indeed, I and my public television col-
1074
leagues believe that, absent any must-carry regulation,
cable operators would feel free to drop and shift public
television stations whenever it suited their economic in-
terests. This would result in significant injury to public
television stations, particularly those that are the second
and third stations in a market.
Conclusion
33. Based on the foregoing, it is my expert opinion
that must carry legislation serves an important interest in
furthering public television’s objectives. Cable carriage
is critical to public television’s ability to achieve its ob-
jectives, including public service, universal access, and
diversity. A public television station’s loss of cable car-
riage deprives its viewers in cable households of access
to the station’s programming and services, and deprives
the station of the revenues that enable it to fulfill its
mission. Particularly in periods such as the current one,
when federal funding is in peril, the absence of must-
carry rights would leave many public television stations
with significantly fewer resources, with the result that
public television stations’ operations would be restricted,
they would not be able to fulfill their public service mis-
sion, and the American people would be deprived of
services.
May 25, 1995
/s/ M. Peter Downey
M. PETER DOWNEY
1075
[EXHIBIT A]
[PBS Logo]
The Educational Power of Public Television
At a Glance
Kindergarten through 12th Grade
* Public television is the number one resource for class-
room programming in the country.
* 1.8 million teachers have access to public TV’s educa-
tional programming and services.
* 29.5 million students served.
* 70,000 schools reached throughout the United States.
* 1,500 individual instructional programs, including math
and science, distributed annually via satellite.
* 300 programs in reading arts alone.
* PTV, The Ready to Learn Service on PBS, to be
launched by 11 model-site stations in July 1994, will
provide a nine-hour block of children’s programming,
increased support services and outreach materials for
children, families and caregivers.
Higher Education
* PBS’s Adult Learning Service (ALS) is the largest
source of telecourses in the world. ALS added nine
new telecourses in 1993, bringing the total to 58. Six
more will be available in 1994.
ALS has enabled more than 2.3 million adults to earn
college credit since 1981.
* Over 325,000 students enrolled for college credit in
1992-1993, a 9.7% increase over 1991-1992.
More than two-thirds of America’s 3,000 colleges use
ALS telecourses.
1076
* Going the Distrance—ALS is developing this new serv-
ice to offer students nationwide the opportunity to earn
a two-year degree through college telecourses.
Distance Learning
* More than 5,000 high school students in 28 states take
advanced mathematics, science and foreign languages
through Satellite Educational Resources Consortium
(SERC) “distance learning” courses (live classes link-
ing teachers and students via satellite).
* 18 SERC courses are available, including probabiilty &
statistics, discrete mathematics, honors world geography,
Russian, Japanese, Latin, economics, calculus and
physics.
Telstar 401, PBS’s new satellite, will aggregate public
television and other services, creating the world’s largest
educational neighborhood in the sky.
Special Services
* Mathline—A new service, to be launched in Fall 1994,
will use a variety of technologies to provide informa-
tion, materials and training to help educators and
parents teach math more effectively and to make math
more effectively and to make math more fun and rele-
vant for students.
PBS ONLINE—A growing new electronic communica-
tion service that provides a wide variety of high-quality
educational and informational materials to parents,
teachers and students.
Learning Link—The K-i2 educational component of
PBS ONLINE, the service is a dynamic curriculum tool
and resource for teachers and students.
* Child Care—THE SESAME STREET Preschool Ed-
ucational Program (PEP) and the MISTER ROGERS’
NEIGHBORHOOD Child Care Partnership give child-
1077
care providers educational resources for active, creative
lessons tied to these series.
: Business—Over 500 businesses, from small to Fortune
500 companies, have used The Business Channel, video-
based training programs available through PBS.
* Health Care—More than 1,000 hospitals have used
PBS’s interactive videoconferences and training pro-
grams to keep professional staff up-to-date on medical
information, issues and trends.
* Agriculture—46 land grant colleges and two agencies
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture use Ag*Sat, op-
erated by Nebraska Educational Television, to reach
thousands of agribusinessmen and women nationwide.
Prime Time
* Nearly 97 million Americans are informed by public
television each week.
* “More than TV”—many PBS senes provide teacher and
user guides and community outreach materials.
February 1994
1079
1078
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1083
1082
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
* 7”
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
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1084
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
STATE OF NEw YORK )
) ss.:
CouNTY OF NEW YORK )
AFFIDAVIT OF FRED DRESSLER
FRED DRESSLER, being duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1. I am Senior Vice President of Programming for
Time Warner Cable (“TWC”) a division of Time Warner
Entertainment Company, L.P. (“TWE”). I have held
that position since 1987. The facts set forth below are
personally known to me to be true.
2. TWC has been injured by the must-carry provisions
of the 1992 Cable Act. The must-carry rules infringe
upon TWC’s First Amendment rights by forcing cable
systems owned and/or operated by TWC and its Divisions,
as well as those in which TWC has an interest (“TWC
systems”) to carry certain broadcast stations at the ex-
pense of programming that TWC might otherwise desire
to deliver to its subscribers.
3. As Senior Vice President in charge of Program-
ming, I regularly deal with programming services desir-
ing to obtain or expand carriage on TWC systems or alter
the terms of that carriage. As part of my responsibilities,
I am in charge of evaluating the value and desirability of
programming services, of contracting for carriage of such
programming, and of advising individual Divisions as to
1085
the desirability of carrying particular types of program-
ming on their systems and the optimal mix of program-
ming each system carries. There are currently approxi-
mately 128 national and 40 regional satellite-delivered
cable services available for carriage to TWC and its Di-
visions. TWC and its Divisions choose among those com-
peting programmers, and programmers considering the
launch of new programming, as well as broadcasters and
distant signals. In evaluating the wide variety of pro-
gramming available to TWC cable systems, I consider the
content of various programming services, the price of the
services and other terms of a possible affiliation agree-
ment. Choosing the content of the speech available to
TWC systems and advising local systems about that con-
tent is one of the most important elements of my job.
The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act hamper
my ability to do my job both by interfering with the abil-
ity of TWC and its Divisions to speak using the content
they desire and by limiting the content available for car-
riage on TWC systems.
4. To acquire programming for TWC systems, TWC
often guarantees a certain level of carriage in exchange
for the delivery of that programming at specified rates and
conditions. Thus, the price of the programming may de-
pend on the level of carriage reached on TWC systems
and may vary accordingly during the course of the agree-
ment. Because a significant portion of TWC channel ca-
pacity is occupied by must-carry broadcasters, TWC’s
ability to guarantee higher levels of carriage has been im-
paired, and TWC’s ability to meet its existing contractual
commitments has likewise been endangered.
5. The must-carry rules have interfered with launches
of new cable programmers. Cable programmers derive
revenue from license fees paid by distributors such as
cable operators for the right to exhibit programming to
their subscribers and from fees paid by advertisers who
1086
sponsor programming on their service. Because license
fees and advertising revenues depend upon the carriage
of the service, it is crucial to the viability of a new serv-
ice that it persuades as many operators as possible to
offer the service to their subscribers.
6. New national cable programming services need to
attract millions of subscribers in order to attain economic
viability. Even new regional services may need to reach
a million or more subscribers to survive. By requiring
cable operators to devote substantial channel capacity to
must-carry broadcast stations, the 1992 Cable Act de-
prives such services of vital opportunities to gain dis-
tribution.
7. The 1992 Cable Act’s requirement that cable op-
erators devote a substantial share of their channel capac-
ity to must-carry broadcasters leaves less channel capacity
for new cable programmers to compete for. On TWC
systems, must-carry broadcasters occupy approximately
10% of channel capacity on average, and on specific
individual systems, the percentage is often greater. Par-
ticularly when considered along with channels occupied
by government-mandated leased access programming and
PEG channels, all government-mandated programming
takes up a significant proportion of channel space. The
ability of these stations to tie up channel capacity without
having to compete for it on the basis of that program-
ming has caused many potential new cable programmers
to fail (such as the Americana Cable Network) or to
put off their launches of new services until such time as
more channel capacity is available.
8. Because of the must-carry provisions, if TWC wishes
to add new programming of its own choosing that does
not qualify for must-carry status on systems where must-
carry broadcasters have filled its channel capacity, it
would have to increase its channel capacity at great
expense, which would ultimately have to be borne by our
1087
customers, thus requiring them to pay more without get-
ting any additional programming that they truly desire.
9. TWC is injured when new cable programmers fail
to launch. TWC seeks to deliver wide varieties of speech
and ideas suitable to each community it serves. To per-
suade subscribers to purchase its product, TWC depends
on its ability to offer a variety of programming. When
new programming fails to launch, TWC loses its ability
to add that programming to its lineups and likewise loses
an opportunity to become more attractive to potential
consumers.
10. Given the opportunity (including available chan-
nel capacity), TWC would have launched or seriously
considered launching the following new cable services on
some of its systems, at least on a test basis to evaluate
their content and performance:
BET on Jazz Home Shopping /Horizon Cable
Discovery Network Time Mood on Demand
Traveler Encore/Starz
Discovery Network/Living 8S: The Shopping
Channel/Fingerhut
Discovery Network/Quark Z Music
Adventure Channel Lottery Channel
America’s Health Network National Health Network
Arts and Antiques TV Muchmuasic
BBC/Reuters/Telemondo News Ole T.V.
Service
Booknet Outdoor Life Channel!
Campus Television Network Ovation
Classic Sports Network Recovery Net
Collectors Channel SCOLA/Satellite
Communications for Learning
Fitness Interactive T.V. Macy’s
Television
Fox Movie Studio Newstalk TV
Game Show Channel The Health Channel
1088
Game Channel Univision
Gaming and Entertainment Viva Television Network
Channel
GEMS Television Women's Sports Network
Golden American Network World African Network
Golf Network
How To Channel
Kaleidoscope/ America’s
Disability Channel
Las Vegas Television
Network
11. TWC also would have considered carrying the
Americana Television Network on more of its systems if
more channel capacity had been available. The Ameri-
cana Television Network launched and went dark within
the space of twelve months, due in part to lack of avail-
able channel capacity for which it could compete for
carriage.
12. Because subscribers provide the bulk of cable rev-
enues through subscription fees, programming is the
mainstay of the cable business. When making program-
ming decisions at TWC, the ability to sell advertising on
cable services is not usually a consideration and has never
been a deciding factor. Advertising is viewed as an in-
cremental opportunity to be taken advantage of when
and where possible.
* * * 2
May 26, 1995
; /s/ Fred Dressler
FRED DRESSLER
[Jurat Omitted]
1089
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
May 26, 1995
1090
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
STATE OF New YORK )
ae =
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER )
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES W. ELLIS
CHARLES W. ELLIS, being duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1. I am Executive Vice President for Time Warner
Cable, a division of Time Warner Entertainment Com-
pany, L.P., a position I have held since September 1986.
I submit this affidavit to show the injury to Time Warner
from the must-carry provisions of 1992 Cable Act.
2. I supervise operations in the following Divisions of
Time Warner Cable: Greater Boston, Cincinnati, Colum-
bus, Memphis, Northeast Ohio, New England, Reading/
Eastern Pennsylvania, Western Ohio and Western Penn-
sylvania. I have personal knowledge of the injury to the
Divisions from the must-carry provisions of the 1992
Cable Act.
3. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act
have injured TWC. The must-carry provisions have re-
quired (and continue to require) TWC systeis to use
valuable channel space to carry certain broadcast stations
that those systems did not and would not choose to carry.
This mandatory carriage has resulted in a number of
problems for TWC beyond the obvious First Amendment
problems in being forced to provide certain speech and
being barred from providing other speech in its place.
1091
Customers on many TWC systems strongly objected to
the loss of cable programming on their systems and its
replacement with broadcasters who did not interest TWC
customers. In other systems, customers objected to the
removal of cable programming from basic tiers in order
to add broadcasters customers did not want or could
easily receive over the air. These incidents created con-
siderable customer dissatisfaction that often reached the
local franchising board, jeopardizing the TWC Division’s
status not only with individual subscribers but with en-
tire franchises. By forcing TWC systems to carry broad-
casters customers do not want at the expense of program-
ming they want to see, the must-carry laws force TWC
to allow its subscribers to believe TWC is not responsive
to their needs and desires. Historically, one of the most
important problems faced by cable systems, including
TWC systems, has been (and still is) convincing con-
sumers that the cable system is responsive to them and
their needs. Customer satisfaction with programming and
service is the most important goal of our business; any
slippage in that area has dire con
tion rates to cable. sequences for subscrip-
4. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Ca
have also harmed TWC by causing TWC cae
reposition programming they want to carry on their head-
ends in order to make room for broadcasters they are
required to carry. On the simplest level, repositioning in-
jures TWC systems because it requires them to invest
time and money in notifying subscribers of changed line-
ups and in making the technological changes a reposition-
ing requires. More importantly, repositioning injures
TWC systems because it creates customer dissatisfaction.
When a cable programmer is removed from the basic
tier in order to add yet another home shopping station
or a broadcaster providing local programming for an
entirely different locality, customers object. They also ob-
ject when cable programmers are moved to part-time
Status, or when a repositioning makes programming more
1092
difficult to find. All of this adds to customer dissatisfac-
tion and the perception of TWE systems as unresponsive
to their customers. That dissatisfaction is substantially
heightened when the system cannot explain the reposition-
ing or other changes by pointing to the significant en-
hancement in programming quality that caused it, but
instead has undertaken to displace desirable cable pro-
grammers with additional unwanted programming readily
available over-the-air.
* * *
May 25, 1995
/s/ Charles W. Ellis
CHARLES W. ELLIS
[Jurat Omitted]
1093
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
May 26, 1995
1094
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
STATE OF NEw YORK )
>
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER )
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. GAULT
JOHN F. GAULT, being duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1. I am Executive Vice President for Time Warner
Cable (“TWC”), a division of Time Warner Entertain-
ment Company, L.P. (“TWE”). I submit this affidavit to
show the injury to plaintiffs from the must-carry provi-
sions of the 1992 Cable Act. The facts set forth below
are personally known to me.
2. In 1994, TWE through TWC and affiliated com-
panies, owned and operated cable systems in approxi-
mately 2,100 franchise areas throughout the United
States, which reached approximately 9 million subscribers.
TWE built, acquired and renovated these costly assets
to enable it to deliver the speech of its choosing to all
those interested in hearing it.
3. I supervise operations in the following Divisions
of Time Warner Cable: Appleton/Green Bay, Indiana/
Illinois, Jackson/Monroe, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Na-
tional, Oceanic and Shreveport. I have personal knowl-
edge of the injury to the Divisions from the must-carry
provisions of the 1992 cable act.
4. TWC and its local divisions exercise editorial dis-
cretion in determining which program services should be
offered to subscribers. In making such determinations,
1095
TWC personnel choose from among the entire array of
programming services that are available. They take into
account such factors as local tastes; local demographic
characteristics, including such variables as age, household
size and composition, income levels, occupational char-
acteristics and education attainments; the quality of pro-
gramming; the needs and interests of identifiable segments
of the local population, including minority and ethnic
groups and the availability of news, information and en-
tertainment to cable subscribers from non-cable sources,
including broadcast television stations, movie theaters,
cultural and sporting events and non-electronic media.
The content of programming services is often decisive in
making such determinations. For example, a TWC cable
system located in a conservative “middle American” com-
munity may choose to offer subscribers a greater array
of Christian religious programming, while a TWC sys-
tem located in a more ethnically diverse urban center
might place greater emphasis upon program services, in-
cluding those oriented to persons who speak languages
other than English, that would have appeal to those
audiences. For example, TWC’s cable system in Queens,
New York, a community rich in ethnic diversity, offers
Greek, Korean and Hindi channels, among others.
5. TWC takes its programming decisions very serious!
and exercises | the same type of editorial ‘Senltion that
newspaper editors employ in determining the content of
the daily newspapers. In addition to individual systems
discerning the best way to maximize customer satisfac-
tion, TWwC conducts numerous subscriber preference and
satisfaction projects.
6. TwC cable operators try to continually refine their
channel line-ups (now within the confines of the 1992
Cable Act) So as to increase subscriber satisfaction and
appeal. The diversity of services offered can be quickly
ascertained simply by comparing the channel line-ups of
systems across the country. Where a particular program
service is carried in all or virtually all TWC systems, it
is because that service has demonstrated broad appeal to
1096
United States television audiences and is an economically
attractive choice.
9. Even bandwidth which is AEs technically —
of use for analog channels cannot always be programmed
For example, some traps may trap too broadly to be
confined to a single channel. A trap of a channel on
channel 58 may also trap portions of channels 57 and 59,
making those channels unprogrammable. There may also
be unusable channels on a system because of interference,
or because the channels are on an aeronautical frequency,
or for other technical reasons within a system. For ex-
ample, although the bandwidth from 0-54 MHz might
theoretically be usable for the delivery of video program-
ming, equipment manufacturers do not supply equipment
to use that bandwidth.
16. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act
have injured TWC. The must-carry provisions have re-
quired (and continue to require) TWE systems to use
valuable channel space to carry certain broadcast stations
that those systems did not and would not choose to
carry. This mandatory carriage has resulted in a number
of problems for TWC beyond the obvious First Amend-
ment problems in being forced to provide certain speech
and being barred from providing other speech in its
place. Customers on many TWC systems strongly ob-
jected to the loss of cable programming on their systems
and its replacement with broadcasters who did not in-
terest TWC customers. In their systems, customers ob-
jected to the removal of cable programming from basic
tiers in order to add broadcasters customers did not want
or could receive over the air. These incidents created
considerable customer dissatisfaction that often reached
the local franchising board, jeopardizing the TWC Divi-
sion’s status not only with individual subscribers but with
entire franchises. By forcing TWC systems to carry
broadcasters customers do not want at the expense of
programming they want to see, the must-carry laws force
1097
TWC to allow its subscribers to believe TWC is not re-
sponsive to their needs and desires. Historically one of
the most important problems faced by cable systems, in-
cluding TWC systems, has been (and still is) convinc-
ing consumers that the cable system is responsive to them
and their needs. Customer satisfaction with program-
ming and service is the most important goal of our busi-
ness; any slippage in that area has dire consequences for
subscription rates to cable.
17. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act
have also harmed TWC by causing TWC systems to re-
position programming they want to carry on their head-
ends in order to make room for broadcasters they are
required to carry. On the simplest level, repositioning in-
jures TWC systems because it requires them to invest time
and money in notifying subscribers of changed line-ups
and in making the technological changes a repositioning
requires. More importantly, repositioning injures TWC
systems because it creates customer dissatisfaction. When
a cable programmer is removed from basic in order to
add yet another home shopping Station or a broadcaster
providing local programming for an entirely different lo-
cality, customers object. They also object when cable
programmers are moved to part-time, or when a reposi-
tioning makes programming more difficult to find. All
of this adds to customer dissatisfaction and the perception
of TWE systems as unresponsive to their customers. That
dissatisfaction is substantially heightened when the system
cannot explain the repositioning or other changes by
pointing to the significant enhancement in programming
quality that caused it, but instead has undertaken to dis-
place desirable cable programmers with additional un-
wanted programming readily available over-the-air.
as * * a
May 25, 1995
/s/ John F. Gault
Joun F. GAULT
[Jurat Omitted]
1098
FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT SUBMISSION OF
EXPERT AFFIDAVITS AND REPORTS
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
VOLUME ILA
Dated: May 26, 1995
1099
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
EXPERT DECLARATION OF JOHN R. HARING
I, John R. Haring, depose and say as follows:
1. I am submitting this Declaration in support of the
motion for summary judgment made by defendants in the
above captioned proceeding.
2. I received M.Ph. and Ph.D. degrees in economics
from Yale University. Between 1983 and 1990 I worked
t the Federal Communications Commission, where I was
the Chief of the Office of Plans and Policy, and then the
Chief Economist of the FCC. I am currently a Principal
of Strategic Policy Research, Inc., an economics and
public policy consulting firm, where I provide consulting
services to a variety of clients in the mass media and
telecommunications industries. Additional details regard-
ing my qualifications as an expert in this proceeding can
be found in Exhibit A, hereto.
* * * *
21. Loss of cable carriage can reasonably be expected
to cause a broadcast station’s advertising revenues to
decline, and that loss of revenue-producing potential will,
in turn, likely cause a reduction in profits, program
expenditures, and the quantity and quality of over-the-air
broadcast programming. In 1991, two FCC (Yale Ph.D.)
economists prepared an extensive analysis of the plight of
broadcast television in the current video marketplace. See
Florence Setzer and Jonathan Levy, “Broadcast Television
in a Multichannel Marketplace,” Office of Plans and
1100
Policy Working Paper Series No. 26, FCC, Washington,
D.C., June 1991. They conclude that:
Broadcast television . . . has suffered an irreversible
long-term decline in audience and revenue share,
which will continue throughout the current decade.
In the next ten years, broadcasters will face inten-
sified competition as alternative media, financed not
only by advertising but also by subscription revenues,
and offering multiple channels of programming, ex-
pand their reach and their audience. Television
broadcasting will be a smaller and far less profitable
business in the year 2000 than it is now. Although
broadcasting will remain an important component of
the video mix, small-market stations will find it par-
ticularly difficult to compete, and some are likely to
go dark.
These authors note (/bid., p. 3) that their “study shows
that a reduction in the quantity and quality of broadcast
service is highly likely.” Owen and Wildman, Video
Economics, Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 255, note
that: “Ultimately, of course, the disadvantages of over-
the-air broadcast stations (limited channels, single chan-
nels, and no practical means to charge viewers) may lead
them to be superseded entirely, either by cable or by
some different technology. But not in the 1990s.”
22. A station’s advertising revenue depends in part on
the number of commercial exposures it can supply, and
the number of exposures a station produces depends on
the fraction of its potential audience it can attract with
its programming. Loss of carriage reduces potential audi-
ence size and thus the actual audience size (number of
exposures) any given fraction can produce. The empirical
work of Mr. Meek and Dr. Rohlfs confirms the existence
of this relationship between potential and actual audience
size. See Expert’s Report of Tom Meek and Expert’s
Report of Jeffrey H. Rohilfs.
1101
23. The relationship between cable carriage, audience
size, and advertising revenues for a broadcast station, is
widely recognized and forthrightly acknowledged by the
cable industry in cable industry documents produced as
a result of discovery in this case. For example, in June of
1993 the Times Mirror Company, a large MSO, con-
ducted “A Study to Assess the Impact of the Loss of
Cable Carriage for a Broadcast Television Station.”
This study, and related documents, are appended hereto
as Exhibit B. (pages TM 000222—-TM 000234)
24. This study concluded that “the ability of a broad-
cast television station to easily reach its audience through
cable television is crucial. ... If the number of viewers
(as measured by ratings) changes then advertising rev-
enues will also change. . . . The loss of cable carriage
could cause a significant decrease in a station’s ratings
and a resulting loss in advertising revenues.” Exhibit B,
at p. TM 000224.
25. The study examined the impact of loss of all cable
carriage on an actual broadcast station in a market that
had only 47% cable penetration, and concluded that “a
drop as small as 10% in the number of cable viewers
could result in a decline of $3.0 million in advertising
revenues. ... In a market with higher penetration, the
impact would be even greater.” Exhibit B, at p. TM
000225.
26. As its revenue-producing potential declines, a sta-
tion’s derived demand for programming also declines,
likely resulting in a reduction in the quality and/or quan-
tity of its programming and the audience fraction it can
expect to attract. Reductions in the quantity and quality
of broadcast programming will reduce the economic wel-
fare of viewers, especially those who rely on over-the-air
reception, but potentially others as well (viz., subscribers
1102
to cable systems on which dropped or uncarried stations
retain carriage).
27. Cable carriage has been a significant factor ex-
plaining growth in the number of UHF television stations,
and the loss of carriage may reasonably be anticipated to
speed their decline. In the past, UHF suffered from well-
known problems with over-the-air reception that limited
the potential size of the audience for UHF stations. This,
in turn, inhibited UHF stations’ ability to program com-
petitively. Noll, Peck and McGowan, Economic Aspects
of Television Regulation, Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1973, p. 103, observe that: “The funda-
mental problems of UHF stations are small audiences and
low revenues, and, hence, the inability to provide better
than low-budget programming.” These problems inhib-
ited the growth of UHF service for many years. Cable
carriage improved the quality of UHF reception and
helped foster a significant expansion of the service. A
recent economic study (see Economists, Inc., An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Prime Time Access Rule, March 7,
1995) presents evidence indicating that carriage of UHF
stations on cable into a rising number of cable house-
holds has served to eliminate or reduce greatly the so-
called “UHF handicap.”
. * * *
31. Cable system operators have equity positions in
many cable program services. In its Annual Assessment
of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Deliv-
ery of Video Programming (September 28, 1994), the
FCC reports that the number of vertically-integrated na-
tional programming services has grown substantially since
1990, and that approximately 53 percent of program-
ming services were integrated with cable operators in
1994. These equity positions give cable system operators
an opportunity to share in the earnings of such services,
which typically reflect sales of national advertising and
1103
payments from system operators. A cable system oper-
ator therefore has a rational economic incentive to drop
a broadcast station and substitute a cable program service
in which the operator has a financial interest, whenever
the operator expects the gains from increased carriage of
the cable program service, including the benefits from
equity participation, will exceed any losses from dropping
the broadcast station.
32. Cable advertising revenues are growing and are
expected to increase rapidly, and cable system operators
are aggressively pursuing opportunities to increase their
advertising revenues. Cable TV Advertising reports that
gross cable television advertising billings had reached
nearly $4 billion by the end of 1993 and forecasts gross
billings in excess of $10 billion by 2001. The large mul-
tiple cable system operators (who serve the bulk of sub-
scribers) are implementing programs to upgrade advertis-
ing hardware and software, improve employee skills, and
supply closer substitutcs for broadcast national spot adver-
tising through greater clustering of systems and utilization
of interconnects. See, inter alia, Paul Kagan Associates,
The 1993 Cable TV Advertising Report; Paul Kagan
Associates, The Cable Interconnect Report (various num-
bers); Paul Kagan Associates, Cable TV Advertising;
Larry Zipin, “Local Cable Advertising Sales: 1992 and
Beyond: Revised”; Comcast Cable Advertising: National
Sales Meeting; Tele-Communications, Inc., Cable Adver-
tising, March 1994; TCI Advertising Sales Executive
Summary, January 11, 1993; TCI Advertising Strategic
White Paper, January 1, 1992; Times Mirror Cable Tele-
vision, Strategic Plan, 1991-1995; Cable Advertising Bu-
reau Five-Year Strategic Plan, Local Advertising Develop-
ment, February 1, 1993; American Television and Com-
munications Corporation, Strategic Plan for the 1990s,
November 29, 1988; Time Warner Cable, 1994 Business
Plan; Time Warner Cable, Ad Sales Status Report 1993;
Time Warner Cable, Presentation to the Time Warner
1104
Board of Directors, July 18, 1991; Cable Advertising
Bureau Report, Regional Networks (undated).
33. Additional documents supporting my conclusions
regarding the relevance and increasing importance of
local advertising revenues, as an increasingly important
component of total cable system revenues, can be found
in Defendants’ Joint Volume VII, at Exhibits 216, 218,
223, 229, 230, 232, 233, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246,
247, 248, 249, and 257. Because of the volume of those
documents, they are not separately attached to this
Declaration.
34. A cable system operator possesses a rational eco-
nomic incentive to drop a broadcast station and substitute
a cable program service on which the operator can sell
local or national spot advertising, whenever the operator
expects the gains from carriage of the cable program
service will exceed any losses from dropping the broadcast
station. In a Time Warner document appended hereto as
Exhibit C (pages TWS 0163 - TWS 0181), Larry Zipin,
Vice President—Advertising Sales, Warner Cable Com-
munications, Inc., “Local Cable Advertising Sales: 1992
and Beyond,” November 20, 1991, p. 6, states that: “As
a result, anything that places a limitation on the size,
composition, and accessibility to the Cable Advertising
Audience, diminishes Ad Sales’ revenue potential; and,
conversely, anything that increases the size, composition
and accessibility to the Cable Advertising Audience in-
creases Ad Sales’ revenue potential.” Zipin (p. 6) notes
that: “Since viewership requires converting the subscriber
base into a Basic Cable Audience, then an MSO impacts
viewership with every decision regarding channel carriage,
dial position, tiering/packaging and most specifically
tune-in advertising/cross channel promotions (emphasis
added).” Zipin (p. 8) states that: “Eliminating video
tape and moving towards computer processing should
1105
overcome the obstacles that currently place limits on com-
mercial insertion accessibility. It is estimated that proto-
types will be available in 1992; with 1993/1994 as a
probable horizon that would make a company-wide con-
version of technology possible.” Zipin (p. 11) states that:
“It is anticipated that this software will be available for
industry-wide proliferation by mid-1992. Since these
designs include interactivity with existing hardware and
multi-headend configurations, it represents the type of
revolutionary technological advance that will raise the
revenue potential of the entire business to new levels.”
Finally, Zipin (p. 14) notes that: “It is important to point
out, that even when the capacity to access this inventory
improves, this inventory is, nonetheless, finite. Unlike
local TV and Radio—but more like Newspapers—Cable
Systems may be in a position to create ‘as much inventory
as they can sell’. This relates to the issues of Cable Op-
erators becoming programmers of their own local chan-
nels, regional/local news channels, etc. To whatever ex-
tent these ventures are successful in attracting an audience;
Cable Advertising Sales potential also increases propor-
tionately with its ability to reach these audiences with com-
mercial messages.” In a Time Warner Cable Memo-
randum from Don Stone to Bill Grimstead, dated May 25,
1994, Mr. Stone worries that competition from a low-
power transmitter would lower cable advertising sales and
inquires whether: “To deal with this competitive threat,
could we refuse to carry this low power feed and continue
to carry KMPH like we are now. This would keep Bakers-
field advertisers from having access to the Time Warner
homes through KMPH’s low power signal and force them
to buy in Fresno to reach Bakersfield. It would also be
more difficult for KMPH to sell in Bakersfield without
the Time Warner homes.”
* * * «
1106
37. Generally, the only potential loss to a cable pro-
grammer of dropping a local broadcast station is the
possibility that a station will be so highly valued by cable
subscribers that a substantial number of those subscribers
would cancel (or be willing to pay significantly less for)
their cable subscriptions if that station were dropped.
Thus, in general, a cable operator is likely to drop lower
valued, lesser viewed broadcast stations before dropping
more highly valued stations with more substantial viewer-
ship.’ This suggests that in the near future, absent a must
carry requirement, cable operators would be more likely to
drop independent stations, particularly UHF stations, than
they would be to drop network affiliate stations. Over
time, however, as the incentives and opportunities to sub-
stitute cable programming for broadcast programming
increase, cable operators would be increasingly likely to
drop even network affiliate stations.
* * * *
44. I want to emphasize the importance of a trend that
will both make it more likely that local broadcast stations
will be dropped, and will increase the impact of a drop
1 The strength of the demand for a local broadcast station, as
for a cable program service, is not accurately gauged simply by the
number of viewers who watch that program once a week or more.
A particular station may have 20,000 viewers, but most of those
viewers may have only slight interest in the programming of that
station, and would not cancel their cable subscriptions (or be
willing to pay substantially less) if that station were dropped.
Conversely, a particular station—say, a foreign language station—-
may have only 5,000 viewers, but they may care passionately about
that station, and would cancel their cable subscriptions (or be
willing to pay significantly less) if that station were dropped.
Thus, from the perspective of the cable operator, the demand for
a particular broadcast station (or for a particular cable program-
mer), cannot be measured simply by the ratings of that station or
cable programmer. For example, many of the premium or pay TV
cable programmers have modest ratings, but they are nevertheless
carried because there is obvious demand for those programmers
by cable subscribers who are willing to pay an additional fee to
receive them.
|
|
|
|
1107
should one occur. This is the marked trend towards in-
creasing horizontal concentration, clustering, and inter-
connects, that is, greater effective economic integration,
among cable operators. If there are 25 independent cable
operators in a particular television market, each serving
the same number of subscribers, if one of those cable
operators substitutes a cable programmer for a local broad-
cast station, the broadcast station will still have access to
24/25ths of its potential cable household audience, and
the local ad availabilities made available to the cable
operator by the substituted cable programmer will only
reach 1/25th of the potential cable households in that
television market. But if one MSO owns or controls
all of the cable systems within a particular television
market, and decides to substitute a cable programmer for
a local broadcast station on all of the cable systems in
that market, the broadcast station will have lost all of its
potential cable household audience, and the local ad avails
made available to the cable operator by the cable pro-
grammer will be able to reach 100% of the potential cable
households in that television market.
45. Others have noted the clear and undisputed trend
toward increased horizontal concentration, clustering and
interconnects. I note that as of June 1993, in almost half
of the ADIs in this country (94 out of 200), one MSO
controlled 50% or more of the cable subscribers. Memo-
randum from Jay L. Kriegel to Jim May, June 10, 1993
(DAE VOL. VII, EXH. 213). Data produced by Time
Warner, which provides information on the fifty largest
ADIs, indicates that as of June 1992, even before the
Cable Act was enacted, in twenty of these ADIs a single
MSO already controlled 50% or more of the subscribers.
and in eleven of these ADIs a single MSO already con-
trolled 40% or more of the subscribers. And in ten of
the remaining ADIs, a single MSO already controlled be-
tween 30-40% of the cable subscribers. “MSO Consoli-
dated Analysis,” June 2, 1992 (TWS 0011 1752: DAE
VOL. VII, EXH. 207). Additional documents support-
1108
ing my conclusions regarding the relevance and increas-
ing importance of clustering and horizontal concentration
can be found in DAE VOL. VII, EXH. 213, 214 and
237. Because of the volume of the exhibits referred to in
this paragraph, they are not separately attached to this
Declaration.
46. In summary, it is my opinion, as an economist
familiar with these industries, that there was a reasonable
basis for Congress to conclude that, absent a must carry
requirement, the economic health of local broadcast tele-
vision would be in genuine jeopardy. Given the increasing
incentives and opportunities for cable operators to sub-
stitute cable programming for broadcast programming,
Congress had a reasonable basis to make the predictive
judgment that, absent must carry, an increasing number of
local broadcast stations would be dropped, not carried, or
otherwise disadvantaged by cable operators acting in their
own economic self-interest.
47. It is also my opinion, as an economist, that local
broadcast stations who were dropped or denied carriage by
cable operators would suffer significant financial injury
and would be compelled to reduce the quantity and/or
quality of their programming. As a consequence, over
time a significant number of them would be likely to go
off the air, resulting in an absolute decline in the number
of local broadcast stations. Decreases in the quantity and
quality of over-the-air viewing options will harm con-
sumers who do not subscribe to cable, with adverse dis-
tributional consequences to the extent that nonsubscribers
have low incomes.
48. Finally, it is also my opinion, as an economist,
that the must carry requirement is rationally and coher-
ently related to the Congressional goals, and will directly
and materially further those goals.
May 25, 1995
/s/ John Haring
JOHN HARING
1109
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
May 26, 1995
1110
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted !
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT A. HILLYER, JR.
ROBERT A. HILLYER, JR., being duly sworn, de-
poses and says:
* te ® *
9 On the 9 systems we operate, we are carrying |
or 2 commercial broadcast channels subject to must carry
rules and 2 to 4 commercial broadcast channels subject
to retransmission consent. We are also carrying | or 2
PBS channels subject to the educational television must
carry rules. Between 29% and 46°% of the basic service
channe's we offer are commercial and PBS channels sub-
ject to must-carry or retransmission consent. Although
Hillcom’s cable systems are very small, represent an in-
significant market, and are barely economically viable,
we are not considered small cable systems under must-
carry because we offer more than 12 channels per system.
Thus we can be required to carry up to 7 qualifying com-
mercial and 3 qualifying PBS broadcast channels out of
a maximum capacity potential of 18 to 21 channels. This
is extremely prejudicial to other existing or potential pro-
grammers, and limits our ability to provide the most
attractive service possible with our limited resources.
— a * %*
May 25, 1995
s/ Robert A. Hillyer, Jr.
Rospert A. HILLyverR, Jr.
[Jurat Omitted]
1111
FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT SUBMISSION OF
EXPERT AFFIDAVITS AND REPORTS
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
VOLUME ILB
Dated: May 26, 1995
1112
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
(Caption Omitted]
EXPERT DECLARATION OF CHARLES L. JACKSON
I, Charles L. Jackson, depose and say as follows:
1. My name is Charles L. Jackson. I am a Principal
of Strategic Policy Research, Inc. (Strategic Policy Re-
search), an economics and public policy consulting firm
located in Bethesda, Maryland I provide consulting serv-
ices to a variety of clients in the mass media and telecom-
munications industries. Before co-founding Strategic
Policy Research in 1992, I was a Vice President of Na-
tional Economic Research Associates, Inc. (NERA) and,
prior to that, co-founded the consulting firm of Shooshan
& Jackson Inc. which merged its practice with that of
NERA Before beginning consulting, I served on the staff
of the Communications Subcommittee of the US. House
of Representatives and was on the staff of the Federal
Communications Commission. I have authored or co-
authored numerous studies on public policy issues in tele-
communications and have testified before Congress on
issues of technology and telecommunications policy. I
earned the B.A. degree from Harvard College in Applied
Mathematics and the degrees of M.S., E.E. and Ph.D.
in Electrical Engineering from the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. My full curriculum vita, including
publications and prior testimony, is attached as Exhibit A.
2. The capacity of cable systems—the number of
channels delivered to subscribers has—grown from a
few channels in the early days of cable to more than a
hundred in state-of-the-art systems and will continue to
grow for many years to come Improvements in tech-
nology, primarily improved amplifiers and fiber optics,
have permitted this capacity expansion in the past Im-
them make more money, (2) franchise requirements or
franchise-related political decisions dictate such an expan-
sion, and (3) as equipment wears out it is replaced
with higher-capacity equipment. My view of the future of
cable capacity is quite conventional It was widely held
in 1992 and could be found in journal articles, trade press
articles, equipment manufacturers’ advertisements and
statements by cable firms. Credible witnesses, including
the Chairman of the FCC and the spokesman for the
National Cable Television Association, testified before
Congress in 1992 supporting such a vision of the future.
3. The capacity of a cable ssytem is normally meas-
ured in channels. There are different measures of capac-
ity. One is the number of channels of television program
service a consumer can chose among at one time. This
is the activated capacity of the cable system. Another
measure is the total number of channels in a system that
the cable operator could activate without extensive invest-
ment—I call this the actual capacity of a system. For
example, a system may have an actual capacity of 60
channels but an activated capacity of only 55 channels.
At any time the activated capacity can be easily measured
with little dispute. The actual capacity is, of course,
always larger but is a softer number There are channels,
for example the two known as A-1 and A-2, which many
cable system managers prefer not to use because of the
potential for interference from the cable system to aero-
1114
nautical navigational systems. If a cable system chooses
to use channels with potential to interfere with aeronauti-
cal communications, they must be more vigilant in guard-
ing against signal leakage from the cable system. In
many systems adding additional channels results in a
slight degradation of the quality of the existing channels
on the system. Hence, the limit on the number of channels
that can be added is set, in part, by the acceptable quality
loss on the other channels. Finally, there is the capacity
of state-of-the-art systems. Cable systems are built with
a variety of vintages of plant and equipment. One addi-
tional useful measure of capacity is the actual capacity
of a brand-new, top-of-the-line cable system built with
current technology. I call this the state-of-the-art capacity.
In the discussion below I show how the state-of-the-art
capacity has improved over time.
4. Cable capacity, however measured, has grown enor-
mously over time. Early state of the art cable systems had
12 or fewer channels. Today, start-of-the-art cable sys-
tems can carry about 160 analog channels or a thousand
digital channels. A comprehensive 1971 study described
the state-of-the-art as 25 or 26 channels [See On the
Cable: The Television of Abundance, Report of the Sloan
Commission on Cable Communications, McGraw-Hill,
1971 (DAE VOL. VILR, EXH. 430), p. 192.] Today
cable operators run systems with a capacity of 160 chan-
nels. This is an increase in the capacity of state-of-the-
are systems of 135 channels or slightly more than 600
percent over 24 years. On an annual basis, this is an
increase of about five channels per year in the state of the
art or a compound growth rate of cable capacity of about
eight percent per year. Another way to view the historical
growth of capacity is to consider the activated capacity
available to the average cable subscriber over time. Paul
Kagan Associates provided estimates of this quantity in
their publication The Kagan Media Index {September 30,
capacity in 1984 to have been 23.4 channels and the
1994, p. 2]. Kagan shows the average cable channel
1115
capacity in 1994 to be 43.6 channels. By these numbers,
the average subscriber gained access to 20.2 additional
channels in ten years—a growth rate of about two chan-
nels per year. These two estimates of annual cable capac-
ity growth are roughly consonant—with state-of-the-art
capacity growing at five channels per year and operational
capacity growing at two channels per year. Clearly one
would expect the possible to grow faster than the realized.
The limits of the possible have grown and cable has been
implementing the improved technology.
5. Several forces drive cable operators to increase
their system capacity. First, of course, is the added oppor-
tunity to carry additional services and thus justify higher
rates to consumers made possible by increases in channel
capacity. Second, local franchise authorities frequently
request or require capacity upgrades at the time of a
franchise renewal or transfer. Third, cable systems, like
trucks or air conditioning systems, degrade over time and
ultimately have to be refurbished—a process that is called
a “rebuild” in the cable industry. Such system rebuilds
typically occur once every 10 or 15 years. At the time
of a rebuild, it is natural to upgrade the system to current
technology—a step that expands channel capacity. Thus,
just the wear and tear of the elements combined with the
changes in the available technology would cause cable
systems to expand capacity over time.
6. I expect the substantial expansion of channel capac-
ity throughout the cable industry to continue over the next
several years. The historical trends of the last quarter
century will continue—although growth, measured in
sheer channel numbers, will be greater in the future than
in the past. The future will bring enormous expansion
of cable capacity. Further, the basis for my belief in fu-
ture capacity expansion is so strong and broad that I
believe that it would be unreasonable for any similarly
informed person to believe otherwise. Moreover, it was
reasonable in 1992 to anticipate that these expansions
would occur. My view is based upon consideration of
1116
(1) the state and trends in the basic underlying technolo-
gies, (2) product announcements, and advertisements by
manufacturers, (3) statements by cable executives about
plans to adopt new technologies, (4) reports from the
cable industry research consortium, CableLabs, on new
technology, (5) congressional testimony by representa-
tives of the cable industry, (6) examination of planning
documents, capacity surveys and other documents pro-
vided by the plaintiffs as part of the discovery process,
and (7) my experience and familiarity with the industry.
7. One route to capacity expansion has been improve-
ments in cable electronics—most notably cable system
amplifiers, but also modulators, converters, passive devices
and cable itself. Modern cable electronics permit building
or upgrading cable systems to 550 MHz or even 1000
MHz (1 GHz) capacity. A 550 MHz cable system can
carry about 80 channels of programming, a 750 MHz
system can carry about 110 channels and a 1 GHz system
can carry 160 channels of traditional analog television
signals. As a result, expanding capacity to 1 GHz (or
160 channels) of information capacity in an alluring way
for cable operators to position themselves to offer the
many anticipated video and information services to the
home. Upgrades are becoming cheaper over time—TCI
recently announced implementation of a new network
architecture that would allow it to upgrade from 300
MHz to 750 MHz with only a 10 to 15 percent increase
in extra cable placement. [See “TCI Details New Archi-
tecture,” Multichannel News, April 3, 1995 (DAE VOL.
VILR, EXH. 431), p. 43.]
8. Fiber optic transmission offers a second route to
capacity expansion. Fiber optic cables have thousands of
times more carrying capacity than the earlier coaxial cable
technology. Today’s practical fiber systems exploit only
a small fraction of fiber’s capacity. Even so, they provide
cable system operators with valuable building blocks.
Installation of fiber optic systems offer cable systems effi-
ciencies. Fiber systems provide greater reliability than
1117
the older coaxial cable and carry signals longer distances
without amplification, reducing service costs. Installing
fiber backbone in a cable system reduces the number of
amplifiers in cascade between the headend and the average
consumer substantially increasing the reliability of cable
service. Fiber backbone also permits either an expansion
of the cable system’s capacity, an increase in picture
quality at the residence, or some combination of channel
expansion and picture quality improvement. Additionally,
installing fiber prepares cable companies to compete in
other telecommunications markets such as voice telephony
and mobile communications. I believe that the cost of
installing fiber backbone in a cable system is affordable.
The costs of fiber upgrades vary depending upon the
density of the cable system, the number of households
served by each fiber node and other factors. I understand
that the costs of such upgrades can be as low as $40 or
$50 per subscriber and range up from that point depend-
ing upon how deep fiber is put into the cable system.
[See “Evolving from FSA to passive cable networks,”
CED: Communications Engineering & Design, September
1994, p. 60.] The adoption of fiber by many cable oper-
ators indicates that fiber is affordable. Industry analysts
also recognize this affordability. For example, one study
shows a fiber upgrade cost of $90-225 of capital expendi-
tures per subscriber. [See “The Cable Television Indus-
try: New Technologies, New Opportunities and New Com-
petition,” March 8, 1993 (DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH.
426), at 1.]
9. Digital compression is a third driving technology
behind channel expansion. Compression does not pre-
clude—and, in fact, complements—fiber optic technology
and analog bandwidth expansion. Digital compression is
a way of transmitting video and audio signals by convert-
ing a TV picture to a series of “Is” and “Os”, and then
eliminating redundant information, thereby reducing the
amount of data that needs to be sent. Similar processes
are familiar to anyone who has watched a letter go
through a fax machine. When the fax scanner moves
1118
beyond the signature line, the page speeds up. This is
because fax machines use a simple form of data com-
pression—using an abbreviation to indicate an all white
region. Typical digital compression systems being de-
ployed by the industry can compress typical video pro-
gramming by about a factor of 6 to 1. That is, six com-
pressed digital signals can fit into a channel that carries
only one convention analog signal. The biggest part of
the cost of converting a cable systems arises from the
digital converter boxes that must go into each household
that gains access to the digital signals. Such converter
boxes cost about $200 today. Since much of the cost of
these boxes arises from their internal digital electronics,
the cost of these boxes should fall just as the price of
computer memory chips has fallen over the last decade.
Notice that it is not necessary to install such boxes in all
households to gain additional channel capacity through-
out a cable system. Consider a cable system with several
pay services. Assume that the lowest penetration pay
service is subscribed to by only 10 percent of subscribers.
Installing digital converters for that 10 percent and mov-
ing the pay service to digital frees up the channel previ-
ously carrying the pay channel. More generally, if cable
systems use digital capacity to provide pay services, then
they can migrate most pay services to digital and free up
several channels without having to purchase a digital con-
verter for all households. Market analysts consider de-
ployment of digital services to be affordable. One group
estimated digital compression deployment of digital serv-
ices to be affordable. One group estimated digital com-
pression deployment costs in the 1994-2000 time frame
to be about $170 per subscriber. [See Ibid.] And, like
fiber, compression techniques are highly likely to improve
and become cheaper over time.
10. Improving technology for traditional cable service
as well as the potential to offer additional services in the
future will motivate continued and accelerated channel
capacity expansion within the cable industry. This view
1119
is supported by results of cable capacity analyses con-
ducted for networks interested in the potential for car-
riage on cable systems. A November 1994 “State of
Cable Operator Survey” conducted by Horowitz/Cohen
found that 65 percent of operators surveyed intended to
increase capacity to a projected average of 79 channels
within the next two years. [See D00985, D001123 (DAE
VOL. VIIL.R, EXH. 91).] Kagan’s March 1994 “Cable
TV Technology Report” reported that cable operators
were focusing on channel capacity to meet competition
from DBS and potential 70 to 80 compressed digital
channels available through DIRECTV. Kagan interpreted
a sample of cable operators to indicate a shift of nearly
3 million subscribers to a higher bandwidth by year end.
[See NOO11247 (DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH. 447).] A
table of MSO planned upgrades catalogued by Boftz &
Company in October 1994 indicated the pervasiveness
of upgrade plans. The table below restates the numbers
cataloged in the report by Bortz and Company.
Upgrade/Rebuild Plans
Target Date Subscriber
to Complete Base To What
MSO Rebuild Affected Level?
(1) — @) (3) (4)
Time Warner Year-end 1998 95% 750 MHz
Continental Year-end 1997 100% 550 or 750 MHz
Comcast Mid-year 2000 100% 750 MHz
Cablevision
Systems Mid-year 1996 50% 750 MHz
Cox Cable Year-end 1996 75% 750 MHz
MetroVision Year-end 1995 75-80 % 750 MHz
Adelphia Year-end 1999 100% 750 MHz
Times Mirror Year-end 1999 75-80% 750 MHz
Viacom Year-end 1966 75% 750 MHz
Colony Year-end 1999 100% 550 or 750 MHz
Source: Bortz & Company survey results, prepared for The Travel
Channel, (DAE VOL. VILR, EXH. 160).
As a guide to interpreting these numbers, a 550 MHz system has a
capacity of approximately 80 analog channels, a 750 MHz system
has a capacity of approximately 110 analog channels and a 1,000
GHz system has a capacity of approximately 160 analog channels.
1120
11. These survey results are confirmed by the plans of
the cable companies. For example, Time-Warner’s Plant
Upgrade Guidelines for the 1995 budget year states that
a forward bandwidth of 750 MHz is typical and should
support 79 analog channels and 33 digital channels.
[TWD00010285-00010286 (DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH.
448) (RESTRICTED).] Similarly, cable MSO Cable-
vision states “In conjunction with its fiber optic construc-
tion program, Cablevision is also upgrading its existing
coaxial cable television plant to increase channel capacity
for the delivery of additional programming and new serv-
ices. All of the Company’s cable television systems haven
[sic] minimum capacity of 35 channels and 70% of them
are currently offering at least 52 channels to subscribers.
As a result of the upgrades, it is anticipated than [sic] by
1995 virtually all Cablevision subscribers will be sewed
[sic] by cable television systems having a capacity of at
least 52 channels and most will be capable of offering 77
channels.” [See Cablevision WWW site on May 23, 1995
http //moon.cablevision.com/cvchtml.txt]
12. Digital compression is expected to be installed by
the cable industry in significant quantity later this year
or early next year. The cable industry has already made
significant investments in compression technology. For
example, TCI, our nation’s largest cable system operator,
makes the following statement in its latest SEC Form 10K
filed March 31, 1995.
Compressed digital video technology converts as
many as ten analog signals (now used to transmit
video and voice) into a digital format and com-
presses such signals (which is accomplished primarily
by eliminating the redundancies in television im-
agery) into the space normally occupied by one ana-
log signals. The digitally compressed signal will be
uplinked to a satellite, which will send the signal
back down to a customer's satellite dish or to a cable
system’s headend to be distributed, via optical fibar
1121
and coaxial cable, to the customers home. At the
home, a set-top video terminal will convert the digital
signal back into analog channels that can be viewed
on a normal television set. The Company intends to
begin offering such technology to its cable subscrib-
ers as the set-top terminals become available for dis-
tribution. The Company has established the Na-
tional Digital Television Center in Denver during
1994 to compress, uplink, encrypt and authorize re-
ception of digital television signals as well as provide
digital television and multimedia production services.
Through March 1995, the Center has established
long term contracts to provide services to a dozen
content providers, digitally compressing and distrbut-
ing more than 100 channels of programming.
On May 10 of this year, Communications Daily reported
Hewlett-Packard’s announcement that it had received
350,000 more orders for its digital set-top. (A 100,000
unit order from Cox and an additional 250,000 from
TCI.) (DAE VOL. VIILR, EXH. 429) It appears indis-
putable that the cable industry is moving toward the roll-
out of compressed digital services.
13. Those who follow the cable industry were, in
1992, well aware of these technological developments.
Bandwidth expansion and the advent of digital compres-
sion could be foreseen for many years. For example, a
1983 textbook, Cable Communication by Thomas F.
Baldwin (DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH. 432), Prentice Hall,
1983, stated that “an increase from 400 to 500 MHz
would add 17 more channels at a nominal increase in
system cost.” That book also discussed compression and
observed that three to one compression would permit a
400 MHz system to carry 150 channels. In 1992, hard-
ware vendors were already actively promoting their digital
advertisement (unnumbered insert), Cablevision, March
23, 1992 and Scientific-Atlanta advertisement (unnum-
bered insert), Multichannel News, November 30, 1992
1122
compression systems in the trade press. [See Magnavox
(DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH. 433).] The evaluation and
selection process for digital compression standard were
well underway by mid-1992. CableLabs planned to test
and choose a digital compression delivery system by year’s
end, and HBO and PrimeStar Partners held competitions
to determine their own digital compression systems. [See
“Standards? What Standards?,” Cablevision, May, 4 1992
(DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH. 434), pp. 66-68.] CableLabs,
the research and development consortium of cable tele-
vision system operators, predicted the transformation of
cable systems to hybrid analog-digital systems beginning
in about 1994. [See “SPECS News from CableLabs,”
October 1992 (DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH. 435), p. 1.]
While discord on an industry standard for compression
had threatened to delay the technology, 1992 brought
convergence between the industry’s compression efforts
and the emerging world standard for coded bitstream and
decoder requirements known as MPEG (Motion Picture
Experts Group). Late in 1992, General Instrument Corp.
announced expansion of capacity of its digital-compression
system by over 60 percent, yielding between 7-16 video
channels per standard analog channel over satellite and
cable links. [See GI: We Have 16:1 Compression Ra-
tios,” Multichannel News, October 19, 1992 (DAE VOL.
VII.LR, EXH. 436), p. 2.] Viacom Inc. announced its
selection of the Scientific-Atlanta compression system for
delivery of Showtime Networks Inc. and MTV Networks
units to hotel and private cable markets by first quarter
1993, and digital delivery to cable TV headends by sec-
ond or third quarter of 1993. [See “Viacom Taps S-A’s
Open Compression,” Multichannel News, November 16,
1992 (DAE VOL. VII.R, EXH. 437), p. 1.] Discovery
Communications Inc. created the “Your Choice TV” re-
mote control ordering system to simplify consumers’ ef-
forts to choose programming. [See “Discovery Debuts
Remote for 500-Channel Universe,” Multichannel News,
December 14, 1992 (DAE VOL. VIILR, EXH. 438),
p. 1.]
1123
14. By 1992, improvements in cable electronics were
permitting capacity upgrades toward | GHz of capacity
of analog capacity. Because digital compression could be
counted on to expand capacity roughly six-fold, an up-
grade to a 1 GHz system carrying only gidital signals
would yield a capacity of 1000 channels. In 1992, Time
Warner Cable had already upgraded part of its Queens,
N.Y. cable system to 1 GHz, carrying 150 channels. [See
“The steps to 150+ channels with | GHz,” Communica-
tions Technology, September 1992 (DAE VOL. VILR,
EXH. 439), p. 46.) Viacom was rebuilding part of its
system in Castro Valley, California to | GHz for market-
ing testing, and designing the rest to accommodate easily
a future upgrade to 1 GHz. [/bid.| Time Warner's Roch-
ester, N.Y. system, Adelphia systems, and Rogers systems
in Canada were all being designed with capability to up-
grade to | GHz. [/bid.| Cable hardware vendors actively
encouraged cable providers to upgrade systems to | GHz.
[ Viewsonics Inc. advertisement (insert), Communications
Technology, December 1992 and Regal Technologies Ltd.
advertisement (insert), Communications Technology, De-
cember 1992 (DAE VOL.;; VII.R, EXH. 440).}
15. Again, by 1992, many cable companies had begun
to integrate fiber into their systems. As cable focused less
on expanding into new neighborhoods and more on better
programming and cable service, upgrades presented the
opportunity to incorporate fiber optic transmission tech-
nology. Despite the advent of the 1992 Cable Act, cable
operators planned significant increases in fiber and ampli-
fier purchases. [See “Operators’ "93 Plans: The Buck
Stops Here,” Multichannel News, November 30, 1992
(DAE VOL. VILR, EXH. 441), p. 3.] Suppliers and
operators claimed declining fiber costs now made install-
ing fiber-to-the-feeder less expensive than installing a
straight 500 MHz coaxial build. Cable operators were
laying excess fiber in anticipation of future services like
personal communications network, telephony or video-
1124
on-demand. [/bid.] By early 1992, Continental Cable-
vision had already embarked on a $7 million consolidation
and fiber upgrade of cable plant in southern New Hamp-
shire. [See “Fiber optics: Shaping cable’s future,” Com-
munications Technology, March 1992 (DAE VOL.
VILR, EXH. 442), p. 26.] In 1992, Cox Cable expanded
the number of systems targeted for fiber-to-the-service-area
(FSA) upgrades to 17. Such companies reportedly saw
movement toward 500-MHz FSA as a transition point for
MSOs who anticipated need for more than 78 channels
before digital compresison were viable. [See “Cox Moves
More Aggressively on Fiber Optics,” Multichannel News,
June 22, 1992 (DAE VOL. VILR, EXH. 443), p. 29.]
Vendors promoted fiber system facilities and demonstra-
tions. [See Harmonic Lightwaves Advertisement (Insert),
Communications Technology, December 1992 (DAE
VOL. VILR, EXH. 444.)]
16. In 1992, a poll of the cable industry showed that
nearly half of the respondents expected that their rebuild/
upgrade plans would result in an increase in the system
bandwidth (and thus in system channel capacity). [See
“Building Blocks,” Cablevision, September 21, 1992
(DAE VOL. VILR. EXH. 445), p. 44.] In 1992, CEO
Thayer Bigelow of Time Warner Cable Programming
anticipated that as many as 90 percent of the roughly 75
percent of the cable industry with 35 to 40 channels
would be upgraded to 550 MHz (78 channels) by 1997.
[See TWS00141149 (DAE VOL. VILR, EXH. 157)
(RESTRICTED).| High cable equipment manufacturer
stock performance in 1992 was partly attributable to in-
creasing fiber-optic upgrades and developments in digital
compression technology. [See “Cable Upgrades Boost
Supplier Fortunes,” Broadcasting, December 14, 1992
(DAE VOL. VILR, EXH. 446), p. 51.]
17. These views of the future of cable channel capac-
ity were not only well known in the industry, they were
communicated to the Congress by credible speakers. For
1125
example, FCC Chairman Sikes testified before Congress
in 1992 that the cable industry was aggressively investing
in fiber and digital technologies. [See S. Hrg. 102-672:
Cable-Instructional TV and S. 1200 Communications
Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of
1991 (CR VOL. LK, EXH. 19), at 49).] Tom Gillet
(former vice-president of CableLabs, later consultant to
and spokesman for the cable industry) testified in the
same proceeding stating “On the cable television fiber/
coaxial hybrid there will also be many enhancements.
Capacity is growing to | gigahertz, digital transport is
being added, two-way capabilities are expanding and com.
pression will soon be deployed.” [/bid. at 72] Phil Ver-
veer, Counsel for National Cable Television Association,
presented testimony that all 20 of the largest MSOs had
begun installation of fiber within their systems, that fiber
installed by these companies had increased 400 percent
since 1988. and that cable industry fiber deployment was
predicted to grow at an annual rate of 25 percent over
the subsequent decade. [/bid.] In that testimony, Mr.
Verveer, the cable industry, witness, twice refers to cur-
rent cable systems as having capacity of more than 150
channels. “The existing coaxial cable to every home is
theoretically capable of carrying 160-170 channels of
sandard, 6-MHz NTSC television.” [/bid. at 122.] “By
combining fiber optic trunking and feeder applications
with the coaxial cable currently running from the curb
into the home (and which can carry more than 150 video
channels) cable systems need not rip out and replace
their enitre networks in order to bring consumers the
benefits of fiber.” [/bid. at 136.) In this example,
Mr. Verveer appears to be speaking of the capacity of
the cable itself. His fundamental point is that the capacity
of a cable system can be expanded by installing fiber and
new electronics but reusing the existing cable plant. No
witness contradicted these correct assertions by these wit-
nesses about the current and likely future state of cable
technology. Cable television technology and the imple-
1126
mentation of that technology has progressed, as shown
by my discussion above in paragraphs 4 to 12, along the
lines anticipated in 1992.
18. Further in the future, I expect more fundamental
changes. Traditionally, cable systems were like broad-
casting—the same bundle of signals went to every house-
hold and the TV set (or the set-top converter) picked off
the specific signal a consumer wanted. Another approach
is to dedicate a few channels to each household, and then
route onto those channels the programming requested at
that house. In essence the cable system would become
more like a telephone system or a computer network.
The viewer could dial-up the program he or she wished
to watch. The limitation on the number of program serv-
ices a consumer could choose among would be created
by the number of program services available at the cable
system’s switching point, not by the capacity of the cable
plant to the household. Such a switched architecture
would be quite similar to the telephone network which
lets users dial calls to millions of destinations—although
it permits talking on only one call at a time. The com-
bination of high capacity on the cable, small serving
areas fed by cable, and switching capabilities at the head-
end, yields a network design that can support a virtually
unlimited number of channels. Consequently, the long-
run vision for cable is not a world of 500 or 1.000 chan-
nels, but rather a world where the consumer can pick
from a menu of tens of thousands or millions of program
choices. The limitation on program services will not be
the size of the highway to the home—rather the limitation
will be the supply of programming.
19. The driving forces for most of these improvements
in cable do not raise from inside the cable industry itself.
Rather, the cable industry offers just one more market
for improvements in communications technologies. The
growth in cable capacity comes from the same roots that
drive the growth in the capacity of modern personal com-
1127
puters, of the Internet, and of services such as Direct TV’s
digital home satellite service. Almost everyone has, by
now, seen an advertisement on network television with
“Frank Fontana” touting the merits of compressed digital
television. Any one who has regulary used a computer
for word processing over the last decade is aware of the
vast increases in the capabilities of those systems. The
Internet has moved from being a research tool for the
computer science community to a tool of everday com-
morce. The same technologies—improved electronics and
fiber optics—that lie at the heart of these now familiar
advances will expand the capacity of cable television sys-
tems manyfold.
May 25, 1995
/s/ Charles L. Jackson
CHARLES L. JACKSON
1128
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF TIME WARNER
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
May 26, 1995
1129
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID KINLEY
DAVID KINLEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. I am President of Sun Country Cable, Inc. and Sun
West Cable, Inc. (d/b/a Sun Country Cable, “Sun”). I
have been President of the Company since its formation
in 1986.
2. I am also Chairman of the Small Cable Business
Association (“SCBA”). I was elected Chairman of the
SCBA in May, 1993. SCBA is a trade association with
370 member companies serving over 2 million subscrib-
ers. The average member system has about 1,000 sub-
scribers and 30-35 channels. I submit this Affidavit in
support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
3. An affidavit has previously been submitted for this
litigation on February 12, 1993 by Lynette J. Simpson
on behalf of Sun. I hereby incorporate by reference the
contents thereof.
4. Sun is composed of 16 systems with an average of
611 subscribers per system. Thirteen of our systems have
35 channels. Two systems have 12 channels and one
system has 60 channels. We currently have plans to re-
build one of our 35 channel systems to 550 MHz. We
have no plans to expand our other systems. None of our
systems have unused activated channel-space.
5. Our systems are typical of small independent cable
systems. Unused activated channels are extremely rare.
Large scale expansion plans are uncommon. The cost
of increasing capacity is fixed—it costs the same amount
1130
regardless of the number of subscribers. Since the average
small cable operator has less than 1000 subscribers, the
cost of expanding is prohibitive when examined on a
dollars-per-subscriber level.
6. Since the last affidavit was filed, Sun has suffered
significant injury because of must-carry. The Los Altos
Hills system has been forced to add the following signals
to its line-up: KMTP, KCNS, KFBC, KLXV and KFTY.
Yet another station, KBI-TV, has recently demanded car-
riage pursuant to must-carry. We had never received a
written or verbal request for any of these stations from
any subscriber. In fact, since they have been added they
have generated complaints. The must-carry stations in-
clude a second Asian language station (the system already
carried Asian language programming from San Francisco)
and 2 religious programming networks.
7. The Tuolomne system, which has 31 channels and
approximately 1700 subscribers, has been forced to add
KCSO (a Spanish language channel) and KSCH (a sta-
tion with a religious format) to its system. Neither of
these stations was ever requested by a customer. Because
the system did not have enough unactivated capacity to
add 2 channels, it had to drop KTVU, an independent
broadcaster outside of the ADI, to comply with must-
carry requirements. KTVU was the only station on the
system carrying news from the San Francisco area. Be-
cause many subscribers are people who live in the Bay
area and weekend in Tuolomne, dropping KTVU caused
a great deal of customer dissatisfaction.
8. Our customers have requested numerous program-
ming services, including American Movie Classics, Turner
Classic Movies, the Sci-Fi Channel and the Cartoon Net-
work. Limited channel capacity and budget constraints
make it impossible to meet all such customer requests.
Being forced to add must-carry stations has made it even
more difficult to satisfy any customer demands. Our
1131
budget allows us to add only one or two signals each year.
Because of must-carry, not only is our scarce spectrum
taken up by unwanted channels, but also the costs of
adding the stations wreak havoc on our capital expendi-
ture budget.
9. Adding each station caused us to incur approxi-
mately $2,000 in capital costs to rearrange or activate
the channels. We have had to buy equipment for the
headend to enable the changes to be made. Furthermore,
under FCC rules and frequently under local franchise pro-
visions, we must notify subscribers of changes in signal
carriage and channel position assignments. Additional
costs have been incurred providing subscribers with ex-
planatory materials and revised channel line-up cards. We
would have preferred to spend the capital in more effective
ways, such as on programming or equipment upgrades.
10. Must-carry requirements impose incalculable costs
in loss of business goodwill. Customers blame changes on
the cable system and drop service rather than learn new
channel alignments. This is true particularly when, as in
Tuolomne County, programming is deleted. Such a loss
of goodwill is devastating, particularly for a system with
few subscribers.
11. Most of our revenues are derived from subscriber
fees. Advertising accounts for only a negligible amount
of our revenues. Only 2 of Sun’s systems have advertis-
ing at all. The minimal amount of advertising we do
have is produced on a character generator. Advertising
accounts for a mere .1% of our revenues. Clearly our
programming decisions are unaffected by potential adver-
tising revenue.
12. We do not have the technology to insert ads on
cable programming nor do we have plans to buy equip-
ment that would enable us to do so. Cable advertising
equipment requires expenditures of at least $10,000-
$20,000 per headend. In addition it is very complicated
1132
to install and operate. The logistics of creating, running
and selling ads make advertising a very unappealing in-
vestment for small operators. Even leaving aside the cost
and difficulty of selling ads, advertising would be far
more costly than any revenues it could generate. Digital
insertion technology is not feasible for us.
13. As chairman of the SCBA, I am aware of very
few small operators who have the availability to insert
ads into cable programming. It is my experience that
for the reasons discussed above, most small systems do
not have plans to obtain analog tape equipment to enable
them to do so. Even the very few small operators that
do have analog tape do not heavily rely on advertising
for revenues, Advertising accounts for at most only 1-2%
of their revenues.
14. Small cable operators, including Sun, are increas-
ingly feeling the effects of RCA/Hughes dishes and other
forms of satellite transmission as competition. Must-
carry has limited small cable operators’ ability to offer
the wide variety of cable programming which subscribers
demand. Subscribers have increasingly turned to alterna-
tive sources to receive more cable programming. Com-
petition from MMDS has been of particular concern to
Sun Country.
15. The retransmission consent provisions of the
Cable Act have also been a source of concern for small
cable operators. The small operator has no leverage
against major broadcasters who have elected retransmis-
sion consent. Customer demand requires operators to
carry the major broadcasters. Broadcasters are fully
aware of their leverage so they elect retransmission con-
sent and exploit the weak position of the small operator.
This depletes the systems’ operating budget and elimi-
nates funds that could be used for programming or
expansion.
16. In sum, must-carry has deprived Sun and other
small operators of their channel space without compensa-
1133
tion. It has forced us to incur costs to rearrange line-ups
and add channels to carry stations of dubious quality.
For the most part these costs can scarcely be afforded by
a small operator. This has had a deleterious effect not
only on the financial health of the systems, but also on
their ability to offer attractive line-ups. This makes it
harder to compete against other forms of satellite trans-
mission. Small operators, who themselves are often
Struggling to survive, have been forced to subsidize local
broadcasters without any corresponding benefit to their
own business or their subscribers.
May 25, 1995
/s/ David Kinley
Davip KINLEY
[Jurat Omitted]
1134
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
(Caption Omitted]
TELEVISION
MEMORANDUM OF NATIONAL CABLE
ASSOCIATION, INC. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1135
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[Caption Omitted]
DECLARATION OF GREGORY L. KLEIN
DisTRICT OF COLUMBIA | 8S:
GREGORY L. KLEIN makes this declaration and
states:
1. Since January 1986, I have held the position of
Director of Economic Analysis at the National Cable
Television Association, Inc. (“NCTA”). I submit this
declaration in support of plaintiff National Cable Tele-
vision Association, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment
in Civil Action No. 92-2495.
2. I hold a Masters degree in Engineering Economics
from Indiana State University in Terre Haute, Indiana
and a Masters degree in Economics from Boston College
in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. I am responsible for
collecting, tabulating, and analyzing information that
bears on NCTA’s positions before Congress and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. I have testified as an
expert witness before the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.
I have also submitted numerous affidavits on behalf of
the Association.
3. The information contained in this declaration is
based on personal knowledge as well as on information
found in reports and other professional publications that
are generally relied on by experts in the field of cable
programming and operations.
4. My declaration primarily discusses the following
topics: the constraints on cable channel capacity and the
1136
costs of adding new channels (44 6-12, 41-43); the in-
creases both in cable subscribership and in the number
of broadcast stations over the same period (44 14, 17,
18); and the current and projected estimates for local
advertising revenues for cable systems (44 32-33). In
addition, my declaration demonstrates that the burdens
imposed by the must carry rules on operators and pro-
grammers exceed those imposed under the must carry
rules struck down by the Court of Appeals in the Century
decision (44 19-27), and that these burdens can be ex-
pected to increase due to changes in the Copyright Act
and Federal Communications Commission actions with
respect to ADI modifications (44 28-31). My declaration
also demonstrates the limitations of the data relied upon
by defendants’ experts to demonstrate cable system local
signal carriage (44 34-40). .Finally, my declaration ex-
plains that virtually all broadcast stations that chose re-
transmission consent reached carriage agreements with
cable operators (44 44-45).
5. NCTA is the principal trade association of the
cable television industry in the United States. NCTA
represents owners and operators of cable systems serving
most of the nation’s 61 million cable households, as well
as more than 100 national and regional cable program-
ming networks.
6. Television signals are electromagnetic impulses that
are transmitted to viewers’ television receivers, where they
are translated to produce video images and sound. The
primary difference between broadcast technology and
cable technology is the medium through which these elec-
tromagnetic impulses travel. Broadcast transmissions
travel through the air in various frequencies, with the
sum of all available frequencies being the frequency
“spectrum.” This spectrum is physically limited, and can
bear only a certain number of television signals. Cable
television, by contrast, transmits electromagnetic impulses
to viewers through metal wires such as coaxial cable,
1137
with different signals traveling at different frequencies
inside the cable. Ensefliect: the debie-nete as a colt
contained electromagnetic spectrum; this allows cable tele-
vision operators to transmit signals without regard to the
specific spectrum limitations that govern broadcast tele-
vision. As I explain below, however, the carriage capac-
ity of cable television is limited.
7. The number of programming sources available to
ae television operators has risen sharply as the number
Seas to cable service has increased. In 1976,
were 4 national cable programming networks. Cur-
rently, 128 national and 40 regional cable networks offer
programming and approximately 43 more networks are
planned. Cable Programming not available through
broadcas t television includes satellite-delivered networks
specializing in quality children’s programming, black
aa dee a Programming, artistic programming, science
= nature documentaries, sports, news, and public af-
airs, including coverage of the United States Congress.
8. All cable television systems have a defined cha
capacity. As of October 1, 1994, 86 percent of all US.
systems for which capacity data was available had a
maximum capacity of less than 54 channels. Twenty-two
percent had a capacity of less than 30 channels. I am
aware of less than half a dozen cable systems in the
United States that have channel capacities in excess of
a (equal to the number of national net-
9. As the principal trade association f
or the cable
television industry, we know that available channel ca-
pacity is highly constrained in our industry. Our under-
standing is consistent with the results in the Arthur D.
Little study entitled Availab ;
Cable TV Systems. vailability of Channels in U.S.
10. Upgrading or rebuildin
: ; g cable systems to increase
channel capacity requires large capital investments—
1138
generally in the millions of dollars for any particular
local system. Paul Kagan Associates, Inc. estimates that
the cable television industry spent $1.12 vm Be ~
building cable systems in 1994, at an average
$26,000 per mile. Another $746 million was spent on
upgrading cable systems, at an average cost of $9,400
per mile. These costs are not expected to fall; rather,
Paul Kagan Associates predicts that the average cost of
rebuilding a cable system will increase to $29,000 per
mile by the year 2000, while the average cost of upgrad-
ing a system will rise to $11,600 per mile. Although
emerging technologies such as video compression may
provide new ways of expanding capacity, these tech-
nologies, too, promise to be expensive. Paul Kagan
Associates estimates that delivery of digital converters
(an important component in the deployment of digital
technology) will be delayed until 1996 and the cost per
converter will be around the $600 level.
11. Considering existing channel capacity and the cost
of adding new channels, as well as the continuing devel-
opment of new sources of programming, it Is clear that.
for the foreseeable future, the supply of programming
available to cable television operators will exceed the
carriage capacity of all but a handful of local cable
systems.
12. In the future, emerging technologies such as high
definition television (HDTV) and interactive program-
ming, as well as innovative services like the presentation
of films at staggered starting times on different channels,
will compete with traditional sources of programming for
available channel capacity.
13. In the course of my work at NCTA, I have had
occasion to review most if not all publicly available
research regarding carriage of local broadcast television
signals by cable television operators. The most compre-
hensive study of the incidence of broadcast signal car-
riage was conducted by NCTA and Price Waterhouse
1139
during the summer of 1988. This investigation showed
that the 3,966 responding cable television systems were
carrying 98 percent of all broadcast stations that would
have qualified for a carriage preference under the interim
must-carry rules invalidated in Century Communications
Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Ninety-
four percent of these systems reported carrying all sta-
tions qualified for must-carry status under the interim
rules, and an additional 3 percent carried enough quali-
fied stations to satisfy their carriage obligations under
the rules struck down in the Century decision.
14. According to the FCC, the number of operational,
full power commercial broadcast television stations in the
United States rose from 915 in July 1985 to 1,147 in
December 1992 to an all-time high of 1,167 in April
1995. The number of operational, non-commercial edu-
cational broadcast television stations in the United States
rose from 299 in July 1985 to 362 in December 1992
to 364 in April 1995, a 22 percent increase. As with
commercial stations, more educational television stations
than ever before were broadcasting in 1995. During this
same time period, there was a dramatic growth in the
number of low power television stations. In July 1985,
the FCC reported 343 operational LPTV stations. By
December 1992, there were 1,310 LPTV stations and
by April 1995, there were 1,623 LPTV stations opera-
tional.
15. Throughout the 1985-1992 period, according to
data provided by Cable Data Corporation (“CDC”),
those cable systems that are required to report their local
signal carriage on average carried over 7 local stations.
Precise estimates for any given period are subject to
change due to the changing nature of the CDC data.
even for historical time periods.
16. Cable television serves about 64 percent of all
U.S. households with television. Competing technologies
(such as MMDS, SMATV, DBS, and TVRO) provide
1140
service to approximately 5 percent of television homes,
while 31 percent of all television households receive only
over-the-air broadcast service. In fact, DBS ~~
broadcast satellite), a service using high-powered _—
lites to distribute programming received on an 18 ~-
dish, already offers significant competition to the ca
industry. Although launched less than two years ago,
analysts have noted that DBS will have approximately
2.2 million subscribers by year end and is —
have over 5 million subscribers by the year 2000. (
Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TV Investor, May 18,
1994, p. 4.) Indeed at the end of 1994, two of the
major companies involved in DBS (USSB and DirecTV )
reporting adding 2,000 subscribers per day. (See The
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, November 6, 1994.)
17. Public broadcasting stations have claimed a
i tant share of all television viewing oO
—* cad they recorded a 4 share during the 1993/
1994 season, up slightly from a 3 share during the 1985/
1986 scason. Independent stations have experienced an
increase during the same period and currently record a
21 share, up from a 15 share during the 1985/1986
season. The top 3 commercial broadcast networks ex-
perienced a decline in their share of viewing from a 66
share during the 1985/86 season to a 52 share during
the 1993/94 season, but they remain the most-watched
programming on television. Combined, broadcast tele-
vision accounted for more than 70 percent of all tele-
vision viewing during the 1993/94 season.
18. In 1980, 55 percent ee
television actually subscribed and cable penetr
22.6 percent of television households. Today, cable
passes over 95 percent of television households and sixty-
four percent of homes passed by cable currently sub-
scribe.
19. The must carry requirements in the (1992 Cable
Act are significantly broader than the regulations adopted
1141
by the FCC in 1987. In order to assess the effects those
differences might be having on the extent of the impact
of must carry on cable operators and cable programmers,
I conducted the analysis described in paragraphs 21-26
below.
20. The recent Arthur D. Little study of carriage of
must carry stations indicates that, by December 1994,
roughly 30 percent of cable systems added television sta-
tions in compliance with the latest set of must carry
rules. See Declaration of Peter Shapiro, Exhibit 2. Cable
systems required to add stations serve more than 50
percent of the nation’s cable subscribers.
21. I conducted an analysis of the 270 instances of
broadcast television stations identified in the Arthur D.
Little “Carriage of Must-Carry TV Broadcast Stations”
report as being added by cable systems in the Arthur D.
Little sample to comply with the must carry rules. The
purpose of my analysis was to determine the extent to
which broadcast television stations added pursuant to the
most recent set of mandatory carriage requirements would
have “qualified” as must carry stations under the interim
rules adopted by the FCC in 1987 as a result of the Joint
Industry Compromise that included defendants NAB and
INTV and which were struck down by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Century
decision.
22. The Century rules differ greatly from the current
mandatory carriage rules. The Century rules more nar-
rowly defined what constituted a “must carry” station.
Under the Century rules, a commercial television station
could qualify for mandatory carriage only if the cable
system was within a 50 mile zone of the station and the
station satisfied a minimum viewership test of a 2 percent
share and 5 percent CUME (net weekly circulation) in
noncable households in the county in which the cable
system is located (stations in operation for less than one
year were exempt from the viewing test) and the station
1142 es
would not be a distant signal for copyright purposes.
This compares to the current rules that grant stations
must carry rights throughout their Area of Dominant In-
fluence (“ADI”) and impose no viewership test. More-
over, the Century rules limited the number of qualified
commercial and non-commercial must carry stations
which a system was required to carry to 25% of usable
activated channels, in contrast to the current rules’ re-
quirement to devote up to one-third of a system’s channel
capacity to carriage of commercial television stations
(and to add noncommercial stations on top of that).
23. Likewise, the Century rules limited the number of
noncommercial stations that a cable system was required
to carry. Systems with less than 54 activated channels
were only required to carry one local noncommercial
station and systems with at least 54 activated stations
were required to carry two noncommercial stations. By
comparison, the current rules do not limit the number
of local noncommercial stations which systems are re-
quired to carry if they have in excess of 36 channels.
24. Based on my analysis, I have determined that only
37 instances, or 14%, in the ADL sample involved sta-
tions that would have been required to be added as must
carry signals if the Congress had reinstated the Century
rules, rather than using the expanded set of “must carry”
requirements.
25. The remaining 232 instances, or 86%, involve
situations where, based on available data, the operators
would not have had to add stations under the Century
rules. Forty-eight of these 232 instances involve commer-
cial stations that fail to meet the mileage criteria of the
Century rules. The addition of the station in 18 other
instances would not have been required because it would
have forced carriage to exceed the percentage of activated
channels which cable systems were required to devote to
carriage of qualified must carry stations. An additional
43 instances involve the carriage of non-commercial sta-
1143
tions added in excess of the maximum number of non-
commercial stations required under the Century rules.
Moreover, 116 instances involved stations which, based
on age on viewing data from November 1994
appear to fail to meet the minimum viewership
cluded in the Century rules, The November 19a tame
reflects viewing nearly 18 months after the effective date
of the must carry rules. See Attachment A for a descrip-
tion of methodology used for this analysis. The remaining
instances involve low power stations and stations which
were distant” signals for copyright purposes, neither of
which had carriage rights under the Century rules. In
one instance, the data was questionable and so I ex-
cluded it from my analysis.
' 26. In sum, my analysis indicates that the vast ma-
jority of the new burden of carrying additional Nonettonnt
Stations imposed by the must carry statute on the repre-
sentative sample of cable operators in the ADL sample
was caused by the differences between the statute and the
Century rules.
27. These results are not surprising. The use of a
eo ADI to determine whether the station is a “local”
station for must carry purposes is inherently problematic.
Many A
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